4th kyiv security forum digest

8/7/2019 4th Kyiv Security Forum Digest

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a platform for Europeansecurity architecture

Changing the Security Paradigmin a Fragmented World.

European Dimension

Kyiv, November 11-12, 2010

DIGEST


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2 4th KYIV SECURITY FORUM

The opinions expressed in the Summary report do notnecessarily reflect the positions of Open Ukraine Foundationor its partners and donors organizations. Speakersinterventions have been edited for clarity and may differslightly from delivery.

Kyiv, 2010

All rights reserved.


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34th KYIV SECURITY FORUM

CONTENT

Acknowledgments 4Introduction 5

Forum Agenda 7

Summary Report 12

Expert Focus 20

Plenary Session I.

New Threats and New Rivalries20

Plenary Session II.Evolving Security Dynamics

30

Morning Parallel Session I.

NATOs New Strategic Concept: RethinkingPartnerships

38

Morning Parallel Session II.

Two Terms, One Meaning: Nationalresilience or Homeland Security?

43

Afternoon Parallel Session I.

Black Sea Geopolitics: Dilemmas andProspects

52

Afternoon Parallel Session II.Ukraine: Choices and Constrains

58

Plenary Session III.The Crossroads of European CollectiveSecurity

64

Media Focus 72


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Arseniy Yatsenyuk Open Ukraine Foundation wishes to sincerelythank all the institutions and individuals who contributed to thesuccess of the 4th Kyiv Security Forum. We would like to express ourappreciation to our partner Chatham House (United Kingdom) for its support and cooperation; to our donors the Victor PinchukFoundation (Ukraine) for the key financial support, Black Sea Trustfor Regional Cooperation, a Project of German Marshall Fund of theUnited States of America and the NATO Information and DocumentationCentre in Ukraine for their financial support.

We would also like to gratefully acknowledge the valuabledeliberations and comments of the distinguished moderators, speakersand participants of the event.

We are extending our gratitude to the Ukrainian weekly Day andnews agency UNIAN for information and media support.

Finally, we are grateful to Stephan De Spiegeleire, James Sherr,James Nixey, Alex Nice, Dimitrious Triantaphyllou, Yuliya Kovalenkoand Orysia Lutsevych for their engagement and contributions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


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The 4th Kiev Security Forum converged against the backdrop of a world communitygrappling with the repercussions of the global economic crisis. Convened in parallel to theG-20 summit in Seoul, the KSF was dominated by economy-, ecology-, and demography-related topics which define the contemporary approach to security matters.

The participants stated that, despite the abiding first crisis wave and the growing GDP-rates registered in 2010 in most parts of the world, the ailment of the global financialsystem is far from being eradicated. As they ascend out of the crisis, the leading nations ofthe world, in many ways, act as egoistically as they did while descending into it: trying toavoid the bitter medicine of streamlining their national economies, abusing the monetarymechanisms, etc.

This is even more concomitant for global political security, as mankind is caught rightin the middle of a transformation from a US-dominated one-polar world to a new multi-polar order on the international scene. The new world is characterized by a deepenedanxiety and apprehension of the multiple challenges heading towards it both knownones as well as those still to be accounted for.

In Europes particular case, these anxieties are strongly aggravated by the existenceof dividing lines and imbalances between the NATO-covered area and the rest of thecontinent. NATOs new strategic concept of 2010 represents a political and ideologicalopportunity to overcome this chasm and create a new, more beneficial background forpolitical cooperation in this new multi-polar reality.

Aside from the new forms and levels of cooperation envisaged between NATO-membersand other nations on the continent, the Strategic Concept can be seen as evidence thatthe security of the modern world can, and should be, shaped by soft power elements. Anddespite the fact that the very term soft power is being questioned or reformulated by anumber of researchers (including during the KSF-4 sessions), the fundamental idea seemsto be firmly taking root in the new multi-polar environment: the military-political terms

cannot and will not solely dominate the security-political discourse in the first decadesof the 21st century.

Whereas there seems to be a consensus regarding the necessity to expand theunderstanding of security in the modern world and to fill the existing loopholes betweenthe East and West of the continent, a unified approach on the part of the NATO-countries on how to proceed with this agenda is still amiss. As the new East European memberssuggest putting ideology first, and using the Western ideals of democracy and freedom ofspeech as the strongest soft power tool for spreading stability throughout the continent,the old members appear to be more pragmatic-minded and accommodating to otherdemocracy models.

INTRODUCTION


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Although Russia a priori stands at the core of these discussions, its political elite oftenappears to be more preoccupied with mounting problems on the domestic agenda ratherthan with the desire to integrate their country into the new political order on the globaland European scene. Russias newly-developed sense of national self-consciousness anddesire to flex its muscles as a global player is often out of sync with the post-crisis senseof political humility in the West, and with the enlargement fatigue imbuing the NATO-dominated realm of the continent. This creates an additional political and ideologicalimbalance for countries such as Ukraine, which are on the lookout for their own answersto the pressing needs of their own and regional security between the NATO- and Russia-dominated portion of the continent.

As most of the KSF-speakers stated, the first steps of Ukraines new administrationin the foreign and security policy field appear to be ambiguous in terms of reachingthe objectives of the nations security. While Ukraines newly proclaimed target of astrategically balanced foreign policy is laudable and reality-bound, it remains to beseen whether anchoring a non-bloc clause in the national Law of Principles on DomesticForeign Policy was the correct long-term answer to the security challenges facing this EastEuropean nation.

In the complicated security environment of todays Europe Ukraine seems to be one ofthe most striking illustrations of existing political ambivalence and blurred ideologicallines between East and West on the one hand, and the old and new NATO-members on theother. As the 4th KSF most vividly demonstrated, whereas East European members of theAlliance continue urging Ukraine to clearly side up with NATO as a community of ideals,the West European members give Ukraine more leeway to define its own security strategyand ideology between East and West.

That aside, the participants seemed to be in consensus that Kyivs main securitychallenges are derived from mounting domestic problems of the last few years, ratherthan from a lack of ideological unity on the national level. As the second decade of

Ukraines independence comes to a close, the nation still finds itself in the initial stageof formulating the essential foundations of the nations economy and political system. Inview of this, the new administrations pragmatic approaches constitute both a chance anda challenge. A chance because non-ideological political managers seem to be bettersuited to act as uniters in Ukraines ambivalent ideological environment; a challenge because non-ideological approaches cannot and should not constitute a rift betweenUkraine and Western ideals.


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FORUM AGENDA

Kyiv, 11 November 2010Venue: Hotel InterContinental, 2A Velyka Zhytomyrska St., floor -2

15:00 16:00 PARTICIPANTS REGISTRATION (Foyer, Intercontinental Hotel, Floor -2)

16:00 18:00 Plenary Session I Grand Ballroom

NEW THREATS, NEW RIVALRIES

What is Replacing US Hegemony: Collective Security? Multipolarity? What are the Implications of the Rise of the Rest?

Are we Entering a Period of Climate Politics and /or Resource Wars?

Moderator:Andriy KULYKOV, journalist, TV presenter, ICTVchannel, Ukraine

Opening remarks:Arseniy YATSENYUK, Member of the Parliamentof Ukraine, Leader of the Party Front of Change, Minister forForeign Affairs of Ukraine (2007)

Presentations:

Oleksandr HORIN, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, UkraineGiorgi BARAMIDZE, Vice Prime-Minister, State Minister onEuropean and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Georgia

Robert SIMMONS, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for SecurityCooperation and Partnership, NATO HQ, Brussels (prerecordedaddress)

Dr. Theodore MELESCANU, Vice-President of Senate, Minister ofNational Defence (2007-2008), Minister for Foreign Affairs (1992-1996), Romania

Andrei POPOV, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and EuropeanIntegration, Republic of Moldova

Robert NURICK, Member, International Institute for StrategicStudies, the American Association for the Advancement of SlavicStudies and the Central Eurasia Studies Society, USA

Petro POROSHENKO, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2009-2010), Secretary of National Security and Defence Council (2005),Ukraine

18:30 RECEPTON HOTEL FOYER (-2 FLOOR)


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Kyiv, 12 November 2010Venue: Hotel InterContinental, 2A Velyka Zhytomyrska St., floor -2

8:30 9:00 PARTICIPANTS REGISTRATION (Foyer, Intercontinental Hotel, Floor-2)

9:00 10:45 Plenary Session II Grand Ballroom

EVOLVING SECURITY DYNAMICS

Is the West Losing its Monopoly on Soft Power? Transatlantic Relationship: Collective Security or Coalitions of the Willing? Will Todays Ministries of Defense be Tomorrows Ministries of Security?

Moderator: James GREENE, President, Effective EngagementStrategies LLC, USA

Presentations:

Dr. Bogdan AURESCU, Secretary of State for European Affairs,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania

Pavlo KLIMKIN, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ukraine

Borys TARASYUK, Member of the Parliament of Ukraine, Chairman,Parliamentary Committee on European Integration, Ukraine

Chris DONNELLY, Director, Oxford Institute for Statecraft andGovernance, United Kingdom

Dr. Yevgeniy KOZHOKIN, Rector, Academy of Labour and SocialRelations; Director, Russia Institute for Strategic Studies (1994-2009), Russian Federation

Michael COX, Professor, London School of Economics, UnitedKingdom

Discussants:

Dr. James SHERR, Head, Russia and Eurasia Program, Chatham House,United Kingdom

Dr. Bartosz STANISLAWSKI, Director, Mapping Global Insecurity Program,Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, Maxwell School, Syracuse University,USA

10:45 11:15 COFFEE BREAK


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FORUM AGENDA

11:15 13:00 MORNING PARALLEL SESSIONS

NATOS NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT:RETHINKING PARTNERSHIPSGRAND BALLROOM Will Relations with Georgia andUkraine be Given New Stimulus? What is the Ideal Role for Russia? Will NATO Policies Towards Post-SovietStates Continue to Cause InternalDivisions?

Moderator: Dr. Thanos DOKOS,Director General, Hellenic Foundationfor European and Foreign Policy(ELIAMEP), Greece

Presentations:

Amb. Marie GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE,Member of NATOs New Strategic

Concept Group of Experts, Canada

Dr. Andrei ZAGORSKI, Professor andLeading Researcher, Moscow StateInstitute of International Relations(MGIMO), Russian Federation

Dr. Klaus WITTMANN, BrigadierGeneral of Bundeswehr (ret), FormerDirector Academic Planning and Policyat the NATO Defence College in Rome,Germany

Amb. Valeri RATCHEV, Head of thePolitical Cabinet, Ministry of ForeignAffairs, Republic of Bulgaria

TWO TERMS, ONE MEANING: NATIONALRESILIENCE OR HOMELAND SECURITY?CONFERENCE HALL 1 How do we Define Threats? What Toolsand Strategies are Required to StrengthenNational Resilience in a Multicultural andInstitutionally Diverse Europe? What are the Resources Required toBuild Resilience? At what Level Should ourCapabilities be? How Effective are Private-PublicPartnerships in Protecting CriticalInfrastructure?

Moderator: Stephan DE SPIEGELEIRE,Senior Scientist, Director DefenseTransformation, the Hague Centre forStrategic Studies, the Netherlands

Presentations:

Dr. Hans-Georg WIECK, Ambassador,President of Federal German ForeignIntelligence Agency (BND) (1985-1990),Germany

Daniel J. KANIEWSKI, Assistant VicePresident for Homeland Security andDeputy Director, Homeland Security

Policy Institute, the George WashingtonUniversity, USA

Bryden SPURLING, Deputy Director,Strategic Policy Guidance, Department ofDefence, Australia

Bjorn RUTTEN, Senior Research Associate,The Conference Board of Canada, Canada

Dr. Todor TAGAREV, Associate Professor,

Centre for Security and DefenceManagement, Bulgarian Academy ofSciences, Republic of Bulgaria


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13:00 14:00 LUNCH

14:00 15:45 AFTERNOON PARALLEL SESSIONS

BLACK SEA GEOPOLITICS:DILEMMAS AND PROSPECTSGRAND BALLROOM

Will the Russia-Turkey Tandem Strengthenor Endanger Regional Stability? Can the Regions Militarization be re-versed?

Will Conflict Return to the Region? WhatLessons have we Learned from August2008?

Moderator: Dr. DimitrisTRIANTAPHYLLOU, Director, EuropeanStudies Centre, Kadir Has University, Turkey

Presentations:

Dr. Mustafa AYDIN, Rector, Kadir Has

University, TurkeyGeorgian POP, MP, Member of theParliamentary Committee on NationalDefence and Security, House of Deputies,Romania

Tengiz PKHALADZE, Chairman,International Center for GeopoliticalStudies, Georgia

Dr. Danila BOCHKAREV, Research Fellow,Global Security Program, East WestInstitute, Brussels

Carina STACHETTI, Head of the Russia,Ukraine and Eurasia Desk, Directoratefor Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defence,France

UKRAINE:CHOICES AND CONSTRAINTSCONFERENCE HALL 1 Are Ukraines Foreign Policy ChoicesDefined by External Threats or DomesticPolitics? Does Ukraines Stability come at theExpense of its Integration into Europeanand Euro-Atlantic Community? Can Ukraine Strengthen its Partnershipwith Russia without Compromising itsIndependence?

Moderator: Valeriy CHALY, DeputyDirector General, Razumkov Center,Ukraine

Presentations:Dr. James SHERR, Head, Russia andEurasia Program, Chatham House, UnitedKingdom

Matthew ROJANSKI, Deputy Director,Russia and Eurasia Program, CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, USA

Pawel KOWAL, MEP, Chairman, Delegationto the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary

Cooperation Committee, BrusselsVitaliy PORTNIKOV, Editor-in-Chief, TViChannel, Ukraine

Dr. Frank EVERS, Deputy Head, Centre forOSCE Research (CORE), Institute for PeaceResearch and Security Policy, University ofHamburg, Germany

Mark OPGENORTH, Staff Officer, Russia

and Ukraine Section, Political and SecurityPolicy Division, NATO International Staff,Belgium


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FORUM AGENDA

15:45 16:15 COFFEE BREAK

16:15 18:00 PLENARY SESSION III - Grand Ballroom

THE CROSSROADS OF EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITYCONFERENCE HALL 1 Is the Corfu Process at a Dead End? How do we Engage Russia in a Constructive European SecurityDialogue? How will Competencies be Divided Among NATO, the EU and theOSCE? Will a New System Emerge?

Moderator: Konstantin von EGGERT, Political Analyst and

Journalist, Centre for Political Research, Russian Federation

Presentations:

Oleksandr PAVLYUK, Head of External Cooperation, OSCE Secretariat,Austria

Dr. Artiem MALGIN, Adviser to Rector of Moscow State Institute ofInternational Relations, Russian Federation

Pierre HASSNER, Associate Research Fellow, Center for International

Studies and Research (CERI, SceincesPo), FranceDavid DARCHIASHVILI, Chairman, Committee on EuropeanIntegration, Parliament of Georgia, Georgia

Dr. Kamer KASIM, Vice President of USAK (ISRO); Director, Centerfor EU Studies, USAK , Turkey

Dr. Graeme HERD, Head of the International Security Programme,Geneva Center for Security Policy, Switzerland

18:00 18:10 CONCLUSIONS FROM ORGANIZERS

Closing remarks:

Dr. James SHERR, Head, Russia and Eurasia Program, ChathamHouse, United Kingdom

Ivanna KLYMPUSH-TSINTSADZE, Director, Open Ukraine Foundation,Ukraine

18:30 BUSES DEPART TO DINNER VENUE

19:00 DINNER (OPanas Restaurant, 10 Tereshchenka Str.)


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SUMMARY REPORT

CHANGING THE SECURITY PARADIGM IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD:EUROPEAN DIMENSION

The European continent is hostage to a security paradox. It is both a place where new

security paradigms are being tested by the postmodern European Union, and one whereold quarrels are still being solved by old-fashioned military means.

Seeing security in interdependence, the EU has spent much of the last 50 years buildinga system in which norms and institutions generate common values. These values beingthe prosperity and well-being of their people, the countries of the EU have graduallyshifted their attention away from military muscle-flexing. Since battles againstpandemics or environmental catastrophes cannot be won with large armies, Europeansno longer think of their security and defense in Westphalian terms. Instead, they have

preferred to adopt a vision of human security that can be defended by building resilientsocieties rather than by accumulating military arsenals. Shrinking European defensebudgets present a clear indicator of the predominance of this type of thinking. At thesame time, recent fiscal austerity measures have further strained the Unions abilityto develop its defense capabilities. This may give an impetus to the idea of commondefense and reinforce the EUs postmodern world vision, but it hardly reflects a realisticassessment of its security environment.

The globalized world is a more interconnected but also a more perilous place. The

recognition of new asymmetric and transnational threats could have laid the foundationfor greater cooperation between countries, but the global redistribution of power hascreated new hyper-competition. The EUs own backyard is a Pandoras Box that hasbeen opened by the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Russia and Turkey have become strongand independent-minded players that the EU can no longer disregard if it wants topreserve peace on the European continent. If strong neighbors are a security challenge,the Unions weak and badly governed neighbors prove that the contrary is also true.Corruption-ridden newly independent states, entrenched in post-Cold War disputes, areequally a source of instability.

GLOBAL SECURITY DYNAMICS

The global security environment is a completely new unexplored land that Europeancountries have yet to discover. The simultaneous rise of China and India, defying therest of the world with fast-growing economies and booming populations, has alreadyset the global power shift in motion. With the global centre of gravity moving steadilyfrom the Atlantic to the Pacific, the European continent will for the first time in 500years cede its central role in global affairs.

In a world where European countries havent yet found their place nor defined their role,the new rules of the game may be expediently set by other players. Despite their familiar


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appearance, evoking memories of the old days of the Concert of Europe, these new rulesare, in the end, Europes nightmare. European countries are neither psychologically nor

practically prepared to play a game in which winners win and losers lose.

Zero-sum thinking has already kicked off the competition, and the resource-hungryrising powers are driving it. To satisfy their billions of hungry mouths, they are ready touse any means necessary. If it means learning from the West how to use such tools assoft power, they will be exemplary students who may quickly outmatch their teachers.What used to be the Western monopoly on the power of attraction and persuasion hasnow given way to a fierce competition for soft power.

In this hyper-competition for hard and, increasingly, soft power, European countriesare unlikely to keep pace with the rising Rest. The EUs reliance on American hard powermay no longer be sustainable. Shifting its attention to the Pacific, the United States isreluctant to maintain the same level of engagement in Europe. Furthermore, soft poweris no longer Europes exclusive advantage.

On the other hand, the emergence of a new set of threats may undermine the relevanceof both hard and soft power. Pandemics, natural disasters, terrorist and cyber attacksare immune to traditional power projection. This is the same reasoning we all use in our

daily lives: if you want mushrooms, you can go to pick them up in a forest where youwill need to carry a gun to protect yourself from wild beasts or other dangers. You canalso go to a grocery store where you may run the risk of buying rotten mushrooms. Butcarrying a gun to protect yourself from poor quality would be grotesque.

European countries are right to emphasize human security. This contributes to a betterawareness of these new dangers, but also presses for action. Building resilient societiesthat are able to bounce back after an attack is a challenge in terms of both thinking andresources. Government stovepipes do not allow the overlap of functions necessitated by

new threats. Making resilience work requires a new way of thinking that must translateinto greater inter-agency cooperation and whole-of-government approach.

On the other hand, governments are often simply not in charge of the criticalinfrastructures that are most vulnerable in the face of new dangers despite theirultimate responsibility for providing security. For example, as much as 75 per cent ofcritical infrastructures in the United States are owned by private companies. In mostcountries, electricity grids and communication networks are run by private companiesand not governments. Thus, protecting vital national infrastructures will make public-

private partnerships indispensable. However, while security is a raison detre for states,private companies are driven by profits. The convergence of interests may ensue onlyif governments manage to build a strong business case for private companies to invest


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SUMMARY REPORT

in infrastructure protection. Its foundation is a simple cost-benefit calculation. Forinstance, the disruption of transport and communication may halt the delivery of

supplies, against which companies may not be insured. Just think of huge losses causedby an eruption of the Icelandic volcano earlier this year.

The ash cloud paralyzed Europe but also demonstrated how unforeseeable our futurecould be. It may also have contributed to a better understanding of resilience.Resilience is not the ability to prevent any attack or disaster: preventing the unthinkableis simply impossible. Being resilient means withstanding a crisis by maintaining theminimum level of operation and by quickly restoring it to normal. In the United States,the change of attitude has apparently already taken place. In the aftermath of the 9/11

attacks, President Bush promised not to let it happen again. In contrast, the Obamaadministration maintains that if a terrorist attack were to occur, American people mustbe able to absorb it. Such an assertion may be unpopular, but it nonetheless deservesthe credit of breaking unrealistic expectations.

In modern societies, individuals used to rely on the state for their security. New securitychallenges are likely to shake up the status quo. The Australian government, forexample, has already moved in that direction by encouraging people to stock up on foodfor emergency situations. Surprisingly, bad governance may better prepare people for

emergencies because they are less prone to count on the government for their safety.

The concept of human security draws attention to individual security. Bouncing backrequires individuals to accept a greater share of responsibility. Traditional state poweris toothless when it comes to new dangers. Nevertheless, if the world falls into hyper-competition, Europes novel security thinking may become futile.

REGIONAL SECURITY DILEMMAS

The European continent is not trouble-free. New threats havent simply replaced the

old ones. Further ignoring the acrimonious feelings of the EUs neighbors is not onlyimpossible, but dangerous. Russia is determined to assert its regional role, and Turkeyno longer sees its alignment with the West as an essential characteristic of its foreignpolicy. The European security system has reached a tipping point beyond which none ofthe existing organizations NATO, OSCE, CSTO will remain relevant.

In recognition of the growing need to rethink the European security architecture,NATO worked towards the November summit in Lisbon by developing a new strategicconcept. The OSCE, in an attempt to overhaul its regional standing, hosted discussions

on Medvedevs proposal under the so-called Corfu Process. Its first summit in 11 yearsalso took place in Astana in December this year.


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CAMERA FOCUS


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SUMMARY REPORT

Despite all the diplomatic back-and-forth on the continent, European security couldntlook more fragmented. Since war between members of the Euro-Atlantic community

is unlikely, Russia is deeply suspicious of NATOs future role. Moscow is wary of NATOsevoking Article 5 to counter energy, cyber security or any other new threats. It alsofears that NATO will act unilaterally in out-of-area operations when the United NationsSecurity Council is paralyzed.

Conversely, the West is tempted to use the window of opportunity opened by Medvedevsproposal to launch discussions on the European security architecture. But reservationspersist. The war in August 2008 demonstrated that Russia has not yet renounced theuse of force. And many are worried that Russia wants to maintain a sphere of privileged

interests by seeking a veto power that would be conferred by its proposed EuropeanSecurity Treaty.

Thus, rebuilding trust must be a priority. NATO could benefit from formal cooperationwith the CSTO in conducting its operations in Afghanistan. For Russia, this would signalrecognition of its regional role. Moving forward on missile defense cooperation couldalso help repair relations. If the idea of common missile defense succeeds, it may lay asolid foundation for genuine cooperation.

Turkey is another disenchanted regional player. As it is queuing up for Europeanmembership with no clear prospects, it feels no remorse for developing a tous azimutsforeign policy. The current rapprochement between Russia and Turkey reflects tacticalconvergence toward divergent long-term goals. Despite growing bilateral ties in theform of trade, a visa-free regime and energy deals, the two countries are mistrustfulpartners. They are partners in keeping the West out of their common backyard, ratherthan long-term allies. When the United States started showing interest in the Black Searegion soon after the 9/11 attacks, many opposed the emergence of what they called aRussia-Turkey condominium. However, as soon as Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of

State, announced in January 2007 that the United States would not seek a larger role inthe Black Sea region, fear of this condominium vanished. Hence, the current tandem ofRussia and Turkey may be bad news for the European Union. The two countries may beteaming up in an attempt to seize the momentum of the European Unions disarray todevelop their own regional policies in the common neighborhood.

The multiplication of regional policies in the common neighborhood of Europes majorpowers Russia, Turkey and the European Union risks perpetuating the grey zones ofinstability. It will allow regional countries to gravitate indefinitely between different

power poles without ever embracing a policy.

Ukraine is a country that swings from instability to disarray because its leadership


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unscrupulously chooses a la carte from competing offers. The countrys geopoliticalsituation bordering two major powers makes balancing intuitive. However, when

the balancing act is not underpinned by an overarching strategic vision of the nationalinterest, the country becomes vulnerable to manipulation.

Ukraines democratic showing is disappointing. Its October elections were like a cardgame in which the dealer got twice as many cards as his opponent. The game itself wasfairly played, but it is not difficult to guess who had the wining hand. This situationillustrates how normal it still is in Ukraine to play with the rules rather than by the rules.Ukraines mimicking of democratic practices gives its people a misleading impression ofdemocracy, causing political disorder and economic collapse. The example of neighboring

Russia, with its relative economic prosperity and stability, is a trap that Moscow isalways ready to exploit. Hence, Ukraines failure to deliver on democratic reforms willinevitably draw it back into the Russian orbit. Moreover, democratic disillusionmentmay draw a real dividing line on the European continent, separating those who equatedemocracy with good governance from those who blame it for disorder.

Reforms have stalled, and corruption is flourishing in Ukraine. This does not make thecountry attractive to foreign investors, but it does not deter those who just have notseen better. Russian businessmen take advantage of Ukraines bribery-ridden system to

get hold of the countrys economic assets. Letting them do so will mean letting Ukrainefall further into Russias embrace.

With respect to security, Ukraine does not enjoy a multitude of options. It is surroundedby Russian military forces on all sides: the Russian border is to the east, Russian troopsare still stationed in Transnistria, and Sevastopol is still home to the Russian BlackSea fleet. By taking NATO accession off the table, the current Ukrainian leadership hasdeprived itself of its last bargaining chip in the eyes of Russia. A bizarre maneuver,considering how little practical effect this decision had on the actual scope of Ukraine-

NATO cooperation. Particularly so, as Ukrainian budgetary constraints make cooperationwith NATO critical for maintaining the countrys current level of capabilities.

Ukraine has not been granted easy solutions. Making its national project work requiresjuggling complex geopolitical realities while keeping an eye on internal divides. Tosucceed, the Ukrainian leadership must put forward a strategy that translates a long-term vision of their countrys cultural, political and security identities.

Ukraines success or failure will determine the future of the whole region. Countries

like Georgia and Moldova look to Ukraine to predict their own fates. The two countrieshave been making progress in building democratic societies and in advancing reforms.Both have Russian troops stationed in their breakaway regions. Tbilisi and Chisinau are


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SUMMARY REPORT

right to discard hard power options when it comes to restoring their territorial integrity.Instead, democracy, good governance and economic prosperity are the right ingredients

for building soft power that their countries lost sons will not be able to resist. Georgiaand Moldova may well be leaders in democratic reform in the region, but they will notsucceed if Ukraine is lagging behind. They need Ukraine to balance against Russia. Bothcountries need a strong, independent and democratic Ukraine to make sure that tradeflows, that borders are secure, and that spoilers are kept at bay.

For centuries, the European continent was plagued with rivalries and devastated bywars. The EU has learned a history lesson that has allowed it to enjoy a fairly longand practically undisturbed moment of peace. However, if it wants to prevent history

from repeating itself, it must ensure that its neighbors do not repeat its own historicalmistakes. If the European continent emerges as a single and unanimous power pole,then others in the world may also be compelled to listen.


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CAMERA FOCUS


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The world today is focusing on solving global

problems: from economic, demographic, social and

medical crises to climate change. Can security be

measured solely in terms of nuclear stockpiles,

implementation of international agreements, arms

control and managing terrorist threats? I believe

security should be defined differently. The world is

facing immense challenges that cannot be overcome

by any country in the world, including Ukraine.

Today, we have to integrate with the globalized

world, because there is no unique formula for solvingsecurity issues. Ukraine is not a member of the G-8

or the G-20, but we would like the world to solve its

problems from the perspective of the G-191 all

the countries in the world. We would like Ukraine to

have an active domestic and foreign policy. We would

like Ukraine to become a key element of European

stability and key contributor to world stability.

I dont understand how a country [Ukraine] that has no international security guarantees,except of course the UN Charter (the Budapest Declaration is an interesting and good

declaration, but these are non-binding obligations, in other words, it has no legal effect)

can independently narrow its own security and manoeuvres?! I believe the so-called

Ukrainian Law On the fundamentals of domestic and foreign policy is a foreign policy

victory for our Russian partners. They have finally legally blocked NATO expansion. This is

the first and most important real victory for our Russian partners.

PLENARY SESSION I: NEW THREATS, NEW RIVALRIES

What is Replacing US Hegemony: Collective Security? Multipolarity?

What are the Implications of the Rise of the Rest?

Are we Entering a Period of Climate Politics and /or Resource Wars?

EXPERT FOCUS

Arseniy YATSENYUK,Member of Parliament,Leader of Party FrontZmin, Founder of OpenUkraine Foundation


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The border between the two worlds, existingin the past, was geographically clear-cut theBerlin Wall. Then the wall crashed down, and along

with it the old political reality. Instead of onehistorical choice, now we face dozens, hundreds,even thousands of everyday and not so everydaychoices. Instead of two worlds, there were a dozen.Most concepts and statuses in the internationalworld became accessible even the status of aglobal player. In 1990 there were two globalplayers: the Soviet Union and the United States.In 2010 there are at least five: the U.S., Russia,

China, EU and Japan and few doubts that soonthey will be joined by India, Brazil and Turkey, withMexico, South Africa and Australia banging at theglobal door. In todays world, countries becomeneighbours with whomever they want, not withwhomever they can. There are geographic, economic, spiritual, cultural, linguistic andreligious neighbours, and the more powerful and open a country, the more open themodern world is to it and the more neighbours real and virtual it has. I deeply

believe that the more open a country and the more it is integrated into the globaleconomic, cultural and scientific network the more closed it is to threats.

There must be a reaction to events that occur in relation with each challenge. Thereaction to what happened in Afghanistan was grossly overblown, and as a resultthere was a new wave of opposition that strengthened anti-NATO sentiment after NATOentered Afghanistan. Islamic extremism can be defeated only by Islamic nations.Muslims must find a solution to combat this radicalism and the world must createconditions to enable this.

Oleksandr HORIN,Deputy Minister forForeign Affairs, Ukraine


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There are debates among intellectuals andpoliticians, regarding which security policy oreconomy policy is more effective, more productive a moral policy or a pragmatic one. I think there isno real contradiction. There cannot be a pragmaticpolicy without results, without considering whatwe are striving for, and what we want to achieve bymaking deals with other countries by becomingmembers of this or that organization. No policycan be sustainable and productive for securitypurposes, for economic development, at least in themedium and long term, if it forgets the principles,

if it strays away from these values and principlesand morals.

It is very important to cooperate within theframework of the Eastern Partnership with our EUfriends as well as directly with the countries of theEastern Partnership. This enables us to cooperate inall the realms that are important for us, beginning

with the issue of security and defence, and dealing with issues no less important such

as education, science, cultural issues, not to mention energy security, transportation,trade etc. This is a very important opportunity for our countries to become closer toEuropean standards.

...We welcome the European Unions and NATOs dialogue with Russia, because webelieve that stronger ties between NATO and the European Union and Russia willencourage Russia to be a more willing player with international roles...

Giorgi BARAMIDZE,Vice Prime-Minister, StateMinister on European andEuro-Atlantic Integration,Georgia

EXPERT FOCUS


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The U.S. has always been a leader of the Alli-ance but it has to be a collective Alliance as allof its members have the right to vote in order toreach a required consensus and, in fact, NATO hasbeen based on such a consensus. ...We will verymuch maintain it. But the essence of U.S. strengthand the strength of our Alliance is that its well-prepared to defend all the members of the Alliance.And we will reaffirm at the NATO Summit in Lisbonthe importance of Article 5, our commitment to de-fend the members of the Alliance.

We are faced with many new threats. As a secu-rity Alliance we will focus on those threats, thoseconcerns that come from our security basics. En-ergy security is one of the new discussions; deal-ing with terrorism is another; cyber-security,e.g. making sure that people cannot act in globalnetworks, and so on. All these demonstrate that wehave to focus on new, broader security challenges,other than the traditional ones. Because we dont

see that any individual country is an enemy ...these new challenges must be facedtogether with the Alliance and its partners.

...About relations with Ukraine. We understand the Governments decision of choosingnot to actively pursue membership in the Alliance at this moment and we respectthis. At the same time, following our meeting in Bucharest, we do see Ukraine being apartner of the Alliance. In relation to this, however, both Ukraine and our neighbourswant to continue the active cooperation which we have between the Alliance and yourcountry. That cooperation is important for what you have done in Afghanistan and

other missions.

Robert SIMMONS,Deputy AssistantSecretary General forSecurity Cooperation andPartnership, NATO HQ,Brussels


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Russia still represents one of the most importantroles in our region. And this is based on spheresof influence. Nobody speaks today about spheresof interest, but there are very clear spheres ofinterest or degrees of interest on behalf of theRussian Federation in its relations. The first sphereinvolves the neighbouring countries of Kazakhstan,Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia. We have a nextstage, which includes members of the EuropeanUnion and NATO, as well as former members of theCommunist camp in other words the Baltic Statesand Eastern Europe, which also are represented in

the Russian Federations zones of interest. Andlastly, of course friendly countries and partnersfrom Western Europe, Western and Eastern Europe,such as Turkey, France, Italy, Germany, which areimportant European partners for Russia.

...We are living in a world in which we havethree different kinds of conflicts, which are linkedtogether. We have the first generation of conflicts

rooted in the Cold War: conflicts in the Middle East, which date back about 60 years,including the tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and other areas. Thenwe have the second generation of conflicts which are related to the dissolution of theSoviet Union and Former Yugoslavia: all the frozen conflicts ranging from Abkhaziaand Ossetia to Transnistria and the Western Balkans. We have a third series of conflicts,which includes global wars, the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, weaponstrafficking, etc. Can the European Union be an important player and actor? Yes, butunder the condition that we can offer the necessary means to build its military andpolitical presence abroad.

We have to concentrate on 3 issues: stabilizing the rules of international law,ensuring institutional stability and the capability of meeting new challenges, andinvolving not only governments but also citizens, civil society, national and sub-national players in all of the processes of decision-making regarding EU security.

Dr. Theodore MELESCANU,Vice-President of Senate,Minister of NationalDefence (2007-2008),Minister for ForeignAffairs (1992-1996),Romania

EXPERT FOCUS


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The position of Moldovas national interest isto develop a strong partnership with its two neigh-bours -Romania and Ukraine, and to become a keypoint of stability.

Ill focus on some elements related to the wayin which the Republic of Moldova can contributetowards the promotion of security and stability inthe region. There are two key directions to this: thefirst step is to transform Moldova into a successful,democratic, predictable European state, and thesecond step is to promote the viable settlement of

the Transnistrian conflict ensuring the integrity ofthe Republic of Moldova. These two goals are inter-related and mutually pre-cursory and solving theTransnistrian conflict is the key factor to makingMoldova an attractive country. These effortsare on three levels: the first level is internal:reorganization, modernization, and transformationof Moldovas inter-level protection of Transnistria.The second level relates to ensuring through

political and diplomatic efforts the security and support of Moldovas partners,primarily in their vital support of finding a viable solution to this conflict. The key,third level of efforts relates to the reversing of the trends of separation, segmentationand drifting apart, which have been taking place during the previous two decades.

We see Transnistria, first of all, not as a territorywhich has to be taken back, but, primarily as acommunity of people who have their interests andconcerns. They have to be listened to and under-stood, and their hearts and minds have to be un-

derstood

Andrei POPOV,Deputy Minister forForeign Affairs andEuropean Integration,Republic of Moldova

I would propose to the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of Ukraine to facilitate the revision of theEuropean Security Treaty and to ensure that solidproposals will be introduced which set up thelegal frameworks of non-bloc status of Ukraine. Itwould give a legal basis for discussions about howto ensure our security. Only after that we can talkabout wider security format.

Volodymyr HORBULIN,Head of National Centrefor Euro-Integration


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This is certainly the case whether the US isabsolutely declining or not. I think it is not! Thesense is that this will proceed in the future and theUS will likely remain the most powerful economicand political force in global affairs. It welcomespower, in part, because of constraints on USactions, and in part also because of the increasingpower of other players.

The main factor that has been poignant andrelevant to this question, of course, is the effectof the global economic crisis on the U.S. and this

effect is real and powerful. Yet there is another onethat may or may not be asked. First, this is politics.After all, the economy tells us what condition thecountry is in and whether it has the resources toengage in foreign policy. Politics always decidewhat course of action to take, and politics inthe U.S. have changed. The results of recentelections really have been quite dramatic. Itsnot simply that the Republican Party has regained

control of the House of Representatives andnearly has regained control of the Senate. Thosetypes of changes are not, in and of themselves,extraordinary, but the shift is what usually

empowers an election. And more importantly, the electoral results were driven by apopular movement campaign, which manifested enormous distrust of the ObamasAdministration, enormous unhappiness in the economic policy, and I think distrustof political institutions in general. And the question that arises in Washington, and isbeing raised for this purpose, is as follows: What should be the foreign policy initiatives

of these people?The new people coming into the House or the Senate have beendriven primarily by domestic concerns. ...What is quite clear is that this group of peopleholds a considerable distrust against multi-level institutions and constraints, and thisis the general sentiment which has been expressed in these elections. These multi-levelnational institutions are too limiting on the U.S. freedom of action. The other elementis the very strong focus on the economy. I think this already reinforces a very powerfultrend in the United States, which resists further choice and, therefore, I dont think weare going to have more interventions of the sort we have recently had in Afghanistan

and in Iraq without enormous political struggles in the U.S.

Robert NURICK,Member, InternationalInstitute for StrategicStudies, the AmericanAssociation for theAdvancement of SlavicStudies and the Central

Eurasia Studies Society,USA

EXPERT FOCUS


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Unfortunately, we have to admit that we are notmoving towards a well-organized and institution-alized collective security, but towards a multi-polarworld that is less stable, less predictable and lacksproper institutional frameworks. Given the eco-nomic recession and sharp increase in problems,including in developed countries, less often canwe say that collaboration by the worlds most de-veloped countries produces effective global solu-tions. The world continues to fight over naturalresources and those global threats, including cli-mate change, remain unanswered. Soft power is

becoming increasingly less effective. Furthermore,its ineffectiveness is increasing the temptation touse military force. Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran areproof of this.

The major changes we see today in the world aretransforming the entire system of international re-lations. A striking example of this is the shift inglobal influence: the growing role of China and In-

dia; the ineffectiveness of international institutions to ensure security and stability,including the UN, NATO and OSCE; the escalation of global conflicts; departure fromnorms of international law that has been the foundation for our system of internationalsecurity and international relations which characterizes the conflicts in Kosovo, Ab-khazia and South Ossetia. All this leads us to admit that the world is becoming increas-ingly less safe.

Petro POROSHENKO,Minister for ForeignAffairs of Ukraine (2009-2010), Secretary ofNational Security andDefence Council (2005),Ukraine


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CAMERA FOCUS


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We have NATO and the EU, which, for us as full-

fledged members, are crucial in terms of ensuring

security through their policy of partnerships, such

as those with Russia, with Ukraine, with Georgia,

the EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Security Council) and so on,

which have created a cooperative security beyond

their borders. These organizations play an important

security role for all countries in the European area.

There exist simultaneous processes of expansion

regarding the countries of Eastern and Central Europe:

they have proven to be an effective instrument for the

stabilization of the region, encouraging political andeconomic reforms and the consolidation of the whole

of Europe. They share the same values and principles,

such as individual freedom, rule of law, market

economy, therefore they both have an intrinsic soft

power dimension.

The important thing is that we are not only in

support of developing our fundamental values, but in favour of actually being satisfied

by these values. NATO or the EU is not in the process of giving up these values, whetherthey are soft or not. These powers are not a drive towards imposing our will on others. It is

rather about leading by the example of others. We should replicate our style while taking

our fundamental values and internalizing them.

The presence of the United States in the Euro-Atlantic cooperation format in the field of

security remains crucial for the security and stability of our continent. Theres also a salient

interest on the part of the European and Euro-Atlantic partners to develop cooperation

and areas of coordination with Russia. Romania is very much open to finding new ways to

cooperate with Russia and is willing to contribute towards the construction of an effectivepartnership based on common values and shared principles.

PLENARY SESSION II: EVOLVING SECURITY DYNAMICS

Is the West Losing its Monopoly on Soft Power?

Transatlantic Relationship: Collective Security or Coalitions of theWilling?

Will Todays Ministries of Defence be Tomorrows Ministries of Security?

Dr. Bogdan AURESCU,Secretary of State forEuropean Affairs, Ministryof Foreign Affairs,Romania


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In the past the world was bipolar. Now many saythat it has become multi-polar. I propose the notionthat the world is non-polar. In terms of polarity, we

had essentially two camps that were different, butnevertheless sought to achieve a balance: strategicbalance, military balance, economic balance, andto certain extent humanitarian balance.

Today everyone agrees that new poles, newcentres, are developing around existing ones. WhatI believe is important is that theyre different different in terms of mentality, economic potential,

their vision for economic development, their visionof global security. Thus, the world we live in hasdifferent poles

Soft security today is dominant. And for me theidea that we have different poles and multilateral regimes is a prototype of the futurearchitecture, including in the security sphere. Any structure, whether bipolar ormulti-polar, is by definition a structure that does not produce security for itself, but

seeks to create security around itself, a structure that will simultaneously have manypoles and multilateral regimes. The multilateral regimes set the rules of the game,and these rules of the game established for the poles, in my opinion, are a uniqueopportunity to create in the future a system that will produce security for itself.

Soft power plays a much greater role then all others. Today, the term soft power isunderstood by many as something that they put themselves in that concept. It lives itslife and is very good. There are key European values that Ukraine must adhere to. Theidea of introducing European values is the basis for the further development of the idea

of soft power, which the European Union can produce rather effectively not only inits own environment, but worldwide. And the European Union needs to learn to producethis soft power because European policy with Russia or the Eastern Partnership so farisnt working that way we would like it to.

Pavlo KLIMKIN,Deputy Minister forForeign Affairs, Ukraine


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We are witnessing a revival and modificationof security processes. We are on the eve of a newStrategic Concept for NATO, new global playersare emerging that impact security At the sametime we are witnessing the emergence of new non-traditional security threats and responses to them,including greater use of so-called soft power. Butthe search for security remains just as it was fifty,thirty, ten years ago the main goal is to ensurethe security of a country, community, citizens andprotect the free market and a countrys energysupply. The main theme of present day global

security processes is the reduced share of themilitary factor and the relevant increase in non-military factors, or so-called soft security.

The security element of the EUs foreign policyremains weak and the European Union shouldfocus more attention on its common foreignsecurity policy.

Borys TARASYUK,Member of the Parliamentof Ukraine, Chairman,Parliamentary Committeeon European Integration,Ukraine

EXPERT FOCUS


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We are now experiencing a period of change inthe world, as fast and as rapid as what happenedduring 19401945. We are experiencing war withchanges and the horrible truth is that our nationaland international solutions, our ministries andorganizations such as the EU and NATO have notbeen able to adapt in order to keep pace withthis change. There are no blocs any more. Theworld, in general, with a few small exceptions, isnot characterized by military confrontation orideological competition. So the idea of balancingis no longer a sensitive issue because theres

nothing to balance. Todays world is characterizedby new powers ascending all over the world.

The next ten years are crucial because they willprobably decide what the world will be like aroundus. This is the new concept we will shape and inwhich we are already living in. New models ofrelationships are replacing the military ideologicalblocs. The EU has also made an effort over the last

half century to create a new model which would take away the unnatural competitionbetween states, and how they perceive aggression, and it has been successful.

But the EU itself is a player within a larger world and the relationships in that wildworld between states are based on a model for which I would like to suggest a title,namely hyper-competition extreme competition is what characterizes this model.Previously, weve called it soft power. This is power, but it is not soft, because its statescompete and they develop new ways of influencing one another...

Chris DONNELLY,Director, Oxford Institutefor Statecraft andGovernance, UnitedKingdom


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There are two components to soft power: theideological product and the method for deliveringthis product. The delivery technique, without adoubt, is constantly being improved. The world hasa brilliant laboratory that is constantly developingnew formulas for delivering information andideological products to people the United Statesof America. From the point of view of delivery,there is constant progress.

Today the world is being presented with aone dimensional ideological product. The Wests

ideological product is now primarily the openmarket, democracy and liberal vales. There is apart of the world that accepts this product. Thatis above all Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, Georgia,Armenia this product is accepted even with thosefeatures that are characteristic for the currentstage of development of ideology, when ideologybecomes a PR ideology.

We look at problems from the context of the Western world, of which Russia, Ukraine,and even Belarus are a part. But in this large western World, we are its periphery,including intellectual and ideological periphery, and this is sad for us.

Dr. Yevgeniy KOZHOKIN,Rector, Academy of Labourand Social Relations;Director, Russia Institutefor Strategic Studies(1994-2009), RussianFederation

EXPERT FOCUS


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A more significant form of power shifting, as manybelieve, is taking place between the great powersof the world. But the debate about the Americandecline, whether or not it exists, is connected, ofcourse, to the rise of another great power. In somesense its a debate about whether America wouldbe less important if there wasnt another greatpower emerging. And another great power is ofcourse China. Since the argument for another typeof power shift exists as well, namely an economicpower shift, it will be political and diplomatic overthe long term, from the United States to China,

which has already affected the region of Asia.

The United States has a long way to go before itgoes down. China at the moment is rising withinthe system. And China recognizes these constraintsbut at the same time we should not underestimateit. Western values remain strong. And what we callthe East, and the many countries in the East stilllook to the West: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan

to the United States both in terms of their ideas and in terms of their basic security.

If the economic crisis continues and shows no signs of going away, and if the rever-berations of the economic crisis also continue, as indeed they are, around the worldand particularly in Europe for the last two or three years, then we could be in a situa-tion where, on the one hand, we have a standard Western economic order in the UnitedStates and Europe, and a dynamic East. If we continue to see this for the next five-ten years, in other words completely uneven economic growth rates, then in tenyears time the good news will be less good news.

Michael COX,Professor, London Schoolof Economics, UnitedKingdom


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There has never been, since the collapse of theHoly Roman Empire, a system of general securityin Europe that has been inclusive, comprehensiveand effective. The systems of collective securitythat have been successful and effective have notbeen inclusive. They have been systems, such asNATO, that were founded on a basis of commoninterests, common values, common practices andcommon working cultures The last inclusivecomprehensive general system of collectivesecurity in Europe was the League of Nations. Itwas not only a failure, but its operations and the

illusions that sustained it, made it more rather thanless difficult to identify, contain and counter realthreats as they were emerging. The one exceptionto this picture was the Concert of Europe in the19th century, and if you look at Russias currentproposals for a new European Security Treaty you

can sense this as an understanding of the Great Concert which the Russian leadershiphas in mind. But let us be very honest about why that system worked. It was not ademocratic system: three of its five great powers were autocracies, absolute monarchies.

It was a hierarchical system that formally limited the rights of smaller powers and it wasa system which legitimized war between the players and was characterized by frequentwars among them.

If Ukraine wishes to strengthen its own security, the starting point should not benew architectures of security which have no historical bases and have not amountedto anything concrete. The starting point must be the use of internal as well as externalmeasures, in order to collaborate more effectively in Ukraines interests with thosesecurity structures that exist, such as NATO. By the way, the CSTO also conforms to

the definition of a non-exclusive but effective system. The challenge for Ukraine is tocollaborate more effectively with those systems that work.

Russias civilizational significance in this part of the world is considerable. But thecivilizational factor and linguistic factor has now been politicized and accentuated ina very effective way. These factors even extend to the project of shaping and reshapingthe historical narrative under which we understand ourselves. The power of Russianbusiness culture in this part of the world is a culture that is fundamentally based on

networks rather than markets. That is a producer-oriented rather than a consumeroriented business market. It is collusive rather than competitive.

Dr. James SHERR,Head, Russia and EurasiaProgram, Chatham House,United Kingdom

EXPERT FOCUS


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Very often during the discussions about thesecurity we hear terms which begin with the wordnew, such as new world order, new terrorism, andnew security environment. We hear about ter-rorism being one of the new challenges that neverexisted before. But most of us here have readabout or actually remember the 1970s. We hearabout the monopoly of violence or the monopolyof military force or force in general being lost bythe States. Think of the end of 19th century andthe beginning of the 20th century: the expansionof anarchism and related terrorist activities. Was

that the end of the monopoly for the States? TheUnited States has not lost the monopoly of pow-er. If the United States so wished, it could havemade Afghanistan look like a parking lot on 9/11and probably the international community wouldnot have had any objections on September 12th,2001. But it chose nuanced warfare much morecomplicated, much more prolonged and much morecostly.

When we look at the issue of invention and innovation, the centres of invention andinnovation are still in the so-called West. Yes, there are some important inventions andinnovations happening in the so-called East, but the East is mostly known for improv-ing the inventions which were created in the so-called West. The main brain power isstill attracted to the West and that is why the East is coming to study and work in theUS and in Europe.

Dr. Bartosz STANISLAWSKI,Director, Mapping GlobalInsecurity Program,Moynihan Institute ofGlobal Affairs, MaxwellSchool, SyracuseUniversity, USA


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We already have the NATO-Russia Council which

can help us build mutual trust and cooperation, but

this will obviously take time. We have to identify

the issues of common interest; where we can work

together, whether it is missile defence, the war

against drugs, terrorism or other issues, and we have

to see how far we can go.

The experts group decided to retrieve the Open

Door policy adopted by NATO which is based on

Article 10 of the Treaty. The report also recommends

that our allies make regular use of the NATO-Ukraine,NATO-Georgia Commissions to discuss mutual

security concerns and to foster practical cooperation,

including on defence reform. It also adds: a

clearer need to articulate its position to partners and

the more accurately it can assess their perceptions,

the more adept the allies will be at defusing crises

and building trust.

Despite the fact that there is a framework agreement between NATO and the UN,cooperation remains a challenge. Both organizations have own culture and priorities, but

as the Afghanistan experience has demonstrated again, NATO has to improve its cooperation

with the UN and with civil society. This will require a number of transformations and I am

pleased to know that our report recommended that a NATO Liaison Office be created at the

UN in New York. We also recommended that a Small Civilian Planning Unit be established

within NATO to maintain points of contact, share information, and engage in joint planning

with partner countries and international organizations.

MORNING PARALLEL SESSION I: NATOS NEW STRATEGICCONCEPT: RETHINKING PARTNERSHIPS

Will Relations with Georgia and Ukraine be Given New Stimulus?

What is the Ideal Role for Russia?

Will NATO Policies Towards Post-Soviet States Continue to Cause InternalDivisions?

Amb. MarieGERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE,Member of NATOs NewStrategic Concept Groupof Experts, Canada


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The first and most important issue is whether ornot the coverage of threats by Article 5 is going tobe extended or not, which means will the Article

5 continue covering only military action or is itgoing to be extended to cover other threats, suchas cyber attacks, or eventually energy security.

There is an entire debate on this issue ofresuming contingency planning, which could makefuture relations between NATO and Russia muchmore difficult if NATO resumes defence planning,particularly with some of its new member states.

The reason for this is that, contingency planningin Europe means developing a war plan againstRussia. It doesnt matter, whether its for defencepurposes or for any other reason, but contingencyplanning means war planning against Russia. Andthis is going to wake every negative instinct inMoscow concerning NATO and NATO policies.

We are still quite far from having a common understanding of what a joint ballisticdefence entails, what is its purpose and how it should be defined, on the practical side.Because in the West, the underlying idea for ballistic defence involves putting assetstogether into one system, integrating assets which already exist or which might appearin the future. While in Moscow the basic task would be: A) to agree, and we have notyet agreed on whether or not we need a ballistic defence; B) to agree on what we needa ballistic defence against; C) exclude the points on which we disagree regarding thisendeavour, and then have a common design and build a joint system which would bejointly managed by all participating states.

Dr. Andrei ZAGORSKI,Professor and LeadingResearcher, Moscow StateInstitute of InternationalRelations (MGIMO),Russian Federation


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Regarding the contentious issues, the StrategicConcept, in my view, should state the following.The Alliance remains a regional organizationbut with a global horizon, and without necessarilyimplying military action, much more intenseconsultation will take place on all security-relevant issues. NATO-EU cooperation needs a newimpetus, which also means overcoming blockagesresulting from national interests, in order to makeit function in a complimentary synergetic wayIt must be made clear that NATO does not want tolead everybody, it doesnt want to coordinate all

others, but rather, to coordinate with them.

NATO must make it clear that it respects theprerogative of the UN Security Council but doesnot totally exclude a Kosovo-like situation. NATOshould also explain its limited role on all the newunconventional security challenges Over all,Article 4 Consultation of the Washington Treaty will be rigorously activated in order to establish

powerful analysis and debate on all security relatedissues worldwide

NATOs partnerships must be further developed and they must be put to use in whatI could call preventive stabilization. Although out-of-area missions are not commonin NATOs spectrum of tasks at the moment, ensured protection of all member-statesremains of the essence...

I think we have greatly misunderstood the Russian political psychology the Imperial

Fatum Pain and we have mismanaged at least the third round of NATO enlargement,while the first round was cushioned by the creation of the NATO-Russia Council which must be developed qualitatively.

The Strategic Concept on Ukraine will place emphasis on the partnership, the use of theNATO-Ukraine Commission. It will not make any advances to Ukraine, such as, pleasecome into NATO, since NATO was never pulling. As far as the signal from Bucharest isconcerned, I am not sure whether we agree on what that signal was. For me, it was a

signal of disunity on a controversy that was totally unnecessary. This has antagonizedRussia in an unnecessary way and Im one of those who think there should be a middleground between no veto for Russia and bending over to Russian indignation; thereneeds to be a middle way of taking into account some Russian interests.

Dr. Klaus WITTMANN,Brigadier General ofBundeswehr (ret),Former Director AcademicPlanning and Policy at theNATO Defence College inRome, Germany

EXPERT FOCUS


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NATO will take responsible actions togetherwith every partner willing to cooperate with uson security and defence matters. If we put thispillar together and look at the question of howour conference is changing the security paradigm,and the security paradigm of the nation could looklike the following. It is in our interest to meet thesecurity threats head-on as early, in the stage ofescalation, as possible in order to: A) diminishand limit the potential damages as far away aspossible from the national borders, because thenew threats can very easily infiltrate society

through different channels that are provided as aresult of globalization, and B) eliminate them assoon as possible in order to downsize and limit thepossibilities of the manoeuvring of the threateningsource. This new security paradigm requires a totalchange of the national security policy of everycountry.

Europe needs to talk with Russia and probably

with Turkey. The recent meeting of the German Chancellor and French President with theRussian President Medvedev demonstrates a remarkable development in this direction.If you add to this fact the proposal of Chancellor Merkel to establish an EU-RussiaSecurity Council and if you add to this the ambition of President Sarkozy to establisha common economic space with Russia, along with a specific security concept, thenthe picture is much clearer. The tendency towards establishing a cooperative securitysystem in Europe is much more realistic than ever before. In my opinion, this does notat all mean the disengagement of the United States in Europe

Amb. Valeri RATCHEV,Head of the PoliticalCabinet, Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Republicof Bulgaria


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Russia-NATO relations are critical for Ukrainessecurity because Ukraine will always be an irritantin these relations. The partnership betweenUkraine and NATO will largely depend on the extentto which Ukraine finds its place in this triangle.As for Russias participation in the Ballistic MissileDefence system, I believe it is hardly impossiblebecause it is unlikely to expect the level of trustthat will allow NATO to delegate some of theresponsibility to such a partner.

Oleksiy MELNYK,Military Programs LeadingExpert, Razumkov Center

EXPERT FOCUS

Dr. Thanos DOKOS,Director General, HellenicFoundation for Europeanand Foreign Policy(ELIAMEP), Greece

Most analysts, especially in the West, wouldconsider NATO as the most successful Alliancein the history. Nevertheless, its continuinginfluence has been questioned quite oftenboth by experts and by politicians and mostimportantly by public opinion, what we callthe tax payers. So NATO has been challengedand it has to adapt to a new global securityenvironment, to the new political challenges.The new Strategic Concept will try to squarethe circle and to reassure the NATO members

in the former Eastern Europe that it will firmlyguarantee their security. At the same time itwill try to revitalize its relations with Russia,but there are two issues that it has with Russia:one is enlargement and Ukraine; and the issue ofmissile defense.


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The idea of resilience is actually something that

comes from Physics. If you take an object, lets think

about an object for a second, if you drop this object,

you know it might break. Its very much focused on

the braking of this particular entity, the braking of

the state, the failing of the state and then that leads

to security consequences. Resilience urges you to

look at the object itself.

An equivalent, in a more traditional security field,

would be what we are doing in terms of the security

sector reform. There we try to build resilience in

states, so that they can start taking care of their own

security problems.

Resilience is something that has really caught-on

in the homeland security crowd. The first responders

are not the fire brigade and are not necessarily thepolice who run it its the people at home. When a

crisis breaks out, if they have the resilience to deal

with these issues, the crisis will never aggrandize in the larger issues where we have to

make much more effort afterwards. So the homeland security community has really taken

resilience almost as the heart of their efforts now.

Security is not just about international organizations such as NATO or the EU. Its not even

just about our governments its also about every individual, its about your children, your

parents.We are on the eve of rather quite major changes and we are not doing well in the security

arena.

MORNING PARALLEL SESSION II: TWO TERMS, ONE MEANING:NATIONAL RESILIENCE OR HOMELAND SECURITY?

How do we Define Threats? What Tools and Strategies are Required toStrengthen National Resilience in a Multicultural and Institutionally

Diverse Europe?

What are the Resources Required to Build Resilience? At what LevelShould our Capabilities be?

How Effective are Private-Public Partnerships in Protecting CriticalInfrastructure?

Stephan DE SPIEGELEIRE,Senior Scientist, DirectorDefence Transformation,the Hague Centre for

Strategic Studies, theNetherlands


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We do not consider the terrorism to be a war. Itis a battle, a fight for which Germany uses thesystem of the criminal law and the penal code. In

other words it is the activity of law enforcementagencies, supported by external and internalintelligence structures.

We alone cannot be certain that we will besecure. So, thats why we are nation-states, thenwe are not an inter-link, but are tied to each otherin this field by the assessment centres of the NATOand the European Union and second, the we are tied

to each other by the police structures which arealso linked within Europe, for example EUROPOL.

The Cold War era, over time, actually evolved intoa capacity whereby countries were transformed tocope with any emergency, so that now emergencyreadiness capabilities can and must be repeatedlychecked every four, five, or six years. However, it

would be in vain if the application of the law canbe manipulated.

The open societies, who usually have control through the process of electionsand through investigation committees of the parliamentary institutions, so thatthe abuse and by-passing can be reduced to a minimum. However, open societies such as those where we had hurricane Katrina demonstrate to us that they alsohave deficiencies. And therefore, open societies have to review the way in which, forinstance, private enterprise runs infrastructure, and then in the case where government

controls are needed to make private enterprise function, these controls must complywith a number of rules. Again, it all comes back to the rule of good governance. Andnow my conclusion is that everyone who lives in Europe, but outside the EU, thinks thatit would be a good idea to live in the EU.

Dr. Hans-Georg WIECK,Ambassador, President ofFederal German ForeignIntelligence Agency(BND) (1985-1990),Germany

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Some people feel they are very different anddistinct, i.e. homeland security on one side, internal, national security on the other side external. I happen to believe in the middle-groundapproach, which suggests that homeland securityand national security really are inter-twined, andhomeland security is a part of national security.The reason that distinction is important, it isntjust for philosophical reasons; it actually wastranslated into bureaucratic reasons in the UnitedStates. What I mean by that is: at 9/11 we realizedthat our government was not effectively organized

to manage the threat of terrorism.

With respect to resilience the way that ourhomeland security enterprise is organized, wehave four major thrust areas: preparedness,protection, response, and recovery. Preparednessmeans getting ready for something, - whetherit is a disaster or natural disaster, or terroristattack and the way we primarily prepare as a

nation of the United States is, we at the Federallevel provide funding in the form of grants to sub-national governments, in our case, to state and local governments. Protection andcritical infrastructure protection are important, and as a result you could end up havingpublic-private partnerships. There is some funding available to the private sector andto organizations, to help secure these areas.

In the United States more than three-quarters, over 75 percent of our criticalinfrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, so the Government does

not control it, but at the same time when it comes to electrical power, lights, hospitals,roads and bridges these areas are absolutely necessary following a terrorist attack.Response is fairly straight forward responding; that is what FEMA (Federal EmergencyManagement Agency) traditionally does. Recovery this is generally when the Federalgovernment pays state and local entities to recover from that disaster.

Daniel J. KANIEWSKI,Assistant Vice Presidentfor Homeland Securityand Deputy Director,Homeland Security PolicyInstitute, the GeorgeWashington University,

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National resilience requires actions not justfrom the government, but from business andfrom individuals. A public-private partnershipin national resilience is essential, because somany critical services are now delivered by theprivate sector. But it is not too difficult to seehow business encourages the making of money, aprofit, and seeing the system as perhaps somethingyou might need, or might take, to preserve theresilience of the system. It is also a challenge tomotivate individuals to play their part in nationalresilience.

In some ways, developing countries can be moreresilient, because, perhaps, the citizens are moreused to making do on their own as they facedevelopment. Citizens cant often go placementbecause governments tend to provide more, theirexpectation to the government can be higher.

Bryden SPURLING,Deputy Director,Strategic Policy Guidance,Department of Defence,Australia

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75 to 80 percent of Canadas trade is with theUS. So if the trade stops, if its interrupted, thatssignificant. We have an integrated electricity grid.As a result, the electricity lines crisscross the bor-der and we supply each other, so its not the one-way supply, it goes in both directions. We realizedthat we have dependences and inter-dependencesacross the border. We need to increase capabilityof preventing incidents, and protection is a part ofthis resilience concept. Protection is a part of it,but resilience is much broader. We want to miti-gate the effect that incidents have on our critical

infrastructures, because it is important for quickeconomic recovery and for operational resilienceas well.

Certainly, the private sector does not have a re-sponsibility for national security ... its the gov-ernment that has the responsibility, but not thecapability, if we are talking about, for example,electricity sector in North America because most

of the generators, operators, and owners are from the private sector. Certainly, it helpsif it is a regulated industry.

You need the appropriate leadership in the region to make this work. Somebody hasto lead this and maybe this has to be a co-chair, because we have a private sector andthe public sector in the room, and obviously our viewpoints, our perspectives and ourmandates are quite different from each other. From our experiences the informationsharing element of building this public-private partnership is hard nut to crack.

Bjorn RUTTEN,Senior ResearchAssociate, the ConferenceBoard of Canada, Canada


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Many of the threats and challenges are of thecross-border nature. So when we talk about theorganization of the security sector, first andforemost, we need to be sure that each individualorganization provides robust capabilities to dealwith primary challenges and responsibilities,as well as capabilities that might be useful forother types of threats and challenges. Thereare also needs for an increased cooperation andcoordination of cross-border activity, and of allthis requires information exchange, knowledgeand something that we rarely talk about trust.

We have to recognize that governments cannot inprincipal be fully prepared to deal with the spectrumof threats and challenges. And the citizens cannotbe seen only as recipients of services providedby the state and other public organizations. Wecannot provide resilience unless the citizens andthe society as a whole are involved in makingthemselves more resilient. To achieve resilience, in

that regard, is not only the matter of legislation, bureaucratic procedures and provisionof equipment, it is a matter of perceptions and attitudes of the people.

Resilience means that vital services are available or quickly recovered after thecalamity. In Europe, in the US and elsewhere, that subject is often discussed underthe rubric of critical infrastructure. Implementing the concept of resilience, in manycases, means that we need to create some sort of redundancies. This means weneed to invest in those redundancies. We need to think about investments that wouldnot necessarily be made according to conventional business logic, i.e., looking for

competitive business.

Dr. Todor TAGAREV,Associate Professor,Centre for Security andDefence Management,Bulgarian Academy ofSciences, Republic ofBulgaria

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I think this topic may be of the utmost impor-tance to us Ukrainians, because we experiencedthe Chernobyl catastrophe. After Chernobyl, wehad a number of catastrophes and many chemicalaccidents, and we have a bureaucratic mess. Inother words, we have many institutions, but, first ofall, we dont have good coordination among thoseinstitutions. Furthermore, it is very important forme to mention the problem of informing citizensabout what happened, because, many of our citi-zens do not believe in official statements and ingovernment propaganda.

Amb. Yuriy SHCHERBAK,Ambassador, Director,Center of Global andRegional Researches ofKiev-Mohyla Academy


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There are a number of problems, dilemmas and

paradoxes which exist in the region, but one recurring

notion, is that all the problems which emerged in

early 1990s, continue to remain as problems. None

of the problems that emerged at the end of the ColdWar have been solved in the region. And this is the

only constant in the region everything is changing,

but the problems are remaining as they are. We

realized that the so-called frozen conflicts are not

so frozen. There are other paradoxes and dilemmas,

including uneven economic development in the

region, environmental degradation, inconclusive

results of democratization, an unsatisfactory level of

regionalization, etc.

Black Sea politics emerging within the region have

not been able to create Black Sea regionalization by

itself. In other words, the politics alone did not generate enough power to create integrity,

good governance and interdependencies. Therefore, outside interested parties should

support and should encourage this. You need push from outside, pressures from outside.

The Black Sea is the only place in the world where Russia, the European Union and the

United States have developed distinct policies and different interests. And also of course,

you have regional polices, difference etc. Thus, this is an area where many problems may

occur if we dont deal with them soon.

Aside from Turkey, none of the regional countries had placed a priority on Black Sea issues.

Even Turkey didnt place a priority on Black Sea issues, but it did develop a number of

initiatives on the Black Sea. For Russia, the Black Sea is part of the Caucasus. Ukraine doesnt

consider itself a Black Sea country. Romania briefly became a Black Sea country between

2005 and 2007, and I think it was not an internal idea; this happened from the outs

4th kyiv security forum digest

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