*Inhibition/Disqualification of judgesG.R. Nos. 173057-74 September 20, 2010BGen. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR.,Petitioner,vs.HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, as Justice of the Sandiganbayan; 4TH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.D E C I S I O NVILLARAMA, JR.,J.:This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution1dated May 4, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 28022-23 and 25122-45. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motions for inhibition,2which sought to disqualify respondent Justice Jose R. Hernandez, Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, from taking part in said cases.The facts are as follows:Petitioner, Retired BGen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS),3signed several deeds of sale for the acquisition of parcels of land for the development of housing projects and for other concerns. However, it appears that the landowners from whom the AFP-RSBS acquired the lots executed unilateral deeds of sale providing for a lesser consideration apparently to evade the payment of correct taxes. Hence, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an extensive investigation in 1998 on the alleged anomaly.In its Report dated December 23, 1998, the Committee concluded that there were irregularities committed by the officials of the AFP-RSBS and recommended the prosecution of those responsible, including petitioner, who had signed the unregistered deeds of sale as AFP-RSBS President. Accordingly, on January 28, 1999, fourteen (14) informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner for violation of Section 3(e)4of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime ofestafathrough falsification of public documents as defined under paragraph 4 of Article 1715of theRevised Penal Code, as amended.6The informations charging petitioner with violations of theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Actwere docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 25122-25133 while those chargingestafathrough falsification of public documents were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 25134-25145.Then, on July 27, 2003, junior officers and enlisted men from elite units of the AFP took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments at Ayala Center in Makati City to air their grievances about graft and corruption in the military. In response to the incident, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo created a Fact-Finding Commission (Feliciano Commission) wherein respondents wife, Professor Carolina G. Hernandez, was appointed as one of the Commissioners. On October 17, 2003, the Feliciano Commission submitted its Report recommending, among others, the prosecution of petitioner. President Arroyo then issued Executive Order No. 255 on December 5, 2003, creating the Office of a Presidential Adviser under the Office of the President to implement the recommendations of the Feliciano Commission.7Professor Carolina G. Hernandez was appointed as Presidential Adviser in the newly created office. Shortly thereafter, respondent Justice Hernandez was appointed as Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan and assigned to its Fourth Division.On October 11, 2004, eight additional informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner. Two were assigned to the Fourth Division of the court, one for violation of R.A. No. 3019, docketed as Criminal Case No. 28022, and the other forestafathrough falsification of public documents, docketed as Criminal Case No. 28023.On April 6, 2006, petitioner filed two motions to inhibit Justice Hernandez from taking part in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45 and Criminal Case Nos. 28022-23pending before the Fourth Division. Petitioner cited that Justice Hernandezs wife, Professor Hernandez, was a member of the Feliciano Commission and was tasked to implement fully the recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, including his criminal prosecution. Further, the spousal relationship between Justice Hernandez and Professor Hernandez created in his mind impression of partiality and bias, which circumstance constitutes a just and valid ground for his inhibition under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of theRules of Court.In its Consolidated Comment/Opposition,8the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) asserted that the grounds raised by petitioner in his motions for inhibition were anchored on mere speculations and conjectures. It stressed that the recommendation of the Feliciano Commission was a product of consensus of the members of the Commission which was a collegial body. And even if Professor Hernandez signed the Report of the Commission to implement the recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the findings of the said Commission did not remove the presumption of innocence in petitioners favor. Hence, the OSP argued that the mere membership of Prof. Hernandez in the Feliciano Commission did not automatically disqualify Justice Hernandez from hearing the criminal cases against petitioners.On May 4, 2006, Justice Hernandez issued the assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:ACCORDINGLY, accused Jose S. Ramiscals Motions for Inhibition are DENIED.SO ORDERED.Petitioner did not seek reconsideration of the Resolution, but instead filed a petition forcertiorariand prohibition before this Court on the following grounds:ITHE RESPONDENT HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO INHIBIT HIMSELF FROM THE CASES PENDING BEFORE THE 4THDIVISION AGAINST PETITIONER NOTWITHSTANDING THAT UNDER RULE 137 HE IS DISQUALIFIED TO TRY OR SIT IN JUDGMENT IN THESE CASES;IITHE RESPONDENT 4TH DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS PROCEEDING TO HEAR THESE CASES WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT ITS MEMBER, THE RESPONDENT JUSTICE JOSE HERNANDEZ, IS DISQUALIFIED FROM SITTING OR TAKING PART IN ITS PROCEEDINGS; AND,IIITHE HON. JUSTICE HERNANDEZ IS DISQUALIFIED FROM TAKING PART IN SITTING OR HEARING THE CASES AGAINST PETITIONER IN ALL THE CASES PENDING BEFORE ALL THE FIVE (5) DIVISIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IN CONSEQUENCE OF HIS DISQUALIFICATION UNDER RULE 137.9Essentially, the issue is: Did Justice Hernandez commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not inhibiting himself from the cases against petitioner pending before the Sandiganbayan?Petitioner submits that it was erroneous for Justice Hernandez to deny the motions to inhibit himself under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of theRules of Court, when in fact the basis for his disqualification was the latters spousal relationship with Professor Hernandez, which situation was governed by the first paragraph of the said section. According to petitioner, while Professor Hernandez was not directly "pecuniarily interested" in the case, she was more than so interested in them because as an appointee of President Arroyo, she was receiving emoluments to monitor the progress of the cases and to see to it that the recommendations of the Feliciano Commission are fulfilled.We deny the petition.The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1, Rule 137 of theRules of Court:Section 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.10In denying the motions for his inhibition, Justice Hernandez explained that petitioner failed to impute any act of bias or impartiality on his part, to wit:What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point of law is the necessity of proving bias and partiality under the second paragraph of the rule in question. The proof required needs to point to some act or conduct on the part of the judge being sought for inhibition. In the instant Motions, there is not even a single act or conduct attributed to Justice Hernandez from where a suspicion of bias or partiality can be derived or appreciated. In fact, it is oddly striking that the accused does not even make a claim or imputation of bias or partiality on the part of Justice Hernandez. Understandably, he simply cannot make such allegation all because there is none to be told. If allegations or perceptions of bias from the tenor and language of a judge is considered by the Supreme Court as insufficient to show prejudgment, how much more insufficient it becomes if there is absent any allegation of bias or partiality to begin with.11We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the assailed Resolution upon the grounds so stated. We have ruled in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi,12that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial.1avvphi1An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the "just or valid reasons" contemplated in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of theRules of Courtfor which a judge may inhibit himself from hearing the case. The bare allegations of the judges partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough.13Petitioner contends that his motions were based on the second paragraph of Section 1,Rule 137, but a closer examination of the motions for inhibition reveals that petitioner undoubtedly invoked the second paragraph by underscoring the phrase, "for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above." This was an express indication of the rule that he was invoking. Moreover, it was specifically stated in paragraph 7 of both motions that "in accuseds mind, such circumstances militates against the Hon. Justice Hernandez and constitutes a just and valid ground for his inhibition under the 2nd paragraph, Section 1 of Rule 137, in so far as the cases against accused are concerned."Hence, there is no question that petitioner relied on the second paragraph of theRulewhich contemplates voluntary inhibition as basis for his motions for inhibition.And even if we were to assume that petitioner indeed invoked the first paragraph of Section 1,Rule 137in his motions to inhibit, we should stress that marital relationship by itself is not a ground to disqualify a judge from hearing a case. Under the first paragraph of the rule on inhibition, "No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise...." The relationship mentioned therein becomes relevant only when such spouse or child of the judge is "pecuniarily interested" as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed to show that Professor Carolina G. Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases before the Sandiganbayan to justify the inhibition of Justice Hernandez under the first paragraph of Section 1 ofRule 137.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED.The Resolutiondated May 4, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45 and Criminal Case Nos. 28022-23 isAFFIRMED and UPHELD.With costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.A.M. No. RTJ-93-964 February 28, 1996LEOVIGILDO U. MANTARING,complainant,vs.JUDGE MANUEL A. ROMAN, JR., RTC Branch 42, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro; and JUDGE IRENEO B. MOLATO, MTC, Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro,respondents.DECISIONMENDOZA,J.:Respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato is the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro. On January 7, 1993, an administrative complaint was filed against him and Judge Manuel A. Roman, Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, by Leovigildo U. Mantaring, Sr., who charged them with conduct unbecoming of members of the judiciary. On February 21, 1994, after the parties had filed their respective pleadings and supporting documents, this Court dismissed the complaint against the two for lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration filed by complainant was subsequently denied.What is before us now is the Supplemental Complaint filed by Leovigildo U. Mantaring, Sr. against Judge Ireneo B. Molato, which charges him with harassment. It is alleged that because of the filing of the first complaint against him, respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation of a criminal case considering that the respondents in that case were complainant and his son. Instead, it is alleged, he took cognizance of the case and ordered the arrest of complainant and his son, Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr., out of hatred and revenge for them because of the filing of the first case by the complainant.The Supplemental Complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator which, in a Memorandum dated 25 November 1994, recommended the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. Nonetheless, the Court required the respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato to comment.In his Comment dated July 6, 1995, respondent judge denies the allegations against him. He avers that on the application by SPO4 Pacifico L. Fradejas, he issued a search warrant which resulted in the seizure from a certain Joel Gamo of a home-made gun, a hand grenade, five live ammunitions for Cal. 38 and three live ammunitions for 12 gauge shotgun; that on August 25, 1993, a complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition was filed against Joel Gamo in which the herein complainant Leovigildo, Sr. and his son, Leovigildo, Jr., were included; that finding that the house in which the firearms and ammunition had been found was owned by complainant and his son, he concluded that there was probable cause to believe that complainant and his son were guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and accordingly ordered their arrest. Respondent judge claims that he inhibited himself from the case after he was ordered by the Executive Judge, RTC, Branch 41, Pinamalayan Oriental Mindoro.In his Reply complainant contends that as the search warrant was issued only against Joel Gamo and Mantaring, Jr. it was wrong for respondent judge to find probable cause against him on the theory that, as owners of the house in which the firearms and ammunition were found, they had constructive possession of the same. He likewise contends that respondent judge did not inhibit himself until after the preliminary examination was terminated and the warrant of arrest issued, and only after complainant had filed a petition for inhibition which the Executive Judge found to be well taken.On October 16, 1995, this case was referred to the OCA for reevaluation, report and recommendation. On January 12, 1996, the OCA submitted a Memorandum, recommending dismissal of the supplemental complaint for lack of merit, for the following reasons:(1) It is erroneous for herein complainant to equate the application for the issuance of search warrant with the institution and prosecution of criminal action in a trial court. (Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249) Complainant cannot insist that since his name was not included in the search warrant, the house designated to be searched did not belong to him, and that he was not present at the preliminary investigation of witnesses preparatory to the issuance of the questioned warrant of arrest, there was no basis for respondent judge to order his arrest.(2) No taint of irregularity attended the issuance by respondent judge of the warrant of arrest against complainant and his son. Neither was the charge that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent judge in the spirit of anger, hatred or harassment purposes substantiated.To begin with, it cannot be contended that complainant Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. could not be proceeded against simply because he was not included in the search warrant issued against Gamo and Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr., who is apparently his son. The determination of probable cause in preliminary investigations is based solely on the evidence presented by the complainant, regardless of whether or not the respondent in that case is named in the proceedings for a search warrant. As correctly pointed out by, the OCA,1the issuance of a search warrant and of a warrant of arrest requires the showing of probabilities as to different facts. In the case of search warrants, the determination is based on the finding that (1) the articles to be seized are connected to a criminal activity and (2) they are found in the place to be searched. It is not necessary that a particular person be implicated. On the other hand, in arrest cases, the determination of probable cause is based on a finding that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed it.In this case, the arrest of herein complainant and his son, together with Joel Gamo, was ordered on the basis of respondent's finding that the place from where the guns and ammunition were seized belonged to complainant Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. and the testimonies of witnesses presented by SPO4 Fradejas. Of course complainant denies that the house in which the firearms and ammunition were found belonged to him and claims that at the time of the search he was in Manila. The provincial prosecutor subsequently dismissed the case against complainant on precisely these grounds,i.e., that the house did not belong to complainant and he was in Manila at the time the search and seizure were conducted. But to say this is not to say that respondent acted arbitrarily or that he abused his powers so as to give ground for administrative disciplinary action against him. It is only to say that he committed an error of judgment for which complainant's remedy is judicial.What we think requires serious consideration is the contention by the complainant that respondent judge should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation of the criminal case, considering that the respondent was the present complainant, who had earlier filed an administrative case against the judge and another one.We are not unmindful of the cases in which it was stated that the mere filing of an administrative case against a judge by one of the parties before him is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing a case.2An examination of these cases reveals, however, that the administrative cases were filed during the pendency of the cases, and it is evident that the administrative cases were filed only to force the judge to inhibit himself from the consideration of the case before him. As this Court held, if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved were allowed to stop the proceedings in order to await the final decision on the desired disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges left to handle all the cases pending in all the courts.3On the other hand, there is a remedy available to the party seeking the disqualification of the judge. If he is denied a fair and impartial trial, caused by the judge's bias or prejudice, he can ask for a new trial in the interest of justice which will be granted if that is really the case.4But, in the case at bar, an administrative complaint against respondent and Judge Manuel A. Roman, Jr. had previously been filed and it was paramount that respondent was free from any appearance of bias against, or hostility toward, the complainant. The impression could not be helped that his action in that case was dictated by a spirt of revenge against complainant for the latter's having filed an administrative disciplinary action against the judge. The situation called for sedulous regard on his part for the principle that a party is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.This circumstance should have underscored for respondent the need of steering clear of the case because he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality. For his judgment must not be tainted by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or preconceived interest in order to preserve at all times the faith and confidence in courts of justice by any party to the litigation.5Indeed prudence should have made respondent judge heed the admonition that "a spotless dispensation of justice requires not only that the decision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering it must at all times maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality."6Moreover, we think it was improper for respondent judge to have issued the warrants of arrest against complainant and his son without any finding that it was necessary to place them in immediate custody in order to prevent a frustration of justice. It is now settled7that in issuing warrants of arrest in preliminary investigations, the investigating judge must:(a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers;(b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and(c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.In this case, respondent judge justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest on the following ground:In view of the above considerations [referring to the antecedent facts], it is the honest belief and finding of the Court that there is sufficient probable cause that the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition was committed and that the named three (3) accused Joel Gamo, Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. and Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr. are the ones probably guilty thereof for which reason Warrant of Arrest was issued by undersigned against them.He thus ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest solely on his finding of probable cause, totally omitting to consider the third requirement that there must be a need to place the respondent under immediate custody "in order not to frustrate the ends of justice."The framers of the Constitution confined the determination of probable cause as basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants to judges the better to secure the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. Respondent judge failed to live up to this expectation by refusing to inhibit himself even when his very impartiality was in question and worse by issuing a warrant of arrest without determining whether or not it was justified by the need to prevent a frustration of the ends of justice. Parenthetically, the records show that the criminal complaints against herein complainant and his son were eventually dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor, but not without the following parting words:It cannot be gainsaid that respondents Mantarings were greatly prejudiced and suffered damages as a consequence of their inclusion in the criminal complaint. The unfortunate incident could have been avoided had the Honorable Municipal Trial Judge exercised the necessary prudence and judicial perpecuity [sic] expected of an impartial Judge in the conduct of preliminary investigation before issuance of warrant of arrest.WHEREFORE, respondent judge Ireneo B. Molato is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. All other charges are dismissed for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143089 February 27, 2003MERCEDES R. GOCHAN, ALFREDO R. GOCHAN, ANGELINA R. GOCHAN HERNAEZ, MA. MERCED R. GOCHAN GOROSPE, CRISPO R. GOCHAN JR. and MARLON R. GOCHAN,petitioners,vs.VIRGINIA GOCHAN, LOUISE GOCHAN, LAPULAPU REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION and MACTAN REALTY CORPORATION,respondents.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:Allegations and perceptions of bias from the mere tenor and language of a judge is insufficient to show prejudgment. Allowing inhibition for these reasons would open the floodgates to abuse. Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the proceedings, and that his bias stems from an extra-judicial source, this Court shall always commence from the presumption that a magistrate shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.1The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the January 28, 2000 Decision2and the May 2, 2000 Resolution3of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 54985. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order dated 13 August 1999 denying petitioners Motion for Inhibition and the Order dated 20 August 1999 denying the Motion for Reconsideration are hereby nullified and respondent Judge is hereby inhibited from further sitting in Civil Case No. CEB-21854 entitled Gochan et. al. vs. Gochan, et al."4The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.5The FactsThe facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:"There is no dispute as to the antecedent facts that gave rise to the instant petition involving close relatives who are either aunties, nieces and nephews or first-cousins."On 03 April 1998, private respondents filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioners. The case was raffled to respondent Judge Dicdican and docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-21854."On 26 May 1998, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim and affirmative defenses."On 07 August 1998, before pre-trial could be conducted, petitioners filed a motion for a hearing on their affirmative defenses some of which are grounds for a motion to dismiss and therefore may be the subject of a preliminary hearing pursuant to Section 6, Rule 16, 1997 RCP. The motion was set for hearing on 11 August 1998."In an order dated 11 August 1998, respondent judge denied petitioners motion without conducting a hearing. Respondent judge however did not stop with the denial but went on to rule on the merits of the affirmative defenses, stating as follows:[T]he Statute of Frauds does not apply in this case because the contract which is the subject matter of this case is already an executed contract. The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts. x x x. For another, the contention of the defendants that the claims of the plaintiffs are already extinguished by full payment thereof does not appear to be indubitable because the plaintiffs denied underoaththe due execution and genuineness of the receipts which are attached as Annexes 1-A, 1-B and 1-C of the defendants answer. x x x. Then, still for another, the contention that the Complaint is defective because it allegedly has f[a]iled to implead indispensable parties appears to be wanting in merit because the parties to the memorandum of agreement adverted to in the complaint are all parties in this case. Then the matter of payment of docketing and filing fees is not a fatal issue in this case because the record shows that the plaintiffs had paid at least PhP165,000.00 plus..."The above ruling is the subject of a petition for certiorari before this Court docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 49084 which is pending resolution on a motion for [re]consideration. Because of the pendency of this petition, petitioners filed on 28 September 1998 a motion to suspend proceedings. Instead of suspending proceedings, the respondent judge set the case for pre-trial on 09 November 1998, per Order dated 01 October 1998."On 05 November 1998, petitioners counsel Atty. Rolando Lim filed a motion to reset the pre-trial from 09 November 1998 to 03 December 1998 on the ground that he had to go to Japan because of a previous commitment. Atty. Vicente Espina, who attended the pre-trial to explain Atty. Lims absence, manifested to respondent judge that the petitioners were willing to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement. In spite of the absence of handling counsel Atty. Lim and in spite of Atty. Espinas manifestation of a possible compromise, respondent judge proceeded with and terminated the pre-trial. And in spite of the manifestation of Atty. Espina, respondent judge indicated in the pre-trial order he issued that the possibility (of a compromise) is nil."After the termination of the pre-trial, respondent judge proceeded to hear the evidence of private respondents who presented their first witness on direct examination on 18 January 1999. This first witness was cross-examined by petitioners counsel on 22 January 1999. Further hearings were set for 28 and 30 April 1999. On 23 April 1999, petitioners counsel Atty. Lim filed an urgent motion praying that the hearing on 28 April be moved to 30 April 1999 on the ground that he had to undergo medical tests and treatment on 27 and 28 April 1999, and that his law partner Atty. Espina would not be able to attend in his behalf because the latter had to attend his brothers wedding in Kananga, Leyte on 28 April 1999."Petitioners counsel went to court on 30 April 1999 and was surprised to learn that his motion to reset the hearing on 28 April 1999 was disregarded and that trial proceeded with private respondents counsel conducting a re-direct examination of their first witness and presenting their second witness on direct examination. During the hearing on 30 April 1999, respondent judge ordered petitioners counsel to conduct the re-cross examination of the first witness and the cross-examination of the second witness. Petitioners counsel manifested that he had not read the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing on 28 April 1999 and was therefore not prepared for cross-examination. However, when respondent judge threatened to waive petitioners right to examine private respondents witnesses, petitioners counsel had no choice but to accede to do what he was not prepared for."On 05 August 1999, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit respondent judge from further sitting in the case on grounds of partiality, pre-judgment and gross ignorance of the law. The motion was set for hearing on 09 August 1999 at 10:00 A.M."In an order dated 13 August 1999, respondent judge denied the motion for inhibition on the ground that petitioners failed to appear to substantiate the motion."On 16 August 1999, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial which the respondent judge likewise denied in his Order dated 20 August 1999, reiterating that petitioners failed to appear during the hearing on the motion."6(Citations omitted)Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe CA opined that the apprehensions of respondents about the bias or partiality of Judge Dicdican in favor of petitioners were well-founded.7It held that the totality of the circumstances showed that he had a glaring animosity towards their case.8It further ruled that he had "likewise displayed petulance and impatience in his handling of the case, a norm of behavior inconsistent with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."9The CA based its ruling on the following circumstances10pointed out by respondents:1. Judge Dicdican denied the Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses filed by respondents, but in the same Order ruled on its merits without giving them an opportunity to be heard.2. The above Order of the judge was too well-prepared to be extemporaneous, leading respondents to suspect that he was bent on deciding the case in favor of petitioners.3. Without indicating for the record respondents objections, Judge Dicdican admitted all exhibits of petitioners and even allowed their witnesses to answer all questions, even if he had not yet resolved the applicability of the Statute of Frauds.4. The judge denied respondents requests for postponements, which were reasonable and justified under the circumstances. Further, during the April 28, 1999 hearing, he allowed petitioners to present their witnesses even in the absence of respondents counsel. And, knowing that the counsel was absent when those witnesses testified in the previous hearing, the judge forced him to cross-examine them in the subsequent April 30, 1999 hearing.5. During the hearing for respondents Motion for Inhibition, the judge started to hear the case before the scheduled time.6. Judge Dicdican issued a Pretrial Order stating that the possibility of a compromise was "nil" despite the pretrial manifestation of respondents counsel that the parties were willing to explore the possibility of a compromise.Hence, this Petition.11The IssuesIn their Memorandum,12petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:"1. Whether or not the respondents are guilty of forum shopping in filing two petitions for certiorari in the CA based on the same order of Judge Dicdican;"2. Whether or not the CA was correct in enjoining Judge Dicdican from sitting in the case at bar on the ground of bias and partiality;"3. Whether or not filing of a motion for inhibition on flimsy grounds is not a form of forum shopping."13Simply stated, the issues in this case are as follows: (1) whether respondents are guilty of forum shopping, and (2) whether Judge Dicdican should have inhibited himself.The Courts RulingThe Petition is meritorious insofar as the second issue is concerned. Judge Dicdican need not inhibit himself.First Issue:Forum ShoppingPetitioners argue that respondents should have raised the issue of Judge Dicdicans alleged bias and partiality in their first Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-GR SP No. 49084, not in the present case docketed in the appellate court as CA-GR SP No. 54985. For filing two Petitions raising the same issues, respondents allegedly split their cause of action and thus became guilty of forum shopping. Petitioners further contend that the elements oflitis pendentiaorres judicataare present in the case at bar, because the matter raised in this Petition could have been taken up in the first one.We disagree. This Court has already definitively ruled on this matter in GR No. 146089.14In its Decision, it was confronted with the very same question raised in this Petition. At issue then is whether there was forum shopping in the filing of two Petitions for Certiorari -- one for CA-GR SP No. 49084 and the other for CA-GR SP No. 54985, the precursor of the present Petition.The Court made a distinction between the two Petitions filed. The first involved the "propriety of the affirmative defenses relied upon by petitioners [herein respondents] in Civil Case No. CEB-21 854."15The second Petition, which is the subject of the present appeal, "raised the issue of whether or not public respondent Judge Dicdican was guilty of manifest partiality warranting his inhibition from further hearing Civil Case No. CEB-21 854."16Below we quote a more important point:"[T]he two petitions did not seek the same relief from the Court of Appeals. In CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, petitioners prayed, among others, for the annulment of the orders of the trial court denying their motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. CEB-21854. No such reliefs are involved in the second petition, where petitioners merely prayed for the issuance of an order enjoining public respondent Judge Dicdican from further trying the case and to assign a new judge in his stead."17It should be clear that our Decision in GR No. 146089 has become final and executory with the denial18of respondents [herein petitioners] Motion for Reconsideration therein.Main Issue:InhibitionAlthough we find that respondents did not commit forum-shopping, still we gave due course to this Petition on the main issue of inhibition. Petitioners argue that the CA erred when it ruled that Judge Dicdican should be inhibited from hearing Civil Case No. CEB-21854 on the ground of bias and prejudice.A critical component of due process is a hearing before a tribunal that is impartial and disinterested.19Every litigant is indeed entitled to nothing less than "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." All the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision were to come from a biased judge.20Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:"SECTION 1.Disqualification of judges.- No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record."A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."21The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. The instances mentioned in the first paragraph of the cited Rule conclusively presume that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in a case. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.To be sure, judges may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation.22But when circumstances reasonably arouse suspicions, and out of such suspicions a suggestion is made of record that they might be induced to act with prejudice for or against a litigant, they should conduct a careful self-examination.23Under the second paragraph of the cited Section of the Rules of Court, parties have the right to seek the inhibition or the disqualification of judges who do not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial or independent in handling a case. Whether judges should inhibit themselves therefrom rests on their own "sound discretion."24That discretion is a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to their sense of fairness and justice.25However, judges are exhorted to exercise their discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice would not be impaired. A salutary norm for them to observe is to reflect on the possibility that the losing parties might nurture at the back of their minds the thought that the former have unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against them.26Of course, the judges right must be weighed against their duty to decide cases without fear of repression.Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis.27This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.28In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence.29Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably -- both to the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-connected.30Equally important is the established doctrine that bias and prejudice must be shown to have resulted in an opinion on the merits on the basis of an extrajudicial source, not on what the judge learned from participating in the case.31As long as opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed by the magistrate, such opinion -- even if later found to be erroneous -- will not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.32While palpable error may be inferred from the decision or the order itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. At bottom, to disqualify a judge, the movant must prove bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence.33Prescinding from the foregoing standards, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that Judge Dicdican has shown a glaring bias against respondents case. His actuations have not engendered reasonable suspicion as to his fairness and ability to decide the case with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Verily, respondents have not convinced us that Judge Dicdican should inhibit himself from hearing the case.Let us now examine one by one the circumstances relied upon by the CA in ruling for the inhibition of Judge Dicdican.Denial of Respondents Motion to Hear Affirmative DefensesThe first circumstance which the appellate court relied upon to show the alleged bias and partiality of Judge Dicdican was his denial of the Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses filed by respondents.34According to them, even if the judge had denied their Motion, he still ruled on the merits of their affirmative defenses and thus deprived them of an opportunity to be heard.The fact that respondents Motion for Hearing was denied does not by itself show bias and partiality. Clearly, Judge Dicdican based his denial on the Rules of Court, according to which a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses is indeed discretionary on the part of a judge.35Thus, Judge Dicdican cannot be charged with bias and partiality, merely on the basis of his decision not to grant a motion for a preliminary hearing.We are not unmindful of our ruling in the previousGochan v. Gochancase.36This Court held therein that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion of respondents for a preliminary hearing on their affirmative defenses. But even in that case, two members of this Court37dissented and believed that respondent judge (herein Judge Dicdican) had not committed any grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the preliminary hearing on respondents affirmative defenses.In any event, this Courts ruling of grave abuse of discretion in a certiorari proceeding such as the one issued in the earlierGochancase does not necessarily translate to bias and partiality that wouldipso factolead to the inhibition of the trial judge. In fact, in the previously cited case, this Court did not mention any badge of bias or partiality on the part of Judge Dicdican. He was simply directed to conduct forthwith the preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses.To repeat, as long as opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed by the judge, such opinion -- even if later found to be erroneous on appeal or made with grave abuse of discretion on certiorari -- will not necessarily prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.38Neither can respondents convince us that they were deprived of due process. The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence available in support of ones defense.39Where one is accorded an opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process.40Due process was designed to afford an opportunity to be heard; anoralhearing need not always be held. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if the pleader is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.41Judge Dicdicans Order42denying respondents Motion for Hearing was based on the pleadings filed by both parties. Respondents filed their Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses, while petitioners filed their Comment to the Motion.43Thus, it cannot be said that respondent judge arbitrarily ruled thereon. He thereafter allowed the respondents and petitioners to file their Motion for Reconsideration44and Opposition,45respectively, before deciding on the matter again.Character of the Order Denying Respondents MotionRespondents further argue that before hearing their Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses, Judge Dicdican had already prepared an Order denying their plea. This is an allegation that they have not been able to prove. We cannot rely merely on their submissions that he was in fact bent on ruling against them. Petitioners correctly argued as follows:"The fact is that Judge Dicdican really dictated his Order in open court with legal citations and authorities but did not prepare it beforehand. We respectfully submit that said act cannot be considered as a manifestation of bias and partiality and deprived respondents of due process because the motion filed by respondents, copy of which was attached as Annex A to the reply of petitioners was complete with the evidence already attached as annexes thereto and contained citation of authorities and the opposition of petitioners, copy of which was attached to the reply as Annex B, contained citations of authorities as well."46The argument that the Order of Judge Dicdican was too scholarly to be extemporaneous is merely the conjecture of respondents. This characterization does not show in any way that he was biased or partial. Besides, as earlier adverted to, both the Motion and the Comment thereto had been filed days before the hearing thereon. It is not unusual -- in fact, it is expected -- that the judge would study the Motion and the Comment filed before him. If he prepared well for the arguments, he should be commended, not faulted.Besides, Judge Dicdican ruled that the issues raised in the Motion could be determined on the basis of preponderance of evidence presented by both parties.47This means that he did not foreclose the possibility that the parties would ventilate these defenses during the trial.To show his fairness, he even allowed the postponement of the pretrial set for that hearing upon the request of respondents counsel. This act showed that he was in no hurry to decide the case in favor of petitioners.As to respondents doubts arising from the alleged "suspicious" appearance of the TSN of the August 11, 2003 hearing, this Court cannot take it as an indication of partiality on the part of the judge. Clearly, it was Atty. Jonathan G. Talabo, the branch clerk of court of Branch 11 of the RTC of Cebu, who had issued the Certification48dated November 11, 1999. Respondents failed to prove that Judge Dicdican had a hand in its issuance. What is clear is that the TSN of August 11, 1998 was prepared and signed by Emelyn V. Fuentes, stenographic reporter of Branch 11 of the RTC of Cebu. Connecting this "suddenly found" TSN to Judge Dicdican is not only speculative, but also baseless and unfair and will not suffice to bar respondent judge from performing his lawfully mandated duty.Admission of Petitioners Exhibits Without indicating Respondents ObjectionsIn his Order49dated June 2, 1999, Judge Dicdican admitted the documentary evidence of plaintiffs. He did so after petitioners had filed their Formal Offer of Exhibits50and respondents their Comments (on Plaintiffs Exhibits).51The former was filed on May 5, 1999 and the latter on May 12, 1999. He issued his Order admitting the evidence of petitioners only on June 2, 1999 or a good 21 days after respondents had submitted their objections to the formers exhibits.We cannot see how such an Order would translate to bias and partiality. Respondents argue the judge should have indicated their objections for the record. But it is clear that he indeed allowed them to file their Comment/Objections to petitioners Formal Offer. It is enough that he allowed both parties to be heard, and that he decided based on their submissions.We do not agree, either, with the appellate courts findings that petitioners witnesses were allowed to answer all questions asked of them, even if respondent judge had not yet ruled on the applicability of the Statute of Frauds.Aside from the fact that these objections are sweeping and unsubstantiated, they should have been raised before the trial judge himself. Respondents had every opportunity to object to the questions the witnesses were asked and the answers the latter gave during the trial, based on the following provision of the Rules of Court:"Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent."52As to the striking out of answers, the rule on evidence (Rule 132) provide:"SEC. 39.Striking out answer.- Should a witness answer the question before the adverse party had the opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, and such objection is found to be meritorious, the court shall sustain the objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the record."On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper."53Respondents have not shown that they were in any way denied their right to object to questions propounded in the course of the hearing.Denial of Requests for Postponement and the Forced Cross-Examination of WitnessesThe CA also ruled that the denial by Judge Dicdican of the postponements requested by respondents counsels also showed his bias and partiality.We disagree. A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request addressed to the sound discretion of the court.54Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume that their motions would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.55Given this rule, the question of the correctness of the denial of respondents requests for postponements was addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Dicdican. His action thereon cannot be disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of any clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice.56Since there was no such finding with regard to the disallowance of the requests for postponement, the CA cannot overturn the decision of the judge. Much less can it assume his bias and partiality based merely on the denial of the requests for postponement.Moreover, respondents cannot claim that all their requests were turned down by Judge Dicdican. This Court takes notice of the fact that respondents asked for an extension of time to file their answer and later asked for two postponements of the pretrial. In fact, when the pretrial was finally set for August 11, 1998, they then filed their Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses. And when the judge denied it, they again asked for a postponement of the pretrial, a request that was readily granted by the trial court.Respondents fault Judge Dicdican for not postponing the pretrial on November 9, 1998, when their counsel had to represent the Cebu Lions Club in an international conference in Japan. But they should be aware that the court had already given them one whole month to procure from the Court of Appeals a temporary restraining order (TRO) to cause the suspension of the proceedings in the lower court. So, on November 9, 1998, they were given sufficient time to prepare for the pretrial. If their counsel learned of the date of the conference only recently, he could have easily assigned the case to Atty. Vicente A. Espina Jr., his co-counsel. In fact, Atty. Espina, armed with a special power of attorney to represent respondents, was present in court on the hearing date. He even admitted that he was able to read the records of the case. Also, as correctly argued by petitioners counsel, respondents had with them their pretrial briefs which could have guided them.As can be seen from the Pretrial Order, respondents were ably represented by Atty. Espina. Hence, they suffered no prejudice even if the pretrial was not postponed. The trial court observed during the hearing:"The Court actually does not consider that as the reason to postpone the pre-trial in this case because it seemed that there is a pattern to delay. And the Court can not countenance that there would be no movement of this case. There seemed to be a pattern as observed by the Court. So we will go on with the pre-trial if there is no possibility of an amicable settlement."57It seems that respondents have no one else to blame but themselves for the trial courts denial of their requests for postponement.As to the other time when the request of respondents for postponement was denied by Judge Dicdican, this Court notes that both their counsels -- Attys. Lim and Espina -- were present during the preceding hearing when the dates of the succeeding hearings were agreed upon. As stated in the TSN,58the parties agreed that the next setting would be on April 28, 1999 at 9:00 a.m. and on April 30, 1999 at 10:00 a.m. But on April 23, 1999 -- more than two months after the trial date had been set and only five days before the scheduled hearing -- respondents counsel filed an urgent Motion to Reset the hearing to April 28, 1999, because both lawyers allegedly had other commitments. Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Reset; thus, respondent judges denial of the Motion was not at all arbitrary or whimsical.The appellate court also faults Judge Dicdican for allowing petitioners to present their witnesses even in the absence of respondents counsel and, on the succeeding hearing, for forcing the counsel to cross-examine the witness presented previously.As we have ruled above, parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume that their motion would be granted and must thus be prepared on the day of the hearing.59What further militates against respondents counsel is his excuse that he was informed by a court personnel that his Motion to Reset had been granted.60Supposedly because of this information, the counsel was under the impression that there would be no hearing on the last scheduled date. His assumption that his motion to reset would be granted was bad enough. What was worse was that, in following up the proceedings of the case, he relied on the unauthorized communication of an unidentified court personnel. He could have easily verified if there was a hearing, and what transpired if it indeed there was one. This is the duty imposed upon lawyers.Due diligence requires that lawyers should obtain timely information from the concerned clerks of court regarding action on their motions; lack of notice thereof will not necessarily make them any less accountable for their omission.61Petitioners correctly argue thus:"x x x. Judge Dicdican then allowed the counsel for petitioners to conduct the redirect examination of his first witness, and to conduct the direct examination of his second witness, giving the petitioners the opportunity to conduct the re-cross examination of said witness and cross-examination of the second witness on April 30, 1999. Judge Dicdican therefore was very fair and considerate to respondents in giving them the opportunity to re-cross examine and cross-examine petitioners witnesses instead of considering the respondents to have waived said right which was within his prerogative."62Indeed, the right to cross-examine may be waived.63The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine a witness is an implied waiver of that right.64Respondents in this case were afforded the opportunity to cross and re-cross examine the other parties witnesses. It was respondents counsel who failed to take advantage of these opportunities.Denial of the Motion for InhibitionThe appellate court maintains that during the hearing for respondents Motion for Inhibition, the judge called the case before the scheduled time.Again, this is a claim that remains unproven and unsubstantiated. Hence, it cannot be the extrajudicial source from which can be inferred bias and partiality. Both parties uniformly quote the proceedings on the hearing date for the case succeeding that on which the Motion to Inhibit was to be heard:"COURT:Were you here last Monday? I did not see you?ATTY. LIM:I was here, your Honor.COURT:When this case was called, there was no appearance.COURT INTERPRETER:He came late, Your Honor.ATTY. LIM:I was here, your Honor, at 10:00 oclock, your Honor, in fact, there were still many parties around, your Honor.COURT:As far as the minute is concerned, it is not reflected that you were here. When the case was called you were not here. The court could not be at the mercy of the parties, so, the court has to act. So, the court stand by that order. So you are not ready."65Respondents maintain that "[o]n the date of said hearing, counsel for respondents was present at 10:00 a.m. However, he learned that the hearing of the case was called earlier upon order of Judge Dicdican. Counsel for respondents then decided to leave the courtroom, to inquire later, albeit unsurprised."66Without presenting any proof of their presence on the hearing date at the designated time, the arguments of respondents counsel lose force and credence. Such arguments become even less convincing when validated against the records of this case. As shown by the Minutes of the Session67held on August 9, 1999 at 10:00 a.m., only the counsels for plaintiffs [herein petitioners] were present.It should be observed that the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer of the Philippines or by some other person especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.68This means that, in the present case, such evidence is satisfactory, more so because it has been uncontradicted by opposing evidence. Also, when the court interpreter69signed the Minutes of the Session, it is presumed that official duty was regularly performed.70In any event, Judge Dicdican cannot be accused of evading the Motion filed for his inhibition. He allowed it to be filed and even cancelled one hearing until the resolution of that Motion. He also allowed petitioners to file their Opposition thereto71and thus showed that he wanted to hear both sides of the issue.We do not find the Order72denying the Motion for Inhibition arbitrary or whimsical. Respondent judge clearly explained why the grounds for it were unjust and invalid. On the basis of his circumspect and judicious ruling, we do not see how bias and partiality on his part can be inferred.Thereafter, he allowed a Motion for Reconsideration73to be filed with the corresponding Opposition74thereto.We again emphasize that personal bias or prejudice is not proved by the opinions the judge forms in the course of judicial proceedings, so long as these have been based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed by the judge, even if such opinions are later found to be erroneous.75Declaration of the Absence of the Possibility of a CompromiseFinally, Judge Dicdican was charged with bias, based on his pretrial Order stating that there was no more possibility of a compromise among the parties.From the time the original Complaint was filed up to the date of the pretrial, the parties had more than seven months to enter into a compromise agreement. This was more than sufficient time. It escapes this Court why, exactly on the day of the pretrial, respondents suddenly informed the court that it was exploring the possibility of a settlement. Besides, their absence during the pretrial negated the sincerity of their desire to enter into a settlement. We take note of the following argument of petitioners:"But Judge Dicdican did not believe in their sincerity to pursue an amicable settlement of the case since they had already filed their first petition for certiorari seeking the issuance of a TRO/Writ of Preliminary [lnjunction] enjoining him from taking further proceedings in the case below. Furthermore, they were never present at the scheduled pre-trials and hearings of the case."76ALL TOLD, a perusal of the records of this case will reveal that respondents failed to adduce any extrinsic evidence to prove that Judge Dicdican had been motivated by malice or prejudice in issuing the assailed rulings. They simply lean on his series of allegedly adverse rulings, which they characterize as tainted with bias and partiality. We note that his rulings resolving the various motions or requests they had filed were all made only after considering the arguments raised by all the parties. It is true that he erred in some of his rulings, but such errors do not necessarily translate to prejudice. The instances when he allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against respondents and/or their counsels did not deprive them of a fair and impartial trial.The parties should be guided by the words of this Court inPimentel v. Salanga:77"Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approach to this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him. x x x Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judges legal obligation under his oath to administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned,is a matter of conscience."78WHEREFORE, the Petition is herebyGRANTEDand the assailed CA Decision and ResolutionREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.The prayer for the inhibition of Judge Isaias Dicdican is herebyDENIED.He isDIRECTEDto proceed with the hearing of CEB-21 854 with all reasonably speed. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

*Unjust Judgment

OCA I.P.I. NO. 11-3589-RTJ July 29, 2013KONRAD A. RUBIN and CONRADO C. RUBIN,Complainants,vs.JUDGE EVELYN CORPUS-CABOCHAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City,Respondent.D E C I S I O NPEREZ,J.:On 14 December 2010, a complaint was filed by Konrad A. Rubin (Konrad) and his father, Conrado C. Rubin (Conrado ), against Hon. Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan (Judge Cabochan), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 98, Quezon City for serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, rendering an unjust judgment and gross inefficiency.The complaint stemmed from the decision rendered and order of voluntary inhibition issued by Judge Cabochan in Civil Case No. Q-09-64898.ANTECEDENT FACTSA civil case for damages was filed by Konrad before the RTC of Quezon City against Virgine Calvo, Alexander Ong and Martin Estores, as owner, general manager and employee, respectively, of Trans Orient Container Terminal Services (co-defendants). The case was raffled to RTC, Branch 82.After due proceedings, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 82 found that the totality of the claim was onlyP311,977.00, hence, ruled that it was the first level court that had jurisdiction over the case. The case was dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing before the proper court.Consequently, Konrad filed the complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and this was raffled to Branch 32. The co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for the reason that the additional substantial allegations in the new complaint changed the very nature of the action, such that the subject matter thereof became incapable of pecuniary estimation.After due consideration of the motion to dismiss and plaintiffs opposition thereto, the presiding judge of the MeTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, upon a finding that the claim for damages as clearly stated in the complaint is capable of pecuniary estimation, the amount of which falls within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.On 24 June 2008, a decision was rendered in favor of plaintiff Konrad, directing the co-defendants to pay him the amounts ofP7,000.00 as temperate damages;P10,000.00 as moral damages;P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; andP2,901.90 for litigation costs.Both of the opposing parties filed a motion for reconsideration.In an order dated 19 March 2009, the MeTC decision was modified by increasing the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees toP20,000.00 each.Still not satisfied with the decision, both parties appealed the case to the RTC of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-09-64898 and was raffled to RTC, Branch 98, presided over by Judge Cabochan.On 1 June 2010, Judge Cabochan rendered her judgment on the appeal. She reversed and set aside the decision of the MeTC based on her finding that the latter court had no jurisdiction over the original action. She ruled that the RTC had original jurisdiction over the case and pursuant toSection 8, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, her court "will proceed to try the case on the merits upon payment of the appropriate docket fees, as if the case was originally filed with it without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice."1Konrad filed a motion for reconsideration assailing respondent Judge Cabochans judgment. The motion was heard on 23 July 2009.Several days after the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Konrad, together with his parents, sent a letter entitled "Request For Help" to the executive judge of RTC, Quezon City, copy furnished Judge Cabochan; the presiding judges of RTC, Branch 82 and MeTC, Branch 32; the Chief Justice; and the Court Administrator. In their letter, they expressed their grief over the judgment rendered by Judge Cabochan which allegedly resulted in a mockery of justice. They claimed that the judgment not only made the litigation of the case very expensive, it also prolonged the litigation, in violation of the Constitutional provision and the Rules of Court mandating a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding in court.2In reaction to the "Request For Help" letter filed, Judge Cabochan issued an Order3voluntarily inhibiting herself from the case. She noted that while Konrad had already filed his motion for reconsideration assailing her judgment, he still resorted to an unfair and inappropriate manner of questioning her ruling. She contended that the letter expressed the complainants serious doubts on her competence, partiality and integrity. She stressed that should she continue presiding over the case, her action will appear to be tainted with bias, hence, she deemed it proper to voluntarily recuse from the case.To emphasize her point, Judge Cabochan narrated that during the hearing on complainants motion for reconsideration on 23 July 2010, Conrado requested that he be allowed to say a word regarding the controversy, which she graciously granted. To everyones surprise, Conrado took the occasion to express his utter disappointment on the outcome of the case while pointing his finger at the judge and declaring that the judgment rendered was unacceptable to Conrado. She contended that the incident, without a doubt, exposed the animosity of Conrado towards her.5On 25 August 2010, Conrado wrote a letter to Judge Cabochan reacting on the order of inhibition issued by the latter. He expressed his opposition over the inhibition and denied the finger pointing allegation of respondent judge. He maintained that he never pointed a finger at the judge, but only expressed his sentiment over the outcome of the judgment and moved for the speedy disposition of the motion for reconsideration. He explained that the opposition to the voluntary inhibition is only for the purpose of giving the judge a chance to justify/rectify herself.In a resolution dated 28 September 2010, Acting Executive Judge Fernando T. Sagun, Jr. (Acting Executive Judge Sagun, Jr.), upheld the voluntary recusal of Judge Cabochan. He relied on administrative circulars and jurisprudence establishing that a judges voluntary inhibition is a judicial action which does not require prior administrative approval.6He maintained that the question of whether to inhibit in a case is best left to the sound discretion and conscience of the presiding judge.Undeterred, complainants filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration questioning the resolution issued by Acting Executive Judge Sagun, Jr., maintaining their vigorous opposition to the voluntary inhibition of respondent judge. They invoked Konrads right to a speedy resolution of his claim for damages.Atty. Salvador B. Aguas, counsel for complainant Konrad, likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the acting executive judges resolution. He contended that respondent Judge Cabochans right to inhibit from further handling the case, particularly in resolving plaintiff-appellee/appellants Motion for Reconsideration, should not work against the important right of his client to a speedy disposition of his case, as the judges right to inhibit is inferior to the superior mandate of the Constitution because such inhibition will not serve public interest.7On 4 November 2010, Acting Executive Judge Sagun, Jr., issued an Order8denying for lack of merit the two motions for reconsideration filed by Konrad and his counsel. He directed that parties and their counsels file any and subsequent pleadings regarding the case before the RTC where the case had been re-raffled.Konrad and Conrado, thereafter, filed the instant administrative complaint against Judge Cabochan. They alleged that Judge Cabochan committed serious or grave misconduct for falsely accusing complainant Conrado of pointing his finger at her in the presence of the courts staff and other litigants; claiming that such statement is untrue and absolutely fabricated. They also claimed that Judge Cabochan acted in gross ignorance of the law when she ruled that it was the RTC and not the MeTC that had original jurisdiction over the case. Such ruling allegedly annulled the 19 February 2011 order of a co-equal court that it was the MeTC that had original jurisdiction over the case. They likewise accused Judge Cabochan of rendering an unjust judgment for directing the plaintiff to again pay docket fees and undergo rigorous trial after more than 10 years of litigation which will, in turn, subject Konrad to bear more expenses, and to suffer more delay and trauma. Finally, they charged respondent judge of gross inefficiency for rendering judgment on the appeal beyond the 90-day reglementary period, in violation of Konrads right to a speedy disposition of his case.9For the alleged infractions, complainants insisted that Judge Cabochan should not only be dismissed from the service but should also be disbarred.In her comment dated 10 February 2011, Judge Cabochan refuted point by point the accusations hurled against her by the complainants. She maintained that she is not guilty of serious or grave misconduct because she did not falsely accuse Conrado when she stated that the latter pointed his finger at her while loudly expressing his utter disappointment at the outcome of the case. She averred that the incident was done in full view of everyone present in the courtroom at that time. To attest to such fact, she attached to her comment the affidavits of Court Stenographer Gloria E. de Leon, Court Aide Rosalina C. Nunag, Court Interpreter Joseph H. Garcia and Attorney Romeo L. Erenio, who all witnessed the incident that transpired during the hearing.She explained that she is not guilty of gross ignorance of the law because her judgment was based on her sound appreciation of the evidence on record and the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter. Her conclusion that the original jurisdiction was vested in the RTC was done in good faith and without malice nor with deliberate intention to favor or perpetuate an injustice to any of the parties. She maintained that her decision is based on the fact that the total amount of damages claimed was within the RTCs jurisdictional threshold.She averred that she is likewise not guilty of rendering an unjust judgment because there is no final decree yet declaring that her judgment was grossly erroneous. She insisted that the filing of the administrative complaint is premature considering that the parties are not without judicial remedies to question her ruling.As regards the charge of gross inefficiency, Judge Cabochan explained that the case was submitted for decision only after the parties had been given ample opportunity to file their respective memorandum on appeal. Contrary to complainants allegations, the case was not yet considered submitted for decision on 29 July 2009. She argued that the reckoning date to determine the presence of delay is not 29 July 2009 but 4 February 2010, after the issuance of her Order declaring the case submitted for decision. She noted that in the spirit of fair play and observance of due process, she issued Orders dated 17 August 2009 and 28 October 2009, directing co-defendant Martin Estores to file his brief/memorandum. Unfortunately, the latter Order was returned with the annotation that Mr. Estores had already died.If ever there was delay in the resolution of the appeal, Judge Cabochan submitted that it was only for a matter of less than a month and not ten months as alleged by the complainants. She explained that the delay was attributable to her frail health condition and her courts heavy caseload.REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THEOFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATORIn its report10dated 26 November 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent Judge Cabochan not guilty of serious or grave misconduct; of gross ignorance of the law; and of rendering an unjust judgment. The OCA, however, found her guilty of gross inefficiency for her delay in rendering a decision on the appeal.OUR RULINGWe agree with the findings of the OCA. The record is bereft of any evidence to prove complainants contention that Judge Cabochan is guilty of serious or grave misconduct. Other than complainants and their witness, Atty. Arceli A. Rubins bare allegation that Judge Cabochan made a false accusation regarding the finger pointing incident, there were no other evidence adduced to rebut the statements made by respondent judge and her witnesses. Besides, the affidavit of Atty. Rubin cannot be said to have come from a disinterested person because not only is she one of the counsels of the complainants, she is also the wife of Conrado and the mother of Konrad.On the other hand, the allegation of Judge Cabochan regarding the finger pointing incident is fully supported by the statements of three of the courts staff and a disinterested lawyer, who were all present in the courtroom when the incident occurred. Complainants insistence that these witnesses were influenced by respondent judge into making those statements deserves scant consideration. In administrative proceedings, not only does the burden of proof that the respondent committed the act complained of rests on complainants, that burden is not satisfied when complainants rely on mere assumptions and suspicions as evidence.11In the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez,12the Court defined misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.It is clear from the aforesaid definition that respondent Judge Cabochan is not guilty of grave or serious misconduct. Even assuming that Judge Cabochan erred in the narration of facts as stated in her order of inhibition, still she cannot be held liable in view of complainants failure to establish that she was motivated by corruption or an intention to violate the law or to disregard established rules when she made the statement. What has been clearly established is that Conrado indeed pointed his finger during the alleged incident and even admitted such fact in his reply, although he claims that it was not directed to the judge but to the counsel for the defendants.13We have observed that complainants focused mainly on the finger pointing incident. A perusal of the order of inhibition, however, would reveal that the incident is not the primary reason for respondent Judge Cabochans recusal from the case. She cited the "Request For Help" letter as her main basis as she believed that it is a clear indication that the complainants entertain serious doubts on her competence, partiality and integrity. She was therefore exercising her judicial prerogative and discretion whe she recused herself from the case. We have always maintained that judges, like Caesars wife, should be above suspicion.14In People v. Hon. Ma. Theresa L. Dela Torre-Yadao et al.,15this Court held that voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge since he is in a better position to determine whether a given situation would unfairly affect his attitude towards the parties or their cases.Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges, to wit:SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. (Emphasis supplied.)The aforesaid rule enumerates the specific grounds upon which a judge may be disqualified from participating in a trial. It must be borne in mind that the inhibition of judges is rooted in the Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which requires that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge.16Certainly, a presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the case.17The better course for the judge under the circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood; his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to.18Hence, Judge Cabochan should not be condemned for her recusal in Civil Case No. Q-09-64898.We likewise find the charges of ignorance of the law and rendering of an unjust judgment bereft of merit.1wphi1It is clear that Judge Cabochans judgment was issued in the proper exercise of her judicial functions, and as such, is not subject to administrative disciplinary action; especially considering that complainants failed to establish bad faith on the part of the judge. Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned from mere errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her part.19Complainants were assailing the propriety of the decision rendered by Judge Cabochan. Complainants should be reminded that unfavorable rulings are not necessarily erroneous. Should they disagree with the ruling, there are judicial remedies available for them under the Rules of Court. As a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.20Moreover, we have explained that administrative complaints against judges cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate thereto, where such review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the cases not yet been resolved with finality.21In the instant case, complainants had in fact availed of the remedy of motion for reconsideration prior to their filing of the administrative complaint.Acting Executive Judge Sagun, Jr., was correct when he ruled on the inhibition request in accordance with existing issuances of the Court and caused the re-raffling of the case to another RTC in the station for continuation of hearing.22Interestingly, we note that complainants did not take it against Judge Romero-Maglaya, the judge to whom the case was reassigned, when the latter affirmed the ruling of Judge Cabochan regarding the requirement to pay again the docket fees. Neither did they assail the judgment as being unjust or oppressive.On the charge of undue delay in resolving the appeal, we adopt the findings of the OCA that Judge Cabochan is indeed guilty thereof.We agree with respondent judge that the case could not have been considered submitted for decision on 29 July 2009 as claimed by complainants. Such assertions were belied by the fact that Konrad, through his counsel, even filed on 5 October 2009 a Brief for Plaintiff as Appellee to refute the allegations of co-defendants in their memorandum.Be that as it may, whether the appeal was decided after ten months from the time it was submitted for decision, as insisted by the complainants, or slightly less than a month, as admitted by Judge Cabochan, the inescapable fact is that there was delay in deciding the appeal.The rules and jurisprudence are clear on the matter of delay. Failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate.23The penalty to be imposed on the judge varies depending on the attending circumstances of the case. In deciding the penalty to be imposed, the Court takes into consideration, among others, the period of delay; the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay; the number of years the judge has been in the service; the health and age of the judge; and the case load of the court presided over by the judge.In the instant case, we find it reasonable to mitigate the penalty to be imposed on respondent judge taking into consideration that this is her first infraction in her more than 23 years in the service; her frail health; the case load of her court; and her candid admission of her infraction. Thus, we admonish respondent judge to be more circumspect in the exercise of her judicial functions to ensure that cases in her court are decided within the period required by law.WHEREFORE, the complaint of serious or grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and rendering an unjust judgment against Judge Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan, RTC, Branch 98, Quezon City is DISMISSED for lack of merit. For her delay in resolving Civil Case No. Q-09-64898, Judge Cabochan is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the exercise of her judicial functions. She is warned that a commission of the same or similar offense in the future shall merit a more severe sanction from the Court. Judge Cabochan is reminded to be mindful of the due dates of cases submitted for decision in her court to avoid delay in the dispensation of justice.SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580 October 6, 2010[Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1608-MTJ]LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ,Complainants,vs.JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila,Respondent.D E C I S I O NBERSAMIN,J.:This administrative case charges Hon. Romeo A. Rabaca, then the Presiding Judge of Branch 25 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), with ignorance of the law, disregard of the law, dereliction of duty, knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order, and violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Officials.The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 176394-CV of the MeTC, an ejectment suit entitled Young Womens Christian Association, Inc. v. Conrado Cano. After trial, Civil Case No. 176394-CV was decided on June 22, 2004 by respondent Judge,1who disposed as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter as follows:(a) to vacate the premises located at Ground Floor, YMCA, 1144 Gen. Luna St., Ermita, Manila; and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff;(b) to pay plaintiff the sum of Php45,211.80 representing his arrears in rentals from February 2003 to July 2003 at Php7,535.30 a month plus the further sum of Php7,535.30 a month as reasonable value for the continued use and occupation of the premises starting August 2003 until the same is finally vacated and possession thereof is turn-over to plaintiff;(c) to pay the plaintiff the sum of Php20,000 as attorneys fees; and(d) to pay the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.On July 12, 2004, the plaintiffs counsel filed a motion for immediate execution, praying that a writ of execution be issued "for the immediate execution of the aforesaid Judgment." The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court as basis for its motion.2In his order dated July 14, 2004, however, respondent Judge denied the motion for immediate execution,3stating:A Notice of Appeal dated July 9, 2004, having been seasonably filed by counsel for the defendant, let the records of the above-captioned case be, as it is hereby ordered, elevated to the Regional Trial Court of Manila for appropriate proceedings and disposition.In view thereof, no more action shall be taken on the Motion for Execution dated July 8, 2004 filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.SO ORDERED.According to the complainants, their counsel talked with respondent Judge about the matter. Allegedly, respondent Judge told their counsel that "if you think the court is wrong, file a motion for reconsideration." With that, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent Judge nonetheless denied in his order dated July 28, 2004,4thuswise:Considering that the Court has already given due course to the appeal of the defendant which was perfected within the reglementary period, no more action will be taken on the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2004 filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.The Branch