5- luhmann's general sociology

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Luhmann's General SociologyAuthor(s): Dag sterbergReviewed work(s):Source: Acta Sociologica, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2000), pp. 15-25Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4201179 .

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ACTA OCIOLOGICA000

Luhmann's General Sociology

Dag 0sterbergDepartment of Music and Theatre, University of Oslo, Norway

ABSTRACTThe article deals with Niklas Luhmann's treatise Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft,exposing it to a critique in terms of Luhmann's own criterion: plausibility. It is arguedthat both Parsons' general sociology and Marxism render more plausible accounts ofmodern society than does Luhmann's theory of autopoietic systems. It is asserted thatthe fundamental mistake in Luhmann's theory is his conflation of the concepts ofdifferentiated social systems and autonomous social systems, a conflation that confers aring of the imaginary to Luhmann's treatise.

Dag 0sterberg, University of Oslo, Department of Music and Theatre, P.O. Box 1017,Blindem, N-0315 Oslo, Norway? Scandinavian Sociological Association 2000

1. Introduction

Ten years ago, in a book on general sociology, Idevoted a chapter to Luhmann's book SozialeSysteme (1984). I concluded with a provisionalepokj?, saying that it was too early for me tomake up my mind as to the validity of this avant-garde approach. Since then, Luhmann hascarried out his entire programme. After publish-ing a series of monographs on particular socialinstitutions, he crowned his life work in 1997with a huge treatise on society as a whole, worldsociety - Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997).As an opportunity to concentrate on Luh-mann's work and take a stance towards it, thepresent occasion is favourable. Mainly, I shallcomment upon Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft(GdG). This voluminous book contains much ofphilosophical and meta-sociological concern -considerations on non-Aristotelian logic, on the'old European' ontology and how to transcendit, on the constructivity of science, etc. I shall,however, limit myself here to questions of amore straightforward sociological character.But in the first two sections, I comment onsome aspects of Luhmann's writings, whichsomehow disturb the sociological reading,before turning to the real subject matter, 'dieSache selbst'.

2. The aggressively anti-left-wing tone ofLuhmann's writingsuhmann's writingsAlready in Soziale Systeme (1984), an anti-left-wing attitude was discernible, in spite of theextremely abstract or general tone of thediscussions in the book. The reason for thiswas that left-wing political positions or activitieswere relatively often used as negative examples.In GdG this anti-left-wing attitude is sharper, asin others of his later writings. All over thethousand pages are sprinkled sarcastic orcondescending or polemical anti-left-wingremarks, which go beyond the mere refutationof a different, adverse doctrine.It is hard to say whether this is incon-sequential to Luhmann, considering that hepurports to transcend all sorts of politics andmoralizing. He poses as one who has pierced theillusions of his contemporaries, who are stuck inan outdated 'semantics' which does not suitwhat he calls 'modern society'. More than anyother great sociologist of the past, Pareto is theone who comes to mind when reading GdG. He,too, liked or could not resist venting his politicalantipathies in the midst of a huge, learned andserious treatise on general sociology.As one example, Luhmann writes (p. 613in.) about 'Marx's trick' of describing society as

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16 ACTASOCIOLOGICA000 VOLUME3

constituted by two social classes. Now, as mostsociologists will know, Marx himself stated (inDas Capital, III. ch. 52) that capitalist society inhis time was constituted by three classes, thecapitalists, the wage-earners and the land-owners. This error raises the suspicion thatLuhmann's vast readings do not include Marx'sDas Capital. But this is a minor point here. Theissue is rather why Luhmann uses the word'trick', thereby suggesting that Marx intended todeceive his readers.

Another example is Luhmann's section(pp. 847 ?T.) on 'protest movements' - theatmosphere is chilly, sarcastic, if not downrighthateful. By ingenious theological reasoning -Luhmann knows a lot about theology - hemanages to present the position of the protestmovement as that of the Devil: just as the Devilpretends to observe God from an independentposition (which is 'impossible'), the participantof a protest movement, Luhmann asserts,pretends to 'know better' than society, whichis also impossible and at best ridiculous. Now, inmy own experience, protest movements do notpretend to 'know better' than 'society', but'better' than the political authorities, which isquite another thing. Luhmann's diabolic inter-pretation of protest movements is thereforeunfounded. But he also goes on to assert that'nothing' warrants the assumption that aprotest movement knows better than theauthorities and their experts. Now, at least inNorway, exactly this has happened severaltimes.

A third example is found in Die Kunst derGesellschaft, wherein Luhmann refers in passing(p. 228) to Adorno's and Horkheimer's 'arro-gant rejection' of mass culture. (It almost goeswithout saying that there are many otherattacks on the Frankfurter School in hiswritings.) Adorno was - in addition to aprofessional philosopher - an outstandingmusicologist and an expert on literature. Healso wrote on film music together with HansEisler. Obviously he was entitled to have his ownopinion on 'mass culture', which he disliked.Why does this dislike qualify as 'arrogance'?Why should we instead trust Luhmann's judg-ment on mass culture, and his judgment onAdorno? Luhmann entangles himself in self-contradictions. He states and repeats that oneshould not pose as a Besserwisser, as theFrankfurter School did and does - so whyshould he himself pretend to know better thanAdorno and Horkheimer?

Aggressive remarks like these may be

subconscious slips of the pen; they revealLuhmann's political stances, but, strictly speak-ing, should not occur within a sociologicaltreatise on this level of abstraction and general-ity.

3. Platitudes and cynicismsPlatitudes of 'gesunde Vernunft'In Luhmann's writings, extreme radicalism goestogether with a strong conformity and establish-ment attitude. His books abound with extremelycommon-sense remarks in favour of the Estab-lishment. Here follow a few examples to indicatewhat I have in mind.

In GdG, Luhmann writes (p. 492): 'Who-ever wants to abolish nuclear plants (Atom-kraftwerke) therefore will find himself con-fronted by the question: How, then, do weotherwise produce electricity?'. One response isthat the consumption of electricity seemsboundless today. Norway, with all its waterfalls,imports electricity from Denmark. Examples ofsheer waste can easily be given. Now, those whooppose nuclear-driven plants very often opposethis boundless consumption of electricity, mak-ing a plea for a diminished consumption ofelectricity if necessary. This is not just a whim;surveys in Norway strongly indicate that themajority would prefer a simpler material life.Besides, surely there are other possible energysources: wind, sea waves, the sun. (In Norway,research on sea waves had a promising startaround 1970, but was neglected by theauthorities when the North Sea oil was dis-covered.) Luhmann's remark trivializes the deepconcern about the danger of nuclear energy; hetakes for granted that nobody will renouncewarm showers and drawing rooms (where thetemperature has risen from 18? to 24 ?C onaverage in recent decades.)On p. 531 we read: 'In the meantime,society has got habituated to technics', and onthe next page we read that turning away fromtechnology 'is practically out of question'. Thisis true, but a platitude, a very boring remark.This boredom may be intentional; Luhmann - asociologist of unlimited imagination - pretendsto be confined within extremely narrow bound-aries. Technology must be accepted - why?Because it has become a habit. But habits,surely, can be changed? No, that is practicallyout of the question. But what does 'practically'mean in this context? Could it mean just thatLuhmann feels comfortable with the present



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Luhmann'sGeneralSociology 17^?mst?***^?;level of technology in his everyday life? A fewpages earlier (p. 523), he states peremptorily:'Since it is only too clear that life and survivaldepends on technics, it becomes implausible 'tomake the true human the contrary of technics".This, also, is a platitude, almost a tautology: ourpresent-day Western way of life depends on'technics' for its survival. But that cannot meanthat humanity as a whole cannot survivewithout technology; at any rate, this is not atall 'obvious' (?berdeutlich). On the other hand,what does seem obvious is that the populationas a whole cannot adopt the Western level oftechnology without the ecological systembreaking down. For instance, not everybodycan have a car. A reasonable conclusion to bedrawn is that the West must considerablyreduce its use of energy-consuming technologyand chemical products, even if this changemakes life materially less comfortable. Surely,Luhmann is acquainted with this simple reason-ing; by ignoring it in his text, he tries to inducein the reader conformity to the Establishedorder, which is still oriented towards technolo-gical growth (pace the Brundtland Report).In Goffmannian terms, Luhmann's framingof his texts, his context of plausibility, is veryoften that of the Establishment, of the liberal-conservative politics and ideology prevailingwithin the ruling and dominating circles. Hisplatitudes have this purpose: to make the readertake for granted the code of Establishment.Cynicism and blas? attitudeTo exemplify Luhmann's cynicism, I shallcomment upon a passage from ?kologischeKommunikation (pp. 212ff.). The topic is therole of values in contemporary political discus-sions, how decisions are increasingly under-pinned by referring to 'values', which leads toan inflation of 'values'. Now, Luhmann has gotan inkling ('man kann ahnen) that the discus-sions of ecology will contribute to this infla-tionary process. In the first place, he surmises,pure air and water, trees and animals will attainthe dignity of entering the 'list of values' (in theidiom of laconic German: they will becomeWertkatalogfdfhig). He then goes on: 'And since itis just a question of a list, one could extend it adlibitum: pandas, Tamils, women . . . '. Thereader is prone to smile approvingly at thisremark, but also feels that this kind of humouris an invitation to cynicism for several reasons.In the first place, one is supposed to endorse('mitmachen) Luhmann's placement of animalsand human beings on an equal footing.

Certainly, pandas are darlings, cherished ani-mals for campaigns of the World Wildlife Fundand similar organizations. But are we to think ofTamils as pandas? For one thing, Tamil Nadu isa state in India, with approximately 30 millioninhabitants. To suggest that they should beincluded in a list of threatened species is tosuggest the possibility of exterminating them.Perhaps Luhmann had in mind merely theTamil refugees in Germany, but why supposethat they are more or less valuable than otherhuman beings, candidates for a 'catalogue ofvalues'? And then 'women': the suggestionseems to be that the various feminist move-ments, while claiming equality with men, willgo on and claim that women are more valuablethan men, or that they feel threatened withextermination like pandas, which portrays thefeminist movement as hysterical or extremelyunrealistic. It also suggests that a woman is adarling just like a panda, easily arousing ourimmediate compassion, which sort of sugges-tion should be resisted by sensible sociologists.Turn and twist it as you like, this kind of wit ismorally reproachable.

Luhmann, presumably, is fed up withplaying the sociologist in the expected role asa goodie-goodie, backing every conceivableGood Cause, speaking for the wretched of theearth, for the underprivileged, for the oppressed,for aboriginal populations, for those who areDifferent as such. Instead, he opts for a certaincynicism, emphasizing the modest role ofsociology in social life today. On this last pointhe may be right, but the situation does not callfor cynicism. The lawyer is committed to Justice,the medical doctor is committed to Health, theteacher is committed to the Youth, etc. Theseare ethical professions that impose moralobligations on those who have chosen them.The sociologist, too, may be under moralobligations. But a commitment to make societybetter is not sufficient. What matters is theprofessional achievement. The sociologists whomake themselves spokesmen for groups whojustly feel that their social rights are beingviolated may appear to be goodie-goodies, butonly if they perform badly. If what they have tosay in public comes out as mere trivial outburstsof indignation, sociologists are useless. Theirspecific, professional contribution is to underpinthe moral standpoint with better argumentsand research data than most non-sociologistscould do, or to reformulate the moral protestwithin a more appropriate social context. Inother words, the sociologist role is a moral or



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moralist one, just like that of the lawyer ormedical doctor. This may sometimes be tiresomeor cause uneasy feelings of hypocrisy. But that isno reason for the sociologist to opt for cynicism.Let us leave all consideration of attitudeand tone aside, since it disturbs the reallyimportant subject matter of Luhmann's work,i.e. his construction of an alternative to allsociology up till now, to which I now turn.

4. Two basic tenetsLuhmann's two basic tenets are as follows:

1. 'Modern society' is above all characterizedby ever-increasing 'differentiation' and 'com-plexity';2. 'Modern systems theory' is best suited todescribe modern society in a scientific way.

By 'differentiation' Luhmann means a prolifera-tion of 'autonomous' or 'autopoietic' socialsystems, each of them defined or constitutedby its own specific code or 'leading difference'.Any social system deals with its surroundings -its Umwelt - solely in terms of its specific code.Therefore, it would be misleading to say thateach social system is a Leibnizian 'monad', a'world of its own', a solus ipse. On the contrary,any social system communicates with itssurroundings precisely by virtue of its closed-ness. Only, it communicates through its owncode. Social systems are - according to Luh-mann - a subclass of communication systems.Therefore, sociology should be transformed intoa branch of communication theory, or - whatcomes to the same thing - a branch of modernsystems theory.Modern systems theory - according toLuhmann - has made considerable progressaway from the systems thinking that influencedParsons' and his school of functional sociology.While Parsons described 'social systems' interms of 'adaptation', 'integration', 'equili-brium' and 'maintenance mechanisms', thuspresenting social life as by and large preoccu-pied with stability and self-preservation, therecent systems theory of Maturana and othersemphasizes wholly different characteristics.

5. Stratified and functionally differentiatedsocieties'The great transformation' according to Luh-mann is the shift from a society constituted by

social stratification to one constituted by func-tional differentiation. With him, the term'stratification' seems to denote a system ofestates or St?nde. Modern society is not withoutsocial stratification, but this is no longer anessential trait. One's social origin (Herkunft)'hardly plays any longer a role within thefunctional systems' (p. 734). (This recalls theLinton-Parsonian distinction 'ascribed status-achieved status', and is probably meant as animprovement on that.) Within functionallydifferentiated society, each 'function' corre-sponds to or defines an autopoietic system,each with a specific leitdifferenz, communicatingwith the environment according to its code.From Parsonian functionalism Luhmannmakes a most important break - to him, 'thefunctional' is dissociated from all concerns withsocial 'integration' (though, as I shall arguelater, he is inconsequential on this point). WithParsons, the functionally differentiated institu-tions contribute, each in its specific way, to themaintenance of society as a whole. Luhmannexpressly denies this.

In any case, one must give up the idea dominatingthe research on modernization after WWII, that is.the idea that modernization trends within theparticular functional systems - political democ-racy, rule of law. research unhampered by dogmas,non-censured mass media, schooling of the wholepopulation according to their individual capacitiesetc. - will trigger off an impulse of development,where the achievement of each particular functionsystem would reciprocally support and affirm theother, (p. 568)

Precisely this was the presupposition of Parsons.Luhmann, by contrast, adds: 'Rather, theopposite is probable' (ibid.) That is to say. theevolution of modern societies points towardsdissolution and disintegration, if it has anydirection at all.

Luhmann states that modern society is notpredictable, nor does he think that sociology cantell the truth about social life. By what criteriathen are we to judge Luhmann's generalsociology? His own criterion is plausibility: 'Thesemantics in question must be plausible andappropriate (passen) to the structures of thesocial system' (p. 156). And: 'Every self-descrip-tion demands historical plausibility in thesituation in which the self-description isregarded as such' (p. 1137).In order to evaluate the plausibility ofLuhmann's sociology I begin by sketching twopre-existing plausible accounts of modern



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Luhmann'sGeneralSociology 19

society, i.e. Parsonian and Marxist interpreta-tions.

6. The plausibility of Parsons' 'semantics'In many ways, Luhmann's construction endea-vours to improve upon and supersede that of hisformer teacher, Parsons. One may thereforewith good reason reflect on the plausibility ofParsons' interpretation of the contemporaryworld, especially as presented in his The Systemof Modern Societies from 1971. (This book,together with its preceding companion volume,is an overview published when Parsons was 68years old, and thus is a pendant to Luhmann'sGdG, published when he was 70 years old.)Parsons describes modern society in terms of hisaction theory and its specification of varioustypes of action, chosen from a number ofstructural variables-universalism-particular-ism, specificity-diffuseness, etc. The modernworld is characterized by the paramountimportance of the universalism-performance-affect neutrality pattern-foreshadowed by theCalvinist type of the Reformation age. Thispattern is internalized as a prevalent personalitytype and institutionalized as a cultural pattern.But this value pattern, while dominant, is notthe only one. On the contrary, it stands in acomplementary relation to other patterns, suchas the pattern dominating within the familyinstitution, and within institutions like scienceand art. Generally, modern society is charac-terized by advanced functional differentiation:each differentiated subsystem has its functionwithin the system as a whole, which makes thesystem as such highly flexible and adaptive.This is so, provided there is sufficientintegration of the system; i.e. the subsystemsand their institutions - while having their own'logic' or specific value pattern

- must at thesame time be functional to the system as awhole. The subsystems must be subordinated tothe system, through value integration. This iswhat by and large has gone on over thecenturies. Thus, one can follow the doubleevolutionary process of differentiation andintegration since the age of the renaissanceand reformation in Europe. The first stage wasthe differentiation of political and religiousinstitutions; the next was the differentiation ofeconomy and household institutions; the thirdwas the differentiation of professional life andeducational culture. The leading societies of thisevolution were England and Holland, but

around the turn of the last century, the USAbecame the lead society. It had become asdemocratic as France and as industriallyadvanced as England, combining these twofeatures on a new level of integration anddifferentiation.What makes the USA so markedly modernis first its absence of nobility and aristocraticculture. American culture is egalitarian, based

upon the value of work and individual achieve-ment. Next, it is the absence of religiouspersecution. Religious life in the USA is plural-ist; indeed, the emigration to America began asan escape from the horrors of religious intoler-ance in Europe. In the USA, religion is not partof the political constitution, but differentiated aspart of civil society. Third, the differentiationbetween daily community life and the legalinstitution is marked; the legal system isimportant for integrating society as a whole,regulating conflicts according to universalistprinciples. Fourth, the political institution issharply differentiated from the economy, mak-ing charges of 'corruption' very serious.

Early America was characterized by amultitude of different ethnic and religiousgroups. Their integration, socially and cul-turally, has been going on by and large un-interrupted. The evolutionary trend has beentowards ever more widespread commitment tothe dominant value system. Ethnic and otherdifferences have been overcome through 'adap-tive upgrading' of the cultural and socialsystems, through a parallel process of general-ization and differentiation. The functionality ofthis most modern of societies is shown by itscapacity to adapt to new challenges from theenvironment.

The conflicts within this modern societymay be considerable, but they do not challengethe dominant cultural pattern as such. Left-wing opponents comment harshly upon theglaring inequalities and injustices of the system,but in doing so, they presuppose that very valuesystem. No alternative cultural and social modelhas been important in the USA. True, the SovietUnion has been a 'counterpart' model since theCold War, at least. But closer scrutiny revealsthat on many points, the Soviet Union repeatsthe modernization process of Western countries,and thus does not proffer an essentially differenttype of society. Its lack of differentiation betweenthe economy and the polity is a pre-moderntrait, making the system less flexible andadaptive than that of the USA. The prospect isthat the Soviet Union will get more and more



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similar to the USA in the future. The same goesfor other non-Western societies - Japan, China,etc.Thus, a synthesis of Durkheimian andWeberian sociology is attained. With Durkheim,

Parsons approaches modern society from theperspective of social and cultural integration.Drawing on recent psychology and psychother-apy, he gives a better understanding of how theindividual internalizes and adapts to his or hersociety, and how personality conflicts have to dowith conflicts and disintegrative features of thesocial groups to which the individual belongs.On the basis of recent, neo-evolutionary biology,he develops Durkheim's sociology of differentia-tion and integration, taking the 'culturalsymbol' as the sociological equivalent of thebiological 'gene', and stressing 'adaptive up-grading', thus meeting the objection that hissociological theory is static.With Weber, Parsons stresses the impor-tance of Western Rationality. He shows how theprofessional in modern organizational life -within business, politics, science, etc. - hasinternalized the value pattern that originatedwithin English and Dutch Reformed Christian-ity, stressing self-control, individuality, 'inner-worldly asceticism'. Parsons combines neo-Freudian psychology with (neo)-Weberianism:the paramount role of the universalism-achievement-affect neutrality pattern entailsconsiderable strain on the personality, threaten-ing neurosis and mental disturbance. Thefunction of modern family life is to counteractthese tendencies; the value pattern of themodern family differs strongly from, say, thatof the Wilhelmine era. In the modern Americanfamily, affectionate relations are all-important,and the significance of marital sexual relationsparamount. The much-derided 'money/sex'preoccupation is therefore a case of adaptiveupgrading, of counteracting disintegration bydifferentiation. Similar considerations pertain tothe differentiation of the scientific subsystem inrelation to religion, or the subsystem of art inrelation to science, etc.

By an elaborate system of 'pattern vari-ables', combined with a refined theory ofdifferentiation, integration, functionality andconflict, Parsons succeeds in giving a highlyplausible account of modern societies. In fact, hisinterpretation appears more plausible today thanat the time it was published. For at that time, theStudent and Counterculture movements hadstarted, protesting against the achievementorientation of the dominant middle-class cui-

ture. This was the heyday of Marcues's Erosphilosophy (opposed to the 'sex-and-work'pattern). Further, the USA's engagement inVietnam was becoming more and more alarm-ing, demonstrating violent and amodernaggression as an aspect of American modernity,an aspect Parsons played down in his account.In addition, Third World countries hadimportant liberation movements, fightingagainst capitalist imperialism, making a deepimpression upon public opinion in the West.Also, the cultural revolution in China had manyfamous proponents. From this perspective,Parsons appeared as a model of the Apologistof his own society. Today, Parsons' anticipationshave been confirmed to a large extent. Norwe-gian society, for instance, has become moresimilar to the USA in recent decades. Themodernization of Asia also goes on in an'American way'. Even the core of the former'counterpart', the Soviet Union, has developed a'market economy' - and so on. The system ofmodern societies appears to be as well inte-grated as ever, under the leadership of the USA -at least from the viewpoint of a sociology ofsocial integration and differentiation.

7. The plausibility of 'Marxism'There has been a widespread flight away fromMarxist doctrines in the last two decades,especially after the dissolution of the Union ofSocialist Soviet Republics, and the reunion(Wiedervereinigung) of East and West Germany.These two momentous political events are oftenpresented as the reasons for a turning awayfrom Marxist stances. This may hold true insome arenas, but from the standpoint of generalsociology, Marxist interpretations of the worldhave not weakened during the 1980s and1990s.

The mode of production characterizingWestern societies is capitalist in the strictsense: it is defined by private ownership of themeans of production and distribution, and thisproperty is administered as capital, i.e. as valueto be augmented in the form of 'profit'. Thecomplement to capital is wage labour and thewage labour-market. The market as an institu-tion makes for competition and non-co-opera-tion, thus making prices appear as the outcomeof supply and demand. For this reason, thecapitalist mode of production and distribution isalso called the 'market economy'.The main cultural code defending and



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legitimating this mode of production is Liberal-ism. It may be advocated in more or less goodfaith, more or less hypocritically. Liberalismcelebrates the capitalist mode of production asthe bulwark of Freedom for all, and also asconducive to economic or material Progress forall.

Liberalism defends the unalienable right ofeach individual to property and freedom, in thetradition of Locke. Its blindness has beenpointed out by both Conservative and Socialistthinkers, countless times. Sociologically, it mustbe considered as a refuted doctrine. Notwith-standing this refutation, Liberal thought con-tinues to dominate the cultural world of Capital,with its cult of individualism. On the philoso-phical or ideological level the prestige of neo-liberal economic theory and its ramifications(game theory, economic theory of marriage,etc.) underpin the capitalist mode of production.

Through its 'materialist conception ofHistory' Marxist thought points out how theartefacts of human activities become a kind of'actor' in social life, in addition to its humanparticipants. By generalizing the role of Capitalas an acting historical force, one obtains thenotion of a 'practico-inert field' (Sartre 1960) ora 'socio-material field', which makes possible anon-intellectualist doctrine of social action, thuscontradicting the Liberal doctrine.

Capitalist production and distribution tendto expand unceasingly, transforming more andmore products and activities into 'commodities'and 'services', thus making money the generalmedium and mediator of relationships betweenhuman beings. Working activities are trans-formed into wage labour and profit-seeking,leisure time transformed into consumption ofcapitalized entertainment such as 'touristpackages' or the products of 'pop industry'. AsMarx and Engels stated in the Manifesto,nothing is 'holy' for Capital.The capitalist mode of production anddistribution entails the division of society intotwo major classes - the capitalist class and thewage labour class, or 'proletariat'. Owing to the'permanent revolution' of the means of produc-tion ('technology'), there exists at any time a'reserve army' of wage labourers. This reservearmy tends to exert pressure on the wage level,making it descend towards a subsistence level.Hence, it is impossible for most wage labourersto accumulate capital and leave the wage labourclass. On the contrary, the historical tendency isto transform small peasants, shopkeepers, etc.into wage labourers. The 'relative pauperiza-

tion' (Verarmung) of the wage labour class is ahistorical trend: the wealth of the great capitalowners being vertiginous, the condition of theordinary wage labourer becomes relativelyworsened.

Social life revolves around the capitalistmode of production and distribution and itsinherent conflicts. The State charges itself withthe task of ensuring 'peace in working life',pacifying and neutralizing discontented groups,implementing schemes for welfare and socialsecurity and protecting the regime of privateproperty through the police apparatus and theprison system. On the cultural level, legitima-tion of the capitalist economy goes on unceas-ingly in the mass media, as testified by soapoperas and the TV series of crime and action.This kind of entertainment is only intelligibleprovided the capitalist or market economy istaken for granted.The so-called 'globalization' process impliesthe speeding up of capitalist expansion all overthe world. The semi-corporate tendencies of thepostwar period have been counteracted sincethe 1980s for countries like Egypt, Indonesiaand India as well for Western Europe. Inaddition, the market economy is sought inEastern Europe, even in the People's Republic ofChina. This globalization entails unfetteredworld markets - a process that considerablyweakens the collective bargaining strength oftrade unions and other wage labour interestorganizations. A world proletariat arises ofhitherto unseen magnitude - millions andmillions of wage earners working on or belowsubsistence level. They are badly organized,even disorganized - a condition upheld in manycases by the State's armed forces.

Precisely because Eastern Europe failed toconstruct an alternative economy, Marx andEngels' interpretation accords better with plainfacts than it has done for many decades. In orderto defend Marxist doctrines in the period 1950-80, one had to be subtler, one had to point outlatent structures of oppression and domination,showing that, contrary to appearances, capital-ist class society was still with us. Today, thebasic traits of a society based upon a capitalistmode of production are quite manifest, evenopenly declared and hailed as historical pro-gress. This, I presume, is one of the reasons whya Marxist interpretation has lost its spell formany sociologists. Since it accords ('stimmt) sowell with facts, it does not pose the sameintellectual challenge as before; it cannot satisfythe need to be sophisticated and brilliant; a



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Marxist description has become plainly inaccordance with facts, and hence banal.True, on one essential point, the Marxistdoctrine is not plausible, on the topic of the class

struggle. The class struggle does not evolveaccording to Marxist interpretations. Thelabour movements in the West are weak atpresent, and the huge masses of wage labourersin countries like South Korea, Thailand, theSmall Tigers, etc. seem at least to live under thesway of capitalist domination. If there is classstruggle, it seems that the rising class is ratherthe capitalists, not the proletariat.

Despite this, taken as a whole, the Marxistdoctrine is quite plausible as an interpretation ofworld society today. This is so because it does -just like Parsons' - base itself upon what Webertermed 'central cultural values'. Marxist doc-trine bases itself upon the fundamental notionsof Modernity - Reason, individual liberty andhistorical Progress. The shortcomings of Liber-alism cannot simply be regarded with forbear-ance, since Liberal thought, too, is committed toModernity. Marxism, as the internal critique ofLiberal thought, is plausible and important aslong as and in so far as Liberalism prevails inour culture.

8. The implausibility of Luhmann'ssemanticsThe world is not acentric; it has one ormore centres'Functional society', Luhmann states, Operateswithout a top and a center' (p. 803). This is, hethinks, one of the main reasons the protestmovements are ill-conceived and doomed tofailure. But the statement is implausible; it evengoes against widespread experience. Luhmannspeaks of 'premature (vorzeitige) fixation ofideas' (p. 540), which in fact applies in thepresent case. According to the theory ofautopoietic systems, 'society' should be anacentric system. But world society certainlyhas a centre, or at least, it is polycentric. Thecentre of the world is the leading strata of theUSA - it dominates the world economically,politically, culturally and militarily. Several ofthe mega-cities of the world - New York,London, Paris, Tokyo - exert a strong influenceupon the rest of the world, an influence which isnot reciprocated by the lesser agglomerations.There is not even a tendency in an acentricdirection; on the contrary, the concentration of

economie, political, etc. power has apparentlybecome stronger recently.The notion of an acentric world can befound in anarchist thinking, such as in Deleu-ze's philosophy of Difference. But this philoso-phical notion cannot support the statement thattoday world society is acentric. That statementis simply wrong. Whoever goes outside theWestern hemisphere will have the experiencethat people are, whether they want to be or not,'other-directed', oriented towards the Westernworld and under its domination. It is almostembarrassing to point out this fact.World society does not become ever more

functionally differentiatedOne may venture the assertion that there existfew, if any, autopoietic systems in social life. Again,modern systems theory, imported from biologyinto sociology, leads astray. To demonstrate thismay be embarrassingly trivial, all the more so asLuhmann himself addresses a list of weightyobjections to his own thesis. Nevertheless, Imake an attempt to point out the obvious,beginning by commenting upon a couple ofquotations.Luhmann states: 'We have already empha-sized that those who possess do not deservemore esteem (Achtung) than those who do not'(p. 406). This does not demonstrate Luhmann'spersonal attitude, but that of modern society.But as such it is plainly wrong. High income andwealth do in fact serve or function as statussymbols. This was pointed out long ago byfunctionalists (Sorokin 1927; Parsons 1940;Davis & Moore 1945). Thus, one of the mainjustifications for income differentiation withinorganizations is that those who fill the mostimportant positions should earn more than therest as a kind of 'reward' and sign of esteem.Luhmann states: 'Not even the very richhave for that reason political power or betterartistic understanding or better chances to beloved' (p. 767). Once more, the incorrectness ofthis as a statement of fact is palpable. As for 'thechances to be loved', it is documented that veryfew rich men are not married, even if theproverb says that love may befall upon dirt aswell as upon a lily. That being rich does notinfluence social standards of art may perhaps bedefended, though investigations such as thoseby Bourdieu clearly indicate that the opposite istrue. As for the political power of rich people assuch, this is almost true by definition. To be veryrich cannot but have political consequences.Therefore the political and economic systems



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Luhmann'sGeneralSociology 2 3

must be taken as one politico-economic system.To conceive the economy as an autopoieticsystem, the code of which is 'pays/pays not',Luhmann makes the distinction between the'achievement' (Leistung) of the economy and itsfunction, to 'secure future subsistence (k?nftigeVersorgung)' (p. 758). Even so, the constructionis awkward. Luhmann praises the 'moneyeconomy' as the most spiritual achievement ofmodern society (ibid.). However, the worldeconomy is not about money, but aboutproduction and distribution of 'use values',about the 'metabolism with nature' (Marx),whereby humanity transforms the environmentand thereby itself. Even within a capitalisteconomy, where financial capital plays animportant role, as is the case today, wherespeculators all over the world can threatennational economies - even today businesspeople are preoccupied with 'real capital' asdistinct from 'money assets'. Institutional eco-nomics has shown over and over again that theeconomy is not autonomous - what, then, isgained by characterizing economy as autopoie-tic? Mutatis mutandis, one could show that theother institutions of society, too, do not qualifyas 'autopoietic' systems. As for the institution ofArt, the autopoietic thesis may, at the very least,hold for a segment of the modern art institution,but not for the institution of art as a whole.

The class distinction is not replaced by aninclusion/exclusion distinctionLuhmann himself emphasizes that 'social stra-tification is by no means abolished' in present-day society (p. 772). But he thinks thatstratification - and a fortiori social class - isless important than the distinction betweenthose who are included in society and those whoare excluded. The inclusion/exclusion distinc-tion recalls that of the '2/3 society' image. Mostof the population is integrated, they have jobs,satisfactory family or other primary relations,they take an interest in public matters, etc. Aminority is marginalized and excluded - thehomeless, the junkies, the criminals, the hope-lessly poor, etc. This conceptualization inducesone to think and feel that wage earners havemore in common with the great capitalists thanwith the 'excluded' - 'after all, I have a home, ajob, I am included'. This is a comforting thoughtfor 'the little man'. Der kleine Mann should notask for too much, but must be content withlittle. In fact, the conflicts in modern society arestill not constituted mainly by the exclusion/

inclusion distinction - but by class conflicts andsimilar interest group conflicts.The notion of progress9 is not obsoleteLuhmann discards the notion of 'progress'many times in GdG. For instance, he assertsthat 'since the end of the 19th century one daresno longer (traut man sich nicht) presupposeprogress' (p. 567). Luhmann may be thinking ofNietzsche or Georges Sorel, Max Weber, Spen-gler, etc., even the Dada movement - all ofwhom rejected the notion of Progress. But evenso, there can be no doubt that the notion ofprogress is still important within modernsociety. Thus, the semantics of scientific pro-gress, or economic progress (Allianza para elprogreso, etc.) has permeated public discoursesince 1945 until this very day. Those whofollow, or have even heard of names like Koyr?,Kuhn, Foucault, or who know anything about'paradigm shifts' constitute a dwindling minor-ity.

9. The imaginary character of Luhmann'ssociologyParsons' Empiricist and Positivist-minded adver-saries used to dismiss his general sociology asempty verbiage, as words and utterances withno 'empirical reference', as mere thoughts.Parts of Luhmann's doctrine may provokesimilar responses. But - except in the specificsense of Heidegger and Sartre -1 for my part donot accept that it is possible to think aboutnothing. All thinking is about something in theworld. Therefore, even if there may not be manyautopoietic systems in the world, and worldsociety may not be structured by functionaldifferentiation, Luhmann's general sociologycannot for that reason be rejected tout court. Itremains to account for the delight of his texts,what makes them so fascinating and brilliant.The answer proffered here, is twofold. First,Luhmann's erudition makes his books highlyvaluable. In themselves all the bibliographicalreferences make his books treasures for anybodyoccupied with the history of ideas and culturalhistory. Also, his style of writing is fluent, lightand elegant. Secondly, and more importantly,the fascination of a work like Die Gesellschaft derGesellschaft is one of the imaginary. Luhmann'ssociology is about society in an imaginary modeof being, as contrasted with society in themodus of the real. Here, as on many occasionsbefore, I take the distinction between the real



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and the imaginary in the sense of Sartre, in hisphenomenological study from 1940, L'imagi-naire (Sartre 1940, published in English as ThePsychology of Imagination). While the real ischaracterized by a general causality, the ima-ginary is not. Therefore, dreams are so hard toretell; they seem to dissolve when we tell othersabout them, since they do not obey the generallaw of cause and effect. The imaginary is unreal,a specific attitude of consciousness towards theworld.

Luhmann's writings often take on thisimaginary character. One sometimes gets theimpression that he is 'playing' at being ascientist, for instance, when he writes aboutchoosing between different 'theoretical strate-gies' or sets forth 'hypotheses' that are notsubsequently put to any test. The imaginarycharacter of the treatise also stems from hisslippery use of biological metaphors. WhileLuhmann asserts that one should not think ofsociety in terms of biology, he time and againwrites in a biological vein. Thus, he tells us(p. 504) that Lamarck introduced the word'irritabilit?' into biology. But he himself writesabout modern society letting itself be 'irritated'by the environment, and this time, he does notmean 'irritation' in the sense that a person getsirritated with another. He suggests 'irritability'in the sense of Lamarck, that is, the capacity ofresponding to a stimulus. By this perpetualquidproquo and Vexierbild our image of modernsociety becomes flimmery and dreamlike, i.e.imaginary.

10. A fundamental objection: conflation ofdifferentiation and autonomizationThe most serious error, it seems to me, isLuhmann's abuse of, or an imaginary, equivocaluse of the term functional differentiation. Thisterm has a clear meaning within the Durkheim/Sorokin/Parsons perspective, where it gener-alizes the notion of 'division of labour'. Thesocially functional is connected to what isdifferentiated, and social differentiation is con-ceptually connected to social integration, just asthe differential and the integral belong togetherin Mathematics. Sometimes Luhmann writesabout the functional in the above-mentioned,traditional sense as something that serves(dient) general society, that is, contributes in aspecific way to its preservation. He also some-times partakes of the Durkheimian concernwith social preservation, as when he uses his

favourite phrase, 'so geht es nicht weiter, itcannot go on like this any longer. Then hedescribes society as perpetually striving toobtain integration in a world of ever-increasingcomplexity. But elsewhere, Luhmann confersanother meaning upon the term 'functional' -every social system is functional by virtue of itsperformance according to its specific code. Now,he describes society as a multitude of systems,each acting according to its own code. What heaims at is to generalize Weber's notion of mutuallyirreconcilable value spheres (the political, themoral, the erotic, the religious, etc.). Weber(1922) tends to present modern society asconstituted by autonomous interest spheres -where art challenges morality (instead of sup-porting it, as in Kant's Critique of Judgment andother idealist aesthetic doctrines); where theerotic challenges the political, and so on, in thefamous 'demonic struggle' between value com-mitments. Weber's value spheres, owing to theirsupposed autonomy, may serve as examples of'autopoietic systems'. Moreover, Weber himselfvery seldom writes about 'differentiation' ofthese spheres, since 'differentiation' refers to thetwin concept of 'integration'.It seems to me that Habermas was the firstto blur the opposition between Durkheim/Parsons and Weber, imputing to Weber a notionof modern differentiation which is foreign to histhought (Habermas 1981). Luhmann appearsto make the same mistake. This mistake is at thesame time obvious and grave - differentiationand autonomization are opposite processes. Theypoint in opposite directions: differentiationtowards integration, autonomization towardsdisintegration and conflict.Luhmann conflates the perspectives ofDurkheim and Weber. But he leans moretowards Weber than Durkheim. His autopoieticconception of modern society emphasizes itsfragmented character, consisting of a multitudeof autonomous contexts and groups trying tomaintain their autonomy. Within such apicture, there is no place for the term 'functionaldifferentiation'. Society, as described by Luh-mann, is not differentiating itself; therefore it ismisleading to designate the social systems as'functional'. The fascination of Luhmann'sgeneral writings partly stems from this con-ceptual conflation; his synthesis is not real, butimaginary. A possible rejoinder may be that,after all, the proliferation of autopoietic systemsmay 'serve' modern society by augmenting themass of alternatives to select from. To cope withcomplexity, modern society then has at its



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disposal an increasing complexity of alterna-tives - and to Luhmann, the functional con-notes alternatives. Possibly, this may be granted,but since the evolution of modern society -according to Luhmann, by contrast withParsons - has no direction, this functionalinterpretation of autopoietic systems adds littleto our understanding of world society - itreminds me of the mild optimism of classicalDeism.

11. Final remarkBy no means does this 'critical critique' intendto reject everything in Luhmann's sociology. Hisbook on intimacy is an important contribution,as is much of his sociology of the art institution.However, these and other fine contributions donot depend for their validity on the generaltheory of autopoietic systems, the specificdoctrine of evolution, etc. What I oppose, inthis comment, is Luhmann's most generaltenets, as presented in Soziale Systeme and DieGesellschaft der Gesellschaft.

First version received May 1999Final version accepted August 1999

ReferencesDavis,?. &Moore.W.E. 1945. SomePrinciplesof Stratification.Americanociological eview.Habermas, j. 1981. Theorie des kommunikativen andelns.Frankfurt m Main:SuhrkampVerlag.Luhmann, N. 1984. Soziale System. Frankfurt am Main:SuhrkampVerlag.Luhmann, N. 1986. ?kologisch Kommunikation.Opladen:WestdeutscherVerlag.Luhmann, N. 1995. Die Kunst der Gesellschaft.rankfurtamMain:SuhrkampVerlag.Luhmann,N. 1997. DieGesellschafterGesellschaft.rankfurtam Main:SuhrkampVerlag.Mane,K. 1895. DasKapital.Book??.Marx,K,&Engels,F. 1848. CommunistManifesto.Parsons,T. 1940. An analyticalapproach o the theoryof socialstratification. nEssays nSociological heory. lencoe, L:FreePress.Parsons,T. 1971. TheSystem of ModernSocieties.New Jersey:Prentice-Hall, nc.Sartre,J.P.1940. L'imaginaire.aris:Gallimard.Sartre, J.-P. 1960. Critiquede la raison dialectique.Paris:Gallimard.Sorokin, P. A. 1927. Socialmobility.New York:Harper andBrothers.Weber,M. 1922. Der Sinn der'Wertfreit'ersoziologischenund?konomischen Wissenschaften. In GesammelteAufs?tze urWissenschaftslehre.?bingen:JCBMohr.0sterberg,D. 1988. Metasociology:nInquiryntotheOrigins ndValidity fSocialThought.Oslo:NorwegianUniversityPress.

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