With its superb integration of fire-power, mobility, and armor protection,the M1A2 Abrams is very nearly theultimate incarnation of the main battletank (MBT). Although more advanceddesign concepts have been published inrecent years, it will likely prove quitedifficult to produce an MBT suffi-ciently superior (to the M1A2) to jus-tify the cost, so why not look for a bet-ter idea?

The Missile Option

When Egyptian Saggers surprised Is-raeli tankers in the 1973 Yom KippurWar, there were many who proclaimed,The tank is dead! A quarter-centurylater, tank advocates point to the con-tinued use of the MBT as proof that thebest antitank weapon is still anothergun-armed tank. Yet it may be that themissile proponents were not wrong intheir pronouncement just premature.

Missiles that are guided to the targetby a human operator (e.g., TOW,Dragon, Sagger) can be neutralized bydistracting or killing the gunner. Thiswould be analogous to World War IIdive bombers being fired on by a bat-tleships antiaircraft guns; disrupt thepilots concentration and the bomb im-pacts harmlessly into the sea.

But an electronic brain does not asfar as we know feel fear or get dis-tracted by nearby shellbursts. It alsohas immensely faster reaction timesthan a human. These factors make elec-tronic guidance far superior to humancontrol for guided missiles.

The self-guided missile has eclipsedthe large-caliber gun in naval surfacewarfare. It is about to do so in therealm of land combat. The tank cannonhas a maximum effective range ofabout 3000 meters, and precise aim isrequired to make a hit. The self-guidedmissile, however, can like LongbowHellfire be effective to more than8000 meters, and the electronic braincontinually corrects the flight path asnecessary.

Although Longbow Hellfire was de-signed for the AH-64D Apache heli-copter, there is no obvious reason itcouldnt be fired from an armored ve-hicle. Indeed, at least one nation is ap-parently developing a similar system.According to the August/December1993 issue of ASIAN MILITARY RE-VIEW, India has developed the NAG, afire-and-forget antitank missile with arange of six kilometers. It was plannedthat the NAG would be the armamentfor a tracked combat vehicle. Withground surveillance radar (GSR) incor-porated into its fire control system,such a combat vehicle could engagetargets through fog and smoke screensthat block thermal sights. U.S. tankcrewmen have never had to face aweapon system with such capabilities.

In the United States, the self-guidedJavelin missile system began being is-sued to the troops in mid-1996. Al-though it was designed as a manport-able, antiarmor missile for infantry use,there is a growing awareness that Jave-lin has enormous potential as a vehicle-mounted weapon. For example, theU.S. Marine Corps is investigating howJavelin can be incorporated into thenew advanced amphibious assault vehi-cle (AAAV). Another idea would havesingle or multiple Javelin launchers in-stalled on the M113A3 armored per-sonnel carrier, thereby vastly increasingthe combat capability of the venerableAPC.

Because Javelins 2000-meter maxi-mum range is less than optimal for ve-hicle employment, the follow-on toTOW (FOTT) program is underway.FOTT will also use fire-and-forgettechnologies, but it will probably havea maximum range of 4000-5000 me-ters.

MBT or FCS?The Armys modernization plan, as

made public in September 1996, callsfor continued upgrades to the Abramsfleet, while conducting research on afuture combat system (FCS). The FCS

is expected to enter production around2015, replacing the M1-series tanks.Since the next generation armoredfighting vehicle is no longer referred toas an MBT, can it be inferred that thefuture combat system need not be atank as we know it today?

If self-guided missiles are chosen forthe primary armament of the FCS, anumber of advantages present them-selves. For one, it ought to be possibleto eliminate the turret assembly; thiswould greatly simplify construction,with a corresponding decrease in pro-duction cost and vehicle weight. Ascurrently configured, an MBT needs aturret to enable 360-degree target en-

gagement without changing hull direc-tion. At a traverse rate of, say, 40 de-grees per second, it would take overfour seconds to reverse the direction ofthe gun tube. For the FCS, if verticallaunch is feasible, traverse could bedone electronically and instantaneously,without any actual movement of thelaunch tubes; for horizontal launch,some form of physical traverse mecha-nism might be necessary, though.

The Abrams maximum rate of fire isabout six rounds per minute; if a singleM1A2 were to engage a half dozen en-emy tanks, the Abrams would be sub-ject to return fire for nearly a full min-ute, since each opponent would have tobe dealt with sequentially. On the otherhand, a properly-designed, missile-armed FCS could lock onto all six en-

14 ARMOR July-August 1997

The M1A2 Abrams: The Last Main Battle Tank?

by Stanley C. Crist

Since the next gen-eration armored fight-ing vehicle is no longerreferred to as an MBT,can it be inferred thatthe future combat sys-tem need not be a tankas we know it today?

emy vehicles simultaneously and salvofire one missile at each target in per-haps less time than the M1A2 crewwould take to achieve its first kill. Thiswould give an FCS-equipped force agreat advantage when fighting outnum-bered.

Ideally, the FCS would use a multi-purpose missile that can be employednot only against armored vehicles, butthe entire array of ground and aerialtargets encountered on the battlefield.As on modern naval vessels, it wouldprobably be wise to include a small- ormedium-caliber gun for close rangeand low priority targets, but this woulddepend on the capabilities of the mis-sile system.

Back to the FutureNo doubt most MBT proponents will

object to the idea that a missile-armedfuture combat system can make obso-lete the gun-armed main battle tank.Perhaps they would find it worthwhileto ponder the words of Rear AdmiralAustin M. Knight in his introduction tothe 1917 book, The United States Navy From the Revolution to Date:

And through all its changes thebackbone of the fleet has continued tobe the fighting ship of large and stead-ily increasing size, with powers of of-fense and defense evenly balancedupon the whole recognizing themenace of secondary enemies andguarding against them as best it may,but seeing its real opponent in the bat-tleships and dreadnoughts of the en-emy. The dreadnought of today hassucceeded, through gradual, not revolu-tionary, development, to the line-of-bat-tle ship of two centuries ago. It may bethat this type is soon to become obso-lete, but the evidence that this is so ap-peals far more strongly to the popularimagination than to the seasoned judg-ment of students of naval warfare.

Substitute battle tank and landwarfare for the terms battleship andnaval warfare, and the paragraphwould read almost as if it were printedin a current issue of ARMOR. AdmiralKnights words should stand as a noteof caution to those who think the MBT

ARMOR July-August 1997 15

Lethality, range, and accuracy of the Harpoon antiship missile has enabled modern cruis-ers and destroyers to become the Navys primary surface combatants, a role that usedto belong to the heavily-armored, direct-fire, big-gun battleships. (Photo: U.S. Navy)

As in naval warfare, aerial combat is now dominated by guided missiles; guns havebeen relegated to the status of backup weapons. (Photo: U.S. Air Force)

Disturbing parallels to land warfare?

is here to stay. Just as the self-guidedmissile has displaced the gun in navalwarfare, so is it sure to do in groundcombat. The question is, will the Ar-mor community follow Javelin andLongbow Hellfire on the path to the fu-ture, or will it stay on the same deadend street that doomed the battleship tooblivion?

Bibliography

Robin Fletcher, The Crewing and Configura-tion of the Future Main Battle Tank, AR-MOR, May-June 1995.

George Forty, Tank ActionFrom The GreatWar to the Gulf, Alan Sutton Publishing Lim-ited, 1995.

Wes Glasgow, COL Christopher Cardine, andDavid Latson, The M1A2: Current and Fu-ture Program Plans, ARMOR, May-June1996.

COL Frank Hartline, Letters, ARMOR, Sep-tember-October 1996.

Christopher T. Heun, Army and Abrams TankLinked for the Long Haul, National DE-FENSE, November 1996.

Peter M. Keating, Agile, Elusive Armored Kil-ler Will Stalk 21st Century Arena, NationalDEFENSE, September 1996.

MAJ James K. Morningstar, Javelins and Skir-mishers on the Battlefield, ARMOR, May-June 1996.

Francis J. Reynolds, The United States NavyFrom the Revolution to Date, P.F. Collier andSon, 1917.

David Schueler, Battlewagons Eternal: A His-tory of the Iowa Class Battleships, COM-MAND, Jan-Feb 1992.

Dr. Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D. Bacon,Forward Area Air-Ground Defense, AR-MOR, July-August 1996.

CPT Harold L. Spurgeon and Stanley C. Crist,The Tank Is Dead Long Live the Tank!ARMOR, March-April 1987.

Hellfire, seen here being fired from an M113, can hit targets as far away as 8000 metersalmost three times as far as the Abrams! If adapted to the Longbow Hellfire system, groundforces would have a heretofore unknown combat capability. (Photo: Rockwell International)

The shape of things to come? A missile-armed Future Combat System might resemblethe Bradley-LOSAT prototype shown here. A very low silhouette is made possible by aturretless configuration. (Photo: Loral Vought Systems)

16 ARMOR July-August 1997

Stanley Crist is a former tankcommander, having served withthe 3d Battalion, 185th Armor.He is a previous contributor toARMOR.