502.heidt silber peterson keenan.neg.cosmopolitanism

Michigan 7 week juniors Cosmopolitanism

COSMOPOLITANISM I cosmopo~itanism .......................................................................................................................................................... I cosmopolitanism 1 nc ..................................................................................................................................................... 3 cosmopolitanism 1 nc ..................................................................................................................................................... 4 cosmopolitanism 1 nc ..................................................................................................................................................... 5 cosmopolitanism I nc ..................................................................................................................................................... 6 Inc civic engagement link ............................................................................................................................................. 7 link: nationalism prevents cosmopolitanism .................................................................................................................. 8 link: nationalism prevents cosmopolitanism .................................................................................................................. 9 link: nationalism prevents cosmopolitanism ................................................................................................................ 10 link: civic engagement ................................................................................................................................................. 1 link: civic engagement ............................................................................................................................................... 12 link: civic engagement ................................................................................................................................................ 13 link: using the state to enforce national idcntity .......................................................................................................... 14 link: state action ........................................................................................................................................................... 16 impact: national identity causes extinction ............................ .. ............................................................................... 17 nationalism impacts: wadgenocide .............................................................................................................................. 18 nationalism impacts: warlgenocidc .............................................................................................................................. 19 nationalism impacts: warlgenocide ........ .. ................................................................................................................ 20 nationalism impacts: war ............................................................................................................................................. 21 alternative solvency-2nc ........................................................................................................................................... 22 alternative solvency-2nc ........................................................................................................................................ 23 alternative solvency-2nc ........................................................................................................................................... 24 alternative solvency ..................................................................................................................................................... 25 cosmopolitanism solves the case better ....................................................................................................................... 26 cosmopolitanism solves the case bcttcr ....................................................................................................................... 27 cosmopolitanism solves the case better ....................................................................................................................... 28 cosmopolilanism Solves Otherization/lnclusion ....... .. .............................................................................................. 29 cosmopolilanism Solves- globalization impacts ........................................................................................................ 30 alternative solvency- Public Sphere ............................................................................................................................. 1 alternative solvency- Universal Citizenship ................................................................................................................ 32 Cosmopolitanism Solves Militarism ............................................................................................................................ 33 cosmopolitanism kcy to environmental protection ...................................................................................................... 34 cosmopolitanism key to environmental protection ...................................................................................................... 35 at: impossible lo reject identity .................................................................................................................................... 36 at: realism .................................................................................................................................................................... 37 at: realism .................................................................................................................................................................. 38 at: realism .................................................................................................................................................................... 39 at: cede the polilical ..................................................................................................................................................... 40 at: cede the political ..................................................................................................................................................... 41 at: world government bad ............................................................................................................................................ 42 at: specific solvency evidence ..................................................................................................................................... 43 at: fiat good .................................................................................................................................................................. 44 at: permutation: do both ............................................................................................................................................... 45 at: permutation: do hoth ............................................................................................................................................. 46 al: permutation: do both ............................................................................................................................................... 47

. . at: we makc nationalism safelcause civic nat~onallsm ........... .. ................................................................................. 48 at: wc make nationalism safelcause civic nationalism ................................................................................................. 49 at: wc makc nationalism safehause civic nationalism ................................................................................................. 50 A2: Hahermas civic engagement key to civic nationalism .......................................................................................... 51 permutation solvency ................................................................................................................................................. 52 permutation solvency ................................................................................................................................................... 53 permutation solvency ................................................................................................................................................... 54 permutation solvency ................................................................................................................................................... 55

Michigan 7 week juniors 2 Cosmopolitanism nationalism good: globalization ................................................................................................................................... 56 nationalism good: democracy ...................................................................................................................................... 57 patriotism good: cede the political ............................................................................................................................... 58 patriotism good: solves racism .................................................................................................................................... 59

............................................................................................................... patriotism good: democracy .................. .... 60 patriotism good: civic cngagernent .............................................................................................................................. 61 at: nationalism bad impacts ......................................................................................................................................... 62 at: nationalism bad impacts ........................................................................................................................................ 63 at: nazi germany proves nationalism is bad ................................................................................................................. 64 Alternative fails ........................................................................................................................................................... 65 Alternative Fails .......................................................................................................................................................... 66

............................................................................................................................................................ alternative fails 67 Alternative doesn't Solvc Public Sphere ..................................................................................................................... 68 Cosmopolitanism causcs intervention ......................................................................................................................... 69

.................................................................................................................................................. cosmopolitanism fails 70

................................................................................................................................................ cosmopolitanism fails 7 1

.................................................................................................................................................. cosmopolitanism fails 72

.................................................................................................................................................. cosmopolitanism fails 73 cosmopolitanism fails ................................................................................................................................................. -74 cosmopolitanism fails .................................................................................................................................................. 75 cosmopolitanism Fails- Causes totalitarianism ............................................................................................................ 76 at: nation state collapse inevitable ............................................................................................................................... 77 at: adorno critique of nationalism ................................................................................................................................ 78

.................................................................................................................................................................... jargon bad 79


COSMOPOLITANISM 1 NC I PROMOTING NAI'IONAL SERVICE PROMOTES AN IDEAI, OF SERVICE TO THE NATION THAT REINFORCES A NATIONAL IDENTITY BASED UPON LOYALTY AND PATRIOTISM

Bass, 04 (Melissa, Brmdeis University, Docloral Candidatc, Civic Education Through National Service: Lessons from American History, CIRCLE Working Paper 12: March 2004 http://www.civicyouth.orglPopUpslWorkingPapers/WP12Bass.pdf)

CITIZEXSHIP AS PATRIOTISM .4 thud common way of ~tndersunding citizenship is in terms of patriotism. as a deep commitment to onc's country md fcllow citizens. As described hy Stephen Nalhansnn. patrioik~n means having a spcchl alieclion fnr one's country. a personal idenliliution with it. a spccial concern tiir its well-heing. and a willingness lo make muitices to

prnmotc i ts good 11993: 78). National service, particularly military service, is often framed as a sacrifice citizens should be willing to make in order to protect. defend. or strengthen their nation. However, bv bringing citizens together to accom~lish these ends, national service can g o Surther and reflect and instill identification, affection. and concern. To the degree that national service brings togclher neople from different classes, races. regions and so forth, it may help to CrGite a Sense of shared national idcntitv. TO thc cxtenl that natinnal service expses panicipants to national needs. prnvidm them with an opponunity

to help address them, anti sipports them in their endeavor. it may help increase particivants' concern and commitmerlt to the Countrv. PLII

anotkr way. patriotism Can be understood as lovalty - in B ~ I I Chlston's words "the developed capacity to understand, to accept, ond m ~rct on thc core priliciples 01

O ~ C ' S wcictyn (1991: 221) - which national service may be able to foster and reinforce in tangible wavs. While not "S contested ~5

eovernmeat- sminstrred nnli~kal activism. whelher mlional service should do lhis - whether oatriotism is a rond thine - is o w n to debate (Mithanson. 1993: Cohen. 1906). in Nmhanuon's -. . framing. patriutism can be exprcsqed in vru'ying degrees. ranging from "rnciderate." to "exlreme," from a proper regard lor one's own homel:bnd to a malevolent disregiud for nthers', from a commitmenl to helping one's country live up to its ideals to a ratn~nale fnr excusing its wont B~iling,~ (also see Hilary htnnnr. 1996). Even in a moderate torn1 Iocl Weslheimer and Joseph

Kahne express concern that "a focus on lovaltv . . . workrsl against the kind of critical refleclion and action many assume are essential to a democratic societv" (2002: 12). R ~ ~ t h c r , given the global, interdependent nature of the economy: the environment, and human rights, some argue lhat stressinn national citizenship and patriotism is counter- productive and so advocate framing citizenshin in global terms (Nusshum 1996). However. there is much less ofa consensus on thc meaning or approprialenes!. of global citi~&n\nahip than on citizenship in general (Coheli 1996). These arc tunhcr reasons why the idei~ of citizcnshii. and naliunal service fnr citizenship. is ccinteured.

NATIONAL IDENTITY REINFORCES ARBITRARY BOUNDARIES THAT KEEP AMERICA SEPARATE PROM THE REST OF THE WORLD, PREVENTING THE REAIdZATION OF COSMOPOLITAN ETHICS

Nussbaum 96 (Martha, Brown Philosophy Professor, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, ed. Nussbaum and Cohen, pp. 3-5)

Americnns have frequenlly suppnned thc principle 01 Bande M a w m . pivinp the fact of being American a special salience in mum1 and politicill dclihcration. a ~ d pride in a specifically Ameri-

can identity and a specilicslly American citizenship a speck1 power m o n g the motivations to political action. I klieve. as do Tagore and his chmcter Nikhil. thnt this emphasis On patriotic pride is both morally dangerous and. ullimatelv, subversive of some of the worthv goals patriotism sels out to serve-for example, the goal of national unity in devotion to worthy moral ideals of iustice and eauality. These &.I shsn argue. would be better served by an ideal that is in any case morc adequate to our situation in (be contemporary wur~d. namely the very old idealOf

the cosmopoli-tan, the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide communitv of human beings. MY anico~etion nfthese issues is mot~vated, in part. hy my experience working on international qn:~lity-of-life issrtes in an institute for development economics connected wilh the United Nations. It is also motivated by the renewal of' appeals to the nation. and national pride, in some reccnt discussions of Americi~n character am! Amcrican education. ln a well-known oped piece in the New York Times (13

17ebruary 1994). philosopher Richard Rorty urges Americans, especiallv the American left, not to disdain patlintism as a V:I~LIC, and i d m d to give central importance 10 "the cmotiu~l of naional pride" and "a Sense of shared national identitv." ~ o r t y N ~ ~ I E S th81 we cantlot even criticize ourselves wEll

unless WE also "rqioice" in OUT American identity and define ourselves hrnda- mcnt:rby in terms orthat identity. Rorty Seems to hold that the pri-marv all~rnatjve to a politics based on patriotismand national identity is what he calls a "politics of difference." one based on in-ternal divisions among America's ethnic, racial. religious. and other subrrrouus. He nowhere considers the possibilitv of a more international basis for political emotion and concern. ws $ isolaleci casc. Rorfy's piece responds 11, and defends Sheldon Hackney's recent call

for a "tKit10nal conversation" to dk-CUSS American identity.~ As apmicipant ID its early phase, I was made vividly aware that thc project, initially

conceived.? pro-posed an inward-looking, task, bounded bv the bordcrs of the na-tion, rather than considering ties of obli~ation and commitment that join America to the rest of the world. AS with Rony's piece. the primary contrast drawn in thc proiect was between a politics based on ethnic and racial and religious difference and a politics based on a shared national idenlitv. What we share as both rational and mulually dependent human beings was simply not on Lhc agenda. One might wonder. howcva., how i;w the politics of nationalism I-enlly is frnm the politics of differcncc. The Home and the World t bctlcr known, perhaps, in S;ityajit Kay's haunt~ng film of the s m e title) is a tragic story of the defeat of a reasonable and pri~iciplal cosmopulitanism by t k forces of natio11;11ism and ethnncenlrism. I bciieve that 7ap1re sees deeply

w k n he okrrvcs thnt. l7t t ~ ~ t ~ t t o m nationalism and ethnocentric particularism are not alien to one an-other. but akin-that to give supDort lo nationalist sentiments sub-verts. u~imatc~y.even the values that hold a nation together, bc-cause it substitutes a colorf~l idol for the substantive universal values of justice and right. once someone has mid. I am an l n d i ~ n first. a citizen of thc world second. once he or she has made that morally questionable move of self-definition by a morally irrele-van1 charnctcristic, Lhe~i what, indeed, will stop that p m o n Irom sdyiup. as Tagore's cku;lclcrs so quickly

learn to say. 1 am 3 Hindu first. and an Indian second, or I m an upper-caste latdbrd first. CI Hindu second'! O n l ~ the co~mopolitan Stance uf the landlord Nikhil-so

horingly i ~ s l in the eyes of his young wire Bimsla md his passionate naio~wlist ~ i n d sundiphas the promise of transcending these divisions, bemuse only this slanu: asks us lo give our first allegiance lo what $ morally goud-and that which. being good, I can commend as such lo illl human beings.


COSMOPOLITANISM 1 NC

ENFORCING A NATIONAL IDENTlTY I'KEVENTS AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO GLOBAL PROBLEMS-NI,Y ARTICULATING A SHARED IDENTITY TO THE WORLD CAN BUILD CONNECTIONS NECESSARY TO PREVENT EXTINCTION

Smith, 2 0 3 (Rogers, Proi'essor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania and PhD Harvard Univcrsily, Stories Of Peoplehood. Thc Politics and Morals of Political Membership. p. 166-169)

Lt is certaiuly i~n]mrlant to oppose such evulut in~~ry doctrines by all inlellectually crediblc mcans. But many have already been widely discredited: and tcld:ly it maV well prove salutary, even indispensahle. to heighten awareness of human identity as shared membership in a species engapd inan ages-long process olachpting to often da~lgerntls and onfor~ivmg natun~l and mm-mdc environments.'" When we see ourselves in the light of general evolutionary patterns. w k c o w awnre that it is gentlinely possible ti~r a species such as ourselves tn soller massive sethacks or even m become extinct if we pursue certain dlan~crous courucs of action. That outcomc iloes not s u m to

be in any human's interest. AM when we retlect on the state of our spcciu today, We See Or should see at least tive major challenges to Our collective Survival, much less ourcoflective noorishirg. that mz in some respects truly unprecedented. These are all challenges of our own making, however, and so they can all be met through suitably cooperativc human efforts. The first is our ongoing vulnerability to the extraordinary WCaPOnS of mass destruction t h t we have been building during the last half century. The tense anticipations of imminent conflagration that

characterized U I ~ Cold Warat its worst are now behind 11s. but thc nnc~car arsenafs that were so threatening are ~argely still with us. and indeed the governments and, perhaps, terrorist groups possessed of some nuclear weaponry have continued lo proliferate. The second great ~hrrat is some son ofenvironmental dkaster. broughl on by the by-prodncts of our effo~ls u~ achieve ever-accelerating industrial and post-industrial prodttction and distribution of an incraliblc rangc of good and scsvices. Whcther it

is global wasmine. the spread of toxic wartes, biospheric disruptions due to new agricuicultum~ techniques, or some combination o i these d o t h e x consequences of human

interference with the air. water, climate. anci plant and animal spccics that sustain US, any mai0r environmental disaster can affect all of humanity. Third, as our economic and technological systems have become ever more interconnected, the dan~er that maior economic or technological failures in one part of the world might trigger global catastrophes may well increase. Stlch i~ltcrdcpeudencies can. to he sure. be n source oisrrength as well as weakness. as American and Eunlpean responses ro thc East Asian and Mexican economic cr ies of the 1990s indicated. Still. if global capitalism were to wllapse or a lechnuloglcal disaster compwoble to the imagined Y2K doomsday scentulo wese to (%cur. the cnnscqucnccs today would be more far-rcaching than they would have been formmpnrablc dcvclopmcnts in previous centuries. Fourth, as advances in food production, medical care. and other technologies have contributed lo higher infant survival nles and lotlger lives, the wc~rld's population has k e n rapidly increasing. placing intensifying pressures on our physical and social environmei~ts UI a great variety of ways. These

demographic trends, necessarily involvinn all of humanity. threaten to exacerbate a11 the preceding problems, generating political and military conflicts. spawning chronic and acutc environmental damages, and straining the capacities of economic systems. The final majorehllenge we face as a species is a more novel onc. and it is onc that may brinp consciousness of our shared "species in-

tereasu even mcm to the forc. In LIE upcaning cmtury. human beings will increasingly be able to affect their own genetic endowment, in

ways lhat might polenthlly alter the vcry sonof organic species that we m. IIere as with modem weapons. economic processes. and population growth. We face risks that Our efforts to improve our condition mav no disastrously wrong, potentially endangering the entire human race. Yet the appeal o ic~~dowing our c h ~ l d ~ n with greater gifts is st~fficiently puwerful thai n r g a n i ~ d effons to create such genetic technologies capable of "redesigning humans" nre illrcildy burpco~dng. both anlong reputable acndemic researchers and less restriuned. but wcli-endowed, fringe To be sure, iln awareness of thwe as well as o t k r potenlial Jangers affecting all h11m;ln k ings is not

cnough by itself to fos~er moral outlooks thai rrjett n m > w and invidioos particularistic conceptions of human identity. It is perfectly possible for leaders to feel that to save the species, policies that run roughshod over thc claims of their rivals are not simply justified but morally demanded. Indeed. like the wrirers I have emmined he^, my own more eg:~linarian ant1 cosmoplran moral leanings probably stem originally from religious and Kantian philosophical influellces, not from any consciousness olthe cornmtln "species interest^" of human beings. Rut the ethically constitutive story which contends that we have such interats. arid that we can see them as moral interests, secms quite realistic. which is of some ;ldv,mtage in any such nccuunt. And under the circumstances just sketched. it is likely that more and more people will hewme

persuaded that troday. thuse a k d sprcirs interests face more protbund challenges thitn they h ~ v e in *,st of human history. If yo. then ~ t r e ~ ~ i n g Our shared identity as members of an evolving snccies may serve as a highly credible ethically constitutive story that can challenge particularistic accounts and foster support for novel political arrangements. Many morr ~ u p t mdy come LO feel that it is no longer safe to conduct their po1itic;ll lives ahsorbed in their traditional comrn~mities, with disregard for oiltsidcrs. without active concern about the hsuer that alfkct the whole species and withoul practical

collabor:~tiveeff~~nsto confront tho= issus. That consciousness of shared interests has thc potential to promote stronger and much more inclusive senses of trust, as people come to realize that the dmgws all* challenges they face in common matter more than the differences that will duubtless persist. I think this so11 of awwness of a sharcd '"spccies intnests" also can suppurtsenses of personal and oollectiw worth. though I acknuwlcdgc that this is not ohviot~sly h wsc. Mony people find thc spclacle of lhe human species struggting for survival amidst rival life fonlls aud an unfeeling material worW a bleak and dispirhing one. Many m y still feel the need to comhine acceptance of m ~'volutbmry constitutive s toq with relipic~ati or phiIn.wphical accounts that supply some stronger sense of nmral purpose to human and cosmic cxistcncc. But ifpcoplc nrc st1 inclined, then nothing I am advocating here sra~~tls in the way of such combinations. Many persons, moleover. may well kind a sustaining sense ooT moral wonh in a conceplion of the.m.msclves as contrib~itors to a spcies that has developed unique capacities to tieliherate and to act respo~tiibly 111 regard to questions m other known species can yet alnceive: how should we liw? Whd relationships should wc havc, individually and collectively. to other people. other life forms, a d the hroader universe? In time. I hope that many more people may collie to a g e e that hu~u~mity has shued responsibilities ofstrw;udship for thc 'mimate and physical worlds u-uuod 11s as well &s ourselves, ultimately seeking lo promote rhe florrrishing of all insofar as we are capahle and the finitude of

existence pennits. B U ~ even shod orsuch a grand sen= ofspecics vcxaticm the idea that we are part of humanity's endeavor to strive and t h v e across ever-greater expanses of space and timc may be one that can inspire a deep sense of worth in many i l n o r m O S f

human beings. Hence it does not sccm unrealistic to hope that we can encourage increased acceptance of a universalistic sense of human pcoplehood lhat may help rein in popular impulses to get swept up in more parochial tales of their identities and interests. III the yearsahedd, this ethical sensibility might foster acceptance of various sorts of transnatjonal political arrangements to deal with problems like exploitative ;md wildly tluctuathg inicrnational financial and labor markcts. desuuctive e~~vironmcntal a ~ l d agricultural pracliceti, population control. and the momentous ksue of humi~n genetic mrrdifications. The% arc, after all, problems that appear to need to be dealt with 011 a near-global swlc if they are to be dealt with satisfactorily. Greater acceptance of such arrangements would necessarily entail increased willinft~ss 10 view existing ~ O V C ~ I I I C ~ I ~ S at all k w l s as at k s l only "semi-sovereign;" authoritative over some issucs and not others, in the manner lhsl acceptance of multiple parliculuislic constitutive stories would also reinforce. In the resulting political climatc. il might be~wme easier to construct the sons of systems of interwoven democratic international. regional. statc and kwal governments that theorists of "cosn~opolitan democracy." "liberal muI1icultur;ll nationahsrn." and "diffewmiarnl democracy" like David Held, Will Kymlicka, Iris Young. William Connolly. and Juqen Habemas all envision.


OUR ALTERNATIVE TEXT: REJET THE AFFIRMATIVE'S ENDORSEMENT OF NATIONAL SERVICE AND USE THE BALLOT TO AFFIRM COSMOPO1,ITAN ETHICS

OUR ALTERNATIVE ENVISIONS A WOULD OF NEW GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP DEVOID OF NATIONAL IDENTITY- INDIVIDUAL ATTEMPTS TO FOSTER ATTITUDINAL CHANGE ARE VITAL TO A LARGER CONSCIOUSNESS SHIFT. THE EDUCATIONAL SETTING OF DEBATE IS THE VITAL FIRST STEP TOWARDS REALIZING GLOBAL IDENTITY.

Roche, 1997 (Douglas, Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament for Edmonton Strathcona, Canadian Ambassador Sor Disarmament. Membcr of the Senate of Canada. World Citizenship: Allegiance to Humanity, Edited Joseph Rotblat, Page 139- 14 1 ) (italics in the original)

Lovaltv to all humankind has both a philosophical and pragmatic imperative. It can be expresscd and taught in a praclical manner. The multi-dimensional agenda for world$ concern has heen sct out by the United Nations: removal of lhreals ro peace, including the nucletr threat; respect for the principle of non-use of force; resolution of conflicts and peaceful setdement of disputes; confidence-building measures; disarmament; maintenance of outer space for peaceful uses; development: promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms; decolonization; elimination of racial discrimination; enhancing the quality of life; satisfaction of human needs; protecting the environment. A wide-ranging programme of action is opened up by this definition. Moreover, this approach enables us to comprehend better that peace is established by thc implementation ofa system of values. Peace demands the attaininn of true human security SO that people everywhere can live free of the threat of war, free of violations of their human rights, free to develop their own lives to attain economic and social progress. All this is clearly an advance in global thinlung. This advance constitutes a signal of hope to a humanity that has for far too long been fractured and frustrated in the attaining of enduring human security. Though patience is requircd, today's turbulence has created an urgent situation. There are too many people suffering. there is too much political fixstration. too much fear of global devastation to allow a mood of passivity. In shorl, loyalty to all humanity means inculcating in people an attitude - not only to the world as it is but as it can be. It means helping them understand the magnitude of the transformation occumng in the world. It means opening up their powers of creativity so that they do not just cope with the world but enlarge the community around them. As the Club of Rome's latest report. The First Global Rawlurion.' points out, the global society we arc headinn towards cannot emerge unless 'it drinks from' the source of moral and spiritual values. Beyond cultures, religions and phjlosophies, there is in human beings a thirst for freedom. aspirations to overcome one's limits, a quest for a beyond that seems ungmspable and is often unnamed.' The militarism, poverty and assaults on nature that conlinue to undermine the global agenda for human security underscore, rather lhan destroy. this resilient human need. Cultural contradictions. excessive nationalism, loss of identity with its concomitant demoralization must be overcome bv thc assertion from a thousand avenues of life that there is meaning - a profound meaning - to the life of every individual on the planet. The trend line of history is favourable to the empowerment 01 individuals because virtuallv everywhere society is more open and informed. The idea of solidarity is changing from a concept limited to the fanlily tribe to a much broader concept. while its strictly tribal connotation may be openly discredited.%niversal norms and values, extending now to the global community, cmbrace freedom, human rights and responsibililies, family life, equal rights for men and women, compassion for the aged and disabled, respect for others, tolerance, respect for life and peace, and the search for truth. The firs1 rcquisite in helping people understand this new reality is to give them a sense of world consciousness in which even individual realizes his or her role as a member of the world community. The historian Paul Kennedy declares that today 'we are all members of a world citizenry', which requires a systcm of ethics.'"he educator Edwin Rcischauer, in his book, Toward the 21st Cerztilvy: Education for a Cha~zging World, said we will never operate successfully unless the bulk of the people develop a sense of world citizenship: This is clcarlv the biggest educational task of all, for millenniums of history have conditioned men to think in terms of smaller and more exclusive units, while suspicion and hostility toward other groups lie deep in their patterns of thought. IS education is to meet its resvonsibilities, it must give young people the stimulus to find and develop better ways of organizing global society lhan by dividing it into hostile, warring factions. Professional educators are the first to know that education can break down feelings of suspicion and hostility and provide an ernuathy for peoples of diverse histories, cultural and religious backgrounds. This is the work of forming young people's attitudes in the new age of transformation. As Virginia Satir notes in The New Peoplemuking: 'Creating peace in the world strongly resembles making Deace in the family'.


I COSMOPOLITANISM 1 NC

ANY PERMUTATION FAILS BECAUSE IT INVOKES A SENSE OF SHARED NATIONAL IDENTITY THAT ASSUMES THE STATE IS THE LEGITIMATE FRAME OF POLITICS-WORKING WITHIN THAT SYSTEM CONCEALS VIOLENCE RATHER THAN REDUCES IT. ONLY CHALLENGING THE ONTO1,OGY OF SOVEREING IDENTITY CAN EXPOSE NEW ALTERNATIVES

Shaw 99--professor of political science at the University of Victoria--(Karena. "Symposium: Re-Framing International Law For The 21st Century: Feminist Futures: Contesting the Political", 9 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 569, lexis.)

Political theorists tend not to recognize the violences of sovereignty. our joh b i n s after the question of the propcr space for politics is resolved. and we work as diligently as wc can--within that space--to renhr political authority as reprewntativc, Icgitimate. democratic, and just as possible. An examplc of this tendency is Benhabib's recently di ted book, Dernoaruc,~ and Diffwtci,. 1138 While the analyses and debates in the book about thc chmcter and possibililies of democracy rodny are rich and important, nor one of the authors seriously questions the state or sovereignty as the necessary [*583] geography through which political possibility is constituted. n39

For each. however pcsscd, contlictecl. and limited the capacity of the hestate to respond to contemporary demands, the sovereign state remains the unquestioned container (and authorizing precondition) for democratic Iheorv. Whatever violence has haupened prior to that space is unfortunate and regrettable, but we work within that space to minimize violence. What if: however, contemporary cottditions we such that the distinction between "inside" and "outside" that space is increasingly problen~atic? What if the conditions under which the resolulions or sovereignty can define the exclusive space for politics are hecoming increasingly rare? n40 What if. in other words. contemporary material. ideological, economic and political conditions are increasingly resistant to the particularity of discourses and practices of sovereignty? Whilc part of the staying power of sovereignty may be its elegance. its ability Lo consmin ~mssihilities for thinking olhcrwise or outside of them, surely the far more significant mason for the slaying power of Hobbes' vision is thal it has bccn consistent and symbiotic with the material, economic and political circumstances ol' the day: the development of capitalism, technologies of mansportation, communication and movement: controls over

population; accessible and exploitable entironrnental resources: pautems of education: and so on. In other words. part of the reason soverei!-Vltv has "worked" when and how it has is related to the presence of the material and economic conditions of ~ossibility for it and to the abilitv of these discourses and practices to adapt as these conditions have chanced. Given that these [*585] conditions have--at the very least--changed significantly since Hobbes' time. and seem to be rapidly transforming

yet again in our own times it seems reasonable to pose the question of whether the conditions under which sovereigntv on this model might make sense still pertain., so, forexample, over thc past few centuries, the pattams of in~lusion and exclusion expressed by sovereignty have been inscribed and reinforced through immi$nlion policies. citizenship and voting policies, bordcr patrols nationalist struggles. the creation of new states. and the divisions ofothers. It would he difficult to assert that these oatterns of inclusion and exclusion simolv "made sense." given the violences that have been cffected to . , maintain them. However, thc structures and functioning of mechanisms of communication, transportation. war, economy, and so on, were such that sovereignty "worked" in some cases to the benefit of citizens within particular states, protecting them from the vagrancies of capitalism. environmental disaster, particular kinds oC violcnces, some forms of discrimination and tjustice. It has never " w o r k s as

cffectively for others. which is no accident. of course. givm the particularity, the historical. social and cultural specificity. of the ontology of sovereignty. However, a technologies--particularly of capitalism, war, and communication--have changed. so have both the potential dangers to citizens and the ability of any given sovcreien vower to ameliorate them. Given this, it is important to pose the question of whcther a territorially bounded, identitv-grounded sovereignty is eilhcr possible or desirable. If it is not, the perpetuation of the mvtholog~ of sovereigntv will provoke ever-increasing levels of violent resistance. To pose this question is to open the problcm of whether we should read Ihc movements that Benhabib argues are struggles for identity as, rather, expressions of political conflicts that exceed the possibilities of an identity-based sovereignty to effectively address. What is, according to sovereignty discourse, the "non-politics" of what hawwns prior to relations of' governance (the effects of the production of the ontological foundation that enables governance), is really where the action is these days'? 1141 What if, for example. instead of only or primarily reading contemporaly movements as demands for "inclusion" at the level of relations of governance, we read them as resistances and challenges to the violences of sovereignty- constitution and subjectivity constitution'? In other words, what if we read them not only as calls for more inclusivc idcntities, but as effects of the violcnce produced by and thus as critiques of the identity/difference architecture for the basis of legitimate political authority? It crucial to d. If we simply refuse to consider what sovereigntv discourse effects (the distinctions between inside and outside, domestic and international, politics atul WW. legilimale and I*~RII illegitimate violence. citizens and foreigners. mm a d women. sine and mad. modern and primitive) and what it conceals (the traditions under which these distinctions are made) we thus contribute to a continuation of the mytholorv that these distinctions (and their constitutive violences) are beyond thc political. We reinscribe them as nccessary and natural, rather than as necessarv and contingent and produced through violences that are both ~Iippling and ~on~titutive of ~ersonal and political possibilitv. What difference might it make to open these questions'! Rathcr than cxclusivcly klcosing on rnakinE nicer idcntitiea. we could ask questions ahnut the condiiions-themeve highly polilical and onen intolc~~hlc--under which we come to rcly on identity as the b. . . f C I ~ I S 01. political aulhority, and the effects of this reliance. We could ask questions about whether we csu recc>nstitnte ibese conditroos. about whcther we can remicula[s the necessities and violences olpolit~cd possibility.


1 NC CIVIC ENGAGEMENT LINK

THE CONCEPT OF NATJONAL CIVIC ENGAGEMENT REINFORCES THE EXCLUSION OF NON-CITI ZENS--EVEN NOTIONS OF FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP REINFORCE NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

Cohen 99--PH.D Political Science; Sociology Columbia University--(Jean L., "Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos", International Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 3,245-268, 1999).

T ~ C background presuppsihn of the modunpwsdigm of cilirenship is thal citizenship involves membership in a sovereign. territorial nation- state within a system of states. The nation-state is not onlv a territorial organization monopolizing legitimate rule within a bounded space. it is also, as Brubaker rightly argues, a membership organization (Brubaker, 1992). Citizenship in such a state is an instrument of social closure. It always has an ascriptivc dimension and it always establishes privilege insofar as it endows members with particular rights denied to nonmembers (today, primarily, the resident alien or foreigner). Thus, in the modern system of states, the republican ideal of the self-determining demos merges with the sovereign state's interest in control over all those in the territory through the construction of national citizenship as a formal category of membership. Exclusion and inequality, not inclusion, thus attach to citizenship seen as a membership principle ( ~ r u b a k u , 1992). TO be sure, certain republican political thcorists noted long ago the tendency of the nation- state to violate the e d i t x i a n logic of constitutional democracy by fostering inequality and exclusion vis-a-\% national minorities and aliens. Hannah Arendt (1973) argued that

his danger is ntrinsic to the netiowstate system. Because the nation-state eauates the citizen with the member of the nation it collapses a politicalAepa1 category into a category of identity and perverts the egalitarian logic of the constitutional state by rendering those who are not members of the nation imlslicitly into second-class citizens. o n the republicall account,

problem lies in the reduction of the political vrinciple of citizenship to a substantive exclusionary conception of collective identity: nationality. Accordingly Arendt nrgued fordisaggregating citizenship from ascriptive criteria of national belonging (ethnic or cultural) and insisted that civil and political rights or citizens should not be allocated on the pre-political basis of nationnlity. States should not he nation-slates but civic polilics lhat gan t citizenship on legal crilerin (Arrndt, 1973). Every attempt to distinguish civic from etl~nic nationalism. or civic/constitutional pauiotisni Cram nationalist commonitilrianism, relies on some form or this argument including contempraq theories of libcral vuitiosalism (Bmhaker. 1992: Habern~as, 1995: Miller, 1995; Tamir. 1W3; Viroli, 1995). The revival of

this discourse in recenl ywrs is a response to the resurgence of ethno-. racialized and very illiberal or anti-democralic versions of nationalistlcommunilarian identity politics.

The fear that such nationalisms undermine liberal and democratic institutions motivates political lhcr>rists to draw distinctions belween good and pernicious forms of political identity, and between open and inclusive as opposed to essen-tialized and inegalitarian criteria of belonging and access lo citizenship. B U ~ we cannot lea* the mattw there. FOT there is anothu set or contradictions inherent in h e nation-state system that Arrndt noted, nmrely the tension bchveen the rule of law and the concept of sovereignty regdrdless of whether it is attributed

to the nation. to the state or 10 the people (the demos). Arendt understood lhal the attribution of exclusive territorialitv and inviolable sovereignty to each nation-state over internal matters contributed to the willingness of states to deprive non-citizens of basic rights and to threaten the rights of national minorities, even if they were citizens. It is the presumed sovereinntv of the territorial nation-state, however democratic, that is at thc heart of the ambiguity notcd above, namely whether the legal status of the rights-bearing individual is eranted lo all human beings or onlv to the citizens of a particular stale. Until quitc rccently the dilemma wab resolved everywhere in thc same way: legal persnnhood \x8r.ils anichcd to citimnshi~~ stalus in il discrete sialc. Rights ol'noo-cilize16 depended on the stale's (as represcntarivc of the sovereign dcmos') will and on litlle rlse. Arendt and other demncracic republican political theorists tricd to moncik the egalitarian universalisLic principles they Dclieved

in wilh thc dixretencss and exctusiamy logic ol'dcmocntic citi~en~hip in the modem ~u2digm UI two ways: fist, by applying i~niversalism to the idea ofciti~enship as membership, such that citiz*nship itsclr h o m e s Ihc corn human risht: everyone born uiiu a territcuial state has the ilzhr lo citizenship within it and ought not to he deprived of it (Arendt, 19491. Second, democracy and the rule ol'hw could he recowiled if, inlernally. the claim ta unificd sovereignty by the stat6 (representing the demos) is rsistcd, disaggregated and contmlled through a constitutionalism which establishes and limits powers hy goerantecing rights, hy creating an overall separation and balance of powers, and by creatinl: counrw-powers through emling a federalist stmctiirr. Cunslitulionalism ofthis son would recuncile democratic self-n~lc of thc demos, slate power and the n~le of law by denying the claim of absolute sovereignty lin the scnsc of l ~ ~ i b u s solutus) of thc starc' nr of its panict~lar organs I ArenQt. 1963; Aralu. 1995: 202-4.) 'l'hm arc scveral thwretic;~l and normative in;rdcquacies with this solutic,n. I address three of them. Pust, thc asurnpiion that the 'excli~sivcwss of the demos' is simply a function ol rr~lcs or access to cnizenship that 6t1.c~~ prc-political (ethnnlcultural) instead of universalislic legal c~dteria is wrung. As I already indicated. if the democr~tic component ofthe citilenship principk is interpreted to entail self-mlz hy a self-deternliaing demos (directly or t h u g h its Rptsent:ltivcs). 'and ifthis idea merges with Ihe conccpt of the suwreign state that n~les all the inhabitants of a territory, then such a polity will be a nation-state. and the demos will incvilably undersvand itself as a nation.

Democratic citizenship in a slate entails a distinction between members and non-citizens, and it inevitably becomes a pole of identity-formation and identification even in the most liberal democratic constitutionally articulated states. T ~ C VCY ambiguity of the term 'national' implies as much: it is used bolh as a synonym for a state's citizenry (to be a French

national is to be a French citizen) and, at the vrr?, least, as acultural category of col~ective identity. Even if citizenship laws are open and 'civic', even if civic patriotism is all that is legally required of new and old citizens, even if the idenlilyof the nation is understood as an amalgam and open to constant reinternretation, national citizenship tends to 'thicken' and to take on a cultural connotation and identity over time (Hollinger. 1995: Lind, 1-5).


I LINK: NATIONALISM PREVENTS COSMOPOLITANISM

NATIONALISM HAS BEEN USED BY THE STATE AS ESTABLISHlNG STABLE CITIZEN 1DENTlTlE.S USED TO EXCLUDE NON-CITIZEN. THIS THINKING PREVENTS ANY CHANCE FOR COSMOPOLITAN MOVEMENTS WHICH HAVE LOST MOMENTUM.

Falk 04--~rofessor of international Law and Practice at Princeton University, Yale Law School (1955); J.S.D., Harvard University; Been on

the editorial boards of about ten journals md magazines; Chairman of the Consuttative Council. Lawyers' Committee on American Policy

Toward Vietnam-. (Richard A., "The declining wortd order : America's imperial geopolitics", 2004, Rouiledge, pg 171 -172)

The essential argument of this chapter is that the rise or transnational economic forces during the 1990s exerted n major influence on the understanding and pnctice of citizenship that mmks itself off fmm the preceding yrritxl of statism, as well as the emergent subsequent period of global wnrfarc directed at overcorning the challenges of megaterrorism. In

the pre-i990s, the Westphalian model of world order based on a society of states prevailed to such an extent as to associate citizenship, as a meaningful dimension of political participation, unconditiondlv with full membership by persons in a particular sovereign state.' The state. with the reinforcing: support of international law. deliberately appropriated the idea and practice of nationality by denying claims of "nationality" on the part o l ethnic and religious minorities, attaching the slatus of citizen only to nationality understood iuridicallv as applicable lo all persons who ~ualifv, regardless of identity. As a result, the state ignores the divergent ~lationalist identities and loyalties of its n~inority inhahitants. This effort WBS not consistenlly successful. Periodic attempts were made hy dissatisfied minorities to nxonfigurc the boundaries of states or lo establish zones of aulonomy within

existing boundaries, if not to breakaway en~itely tofonn a state ortheir OM. The rise of "nationalism" as the basis for community was itself a maior dimension of the secularizing process that accompanied the rise of statism lrom the seventeenth century onward, and was complementary to the determined effort to exclude religious and ethnic intluences from the vublic sphere of governance. But this statist approach to citizenship often reached ambiguous results in practice. The insistence On conflating juridical ideas of membership and affiliation with a more sDontaneous politics associated with identitv and desire gave rise to resi~tance that assumed varying- f0IXTl.S. 'The main sources of popular resistance lo this dominant statist trend arose m n g groups that perceived themselves as marginalized 811d dissatisfird with political identity's prevailing legal ~urangcmmts. This often reflected intense ethnic attachnienls or arose fro111 strong mtisec~~l;lr refusals to

suprsede religious solidarity and rtccepr a tieid separation of church from state. Such captive "nations" remained trapved within state boundaries generating autonomv and secessionist movements designed to achieve a maximal overlap of personal and group solidarity, nations. and stales in fully legitimate political units, what were claimed to be "natural political communities." Also, especially during the culonial period, citizens of colonial powers were given varying d e g w s of exuaterritorial exemption From and protection of their special status when physiodly present in various non-Western counhies, an invidious dep,uture from territorial law that inculcated relations of superiority and inferiority, leading

the latter over time to resist and revolt. Despite these qualifications. the core reality of citizenshin in thc modern era could be accurately related to the territorial domain of the sovereign state. To be sure. there were all a l o n ~ idiosyncratic and visionarv claims of "global citizenship," particularlv in the aftermath of the two twcnticth century world wars; bul these claims were usually animated by antiwar fervor and associated with isolated vearnin~s of individuals for world government. world peace. and affirmations of human solidarity. These plobalizing perspectives never acquired grassroots backing, remaining- so marginal in their ~olitical relevance as to bc treated as sentimental anomalies of an overwhelmin ply statist realitv and of no ~0nceptual Or political importance. Exempl~q individuals seemingty dedicating their lives and energies to humanity. such as Alhen Schweitzcr and Dag Hanunxskjold. welz often identified as "c~dzens of the world" or "world citizens," giving a cemin weight to this ideal~st image of an essentially unified human species.'


LINK: NATIONALISM PREVENTS COSMOPOLITANISM I ACCEPTING NATIONAL IDENTITY PREVENTS FORMING CROSS-NATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND REINFORCES ARBITRARY BOUNDARIES--AN APPEAL TO COSMOPOLITANISM ALONE IS SUPERIOR

Nussbaum 96 (Martha, Brown Philosophy Professor, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, ed. Nussbaum and Cohen, pp. 14-5)

4. We make a consistent and coherent asument based on distinctions we arc prepared to defend, In Richard Rortv's and Sheldon Hackney's eloquent appeals to shared values. there is something that makes me very uneasv. They seem to argue effectively when they insist on the centrality to democratic deliberation of certain values that bind all citizens together. But why should these values, which instruct us to ioin hands across boundaries of ethnicity, class, nendcr. and race, lose steam when they get to the borders of the nation? By conceding that a morally arbitrary boundary such as the boundary of the nation has a deer> and formative role in our deliberations, we seem to deprive ourselves of any principled way of persuading citizens they should in fact ioin hands across these other barriers. For one thing. the verv same grouus exist both outside and in-side. Why should we think of people fromchina as our fellows the ninute they dwell in a certain place,

namely the United States, but not when they dwell in a certain other place, namely ~hina?What is it about the national boundary that ma~icallv converts neople toward whom we are both incurious and indifferent into ~eop lc to whom we havc duties of mutual respect'! I think. in short, that we undercut the very case for multicultural respect within a nation by railing to make central to education a broader world respect. Rich- irrd Rorty's patriotism may be a way of hringing a11 Americans together; but patriotism is verv close to iinaoism, and I'm afraid I don't see in Rorty's argument any proposal for coping with this very ohvious danger. Furthermore, the defensc of shacd national values in both Rorty and Hackney. as I understand it. requires appealing to certain basic features of human personhood that obviously also transcend national boundarics. SO if we fail to educate children to cross those boundaries in their minds and imaginations, we are tacitly giving them the message lhat w e don't rerlly mean what we say. We say that respect should be accorded to humanity as such. hut we really mean Ulat Americans as such arc worthy of special respect. And that. 1 think, is a story that Americans havc told for fa too long.


I LINK: NATIONALISM PREVENTS COSMOPOLITANISM . PROMOTING NATIONAL lDENTlTY PW\'ENTS REALIZING AN ETHIC OF GLOBAL COSMOPOLITANISM

Nussbaum 96 (Marlha, Brown Philosophy Professor, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, ed. Nussbaum and Cohen, pp. 6-8)

When Diogenes the Cynic replied, "I am a citizen of the world," he meant, apparently, that he refused to be defincd by his local origins and group memberships, so central to the self-image of the more universal aspirations and concerns. The Stoics, who fol- lowed his lead, further developed his image of the kosrnou poliles (world citizen) arguing that each of us dwells. in effect, in two communities-the local community of our birth, and the comrnunitv of human argument and aspiration that "is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this comer nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun" (Seneca, Dc Olio). i t is this community that is, fundamentally, the source of our moral obligations. With resuect to rhc most basic moral values, such as iustice, "We should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors" (Plutarch, On the Fortunes of Alexander). We should regard our deliberations as, first and foremost, kliber- ations about human problems of oeoule in particular concrete situations, not uroblems growing out of a national identity that is altogether unlike that of others. Diogenes knew that the invitation to think as a world citizen was, in a scnse, an invitation to be an exile from the comfort of patriotism and its easy sentiments, to see our own ways of lifc h m the point of view ofjusticc and the good. The accident of where onc is born is just that, an accident; any human being might have been born in any nation. Recognizing this, his Stoic successors held, we should not allow differences of na- tionalitv or class or ethnic membership or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings. We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and five its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respecl. This clearly did not mean that the Stoics were proposing thc ah- olition of local and national forms of political organization and the crcation of a world state. Their point was cvcn more radical: that we should give our first allegiance to no mere form of novernment, no temporal vower, but to the moral community made up bv rhc humanity of all human beings. The idea of the world citizen is in this way the ancestor and the source of Kant's idea of the "king- dom of ends," and has a similar function in inspiring and regulating moral and political conduct. One should always behave so as to treat with equal respect the dipnitv of reason and moral choice in every human being. It is this concept that also inspires Tagorc's novel. as the cosmopolitan landlord struggles to stem the tide of nationalism and factionalism by appeals to universal moral norms. Many of the speeches of the character Nikhil were drawn liom Ta- gore's own cosmopolitan political writings. Stoics who hold that good civic education is education for world citizenship recommend this attitude on three grounds. First, they hold that the studv of humanity as it is realircd in the whole world is valuable for self-knowledge: we see ourselves more clearly when we see our ways in rclation to those of other reasonable peoule. Second, they argue, as does Tagore, that we will be better able to solve our problems if we face them in this way. No theme is decper in Stoicism than the damage done by faction and local alle- piances to the political life of a group. Political deliberation, they argue, is sabotaged again and aeain bv artisan lovalties, whether to one's team at the Circus or to one's nation. Only by making our fundamental allegiance to the world community of iustice and reason do we avoid thcsc dangers. Finally, they insist that the stance of the kosmou polites is intrin- sicallv valuable, for it recogni~cs in pcople what is esueciallv fundamental about them. most worth^ of reswct and acknowledg- ment: their asuirations to iustice and goodness and their capacjties for reasoning in this connection. These qualities may be less color- ful than local or national traditions and identities-it is on lhis basis that the young wife in Tagore's novel spurns them in favor of qualities in the nationalist orator Sandip that she later comes to sec as superficial-but they are, the Stoics argue, both lasting and deep.


LINK: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE SYSTEM THROUGH CIVIC ENGAGEMENT WILL LOCK IN FORMS OF EXCLUSION AND RISK COOPTlON4UR ALTERANTlVE IS COMPARATIVELY SUPERIOR BY IMPLEMENTING AN ACTIVE PROCESS OF CONTINUAL IDENTlTY CONTESTATION

Hayward, 04 (Clarissa Rile Hayward, Ohio State University Department of Political Science, Constitutional Patriotism and Its Others, the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2004 http:Ilpsweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/intranet/polthcory/Constitutional~Patriotism.pdf)

A second, a ~ d potentially more wciphty objection centcrs on the relative Icgitimacy of constitlitional patriotism's exclus~ons. A Habermasian might concede that principled forms of

binding exclude: that the civic wc is necessarily defincd with rererencc to somc constitutive outside: that it is never fi~lly inclusive. However. shc might argue, this mCanS no more than that the role for the political theorist must be to search for a way to define the civic we as inclusively as possible: i.e.. to approximate as cbseiy as possible the unattainable idcal of "democratic citizenship." .. 1E wc cannot eliminate the tension belween democratic principles and civic ideals." she might ask (rhetorically). "should we wt a1 ki~t search for ways to minimizc it?" By this view, the relevant queslion is 1101. "Do principled definitions of thc civic 'wc' excludc?" but: " W h m do they exclude. and on what gmi~nds'? Some grounds for exclusion are normatively objectionable. bul others are not. Constitulional patriotism, the Habcrmasian nlight suggest, although ituieed it excludes, cxcludes in ways that are legitimate. The objection is not without b r ~ e . Granted. there are. from a liberal dcmocratic perspective. beuer and worse Corms of political exclusion. Recall the dual demands that lute every democratic polity: demands for cohesion, which. above, 1 suggested posc "hinding problems." and demands for inclusion, which I argued pose "boundary problems." If one couhl imagine the univcrsc of identities and potential identit~es. no doubt s o m would perform one or both or these functions poorly. or perhaps not at all. Some identities and some potential identities would prove imapable of generatine a civic bond sufficient to create cohesion ilcmvs lincs of interest andor paticulwislic irlentilirx.?tim. Others arbitrarily wouki exclude large numbers of pcople a d o r would Cue1 extreme forms of vhlence and aggression duwred nr the exc111ded. Yet there is a range of idcnlities and pntential identities that one might think about as mectiny a minimal rlueshold for bolh cohesion and inclusiwness. Within this set. the second Habem~asian objection suggests, should not the g~>al bc lo

maxinlize cohesion and inclusion. or at kast a find UI optimal tr'xde-off between the two'! On a purely analytic kvrl, this a p p r t s ~ h w m s reasonable. However, given thdt even relatively cohesive and inclusive political identities necessarily excludc, in practice, it can generate comulacencv with respect to whichcver exclusions obtain. The principal diflicultv, in otherwords. with approaches to

bil1ding;lnd bon~ldqproblenis that define an unattainable ideal of "democratic citizenship," and then work to approximate that ideal, is that they function to legitimize the deficits of their own avvroximations. With r c s p ~ t to Habermos'il variant ofconslit~nional patriotism. my worry is not simply that it exclodes illiberal and anti-democratic olhers. It is ako, and principnlly. that because it claims to do so on normativelv unobjectionable grounds. it

legilimizcs those vergexclusinns. Hence. as evidenced by the recent policies and practices of the Bush administration, it can serve to fuel aggressive attitudes toward. and actions aimed, at its others. A better tack is to highlight the tension between democratic principles and civic ideals, and to exploit that tension with a view to promoting contestation over the boundaries that delineate the civic we. For an iltastratinn of whst S U ~ I I contesration might Ike. I want to canqidcr bricfly some of Habermas's reccnt interventio~is into political debates amor Cia~nan identity. i~hout German asylum policy and citizenship law, and about Lhe pusibility of a transnational Ruropeau political ideruity.41 In his capacity as il political philosopher. 1 hsve suggested. H a b e m s aims lo discover a normatively unobjectionabb sct of civic exclusions: exch~sions which the claim to universabry it~nctions to legitimi~e, rendering constirutional patriotism vulnerable to what. at times, can he treacherot~s forms ofillibtml and anti-democratic abuse. In his rolc as a political actor. however. he does something rather difrcrent. tIe argues pliblicly for a recontipration o r the collective self-understanding of Ihe German pcople, and of the shape of the boundaries thal define and delimit that people. Ile issues a call for the conscious collective construction of n w , more expansive civic boundaries, which would define a trans- ~iational Europcan political identity. Hahermas advances nrgumcnts. that is to say, for the redefinition of a civic we: arguments that aim, priormatively, to act upon. or in ways that affect. its buundwies. In this more political cspacily, he works to unsettle for his audiencc the sense that "'democntic citimnship" has been achieved. Such interventions can be understootl as instances of what Ernesto 1.aclau and Chantal Mouffe call "hcgcmonic stnlggle."42 If thcy were lo sucwe&if IIakrmas were to p n u a d e the German, andlor the broader European public to i~flderstmd thcmsclvcs as self-consciously and post- ni~tic~nally wnst i t~~ted political peoples-then it likely would appear to future generations as if " 'dmocntic citiwnship" always had heca [ot~nded on constitutimal norms and valucs. but Gel-nian !atid other) nationalists simply had failed tu reillize this was so.43 Yet Laclau and Mouffe would urge denuxnts to resist the templation to be s~tkf icd will] this new definition: to view it as a good-enoi10 approximalion of an impossible id&~l. I~xtcial: they wuuld suggest, we should regard and approach u as a Jefnition that ~uctss in ly introduces a new set of exclusions. ICthe task uf the political theorist prior to this inlerventiun was to uncover and to e x p s e the exclusm~ns defined by the extant interpretation of "democratic cilize~~ship." then. aner the intervenlnn, her task

rcmains the yam. The principal ditfcrence bet wen^ on the one hand. this appmach. and on thc other, Habermir. s's ss articulated in his more striclly philosophical n ~ i t u ~ g s . is l b l . while the latter eniphasiws theconlenl of t k dfl~nitinn of "democratic citizenship," aiming to discover that co~~tent which best ;~ppl-c~ximates the (onasninahlel ideal. thc fornlcr e m p h u i ~ s the struggle

itself to define and to re-define that content. BY Laclau and Mouffe's V ~ W , this struggle is intrinsically valuable. both because it helps unsettle extant understandings of the civic "we" and because it ekbodies democratic fre4om.a Democracy requires theconstittttioo o f a hounded "pcoplc." and therefore necessarily prnduces exchdons. This effect enjoins the democrat. not to rcsolvc the tensio~i between de~nocratic principles a d civic ideals. by dcvising a minimal andlor an nnobjcctionable set of exclusions. hut rather 10 lind ways m shape social and political institutions and practices such that they promote the ongoing interrogation of, and suppo~t stmgglcs aimed at challenging. whiihcvcr escloaons obtain, To be sure. p r l of this task musl involve tinding ways lo avoU the most extreme terms of exclusion: institulio~ial

mechanisms that discoutage. for example. the pruduction and the mmhacnancc of idenlities that are explicitly intolerant. Bt~t that IS not enough. In addilion. democralic illclu~ion requires an active politics of identity contestation: a politics that. I want to stlggesr. consists in both deconstructivc and reconstructive contestatory praclices. such a politics wouu be L-haranerized. by forms ofcontrsvation that draw attention to t ~ i e exclusions prodo~xd hy extant definitntns of thc civic wc: that advance wguments about what is wrong with those exclusion$: andlor thw voice claims for inclusion on bchnlf of at Ieasl s u m of the excluded. One c ~ u n p k or such deconsuuctive iitentity-contestation is I h k t m u ' s own critique of the difkrential trealmnt that German citizenship law ilccords. nn the ant! hand. so- called '$uest wurkers." and on the other, those who we considered '2thn1c (ierm:~ns." Cienmns, Hahermiw urgues, should nnt define membership in their political sclciety along liner o i presumed ethnic and cultural sameness, since to do so iq to fail m Lake into account significant mocll obligations, such as those owed the immisrants whom state oflicials acctivcly rccmitd to serve as a WUIIX of cheap labor in the, postwar ym3.45 Political ident~ty-conteaation must involve. as well. efforts to anicalntc altcmative definitions of t k civic "we": trr offer accounts. that is, of how a pwicular political society might definc and nurture a cohes~vc ~dentily. accounts which depart h m the dominsnt and/or the status quo drfmition. Let me illu~tratc. agiain. with an example drawn from Habermas's rccenl political writings. this time Irom his intervenlions into lhc historians' dehate about &man political i~kntity. I-Iere Hahermas argues ag.zinsl thc claim that Genna~is should strengthen ethno-culturally particularistic understandings of tbe t political identity via stories that miti7e and "normnlizc" thc nqtio~t's Nazi p ~ s t . Instead, his claim is. the German people consciously sheuld rwonstruct its political idenlity, drilwiny on its "ties to thc Wcst's Enlightenment culture."4b They shr~old do so. Habermas srcuas. lhmugh a process ulcrilical reflection and debatc that involves the ptublematization and the zpudiation olwhdt he calls Germany's most "disastrous hditions."47 To the extent that H;iberms advances these and similar clainu: for consritotional

patriotism as a form of pc~litical interventinn, his work is an instance of what I want to suggest is a demwmtically invalt~~blc form oleontestatory politics. MY q ~ a ~ e l , then, & not with such political interventions per se. but with Habcrmas's more programmatic affirmations of constitutional patriotism. My cowern, in other wards. centers on a cenain way of regarding this reconstructive task: on understanding ix us an endeirror that might one day end, when somcone finally

gets it right, when some political philosopher finilll? discovers the most inclusive possible defmition ofLwho wc are." & indeed, every definition Of the civic We Continued.. .


.. LINK: ClVlC ENGAGEMENT

Continued.. . produces exclusions, then the trouble with such an approach is that it deflects altcnlion from the very exclusions ekc ted by contestalory reconstructions. Better an interative process. whereby deconslruclion accompanies every successful reconstruction, whereby plural forces contend. continually. to define and to re-dcline the terms that bind and bound the demos. 1t is not the case, then, that the political theorist's principal role is to provide the best possible content to the civic we: to reveal that "we" should define ourselves with reference to liberal and democratic principles, rather than, say, ethnic origin. To the contrary, her most crucial task is to dislurb thc very sense of having achieved a statc of "wew-ness. and hence to provoke democratic contestation over the terms that define who " ~ e " are. 111 .Junerici~n politics today. an important pan of that lask i~lvolvss highlighting and drawing critical attenlion to the rnk of"terror'. as the constitutive outside of civic idenlily. Ten, or twenty, ca fifty years from now, it will mcan ~0mCthlng different. In tltis essay, 1 have argued that constihttional parriotism. as developed itnd defended by Jiirgeo Uzberrnas. fails to resolve the tension hetween democmiic and civic idedu th:~t b conrtitutive of democratic politics. In concluston, I wmt to sketch some insigh& this dis&ussion yields for those concerned oi

pmmoie both public-regarding crvtc engagement and detnnaatically inclusive collective self-determination. 'fhe argilmenl supges~s, for onc, that the tension between democratic principles and civic ideals may be at its most extrcmc when what is at stake is a fixed and a sinpular citizen-identity . Hence tkorLsis concerned with democratic citimnship's binding and boundary prohiems would do well to devote attention to reccnt wcork on multiple and overlapping, and in what Aihwo Ong hos termed '-tlcxiblc" citizcnship. including those forms of citizenship thal travem nation-sratc boundaries. Somc scholus point to the Europeo~ Union as defining unponant new forms of transnatic>nnl citizenship. for instance. Others vicw dinspuran identities as evidence of transnational political idenlification. Still others point to the allegiances forged in international civil society as signs of emerging transnaiional practices of civic solidarity.48 1 do no1 w i ~ n ~ to suggest. howcvcr, that moving in this direction will provide an e u y answer or a solution to problems of "democratic citizcnship." To thc contrary. it seems likely that. to the extent that cilizemhip hecomes multiple and kxible, it surrelxlws some of its binding capacily. At thc same time. because people am differentially positioned to "flex" their flexible citizenships, il is far from evident that transnational righLs, obligations, and rolidiuilics ywantes

democratic equality and inclusiveness. Instcad. thc argument suggests what may strike some renders as a b s patilying conclusion: thal politics that promote civic ideals often depend uvon boundaries that are, from a democratic uersuective, arbitrary, and that a commitment to democratic principles can recommend disrupting the binding work citizenship performs. The tension between democratic principles and civic ideals is a chronic tension. Yet it is a tension that can be productive of democratic contestation, since the very aspiration to "democratic citizenship7'-i.e., to a binding civic identity that is democraticallv inclusive<an propel the challenge of whichever exclusions obtain. And it can do so again, and again, and again.

CIVIC-REPURI~ICAN DISCOURSE OF NATIONALISM KILLS DISTRACT AND SUPERCEDE COSMOPOLITAN ETHICS FOR AMERICAN CONCERNS

Abowitz in '03 (Kathleen, Associate Professor Educational Leadership at Miami University, International Conference on Civic Education Research in New Orleans, "The dominant discourses of citizenship in American life and schooling". November, http://civiced.indiana.edu/papers/2003/10523 1541 4.doc)

CArticulations of ]wlilical community in this dismurse focus on comnuonnlity, consensus, and unity. Ilnlike the exclusive cltrb of ancient Athcnion democr.xy. where only a small group of Ihe . . adults were actually given rights of citizenship. civic republicans do often communicate an awnrencss of a multicultural An~erica. Still, as Oldham (1998) describa. ClVlC republican discoursc largely maintains the benefits of ~ X C ~ U S ~ V ~ ~ Y . All discourses of citizenship must define hountlaries (of rnemhership. of benefits, of rights. of

dnties). but the civic republican discourst: draws h e sharpest lines of incl~lsion and exchsinn in its expressions of poli~iolllmemkrship. "In choosinv an identity for ourselves, we recognize both who our fellow citizens are. and those who are not members of our community, and thus who are potential enemies" (Ibid., 8 1). Oldham states that this idea 01 exclusivity, which lies at the heart of the civic republican tradition, gives priority to political community, when necessarv. over universalist or humanist ethics. For example, particularly in times of war or economic threat. the needs of nation suverccde global or cosmopolitan ethics - recall the nationalisl rhetoric that introduced the Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) under the threat of a strong Ja~anese economy. Similarly, after 9/11/01 Lvnne Chenev stated that "the most important civics lessons for American children are found in American history" (2002, p. XX). Civics, it is implied here. does not involve a study of world historv except as a secondary matter -stt~denls primarily need to know abont dimcult accomphshments of slaning and maintaining our democratic sucicty 12002, 14). Otherwise. our democratic society will not be reprodumd in future grnerdlions. Pulure generalions of U.S. citizens arc of g a v e concern lo civic republicans. and t e a s in this discoorsc cnlphasuc cognilive learning aboul democracy's history and institutions,

The civic revublican discourse strongly values civic knowledge, sometimes called civic literacy ( ~ i l n c r 2002). as an essential component of citizcnship. Civic educatiw has to do with students gainins the right mount of civic kmwledgr. virtues. iind skills lo successTully engage in the pmcess of dclnocracy (Butts

198% Milner 2002: Nic. Junn and s t e h ~ i i - w i y , 1996). Such civic knowledge would focus on American history. institutions, seminal texts (Constitution, Bill of Rights, etc.), reserving a lesser place for more humanistic, intcrnalional. and critical - content and pedagoay. Many knls in this discourse hemoan the diminished civics ofikrings in high schools, and the diminished scores that U.S. studenus receive in tests on civic kn~vilafgc compared with uthcr naiions (Quigley 2003.2. N.mP repon card. 1999).>


.. LINK: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

STATE BASED CITIZENSHIP FUNCTIONS WITHIN MODERN FRAMEWORKS WHERE PEOPLE ARE TERRITORIALIZED AND REPLACE THE COSMOPOLITAN INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY.

Cohen 99--PH.D Political Science; Sociology Columbia University4Jean L., "Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos", International Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 3, 245-268, 1999).

The m~ltnol criricisms leveled hy advocates of each position often hit their m k . It certilinly easy to point Out the abstractness of ~osmopo~itan individualism, its failure to take particular identities (political and cultural), contexts and traditions into account, as well as its quixotic effort to coniure away the discreteness of the political and to replace it with universalistic juridical relations based on the most abstract identity of all: humanity (henat. 1973: Cohen, 1996). Republican md democratic tl~rwrisls arr:

risht to insist that 'humanity', even if positivized into 'legal personhood', is too thin an identity to motivate much mobilization, participation or solidarity on its behalf. They are also right to insist that democratic political institutions and active citizenship are indispensable for determining, the common good and .for protecting liberty, both public and private. ~ lx : reciprocal i~~usiolls of civic republicanis~n are less ohvious. and 1

come back to them later, but certainly they include a peculiar naivete visa-vis the exclusiveness, particularism and arbitrariness that are usually at work when sovereign states or sovereign citizens delimit membershia in the demos and articulate the special rights of citizens. Our choice is not between liberal universalism that is focused on human rights and the rule of law US democracv construed as the sovereign self-determination of a people whose representatives have exclusive rule over all the affairs and inhabitants of a territory. This old antinomy between rights and democracy (reminiscent ofcar1 Schmitt) re-emerges today because theorists fail to adequately analyze the citizenship principle and to transcend core assuniptions of a now anachronistic paradigm. Thus neither approach is able to discern whar I c o n s i d e r o s s i b i l i t i e s for a new paradigm of citizenship and new political forms of organization.


LINK: USING THE STATE TO ENFORCE NATIONAL IDENTITY

DEMANDS BASED UPON A PARTICULAR SHARED IDENTITY RElNFORCE AN ONTOLOGY OF SOVERElGNTY AS THE NATURAL CONTAINER FOR POLITICS; THIS AfPTHORI7,ES STATE VlOLENCE AGAINST THOSE OUTSIDE OF THAT IDENTITY

Shaw 99--professor of political science at the University of Victoria-( Karena, "Symposium: Re-Framing International Law For The 219 Century: Feminist Futures: Contesting the Political", 9 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 569, lexis.)

If sovereignty is broadly constitutive of political possibility, why not simply assume it so that we can get on with our malyses and our progressive practices? As Benltabib notes,

manv conlemporary movements articulate their demands in languages of sovereigntv and identity, ;md thus lend themselves to

being read as she does: as demands for identity production or recognition. After all, that thesc exclusions and violences have been resistcd through the appropriation of the same discourses used to effect them-- discourses of sovereigntv expressed in identitv oolitics. human rights discourses, humanism--is a testament lo the power of sovereignty discourse, and to its domination of discursive spaces of power. SO why not acceptthesc d m n d s at "face value" and work to facilitate these ideals, to "include" Ulose previously excluded from the polis, to gnnt them sovereignty and thus (apparently) political subjectivity? Why not, in other words. accept the ontology of sovereignty--not as perfect, but as what we have to work with-- and turn it to the empuwennenl of its previous victims? Why not accept the modem slate as thc contiliner for . . politics and work to facilitate adequate representation ti,r each and all at the state level? 1"582] To be clear, this is a necessary strategy under some conditions. But It 1s also both insufficient and potentially dangerous. The dan~er of assuming sovereigntv is twofold. First. the assumption of sovereignly forecloses thc questions that we most need to address. forcing us into a reading of politics that leaves us unable to respond to conlemporary political challenges. In particular, the assumptic>n of sovereignty prevents us from subiecling the discourscs and practices of sovereigntv themselves to the kind of critical scrutiny that is rewired, given changing material conditions for the production of political authority. Sccond, if we continue to assume that sovereignty is the necessarv precondition for political authority. and thus remain unable to engage the question of its character or appropriateness, we will continue to impose and enforce--however violently--the necessities of sovereignty onto material conditions that may be increasingly resistant to such an imposition. BY maintaining; the mythology that sovereigntv is necessarv and natural as a precondition for politics. we will- however unintentionally--continue to sanction the violences done in the name of sovereignty, considering them necessary and natural rather than contingent upon the particularity of the ontology of sovcrci~nty. Toopen thediscourses and practices of sovereignly to questkon, on the other hand. enahles a range of questions about the conditions of possibility for political authority to he opened and engaged. 1 believe that thc future of feminist politics depends upon an engagement wrth these questions. The dangcrs of assuming sovereignty emerge trum the ways in which the assumption of sovzrelgnly--the assumption of the necessity of thc panicular ontological resolutions that have enabled modem political authority--shapes and colatrains our thinking nbout politics

andour politic^ action. AS I haveemphasized, one of the particularly powerful aspects of Hobbes' architecture of sovereigntv is that it convincingly persuades us that there is no alternativc to sovereignty. It is the necessarv precondition for all that is good; all else is war. conflict and violence. If we believe this varticular mythology of sovereigntv, of course, we will be

compelled--as theorists and practitioners of poUtics--to do everything we can to create, prolcct and strengthen the ontoloav of sovereignty; we certainly do not want to be responsible for leading our fellow beings into the alternative. ~t is this pnrticular clement of the architecture of sovereignty diswursc: thnt has led to prhaps ils greatest violences. Because the ontology of sovereignty is not assumed to be contingent, bul necessary and natural, whatever violences go into its production me also rendered necessary and natural rather than political. However. the ontology of sovereignty is neither

nahral norneutral. On the contrary, both the particularity of the ontology of sovereigntv and the belief in its necessitv have been responsible for incredible violences. It is not difficult to think of many examples of this: the extermination and colonization of indigenous peoples on the grounds that they lacked the social [*583] and political institutions to survive in the modern world; 1136 the exclusion of large numben of people--not least women--fm political authcmty because they were not adequately "sovereign

individuals:" ~arious foms of religious persecution: and so on. In each of these cases, it is the naturalization of the O ~ ~ O ~ O E V of sovereignty that has produced the victims of sovereignty discourse; they arc those who mark the edges of sovereignty: the non- rational. non-modern, and so on. This "othering" in turn enables campaigns to either convert or destroy them as non- sovereign, as dangerous or feeble. B U ~ theex:xnr~nples do not end there. Many of the violences that have accompanied recent nationalist struggles are legitimated through the samc logics. The necessitv of producin~ a coherent, shared land ontoloaicallv homo~eneous) identitv has accounted for exclusions and violences in the name of the greater good: the achievement of sovereigtsy, the precondition for political subjectivity, n37 Given the particularly violent past of sovereignt~ discourse (or at least its

complicity in this past), to continue to assume, or even triumph, sovereimty's necessity or to continue to believe its own account of its necessary alternatives is highly problcmatic. It certainlv runs the risk of perpetuating further violences under its tattered banner. Crucially, tk is not ro say that one cai simply deny the geography ot sovereignty a d try to cwde alternatives. (;iiven th;tt sovereignty is cxpmsxii lhrnugh mcxlern suhjeclivity, irs accounl olits own alternatives has ail astonishing capacity to bs persuasive in action even if we dcny it in theory.-The queslion is not whether sovereignty is true or wal, but mther, what the conditions are under which we can t ~ ~ a k e claims to such rntth or reality (or legitimate authority. necessary force. md so on). It is this latter question that providcs the crux of contemporary political posbibility, as it opens the pssibilit4. for mnegotiations of discourses and practices of sovereignty.


A FOCUS ON SOVEREIGN STATES AS THE GROUND FOR PO1,ITICAL ACTION EXCLUDES ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF ACTION THAT ARE NECESSARY FOR AN EFFECTIVE PROGRESSIVE POLITICS

Shaw, 1999 (Karena, professor of political science at the University of Victoria, 9 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 569, lexis)

In this way, Benhabib asserts a particular reading of "global politics" as evidence for the necessily of (a particular theoretical form for conceptualizing) identity. By extension, hers js_also an argument for the continuation of the modern ideal of volitical or~anization: sovereign states, or "polities," with firm insides and outsides and clear rules of entrance, where everyone can find his or her place. Her reading of global politicsthe "new constdlationU--thus simultaneously provides the justification for and is inrormed by her theoretical commitments. This rcading of "politics" remains uninterrogafed in her article; it is presented as obvious. 1112 This enables her, in turn, to dismiss alternative conceptions of identity or political possibility, such as those presented by Judith Butler or Rosi Braidolti. as "unrealistic." 1113 In this way, Benhabib's argument has the appearance (but only the appearance) of being grounded in "real" political Concerns, to the extent that she canclaim to bc reorienting feminist theory IU respond to thcpolificel demanda oTIbe twenty-Ti1 crnlttry. I*5741 This fimili.~r claim to poliljcul relevance in pzicular, and Benhabib's nepxiation of the relaiinship between theorctiwl arguments and political " r e s l i i ~ ~ " more broadly, lead me to Ihc

pmblem 1 scek to explore here. For those concerned wlth the inuicacies of global, trmsnatbnal, or feminist pohlics. it might be tempting tci dismiss Benhahib's argument, specificnlly thc larger debate in which it inlcrvenes, and even Bminist political theory more broadly. as at lea l poliliwlly naive. and perhaps as i r r e l e v , ~ ~ ~ . It b especially ditlicult to imdgine--even if one accepts her readinp of the "new constellation" on thc most general level--thal the yolulic~n to thi? chalienge lies in either narrative or perfomdive conccplions of identity. Surely. one might say, the resolution of such assertions of idcntity is at leas1 as mwh bound up in such things as access L o muterial rrsources. economic am1 e~lvkonmcntal stability. political stnlnures and processes hislorics of viulence and oppressicln. and so on--all things to which Benhahih's strategy has only teigential access. Benhahihk focus on nmtivc--as opposcd lo material, economic, legal, or ecological-- webs ilJt~slrales this troubling n;uTowness. While she might a r g t ~ that mtterial. a~lnomic , environmental and political C u m are expressed in narmtive wcbs. their exp~essbn in these webs

cannot account forthcir panicipation in t t ~ constructian of the oondirions otpussihjlity for na~at ive webs. Perhaps being a "cultural broker," helping to construct more "inclusive" narrative identities, is all theorists are good for, and the rest should be left to practitioners of "real" politics? I argue otherwise on both counts: Benhabib's argument has considerable political relevance insofar as it continues a vractice--rampant within most modern and contemporary political theory--of obscurinrr the precise questions we mosl crucially need to engage in order lo envision and enact effective futures lor kminist or other forms of progressive politics. Benhabib assumes the framework of a modern and specificallv liberal politics, and forces not only gender, but all of the diversity and complexity of contemporary global politics into it. While this frame for understanding; politics remains very powerful, there is considerable evidence to suggest that it is increasingly inadequate not only as a frame for gender politics, but also much more broadly. Further, as long as we continue to assume this framework. we will remain unable to engage the political questions that most require our attenlion. Whilc it remains extremely difftult to amid assomins this framework. 1 want lo SII~&!OY~ a different way of approaching Ihc question of the day fur political and femini~t theorists. one that pruviks much richer terrain for poliksal an;llgsis and intervention In Section C. I explicate what Benhabib's assumpii>n of a specific account nithc political involves: in Scclion D. 1 explore the danger of failing to challenge it; and in lhc rcmainder of rhe paper, I snggcsl how we might more pmduclively reorient onr thinking. C. Holrlrrsiun Erusure.~ Benhabib's arsumenr lrsts on the assumnption chi11 we know what political struggles today are most cenlrdlly about--the search lor fitable and 1*575] cohcrent Wentitics and how we should rrspond lo them--by adiipling the framework of modem pulilts lu render identity more 'inclusive.* As others have noled. 1114 this assumpli~~n expresses o belief in distinctly ~nodcrn

philosophical resolutions to ,tk prohkms of social and political order. Moreprecisely, it expresses it belief that discourses and practices of sovereignty should or must remain the limit condition of social and ~olitical analysis: the world is and should bc divided into sovereign units (individuals and polities), and these politics are the wecondition for individuals lo realize their full potential as aUtOnOmOUS agents. As Benhabib indicates, this archilecture is framed on the one hand by sovereign individuals and on the other by sovereign polities or statcs. "Outside" this frame individuals face anarchy, violence, conflict. and war; "inside" resides the possibility for politics. For Bcnhnbib, the processes through which penonal subjectivity (ideality) and natiolwl sovereignty (identity) are achieved are isomorphic and can he analyzed as essentinlly similm phenomena. 1115 In one fonn or anuther. whether explicil or nul, the sssumptinn of this architeaurn is conventional both amongst contempormy prliticsl theorists and feminist thcorisls. The expresaic~n of this assumption varics. but mosl theorists assume that Ihe probk~il ol'lhc prciprr ioaatirm and character of polilical authority is settled. proceedins only to conlest how it h legitimated or organized. how it is genderell or not, and so on. As Duller especially has argued. many feminist theorists have t e d d to &$.wme sex even as they critique thc gcndered characler of Lhe modern subject, n16 Ry illuslraring how the dualistic smn~ctures of sex and gender are produccd by and thus remxin embedded in our l a a ~ u a p and cconeeptiuns of subjectivity, Raller illt~stratcs that we cannot assume

sex and simoltaneously "ongender" the sohject. In this way. she and olhcrs have opened crucial political ground, potentially rcarliculating the ternin of gcnder as an axis of analysis. The analysis I develop here parallels Butler, in that it seeks to similarly disrupt what I argue to be the other pole of the assumed architecture of modern politics: the assumption ofthe polity that provides the condition of possibility for thc modern subject. It is only through a simultaneous disruption of this pole, I believe, that thc ~olitical force of Buller's critique can come to be articulated beyond the relatively constrained confines of feminist political theory.


IMPACT: NATIONAL IDENTITY CAUSES EXTINCTION Y I

EMBRACING NATIONAL IDENTITY FORECLOSES THE TRANSITION TO A GLOBAL IDENTITY AND RISKS EXTINCTION

Rapoport, 1997 (Anatol, Founder of the Society for Gcneral Systems Research, World Citizenship: Allegiance to Humanitv, Edited Joseph Rotblat, Page 122-123.

TO assess thc role that Ihe m t b n state c m or should play in an increasingly intcrdcpendenl world, we must lkst form a clem. idca of whar in~erdependence means. It means thal & important problems with which humans are faced are now global problems. This is explicitly recogni7ed in the realization (hat the security of a state vis-a-vis othcr states is a chimera. There is no such thing. The only security from violence on the levd of

states, that is, war. is the security of all. Neither 'balance of power' nor 'deterrence' can provide this security. Pursuit of 'balance of powcr' has consistenlly instigated arms races. Deterrence is predicated on the 'rationalitv' of the opponent and isregardcd themore

crediblc the more reckless is thc deterring p o w c r . T h e idea of calculated risk' is an absurdity in this context, sincc no matter how small the probabilitv of catastrophe is, its occurrence in the age of wars of total destruction makes all formal ~a~culations of its 'probability' irrelevant. Threats not yet imagined by the dcsigncrs of;^ .world order' at t k close or World War 11 ;lrc now ~ t a k i y apparent.

TIICY are generated by the rapidly accelerating degradation of the environment. which transcends all national boundaries. The conseauences of this degradation may instigate struggles for arable land. or water or living spacc of the Sort that fuelled the genocidal wars oiantiqoity. T ~ C fcrocity of these s t~ugpks fought with weapons now developed c;ln he readily imagined. It slands to rrasnn that

anticipating these threats and preparing to deal with them effectively reauires globally integrated actions, which can be undertaken only if sovercinnty of nation states as they arc ~resently organized is drastically curtailed. It follows that national sovereigntv is an insuperable obstacle to the removal of threats to humanity that have had 110 p r e h n t s .

nanely. tllreals of irreversible destnlction magnified heyond imiiginatlon by technology specifically developed for that purpow and threats to the very substrare of human Life on this planet. A satisfactory solution to this dilemma is by no means guaranteed. It is predicated on the abrogation of sovereignty on any level below the global, which, in turn means either thc demise of the nation state as an institution, or its ildaptatinnma

new role in a h~erarchy of aathorities culminating in a global inqtitution entn~rted with seeking and impletnenling solutions of global problems.

NATIONALISM IS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND STATE MOBILIZATION OF POPULATIONS TO COMMIT MASS EXTERMINATION

Falk 04--professor of Interna~ional Law and Practice at Princeton University, Yale Law School (195.5); J.S.D., Harvard Universi~y: Been on

the editorial boards of about ten journals and magazines; Chairman of the Consultative Council, Lawyers' Committee on American Policy

Toward Vietnam-- (Richard A., "The declining world order : America's imperial geopolitics", 2004, Routledge, pg 216-217)

(:l;mting that love of counrry is desirable, who1 should the alunlry ~epresent? Shnulln't 1l1e true patriot seek n counuy principled in dealing with othcr states, a world of conpration and mutual respccl? With the rihe of ghhalizatios and poslmudernity. the nature of political community becomes far nlore cnlnpliwred and nu~ltilnycred. The state can no longer claim to exh;lusl thc senw

of belonging even with respect lo poiirical identity. And yet, despite erosion of the foundations of patriotism as conventionally conceived. it remains a potent force in human affairs, perhaps accentuated in somc ways by thc emergence of many new states around the world in the last b ~ . c e n t v l y . d

the prevalence of nationalism as still the most powerful political creed active in world, moving people to support wars and the sacrifice of the l h o r l h r i pungen,mostby malt, citizzns. The attacks of September 11 reawakened and refocused American patriotic impulses in a climate of opinion that was ultranationalist in tone and substance. There wasarcfusa.1 to explore the sources of rewnlmenl around the world, and especially in lhr Islamic world. that secmcd to ~ i v r rlse tu such dcndly political extrcm~sm aimed principally a Ihe United Staes utxi its

citizens. There was a willingness, even an eagerness. by America to become mobilized for war even thouch no clear connections could be drawn between the wars undertaken and the threats being posed. And there was an insistence on treat in^ the persons responsible for the attacks as evil enemies who deserved to be exterminated. m watment ofnl Vaeda suspects held in the (ioanlanarno prison is emblematic of both a refusal by the American government to grant ~$ghts to detained combntants demanded by internatiolwl huma~~ilari:tn I:iw and thc acccplance by the colmrry and its govcrrunental representatives of such wngeful pclctices that cannot be convincingly explained by reierencc to security considerntions.

Westphalian patriotism nives an often dysfunctional blank check to the state when the citizenry is successfullv mobilized in reaction to a perceived enemy, and the intensitv of the mobilization is often in direct pro~ortion to the magnitude and traumatizing impact of the threat posed. It is dysfunctional because it induces overreaciions that can bc self-defeating and harmful for everyone. It was Thucydides who first depicted this vulnerability of democracies to demagogic apueals in his classic account of the fall of Athens ill theaftermathoffhe Pebponnehian WWS. AS the ultranationalism oC Nazi Germanv demonstrated, even fascist states can invoke vatriotic sentiments to build vooular enthusiasm for irrationally grandiose schemes of conauest and expansion. Of course, this mobilization of the public for militarist advcntures has taken various forms over the centuries, with each instance exhibiting its own particularity. This conccrn

itbout the link berwcen patriotism and aggressive war making remoins a potentially fan1 flaw in cxisting political mangements at the interface of modernity and postmude.mity. American patriotism in the aftermath of September 11 is the latest manifestation of this phenomenon. allowing the U.S. government to proceed with an ill-advised empire-building proiect wiihout confiontim domestic opposition and an accompanying public debate.


I NATIONALISM IMPACTS: WARIGENOCIDE

APPEALS TO NATIONAL IDENTITY GUARANTEE WAR, GENOCIDE AND DEHIJMANIZATION-THE AFFIRMATIVE'S IMPACT ARGUMENTS ARE CONSTRUCTED IN AN EFFORT TO PROVIDE A JIISTIFICATION FOR NATIONAL COHESION

Rapoport, 1997 (Anatol, Founder of the Society for Gcncral Systems Research, World Citizenship: Allegiance to Humanity, Edited Joseph Rotblat, Page 1 1 1- 1 13)

The destructive components of nationalism or tribalism, its primitive form, in their most aggressive manifestation provide rationalization of seeing others through the prism of an unbridgeable we-they dichotomy. Thisis w11at . . observe today as conscqucnces of the hreak-up of multi-national states and the disintegrat~on of colonial authorities. In thc last dccadc of our century n;lf 10nallSm must be acknowledged as a state of mind thal denies common humanity. The collective group is prone to embrace hatred as its moulding link when the gnmp has k e n exposed to hi~miliating expcrienccs that havc been perceived as injorics to the identity of the goup. Forex;unpic, during Soviet uccupulion Moldavinns had to wlite thcirRomanian language in the C:yrillic alphabet. Now that Moldaviil has become a 'sovereign stale'. its Russian inhnhitmts are afraid Ulill they will have to write

Rosrhn In the 1.atin alphahft. Wars, victories, defeats. catastrophes, pogroms and hunger, in COntrdSt to quiescent events, are embraced in our memorv boxes as 'peak affective states'. These become seminal in moulding a group's perception of its role. its self-perception and its position in the world. Memories during 'peak affective states' skew reality and force assessment into primitive dichotomies - all good or all bad. The.'bad7 object is both needed and desired-'This need and desire becomes a sure stepping Stone towards dehumanization. Dehumanization has been defined as 'a defence against painful or overwhelming emotions wh~ch demase a penon's sense of one's own individuality and perception of the hnma~ieness of other people'.' The collective self under thc impact of h.2trcd perceives

the 'bad' others as though they werc vermin or inanimate dispensable objects. C~llective group hatred leads to violence in its need Ir, destroy the needed obiect. The enemy is usually the one who is both wanted and needed, and seems to be needed for affirmalion of one's identity. For example. Ukrainians sccm to need Kussians for their animation ot.idcntily, and Kussians ueed Ukrainians for the same parpox. Coss:rks rn ii source of negative identity to Jews and a positive identity to Ukrainians. In this way collective group hatred becolncs a niost s u ~ ~ e s ~ f u l and handy tool in the h:mls of political arsonists.

Bloodletting in Somalia and Rwanda can be ascribed to the same sudden disintegration of power which had constrained interaouu violence by its own monopoly of violence - the essence of the nation state. The evil legacy of the nation State is the P C ~ V ~ S ~ V ~ identification of Security with military potential. This legacy is not confined to the pervasive idea that the sccurity ot a state. culture, or way o l life means the ahility to repel m e d attack with armed fnrce. Even as the concrete military threat kom a designated cncmy disappears, Ihe military estahlbhment remains. Thc very semantics of the w r d 'defence' makes the dismantling or Ihe milimry machine unthinkable. since it would make the country 'del'enceless'. All ministlies of war have become ministries of 'defence'. and all war spending is uw'uiably callcd 'dcfeacc' spcnding. 11 is iosuuctivc to compare h e global armament levels and 'defence' spending hefore and after the end of the Cold War which fuelled the arms race. The tiurnher of nuclear warheads. a good indicator. was a h a 70.000. At the cnd of START I1 in 2003. the number ul'stratagk wt.;tpuns is to he reduced lo atnul6000, or in about 15.000 if tactical weapoos are to be included." kqide from t k tact, however. that the rcduced numbrr still reprrsrnts a threat of tnlal destruction ol' civibz~tion. I k agl-eed upon timescele (ten years) is ten to twenty rimcs longcr than necessary. 'The reduction could be accomplished in a few months by deactivating delivery systems and separating the warheads which cot~M [hen be stcmd under multilateral control. Arguments against this procallre rn based on the inviolate identification of dcst~nctivc powcr with 'sccurity'. Global 'defence'expendilure, which peaked at $1.2 trillion in 1988. has kc11 reduced by about om-third. Thc saving oFMW million is snbstmthl and could he put to excellent use. However. thc damage of 'sccurity=defence spcnding' menlalily was nul confmed to the waste of funds. It entailed also diversion of human resources into 'defencet-related employments. Co~~scqucnllg, reduction of 'defence' spending cntails decline of employment atid of economic activity generally, and is for this ieason vigv~ously resisted not only by the military-industrial-scientific complex

establishment b11t b y ~ m g c sections 0 1 t h ~ genmal population. T~&s, addiction to violence spiked by burgeoning killing technology is not the onlv evil legacv of the militarized nation state. It involves also an addiction to a war economy, identification of preparations for war with economic robustness. full employment, and so on.

NATIONALISM IS THE LEGITIMATING MECHANISM FOR GENOCIIIE

Savich, 03 ( ~ r u l , historian, "Nationalism: Origins and Historical Evolution", htt~:Nwww.~o~l~di.~o.wleneIi~hlnacionalimm.~h~)

IS gcnocide presupposed in aationalism? Nationalism is predicated on homogcneily---ethnic, linauistic, cultural, religious, racial--- best cxprcsscd in the Nazi S I O ~ U L ~i Reich. Ein volk. Ein Fuehrer. There is (I logical necessity and imperative for homogeneity in nationalism, whether it be ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, or linguistic, that makes genocide implicit in its ideological a ~ ~ ~ m p t i o n s . Gellner expressed it this w;ly: "J t~s l as every girl should have a huah;nid, preferably her own. so every culture mtlst have its state, p~eferably its own:. Minorities are archetypical Aliens. or Others, in this formulalion. In times of war. in times of crises, the perceived danger from the Other is heightened. Even in the US during World w a r n . ;~ppmximatcly 120,000 hpanese Americans. mcn, women, and children, were interned in detention cclllen, IWO-

thirds of them wel-e US citizens. But kcause Japan had homhed Pearl Hnrhor. the "the duty Japs" were a perceived threat (M- danccx lo the US Mion and hid to bt. rounded t ~ p and put in camp. r*llowing the '111 1 attack on the World Trade Cenler, Muslim residenls of the US k c i e auspect. US analysts called for the invasion and occuparinn of the AnbIMnslim world to forcetully convml Muslim? to Christianity. a replay of tllc Cmsadcs. Anti-Muslim and anti-Arab bigotry and racism was rampaut in the US. Many Mosli~nslkabs (or those who looked like same) wcrc attacked and murdered. Mosques were attacked and damaged. During World War I. German-Americans were perceived as the Other in anti-(icrman frenzy in the US and Caosda. 'The city of nerlin. Ontario w;~s renamed Kitchener in honor of rhc British War Sccrclnry Horatiu Kichenu. %~aucrkraut m a renruncd "liberty cabhage" while "hamburger" became "libeny meat" and

. 'Sal~bt~ry stcnk" and 'Yrank[urters" kcame hot dogs in the US. During the US "regime change" of Iraq in 2003, this bigotedlracist phenomena in the US was repeated. Becaust: France had opposed the US military overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, there was a pro~osal to change the name of French fries to "freedom fries", prencll toast to .*freedom toast.. . There was a shameless and strident glee jn this atavistic nationalist racism and bigotry. Racism and extermination directed at minorities evolved with nationalism. This is a phenomenon of recent or i~in, it has its roots in modern nationalism. The concept of destroying nationalities because they posed a military threat to the nation evolved with nationalism. h plc-industrial perinds, nnlionnl armies were made up of professional soldiers. Thc conccpt of a Rfth Column is of rclarivcly =cent origul. Moreover. ethnic and religious diversity and heterogeneity were pre-industrial norms. In the nationalist age, howev~l.. llniformity and homo~eneitg---ethnic, rdipious, mcL1. cultural. linguistic--- bccmc the new norms.


NATIONALISM IMPACTS: WAWGENOCIDE I NATIONALISM RISKS WAR AND GENOCIDE

Zinn, 05 (Howard, Professor Emeritus in the Political Science Department at Boston University, 'The Scourge of Nationalism'?, The Progressive, June, htt~://www.vro~ressive.or~/?~=node/199~

Is not nationalism--that devotion to a flag, an anthem. a boundary so fierce it enpenders mass murder--one of the great evils of our time, along with racism. along with religious hatred? These ways of thinking--cultivated. nurtured, indoctrinated from childhood on--have been useful to those in power, and deadly for those out of power. Nationalspiritcan

be benign in a country that is small and lacking both in military power iln~l :I hongcr fur expansion (Switxrhnd, Norway, Cos~:l Rkl , atd many m r e j . nut in a nation like Ours-- huge, possessine thousands of weapons of mass destruction--what might have been harmless pride becomes an arrogant nationalism daneerous to others and to ourselves. Our citizenry has been brought up to see our nation as different from others, an exception in the world, uniquely moral. expanding into other lands in order to bring civilization, liberty, democracy. That self-deception simed enrly. Whcn thc tirst English scttkrs moved into lndiui land in Massachusetts nay and were resisted. thc viulmcr escalated into war wilh the Pequot Indians. 'The killing of Indians was scen as approved by God. the taking of land as com~nandd by Ihe Bible. The Puritans cited one of the l'salms, which says: "Ask of me. a d 1 shall give thee, the healhen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost p'ns of the Eiuth for thy possssion." When the English set tire to a Pequot village and massacred mcn. women. and children, the Potitau thenlogia~~ Cotton Mathcr said: "I( was supposed that no less lhsn 600 Pequot souls were brooght down w hell thlt day." It was our "Manifest Destiny to overspread t k continent allotted by Providence," an Americ;mjoumalist declared on the eve of the Mexican War. Aflcr the invasion of Mexico beyan. the New York Herald announced: "Wc klicvc it is a part of our dediny to civilize that b u t i f u l counfry." It was always supposedly b r benign purposes that our counlry wen1 to war. We invaded Cuba in 1898 to libcrate the Cubans. and went to war in the Philippines shunly aflcr, as President McKinley pul it. "to civilize and Clu.isrianizeW the Filipino people. As our armies were committing massacres in rht. I'hilippines (at Imst 600.000 Alipinus d i d m it few gears of conflict). Elihu Root, our Secretar). of War. was saying: "The American soldier is d i i r e n l from aU o h r soldiers of all other

counuies rince the wx began. He is the advance guard of liberty and josticc. of law and order. and of peace and happiness." Nationalism is given a Special virulence when it is blessed by Providence. Todav we have a President. invadin~ Iwo countries in four years, who believes he gets meSsdgeS from God. Our culture is permeated by a Chrislian fundamenlalism a, puisonuus as that of Cotton Mather. It pemlits the mass murder of "thc other" with the same confidence as it accepts the death penalty for individuals convicted of crimes. ASupremeColrn justice. Antunin Scalia. told all audience at the University of Chicago Divinity Schuul, speaking of capital punishment: "For the believing Ciu.isliiln. dcalh is no big de:il." How many time8 have we h a d Bush and Rumsfeld l a k to the troops in Imq. victims thcmsclvcs. but also perpetmtors of thc demhs of thousands of Iraqis. telling them that if they die. if they return without arms or legs. or biindcd, it is kir "libeny," for "democracy"? Nationalid super-patriotism is not confined to Republicans. When Richnrd Hofstadtcr analyzed American presidents in his h o k T h e American Political Tradition, he found that lkmocl-atic lcadcrs as well as Republicans, liberals as well as conservatives. uivded other countrier. sought to expand 1I.S. p w e r acrnss the globe. Libenl imperialists have been amon$ the most fervent of expansionisls, more effective in their claim to moral rectitude precisely kcause they are liberal on issues olher than foreign policy. Theodore Rooscve.lt. a bvcr of war, m d all enthusiastic snpporter of the war in Spain and the conquesl of Lhc Philippines, is still seen as a Pro~ressive hecause Ix: supponed c a a i n datnestie reforms and was concerned with the niltlomi environment. l n d d , hc ran as President on the I'rogressive ticket in fV12. Woodrow Wilson. a Democrat, wi~s the rpitotne of lhc liberal apologist for violent actious abruad. In April of 1914, hr nnlered Ihe homhardment ofthe Mexican coast. and t k occupation of the city of Vcra Cruz. in retalialion for the m s t o I several U.S. sailors Ile sent Marines into Haiti in 1915. killhig thousands of Raitiat~s who resisted, beginning a long mililiuy wupalion of that tiny country. He sen1 Marines to occupy ths L)ornh~icao Rcpuhli in 1916. And, after runninz in 19 Id on a platform o f peace, he brought the naiion into the slaughter that w w taking phcc in Europe in World W.x I, saying it was a war lo "make the world safe for democracy." In uur thnc, it was h e liberal Bill Clinton who salt bornhers over Raphdad ns soon as he came into office, who fvst c d s ~ l the spccter oi"weapons of mws destruction" as a justification for a series of homhing attacks on Iraq. Liberals today criticize Cinrge Bush's unilatcmlism. But it was Climun's Secrerary of State. Madeleine Alhright. ~ - h o told the United Nations

Securiry Coullcil tha~ Lhe U.S. would act "multilateraily when we can. unilaterally whell we most." One of the effects of nationalist thinking is a loss of a sense of pro~ortion. The killing of 2.300 people at Pearl Harbor becomes the iustification for killing 240,000 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thc killing of 3,000 people on Se~tember 11 becomes the iustification for killing tens of thousands of people in Afghanistan and Iraq. w h ~ t d e n our nation immunc from the normal standmds of human decency'? Surely, we must renounce nationalism and all its svmbols: its $lass. its pledges of :~Uegiance, its anthems. im insistence in song that God must singlc out America to he blessed. We need to assert our allegiance to the human race, and not lo any one nation. We need to refute the idea that our nation is different from, morally superior to, the other imperial powers of world history.

NATIONALlSM WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE THE HOLOCAUST

Savich, 03 (Carl, historian, "Nationalism: Origins and Historical Evolution". http://www.pogledi.co.yu/en~lis~nacionalizam.~h~)

w h o was retponsiblc for Holocaosl? One can argue that the Holocaust had nothing to do wjth nationalism but was motivated bv Hitler's own personal obsession. The contrary argument is that lhc Holocaust resulted as a natural end-result of modern nationalism. Modern nationalism by its very nature dcmands ethnic. racial, and religious homogeneity. Thus. modern natlonall~m made the Holocaust possible. Similarly, mndern nationalism h ~ e l s thc criscs in Kosovo. Georgia. Nagncm,-~arshakh. Chechnya; and llle Israel-Palestinian conflict. Conclusion Zlntinnalism is a political ideology thst has originated and evolved since its emergence after the French Revolution of 1789. Nationalism is based on the creation of a gro~ip fantasy and an "unagincd commanity" bawl oil a common language. commt)n religion. common race or ethnicity, and a common cnltore. Natmnalism is also the product of industrialization/modemi~Liun/crpilalism. Both industnaliutiin and natiol~ilism require homogeneity in Ihe society. ethnically. racially. culturally, linpuislicaily. Nationalism and indusuialism thus developed symbiotically, each reinfi>rcing the other, So ~l;ltionalism has both an ideological cumpunmt md a component hased in economic, social. and political developmcnt. Idcc>logy and industhli7ation require homogeneity. standarduation. mobility. and uniformity. Nationalism is thus bsed an hom~gefleitg and a slmdardi.ccllion arxi commonality of language.

racc. cthnicity. u ~ d colmre. The logic and idmlogicsl imperative of natiunalim demands homogeneity. Genocide Or the destruction and eIirninati0n of minorities or those groups who threaten the homoaeneitv of the nation is assumed in nationalism. The loeic of nationalism thus results in homogeneilv that threatens heterogeneous minorities within these nations. Genocide is a by-product of modern ntltJ0IlaliSm. w e cannot blind outselves to the f x t t h t mtiurwliim by 11s very nature requires conformi~y and homogeneity. Indeed, modern

industria~i~ed suciely itselfrcquires oniformity, stanlardiz~tion. and homogeneity. s o nationalism and industrialized society offer manv benefits but one of the costs is antipathy towards heterogeneity in any form. Genocide is thus the inevitable by-product of modern nationalism.


I NATIONALISM IMPACTS: WAWGENOCIDE

NATIONALISM IS THE ROOT CAUSE OF WARS AND GENOCIDE

Klitou, 05 (Demctrius, presented this paper for his master's thesis at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies in Malta, '"The Friends and Foes of Human Rights", Ask: The Journal of the College of Arts & Sciences at Drcxel University, h t t p : l / w w w . d r e x e l . e d u / c o a s / a s k / e s s a y s - a r h t s . a s p )

As rwny scholars argue. such as Eric Iiobsbawm. Bcnedict Anderson nnd Erncsr Gellner, n;~tionalism ant1 natioml identities ue nunlern inventions constructed hy the elite. and their creatiolls

c i ~ n i x historically m e d . Nationalism has been the most pathogenic force in history. It has replaced religion as the dominant "weapon of mass division," and as such has become the dominant cause of wars, bigotry, fascist regimes and gross human rights violations. The creation of multiple national consciousnesses divides the single ~ loba l consciousness, creates r>svcholo~ical opposing sides. and epitomizes a nationalized frame of mind of us and them; onrs and theirs; we and they:

self a~ld an~i-self: ad 1 i ~ notion nfthe othrr. The inward takc on identity, created by nationalism, dehumanizes human beings. BY chssifying similm human heiilps like 7oology classifies diflerent animals. nationalism overe~l~phasizes what distidg~iishcs one nation from anothcr. Hum.tn heir~ps hnve become manifold divided peoples, as opp)sed to singlc unified people. A problem that cvcn plagurs human ~ i g h l s wnvcnticlns. such as Ihe African Chaner a 1 Human and Peoples Rights. and the charters of universal

institutions. such as the UN C h m e h "we thc Peoples." The artificial credence of nationalism as the paramount realization of pT-actica~lv evcrv important element of human bein~s, includin~ identity. culture. social existence, consciousness and political will, strips the 'human' element from human beings. The national being replaces the human being. Subsequentlv, the dehumanization of human beings causes the dehumanization of human riehts, also stripping from it the estntial hllman elemclit. AS a result. human riyhls have been weclkened k c a u s ~ humans do not considcr thc existe~~ce o i a hum;m identity. or hi1 lo acknowledge that we arc d l human Wngs. Human beings ace born without distinction, hilt a'e immediately and permanently baptkcd. for example. as a Jordanian. Italian, Colombian or Canadian. Thcy are compelled to attach lhemselves lo clne uatbnal identity tor their entlre lives, withlittle npponi~nity for disamiiatk~n or rmfliliation. Nationalism denies individl~als lhc freedom to decide and to express who they really are or want to be. thusdenying l k m the right to freedom of speech or expression. As Thomas Franck also argues in his book. The Empc~wered Self: Law and Society in the Asc of Individualism. the individual choiar of identity is a human righl prohibited by natio~lalism. Since these nalional identitis or idfiliatinns are not voluntarily made hy autonomoos individuah. they we in contest with human rights. When on individual is compelled lo he called an Ammiurn. a Chineqe. a Mexican, a Canadian. an Israeli. or a Gemx~n. jua lo name a few, that pcrson is also co~npelled to build a psychological wall1 around hi or herself. Ciroups of ind~viduals hehind the same wall share the samc national identity. A n p n e nnt behind thc i dcaignnted wall, or not m o n g people of the wme national identity. thereforc $ convidered an ootsider and. in the extreme sen*. an intruder. .h a sentiment, ndi~nllllsm invokes an unqualiiiai obedicnceand loyalty of the individual Lo the collective entilies.

and mtion. I" doing SO. nationalism feeds on these acauiesces of national solidarity, transforming them into exploitable national loyalties. such as the support for war or the violation of human riehts. As a result, nationalism has time after time produced conscquences that arc grossly criminal. It has caused people to disrenard other woples' claims to justice and human rights through thc practice of ethnic cleansing and genocidc. Nationalism fosters hatred and disgust of the other and easily permits the judgement of the other as evil or as the "problem." The first staees of genocide, revealed by Gregory Stanton, =the following: Classification: Symbolization; Dehumanization. The classificarioa stagc cotego~ises the relevant humans into target groups according lo ~ I I C U elhnicity or nationality and promotes an hs against thcm' mind-set. The symholixalion sage givcs

symbols lo these grnups. The dehumanization stage equates the target goup to animals. vermin or disease. and therefore unqualified make legitimate claims to human rights. This allows the murderers to iuslify killing and to overcome the natural revulsion against murder. Nationalism does the same, but ~crmanently and iudiciouslv, on a global scale. It dehumanizes humans by depriving them of their innate human qualities and brands non-mcrnbers of a nation as allens Or sub-humans. Naiionalism desensitizes and justifies the wrongs committcd by one nation against nnnther nation. causing penple to declarc. 'My colmtq. right or wrong.''

no matter how ~ILISSIY inhumane theactions. The totalitarian ideological movements, fascism and Nazism, were both fuelled by nationalism, national pride and their associated desire for national aggrandizement. riefore w, nationalism I& tn a period of excess pr~de in Germung's dominaiw and a desire ro satisfy it. The subsequent deiert of Germany and the h u h conditions dictated by the Tre;~ly of Versailles diminished their national pride. However. cxtremc nallonalism once again led to the intensifiwtkl~l of national pride and ultimately facilitated the risc of the Naei Party. Hitkr rosc to power bdsd on this loss of 11atiolta1 pride by making it urnlerstood to the Germans that he would do anything tci restore it. Forthcnnare, the NwiGemm government invcntcd mn;inml myhs that incunated nationid pride, such as the "purc blood"

theoly, which aimed lo "pnrify" the rutinn by killing millions of Jews and other minority. non-German grnups. Gcnocide Was Seen as a means towards "national rebirth." and nationalism was used to justify the mass murdering of nations deemed inferior. Thus, as political philosopher Hans Morgcnthau rightfully points out, Nazism is iust a degree of nationalism.

NATIONALISM CAUSES GENOCIDE

Savich, 03 (Carl? historian, "Nationalism: Origins and Historical Evolution", http:Nwww.~o~ledi.co.~ukn~lish/nacionalizam.php)

tiationalim ab a modem p h i c a l ideolo~y emerged only following the French Revolution of 1789 md dewloping during the 10th maury. Nationalbm reached ils climax ni the time of World War I. Nationalism is based bnth on group fantasy or an "imagined commonity" and as the produn of indnstri~lization. capitalism. and mndernizntinn. Industrialization and fi~tiondism evolved and developd in a symb~otic relationship, each rcinlbrcing the other. Nationalism n d industrialism require uniformity, standardization, md homogeneity---cthnic, r;ri;ll, religious, linguistic,

adcul tun~l . The homogeneitv fostered by both nationalism and industrialization and modernization Doses a threat to minorities who, as heterogeneous members of the modcrn nation-state. are perceived as a threat. Genocide is a by- product of modern nationalism. The logic of nationalism mandates homoncneitv. Genocide is a by-product of nationalism and of industrialism and modernization. Genocide is one of the costs of modern industrialized societies. The ideologv of modern nationalism makes genocidc possible.


NATlONALtSM IMPACTS: WAR

NEW WARS WILL BE WARS BASED UPON IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM--ONLY COSMOPO1,ITANISM IS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE

Kaldor, 2k (Mary, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics, "Cosmopolitanism and organiscd violence", httu://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/prcss/O 1Okaldor.htm)

These are the circumstances that give rise to the 'new wars'. I1 is the lack of authority of the stale. the weakness of representation. the loss of confidence that the state is able or willing to respond to public concerns, the inability and/or unwillingness to regulate the privatisalian and informalisation of violence that gives rise to violent conflicts. Moreover, this 'uncivilising process', tends to bc reinforced by the dynamics of the conflicts, which have the effect of futther reordering political, economic and social relationships in a negative spiral of incivility. I call the conflicts 'wars' because of thcir political character although they could also he described as lnassive violations of h u m rights {repression against civilians) and organised crime (violence for private gain). Thcy are about access to state power. Thev are violent struggles to gain access to or to control the statc. As the state becomes privatised, that is to say, it shifts from being the main organisation for socictal regulation towards an Instrument for the extraction of resources by the ruler and his (and it is almost always 'his') privileged networks. so access to state power becomes a matter of inclusion or exclusion, even, in the latter case, of survival. In the majority of cases, these wars are fought in the name of identity - a claim to power on the basis of labels. These are wars in which political identity is defined in terms of exclusive labels -ethnic, linguistic. or religious - and the wars themselves give meaning to Ihc labcls. Labcls are mobilised for political purposes; they offer a new sense of security in a context where the political and economic certainties of previous decades have evaporated. Thcy provide a new populist form of communitarian ideology, a way to mainlain or capture power, that useithe language and forms of an earlier undoubtedly, these ideologies make use of pre-existing cleavages and the legacies of past wars. It is also the case that the appeal to tradition and the nostalgia for some mythical or semi-mythical history gains strength in the social upheavals associated with thc opening up to global pressures. But nevertheless, it is the deliberate manipulation of these sentiments. often assisted by Diaspora funding and techniques and speeded up through thc electronic media, that is the immediate cause of contlict. in these wars, violence is itself a form of political mobilisalion. Violence is mainly directed against civilians and not another army. The aim is to capture tenitory through political control rarhcr than military success. And po1itic;ll control is maintained through terror, through expulsion or elimination of those who challenge political control, especially those with a different label. Population displaccment. massacres. widespread atrocities are not iust sidc cffects of war; thev are a deliberate strategy for political control. The tactic is to sow the 'fear and hate' on which exclusive identity claims rest. These are also globdised wars in another sense. Unlike inter-state wars. which wcrc highly regulated and which indeed provided a modcl for statist forms of planning. these wars could be almost be described as the model for the contemporary informal economy, in which privatised violence and unregulated social relations feed on each othcr. In these wars, physical destruction is very high. tax revenues plummet furlher, and unemployment is very high. Thc various parties finance themselves through loot and plunder and various forms of illegal trading; thus they arc closely linked into and help to generate organised crime nelworks. They also depend on support from neighbouring states, Diaspora groups, and hullunitarian assistance. The 'new wars' are no longer discrete in time and spacc. The various actors -states. remnants of states, para-military groups, liberation movements, etc. - depend on continued violence for both political and economic reasons. Cease-fires and agreements are truces. brathing spaces, which do not address the underlying social relalions -the social conditions of war and peace are not much different. The networks of politicians, security forces. legal and illegal trading groups, which are often ~ransnational. constitute a new distorted social formation, which has a tendency to spread through refuges and displaced persons, identity based networks often crossing continents, as well as criminal links. Moreover, the conditions which give rise to the 'new wars' and which are cxacerbated by them, exist in weaker forms in most urban conglomerations in the world and indeed often have direct links with the most violent regions. All the same. social formations that depend on violence are alwavs vulnerable, fragile and close to exhaustion. As Hannah Arcndt pointed out, power devends on legitimacy not on violence -it is vcry difficult to sustain forms of uolitical mobilisation that depend on violence. Hcrein lies the uossibility for a cosmopc>lilan, i.e. non-exclusive, alternative.


ALTERNATIVE SOLVENCY-2NC

OUR ADVOCACY TAKES A MOVEMENT-BASED PERSPECTIVE ON GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP THAT CAN CREATE SOCIAL CHANGE MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN STATE ACTION

London 2K- Independent journalist and radio producer based in Southern California-(Scott, "Global Civil Society." in The American Prospect, September 1 1, 2000. www.scottlondon.corn/articles/civilsocie~

Civil society play no increasingly pivolnl rok in shaping the p s l F o l d War world I1 had a centla1 part in the shili from colnm~~nism tu Western-stylc dcmtlcracy in the former

Snv~et wtlrld. lurexample. and it is having an increasingly visible impact on global citizen movements, such as the rise of environmentalism, the uush for human rights, and the backlash against economic globalization. rll b lowing paps. 1 survey threc articles lhi~t address the vital role of civil solciety 111 shi~plng glubal i~ffi~u-s tuday. In the iusl. p o l i l i ~ ~ l philosopher Bc~Jnmin Bxhcr cxarnines the impact of global citizen movements, aguing that a new form o l borderkss adivism k emerging toli;ly under the banner ol tmnsndliunai nnn-pnvernmental organv~tions. In the second, economist Hazel Hcndcrson maintains that international citizen movements lepresent one of the most powerh~l ;tnd ondervalt~ed forces for social innovation [oday. F i l l y , in an c s s ~ y adapted from a p~~bl ic spcrch in 1992, Vxlav I-lavel make$ an etoquenl case for what he sees as a new civil ethic emerging in the ps t -c(~mmun~st ern. Erch of these xticlcs sws to the prr~foond

and growing imponance of citixn movelncnts in creating a more peiceful and sustainable wilrld in the 21st ceaury. In "Globalizing Demrrcracy." Benjamin Barber argues that the debate over globalization has paid insufficient attention to the role of citizen-lcd groups. "We are entering a new era," he writes, "in which global markets and servile governments will no longer be completely alone in planning the world's fate." He cites numerous examdes in which citizens have reshaped public debate worldwide, including the campaign apainst land mines, efforts to protect dolphins from the tuna industry, and the "microcredit" movement in which small loans are made to women in developing countries to help them slalt hnsinesses. According tu ste el; these sons of

movcmcots arr having a trementto>us positive impact and deserve greater intemational attention and support. Kot only do they promise a measure of countervail in^ vower" in the intcrnational arena as a bulwark against reactionary movements (such as the ultra-Right wing politics of Pat Buchanan or Rance's J ~ ~ ~ - M ~ ~ ~ ~e Pen); but they also cmbody a sari of' global public opinion. InBwber'sworJs, "they put flesh on the bare boncs of legalistic doctrines and universal rights .... These new transnational civic spaces offcr ~ossibilities for transnalional citizenship and hence an anchor for global rights. While Barber is g e m l l y oplimihlic about the growing influence of these civic movements, he cautions ap~ins t uwrstaling their importance. "These transnational civic projects should not fan1 us into thinking that Amnesty Lntcrnntional or blcdecins Sans i-rontieres [Imclors Without 13ordersl are the equivalent in clout of AUL T i e W,mcr or the Inenulional Monelxy Fund." This is a powerful argument and one which I lplieve deserves grmter attention, especially as a cosntcrwdght tn Thomas L. Fnalman. Samuel Huntington. Francis bukuyanu~ and other high-protilc observers of globalization whu have little. iran)thing. t say abuut he role trlcitirens in shaping a new h)rderless world R r the twenty-first century. As ;I maverick cconomisl and highly respected futurist. Hazel Henderson has been making this case tor uver a decadc. In "Sacid Innovation and CiliLen Movements." she exiunincs the growing inlemalionnl significance of thc voluntary. civic, or "third" sector comprising vnriol~s types of innovative c idzns organizations. She pays special attcnlion to nongovernmental organizalions. NGOhnnge llwn bcal *mice chbs. chmbcrs uf cummel-ct.. a d prufusional as.wciations. to international human rishts orgnnizations and glohal eleclmnic nelwurks. The rise of these type? of organizations is "one of the most striking phenomena of the 20th century,'' she Aqserts. One of Ihe most diaunctiw ieaturcs nt NCjOs. in Henderson's view. i~ that they are orientad tow,ud "preferred rulures" and "invoke the possible by mapping social plenlials." By contrast. curplr;!tions m d government-sponsored institutions are usually developed lo meet pncstablishcd social nccds. In this way. NGOs ohcn .%me as precurstlrs to national and international governmental u~stitutions hy prodding

kgislaton tn ~ t s p o ~ d to pssslrres i~t the gr.fi~-r<w~s kvt.1. ln addition. N C ; ~ S are often quick to find creative and innovative i~lternarives lo social prnhlems. They can network across national borders, as well as corporate and aovernmenl boundaries, thereby enabling rapid syntheses of new or ~reviously overlooked information. Government and corporale elites, on thc other hand, "often remain innorant of viable policy alternatives. insulated within top-down hierarchies" from the -inconvenient" views of citizen organi7atians and the public at ku-ge. H e d e n o n observes that NGDs m usually founded on a "trickle-up" model-the very opposite of the "elitisL technocmtic 'trickle-down' promoted by tradit~onal ecclnomic development theorists." In this respect, they constime a "priceless social resource" by "offcrinp new paradigms to societies stuck in old w;~ys." H d e r s u n believas that thc world has become too complex for the traditional gbbal and national insritmions. Thc proliferation of international citkcn o~~anizatmns, Uansnatioml corporations. global satellirc communications. media companies. and electronic securities and c u r r m y trading is gl~~dually undermining thc sovereignty and competence of nation-states. "Only when Ihe UN is reshaped." she says, "together w~th other needed gluhal stmcto~rs, c:ut a more lunited but cffcctive form olsovereignly k cxcrciscd by nations." Hcndersor~ wncludes with a brier discussion ol'thc ~lecessily in any ~umplex sysum for f d b ~ c k and input. Shc stresses the need for "the rclooling c~fdemocracics" to accommodale a grea ter~nk for the public in the decision-makhg pmccss. She cites Joseph Tainter's fidings that "hierarchies collapse a l l leaders topple lpcaose of lack of leedback C I I ~ I the governed. i t . . they lack the requisile complexity and receivc too little valid, rmliry-tested information." What Henderson does in these pages is prcsent an inspiring, and in my vjcu pcrsuasivc. casc lor c~t ize~> activism and

pmicipatinn. She describes not only the unique characleristics os citizen movements and how they differ fiom the mectx~nisms of gclvernmenr ami the fire mrirket. but

shows that they are more receptive to constructive social change than either the state or private enterprise. laal said. she nlay be overly oprituistlc about the actual influence of citizewled :rwps. As Benjamin B;lrlxr ivould no dwht remind Iler. the power ol'lrawnal~onal NCiOs canna hdd a raixile lo lllc inllucncc of intermtional hdies sucll as Urn %'<wid Trade Organiznum or multinarional corpnrtii~ns such as Nestle and Coca-Cola h e n so, ha1 is MI excuse tor ignoring civil sociny iu an cmr~?ent and increasingly signiiicant global plmolllenon. Like Barber and Henderson. Czwh prwident Vaclav 1Iavd s w a growing rult. for citizens and civic urganizaticms in shaping glohal affairs. In a profound a d moving =say adapted fi.om a lalk presented a1 ll~c Wurld Econunuc FONII~ in Switzerland in February 1992. Havel points cmt that we arc moving into a new era in rvcrld affairs, m e that has litlle in common with "the older systems of order forged in Helsinki. Yalta, and Vers:ulla." What tlus cllange xpesents. hr says, is ml only the collapse of tlle Cold War system, hut the emergence of a pn>iwndly new global ethic. "Ttle cn~l of alnlmunirrn is, first and torcniOSt, a niessagc to (he hlman ncc." Havcl insists. "lt js n mcssacc we havc not ye1 hlily &nphued and mprehcndcd. In its derpcst sense. t le end dmnrlnunisn~ Ims, I belivvc. hruuph~ a major en in human luslwy to an end. It has brought an end not just to the ninaeenth uml twentieth centuries. hut tlle mndzrn age as a u~Imle.".Tnis lnndern a p , as Havel defines il. 18

characterized by the Ediplnenntea notlcln of a clrckwork universe that is rationally wderd. suhjat to universal laws. and capahle of heing understood hy scientific nlcans. ln political lernis, thir ethos cxpresscd itself in systems, institutions, a~ecl~anis,w. nalistic;~l avuags. and lwnliziny idcul(>yits ~fi-nll kinds. "Cunnmnisnl was the pcrverse extreme ofthis trend." Havel suggests. "11 was an attempt on the bais of a few propositions masg~watling as tlie on1 y sciwlific truth, tt) mgmizc all of Iiie according to a sin& mudcl. and to bubjm it to central plannin~ and control regardless of wlrdler or not that was wll~l life wmted." We are nd ye! fiec from this apprwh to human affairs. according to Haucl. 1t still lives witlun cur politi~xl and ocum7ulic sptelns. our institutions. and even our habits of 11u1d. Yd Ifie~e is something altosetha new emerging amund the world. It expresses itself in a new opnness. What we nezd now is to give voice to tlut impulse. says Havel. We nwl "a st:rrsc of lransccrulenlal rrsponaibilily, archclypdl wisdom. good taste. munge. cumpassion. and faith in the inlponanceot particular measures tlml do not w e to be a universal key to salvatim." Havel concludes wrth a hwl~tiful statenent which err~boclies a sinular Iailll to Illat of Benjamin Barher and tkuzl Hendawn: "ln a wurld aigobcrl civiliralion. unly those who are looking for a technical nick lo save that civilizacjon need feel despair. Rul dlose tvlro bclierc. in all n~odtsy, in t l r ~nyslwims pawm uf their onvn Imman Bdnp. which nredhlcs hdwwn them and the nlystmims pcwer of the world's Being, have noreason to

dcspairalaI1:Benearh tksonlewhatesnaic mewphm. what Havel is expressing is a politics of hopc, a politics of Lhe future, a politics in which the attitudes and actions of everv individual have an important place and luncdon. It is an openness to change, to uncertainty. and to the possibilitv that the best is yet to come. Thequestion IE leaves unanswered is Ihis: DO we, a,sciti>ens orthis new era of human history, have the faith In go forward inlo the unknown. to crilte r glnbnl Culure lhal rdecls our dignity and highest potenlii~l? It is o question without an answer. of coursr. but one wonh asking ull rhe same. For that reason. 1 think Havcl's aniclc should be essential leading lor m y and all obscrvcrs of globaliration.



THE ARGUMENT THAT COSMOPOLITANISM ISN'T PRACTICAL DOESN'T ACCOUNT FOR THE EFFORTS OF INDIVIDUALS TO CREATE SOCIAL CHANGE-THE SAME ARGUMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN USED TO DERAIL EFFORTS TO ABOLISH SLAVERY OR PROMOTE WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Satz, 1999 (Debra, Assosciate Professor of Philosophy and Stanford University. Nomos XLI: Global Justice, Edited by Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer. Page 60)

Let me conclude by taking up one last argument against cosmopolitanism made bv Miller. This is that cosmopolitanism cannot be right because ils implications-forcxamph. about IIK I M ~ rt~r international r e t l i s t r i b o t i o n - ~ ~ n f l i ~ t with widelv held convictions. The same would no doubt have been true two centuries ago if it had been suggested that slavery should be abolished worldwide. And a prolo-Millerian only a century ago would have laughed to scorn the idea that women should have the same political and civil rights as men. P e r h a p s in snothw century, it will be a matter for amajtcrnent that tnnsfen rrom rich

countries to pwr oncs 010.2 or 0.3 per cent ocGNP werr uncc thrlught xkquate m meet the mom1 ohligntio~~s of people in rich countries. Whether thcy do or nor, to adduce as an argument against there being such an obligation that a lot of people currently do not believe that there is seems to me unuttcrablv feeble. If we have convictions, let us have the courage of those convictions.

THE IMAGINING OF ALTERNATE WORLDS IS VITAL TO SOCIAL CHANGE-THE IDEA OF THE NATION 1S SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED AND CAN BE CHALLENGED RY IMAGINING ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES

Calhoun, 02 (Craig, president of the Social Science Research Council and a professor of sociology and history at New York University, "Imagining Solidarity: UCosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the Public Sphere," Public C~tlture 14.1 (2002) 147-17 1 http://muse.ihu.eduliournalslpublic culturc/v0l4/14.lcalhoun.html)

The U.S. example couW inform a different conccplinn of constitutional patriotism. stronger than that advocated by Aabermas. Althuugh. in this new ~omtla t ion , t l~c cinphasis on the norms thal underw~nte n justifiable life ingelher would remain. this would no longer appectr so much lo he a matter of getting the ahstmctly "righl" procedures in phcr o n an abstract level. Rather, the idc.1 or

a basic law (espcciaily a written document) would be complcmcnted fust by the Arendtian notion of founding. This idea of constitution as world-making helps clarify the role of the social imaginary. This is not simply about the imagining of counterfactual possibilities--utopias, for examplc-- however instructive. Rather. it foregrounds ways of imagining social life that acruallv make it possible. World- making is a way of approaching culture that emphasizes agencv and history in the constitution of the languages and understandings by which populaces give shape to social life. To sncak of the social imaginarv is to assert that there are no fixed categories of external observation adequate to all history; that wavs of thinking and structures of feeling make possible certain social forms, and that such forms are thus products of action and historically variable. 1(1 It follows that cultural creativity can be seen to be basic even to such sccmindv "material" forms as the corporation or the nation. These exist precisely because thev are imagined; thev are real bccause they are treated as real; and new, particular cases are produced through the recurrent exercise of the underlvinrr social imaginary.

ADVOCATING CULTURAL COSMOPOLITIANISM IS VITAL TO LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR POLITICAL COSMOPOLITANISM-RESISTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES IS VITAL

Thorup, 06 (Mikkel, lecturcr in the History of Philosophy Department at Aarhus University, "Cosmopolitics!", 411 0, http://www.eurozine.com/rlrticles/2006-04-1O-thorup-en.html)

Political cosmnpolitanisrn was born out o l an zmalysk of plohalizstion which enlphns~zcd an increasingly significant connectio~~ with the global n;aurc of hardship. P01itical cosmopolites are critical both of thc neo-liberal globalization of the market and the fundamentalist or nationalistic backlash. They want a political glnhalizatir~n that cmbcds accountt~bi~ity wilhii those processes that affect pupuhtions the worM over. Globalization has placed all actors and processes "inside"; the ignorable notion of "out there" becomes increasingly less applicable lo reality and less appropriate in practice. This also means that our obligations become global and that each individual human being first and foremost should be recognized as equal and not exclusively in terms of citizen or non-citizen. Questions concerning world citizenship, dual citizenship, multiple loyalties and so on make their presence felt as it becomes increasindv difficult to differentiate between inner and outer. foreign and domestic politics, citizen and foreigner, and friend and foe. Cosmo~olitanism in ceneral and political cosmopolitanism i n particular do not say that these conceutions are becoming completely meaningless, rather that they are becoming ever more ambiguous, ~II~crtain, volatile. the subiect Of constant negotiation. our politicd institutions, prwices XXI imaginations have thcir work cut out for them. Cultural cosmopolitanism altempts to create the relational infrastructure, and political cosmopolitanism the institutional infrastructure which should make it possible to enter the aee of cosmopolitanism.



THE ARGUMENT THAT THERE'S NO ALTERNATIVE IS A LINK-IT IGNORES THE CONSTRUCTED NATURE OF SOVEWIGNTY AND ASSUMES ITS NATUKAhTHIS FORECLOSES ANY POSSIBlldTY OF RESISTANCE

Shaw, professor of political science at the University of Victoria, 1999 (Karena, 9 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 569, lexis)

The dangers of assuming sovereignty emerge from the ways in which the assumption of sovereignty--the assumption of the necessity of the particular ontological resolutions that have enabled modern political authority--shapes and constrains our thinking about politics and our political action. As I have emphasized, one of the particularly powerful aspects of Hobbes' architecture of sovereigntv is that it convincinnlv persuades us that there is no alternative to sovereignty. It is the necessary orecondition for all that is good; all else is war, conflict and violence. If we believe this particular mythology of sovereignty, of course, we will be compelled--as theorists and practitioners of politics--to do every thin^ wc can to create, protect and strengthen the ontoloav of sovereigntv; we certainly do not want to be responsible for leading our fellow beings into the alternative. It is this particular element of the architecture of sovereignty discourse that has led to perhaps its greatest violences. Because the ontology of sovereignty is not assumed to be contingent, but necessary and natural, whatever violences go into its vroduction are also rendered necessary and natural rather than political.

ARGUMENTS THAT THE ALTERNATIVE IS TOO VAGUE OR CAN'T WORK ARE MADE FROM WITHIN THE FRAME OF SOVEREIGNTY D1SCOURSE


The implications of this reinscription emerge when these conversations confront those feminist literatures concerned with expressions of the political that exceed relations of governance, such as thosc that delve into the vower relations embedded in the constitution of modern subiectivitv n49 or the practices through which forms of scientific authority are constituted. n50 From within the perspective of thcorislslpractitioners of governance, and thus from within the architecture of sovereignty, these latter works often have thc appearance of', and are accused of, floating untethered from "political realities" and delving into "irresvonsihle" or "unrealistic" forms of critical inquiry. These works appear deeply problemalic from within sovereignty discourse preciselv because they seek to politicize the naturalized foundations of sovereignty discourse. Whether accused of being dangerous, improperly political, or simply irrelevant in their abstraction, in each case the architecture of sovereignty is deployed to discredit them. At the same time, however, these latter literatures remain constrained in their ability to respond effectively to this dismissal, and to arliculatc the political implications of their work. This is, in part, because the discourses of sovereignty continue to dominate many analyses, sites and practices of politics.


ALTERNATIVE SOLVENCY

RETHINKING THE WAYS INDIVIDUALS RELATE TO ONE ANOTHER IS VITAL TO RESHAPING THE GLOBAL ORDER- ITS TRY OR DIE FOR THE ALTERNATIVE BECAUSE THE CURRENT SYSTEM MAKES WAR AND TERRORISM INEVITABLE

Murphy 01- Editorial Board American Journal of Jurisprudence and professor of law at Duquesnc University-- (Cornelius F., Theories of World Governance: A Study in thc History of Ideas. 6/22/2001, The Catholic University of Americca Press. pg138)

Such unities will be expenentiallv developed lhroueh a proper balance of the rights and duties of indeucndcnt, but fraternallv cooperative slales. Within this deeper understand in.^. the intemalional community can achieve a greater degree of solidarity then is wossible when relations among states arc governed bv rules and nrocedures whose only uumose it to allow each to pursuc its Own interesls. But these i~nprovelnents must he considered as heing pans of an interim ethic. The fundamental instdbilitics of the nation-state system are so wervasive that no measure of im~rovement, no maller how well-intentioned. can fully correct them. AS we have already observed, thc present organteation of the world is primitive in nature. Its laws have no rcgular sanctions. The urder of the whole is dependent upon the managerial dominance of thc few, and

the leading states act under constantly shifting ~ ~ i t e r i a of legitimate p w r r and authority. Developments in weaponrv. arms transfers. and terrorism have eroded the limited security which states possessed m an earlier international state of nature. Much can still be done to improve the reasonableness of Ihc currcnt arrangements, hut it would be irrational lo assume that. in its present form. the international community will naturallv evolve into a durable and pacific union. ~t some point, in an indefinite future, the basic form of global organization which the world has inherited must be substantiallv changed. Persons from dislinct stdtes and cultures must come together in some public space, and start something new. This will q u i r e thc estahlishmenl of inslitutions that can balance national and internationnl

aullwrity in a way tha~ preserves all the unities and diversities of human experience. TO begin to anuroach that unknown gathering there must be a shift in intellectual, as well as moral. orientation. The retlective mind must mow away fm111 its fascination with scicnce and its metoh~ological u~ldmstandin_g of human

nature, together with the conformities it implies, The full potential of human sociability can only be realized when political philos~why regains its rightful wlace in the articulation of a comprehensive international theorv. For the fundamentad questions of world order are essentially political, and

not sociological, in naturr. And they begin with the problem of sovereignty.


COSMOPOLITANISM SOLVES THE CASE BElTER

COSMOPOLITANISM IS THE BEST AI'I'ROACH TO DIFFERETWX, CREATlNG GLOBAL FLOWS OF RESPECT AND DIVERSITY

Appiah 96 (Kwame Anthony, Prjnceton Philosophy Professor, "Cosmopolitan Patriots," For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, ed. Nussbaum and Cohen, pp. 22-3)

Some might complain that cosmopolitanism must be parasitic: Where, they will ask, would Stein have gotten her roots in a fully cosmopolitan world? Where, in other words, would a11 the diversity we cosmouolitans celebrate come from in a world where there were only cosmo~olitans'! The answer is straightforward: The cosmopolitan patriot can entertain the possibility of a world in which everyone is a rooted cosmo~olitan. attached to a home of his or her own, with its own cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of other. different, places that are home to other. different, people. The cosmopolitan also imagines that in such a world not everyone will find it best to stay in their natal patria, so that the circulalion of people between different localities will involve not only cultural tourism (which the cosmopolitan admits lo enjoying) but misa- tion, nomadism. diaspora. (In the past, these processes have usually been the result of forces we should deplore: the old migrants were often refugees, and older diasporas often began in an invol- untary exile. But what can be hateful if coerced can be celebrated when it flows from thc free decisions of individuals or proups4 In a world of cosmopolitan patriots, people would accept the citizen's resuonsibility to nurture the culture and politics of their homes. Many would, no doubt, spend their lives in the places that shaped them; and that is one of the reasons local cultural practices would be sustained and transmitted. But many would move, and that would mean that cultural ~ractices would travel also (as they have always traveled). The result would be a world in which each local form of human life was the result of Ions term and persistent urocesses of cultural hybridization: a world, in that respect, much like thc world we Iive in now.

COSMOPOLITANISM EXPOSES THE ARBITRARINESS OF CULTURE THROUGH THE LENS OF THE OTHER

Nussbaum 96 (Martha, Brown Philosophy Professor, "Patriotism and C~smopolilanism,~ For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotisnt, ed. Nussbaum and Cohen, pp. 11-2)

Throuvh cosmo~olitan education. we learn more about ourselves. One of the greatest harriers to rational deliberation in politics is the unexamined feeling that one's own preferences and ways are neutral and natural. An education that takes national boundaries as morallv salient too often reinii)rces this kind of irrationalilv. by- lending to what is an accident of historv a false air of moral weight and glory. BY lookina at ourselves through thc lens of the other, we come to see what in our practices is local and nonessential, what is more broadly or deeply shared. Our nation is appallingly ignorant of most of the rest of thc world. I think this means that it is also, in many crucial ways, ignorant of itself. To give just one example of this: If we want to understand our own history and our choices about child- rearing and the structure of the family, we are helped immeasurably by looking around the world to see in what configurations families exist, and through what strategies children are in fact being cared for. (This would include a study of the history of the family, both in our own and other traditions.) Such a study can show us, for example, that the two-parent nuclear family, in which thc mother is the primary homemaker and the father the primary breadwinner, is by no means a pervasive style of child-rearing in today's world. The extended family, clusters of families, the village, women's associations-all these groups, and others, in various places in the world have major child-rearing responsibilities. Seeing this, we can begin to ask questions-for example. about how much child abuse there is in a family that involves grandparents and other relatives in child-rearing, as compared with the relatively isolated Western style nuclear family; or about how the different structures of child care support women's work.4 If we do not undertake this kind of educational proiect, we risk assuming that the options familiar to us are the only ones there are, and that they are somehow "nor- malt' and "natural" for all humans. Much the same can be said about conceptions of gender and sexuality, about conceptions of work and its division, about schemes of property holding, or about the treatment of children and the aged.


COSMOPOLITANISM SOLVES THE CASE BETTER 1 EDUCATION SHOULD FOCUS ON PROMOTING COSMOPOLITAN VALUES OVER NATIONAL IDENTITY

Nussbaum 96 (Martha, Brown Philosophy Professor, 'Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, ed. Nussbaum and Cohen, pp. 9-10)

The Stoics stress that to be a citizen of the world one does not need to give up local identifications, which can be a source of great richness in life. They suggest that we think of ourselves not as de-void of local affiliations, but as surrounded by a series ofconcen- tric circles. The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family, then follows the extended family. M, in order, neighbors or local groups. fellow city-dwellers, and fellow coun- trymen-and we can easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender, or sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the lar~est one, humanity as a whole, Our task as citizens of the world will be to "draw the circles somehow toward the center" (Stoic philosopher Hierocles, ist-2nd CE), making all human beings more like our fellow city-dwellers, and so on. We need not give up our special affections and identifications, whether ethnic or gender-based or religious. We need not think of them as superficial, and we may think of our identity as constituted partly by them. We may and should devote special attention to them in education. But we should also work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality, and give the circle that defines our humanity special attention and respect. In educational terms, this means that students in the United States, for cxamplc, may continue to regard themselves as defined partly by thcir particular lovcs-their families, thcir religious, ethnic, or racial communities, or even their country. Bul they must &, and centrally, learn to recognize humanity wherever thev en- counter it. undeterred by traits that are strange to thcm, and be ea- ger lo understand humanitv in all its strange guises. Thcv must learn enou~h about the different to recognize common aims, aspirations. and values, and enough about these common ends to see how variously they are instantiated in the many cultures and then- histories. Stoic writers insist that the vivid imagining of the different is an csscntial task of education, and that it requires, in turn, a mastery of many facts about the different. Marcus Aurelius gives himself thc following advice, which might be called the basis for cosmopolitan education: "Accustom yourself not to be inattcntivc to what another person says, and as far as possible enter into that person's mind" (VI. 53). "Generally" he adds, "one must iirst learn many things before one can judge another's action with un- dcrslanding."

THE INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF GLOBAL PROBLEMS NECESSITATES A COSMOPOLITAN ETHIC OVER A NATIONAL ONE

Nussbaum 96 (Martha, Brown Philosophy Professor, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Putriotism, ed. Nussbaum and Cohen, p. 12)

We make headway solving problems that require international cooperation. The air does not obey national boundaries. This simple fact can be, Tor children, the beginning of thc recognition that, like it or not. we live in a world in which thc destinies of nations are closelv intertwined with respect to basic goods and survival itself. The pollution of third-world nations that are attempting to attain our high standard of living will, in some cases, end up in our air. No matter what account of these matters we will finally adopt, any in- telligent deliberation about ecologv-as, also, about the food supply and povulation-requires global planning. global knowledge, and the recognition of a shared future. To conduct this sort of global dialogue. we need knowledge not onlv of the peonraphy and ecolonv of other nations-something that would already entail much revision in our curricula-M also a great deal about their people. so that in talking with them we may- be capable of respecting their traditions and commitments. Cos- movolitan education would supply the background necessary lor this type of dclibcration. 12


COSMOPOLITANISM SOLVES THE CASE BETTER I COSMOPOLITANISM IS NECESSARY FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

Nussbaum 96 (Martha, Brown Philosophy Professor, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," For Love of Country: Debuting the Limits of Patriotism, ed. Nussbaum and Cohen, pp. 12-4)

We recognize moral obligations lo thc rest of the world that are real and Lhat otherwise would go unrecognized. What are Americans to make of the fact that the high living standard we enjoy is one that very likely cannot be universalized, at least given the present costs of ~ollution controls and the prcscnt cconomic situation of developing nations. without ecological disaster'? IS wc lake Kantian morality at all seriously. as we should, we need to educacc our children to be troubled by this fact. Otherwise we are educating a nation of moral hypocrites who talk the language of universalizabilitv but whose universe has a self-serving, narrow scope. This point may appear to presuppose universalism, rather lhan being an argument in its favor. But here one may note that the values on which Americans may most justly pride lhemselves are, in a deep sense, Stoic values: respect for human dignity and Lhe opportunity for each person to pursuc happiness. If we really do believe that all human beings are created csual and endowed with certain inalienable rights, we are morally recluircd to think about what that concewtion requircs us to do with and for the rest of the world. Once again, that does not mean that one mav not perrnissiblv give one's own sphere a special deprrce of concern. Politics, like child care, will be poorly done if each thinks herself equally responsible for all, rather than giving the immediate surroundings special attention and care. To give one's own sphere special care is justifiablc in universaIist terms, and I think this is its most compel- ling justification. To take one example. we do not really think our own children are morally more impcn-tant than other people's childrcn. even Lhough almost all of us who have children would give our own childrcn far more love and care than wc give others'. It is good for children, on the whole, that things work this way, and that is why our special care is good, rather than selfish. Education may and should reflect those special concerns-for example, in a given nation, spending more time on that nation's history and politics. But my argument does entail the idea that we should not confinc our thinking to our own sphere, that in making choices in both volitical and economic matters we should most seriously consider the right of other human beings to life, liberty, and the pursuit of havuiness. and that we should work to acquire the knowl- ednc that will enable us to deliberalc well about those rights. I believe this sort of thinking will have large-scale economic and political consequences.-


COSMOPOLITANISM SOLVES OTHERlZATlONnNCLUSlON I COSMOPOLITAN GLOBAL CITIZENSHII' IS KEY TO INCLUSION WHICH ISN'T POSSIBLE IN THE STATUS QUO

Cohen 99--PH.D Political Science; Sociology Columbia University-(Jean L., "Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos", International Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 3,245-268, 1999).

This strong democratic conception of citizenship puts political equality and participation a1 its center, but it is also particularizing and exclusionary Indeed, it has always been associated with certain prerequisites for membership that exclude important segments of thc population. It has also entailed the rule of citizen veers not onlv over one another, but also over non-citizens. In short, in the republican conception, the competent exercise of public autonomy rewires a unique set of capacities which, until very recently. meant that only some could become equals. We all know that in the classical idcal. the citizen had to be male, of known genealonv. vroocrtied, thc head of a household and able and willing to take UP arms (Pocock, 1995). Even if today the prerequisites for the dcmocratic and/or republican conception ol' citizenship have changed, no democracy is completely free of'them (Pocock, 1995). The circle of people endowed with full participation rights has everywhere remained narrower than the class of persons subicct to the law (Neuman, 1996). The question that must be faced, then, is whether or not exclusion is constitutive of the very ideal of democratic citizenship. Modern struggles for inclusion in the category have reconfigured the ideal of citizenship by drawing on a juridical conception derived from Roman law (Pocock, 1995). The citizen in this approach is not a political actor but a legal person free to act by law and expect the law's protection. The focus of the juridical reconceptualization of citizenship is legal standing. and personal rinhts: the citizen can sue in court and invoke a law that grants him rights. This does not entail having a hand in making the law. Nor does it require uniformity of rights among the citizenry. The juridical dimension of thc citizenship ~rinciple is thus universalizing, elastic and potentially inclusive: it is not tied to a particular collective identity. or membership in a demos. it can go well with a oluralitv of different statuses, and it need not be territorially bound. The universalism inherent in the juridical model of citizenship as legal personhood is open to the politics of inclusion, and it is on this basis that transnational or global citizenship is at least conceivable. Indeed, once the iuridical mode1 of citizenship is taken ue bv liberals in the modern era it gets equated with the practice of claiming and assertinfi rights, logically open to all. The push toward the global positivization of human rights is an example of this trend.


COSMOPOLITANISM SOLVES- GLOBALIZATION IMPACTS

GLOBALIZATION IS INEVITABLE-THE QUESTION IS WHETHER ITS DOMINATED BY AUTHORITARIAN OR COSMOPOIdTANISM

Kaldor, 2k (Mary, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics, "Cosmopolitanism and organiscd violence",

Those in the lower left box, I would argue, have no fulurc. Globalisation cannot be reversed. The collapsc or communism dcrnonstrated that it is no longer possible to sustain closed societies and to insulate larnc parts of the world from growing global interconnectedncss. 'Socialism in one country' is no longer an option, if il cvcr was. Of course, fundamentalists and dezlobalisers may succeed in establishing temporarily closed states, for example Iraq or Serbia, but these cannot be sustained and have to be understood as an ongoing reaction to rathcr than a reversal of globalisation. Those in the top right box, who favour globalisation, are here to stay. But they need alliances with those who ofkr some form of political regulation. The two possible alliances that can be made suggest two possible directions for nlobalisation. The New Right favours an unregulated economy but strong and evcn authoritarian political slatcs. They favour movements o l trade and capital but they are against free movement of people. They want to restrict asylum seekers and maintain ethnic purity. An alliance with the New Right suggests a world of wild globalisation, managed or contained through authoritarian nationalism and coercion. The realist view that 'stabi1iZy' is more important than democracy -that, lor example, favours Putin or negotiates with Milosevic - is also in line with this approach, even though its proponents might express themselves in more moderate terms. The alternative is an alliance with the cosmopolitans -the people often described as ~lobal civil society, the ncw tnnsnational NGOs, the human rights community, those who support multiculturalism, and so on. I have put the cosmopolitans in the lower right box because I do consider that cosmopolitanism involves a conunitmen1 to human rights, and 1 also take the view that civil, political and social rights are indivisible. Jones defines the cosmopolitan standpoint as 'impartial, universal, individualist and egalitarian' (Jones. 1999, p.) and argues for a system of global justice based on a cosmopolitan moral position. What then makes cosmopolitanism any different from a human rights perspective? Appiah suggests that cosmopolitanism is different from humanism in that it celebrates multi-cultural diversity and the free movement of people. He argues for thc notion of a rooted cosmopolitan -someone who is attached to a particular place or home with its cultural particularities 'but takes pleasure from the presence of other, different places that are home to other different people' (Appiah, p. 22) and also is ablc to choose his or her home. Of course, it could be argued that a human rights perspective must include respect for different cullures -the right to wmship frecly or to use one's language. for example. Appiah suggests that a humanist position is compatible with world government. whereas a cosmopolitan perspective implies a variety of polities. I am not convinced of this point since world governmen1 implies such a concentration of power that guarantees of individual l i b w would be hard to sustain. However, the utility of the term 'cosmopolitan' as opposed to humanist does stem to lie in its presumed emphasis on cultural and political diversity. This is partly explained by its colloquial usage. A cosmopolitan tends to be someone who is familiar with different cultures and languages -although it does have w urban, elitist connotation. More importantly, it derives from the original Kantian use of the tern]. Kant envisaged a global system divided into states in which cosmopolitan right overrides the claims of sovereignty. This is usually interpreted as human rights. But an interesting aspect of the original Kantian position is the way in which he insisted thal, as a condition for perpetual peace, cos~nopolitan right could be confined to the right of hospitality. This can be interpreted as a plea for multiple identities. Strangers need to bc trmted as guests -politely but not as memhers of the family. Hospitality, surely, requires respect for h u m rights, hut this is not the same as integration or homogenisation. Thus an alliance between the new globalist centre and the cosmoplitans implies a global 'civilisinn process'. The aim is a rights-based system of global governance. And this implies a alobal social contract - a elobal civil society. Cosmopolitanism is often treated as a sentiment or moral standpoint. I want to suggest that it is, in fact, a political project, which is best elucidated in relation to 'new wars'.


ALTERNATIVE SOLVENCY- PUBLIC SPHERE

THE PUBLIC SPHERE IS CONSTITUTED THROUGH DISCOURSE-THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS REALIZING NEW FORMS OF SOCIAL SOIADARITY TS TO RESHAI'E THE DISCOURSE OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Calhoun, 02 (Craig, president of the Social Science Research Council and a professor of sociology and history at New York University, "Imagining Solidarity: nCosmopoIitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the Public Sphere," Public Culture 14.1 (2002) 147-17 1 http://muse.ihu.edu/iournals/public cu2ture/v014/14.1 calhoun.htm1)

Can we conccivc of public discourse as (among other things) a form of social solidarity? Such a framing flies to some extent in the face of common usagc. Solidarity or integration is treated as a question distinct from. and generally prior to! that of collective decision-making or legitimate action. Thc implication is that the collective subject is formed first, and activity in the public sphere is about steering it, not constituting it. One reason ftx this is that in the most influential early modem works of political theory--and not just the cxtrcmc example of Hobbes--thc collective subject was conceived, to a great extent, not as "the people." but as thc state. Or, more precisely. thc pcoplc were arguably the subjcct of legitimacy (in a modem. "ascending" approach to the question of legitimacy, as distinct from a medieval, "descending" approach emphasizing divine right or heredity). But the state was the subject of collective uctiun, which was either legitimate, or not. So in a sense, states were actors, and public discourse--where it was influential--steered states. The collective action of the people might have created states in the mythical past of social contract theory or in the language of the U.S. Declaration of Independence. But both for liberals in ihe tradition of Locke and conservatives likc Hegel, the state became the proper collective subject, either ensuring the freedom of individual actors within it or subsuming them into its largcr whole. Legitinlacy came in some combination from serving the interests or the people or fiom the process by which the people contributed to the steering of the state. But in approaches deriving from this son ol account (notably, for example, Habermas's [End Page 1581 classic exposition) a clear distinction was made between the public sphere and the state. 18 The public sphere appeared, then. as a dimension of civil society. but onc that could orient itself toward and potentially steer the state. In this sense, the public sphere did not itself appear as a self- organizing lorm of social solidarity, although another crucial part of civil society--the market (or cconomic system)--did. Rather than a form of solidarity, the public sphere was a mechanism for influencing the state. Civil society provided a basis for thc public sphere through nurturing individual autonomy. But the public sphere did not steer civil society directly: rather. it influenced the state. The implication, then, was that social integration was accomplishd either by power (the state) or by self-regulating systems (the economy). If citizens were to have the possibility of collective choicc, thcy had to acr on the state--which could then, in turn, act on the economy (although too much of the latter would constitute a problematic dedifferentiation of spheres according to many analysts. including the later Habermas). What was not developed in this account was the vossibilitv that the public sohere was effective not onlv through inlormine: state volicy, but also through forming culture--that through the exercise of social imagination and the forging of social relationshivs the public sphere could constitute a form of social solidaritv. The public sphere is important as a basic condition of democracy. But it signals more than simply the capacitv to w c i ~ h specific issues in the court of public opinion. The public sphere is also a form of social solidarity. It is one of the institutional forms in which the members of a society may be joined together with one another. In this sense, its counterparts are families, communities, bureaucracies, markets, and nations. All of these are arenas of social participation. Exclusion from them is among the most basic definitions of alienation from contemporary societies. Among the various forms of social solidaritv, though, & public sphere is distinctive because it is created and reproduced through discourse. It is not primarily a matter of unconscious inheritance, of power relations, or of the usually invisible relationships that arc forged as a by-product of industrial production [End Page 1591 and market exchanges. People talk in families, communities, and workplaces, of course, but the public sphere exists uniquely in, through, and for talk. It also consists specifically of talk about other social arrangements, including but not limited to actions the slate mighl take. The stakes of theories and analyses of the public sphere, therefore, concern the extent to which communication can be influential in producing or reshaaing social solidarity.


ALTERNATIVE SOLVENCY- UNIVERSAL CITIZENSHIP I COSMOPOLITANISM ARTICULATES A NEW UNIVERSAL CITIZENSHIP WHICH CAN SOLVE THEIR HAKMS WHILE OVERCOMING THE PROBLEMS OF SOVEREIGNTY

Cohen 99--PH.D Political Science; Sociology Columbia University4Jean L., "Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos", International Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 3,245-268, 1999).

Hul thrre is one more concern of the democratic civic republican that must k attended to. A key oh.jection to lihenl cosn~opolitanism is that as the human rights that arc enunciated on the supranational level, backed up by cou~ts and other govrm~nental instances, hecome more extcnsive, the less is left to the &mos of any polity to do. This nrakes the democratic component of h e citizenship principle paper-thin and cheapens participation. It would, moreover, violate the principles of democratic legitimacy to leave the

specification of dl or the most basic rights up to courts, lawyrrs W I ~ hurraucrats. The starting voint for a disaggregated model of citizenship and the imoeralive behind the articulation of universal rights of persons is the presence of large numbers of non-cilizens in most countries and hence the imvossibilitv of pretending that all those subject to or affected by the law (given interdependency) are also its authors. Consequently, the rights of non-citizens have not been elaborated as special rights but as universal rights to which, as

indicated earlier, citizens themselves make claim, triggering the intervention of supranational courts on their behalf against their Own States. There is oo convincing d e m r a t i c argument against the legal F ~ h ~ ~ d of non-citizens. However. when the articulation 01 universal rights applies to the cilizenry as well, this raises the legitimate fear that in t l~e long run there will be nothing left for thr demos to decide. The demos, in order to be politically autonomous, must have the competence to atticalate and spw~fy certain principles, certain areas and ccrtdin key rights regarding the citizenry, otherwise democracy is evixerated. Thus even in the postmodem disiggegated conception, there remains a tension hetween the various components of the citizenship principle: the liberal and democratic

components, not tomention the identity dimension, pull in opposite directions. Brit 1 believe that in the disaggregated model the tensions can be reduced if the ideal of exclusive state sovereignty and territorialitv is abandoned, if a plurality of instances of governance are acknowledged, and if some key rivhls are articulated and iustified in thc civil public spaces of transnational civil society and guaranteed by the supranational instances of a vartly post-national international regime. kvereignty must be m~de ever more democratic and guided by principles of justice. Serious reflection On the institutional St~LlCture, comvetencies and powers of the components of the emcrgent supranational regime, especial~y of supranational courts and the quasi- governmental hodies of regional federations but also of memher states, is now crucial. New meaning w n certainly be given to the multiple levels of belonging, the various loci of identity (local, national, regional. global), the differing forms of participation and the intersecting complexes of rights, duties and loyallies that characterize multicultunl polities existing in a global context. Rut we must honestly acknowledge that the distribution of competcncies in speci6ing rights is an issue that can only bc resolved politie;dly. Hopefully lhis will he done democratically. informed as much as possible by considerations of justice. We will avoid the Scylla of foundationalism and the Charybdis of democratic despotism only if we ~Lnowlzdge that substance and process. justice and democracy are in a recursive relationship to each other. The assenion of basic rights in civil public spaces requires moral justification through the giving of substantive reasons and free argumentation. An independent judiciary to protect rights is ~xucial. But so are democratic political institutions that legislate and make policy in light of publicly justifiihle reasons (Gubnan and Thompson, 1997). Democracy cannot guarantee justice, hut neither can moral justification appal to some absolute truth ha1 exists independently of consensus. My abstract discussion of the logic of citizenship on a 'posunodern' p d d i p has institutional implications. I would like to suggest that instead of assuming hat Ihc future will entail eilhm a new system of sovereign Cederdl mega-states, a return to liberally

national nation-states, a world government. or some sort of cosmopolitan world legal order, one must imagine a combination of the elements of all of these. The idea of world government in which liberal and democratic considerations would merge is both implausible and undesirable since it would threaten political diversity. AS already stated. quasi-govern~i~mtal institutions must he open to the influence of civil society. Government11 s tn~c tum on the national, supra- and suhnotional lev-els must havc 'lrcepa~rs' for this influeocr. Indeed, it is entirely possible t11;a political parties might emerze on the supranational level to supplement national p.uties and help to articulale and redesign political institntions in a democratic direction, as Habermas hopes. Institutional redesign that m a h s federations morc denlocntic and states more open to norms articulated on higher levels and to the diversity emerging inlcmally is idso called for. But it is not necess'q to envisage federations replacing the territorial state. Instead we must be open to a

plurality of forums, and of modes of institutionalizing voice on the supranational level. Existing state jurisdictions would certainly retain control in many areas and be the instances that implement many rights and norms ar~iculalcd on other political and legal levels (covenants, court decisions and so forth). Democratic, constitutional nation-states could remain a level of political identification for the local citizenrv. But new identities and new forms of representation could follow new institutionalizations, complicating the levels of belonging and allegiance in salulary ways. At the same time each state's sovereignty could be tempered by the rules of the federation and other supranational bodies.


COSMOPOLITANISM SOLVES MILITARISM

COSMOPOLITAN IS NECESSARY TO OVERCOME STATE MIIATARISM

Hayden 05-- Senior Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Wellington-(Patrick, "Cosmopolitan global politics ", Pg 67, Ashgate Publishing, January 2005)

The lessons leu~led from intemntionnl politics in the post-Cold War era and the nature olglohrl conflict today compel us to accept m important fact: it is impossible' to protect and enhance hnman Frcedom and well-king exclusively through the rraditio~~al pfildigm of national sccurity. The security ol the individual human being must also bc taken into considerntx>n, Internarinnnl polilicol theclry and practice rntlst come to accept this global reality sincc all loo u k n the best kid plans for achieving state securily have come at the cost of an increase in h~mhn suffering. fern

nnddcprivation. Government policies, especially those of rampant militarism, intended to protect territorial integrity and state power from the perceived threats of outside forces often negatively affect the lives of individuals within sinple states and increasingly throughout regions and the globe as a whole. The security of the human person reauires the promotion and prolection of core values, and the reconstruction of local, national, and international social environments and political relations which favour increased safety, freedom and well-being. More particularly what is required is a new global outlook: an approach that recognizes the highly interdependent nature of human life across political and territorial boundaries, and the growing irrclevance of the traditional conception of state sovereignty as an end in itself. Integrating cosmopolitanism with the conceot of human securitv may best represent this new global outlook. Cosmopolitanism claims that we owe duties of justice to all the persons of the world and thus that normative theories of global politics should focus first on the interests or welfare of persons rather than of m. For this reason cosmopolitanism is most basically contrasted to the traditional state-centric or realist approach to international relations. While statism requircs noninterference into the ;Iffairs of olher states in order to protect the sovereignty of aetonomous states. msmpolitianism hul'is that .Slate sovcreignty is legitimate only in so far as it pmmotcs fair principles of juslice (which requires respeclmp persons and lheir rghis). Accordiig to cosmc>politanism rcupecl Cur scale sovereignty per ssr providcs no reason not to intervene when necessary, for example. to prcveni humnitarilln disaters and goss humnn righb uiolations.

COSMOPOLITANISM IS KEY END VIOLENCE AND ENGAGE IN POSITIVE PEACE- AND BREAK DOWN NOTIONS OF JUST WAR THEORY

Hayden 05- Senior Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Wellington-(Patrick, "Cosmopolitan global politics ", Pg 91, Ashgate Publishing, January 2005)

State sovereignty, in its most basic sense. is being redefined-not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-o~eration. Slates are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice Versa At the Same time individual s~vereigfity-hy which 1 mean thc fundamental freedom of eaih individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties-has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading cunsciousness of individual rights. Whe11 we read the chaser tday, we are more than ever

conscious that its aim is to protect individual human hcinys not to protect those who abuse them .... This develovin~ international norm in favour Ot intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to pose profound challenges to the international community. In some quarters it wiU m u s e distrust. scepticism, even hostility. But 1 believe on balance we should welcome it. Why? Because. despite all the diRicuhirs of puninz it into practice. it does show that humankind today is less willing then in the past to tolerate suffering in i ts midst, and more willing to do something about

it (Annan 1999: 49.~0). The explicit articulation of a cosmopolitan conce~tion of human security and a correspondina right lo peace is a positive develo~ment in dobal politics inasmuch as it decentres the state in our understanding of the human community and delegitimizes offensive war and organized violence as the generally accepted means for the 'continuation' of realist uolitics I have argued that iusl war theory when defined in suitably narrow fashion helps to contribute to our thinlung on issues of human security in several ways it it urovides a stringent normative framework for a reasonable iustil'ication of the resort to force. Second, it enables us to conceptualise significant moral and legal constraints on war and thus on the powers of states to wage war thereby displacing thc use of force from thc statist paradi~m of security' 'l'hird, it contributes to the delipitimation of uniust wars, that is, military actions undertaken for any purposes other than human security. Finally in so f;lr as it provides a justificatory basis for the increasing demilitarization of

society. it may inl'luence the progressive and iust ~acification of vlobal politics. As long as the types of human wrongs that present the gravest threats to human security continue to haunt the global community, there remains a need to bc -y so as to protect the rights and well-being of individuals. Indeed given the occurrence of genocide ethnic clcansing, massacres and other such injustices, few things have done more harm to the global community's 'shared ideal that ueoule are all equal in worth and diznity than the inability of the community of states to Prevent these horrors' (Evans and Sahnoi~n 2002: 100). This need to prevent and protect people poscs a genuine dilemme for humanitarian morality and politics in so far as many of the military cqmbilities required to M e n d and to aid vulnerable pexsons can dsu be the source of threats to human life and welfare. Yet the existence of this dilemma need no1 I d us either to apathy or to cynicism.


COSMOPOLITANISM KEY TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

COSMOPOLITANISM SOI,VES THE ENVIRONMENT- CURRENT SYSTEMS WILL INEVITABLY FAIL- RENEWED COALITIONS ARE KEY.

Hayden 05- Senior Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Wellington-(Patrick, Cosmopolitan global

politics, Pg 140-142, Ashgate Publishing, January 2005)

AI tncntiottcd in h c introduction to this chapter. the u;msnational environmental movement and the importance attached to global environmental problems have occurred mainly as a result of the recent emergence of a number of wcll-publiciz~xl glob:~l environmental threats Envimnmentnl organi7ations in both developed and less developed counaies have it~crcascd Ihc profile of h e h a t s and have helped to move them onto political agendas by putting ptesswc o n influential actors and institutions. For this reason. and in light 01' the

typzs of concerns f o c u s d on by environmental justice discourse, global environmental change is best understood as a social rather than physical phenomenon. This is because what has occurred is not simply dramatic change in the natural environment but more sianificantlv the growth of an cnvironrnental consciousness which realizes the limits of human exploitation (ofboth the earth and other'human beings) and seeks to preserve the environment as the suvport svstenl necessary for human exlStenCe (Lipschutz and Meyer 19W 20) The entrrgence of environmental consciousness is, then, very much the result of the rediscovery of human dependence on our

natural surroundings. which has been masked by h e modern scientific and technological illusion that A\cAu""~"*~ " "or'sSor e d human expansion (Fnlk1995: 252)

Therefore, although the transnational environmental movcment is due in laree part to a number of world ecological threats becoming incrcasingly evident, the development of a shared globaI ethic seekinn to limit human exploitation of the earth and the human costs of such exploitation is an important indicator of a transformative cosmopolitan politics. Lilrgcly as a result of the emergnce ofthe Iransnational environmental movement and its shnrcd global clhii, environmental globalization is rapidly occuminp. David Held defines gbbaliz~%tioo the 'stretching and deepening of social relations and institutions across time and space'. a resnlt of which is that local activities incrmsinply are influenced by cvcnts across iuuf 5 yf.lc:,grmas "1 l o o 1 yrAPS cnn have global influence (Held 1995.20). As Willism C. Ciark argues. if envh~nmentnl gloh~lism ctlnsisls or the existence of a rich wtwork ofenvironmentally mediilld linkages among acton at multicontinentirl distmcc', then it is unequivocally a fcalure of global society. He suggests as well that if, using Held's definition enviro~~~nentnl globalization is t k 'thickening' of thc lii~kages uienvironmental globalism then this process is well under way (Clark 2 W : 101-2). Clmk ooutlines three g~,onps of envu.unmenta1 Iinknpes thal have noticeably increased in the past few decades. focused oo what hc calls thc 'c~iriruomental stuff dimension of globalism. namely. the flows of materhls (such ~LF hr)ardous materials. toxic wastes and

.greenhouse8 pses) ;md hiclta amund the gobe, environmc~unI ideas, and envirunmenlnl governance. He cites increases in the variety, strength and densitv of long distance relationships among, actors, the number of actors involved in those relationships. and the vellocitv of change in society that these relationships help to induce as persuasive proof of environmental nlobalization. clark uses the phrase 'plobaliutiun of stuff lo denote Ihe way in wh~ch flows olc~~crgy. materials and organisms Ihrouphoul the nalura1:md human enviroomen~s link the aclions of peaple in one place with people at a distance. Clark and olhrrs w n t e d that it 1s necessary to undersond the earth as a syslern that involves a vast numb of cn~npkx interactions and W ~ e s which ae u ~ d u c i b k to n linen cause and effect conceplion of actions in the cnvironme~ir (Clark 2OOW 57; BL~cclo~~orc and Smyth 2002: 204). The nuws o i mergy m u d the e a h mean that disturbances to the planet's energy at one pklce can augment and create a large-scale impact in a nlimkr of othcr placcs. In addition flows of materials, which include those relocated by in&rconti~~ental tranqx)11* urell gases and

particks h t flow through thcatmosphere. together peopk in different p k e r . rimally. biotic linkages such as the movement of Pests or diseases can have significant and devastating affects on human vooulations and their supporting ecosystems. Bccause the e m w s environment ft~nctions as a complex system there has always been a degree of globalism in the ways in which relationships between humans are medial& by environrncntal linkages. However

ns o result of the increase in the world's population. consumvtion of resources and greater cconomic inlcrdependence, these linkages have thickened considerablv ( C I X ~ 2000: 87-94). Another way in which people around the world arc linked in the transnational envlronrnental movement is t h r o ~ x h the spread ofenvironrnenti~l ideas. tiivcn the growing awareness oithe extent of interconncctedness in the globill environment as well as the emergence of pressing cnviromnernal pmhkms at thc global level. il is not surprisinl: that there is widespread demtnd for global eiivironmental policy and nmnagerncnt to ensure that environmenlal degrddation is minimised and reversed as much as is possible. For example Richxd Bendick. the US negotiator for the 1987 Montreal Rotocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. described the wed for n hew paradigm' which explicitly recognized that no state or singlc gmup of sL1te.s can eflectively solve many environmentnl problems of the contemporary world. and instead p~amoted global cooperation as the essential means Lo address those problems (Czcmpiel 1992: 2501, These initiatives have beoefitcd greatly from the cnha~lceme~it of communicaLions tochnolugy which allows the lalest scientific tindinbs ro tc publicized worldaidc and enables environmental ideas and issues to appear ;llmt~st simultaneously on social and political agendas around the world. Foremost m o n g the envuonmnemnl ideas which have spixnd widely and have had much inflilcncc arc, of course, those relaling to the concepts 01 sustainable development and environmentdl justice which seek r11 integrate

devclopme~~talan~eco~lomicinitiatives wilh environmentalconczms. The third significant comvonent of environmental rzlobalization is the thickening of linkages between actors as a result of the emergence of a complex system of global governance aimed at addressing dobal environmental problems. Global governance refers to 'collective actions to establish international institutions and norms to cope with the causes and consequences of advcrse suvranational, transnational, or national problems' (Vayrynen 1999: 25). Global governance involves both governmental institutions and nongovernmental organizations in the collective making of rules and exercising of power at the global level but unlike thc formal system of government, global governance is not necessarilv backed bv police powers ( ~ o s e n a u 1992: 4). Emst-Otto Ctempiel's description of governance as the capacity to get things donc without the lcyal competence to command that they b e done'

emphasizes the lack of coercive power inherent m the definition ofgovcrna~tcr as distinct fiom government (Czempiel992: 249). Young further defines global governance as the management of complex interdependencies among an extensive nctwork of actors who are engaged in interactive decision-making and take actions that affcct each others' welfare (Young 1996: 2). system of global environmental governance thus includes both formal treaties and the institutions created to implement them, as well as less formal norms and rules that both constrain and enablc actors' behaviour without ncccssarilv beinn backed by strong coercive powers (Lipschutz and Meyer 1996- 249)


COSMOPOLITANISM KEY TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE BASED ON COOPERATION IS KEY TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES VIA VAST NETWORKS OF COOPERATION NOT ATTAINAB1,E NOW

Hayden 05- Scnior Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Wellington-(Patrick, CosmopoIitan global politics, Pg 142-143, Ashgate Publishing. January 2005)

Out of this general background of global environmental governance another notable feature that has evolved is the emergence of networks which involve I w e numbcrs of diverse actors united by their interest in a specific issue or project. These vasl networks constitute what is now referred to as global civil societv' and ennane like-minded actors from different levels and sectors of socictv from the local to the global. As Mary Kaldor notes global civil society is in the process o l helping to constitute and being constituted by a global system of rules, underpinned by overlapping inter* governmental, governmental and global authorities' (Kaldor 2003- 2) These civil societv networks are defined as nlobal because the actors, in addition to heino, from numerous different countries, are involved in international forums, conferences and debates. and arc globallv linked through networks communications and a shared chic aimed at preserving the environment and rectifving social harms connected with environmental problems Global civil societv is fundamental in dealing with global environmental problems as it involves local practices which are linked globallv and which therefore make shared global practices plausible (Lipschutz and Meyer 1996- 49-60)

COSMOPOLITANISM SPARKS GLOBAL NETWORKS OF WHICH ARE VITAL TO SOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

Hayden 05-- Senior Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Wellington-(Patrick, Cosmopolitan global

politics, Pg 147, Ashgate Publishing, January 2005)

Although systems of global environmental governance have not yet made major progress in solving environmental problems, important building blocks have been put in place in the organization of the transnational environmental movement. The most encouraging aspect of this movement is its contributing role in the emergence of global civil societv in which networks of actors spanning, diflerent levels and different sectors of society are linked by their shared concern for the environment and human development, which results in local groups taking action based on globally embedded ideas. For this reason it is possiblc to speak of a consolidation of cosmovolitan and environmental values and ideals into a new conception ol"wor1d environmental citizenshipf as a dynamic moral- political dimension of alobal civil societv. World environmental citizenship can be viewed as a component of the more aeneral cosmo~olitan conception of world citi~enship. The idea of world citizenship, as discussed in Chapter 1, refers to the individual as a member of the wider community of all humanitv com~lernentarv to whatever other political communities. such as the state, of which he or shc is a member. Membership in the community of humanity implies some form of identitv with and colnmitment to the other members of that community, and to the well-being o l that community as a whole. World enviromnental citizenship arises from an ethical concern for the social, political and economic problems associated with the environment and humanity's dependence upon it, and from a recognition of our global responsibilities for the human condilion in light of humanity's interconnectedness with the environment. Thus thc world environmental citizen is concerned about the common good of the human community and places articular emphasis on the fact that we arc all citizens belonging to both local environments and a single global environment. Onc of the first attempts lo define environmental citizenship was offercd by Environment Canada, the department within the Government of Canada that manages environmental ailairs: Environmental citizenshiu is a ~rsonal commitment to learning more about the environment and to taking responsible environmental action. EnvironmenLal citizenship encourages individuals, communities and organizations to dunk about the enviromnental ri~hts and responsibilities we all have as residents of planet Earth (Environment Canada 1993).


AT: IMPOSSIBLE TO REJECT IDENTITY

ACHIEVING A NEW COSMOPOLITAN ETHIC REQUIRES REJECTING NATIONALISM, WHICH IS THE KOOT OF WAR. IT DOESN'T REJECT INDIVIDUAI, IDENTITY, BUT IT REQUIRES FOREGOING THE COLIAECTIVE SENTIMENT BEHIND NATIONAIJISM

Thorup, 06 (Mikkel, lecturer in the History of Philosophy Department at Aarhus University, "Cosmopolitics!", 4/10, htt~://www.eurozinc.com/articles/2006-04-10-thorup-en.html)

What is new about today's cosmopolitanism is its attempt to acknowledge and work on pcrsond preconceptions and limitations. Where previous enlightenment cosmopolitanism was somctimcs rightfully accused of blinkered vision and self-aggrandizement, new cosmopolitanism attempts to take seriously the imperialism and nationalism of the intervening period; its threals. challenges, and opportunities for reflection. n nAs David Hollinger highlights, the new form of cosmopolitanism is neither universal nor pluralistic. New cosmopolitanism can be said to lie somewhere between the universal and the pluralistic. Holiinger writcs: "For cosmopolites, hun~anity's diversity is a fact. For universalists this is a problem. Cosmopolites s h m universalism's mistrust of restricted spaces but understand their necessity as contingent and temporarily segregated domains where people can have intimate and lasting relationships and where thcy can create diversity."[5] Nationalism often ends in "foreign" bloodshed New cosmopolitanism, however, is born of the universalist insight that nationalist or particularistic solidarities threaten large communitjes; that they render politics impossible, that thc point of departure is humanity, or what Ulrich Beck calls the "World Risk Society"; also that nationalism oftcn cnds in "foreign" bloodshed both within thc j cosmopolitanism" or universalism, which dictates the whole of humanity as the only valid political and emotional unit. New cosmo~olitanism recorznizes that oeoole have a need for primarv or local identities that are less significant - than humanity but significant enough to enable political action. The ~rc~blcm with nationalistic pluralism lies in its collectivism. In this, cosmopolitanism is far more liberal and individualistic, in that the individual person, in both his or her individuality and equality as a human being, forms the primary unit in political society. Between these two insi~hts, new cosmopolitanism prescrjbes the ability to manoeuvre between a multitude of identities, which are open and in constant flux and which cannot be boiled down into one fixed identity. Pluralist and nationalist alike acknowledge onlv one identity amongst an abundance of other, similarly closed identities, and universalism does not recognize any unit smaller than humanity. New cosmopolitanism is therefore critical of what we can call the universalist Left and the nationalist Right.


AT: REALISM

ASSUMPTIONS THAT THE STATE IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT CHAOS AND WAR ONLY SERVES TO ENTRENCH THE CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGNTY THAT SPARK EXCLUSION AND DOMINATION

Shaw 99--professor of political science at the University of Victoria-( Karena, "Symposium: Rc-Framing International Lrrw For The 21st Century: Feminist Futures: Contesting the Political", 9 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 569, lexis.)

To reinforce this, the alternative to sovereigntv must be rendered so awful thal the necessity of sovereiqnty--the ontology of soverei~ntv--remains unquestioned. Hence, Hobbes' famous description of the stale of nature: the absence of sovereinntv, in which not only politics, but society, technology, progress, law, order, even an account of time, are impossible. n24 Thouph presented as natural and inevitable. this description only achieves the status of "truth" if one has alreadv accepted (or is subject to) the ontolonv of sovereignty. 11 isatcstamcnt lo t h ~ ~ u ~ ~ e s s o f ~ o b k ~ . p m d ~ ~ t i o n ofthc political thal so many attempts rouse Hobbes ns thr kcy figure in the emergenee of modern accounts of politics simply begin with that description-- contested or nor. it is assumed to he a description nther than a prodoction-- rather than with the processes Uuough which it has come to be the necessary defieription of Life outside ofsovereignty. n7j Howe\,er, as much ~LF they may dispute his analysis of relations oTgovemimce, most ppulnr accounts of Hobks assume that the spatial and temporal conditions for the escitblishmenl of legitimate authority are already resolved: the sovereign stale is the precondition for politics. Cmcially. however. this assumption naturalizes what is a particular--and for many pat~cularly problematic- - ontology. re-establishing this ontology as the necessary "ground" upon which conflicts must be mediated. One of the implications of Hobbes' story that is too often overlooked is the relationship betwccn political authority and the production of knowledge. Because political authority is guaranteed through a shared ontolt~gy. as expressed in the subjectivities ofcitizcns, the production of knowledge and [*579] thc lcgitirnation of authority are also intimately connected. It is the ontology of sovereignty that gumanteus and authorizes knowledge claims. 111 thc absence 01 sovereignty, wods have no meaning: covenants without swords are Inere words. n26 Because the ontology of sovereignty gives words their

authority (a political authority can only be considered sovereign if it can guarantee the meaning of its words), this 0nt010g~ n~cessarily provides the basis for authority and legitimacy throughout SOC~C~Y. This ontology is expressed and enforced in Hobhes' text by. for example, his careful disciplining of knowledge. n27 which illustrates the ccnuality of strucLures of knowledge production to matters of political authority. This connection between the disciplining of knowledge and the ontology of sovereignty continues to be apparent in the contemporary academic disciplines. which follow the spatial and temporal resolutions of sovereignty that Hobbes lays out in thc first few chapters of Lrviuthw: n28 politics happens inside states under state sovereignty, international relations happen outside states and state sovereignty: anthropology happens before state sovereignty, sociology happens "under" the structures of governance. "micro" and "macro" economics arc separated by the same divide, and str

on. This division of knowledge is not a transparent division of the "real," but rather ~roduces and monitors what is "teal," enforcing the lenitimacv of certain lands of inquiry and reinforcing silences or rendering, other qucstions n~n~ens ica l . In this way, thc assumption ot sovereignty cannot be reduced to an assumption nf the shte. The discor~nes and practices of sc~v~reignly uc deeply embedded in not ~ n l y our plilical insl~lutions. hut also. more broadly. in our constructions oZ legitimate authority. Tkse discourses sre comtitotive of our very subjenivitics: who we think we arc, what k ids oT a~~lhority we accept or find persuasive. and so nn. As Hobhes says. onc must only look inside oneself to know lhat the epistemology he lays out k a rue." n29 Onecsn dispute his epistemology-- and many have--but soch an cffon. in6ofm as it occurs withuut a challenge to the underlying structure of sovereignty discourse, only Tuncticm tu strargthcn the mhitacturc Ilohks produced. To assum sovereignty is. thus. not simply to assume the state. but lu assume a set of preconditions and nrcessities for the eaiblishment of legitimate authority. To make the point lhat sovereignty is in.%ribrd In complex ways at a complex of sites. rather than king obvious. naturill or inevitable. is nu110 assert hat suvereignty is not "real." or "true." or does not have a vmicty of L*S80I en'ects. or that lo lakc thcsc qucstions seriously is "i~~ucalistic." as Benhabib claims. 1130 The discourses und practices of sovereignty ilre the mecha~~~srns though which iln cvalualion of "truth" (or legithnatc/ilcgitimslLI violence. justice. ant1 so on) is made possible. As such, we cnnnot simply discard or do without sovereignty. However, I argue helow. neither call rvc simply assrllnc it. or elements of it. as unchangin~, =essay or natural. 1131 Hobbes' account of the necessity and contingency enacted by sovereignty has, of course, been challenged and rewritten by many others. not least perhaps by Rousseau n32 and KaiL. 11.33 His specific arguments about the character of the government that rests upon sovereignty have been even more contested. Indccd they have become the primary focus of contestanon in modern political thought. Lockc, rather than Hobbes, has thus provided the most familiar starting point for

theories about the parameters md possibilities of modem political life, n34 Nevertheless. Hobbes' simultaneous framing and erasure OK the problem of sovereienty, his basic neonra~hy of where and what we are in the world, remain paradigmatic. the crucial ~ X P ~ C S S ~ O ~ of Our almost unchallcnned c O m ~ o n Sense. It is expressed not only in the contemporary discipliningof howledge. hut in sites as diverse as domestic and international law: at border crossings and in n d i c a l and mental health systems. Benhahib's assertion that identity is and must be a precondiliou fur the political expresses not only a belief in the general :mhilecture. but also in the particulu ontobpy expressed by Flohhes: wkrc "identity" (shared ontology) is a precondition for political possibility. By assening this. Henhabib cffcclivcly rtilies the onlology of sovereignty, reinscribinp thc sovueigo Elate ns thc limit condition ot'pulitics, the modern ideal of identity as the precomiilion for poliiicnl or pwsonnl subjectivity, and thus the modern architecture oi politics. The power of this architectlmre is especially ~mpitssive given the extensive critical brcc that has been directed against it. The

\'iolenccs enabled by this ideal have been cr~ticizcd in many diffcrcnl literatures, perhaps ~ m t s ~ ~1werIu1Iy within some str~nds of feminist theory. The [*58 11 legitimation Of practices of colonization; the exclusion of women, children. the "mad" and the colonized iiom politics; even the violence of struaales for nationalist vroiects--all have been criticized as necessarv ellccts of thc legitimation and domination of discourses and practices of sovereignty.

COSMOPOLITANISM CAN SOLVE FOR THE INEVITABILITY OF REALISM

Murphy 01- Editorial Board American Journal of Jurisprudence and professor of law a1 Duqucsne University-- (Cornelius F., Theories of World Governance: A Study in the History of Ideas, 6/22/2001, , pg167)

This irnagc of immanent but fraemented development promises a general hbauiness but it is in reality a prediction of social disintegration. The Ionic is one in which the masses lavse into automatism and conformilv while public affairs are manipulated by a dominant minoritv. The vision also overlooks the degree of international interdependence which is an integral vart ol' modern social existence. Like individuals, states can feel that they are self-sufficient; as with individuals, the sense of autonomy is largely unrealistic. Furtherrnorc.

unlike individt~als, statcs coexist in an international shte of nature. The propensities toward violent disorder within such an association are only partiallv the result of desires for prestiee which can bc cured by mutual recognition of a common dignity. AS we have rcwatedly pointed

out. the international society will remain destabilized so lona as there is no effective way of resolving serious international disputes. But the deeper flaw in this perspective ol'dispersed fulfillment lies in its assumption that the individual citizen who will bc living within these sewarate but equal states will gradually abandoned all interest in the world beyond his. or her. frontier.


AT: REALISM

REALISM MAKES COERCION, VIOLENCE, AND WAR INEVITABLE- A TRANSITION TO COSMOPOLITANISM IS POSSIBLE AND ITS TRY OR DIE

Hayden 05- Senior Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Wellington-(Patrick, "Cosmopolitan global politics ", Pg 68-69, Ashgate Publishing, January 2005)

Human security is a concept that has cmcrged in recent years lrom the work of critical international political theorisls ilnd policymaken. and has far-reaching implications for global activity bcyond thc realm of the classical conception of national security. The human security approach has both ethical implications for how we conceive our obligations towards other human beings and legal or institutional implications for assessment and management of threats to humn safety and freedom. For this reason the concept of human securitv intersects usefullv with the cosmopolitan proiect. For cosmopolitans as well as human securitv advocates the traditional claims to sovereigntv and nonintervention on the part of states are beinn supplanted in international relations bv a norm of humanitarian assistance driven by the human rights and securitv interests of individuals. This chapter first reviews thc cmergence of the concept ol'human security and its meaning and implications for challenging thc dominant realist paradigm of state security and that paradigm's rationale for the state's monopoly on violence. The discussion then movcs to a consideration of what constitutes a threa~ to swurity under the human security framework. threats which include many of the policies and actions pursued by the statist national security agenda. From there an aryment is advanced in support of the idea of a human right to peace. this right serving as a core component of a cosmopolitan Pormulation of human security. Finally the chapter concludes by considering how a constrained version of just war theory can providc us with a framework for thinking about how wc ought to respond to some of the most severe threats to human security while doing justice to the human right to peace. The modern theory and practice of international relations has been dorninatcd by political rcalism, an approach that is committed to a unified view of power and national securitv as defininn of the political world. Realism and its more recent manifestation as neorealism has a long history which includes major figures such as Thucydidcs. Machiavclli, Hobbes, Reinhold Niebuhr, E. H. Cam and Hans Morgenthau. The varied and complex contours of this history fall beyond the purview of this chapter. Flere we are concerned only with the basic way in which realism as embodied in conjunction with thc AVestphalian inheritance of state sovereignty has shaped the contemporary sccurity paradigm of world politics. This paradigm assinlilates several of the following basic premises of realism: states are the primary actors in the world's political system: states seek power as a means and as an cnd to ensure their survival in an anarchical world; power is defined in terms of the possession of resources. and military might; states are rationaI, egoistic actors in so far as they pursue what is in thcir own best interests; and stalc interests are driven primarily by the necessity of' national survival. In a realist international system states arc concerned only to further their own interests and interstate cooperation is carried out only instlumentally and provisionally. In such a system relatively weak international institutions are the result of governmental practices based on the current distribution of power and states' attempts to maintain or improve thcir relative ranking. Realists contend that states rarely join or comply with regimes that are not in their national interest, defined by the need to acquire, maintain and excrcisc powcr. In Hans Morgenthau's words, 'The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through thc landscape of intemational politics is the' concept of interest defined in terms of power' (Morgenthau 1954: 5). International politics thus constitutes a competition over the balance of power and a continual effort to achicve national security in a world that is conceived as being inherently insecure. Somewhat paradoxically war and other forms of state-organized violence are regarded as the most effective instruments with which to assure national survival. This last point is made abundantly clear by a representative of twentieth-century realism: 'In international society all forms of coercion are permissible, including wars of destruction. This means that the struggle for power is identical with the strangle for survival, and the improvement of their relative power position becomes the primary obiective of the internal and external policy of states. All else is secondary' (Spykman 1942: 18). Realists often base their pessimistic view of interstate relations on a similarly pessimistic view of human nature. The egoism of states is merely I a reflection of the egoism of individuals, for whom self-interest is the! ovemding passion. The corruption and 'wickedness' of human nature make conflict and insecurity inevitable features of human cxistcnce. Here Hobbes' conception o l the state or nature as a 'war or all against all' finds its expression in the supposedly anarchic stnrcturc of international relations. While the anarchy of the state of nature can be restrained by establishment of the sovereign stale, the relations between states still occur in an ' ',marchical socicty' duc to thc absence of an internaiional hierarchical j political authority (Bull 1977). The international order. it is thought by realists, necessarily consists of a system of indcpcndent, self- interested states, each assurning the worst about the others and seeking to ensure its survival in a dangerous, self-help world. Rcalists reject the possibility of any positive conception of long-lasting peace in the circumstances of international relations conceived as anarchic. The best that can be hoped for is a tenuous balance of power, that is, the maintenance of an ordered society of states brought about through the incessant contestation of opposing forces in world politics. In this system sovereign states-which in the abstract vary only in terms or their functional capacities-continually find themselves in a ~e rw tua l 'security dilemma'.


AT: REALISM

THE U.S. STRIVE FOR DOMINANCE ISN'T SUSTAINABLE AND IS CAUSING A BACKLASH AGAINST IT THAT WILL CULMINATE IN WARS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION. ONLY BOLSTERING MOVEMENTS FOR COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRATIZATlON CAN SOLVE

Falk 04--professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University, Yale h w School (1955); J.S.D.. Harvard University; Been on the editorial b o d s of about ten journals and rnagazincs; Chairman of the Consultative Council. Lawym' Cormnittce on American Policy

Toward Vietnam-- (Richard A,, "The declining world order : America's imperial geopolitics", 2004. Koutledgc, pg 25-28)

The rencwed focus on security brought on by the September 11 attacks combined with the sreniing inability to address effectively the nteg:rtmor-ist threats posed within a Westphalian frame have provided a rationale for an American-led effon to provide security for and impose order on thc entire world. Such a grandiose global security project is suppsedly indispensable given the glob:tlly networked and conccaled chara~'ter of al Qaeda: as well as the uwncy of guiuding against its extremist willingness to infl~ct hann on civilian society to the maximum extent possible. The undertaking rests on American miliuuy dominance. relying espccially on the wcaponizalbn of space to pmrilic missile defense and. morc significantly. tn acnievc by surveillance ;in offensive capability to strike a decisive blow anywhere on thr planet. This levcl of dominann is projected in such a way as to m&e it futile for any country lo seek to challenge the U S , role. Such a result would involve the establishment of a global empire. although nut fi>rmalized as yuch. hut also, us with ill Qiiedo, a glohal empirc basal

on a concealed network whose effectiveness is dependent on the control and mmap~~lation of infurmatinn mnre than on thc technology ol'desiruction. The idm of a global empire administered from Washington is also a dead end. It rests on a prendse of permanent militaization and the submission of other constellations o l power and inflnence. The perception of such imperial runhitions has throughout internaliondl history generated a reactive formation ,among states - alliances to defeai, or at least contain, the quest for

global empire. There is every reafion 10 suppost that the remainder of the world will not accept, without mounting some sort of resistance, this American bid to establish such a global empire. The resull would be a hiah-risk rivalry. wasteful of resources, endangering catastrouhic warfare among; state actors, and shifting priorities of volicvmakers away liom human rights, enviro~mental sustainabilitv, and equitable development. This detenllined pursuit of glnhsl empire has untashtd an illegal aggressivc war against Iraq that could not k persuas~vely cxplalned as a rmnab l r response to the al Qacda threat. This is a pst-Westphalian scenario that is both an example of dysutopin and a course of hislory that restates to political consciousness the achievements of the Westphalian solution of world ordcr that is based on political ploralisrn and a high level of r e s p t for sovereign rights. Noring the HislrrriculMomenz ofLosr Oppnnunify As the Cold War ended, the Soviet Union disintegrated, the world economy tlourished. constitutional democracy was robust - there existed a hislorid moment of unprecedented opportunity to salvage the Westphalian legacy. Salvaging would have involved a mixlure of initiatives designed to promote huniane global governance: espccially demilitarization. the buildup of I JN pacckeeping capabilities, and "a Marshall Plan" for Africa

and the Caribbean. Seizing the occa.sion dcprndad on American leadership, which was timid and ambivalent. retreating from any claim lo prumote what had earlier hccn called "libcral inta'nalionalism." Unlike the endings of the two world wurs uf the twenlielh century. the end of the Cold W:u did not give rhsr: lo giassruuts demands for global rcform, nor aerc the leaders on the scene dcdicaled to achieving n peaceful seltlement that adtlresscd thc majur prohlems o l world order. Instead, thc prevailing mood was complacent and foolishly oplimistic ahout the futitre, triumphahst in response to the outcome of the East~West suuggle, economistic in its sen% of what needed a, he done to secure liu~nan well-heing. and essentially unresponsive lo the legitimate grievances of peoples in the South. There was some recognition of the opportunities and chnltenges of l l ~ 1990s. George Bush in 1990-1991 lemporarily aroused interest and built suppon during the lead up to the Gulf War by constantly referring to the possibility of establishing "a new world order." by which he meant a functioning collective security process U&T UN auspices. Humanitarian diplomacy was also taken seriously in this period, both in rchtion to the protection of thc Kurdish minority in Iraq. the responsc to the humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia, and the effort to avoid "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia. But for reasons too complicated to discuss here. disillusionment ensued, and the more promising implications of such initiatives never materialized. Among lhc more hopeful initiatives was Uie effort by Lloyd Axwonhy. while foreign minister of Canada, to champion a shift from "national security" to "human security" as the basis for the role of the sovereign state, a conceptualization aulier given currency in an annual

V O I L I ~ C of the Human Development Report. Instead, the United States led a return to Westphalian geovolilics in its narrower state- centric ethos, a backlash against the United Nations, and a primarv reliance on the world economy organized ideologicallv along neoliberal lines (with hypocritical self-serving exceptions to protect some private sectors from competitive pressures) to addresq problem nf human sulkring (Including poverty and the A1L)S epidemic) and ecological sustainability. The oppurtunity to initiale comprchcnsive negotialions to nb~lish nliclear weapons was no1 even seric)usly considcrcd during this period. nor wcre propods trr establish a UN volunteer pacekeeping f o m that could respond to humanitarian catastrophes rapidly and without passing through the realist. geopolitical, and n~tionalist filters of leading stales. Such states wcre I-eluctant ro brathe financial or hnman costs of it diplomacy that could not be validated by traditional criteria associated with niltional sccur~ty and strategic overseas interests-(for example. to put the maner most starkly, oil is worth dying for. but the p m n l i o n of genocide and

crimes against humanity is not, especially in a Third world setting). AS a result, the main deficiencies of West~halia wcre preserved: the war system of global security and the vulnerability of the ~eoples of the world to various forms of oppressive governance exercised within territorial boundaries. Nevertheless. the case fordrastx: global refo1.m was kine made in various arena. and if not attainable within lhe Westphalian framework then possibly it? realization could he achieved through Ule agency of transnational social forces and the emergence of pwt-Wcstphalian smtctures of governance. What was this case? What were these social forces? Essentially, thc plausibility of polst-Wesrphnlim-perspectives involved the rim to high visibility of a niullidimensional normative agenda: imple~nenlation of human rights, accountability for pilst crimes of state, a b r i d g e ~ ~ n t s of sovereignty. the rise of huoianilarian peacekeeping. Beyond thc agenda, steps were nketk to achieve institotiondimtion: an u~creasing willingness of national judicial bodies to apply intcmational legal s t anhds as relevant: greater reliance on mulitlated approaches to global security, especially under the auspices of the United Nations; and the impressive growth of regional govmance, especially in Europe. with mandates to promote human rights. to sustain a social contract between citizens and market forces, and to facilitate trade and investment. Such goals by their natum could not

be r e a l i d without co~nprondsinp the internal autonomy of sovereign states, and this would not happen without the agency of political actors other than the mte . In effrct,

drastic global reform, if it is to occur, will eventuate in a post-Westphalian scenario of transformed slate structures and strengthened transnational, regional, and global formal and informal institutional procedures." The most currently vromisina of these developments is the campaign to promote global democracy and the various movcments to build comprehensive rcpional frameworks for democracy. human rights, and political identity. If cumulativel~ effective, the impact will be to view the outcome as post-Westphalian: states become subicct to external and internal standards of accountability, the rule of law is extended to the tbreign policv of ~overnments. and official ~olicics are subject to the discipline of democratic practices: and regional institutions become vital actors Ihnt adhcrc to frameworlts that ensure constitutionalism and collective well-being within regional boundaries, but also parlicipa~e in efforts to increase the quantity and quality of global public goods. World

order is thus no longer state-centric, alihough the role of states remains crucial, even if reconfigured in light of legal and ethical norms. The dusk of Westphalia Can be best understood in relation to the setting sun of sovereignty and the rising sun of regional and global policy horizoning, rather than by supposing that the statc itself will disappear by stages. or is in the vroccss of being marginalized.


I AT: CEDE THE POLITICAL k

THE REASON THE ALTERNATIVE APPEARS UNREALISTIC IS THAT THE PLAN RESTS UPON THE ONTOLOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY AND DERATES ABOUT HOW TO IMI'ROVE THE STATE REINFORCE THlS LOGIC. THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS POLITICAI, CHANGE IS REFUSING THlS ONTOLOGY

Shaw 99--professm of political science at the University of Victoria-(Karena, "Symposium: Re-Framing International Law For The 21 st Century: Feminist Futures: Contesting the Political", 9 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 569, lexis.)

These debates have emergcd through what should by now be a familiar architecture: the architecture of sovereignty. How these debates have come to bc framed through this architecture is complex. For example, thosc working within traditions of political theory to challcnge the "gendering" of these traditions have often reproduced thc tcndency of contemporary political theorists to assume the ground of sovereignty--the basic architecture of politics as constructed by Hobbes--as their enabling condition, thus necessarily stopping short of an engagement with the constitutive conditions of possibility for the political. This is expressed in the general assumption 13921 that although relations of governance might need to be critically exvanded to recognize other political practices and &--the family, sexuality, care--and although we may. or may not, need a feminist theory of "the state," the spatial and temporal resolutions of sovereignty remain an adequate ground for analysis and practice. Although we mav need an "im~roved" state, or a proliferation of political spaces, the state as a container or frame for politics remains largelv unquestioned. 1148 This has led to rich conversations over the character and scope of relations of governance. However, these conversations. whether in the form of debates over concepts, public policy or legal strategies, also rest won and imalicitlv reinscribe governance as the Drover space for politics and, thus, the architecture of sovereignty. The implications of this reinscription emerge when these conversations confront those feminist literatures concerned with expressions of the political that exceed relations of governance, such as those that delve into the power relations embedded in the constitution of modern subjectivity n49 or the practices through which forms of scientific authority are constituted. 11.50 From within thc perspective of theoristslpractitioners of governance: and thus from within the architecture of sovereignty, these latter works often have the appearance of, and are accused of, floating untethered from "political realities" and delving into "irresponsible" or "unrealistic" forms of critical inauiry. These works appear deeply problematic from within sovereignty discourse vrecisely bccause they seek to politicize the naturalized foundations of sovereignty discourse. Whether accused of being dangerous, improperly political, or simply irrelevant in their abstraction, in each case the architecture of sovereignty is deployed to discredit them. At the same time, however, these latter literatures remain constrained in their ability to respond effectively to this dismissal, and to articulate the political implications of their work. This is, in part, because the discourses of sovereignty continue to dominate many analyses, sites and practices of politics.


AT: CEDE THE POLITICAL

RETHINKING THE MODES OF STATE-CONSTITUTED IDENTITY IS THE ONLY WAY TO OVERCOME THE SOVEREIGN STRIJCTURE THAT REINSCRIBES AND JUSTIFIES ALL STATE VIOLENCE. ANY PERMUTATION FAILS BECAUSE ACCEPTS THE ONTO1,OGY OF SOVEREIGNTY AS ITS STARTING I'OINT

Shaw 99--professor of political science at the University of Victoria-+Karma, "Symposium: Re-Framing Intcmational Law For The 21st Century: Feminist Futures: Contesting thc Political". 9 Transnational LAW & Contemporary Problems 569, lexis.)

Coascqwntly, politics today is at least as much about nrobing and rcarticulating the limits of how we conceplualixe the political as it is about mobilizing resources to include people in existing political arrangements. w c w n n o t i l ~ ~ l l n l ~ (andleitbe

others to documcnt) what is going on polirically. Nor can we assumc how wc should corn l o understand whal is goitre on. or consider it to he obvious, and only tkhate "what ta dil.'' I n ivn important ,wnsc it thc obvious thal b our greatest enemy. 11 is in the ohvious thitt our most deeply held assumptions are lodged. Thus. we must ~ i m ~ ~ l t a n e o i ~ s l y punue t l ~ c qursliuns of what in

going on and how we should undersurtd whnt is going on. We can onlv pursue these questions Lhrough a critical relation to our own categories and a~~~jumptioll~. ~ ( m : prccisclg. our work must conle to grips wit11 tllc spatial and tenlporal precond~~mons for the consti~utmon of subjectivmly. pliolilic;~l null~ority a d sobereignty. We nlust colite to grips with Ume arclulecture mi~ulated hy Hohbes. as it IS imtanliated t d y . It is tluou~lh swing how the spatial and te~impcwdl prsondirions for U1e ~(~nstilulion of subjectivity and sovueigntj arc already bdng recon.stitulc4 and reartimlatd tl~af wc tan come IC) dcvelup a critical perspective on thc categuries through wtuch we disciplinelhc political. nas, for example. an analysis of U*: ~endered nature of ttadilional colrLlrts of !vestem ~ lo l i l~cr l theory--such as auImoniy, authority. w w u . democracy. Geedmmr--needs lobe locared within a wious iwcsti~atio~b of conlen~nxary political ixocrsse and inr;ltutiom. . . . . SUCII nlwl)ri, wusr hc located M only WIIIUII LIC context ot i lm~ests pollcy ~ ~ ~ ; ~ k i n p . bul wjtlsn pnrcsset am1 lnstilulicns 1lu1 thmwlves 3rc dman~plivr u l t l r atlrgurlcs 1'5951 thal cnlhle 1'1ese ruticel~l\ Ulr Imrc~nduonal [.rlnonal Cdurl I1 C.C.). lor cxn~ni?lc, o: h e 1:wnpean I:nwn lE I' I H, tlus l e ~ ~ ~ n l ~ ~ u c a l l v do mw m a n lo rllnalracc Icr~~mul;~la~m such a. "What me thc ~nwliialicns (9 .eluballdtivn lor Ilr C.U. tn thc I.C.C. I lor concepts ol. citizenship'? On th~cowrary, swh a rorn~ulation--as rve bau in relaiicm to ~enhahih's work ~ 5 3 -- alrtidy assunm a w i d c p19iiical geopraphy~ nor l o mca&n a subpct. Rather, wc mu* ask how both the ammals of rlohaliiation and ofciti?nshin remain embedded in a slmrai corxentiw o l soace tin=. and ml thesiblilies COT ~ulitics, a concmion Unl nuelit L a ~ l a our understandines of . - ~ r l i t i ~ a l ~ ~ h i l i t i r s incuunte-praiuctive Again, this re~uires that we ask cluestions and pursue research that is simultaneously grounded in empirical and critical understandings of thc categories and conditions lhrouah which thcse are articulated. AS p m of unpacking this mutual implication. the limits, closures, and blind spots of sovereirrnty discourse must become visiblc, enabling us to begin to articulate critical possibilities otherwise closed off. It is in the disruption of these limits thar new possibilities for feminist volitics and theory can be envisioned and enacted. ~ntt l is iront. we shnu~d not sell irnunistns short. A! their hest. rhc! havr been pal of a broad% critique lla! has resenled the wolences lnhcrcnl in lhae linuts. the niechenisnis tllrougll whch they are rcinscrihed and Ihc oesasily of their disruption. In order m sustain and build upon this critical success, feminists will nccd to come tu grips with the multiple siles at which Uiese hmls are heing rewiculated, b d l spui(iully i n rexponse l o SCII~~N~I activism and in reswnsa lo hrodiltr develonments. Aeain. Uds necessitates eneasements 1101 onlv with the history of rx,lllical thnleht. hul u i lh en~erdne Dditical idslilutions anti silcs cHdisrursiw and imaarerative slru~cle - - . . \ & .

such as interrational law and Iransnatlonal polilical wganizations. whether rmn-pvcrnnlzntal. stae-sponsored, nr txonolliic. I t n~es3itales engzemnt with events that express and force thex rearticulatiuns. such as NATO's bomhing of Kosovo. saugles ova genct~cally rntxhfiui foads. expansions of lornw and k i d s of mmmunicarmon% network. sit- oiconllict between differenr expressions of polilical and

relmgiws autlxxity, ~ u a s n~ovements ofpeopk as refugees or wnrkers, the Irmnec. ..global warmins" and soon. .41tlmug1i na cxp~icitiy "won1en.s issues." these are the sites at which f~h l rc p0liticaI possibilities are being negotiated for all peoples. n ~ e political stake of the~c sites. LIIUS. ;rre ncitkr '.OUZ th~e ' . w i t ~ i tile pulicymakm and diplosnts nor in 111e Iu l lowd forms of acadenuc intwpretation, but mn the coniplex interactions haween then1 Tix connectiovs among Uuse sites and tlle effects of their app;ulmt discontinuity must he unraveled

am1 R~UXCI. If we continue to force feminist struggles--theoretically or practically-- inlo the containers for politics that sovereignty products, we stand not only to miss opportunities for developing more effective or apvronriate political [*s96j

institutions tonrs umt miphl enable us to address the past bjolences ofho\.ereignty). bur r e m y also suslain the atlemnpts to force old solutiom omo nuterial conditions t11a1 exceed 111csc p s i h i l i t i s . Tllere is so rlouhl that Ihe discm~rsa and practices of modern snvereignly will remain persuasive Ibr a lo.? while, ;nrd lhal they are crucial si ts to work from in order to aullmim prrliticd institulions arnl nriIcUces, hut this will be rruc onlv inroicu as we continue to accenl thcir termns of reference and overlonk tlleir n%$t violences. And one can onlv o v a l one's eves fro111 lhelaner hv si~~l l tal lewstv rcicmin~ 3 iigniliwnt body of fcntinist literaiure. indeed, sonre of the best. engagement with contemporary fenu~usl &litics mast thus pmcced t h g i an engagemint with the ttiscu~rsis and pract ici ol~sovm;igny. and Ilds in urn nlua m e e d tlrimu~h an imntinent mliunc. eiven that tllereis no outside or alternative lo which one can turn to effect a milime of sovereitmv discourse. This criliouc xiiust thus nra'wd n e olllv . .. - . lhrough ole wnditions we work wilhin, forcing us m simultnncously pursue work that is "rheoretical" and "prxtical." "nmmative" and "anpirical." again challengiq dr catepm'is t lul frame a d enable our

'

intdlectual pro.pLis. They also require thal we cmnhed, whnl 1 call. a "crilicnl intwiliiiplinarity" i n our work. TIE "criucal" is llwe to 111ark a distinction: given tlual sovereigrly h cmlitutive of disciplines, and i ~ ~ S d l ~ t i ~ n a l and inlellecmal pncliws funclion in warj U1I cou$~stently "discipline" work along these lines, to silnply expand our repertoire of srrurce naterial into "other" hsciplines is incuff~ienl. 11.54 The

constitution of t lwe disciplines is neither arbitrary nor neutral. 'tlley work together to legitimate particutv wnys of being, knowing and acting. TO ignore the collstihlti~n and re~lication of these cateeorics is thus to ignore one of the crucial sites for the reproduction of particular ontologies of sovereignty as the limit condition of our th?*. wr knovencuyhto knowlrner th~nlllls. Ourintrrlliimpiinary w:rL nnmo s~~nttltammxl~ly w e z d mdIn1mya:rIlr,c huanJanc\. \oct.~og 1.1 expurr 111: ~ o h l ~ l ~ ~ n ~ s under wldsh Umey ccmlr to he a r d w l w d as b~und. .~s . md s ~ x h n g a) render ~ i r i h l r the silences and closures hc) cffcrr. n u s r a p l r e rvlr only cricall) silwht~np our own work. hut seekine lo autlmotire it in ways that resisl thc closures such practices n~igla otherwise effect. The apparent complexity and difficulty of such work is cou111a-hnldnowl by the faa tllal thc resourctr to pursue il arc plemihl. Not only 1s there syn~hiolic itliuugh not necn%artly explicitly fa~inisl) work happening in many of lllc m a s ~netioned above, hut feminist anhis~rj itself also provrdes a crucial source for the dcveloptncnl of s u d ~ analyses Tbesercrources we apprenl in nruch of Uw literature cited ahow. rS5 The. emerging litemmm on intanational Ceminisl politics. lbr exanple. arc an excellent case in m)im. ("'597 1 Allhuuph still comsaincd hy tlie bw.i~;rl a d conwaralive l o ~ i c s o l sovcreiemp, and rlw? still struedine will1 irrsoluble westions of 'miculatio~~ oo(poli1imI wssibility wnhln a himchical ftame. . . . - -- - precisely in lhcir stru&w they enable and povokc ptssihilitia'fc)r cr i t rai work In rclation to lhese logrs. Anotha panictrlnrly rich ste includes teminist critiqu& of science and social sclence. in which the logics a d lirluts of tlic mtnxlern subject's ohsession with qislenwlogy have been exposed and rwrticulnted. nese literatures arc paraneld by lileranrres less concerned with gender as a ptilunry oxis n l analysis, hut nolnhelas, enpaged in complemenlary struggles with the li~mlils of political p i h i l i t y . Hecauseof rhus cos~plenwntaritg, a Lminisul ttlM pursucs and idnrogales Utes? queslions has nluch lo uffer tu the hmada mlvsis of odiucs. Indeed. anv &on to conie to erlm with mutetilooran nditics without eneacinc the insirhts of femilusts will necessarilv remain linliled. To analne ~ r a c t i c l ~ ol'oolilics without . . - . ~ .. - - . - . . understandii~g how gender funclio& asan axis o f p ~ w e r is lo evade a crucial prohlcmatic. Pbnher, it is in and through sucl andlyses of gender drat io1i1e oit11c iinits of cur unhsrandiqs &polifics--linils ctinsutuled hy sowdgnty d~xuurse--are prhaps I I I ~ clexly expressed. Frrlrinta cttorts to analyze the interaction of gender in rclaliun to other axes of difference--historical. rcl~~rjuus, etlmnic, cultural, geo~raplucal, CCUnolluc. epistemological, ontologin~iod--tdier extend these insights. Fcminisln pmvides a doubleresonrcp. howwi'r. NN only dccs the analysis of gender reveal much ahout how differences can be C U I ~ U ~ U U ~ ;tnd IuhlMn ah axes o i +ww. h r ainnalgc:s 01 Inmn1.;1 rcuvisnl a now cruc~al 1;undersan9nF llou mnct~lul~onnl politics lu~ruun ;I( a ruler). ot s11r.i. Apain. 111 lhc kana cast 11 IS In llle cncoun<r 5etwee11 I ~ n ~ i n i l l acllnsnl and pmicula: ~nrntulicnal e x ~ x ~ r b i t ) ~ ~ ~ UI ~ 1 1 5 ~ s (such as law) that t k l~niits o i 1I1e I~IIICJ~ which wc work will~ln 3rt' wh:~ps nlml ~ 1 x 1 ) ~AIXISC:~ Pahaps Ihe L:Y 1 ~ 1 x h 1 01 femninlmn~ i n ahcr words. is that politicel institutions and pract~es--~s comi~uted l l m g h discourses of snva.e~gnly-are enabled hy, dependem upon and repro~uctivi of axes of difference thal cons<tute political authority. and Ihal to codrs~ h a 1 auihoritv willmuul chdlleneine the constitution of axes u i difference functions as odv a verv narkdl remedy. 'me fufururer of oolilics Ilinrc, rdU1er. on the ways i n which ltusr iinlit - - . . . condinons of Ihc plitical be re;uticulated. In considaing possihle fururcs for fcnlinisrrt. I would nm go so far as to nssm a single new constellatiom. 6r a1 Icasi one that we already c i m l y underaoncl We are ill 3 wriVj oistrueele over and reatticubatinn of thc mmu~ ahl w s s i b i i t olitics. hu~tn~n communities. institutions. and sclves. l do nol think we even have the ahilirv to SIX whdt is haDneninp with .. - any clw)ly. Rather tgn' heing "cultural brokers.'. 1 would suggest thal i f c need mcst ro hPcome critical students dpolmlics, pursuing questions ofhow the limic; of pol~tltal pmsib i~ i t~ are ronslifured. what their effects arc. and how they are heil~g challmnged and reaniculated i n light oi t l r rrtasslvc [*5981 chnges uJe secln ro be living tlucu$h. w i n g opcn t l ~ critical qusuons a1 h i s levd is crucial for fenirnisni. at it is kr tI10%? concernrd with progressive politics broadly bpdinp. I)U~er!~~sa, we sell shwl tbe important critiques lhat have heen forwaded by fenlinisa. I n pani~wlar. wc ohscure the possibility tho1 fc~ninissr is nut ahout 'hs" panicipning i n p~tchinf up and si~nultarwsly perpctuatine: the vidcnccs of m~mIxlertnry. hut raUier is ah(mt )mstidpalirg i n r&niag~mn$s of Ule plitical. rcarlicuknlions of poliucal possihilily i n the Wntrxl of a dymnic. c i n f l i ~ l ri&n. difficult set of slutis expressed drfferently at differenl sitcs. The iuture 01 feminisnl, in othcr words. cannor bc framed by an mlys is of "idcnlity;" hut must proceed thruugli a ~I' i l i~l, nslfilacsed etqagcllient with the prahlern of the politiixl. Llmil we can understand how it is U%aL mknlity k o m e s a a u c i ~ l polililitical uop. the effecrs of Ys 1cinscriPfion as the Iwd l p i n t of pol~t in. ils

c~mditions of pssihility, constitutive violace and polilicrtl effects. we will remain trap@ wilhin its l o u n . Developing a critical pcrs~ective On identity thal opens the possibilitv of challen~inn these logics rewires an engagement with the architecture through which discourses and practices of sovereignty constitute political pos~ibilily. The necessity of SUCII an analysis is kcoming incl~nsingly w processes of g l o h l i n t i o n

render the assumption of sovereignty less and lcss tenable. even as these processes open possibilities for and effect wmliculutiunu o f sovereignty discourse.


AT: WORLD GOVERNMENT BAD I OUR ALTERNATIVE IS EXPLICITLY NOT WORLD GOVERNMENT-INSTEAD IT'S A CALL TO EDUCATE PEOPLE ABOUT WORLD IDENTITY INSTEAD OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Bell and Logan, 1997 (David and Robert, Professor in Environmental Studies and Professor of Political Science and Professor of Social and Political Thought at York University, World Citizenship: Allegiance to Humanity, 1997, Edited Joseph Rotblat, Page 21 6-2 17)

In using this framework wc must be careful to understand lhc subtle distinctions bctwccn these different forms of belongingness. Family ties, while institutionalized by religion, are actually totally informal and arc rcgulated almost totally by tradition and custom. Ethnic ties are also largely traditional but they are reinforced by informal community sanctions. National citizenship, on the other hand, is extremely formal, entailing very rigid responsibilities prescribed by written law and enforced with authority. World citizenship, as we are using the concept. is once again an informal tic cntcrcd into voluntarily The concept of world citizenship that we are describing is the one that ariscs naturally o u ~ of'the electronic forms of mass mcdia and not the kind associated with a world government in which member nation states have surrendered their sovereignty. The concept of world government might make sense thcorelically, but given the ralhcr poor performance of the United Nations it is perhaps wiser to try for the more modest goal of inculcating through education a sense of responsibility for humankind throughout the globe. In this nuclear age, when the continued existence of our civilization, perhaps even of all mankind, is threatened bv advances in science and technolo,ov, advances which are making the world ever more interdepcndent. it is becoming essential to extend loyalties bevond national frontiers." At the same time that people across the world feel a great affinity for each other and a common cause as citizens of the same global village, thcir national or nationalistic identities are weakening while their attachment to their ethnic identities are becoming stronger. The explanation to this paradoxical result lies in understanding the way in which television robs individuals of their personal identity. As McLuhan put it: "Television sucks the brain right out' of your skulls.' The individual, therefore, feels a much greater afiinity for their ethnic identity over their national identity because it is more personal and more. closely tied to the language they speak in the home, their own personal dialect. This phenomenon explains the many movements that have arisen across the globe since World War 11.


I AT: SPECIFIC SOLVENCY EVIDENCE

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ISN'T OBJECTIVE-ALL TRUTH CLAIMS ARE POIATTICAL, AND THEIRS ARE SUPPOK'I'ED BY AN IDEOLOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY


Again, however, the key question is why we should read these strugdes one way rather than another. It is here that I think the most significant political stakes of contemporary theory reside. Crucially, this is not a question that can be answered hv piling UP empirical evidence, given that empirical evidence is always already framed by theoretical commitments. Nor is this to say that all readings are equally plausible. Thc question of how to read contemporary events and processes is essentially a political question. If we fail to open this uuestion, a uuestion that cannot be opened il' we assume sovereignty. we will continue to im~ose sovereipntv whcthcr or not it is the appropriate response lo contemporary circumstances. Tfiis, in turn, will leave us trapped within thc mvlhologv and logics of sovereignty, potentially facilitating further violences in its name.


AT: FIAT GOOD i

DEBATING ABOUT WHAT TO DO IS THE WRONG APPROACH AND GUARANTEES THE ENFORCEMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY DISCOURSE-EXAMININE WHAT IS GOING ON AND HOW WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND IT IS AN IMPORTANT PREREQUISITE


Consequently, politics today is at least as much about probing and rearticulatinn the limits of how wc conceptualize the political as it is about mobilizing resources to include oeovle in existing political arrangements. Wc cannot assume (and leave others to document) what is going on politically. Nor can we assume how we should come to understand what is going on. or consider it to be obvious, and only debate "what to do." In an important sense it is the obvious that is our meatest enemy. It is in the obvious that our most deeply held assumptions are lodged. Thus, we must simultaneously pursue the questions of what is goinn on and how we should understand what is going on. Wc can only pursuc these questions through a critical relation to our own categories and assumptions. Morc precisely, our work must come to grips with the spatial and temporal preconditions for the constitution of suhiectivitv, political authority and sovereignty. We must come to grips with the architecture articulated by Hobbes, as it is instantiated today. It is through seeing how the spatial and temporal preconditions for the constitution of subiectivit~ and sovereignty are already being reconstituted and rcarticulated that we can come to develop a critical perspective on the categories through which we discipline the political.

DISCOURSE OF CITIZENSHIP SHAPES ITS REALITY

Abowitz in '03 (Kathleen, Associate Professor Educational Leadership at Miami University, International Conference on Civic Education Research in New Orleans, "The dominant discourses of citizenship in American life and schooling", November, http://civiced.indiana.edu/papers/2003/1O523 15414.doc)

<This manuscript reviews contemporary theoretical and applied (curricular) texts focusing on citizenship or citizenship education, and provides an analysis of two of the dominant approaches to citizenship in contemporary U.S. society. This study is part of a larger project in which discourse analysis is used to interpret six distincl citizenship discourses that are actively producing meanings and effects in our society. "Discourse" is used here in the Foucaultian (1972) scnsc, as a body of rules and practices that govern meanings in a particular area. A particular citizenship discourse is not composed of randomly chosen words and statements: each discourse is a product of its historical and social circumstance. which provides the discursive practices - terminolony, values, rhetorical styles, habits. and truths - that produce it (see Cherryholmes 1988, p. 2-3). Discourse is the primary way that ideology is produced. reproduced, and circulated; idcoloaies are belief systems that help people understand and act in the world. "Ideologies are the frameworks of thinking and calculation about the world -- the "ideas" which people use to timre out how the social world works, what their place is in it, and what they ought to do" (Hall 1997,971. Ideologies are produced, reproduced and circulated through discourse. "Ways of talking [speaking, writing] produce and reproduce ways of thinking, and ways of thinking can be manipulated via choices about grammar, style, wording, and every other aspect of language" (Johnstone 2002,45). How any given text - a speech, a curriculum, a web- site, a journal article - articulates civic membership, identity, values, ~articivation and knowledge constitutes an expression of belief about citizenship. "Deciding what to call something can constitute a claim about il." (Ibid., 48). These choices and claims lead to certain kinds of meanings and truths about civic life. democracy, and citizenship.>


AT: PERMUTATION: DO BOTH

THE PERMUTATION FAIIS-THE INCORPORATION OF NATIONAL SERVICE WILL BE COOPTED BY BUREAUCRATIC MANAGERS

Gorham, 92 (Eric, Assistanl Prol'cssor in the Department of Political Science at Loyola University, New Orleans, National Service, Citizenship, And Political Education, netlibrary, p. 198)

Good citizens ought to light against the institution of national service under its present configurations. Thus the following remarks suggest one of two possible strategies for opponents of national service us presently conceptualized. The first strategy is to argue for political service, and I have sketched out potentially relevant service tasks below. The second is to fight against the very institution of national service. In mv more idealistic moments I might pursue national service as political service, but I doubt that those who reside within and around the northwest quadrant of the District of Columbia would do the same. I doubt that even if they did agree with the following suggestions (much less the entire thesis of the book). thev could transform it into a nonhurcaucratic. parlicipatn, realilv. I offer the followng, then. as food for thought. rather than as detailed policy advice, and 1 advise those who share my concerns to fi&t rhc verv idea of national service as the federal government is devising it. Service lo a nation of individualists, instrumental reasoners,

appropriate civic gesture is to contest the institution of national servicc. Good citizens need to resist this sort of "good citi~enship.~' Therefore the following tasks are practical, if cumntly impracticable, ways in which service workers and participants can become good citizens.

COSMOPOLITANISM IS INCOMPATIB1,E WITA A STRONG NATION STATE

Thorup, 06 (Mikkcl, lecturer in the History of Philosophy Department at Aarhus University, "Cosmopolitics!", 4/10, htt~://www.eurozinc.com/artic1e~/2006-04-10-thorup-en.htm1)

Kant has become a key frame of reference Political cosmopolitanism is one of our era's most innovative and ambitious attempts at comprehending and reforming the global system. It has quickly become a collective expression: partly a philosoph~cal universali7a1ion of the notion of justice; partly a theoretical explanation of the relationship bctween nationalism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism: and lastly, patly a range of concrete suggestions for political reform. This rediscovery of the cosmopolitan is founded in a critical re-reading of Kant's short essay P e ~ p t u a l Peuce. Kant has become a key frame of reference - his writings on peace are poised between cosmopolitanism and sovereignty, internationalism and patriotism in such a way that they allows for an actualization of what Jiirgen Habermas has called "the post-national constellation". This tendency originated in frustration o v a the shortcomings of liberal international regimes; it has most definitely made significant progress in the post-war era - for example the UN. the human rights movement, and many other instances of international cooperation. But it became stuck fast in the geopolitical accord afler the end of the WWH, at a statecentric point of origin and within a restrictive liberal economic interpretation - which combined. blocked the path towards reclaiming market powcrs, democratising global processes and hurnilnising world relations. The cosmopolitan straterv is LO radicalize certain elements within the liberal international regime - not least to reinforce the individual in relation to the state. Ole W ~ v e r expresses it accurately when he writes that: "The realization of the cosmopolitan order demands a relativising of state sovereignty and in practice also that one acts with direct reference to human rights and in contravention of the laws that states have formulated between them, specified in international law."[71 Political cosmovolitanism therefore presents a challenge to the nation-state, to the Bodinian doctrine of sovereignty and to all conceptions and practices where an element of the "modern nation-state" is present. It is here thcrcforc that we find the scientific cosmopolitanism represented by Ulrich Beck, who maintains that discrete categories havc already been transcended.


AT: PERMUTATION: DO BOTH I ANY PERMUTATION IS IMPOSSIBLE- ACTIONS FROM WITHIN THE STATE SYSTEM CAN'T SPARK A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITlON AND ONLY SERVES TO ENTRENCH EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY, WHICH PREVENTS COSMOPOLITANISM. ALSO EVEN IF THE PERMUTATION DOES HAPPEN, THE RESULT WOULD BE A TOP-DOWN COERCIVE GLOBAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURED AROUND THE STATES.

Murphy 01- Editorial Board American Journal of Jurisprudence and prat-essor ollaw a1 Duquesne University-- (Cornelius F., Theories of World Governance: A Study in the History of Ideas, 6/22/2001, The Catholic University of Americca Press, pg 168)

However, as we have already stated, a global civil society is not the same as a world political community. Although the magnitude of shared interests, values and purposes is constantly increasing, the international system as a whole remains in a pre-political condition. No matter how deeply the bonds of a transnational solidarity are extended, states will retain the privileges of external sovcrciontv which prevent the world at large from forming an internal order of its own. An increase in social aclion will not fundamentally change the situation. Noris there aplnnctruysovereignly already in k i n g which a prog~~ssive leidership could justly represent. Yet. as others have reali~zd. states are pans o i a wider hurna~~ society, or society of socicucs. and this deeper wthoriry is the

ultimale source ofglobal sovereignty. World political institutions cannot be created bv the governments of extsting states. Even if practicable, such a transition would be unacceptable as a matter of principle. If the states which compose the socielv of states were to establish universal instruments of governance the result would he a world-state imposed, from above. upon existing political societies. States cannot delegate such supreme authoritv because states arc not themselves the final repository of the political authority of the people they represent. They are only the topmost agencies of divenc

bodies o ~ p o ~ i t i c s ~ c o m m u n i t i e s . " ~ world stale would be illegitimale. And no power on earth has or will ever have. a riehtful claim to a supreme political authority over the whole of human societv. A world government, however, remains a rightful possibilitv. But it would only come into existence when, and if; the peoples realize that their desires for fulfillment-to live well as well as to survive-cannot be satisfied within the imperfections of the nation-state svstem. Thcy must thcn freely dcvelop the will to live together under a fundamental law to which they can give consent. The cummunlty of witions will have kctlme one hody pnlit~c. havmg its own suprems authority. Slates, as parts rather than wholes, will no longer have that ahsolute independence and external sovereignty which is the Iiindamcntal source of inlema1ional anachy.

NO PRAGMATIC ACTION IS POSSIBLE-APPEALING TO OUR ALTERNATIVE AND SUPPORTING STATE ACTION REINFORCES THE ONTOLOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY THAT IS THE ROOT CAUSE OF VIOLENCE

Shaw; professor of political science at the University of Victoria, 1999 (Karena, 9 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 569, lexis)

If sovereignty is h m d l y cnnslitutive of political possibilily. why 1x11 simply assume it so that we can gel on wlth our analyses and ourproyessive practices? As Benhibih notes. many contemporary movements articulalc their demands in lan~uages of sovereignty and identity, and thus lpnd them.$elves to k i n g read as shc does: as demands fnr identity production or recognition, After all. that thew erclusions and violc~~ces llarc hccn lcsiacd through thc approp~iatian of the same riiscour~e.~ used m effect thcm-- disco~~rscs of suvcrcipnly cxprcsscd in idenlily polilic~ humsn r i ~ h t s discourses. humanism--is a testament to the power of sovereigoty diacc~urse. and lo its dominacio~i oldiscueive

spaces t>fpowever. SO why not accept these demands a1 "face value" and work to facilitate these ideals, to ..i~~cludc.. t h s e previously

excluded from the polis, lo glxm them sovereignty m d thus (app:lrenlly) political wbjectibity? Why not, in other words, accept the 0nt0lOg~ of sovereignty--not as perfect, but as what we have to work with-- and turn it to the empowerment ol'its previous victims? Why m t accept the modern state as the container for politics and work to Fdcilitate adcquate rcprcscnlation for cach and all at the stat? level'? [*5X2j To be clear, this is a

necessary slrategy under some conditions. But it is sLqo hoth insufficient and potentially dd~gertlus. Thc dangcr of assuming surercignty is twofold. F i t , the aSS~mptI0n of sovereignty forecloses the questions that wc most need to address, forcing us into a read in^ of politics that leaves us unable to respond to contemporary political challenges. In particular, the assumption of sovereignty prevents us from subiectinp the discourses and practices ol' sovcrcicntv themselves to the kind of critical scrutiny that is required, given changng material conditions for the production of political authority. Second, if we continue to assume that soverei~nty is the necessary precondition for ~olitical authority, and thus remain unable to engage the question of its character or appropriatencss, we will continue to impose and enforce--however violentlv--the necessities of sovereignty onto material conditions that may be increasingly resistant to such an imposition. By maintaining the mythology that sovereignty is necessary and natural as a precondition for politics, we will-however unintentionall~--contin~e to sanction the V I O ~ ~ C ~ S done in the name of sovereignty, cunsidering them ~ECSSXY and natural rathcr than

contingent up011 thcparticuLvily of the ontology ofsovereipnty. TO open the discourses and practices of sovereignty to question, on the other hand, enables a range of questions about the conditions of possibility for political authority to be opened and %aged. I believe that the future of feminist politics depends upon an engagement with these questions.


I AT: PERMUTATION: DO BOTH

ANY PERMUTATION FAILS--OUR ALTERNATIVE REQUIRES MOVING BEYOND STATE-CENTERED POLITICS IN ORDER TO SPUR THE TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE--IT REQUIRES REJECTING THE NOTION OF NATIONALISM

Calhoun, 02 (Craig, president of the Social Science Research Council and a professor of sociology and history at New York University, "Imagining Solidarity: CICosmopolitanisrn, Constitutional Patriotism, and the Public Spherc," Piihlic Culrure 14.1 (2002) 147- 17 1 http://musc.i hu.cdu/iournals/Buhlic culture/v014/14.1crtIhoun.html)

Recognizing politics at work at sitcs bevond or outside the state is esuecially important to seeine how transnational public spheres might be effective. The questions of how a Eu~npcan public sphere might hc organized m d what influence it might have are as basic lo Europe's ft~tnre as the rise of democratic i~~stilu[ions within nation-slilles was to ils past. Indeed. Hahermils himself has rcturned to this thcorcticnl framewotk recetxly in considering the relations among ndtion. rule

or law. and democracy ina chitn~in$ mope: The initial impetus to integration in the direction o l a postnational society is not provided by the substrate of a supposed "European people" but by the communicative network of a European-wide political public sphere embedded in a shared political culture. The latter is founded on a civil society composed of interest groups. non-government organizations, and citizen initiatives and movements, and will he o c c ~ ~ p i ~ x i by m n n s it, which [he

political parties can d i i t l y address the decisions of European inwi~otions and go beyond merr ~;lctic;~l alliance to form a European pang system. 2') This is d e a r l ~ a Statement of hopes and conditions for a desirable future as much as a description uflrends. Such a Eun~pean public sphere is a question more than n rcality, as is an intrgriited

Eunlpeanpartrty system. Rut theeonceplualpoint is clear. _The creation of such a public sphere is the condition of a democratic, republican integration of Europe and the safeguard avainst a problematicallv nationalist one. 30 ,End ]age 1641 he production ofa tlourishirtg public sphere. thus. alons with a normatively sound con~litution. offers a good mswer lo Habermas's orienting question: "When does a cullection of pcmns c o ~ ~ n i t ~ i t c an entity--'a people'--entitled to govern itsclf democmtically?" Rut as Habermas Ilotes, lhc answer mosl commonly provided is much less p~.u~nising: "In the real world. who in each instance a c q u k s the power to define the dispmed borders of a statc i s settled by historical contin~encies, osually by the quasi-nalural ontcomc of wolent conflicts, wars. and civil was. Whe~eas republicanism reinIorces our a s m n c s s of the coldingency of lhese borders, this contingency a n be dispelled by appeal to the idea o l a grown n;dbn that imbues the horders with the aura of imitated substantiality and legitimates them thmuzh fictitious links wilh the p:~st. Nationalism bridges the normalive gap by.appaling ti7 a so-callcd right of nitional self-determination." 71 At the kart of the notion of a democratic public sphere lic differences. both among pulicipants and among possible opinions. 11 a public sphere is not able to encompass people of different pcrsonal and group idcntitics, it can hardly be the

basis fur democracy. If people have the same views. no public sphere i s needed--or at least none beyond a space ior plebiscites or ritual aftlnnations of 11nity. Differences amOtlq opinions challenge not only nationalist pressures to conform. but also technocratic insistence on the application of expertise, as though such expertise (or the science that might lie behind it) embodies perfect, unchanging, and disinterested solutions to problems. Differences among participants also pose a challenge. If a public sphere needs to include people of different classes, genders, even nations, it also requires varticipants to he able--at least some of the time--to adopt perspectives distanced from their immediate circumstances, and thus carry on conversations that are not determined strictlv bv private interest or identitv. The point is not that any interlocutors escape influences from their personal lives, but that none are strictlv determined by those influences, unable to see the merits in good arEUmenlS presented by those who rePFeSent competing interests Or worldviews. rr there are no memin_eful differences within t h ~ public sphel-c, Ihe lack may rwfiirm solidarity and consdencv coilrcriv~. hut il can~lot address choiccs about how solidariiy and inslilutirml arrangements could he other than w k ~ t they are.

THE NATIONALISM MENTALITY PREVENTS INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES IN SERVICE

Kennedy, 04 (Clayton, student at Bard College in the Bard Globalization and International Affairs Program, and inlcrn at the International Partnership for Service-Learning and Leadership, Bard Politik: The Bard Journal of Global Affairs, "BUILDING DEMOCRACIES FROM THE BOTTOM U P , Fall, http://www.bard.edu/bgia/journal/vol5/32-35.pdf)

Landrum himself has endeavored to push forth this mentality and movement, co-founding Youth Service International in 1997. YSI is essentially attempting to do transnationally what Youth Service America did on a domestic scale: create a collabo- rative network that supports and pilots high-quality youth volunteer programs. He has found that the time is not quile ripe yet,however. Policv makers and major foun-dations want to scc proof of the international imuact of vouth service before they devote resources to it. and the state of international service is still fairlv weak. Many countries are stuck on nationalistic conceptions of vouth service ("Serve to makc Mother Russia stronger!"), and are unwilling to collaboralc across borders. Other countries are so new to the idea of vouth volunteering that their program leaders are too preoccupied with the survival of their own models to even think about expanding the network. Still, Landrum has seen new service programs arise with each passing year. As these small-scale programs become more visible to the policy and grant-giv-ing elite, it will be easier to convincc lhem of the genuine potential of a wide-scale, transnational youth service movement.


AT: WE MAKE NATIONALISM SAFUCAUSE CIVIC NATIONALISM . THE EMBRACE OF NATIONAL LTTIZENSHIP WILL BE MANIPULATED BY ELITES AND SUBVERTED

Hayward, 04 (Clarissa Rile Hayward, Ohio State University Department of Political Science, Constitutional Patriotism and Its Others, the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2004 http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/intranet/poltheory/Constitutional~Patriotism.pdf)

At this poinl. it is osetul to rcwll t k lugic of the cosmopi~litan critique orcivic nationalism. Clearly. civic republiesns who celcb~,ale pa~riotic identiric;ltiun do not themselves advocate punishing atiii~des toward thc othcrs that m?tional citize*i&ntrtics dcfinc. NoncIhe)ess, the claim is, a thick cilizcn-idcntity can and docs fucl such attitudes. A nontrivial reason why it does is

mat political elites have a strong incenlive to exvloit nationalist and other uarticularist forms of identification. As Rogers Smith argues, "... leaders ... have incentives to advance accounts of pcoplehood and forgc coalilions that render [out-Lgroups outnumbered. disernpowered, subordinated, or excluded altogether. The politics of people-mnking ... invoivcs contnll~al. partisan. conflictual, often invidious and always exclusionary processes ..." 2? Habermas h~mself. underscores this pomt. "Precmely the artificiality of national myths," he writes. "both in thcir lwined origins and their dissemination through propaganda. makes nationalism intrinsically susceplibk 10 lnisilse by political eiiles."25 But docs not the same hold for

co~alitol~onalpatriotism? If Habermas's critics are wrong-if constitutional watriotism indeed can verform the binding work that he belicvcs it can-then surely it can legitimize hostile attitudes toward. and the punishing treatment of its others. And surely there is a strategic incentive for politjcal elites to manipulate and to exploit this capacity. That such manipulalion can and does occur-and that its costs can be, from a liberal and democratic uersmctive. nontrivial-is illustrated by recent rhetorical strategies adopted by the current Bush administration. Take, asacaseinpoint.two

highly publiciped duc~~mcnts that were released in the afterrtlllth or the September I 1 attacks: the National Strategy for Homeland Security ( N S H S M Lhc ~f~trateg;v~ united Stittes of America (NSSUSA).?~ ~ a c h of these ducuments Opens with an address by the president to thc American people. Both in these o~ening letters and throuphout the documents that " ~ e o ~ l e " and its specificallv Amcrican "way of life" are defined in terms of. not ethnic or national sameness, but shared liberal and democratic principles. n i l s NSHS def ies the ~rnerican people with reference to "ilmerica.~ commitmcnt to freedom. liberty and our way of life.+ where the iatta it eharactcrizcs in tcrms o f a "demucmtic political system ... anchorcd by thc Cunstitutiot~," "[fJrccdom of expwssioa frccdom ul'religion. frccdoin of movenicnt, pmpclly rights. [and] frecdo~n fl-nm nnln\vfirl

discriminaion..27 Both NSHS and NSSUSA intervret these liberal and democratic ~rincivles-as Habermas recommends- through the lcns of U.S. founding documents and historical experiences. n e NSHS cites t h ~ Constitution amj the nil1 or Rights. for example. It stresses the imponance uT building upon the American tradition of federalism.28 The NSSUSA emphasizes that "... even in our u70rst moments, the principles enshrined in the DecLlralion o f

Indcpndcnce were there to guide us. AS a result. America i5 not just a sbonger. hut is a freer and more just soc~ty.,*29 Yet both NSHS and NSSUSA employ these liberal and democratic constitutional principles in ways that define and demonize others of American liberal democracy: illiberal and anti-democratic "rogue states." "evil ... enemies," "terrorists and tyrants."30 Both documents employ, that is to say, not particularistic, but principled definitions of an American political identity, in order to distinguish an American "we"-lovers of liberty-from an anti-American "theym-purveyors of terror. What is more, both documents exploit this distinction to advance arguments for the exclusion and the policing of these others, and for acts of violence aimed at them. They attempt to legitimize the shoring up of American borders, for

instance; thc heightened surveillance of foreigners, both a1 home and abroad: and, in the international realm. unilateral vreemptive awession in response to American elites' perce~tions of threat.31 This strateg is anything but an anomaly. AS is we11 known. sincc the September 11 stlacks. George W. Bush has articulated-aml on multiple occasions he has affutned-his adminislraljon's policy ol'preemption. as well as its goal of -regime change." Ile has adopted. that is to say. aims md strategies that were ziniculaled by Richard Pcrlc. Paul Wolfowiu. Donald Rumsfcld and othcr neoconservative political thinkcm and actors in the U.S. long bcfoffi September. 2001.32 .4s early u t99h. for instance. William Krisrol and R o k n Kagan issued o call for what they mcmomhly termed "benevolent glnbal he~emony."33 They made the CII% Ihal is. for an aggressive U.S. foreign policy aimed m t only at ndvanciag An~crican interests. but also at "aclively promot[ingl] American principlcs of govemancc abroad- democracy. i r e makets, respect for liheny."34 Anticipating the logic of the KSHS am1 the NSSUSA. fitstol and Kagan cited the Declararmn of Independence as an insrmce of a historiwlly pmicular inlerpretation of conatitutiunal principks: principles which, they underrsoml. "'am not merely the choices of a particu1.u cuhure but me universirl. eduring. 'aelfividenl" lnill1s."'35 .%egression, their claim was. isiustificd by thc universalism of thc principics it promotes. Those who fail to embrace such principles ,m not only d c ~ r b i n g of inrolerance. hi11 taho pmpcr tarpets of attach T k y a. in Kristol and Kagan's words, 'honsters" who must not he "left on the 1oo.w. ravagink and pillaging to their beans' cnntent.'?h In recent years, this logic has been echoed in key speeches and texts pmduccd by thc American right: in rhc Scptcmber. 2000 assertion by the Pro:pct for tlx: New American Ccntury that thc appropriate role for the United Staes military is actively ICI seLvre a "benevolent" world order: in Max Hoot's cry, just after Seplemher 11.2001, for "a liberal and humanitarian imperialism": in Georzc W. Bush's ponentoirs call, in his 2002 Slate of thc Union Address. for an aggressive American assault on the '%xis of evi1:'37 The actions justified by such reasoning 'we, by this point in tune, all too well-known: the

violalion of human rights abroad and civil rights at holm. and in Irq . the h ~ a c h 0 1 t h ~ \cry democratic principles invoked to justify war.38 21 To be clear, I do not I'IIean S u m that Habermas or other advocates of constitutional patriotism would endorse the recent rhetoric of the Bush administration. To the contrary, I am certain they would not.39 &t my larger point is this: indeed, consdtutional patriotism is capable of binding together a civic "we." then-not unlike other forms of patriotism-it is (to honow an expression used frequently by Hab~mas) JanuS-faced. Even divnl-ced Irom communitarian readings that link it with particularistic forms of social idcntificatinn.

citizenship is, unavoidably, a binding and a bounding category. 11 is a category that nccevvarily delimits an i u c l u w mand an C X C I U ~ C ~ sct. 11 and fo Lhc cxtent that principled understandings of civic belonging effectively can motivate people to look beyond their private mucerns

andrheir panicularistic identities, p~td to take into account the wersuectives of those whom they understand to deserve their political recognition, then it iustifies their disregard, their refusal to take into account the views and the claims of those whom they understand to be not so deserving.


AT: WE MAKE NATIONALISM SAFEfCAUSE CIVIC NATIONALISM

EVEN IF THE PROBLEM IS NEOCON MISUSE OF THE PLAN'S RHIETORIC-THAT DOESN'T ADDRESS THE TRUTH VALUE OF OUR COOPTION CLAIM-ITS UNAVOIOABLE

Hayward, 04 (Clarissa Rile Hayward, Ohio State University Department of Political Science, Constitutional Patriotism and Its Others, the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2004 http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/intrane~/poltheory~Constitutional~Patriotisin.pdf)

In response to this line of critique, a Habermasian likely would pose one or both of two objections. First, and perhaps most obviously, she might argue that the rhetorical maneuverinas of Bush and his allies fail to demonstratc that principled definitions of civic identity produce and demonize "others," because they fail correctly to employ constitutional principles. Clearly, a belief in collective autonomy and in human rights does not lepitimiw aggressive attacks against people who do not endorse thesc constitutional principles. To the contrary, a commitment to human rights and democracy promotes loleration, political equality and inclusiveness, and respect for all human beings. Thus. a deep illogic plagues the neo-conservative rhetorical use of liberal and democratic norms and values. Rather than serve as an indictment of constitutional patriotism, a Habernlaisian might suggest, this posturing invites a constitutional patliotic critique of the contemporary American Right. The objection is sensible, as far as it goes. Granted, neither Bush nor the so-called "neocons" whose thinking shapcs his policy are consistent-or, for [ha1 matter evcn necmsarily sincere-conslitutional patriots.40 Yet it would be a mistake to allow the illogic of their rhetoric to divert attention from the genuinc political threat that it poses: a threat that unavoidably attends the susceptibilitv of constitutional principles to such rhetorical misuse. Consider. once more. ethno-culturallv narticularistic forms of civic bindine. and the cosmo~oljtan critique of the dangers these Dresent. If the civic we is defined with reference to shared anccstly or conutlon dcsccnt, there is no logical reason why those included should be hostile toward. or should act aggressively toward, people whom they understand to stand outside their particularistic identity- group. Nonetheless, the worry is, because particularistic definitions of "who we are" are suscc~lible to rhetorical manipulation, they can, and they often do, support excessively punitive actions aimed at their others. In this respect, my claim is, there is no qualitative difference between particularistic and principled definitions of thc civic we.

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISM IS MORE DANGEROUS THAN ANY OTHER FORM

Robbins, 97 (Bruce, teaches English and Comparative Literature at Rutgers University, Theory & Event, 1:2. "Cosmopolitanism and Boredom", Project Muse)

Many of thc mspondents balk at being asked lo ucal slranpers as lovitigly as lhcy would treat their own ijmily or friends. One can see their poinl. As Elaine Scarry argues, it is quite possihle thai the confitsion of strangers wilh friends is bnth unnecessary i1nd a mist.akc. You don't have to pull off the neat trick of reluting to the workl's distant peoples with full imaginntivc and emcllional itlte~lsitg in oldcr to l o b y for beiterpolicie~ with r e s i ~ ~ c t to their wellbeing. And feeling obliged to tly may le.ad pi1 to wglect the legal m~chinery of the smle, with which cosmopolitans musl hc glad to woperate whcn they can. as well as K(3C)s operating in the politically arnhipous hut increasingly e f l e c ~ u ~ l domain ciCintu~~alicin:~l civil society. A t h i ;~ltemaiive would involve thinking of distant slrmpero neither as objecls of loving wlh-ern ntrr as objects of poky. but as inledoculors with whom one must enter into dinlopuc. common pwlicipsnts in a trans-notional pnblic sphcrc whose goill would be coordinated action. This path might seem a \cry mikl extension of existing belief in participatory democracy, but the theorists of Americntl democracy reprewntcd here dccline to venture down it. 'American ptrintism,' Benjamin Barher nsvens defiantly, is 'ibelC the wulrler to h e very evils Nuvsbnum associales with American patriotivn.'

Barber's patriotism, like the constitutional patriotism of Habermas, resembles that antidote to ethnic nationalism that Michael Innatieff and olhcrs have called civic nationalism: 'the only guarantee that ethnic groups will live side by side in peace is shared loyaltv to a state.' This remains the crucial concept allowing Americans (and a few deluded others, such as Elie Kedourie) to deny that there is nationalism in the US at all. But respect for the constitution unfortunately guarantees very little. Quiet and constitutional rather than ethnic or tribal. American nationalism arguably has been and remains one of the world's most dan~erous. Whatever might be said on behalf of constitutional patriotism. it is of little use to non-citizens and non-residents, especially those who are touchcd by US power without living on US soil. Even thc most iudicious interpretation of the constitution will not make it protect those who stand outside it. Internally, constitutional patriotism may calm things down, shieldina thc stalus quo against bloody vutbreaks of ethnic violence. But it cannot speak to the desperate need to change the status quo rh;,~ is Nussbaum's poinl of depa~tiire. In order to gel the haves mobilized behind s signitlcent tronaier ofresourccs to Ulc hake-nots. you would nccd morc than even a ccismopahtan extellsion of decornos constitutionalism (which is already morc than Barber oilers). Yoii would need something like religions fcrvw. The rrne opposite of such fervor is not constitationalism, however, but boredom. On the defensive from the outset. Nussb:tum ~ j e c t s thc charge that cusmopolilanisrn is as 'borio~ly flat' 3s it mag seem. But tlds is a point that cnuld be made more npgsssively. . . Nussbat~m could have said (ha, boredom and itdiSScmncc name lhc truth nut aholli cos~nopoliraliism. but shout nationalism. For in countries l i e the US. at least, natl~lnall~m docs the most damage today not by its racist and xenophobic enthusiasms, real as these are, but rathcr because it encourajzes inertia, compassion fatigue, a normalizing of our all-too-human satedness with the demands of the {.


AT: WE MAKE NATIONALISM SAFEICAUSE CIVIC NATIONALISM

STATE COOITION OF PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM IS INEVITABLE

Falk 04--professor of International Liw and Practice at Princeton University, Yale Law School (1955); J.S.D., Harvard University; Been on

the editorial boards of about ten journals and magazines; Chairman of the Consultative Council, L w y u s ' Committee on American Policy

Toward Vietnam-- (Richard A., "The declining world order : America's imperial geopolitics", 2004, Routledge. pg 215)

Patriotism. love of country. can be appreciated both as a political virtue of the highest order and a dangerous political vice that invites governments to take dire risks and make ill-considered commitments. Patriotism in the modern era was linked, of course. to the Westphalian framing of political community by reference to territorial sovereign slates, given cbhesion by fashioning of a myth of national unity. As with nationalism, so with patriotism, the stale seeks to appropriate the loyalty of its citizenry, punishing socially and cvcn legally those who are deemed unpatriotic. Such pressures rise to their height at times of crisis, patticularly when the national society perceives itself to be in danger from enemies withour and within. The result of these pressures is often conferring on lhc state vast authority to protccl society, including the means to curtail drastically the freedoms of those believed to be aligned in some way with the enemy, prrhapsonly ethnically. In turn. the state may manipulate such fears and stimulate palriolic sentiments so as to mobilize enthusiasm, support. and sacrifice from its citizenry. Not only are lieedoms subordinatcd. but so is truth. T ~ L : intensity of patriotic feelings i s cxhihikd by prefemng partisanship to objectivity and rationality in assessing the pros and cons of bitter international conflicts. The pabiot as nationalist does not question the Tightness of the cause pursued by his or her government, nor the legality and morality of the means used b achieve national objectives in times of w;u. The patriot

seeks victory. and is sustained by the one-sidedness of her or his understanding of a conflict. Westphalian palriotism skives t0 be statist in ScOPc, although the existence of minorities and pockets of dissatisfaction creates potential tensions in times of crisis.


A2: HABERMAS CIVIC ENGAGEMENT KEY TO CIVIC NATIONALISM

HABERMAS' APPEAL TO CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IS VAGUE AND DOESN'T ACCOUNT FOR HISTORY-ANY APPEAL TO NATIONALISM IS LIKE1,Y 1'0 THWART THE TRANSITlON TO COSMOPOLITANISM

Smith, 2003 (Rogers, Professor of Political Scicnce at University of Pennsylvania and PhD Harvard University, Stories Of Peoplehood, The Politics and Morals of Political Membership, p. 145)

These are reasonable but not innovative movcs, and Haberrnas has not done much more than Rawls to address the key problems they lcave unresolved. Just how far can a core allegiance to his discursively democratic political principles really bc combined, philosophically and po-litically, with distinctive national traditions and still more comprehensive cultural identities, while preserving a liberal political culture'? How far can a liberal society go to make expatriation, emigration, and immigra~ion practical choices for all humanity, as Habermas seems lo wish, while at the samc time seelung to maintain an at least mildly distinctivc form of liberal democratic constitutionalism for its members? Haber-mas does not really provide any guidance on those issues, beyond repeated swecning but vague stipulations hat positions contrary to povular sovereignty, human rights. and universalist legal principles are not to be allowed (c.g. 1996,500; 1998, 118). Instead he makes these ~roblems seem less vressina - suggesting rather misleadingly that by the late nineteenth century (before the Holocaust, Jim Crow, and apartheid!) that repressive ascriptive nationalisms were already giving way to purely civic conceptions (1996,494-495; 1998, 112. 146). He is also hopeful that a common liberal European political culturc, indeed even a global liberal political culture, sufficient to support transnatjonal or even cosmopolitan citizenship, can be seen as emerginc (1996,507, 5 14; 1998, 153). He does argue that those transnational cultures will havc to be achieved through the blending by "cultural elites and the mass media" of "various national specific interpretations of the same universalist principles" (1996, 507). But again - how can this blending be done. both philosophically and politically? Wc need a fuller analysis of the problems than Habcrmas has provided of the ~roblems that existing national traditions and relirrious, racial. ethnic, and other cultural identities pose lor the political challen~c of promoting transnational loyalties while eschewing illiberali~m.~


PERMUTATION SOLVENCY

GLOBALIZATION IS ERODING NATIONAL COHERENCE-WE HAVE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO QUESTION THE MEANING OF NATIONALISM AND ORIENT IT TOWAKDS CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY AND AWAY FROM ETHNICITY

Willinsky, 2k (John Willinsky, Professor in the Department of Language and Literacy Education at the University of British Columbia, "The Nation State After Globalism," AESA 2000 Annual Conference in Vancouver, 2000 , http:llwww3.uakron.edulaesa/convention/Willinsky.doc)

The nation may still stand as the fundamental demarcation of geographical space, the primary organization of place. But the cold-war's end has meant that the nation is no longer the domino in the onlv game in town. The nation is no longer the primary ideological unit, to stand as friend or foe, in the great struggle against cvil. Global forces connect the world in a virtual and literal sense that pays little heed to national borders. It makes less sense. then, to think of the nation as defining who people are, how they live, and where they belong. For some, like John Tomlinson. of Nottingham Trent University, it may well scem that globalization "weakens the cultural coherence of all nation-states, including economically powerful oncs." but 1 would hold that this sense of cultural coherence within thc nation has always been a questionable state (forgive the pun). What this increased transnational flow of people, capital, and goods docs enable us to do is to call this assumed coherence. and the unnecessary daniage it does, more forcefully into question (1991, p. 175). So let us not allow this scc~ning loss of national distinctions cause us lo go misty-eyed. Please, let US k both educational and ethical opportunists here. Let us ask how can we steer this slight turning away from the nation toward some greater good for, in the first instancc pcrhaps, the transnational young who are trying to find thcmsclves in our schools. Let us see whether wc can correct the educational excesses that would closely link national identity to race. culture. and gender. Let us see if we can teach the young about holding the democratic nation to its promises, challenging its shortcomings, and supporting its ongoing civil and politicat experiment in public deliberation. This means drawing the younE into a concern for the experiment they are living out, giving lhem a sense of responsibilitv, not for living out national destinies but for improving, on a local and dobal level, how people live and work together. 11 means teaching them how lo hold the nation responsible for principles that extend beyond the nation and nationalism. Now, such educational optimism may seem a trifle unwarranted. After all, 1 do read the papers. The headlines are regularly haunted by spectacles of ethnic nationalism. And I know tha~ we are a long way from separating how we view nationality through the lens of race, culture. and gender, a long way from allowing that everyone has an equal and unequivocal claim to being hcrc in that national sense. But we need to start somewhere, and I am uronosinn that we begin by reducing the emphasis on the nation as defining what is inherently common to us all, so that we can see it more fully as a civil and political device for working with and through differences. This is no small step, given that only a couple of decades ago, the distinguished social theorist Ernest Gellner could define nationalism as ?he principle of homogeneous cultural units as the foundations of political life. and of the obligatory cultural unity of rulers and ruled" and that. as such, was inherent in "the condition of our times" (1983. p. 125). If nationalism was neither natural statc nor a "‘precondition for social life," Gellner held that it was driven by industrialization, which created a "national imperative" of cultural homogeneity. Such homogeneity was necessarily supported by national school systems that ensured a common language and sensibility. Such grand theories of national identity are exactly what our students must test against the experience of their own neighborhoods, as well as within the economies that dress, feed, and amuse them. Thcy nccd to see how the nation has a history of stumbling badly over these assumptions of cultural coherence. In thc case of Canada, for example, they could well turn to the work of Sunera Thobani, in Women's Studies at Simon Fraser University. She has found that "historically, the Canadian state has contcndcd with thc conflicting interests of preserving 'whiteness' of the nation while simultaneously ensuring an adequatc supply of labor" ( 2 0 , p. 34). And if that was then. what now, given that race has been ostensibly removed from this country's imrnigmlion policies, and voting privileges have, since the second world war, been extended to immigrants from China and India, as well to the aboriginal peoples'? "Canadian nation building," Thobani finds, "relies in no small measure upon the construction of immigrants. in general. and immigrant women in particular, as one of the most potent thtwts to the nation's prosperity and well-being" (ibid.). This may well be an era of globalization, but we clearly have much to do in setting our ideas of the nation in order. MV educational proposal calls the very idea of the nation into question. It has an eve to advancing the nation's civil and democratic sualities through two steps: First, we need to study with students how the original promise of Lhc modern nation, as a free association of equals, is the point of a continuing economic. social, and philosophical struggle, even as the nation's status is changing in the face of globalization. Second, we need to explore with students various means of advancing this democratic exueriment. not only with the nation-state, but at the global and local levels at which we now live. This rethinking: of the nation with students could begin with how thc modern nation-state has long been pulled in two directions - ethnic and civil, the nation as a source of cultural idcntilv and the nation as a form of voluntarv political association. The goal here is not necessarily about striking a balance between the nation as shmd destiny and political engagement. as the two ideas can eusily work against each other. If democracy really did require this ethnic nationalist scnse of a shared culture and a conlmon set of values among its citizens (beyond a conlmit~nent to democratic processaq), as Yrinceton political philosopher Amy Gutrnan makes clear, then it would be far less of a democracy, with rill' less hope of teaching us about oursclvcs and each other through deliberation and debate (1999, p. 11). Rather, the democratic slate Continues.. .



Continued. .. was founded, at least in its formal political sensc, on a minimal principle of association, based on a common humanity. with peonle committed to working out together ways of advancing; their varying and common interests. Certainly. the United States, to take a nearby example, was launched in the spirit of the political rather than the ethnic nation. The country's initial public offering, othelwise known as the Declaration of Independence, refers to "nation" but once. when it speaks of how unworthy the King George 111 is as head of a civilized nation. The Declaration speaks rather of "the political bands" which "connect" onc pcople to another, held together by the self-evident truths of people's fundamental equality and thcir unalienable rights: "That Lo secure these rights. Governments arc instituted among Men. deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." This sensc of the state, as a secular banding together of people interested in securing their rights, needs to guide our educatic~nal efforts which must ultimately equip the young to judge the great shortfalls in securing the rights and to pursue a just power that derives from the consent of the gov~med. This secular, civil model of the nation has often been lost to its standing as a "spiritual principle." in the words of historian Ernest Renan. In his lecture "What Is a Nation?" given at the Sorbonne in 1882, Renan was, even then. concerned with stripping the nation of its metaphysical claims. He points to how critical Yorgetting" and "historical error" are to the "creation of a nation" especially given that national unity is "always affected by means of brutality" (p. 11). Renan goes on to ~t.ject the commonly assumed national principles of a shmtl race, Ianguage, and relig~on, only Lo accept, as a good historian should perhaps, that the nation is "the outcome of the profound complications of history" (p. 18). "It presupposes a past," he adds, "it is summarized, howcver, in the present by a tangiblc fact, namely consent. the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life" (p. 19). In the face of (he nation's "spirituaI principle." he still looks for how its continuing existcnce reflects. in effect, "a daily p1ebiscitc" (ibid.). Similarly. he holds the nation up as a lovc object, as "one loves Lhe house that one has built and that one has handed down," even as he attempted to distance himsclf from its racial and cultural basis (ibid.). But how possible is that, you might well ask, given how the heady mix of patriotic nativism burned through too much of the twcntieth century with horrendous associations of nation and race, even as nations failed terribly to protect all of those who found themselves living within their borders. Yet students also need to appreciate how this spirit of ethnic nationalisnl also proved an effective instrument against colonialism and the subjection of minority cultures within existing nations. Historian Partha Chattcrjee, speaking of India's struggles against British imperialism, points out that "here nationalism launches its most powerful, creative. and historically significant project: to fashion a 'modem' national culture that is nevertheless not Wcstcm" (1993, p. 6). Still. Chatterjee allows, "the dominant elements of its self-dcfinition, a1 least in post-colonial India, were drawn from the ideology cif the liberal-democratic state" (p. 10). even as he offers a vision what comes afier the triumph of this nationalism in India: 'The critique of nationalist discourse must find for itself the ideological means to connect the popular strength of the people's struggles with the consciousness of a new universality" (1986, p. 170). In a post-colonial Canada, both the aboriginal peoples, as I've already indicated, and the Quebecois have callcd on a self-defining nationalism to fight for previously denied rights within the larger nation. Picrre Elliot Trudeau. among this nation's greatest prime ministers and another of this country's recent losses, was drawn, as a Qukbecois, into politics to fight a Quebec nationalism that he saw as the enemy of a liberal democralic tradition. As it turned out, of course, Trudeau niwaged to hold the spirit. of Quebec separatism at bay through an questionable political mixture: suspending civil liberties during the War Measures act in 1970 while going on to make the country officially bilingual and multicultural and instituting a national Charter of Rights and Freedonu. Allhough Quebec's future is by no means settled, students here might well appreciate how Tmdeau sought to counter cthnic naljonalism by strengthening the rights-based civil slate. More importantly. and encouragingly for my proposal, this civil strategy has been on the rise on a global scale in recent years. Over the last decade, according to Ted Robert Gurr, University of Maryland head of the Minorities at Risk Project, there has been "a sham decline in ethnic wars, the settlement of manv old ones. and proactive efforts bv states and international oraanizations to recognize group rights and channel ethnic disputes into conventional politics" (2000, p. 52). This channeling of ethnic disputes into national political processes has taken place, among newly democratic governments in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, as they formally recognize and guaranlce political and cultural rights to minorities within their borders. This. for me, holds important lessons about the changing nation-stale. In Tar fewer instances is the nation being defined as an ethnic unit by those who live within it. Although ethnic bloodshed persists in Israel, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere, the decline in violence over the last decade, Gurr argues, points to gains in political and civil solutions to the queslion of what defines the nation. historical lcssons that need honing concern how the nation's best hopes for equal particination and unalienable rights have reocatedly fallen short of the promise. even as the nation may well have made small incremental steps toward that noal. Students also need to understand how this vision of humanity's basic equality has not always been a part of what was and continues to bc laught in school. Students need to see how the schools' critical role in shaping how we perccive who-belonns-where by nationality, and their own textbooks, as well as earlier ones still sitting perhaps in the school's bookroom, form a fine starting point for underskinding how we need to reset our understanding of the nation, setting it back on a civil path as an association of equals.



evm IF GLOBAL INSTRUTIONS ARE MORE POWERFUL THAN THE STATE, CHANGE NEEDS TO START AT THE LEVEL OF THE NATION-STATE

Willinsky, 2k (John Willinsky, Professor in the Department of Language and Literacy Education at the University of Rritish Columbia. "The Nation Stale After Globalisn~." AESA 2000 Annual Conference in Vancouver, 2000 . hllp://www3.uakron.edu/aesrt/convenlion~illinsky.doc) This brings me to a second concern, which is that the nation is already a lost cause and we had bcst just iiet over it. Suich k the view, for cxample, of Mohammrd B:~myeh, of New Ynrk University and cditor o la iournill of 7ransnalioniil and rransci~lti~nl studies." Ile holds in his critique of the new

imperialim, 11~1 final victory of capivalism e\orywhre mans... that the capitalist state has bst its n~ission and meaning3:'. 12000, p. 2). Bamyeh places his faith in grass-rools "organized voluntaristic intervenlions" and a "nascent 'dobal civil society"' (p. 24). Similarly, Bernardo Gallegos ;ir.ues that, in the case of Mexico and the United States, the nation can be "a disabling discursive category" that leads to the "terasure of indigenous identities" while hc calls for a rc-conception of social spacc and mangemenu, pointing to thr indigenous Zapatista movement in the southern Mexican State of Chiapas as an example (1998. p. 217). It is clear that this is an age of new ppolis Uli~t upsets old ways of understanding thc nation. As Anne-Christine Habhard, deputy secretary general of International Federation of Human Rights, has explained these politics mean that "oors is a new planwary citizenship, reflecting the fact that decisions have migrated from the state level. Voting for naliow~l

representatives, an old expression of citizenship, achieves nothing, because they have scant powei. (Cohen, 2000. p. WKI). There is no question that decisions of considerable conseauence are increasingly talunn place on the global stage, often behind the closed curtains of the WTO, IMF, and maior fhUlcia1 interests. Even the president of Ihe World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn, knows enough m dec lw that "something is wrong

when the richest 20pcrcent of the global population receive more than 80 pzrcent of the glohhal income" (Khan. 2000, p. ~ 6 ) . The uue~tion then is what to do in the face of a uroblem of such enOrmOUS Scope. llow can we, to further quote bank president Wolfensohn puts it, "make globalization an instrument of

opportunity and inclusion - not fern" (ibid.)? ~n the of such a question, rather than simply ioining in t h ~ chorus railing against the death of the nation and the rise of globalization demons, it mav he far more helpful, I am suggesting, to identify specific pro-iects that stand some chance of furthering opportunity and inclusion, whether we are bank presidents or university proTcssors. I think it hasty to write off states as "large deadly vacuities," as Banlyeh does (2000. p. 25). I thinkit

time, following GPIC~OS, to nconceptuali~e the social space and ilmngements of the nation. Let us at least turn to the state's school systems and universities lo see if we can prepare the younn and ourselves better for working in coniunction with grass-roots organizations to foster a more civil society at cvery level. Civility cannot simply haupen at the global level; it has to be civil all the way down. I see this as an ovuortunity for the schools and universities Lo sharpen the state's political focus, to help it bring public reason to bear on uuestions of local and global interests. This is about thccaphalisl slate having a mission

admeaning. We have to see how our work as educators can do more to expand. if not restore, the scope of the public sphere within national democratic processes.

l X E PERMUTATION SOLVES-COSMOPOLITANISM REQUIRES AN APPEAL TO NATIONALISM

Janowitz, 82 (Morris. Distinguished Service Professor of Sociology and Social Sciences at the University of Chicago, Air University Review, Jan-Feb, "Patriotism and the U.S. All-Volunteer Military, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aurcview/1982/ian-feb/ianowitz.html)

Thcrcfnrc. it brcomcs necessary to ponder the defillitioli and redefinition of the content and meaning of nationalism. particularly national ideology and patriotixm in the contemporary period.

it possible to think of a delicate balance of vigorous national sentiments with ever-strengthened supranational civic aspirations? In sociological analysis, the distinction between "locals" and "cosmopolitans" is too often overdrawn and rigidly auplied. The United States is not madc up exclusivel~ of nationalists (locals) or internationalists (cosmopolitans). Those who think of themselves as internationalists constitute a tiny minority. The bulk of the population is nationalists of varying intensity. 11 i~ crucial that segments of the natio~ulisl* have alrzady expanded their socioplitical space to include in varying

degrees a supranatinnat fmmc ofrcfcrcnce. wt. are not dealing with a zero-sum game; international identifications are not necessarily developed at the expense of more localistic or delimited afliliations. Nor LS patriotism an inherent barrier to the search for world cdizeiihip. of course, tmditional forms of patriotism that dcveloped in the yect~nd half of the nineteenth century and the first half of thc twentieth cenrury are far lronl appmprislc. Articulated patriotism. incorporating a clear element of self-conscious awareness, is required Tor the emergence of supranational citizenship. In facl. there has been as observable modificatitiun ofpatviohsm in thc Unitcd States. To desclibe the silllation in alternative terns. thc refashioning of ~ution~list ideolngy and traditiol~al patriotism has already prcmeded to that point wlxre global international sentiments are rot the only abrnative to traditional natiiinalism and conventional patriotism. In elements of the population - a mil~ority though it he - one can find a sensc of cnliphteued self-interested nationalism and patriotism relevant form cxpandrd scope of cilimnsh~p. (It is striking that the massive machinery of nc.ldcmic and commercial ppnhlic opminn surveys has completely neglected study of aitiludes of national and intemi~tional idenlfication.) But there is no need to stnl~ele with traditional terms and concepts in order to deal with the rqoircncnts olc~)ntcmporary citimnship and parrinlism --national or si~praniliuni~l. Civic education limited to thc incc~lcatiun of tr~ditional patriotism or co~irenlional nationalist ideology is obviously madcquale Tor the complexities of an advanced i~d~lstrial society and a highly inleriiependent wnrld. In fact. 1 fnd thc terms nationalist and prriotic Limiting. I offer and make use oitlle Ienn civic con~n'ou.sness. 11 refers In psilive and m~lningfi~l attachments a pemn dewlops to Ule lal lion-stare. I1 represents

qtrong commitmeds but not without 3 self-critical component. Civic consciou~nes~ is a relatively self-critical version of patriotism in an advanced industrial socicty. Civic consciousness is compatible with and required for both national and international rcsponsibilities and obligations. II involves clmtnts of reason and self-critici~m as well as perso~~commiiment. In p;uliculm. civic consciousness is the process by which national attachments and national obligations are molded into the sciucl~ for supranational citizenship. I believe thar pivcn the state of military technology and Ihe forms of inrc~nntio~~al conflict. t k concept of civic conscionsness is highly rrlevmt both for the caleer military and ihe short-lenn ptmonnel of the all-volunteer military. A milimy concerned with effective narional alliances. with arms cnnlrc~l and peacekeeping, and wnh regional political stability cannol hide under old-fashioned patriotism. 11s palriotism must be l i e d lo thc positive roles it is asked to perhrm.


PERMUTATION SOLVENCY I COSMOPOLITANISM REQUIRES PATRIOTISM IN ORDER TO BE EFFECTIVE.

McConnel96 (Michael, fcderal judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, "Don't Neglect the Little Platoons," For Lovc of Country, ed. Cohen, Pg 79-80)

An alternative view, going back at least to Edmund Burke, perhaps lo Aristutlc, holds that patriotism and cosmopolitanism are not at odds. Human affections begin close to home: wider circles of affection grow out of, and are dependent upon, the closer and more natural ties. Aristotle envisioned society as a hierarchy of attachments--family, household, villagc, and fillally the polis itself- and was skeptical of the ability of any community larger than the polis to serve as a locus of fellowship or of citizenship in the strong sense. Burke put it this way: "To be attached to the subdivision. to love the litlle plaloon wc belong to in societv, is the first princivle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in thc series by which we proceed toward a love to our country and to mankind." The key to moral education is to fuse the sentiments (especially love) to a teaching of the good. We beein to do eood because we lovc our preceptors (especially our parents): we want to vlease them and we want to be like them. Wc continue to do good because thal is the kind of vcrson we have mown un to be. Later we learn that our parents (and nei~hbors, and church, and nation) have flaws and moral blemishes. but our affection teaches us tolerance and for~iveness. Nonc of this is head knowledge. It involves relalionships. time, example, ceremony. play. rebuke. and most of all. love. It is, in short. not the work of the world at large. Moral education of necessity begins with those close enough to engage in these loving relationships: wilh parents and family. expanding to neighbors, churches, synagogues, and local schools--communities that are familiar and that are able to provide a unifying focus to the moral life. Through the study of history it extends to the nation, and ultimately to worthy obiects in thc world. But its source of strength lies in the affections. which must begin close to home and radiate outward. Effective cosmo~olitanism is therefore a by-product of moral education in a great tradition. It comes when students recognize in other cultures a varallel to that which thev love in their own and tolerate the flaws in other cultures iust as they tolerate flaws in their own.

THE PERMUTATION SOLVE-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS CAN BE A SPRINGBOARD TO COSMOPOLITANISM

Kaldor, 2k (Mary, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics, "Cosmopolitanism and organised violence", htt~://www.thedobalsite.ac.uk/~ress/0lOkaldor.htm)

A Cosmopoliwn Approach to Ncw Wars It follows from the nrgament about the characlex of 'new wars' that efforts aimed at conflict prevention or managemenl shoukl fc~cus on a reversal of the

'uncivilising process'. on the ~ o n s t r u c t i o n of relations based on ageed rides and p~lblic authurity. Akwe all, the cenlrepiece of any peace Strategy has to be the restoration of ledtimate aulhoritv. It has to counterpoise the strateay of 'fcar and hate' with a strategy of 'hearts and minds'. This kind of restoration of legitimate authority cannot mean a reversion to statist politics; it must imply multi-lavered authoritv -global, regional, and local as well as national. It is impossible to revert to a b o d e d 'civi~ising process'. ~ i r s t and

roremost such an approach has to start by building a new form of cosmopolitan politics to counter the politics of ~ X C ~ U S ~ O ~ . At a low1 level, wsmopniitan politics can include both poli~ical movements ;uld portics that are secular and non-nnrionalist or religious. as well as moderate identity bas&

partiestha1 respect and cherish different identities. Cosmopolitan or democratic politics is usually associated with civil S O C ~ ~ ~ Y , in particular NGOs and independent media, but it also mav have political representation in parliaments or even ~OVeImmentS. Whihal iv newled is a transnational alliance that incltldes both local m o r s and those enkaged in a variely of inlernationdl activities committed lo a cosmopolititn approncl~

ENGAGEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION IS KEY TO EVENTUAL TRANSITIONS TO A GLOBAL CARE FOR HUMANITY

Murphy 01- Editorial Board American Joi~rnal of Jurispmdencc and professor of law at Duquesne University--(Cmnelius F.. Theories of World Governance: A Study in the History of Ideas. 6/22/2001, The Catholic University of An~ericca Press, pg168)

The assumption is that as individuals gain the bencl'its of liberal democracy, the increase in security and affluence they experience will expunge their interest in public life. But consumerism is not a terminal human condition. Meaningful democratization requires the on go in^ participation of great numbers of citizens in all the processes of self-government. The sovereianty of the people is a g a v e resvonsibilitv and its exercise will makc considerable demands upon versonal, as well as collective. maturity. While civic duties are primarily cultivated within the societies to which the person bears primary allegiance, the congeniality they cultivate eventually reachcs out to serve the needs of a common humanityb8 As we notcd above, a global civil societv is already being formed bv the actions of private individuals and groups who are assuming public responsibility for an ever-increasing transnational well- being. Rich and poor are form~np; a larger "we" as they participate in the international communitv which they share. The world is becoming a socicty of individual persons as well as a society of states.

Michigan 7 week juniors Cosrnopoli tanism

I NATIONALISM GOOD: GLOBALIZATION

NATIONALISM IS A TOOL TO RESIST AND SHAPE Gl,OBALIZATIONC\NLY STRONG NATIONS CAN FACILITATE A TRANSITION TO GLOBA1,IZATION

Resina, 03 (Jwan, Professor of Romance Studies and Comparative Literature at Cornell University, diacritics, 33.314 46-74, projectrnusc)

Cosmouolitans make thernsclves vulnerable to the charge of mistaking the nature of the political communities on which thev rely for the rannc and resonance of their voices. It is above all in those states most secure in the gerrnanence of their political systems, states that can afford a degrce of internal skepticism, that intellectuals may question the conditions of citizenship ineffectuallv but with imounitv. Their ostensible aloofness from nationally vital issues-which can be a response to the embarrassment causcd by cultural intimacy with their own national group [Herzfeld 21-often strengthens the state ideologies thev rhctoricallv deplore. One does not have to accept Richard Rorty's nationalism of global leadership to realize that it recognizes the rule that the United States has cut out for itself after 1989, including the self-given American citizens' duty to act ethically and politically on a world power whose legitimacy devolves upon them. This nationalism of the New World Ordm proiects its own kind of space. Voicing a conviction that today has thc status of a US dogma, Rorty conceives the globe as a spacc to be filled with democratic values, which. far from being universal, have their source in one nation, from whence thcy spread to the rest of the world. Rorty is not a reactionary thinker but a pragmatic one. Whethcr or not he is right about the universalizable nature of American democracy. he surely is to critique the "futile attempts [of academics] to philosophize one's way into political relevance" [94]. One cannot insert oneself into the political process while speaking from a transcendent space. "Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations" [MI, a statement with which Marx would have agreed. Among these hallucinations he includes the alleged disappearance of the nation into an uncharted temtmy whose sphericity is about all we know with reasonable certainty. Belief in the nation's ohsolcscence. says Rorty, is the major obstacle to tackling problems of social justice, whose resolution will remain bound to national governments for the foreseeable fiiture. It is possible to object to Korty's claim that national governments remain the sole effective agents on matters of social justice, since the power of the United States is no1 transferable, and even here, it is questionable that Washington exercises its power of arbitration Lo achieve a semblance of social justice. But what about the more obviously dependent nations, those that are wtnerahle to nerxolonidism and those that. lacking a state of their own. do not even figure in the global map? k they dissolving in postnational spacc'? Whatever their ultimate fate may be, they cannot afford to give up the right to democratic sdf-regulation any more than influential nation-states can. And this right cannot be exercised if it is not grounded in a common memory and expcriences held in common. National forms of political organization do not hinder globalization. Globalization deploys universal principles but needs popular legitimation, and this is likely to remain nation-dl. [End Page 701 The persistence of nationalism becomes less mysterious when one understands that nationalism is the oil that lubricates thc state. Furthermore? thc increasing interdependence between slates does not eject the nation from the political map. One may call the space of interdependence "postnational" if one wishes. but the entities that relate in this way are national through and through. As WaIlerslein reminds iis, "The interstate system is not a mere assemblage of so-called sovereign states. It is a hierarchical system with a pecking order that is stablc but changeable" ["Construction" 821. Hit is not a constellation of symmetrical democracies. then it can be only an arrangement of spaces with an unqual distribution of social, economic, cultural, and political opportunities. in othcr words, a political map. This pecking order is apparent, quite graphically, in the position taken by heads of state before thc camera that records their attendance at G-7 or European summits. inequalities within this order, according to Wallerstcin, "lead to ideologies able to Justify high rank but also to challenge low rank. Such ideologies we call nationalisms" [82]. Nationalism. then, is not an irrational force but a tool. and at times a weapon, in the struggle to alter the victure of world relations and to recreate the space of the wc~rld. It is an instrument for progress and also an imposing bulwark for immobility. In the conditions of worldwide interrelatedness, "[flor a state not to be a nation," Wallerstein states, "is for that state to be outside the game of either resisting or promoting the alteration of its rank. But then that state would not be par1 of the interstate system" 1821. A postnational state, if such a thing existed, would be literally invisible on the political map. The nationalism of stateless nations or, more exactly, of nations incorporated into a stalc ruled by a hegemonic nationality is also an attempt to alter rank by securing a place in the interstate hierarchy.


NATIONALISM GOOD: DEMOCRACY

NATIONALISM IS VITAL TO DEMOCRACY

Fonte, 97 (John, Director, Center for American Common Culture and UScnior FelIow~Hudson Institute, National Review, 10127, http://www.highbeam.com/library/docFree.asp?DOCID=1G I : 19973501)

An examinatir>n of what many in our intckctoal class have bmn wying for the pa%t rcvcml years cormhrares this asser l io~~ There is a POSI-West. and it advocates Iranw2ending imd r l r l in ing

traditional western dens ofpatriotism and the nation-state. B U ~ historical evidence sueests that patriotism and the nation-state are necessarv conditions for the survival of modern constitutional democracy. Ir we accept I ~ C rust-western vibiun. tnditinnal lihcri~l democracy will ultimately be

trit~formcd intoa ~OSI-~ibtr;~l-de~nocratic regime. Let US br clear. Civic patriotism or liberal-democratic nationalism is not based on "blood and soil," or race and cthnicity, or superiority and dominance over others. It is a love of country based on political allegiance. shared values, and a shared history and culture (which can bc adopted by fin~uigrants through an identitication with (he nation's p a t and

:rssimilation of its trdiliuns). It is e~~cn t i a l for active citizenship in a self-governing politv. IL is not inconsistent with an internationalist foreign policy. libelalized global wade. or broad pilniciparion in world affairs. An America. Britain. or France shorn of such patriolkm would he a dityerem country, bul not noccssarily a better. or more demrlcratic. <me. S o m disagreti with this view and reject the linkng of patriotism and the naiicin-state with liheral demrrcmcy. Thus. in 1995. in a widely discussed anicle in Bckston Review. bniversity of Chicago philosophy professor Miutha Nussbar~m explicitly attacked the conccpl of pat~iotism and declared that "patriotism is very clo.se to jingoism." Commenting on Prof. Ni~ssbaum's article. Frinceto~~'s Amy Gutmann declared that it is 'repupaant" that Arneriml str~dents should "lcnrn 11411 they are above all citi?..es u i the United States."Tkir "primary allegiance should nut he to the Ilniled Stalcs or m y actual communily." but lo what shc calls "democnric humanism.'' Writing in Foreign A f f a h in 1991. Harvani's Charks Maier was impatient with rhc tradii~on:~l A~ncrican ccmcept of cili7enship. He declared: "it is time tbr confederation, cantoni7aion, and overlnpping citizenship." And in a l i tk-not ied article fivc ycars ago, Deputy Secmlary of State Slrnhe Talbolt, lhcn a senior editor u Time. wrote: "All countries nrc basically social wranpemenls. ~commodations to chi~nging circumstances. No matter how permanent and c w n sacred the) lnay w m a1 any one time, in fact they are all aniLccial ;mJ tcmpolary." TaLbn prcdiiled th.at by the end of lhe twmty-fua cent~try "noticinhood as wc know it will be uhsolete: all

sra~cs will recognize a single global authority.'' Moreover, he dcscrikd the weskening of snvereipnty LS a "basically positive phenomenon." This criti~ue Of ~atriotlsm. nationalism, and the nation-state is advanced in the name of universal ideals such as humanitarianism. egalitarianism. and dcrnocracy. T ~ U S .

Manha Nussbaum contends that our "primary allegiance" should be to the "community ol'human heings in the entire world" and lo rht "moral ideals ofjustice and cqoality." This may sound benign 10 many. hut what spccitically ;ire those moml ideals? Well. Prof. Nossbao~n writes that it is ciui mow1 i~bliaation to recognize thit the "high living starrlanl we [in the West] enjoy is onc that very likely cannot hc universalized. . . . given the present costs oC pallulinn conlrols and the prcsenl economic situalinn ofdevelopu~~ countries. without ecological disasler." What is required, according to ProL Nussbaum. is global planning and presumably the rcdistributii~n of wealth finm the "north to thc "south." .Mureover. transnationi~l regutation is necessary to solw

crucial gbbal issues such as environmental degrada~ion, ovcrppulation, gender inequities, poverty. and the like. Hmce. just below the surface of the claims of universality we find the specific political agcnda of an influential group of arogrcssive activists. Instead of philoso~hy we find ideology; instead of cosmor>olitanism we find the parochialism of the Western progressive elite. Furthermore. bcsides rhc promotion of a progressive political agenda under the st~ise of universalism. we see a dennand for power, because - - as lohn O'SullivPn put it UI these pages reccnlly -- all this planning and regulation will require tBe guiding hand of no international "New Chss." THHSI< ideas hiwe important political consequences. Thus. ltssic:~ Mathcuvs of the Council on Foreign Relations boks forward to the day when there will be a "Glohal Environmental Atttltority with independent regalatnry powers." She is pleased to rcpon that un major global Issues 'sott law in lhe firm of guidelincs, rccommcnded practices, ~lonbinding resolutions. . . [is] rapidly expanding" and thnl "behind each new agreement 'me scicl~tists and lawyers" -- a " I I ~ W conslitucncg" includtng "a burgconil~g influential c l a s of internalionnl civil scrvants responsible for implementing monitnring. and enSorcing this eninnuus new body of law." She nates apprnvingly that the European Union's judiuary can ovcrrkle nation8 I:LW and its Council of Ministers can overrule certain domestic execnrive decisions. To her credit. Mrs. Mathews does admit that "more international decision-mi~kin~ will also exaoerhate the so-called 'demtrcr~cy d e f ~ i l . ' as decisions that clcncd r e ~ n t a t i v e s once made shill to unelected international bodics." 111dred. this is the

h e m of the mattel-. The Achilles' heel of the progressive project is that the effort to diminish patriotism, nationalism, and the nation-state appears to have the result of diminishina liberal democracy as well. B I I ~ although supporters of the transnational progrcssivc project are aware of Ihc "democracy problem." they have no answcr. I.iheral democracy and liberal democratic nationalism are phCIwm2na of the modern age, whereas Lhe alternative progressive vision smacks of the ply-modern and poa-modcm. Instead of individual rights and nat~owl citizenship thee is an emphasis on group righls and mnlticulturalism: inslead of ~niljorily rule there is prnportional rrprese~taiort for ascribed gmup: instead of patriotic affcctioli for one's own saticon. multiple loyalties to n~b~lational and supranational Sroups arc emphasired. Thr Unhcd Nations women's conference in ['eking is insttucti\c. At that conference. the Wewern nat io~~s promoted the idea that women's rrp~tsentation in national legislat~~rcs shoi~ld be roughly prnportinnnl to their prescncc in the populatiun. Thus for example, if womert makc LIP 57 pcr ccnt of the papularion of Great Britain. t k n 52 per cent of all mcmhms iof Parliament should he womco. If the Rrilish electorate in 3 free ctction tails to choose members nf Parliament on this proportional basis, therr. is appasenrly a problem of 'ondcrrcpresentation." "Dsmocracy" is thus ~ d e i i n e d from :I system that permils free choice o f a peopb's rcpresenrarivcs to a system that requiles grnup reprcscnrlion. This concept. as I have sugpstcd. is hoth pn-modern and post-modem. It would base electoral results not on the choicc of the individual voter, hut on preordained proportional representarion for ascrihed groops. iikc t k "estates" of the Alrien Regime. That this idea wi~s proniotcd by Western governments at Pckinp (including the Clinton. Major, and Kohl Administnlio~~s) tclls US something about the coherence of liknl-democratic ideas in the contemporary West. And the appcurance of the radical former congresswoman Bella Abzug speaking 011 behalCof Western non-govermlcnlal organizations [ N O S ) tells us somethine about the s t n c of Wcstern civil socirly in the mid 19YOs. Signi~icicn~uly. the Clinton .4dministntion is \igomusly promoting this illiberal. nei~-cii~~oratisI view ofdemiic~acy promulgated at kking. Thu~s. thc Administration's unbassadw to Ausuia. Swanee Hunt. in a recent Foreign Al'iairs mick; decries the decrcasr in "gender pxity" in Eastern Euuropean parliaments since t k fall of Con~munism and thc advent of free elections. Amkissador llut~t comph~ins: "Across the polilical upheaval, fionl 1987 to 1994 Ihc percentage of u*omcn in parliament decre~sed from 28 per cent lo 6 per cent in Albania, from 34 per cenr lo 4 per cent in Kumania. and fiom 21 percent to I1 percent in Hungary. P a r l h ~ l i ~ c ~ ~ t was 33 pr cent female in the Sovict Union, but in many of the newly independenl sates the f i g ~ ~ r e is lmw under 3 per ccnt." Hunt notes that "Although Commu~list puliunent.; were liltk more than rubher stamps. women were at lrast visihk. ensured by statoimposcd quotas" Acmrding to Ambasmdor Hunt, reversing this "underrepresentalion" (caoscd, ir should be notcd, by free ektiollsl is a major goal afLT.S. forcign pulicy under Clinton hecause it reflects "basic American valr1rs" md is consistent with "stable de~nocracy." In olhrl- words. Clinton's a p p n i n t c ~ ~ judkc the hcalth of democracy not in liberal-democratic terms -- for ewmpk. by the strength w d vibrancy of freely chosen paili;lmenls -- but, instead. in neocorporatist tcrms -- by the percentage or ascrihed y o u p replesenlatio~~ in those parliaments. Moreover. the Clinton Administration is supporting the shift from trditic)nal lihenldenlocracy to nerlcorpuratism in pracrice as wcll as in theiiry. In 1991 Argentina passed the world's l i s l gender Quots Law (Ley tle C u p s ) for electing ~ulional legislators. It reqai~ts all political parties to: 1) lun a ~ninimom of 30 p t ~ cent women candidates in all disuicts and 2) place these women in electehlc positions. If :I party fails to comply with thc Quota Law it is no1 allowed to compete in the election. In July 1997 at a conference in Washington, D.C., Assistnnt Secretiuy of State Alexandur Watson praised Argentina's Quuta Law as an exnmplc of thc "political affirmative action" that the Clinton Administration favors. OF COURSE, there are recxognized scholars who are willi~ig to maintain that, so far fmm

being Lnpediments lo demcicracy. liberal nationalism end civic patriotism are virtud~p intrinsic to it. Georgian political philosopher Ghia Nodia declarcs that "denouncing all nationalism as would-be fascism makes no more scnse than denouncing all religion for ultimatel~ leading to fanaticism." Moreover, Prof. Nodia insists that "democracy never exists without nalionalism" in some form. And Francis Fukuyama statcs that "many proponents of liberal democracy do not understand thc ways in which moderate nationalism can contribute to the success of democracy as a matter of practical politics."


PATRIOTISM GOOD: CEDE THE POLITICAL

PATRIOTISM IS VITAL TO APPEALING TO CONSERVATIVES AND CONNECTING WITH THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

Huntington, 99 (Samuel, professor of history at Harvard, The National Interest, "Robust Nationalism", 1/20, http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/Robust-Nationalism-Huntington20jan99.htm)

THROUGHOUT much of the world, but particularly in the United States, economic globalization is creating a growing gap between denationalized elites and nationalist publics. An international class of businessmen, officials, acirdenccs. journalists and others has xisen whosc n~embers constantly Lravd, irrtcract with cncl~ olhcr, and advocate policies to expand trade, investment and profits. and to pmmote liberal democncy and market economies. These goals. however, often run counter to the economic interests and cultunl concerns of the m a s publics in their socielies. The conscauences, as Kofi Annan

has warned, are nationalist. illiberal and po~ulist reactions to globalization. The tinited Statcs is not immune to these trends. American ~ 4 t h

and power are at their peak. The national unity. econon~ic equity and cuktural integrity of America are not. In the broadest sense, American national identity is under challenge from a multiculturalism that subverts it from below and a cosmovolitanism that erodes it from above. Patriotism is passe among large Sectors of American elites. Conceivably, in the future serious external threats to America could arise from China. Russia. Islam or some combination of hostile states. At oresent. however. the orincinal threats to American unitv. culture and cower are closer to home. 71re . . * a

appropriate response of both classic conservatives and mocon~va t ives is to come together it) support ol'a robust nationalism that reaffirms some basic mths. America is a

religious country. Pauiotism is a virtue. Universalism is not Amnericaoism. Nationalism is not isolationism. These truths resonate with the American people. In their commitment to God and countrv. conservatives differ from many liberal elites, but they are at one with the American people. Atnerica was in large pat creatcd for religious reasons. and throughout American history foreign obscrvcrs have identified the intense commitment to and extensive practice of religion as distinguishing characteristics of the American people. This is as true, and perhaps even more true, today than it has heen in the past. By every conceivable measure, America sfands apnrt m o n g wealthy countries in its high degree of religiosity. In cross-national polls, Americans also are almost always more

patriotic and tnke greater pride in their country than people of 0th- nations. Patriotism and religion are central elements of American identity. The American public, unlike many American elites, is also robustlv nationalistic in many of its views on particular foreign policy issues. The 1998 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey 011 public opinion and foreign affairs revealed significant. and in many r e s v l s growing, diffrrrnces between Ihe views of the public and thosc of foreign policy leaders on many key issues. ?he public Imlds a highly conservative view of the hture, 53 percent believing the twenty-first century will be more violent than the twentieth century, in contrast to only 23 percent of the lenders, 40 percent of whom blie\.e it will he less violent. Owrwhelniig nrajoriljcs of both the public and the leaders believe that prcvcnting nuclcar proliferation, combating terrorism. and maintaining American military superiority should he "very important" goals of American foreign policy. Farmore lhan the Ieaders. however. the pubkic suongly supports curtailing the tlow of illegal drugs into the country. reducing illgal immigalion, and protecting the jobs of American workers. Sixty percent of the public, but only 36 pcrcmt of the leaders, believes tariffs iue necessary to protect certain manufacturing jobs. The public also is €31. more opposed to economic assistance prosrams and miliraty interventions abroad than are the leaders, yet by a small margin the public supports expansion of military spending while the leaders by a slizhtly larger margin oppose it. These data sugest that robust nationalism could haw substantial public apprd and could also serve as an

alternative to mort: narmw isolationist measuws that might B I S ~ win public support. Robust nationalism is an alternative to divisive multiculturalism, xenophobic isolationism and wimvv universalism. It is a foundation on which conservatives could unite to promote American national intercsls abroad and national unity at home.

ANY ALTERNATIVE THAT LACKS AN APPEAL TO THE NATION IS UTOPIAN AND IMYOSSlBLE

Resina, 03 (Joan, Professor of Romance Studies and Comparative Literature at Cornell University, hacritics, 33.314 46-74, projectmuse)

Even so, the tacit depcndence on the national community haunts contemporary political theory. When someone envisions democratic polities based on impartial law and the subordination of special to public interest, the nation is never far away. As ~ i r ~ a r e t Canovan points out, "contemporarv political theory is saved from complete utopianism and linked to the tangled world of empirical politics onlv because the community it presupposes is an idealized version of'a political community that really does exist in some places. namely the nation" [46]. This tacit assumption may be less a contingent effect of the still prevalent tendency to view political space in terms of national territories, than a logical necessity based on a historically determined relation between the rise of popular sovereignty and national politics. Outside the theoretical imarrination. decouuling the nation from democratic polities may prove as elusive as separating a [End Page 551 bodv from its shadow. According 10 Liah Cireenfeld, "ldlemocracy was hom with the sense of nationality. Thc two are inherently linked, and neither can k fully nnderstoad apart £rom this cunnection. Ndtiunalism was the form in which democracy appyed in Lhc world, wnlakd in the idca of the nation as a butterfly in a cocoon" [lo]. But if nalionalism was democratic ah ovo. then the severance of the two nttitudes suggests the radical alterairin of thc gcnetic wnditn>ns rrf democracy and thus the wd oiit in any rigomus scnse. OuBhenno is surely righl lo stress Iht: rel:~tion ktwcen the Western idea of libeny in an open ct~mrnunily and the territorial roots of the nation in La tin de In dCmocmtic (Thc End of the Nation-Statel. "The libe~ly thal Lthc natio~il giws individuals [. . .I." hc says, "is based on thc spacc thal it governs" [51. Libeny. in n classic sense. meant a slate of exception \'is-?-~is general exactions and burdens. Libenies totien expressed in the ploml. and with a meaning close to that orcontemporary "rights*) were granted to certain villages, cilirs, ur rcrions and not to otkrs. Nationalism univerwtli.zed the liberties throughout Ihe stat& making them the bihright of wch membcr of the polilical community. RLI~ since lihcrty was n pledge ol'alt lo each, it depended on thc narional j~~risdiction. I11 other words, ir was guw~nteed only inaoedr as 1k stale could protect its borders. If globaliurion deterritorializes Ihe polity, there is reasun to suspect that it will bring an end to politics. Politics is here underjtocxl in the sense of universal participation in public: al'laus tthoagh stand-ins whose claim to represent the civic conl~nunity rests oo the assumptioo, or lhe fiction. of a coequal relarion to the public good.


PATRIOTISM GOOD: SOLVES RACISM

PATRIOTISM IS THE ONLY WAY TO TRANSCEND OTHER STRUCTURAL ANTAGONISMS LIKE RACISM OR TRIBALISM

Harris, 03 (Lee, writer and contributing editor of Tech Central Station. "The Cosmopolitan Illusion", Policy Review, April, http:llwww.volicvreview.orn/apr03/harris.html)

In fact, one can go farther. On deeper reflection. the preferencc for the label "cosmoaolitan" over the label "patriotic" may well constitute a danger to the very values of the Enlightenment to which people like the Abbi de St. Pierre and Martha Nussbaum are so obviously committed. As the example of Romc suggests, it may well bc that patriotism, by some strange dialectical necessity, is the jndispensable wrereauisitc of constructing a higher and more universal perspective than the one given by one's familv. or one's tribe, or one's creed. or one's race. Patriotism, in short. may be the onlv reliable means by which the human race can be led to transcend those lesser forms of structural antagonism that Nussbaum so rightly decries -those associated with ethnic and racial as well as tribal and sectarian divisions.


PATRIOTISM GOOD: DEMOCRACY I

AN APPEAL TO PATRIO'NSM IS VITAL TO DEMOCRACY

Taylor, 94 (Charles, Professor of law and philosophy at Northwestern, "Why Democracy Needs Patriotism", Boston Revicw, http:/lwww3.haylor.edu/-Scott~Moore/essays~emo~Patriotism.html)

I agree with so much in Martha Nussbaum's well-argued and moving piece, but I would like to enter one caveat. Nussbaum sometimes seems to be proposing cosmopolitan identity as an alternative to patriotism. If so, then 1 think this is a mistake. And that is because we cannot do without patriotism in the modern world. This necessity can be seen from two angles. The most important is this: > willing to some degree to share euuJlv -- require strong identification on the Dart of their citizens. It has always been noted in the civic humanist tradition that free societies, relying as they must on lhc spontaneous supportive action of their members, need that strong sense of allcpiance that Montesquieu called "vertu." This is if anything even truer of modern representative democracies, even though they integrate "the liberty of the moderns" with the values of political liberty. lndecd, the requirement is stronger just because they are also "liberal" societies, which cherish negative liberty and individual rights. A citizen democracv can only work if most of' its members are convinced that their wolitical society is a common venture of considerable moment. and believe it to be of vital importance that thev participate in the ways thev must to keep it functioning as a democracy. This means not only a commitment to the common project, but also a svecial sense of bonding among people working together in this proiect. This is perhaps the point at which most contemporarv democracies threaten to fall apart. A citjzen democracv is highly vulnerable to the alienation which arises from deep inequalities, and the sense of neglect and indifference that easily arises among abandoned minorities. That is why democratic societies cannot be too inegalitarian. But this means that they must be capable of adopting policies with redistributive effect (and to some extent also with redistributive intent). And such policies require a high degree of mutual commitment. If an outsider can be pcrrnitted to comment, the widespread opposition lo the extremely modest proposal for a health plan in the United States doesn't sccm to indicate that contemporary Americans suffer from too great a mutual commitment. In short, the reason whv we need patriotism as wcll as cosmopolitanism is that modern democratic states are extremely exigent common enterprises in self-rule. They require a great deal of their mcmbers, demanding much greater solidarity towards compatriots than towards humanity in general. We cannot make a success of these cnicrprises without strong common identification. And considering the alternatives to democracy in our world, it is not in the interest of humanity that we fail in these enterprises. We can look at this from another angle. Modern states in general. not just democratic states, having broken away from the traditional hlcrarchical models, require a high degrce of mobilization of their members. Mobilization occurs around common identities. In most cases, our choice is not whether or not people will respond to mobilization around a common identity -- as against, say, being recruitable only for universal causes -- but which of two or more possible identities will claim their allegiance. Some of these will be wider than others, some more opcn and hospitable to cosmopolitan solidarities. It is between thcse that the battle for civilized cosmopolitanism must frequently be fought, and not in an impossible (and if successful, self-defeating) attempt to set aside all such patriotic identities.


PATRIOTISM GOOD: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

PROMOTING PATRIOTISM THROUGH A LENS OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT SOLVES THE VIRULENT PARTS OF PATRIOTISM

Abowitz in '03 (Kathleen, Associate Professor Educational Leadership at Miami University, International Conference on Civic Education Research in New Orleans, "The dominant discourses of citizenship in American life and schooling", November, http:/lciviced.indiana.edu/papcrs/2003/10523 154 14.doc)

<The civic knowledge that is needed to advance respect and engagement is not only a knowledge of the cultural diversity seen in contemporary America, but a knowlcdgc of American history and government (Carnegie Corporation et. al. 2003; Boyer 1990) that is used to critically understand and assess the current social and political context. The cognitive knowledge about American government, history, and politics, especially with a focus on individual freedom and our multicultural national history, is stressed. The grade ten Social Studies content standards in Ohio include the study of civil disobediencc and periods in history in which some rights were restricted by the government, such as the McCarthy era and the Rcd Scare (Ohio State Department of Education, 2003,92). In California, as early as first grade, students are required to undcrsland the symbols, icons, and traditions of the United States (History/Social Studies Standard 1.3), and to understand the forms of diversity in their communities, including the "benefits and challenges of a diverse population" (California State Board of Education 1998, 6). But the focus on civic knowledge is always stated within the political liberal discourse in ways that emphasize the linking of this knowledge with communicative and deliberative skills. Boyer (1990) says that "civic education is concerned, first, with communication.. .Citizenshiv training.. - .means teachinn students to think criticallv, listen with discernment, and communicate with vower and vrecision" (5). The NovembedDecember 2001 issue of Social Education focuses on educational resaonses to a time of war, and h e a w emphasis is placed on deliberation and critical thinkina. "Teachers need to encourage discussion and debate," is urged in an article on educational responses to 911 1/01 (Singleton, 2001), and a further push for critical thinking is found in an article on media lileracy skills in which the author argues that students need to learn to question and analyze media messages regarding terrorism and war (Hobbs, 2001). Unlike the more nationalistic, lovalist responses within the civic republican discourse after 9/11 and war with Iraa, political liberal discourses hosted an array of responses that urged discussion, debate, and student and citizen participation in the ~overnment's decision to wage war. How should citizenship education in public schools help foster a loyalty and lovc of society and nation without endangering the fundamental political liberal commitment of freedom? The term patriotism has en endered some controversv in the political liberal discourse of citizenship, particularlv since 9/11/01 (Kazin 2002; Sleeper 2003). Unlike the civic republican discourse in which patriotism is a fundamental value and disvosition to be nurtured in citizenship education, patriotism is a much debated issue in political liberal discourse. (20021, in an essay posted aAcr 911 1/01 on the American Federation of Teacher's web-site, argues for a patriotism of ideas and principles, not of blood-lines, tradition, and loyalty to people. Bern advocates a patriotism that instills lovaltv to the ideas of freedom and e students to be able to see the perspectives of manv nations, cultures, and ideologies, but also helping them to "make distinctions between freedom-fighters and terrorists based on the methods used and the ends that are being fought for" (6). Callan (1997) argues for a Iiberal patriotism that is different from a "sentimental civic education" that arouses and shapes notions of civic love and blind lovalty (103-104). Patriotic pride, he offers, is inseparable from "evaluative judgments about the nation or multinational polity with which one identifies, judgments about the impressive accomplishments of its past or the hopeful prospects for its future" (105). American sentimentality is distinct from pride in America, since pride within political liberal discourse involves a reasoning evaluation about whether or not we as a people are living u p to our ideals of freedom and equality for all peovIe.r


AT: NATIONALISM BAD IMPACTS I NATIONALISM ITSELF ISN'T GOOll OK B A b M A T MATTERS ARE THE GOALS OF THE NATION AND THEIR SPECIFIC CONTEXT

Brilmayer, 95 (Lea, professor of law at New York University, "The Moral Significance of Nationalism", 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 7, lexis)

Ul~e o[ the punling things about nationalism is that ir sometimes seems to be a force tor good, attd sumrtimes a furce fnr very great evil. At this pnnicula ri~nc. we sty t o r e likely 10 thmk in terms of the evil nationillism kings ahottt: this asst~ciotion is the legacy o i the war in thc formcr Yuposlavi;~. the killiep it1 Rwanda. the ungoinp fighting in Chechnya. and many other examples that all loo easily come to mind. Nationalism now tends to he associatnl with b;trb;rism: with @onocide. ethnic ciertnsing. rapc and wanton murder. But nationalistn cat1 also be a force lor great gocld. When Armenians livmg in America comribtlte from their own limited resources to help Armenian elirthqoake victims. when Erittpnns sacrifice their livcs lo likrale their country from :I colonial power. or when Ripokwa Menchit commits herself to a Ble of personal hardship and danger to advance the human rights of Ccntnl American ncttive peoples. it is hard to deny that

oationsl sentiment can play a nuble mle tn world cvcnts. T ~ C hypothesis 1 watt to invatigate here is that nationalism, itself, is morally t r ~ n s p ~ e n t , and that this fact accounts for its ability to coexist equally well with good and evil. The argument is that the overwhel~r~ingly relevant - normalive feature of today's nationalism is the justice (or lack ofjusticc) of the claim nationalists advance on behalf of their nation. The single most important normalive feature - indeed, perhaps, the only important normative feature - is the right of the nation to the thing that nationalists assert on its behalf, and this right is not itself a consequence of na~ionalism hut a conseqilencc of other underlying moral claims. What matters from a moral point of view is whether the claims of one's nation and cvnationals are worthy, and whether they are pu~sued by morally ac- [*8] ceptable means. Resistance to colonialism, human rights abuses, and dictatorship is iust, at least so long as morally defensible means are used, and ethnic cleansing, rapc. and genocide are morally wronp: this is not so because of any reasons involving nationalism. but because of other moral features of the situation. Nationalism means simply that On€! identifies with the claims of one's nations and one's cnnntionak. and takes them as one's own. Nationalis& act as agents of their nation. and when agents act what matters is the ttghts of the principal (thnl is. thc nation) rather than the agents' motiwtions (that is. their nationalism). 1 will refer to the claim that rwlionoli~m is itself not unpnnant to the evaluation of nationalistic actions as the irrelevance hypothesis; thc most uncompromising version of this hypothesis holds that nationalism wver matlers. The irrebvance hypolhesis i.\ grounded (111 rhc assumption that the entity status of the national group - its national unity along linguistic. I-eligious. ethnic. w cultaml lines - neither adds to nor derracts from thc moral lcgilimncy ofthe actions tk11 :I natiot~alist movement undertakes. 73e alternative to Ueating the suttus of the national entity ;IS central is a focus on what I will call the underlying independent moral claim. A moral claim is independent (in the sense that I intend here) if its moral force docs not depend on the so11 ofe~ttily that is essrrting it. and in particular on whether it is ascned by n certifiably national cnthy that is homogeneous according to some "naticlnar criteri~. . In the final analysis. this miclc will not stake ottt a position oicomplek irrelevance; Pal Ill cnnsiders ways that national entity status cr~rld =asonably be considered morally significant. Rut even if the argument for cumplete irrelevance is incorrect. XI imponant corrective to much contemporary discussicln n e d s to he ohsemd. Thc justice of the indcpendetit underlyu~g national claim needs to be put sqit;uely on the apettdo. even if it is not the only hctor that matters. It is quitc striking that philosophical discussio~ls of nationalism have paid virtually no arlcntion lo the justice of the independent underlying claims that ~~attonalists ~nake on behalf o l their nations. The only claim of mord juslific;ation that id considered in most philosophical accounts of nxtio~ulism is that a tutiat might be m t i t M to stnnething simply because granthg that cntitlcmenl would promole naIiunal flourishing. Philosophers interpret the claims thut natio~ulists nuke as arguments that "we are entitlcd to thus-and-such because we arc a nation." This is an arsument b e d on national entity watus. Bur that is not what nationalistic claims me generally nbout. lnstedd. wdtic>ndlist claims typically take lhc itinn 'we me enisled to thus-and-such because il w take11 Cronl uh wrnnply." or "bxausr we have suffered injury for which this is the only suitable repi t iom." or "because Civd intended us Lo have iL" or snmerhing of that son, That is why nationalists do not feel any inconsistency in fighting lu selze resotuccs hum other nalions: if their claim w e e simply that it pr711p dcserves so~tletlling tecause it is a nation. then one would expect them lo belter appreciitre the competing claim% of thcir adversaries. who arc typically also behaving oatio~talitically. [*9] This is not to say that nalionalists ncvcrrcly on nationalistic arguments; mrionhood. they

recognize, is what draws them tosethcr in thrir fipht. BCI~ the lunction of national identification is generally to provide an explanation for whv they are fighting, not for whether their cause is iust. Nationalist claims are seriously misserved by the way that philosophical discussions of the topic are usually conducted. The reduction of nationalist claims to a claim that "we deserve such-and-such because we are a na~ion" lumps a11 forms of nationalism together, implicitly enc.oura5nn the assumption that either nationalism is nood. or nationalism is bad. The philosophers' typical depiclion of what mlionalist claims x e all about leads to treating nationdislc fighting a s prima facie illogical, because those who me involved should nnderstmd (but don'i) thc similarity of the two competinpclaitus. The stlndard philosoph~cal interpretation of nationalism envisions a water symmetry of rights and wrongs than typically exists.

NO IMPACT-UR NATIONALISM 1S DIFFERENT

Hauss, 03 (Charles, "Nationalism", September, htm://www.beyc~ndintractability.ornlessay/nationalism/)

h'alionalism is irnpnnnnl in twc~ way%. 'l'he fist is reluively benign and IS best seen in the ptriorism of most w o p k in thc United States. the United Kisgdom. or h.;mce. In those countries. almost everynne helieves that the srate is Iqitimate and supports it often without question. l o counuics that still have a dmB, virtually everyone agrees to put on a uniform if conscripted. Such

patrioli~m can have an ugly side - who hasn't becn appalled by the buorishness nf Amerian hockey or English soccer fans And. mOSt observers are convinced that patriotism can leavc most oeoule more blind than thev should be to their country's political flaws, something many critics have argued about Americans since the 911 1 terrorist attacks. Yet that sort of hyper-nationalism has not often led to the kind of violent conflict which claimed well over 100 million ~eop l e in thc twentieth century. One of the major causes ol' most of those conflicts has bccn nationalism of a different kind -- onc that gets out of hand, turns into hatred of others, and sparks violence, oStcn of the most brutal form. That is especially true when leaders of states can convince ~ e o p l e that they have somehow been treated abusivelv by thc "other" or that members of "our" group who live outside "our" borders need to be incorporated into the "homeland."

Michigan 7 week juniors Cosmopo~itanism

AT: NATIONALISM BAD IMPACTS

NO IMPACT-TBEIR EVIDENCE ASSUMES ETHNIC NATIONALISM, NOT CIVIC NATIONALISM. THE RISK IIF WAR COMES FROM WEAK STATES, NOT STRONG ONES

Sidwell, 05 (Marc, Director for the Governance / Strategy section of The Henry Jackson Society, "Constructing Nationalism", 1 2 / 6 , h t t o : / / z o D c 0 6 . v . s e r v e l o c i t v . n e t l h r s / s e c t

First, a distinction between two forms of nationalism. The nationalism which has so befouled Euro~e's reccnt past in Nazi Germany and the post-Soviet Balkans is ethnic nationalism, founded upon a sense of blood or tribal or relidous ties. The nationalism exemvlified by American vride is civic nationalism. founded upon the shared civic institutions which bind a plural community togcther.[2] When civic nationalism is allied with democratic institutions that guarantee individual freedom, it is a model of ethnic and religious tolerance, only drawing its line belwten citizen and non-citiml. SLlle-building in the twenty-first celltury aims to build plural liberal democracies: rhc lechnucrals invol\'ed should not bc irighlened hy the thciupht of instilling pride in such constitutions.

Crcating a sense of civic nationalism in a weak state is not a danger to the wider world. Thc traditional fears that accompany talk of nationalism are exclusivitv - which civic nationalism denies - and external aggression. which is inconceivable for such ruined polities, and spoken against by the values at the heart of democratic civic nationalism. As Sharansky argues, it is states without legitimacy that constantlv seek external enemies to maintain their strength at home.C3] Collective pride in their institutions helps the citizens of a free state survive and flourish, without seeking a fight. Democratic civic nationalism, if it could be created, of't'ers the prospcct of a sense of cohesion that trump ethnic or religious identity. helping to hold together the fragile peace in areas laid waste by conflict and . . . ~ I V I S I O ~ . I r can also activcly prevent a pea= settlemelit sliding back into open w x f m . Michael Ignatieffcitcs the razing of Vukovar as an insta~lcc of the destmclion Iha ethnic mtionalism can producc, where two self-identitied nations contend for the same piece of hnd.[4] Ry contrasl. in Ihe United Slates, K o k n E. Lee refused the suggestion of continuing the Confrderatc campaign uia guerilla tactics despite a good chslxe olsuccess. citing its effcct upon the nalion. For the same rrasons. Clrsnt chose to show clemency to his defeated cnunt1yman.[51 Civic nalionalism is just ns useful when peace is settled and statebuilding is underway. Whcn facing the h i task of creating stalecapacity from the gmond upwmd. lying nationhocii to ncw administrative stntctures helps to legitimise their provbions. beginning thc p r w w hy which a b~~rcaucrnt~c scheme hecomes a national inwilution. noth sitles ut thc polilical specllum have hegull to see the subsmnce of this p i n 1 at home. The cditor oiProsprct. Drvld Golrdhrut. Ins argued that mai~itaining the wellare slate demands solnc sciise of nilti~mal mhesionI0], while Roger

Scrutnn conlends. in his b01,k. ' T ~ C ~ ~ e d for Nalions'. that there can be no social contract without a sense 01 nationhood.[7]

THE CHARACTER OF PATRIOTISM OR COSMOPO1,ITANISM IS WHAT MATTERS-ITS SUPERIOR TO REJECT PRACTICES INSTEAD OF THE THEORY AS A WHOIX

Brennan, 01 (Timothy, professor of cultural studies, comparative literature, and English at the University of Minnesota, "Cosmo-Theory", The South Atlantic Quarterly, 100.3, project muse)

On the other hand, cosmopolitanism has prompted some of these very symptoms. It is a fundamentally ambivalent phenomenon. An ethical argument for cosmopolitanism or for its nominal opposite (vatriotism) cannot be based on a formal adherence to a list of positive qualities. Onc's judgment of cosmouolitanism's value or desirability, in other words, is affected by whose cosmopolitanism or patriotism one is talking about-whose definitions of pl~judice, knowledge, oropen- mindedness ollc is rele~ring (End Page 6591 to. Cusrnoplrliti%oisni is Imrri whik denying its local character. This denial is an mtrinric ffaturr nf cosmopolitanism and inhel~nt lo its appeal.

NATIONALISM ISN'T INTRINSICALLY LINKED TO IMPERIALISM AND ALTERNATIVES CAN EASILY FACILITATE IT

Resina, 03 (Joan, Professor of Romance SLudies and Comparative Literature at Cornell University, diacritics, 33.3/4 46-74, projechnuse)

In the wast, nationalism could replace dynastic ambition and religious intolerance as a ground for imperialism. heca1~c il was the one political doctrine that the masses could fccl as thcir own. Nalionalism ultimately mmnt r lovemment of the people. hy the peoplc. for the people: and twentieth-century dicwols

u~ldcr.stood this V ~ I Y weu nhcn they resorted to popuhm in ~ d c r t~ p r o i : ~ ~ themselves as the nation ~ I ~ C ~ I I I ~ L ~ . B u ~ other things are cavable of grounding imperialism. including free markets and democracy. AII that this proves is thal an adjectival functiun should not hc taken fora nominal one. Imperialism. a degadcd form of universality, il~volves unequal interactions both inside and outside the natiunal guup. Its hierarchical arrangemerl of the internal social co~npsition correlatec with profoundly unequal external retdtions based on domu~alion. Imperialism b. at thc limit, a suuggk for global power and resources. It views space from the top down. whcreas nationalism is steeped in the

scnseofplace. Detractors of nationalism, blind to the institutionalization of violence in colonial or semicolonial situations, tend to associate the ravages of imperialism with the struggles of groups seeking to disengage themselves from the clutches of an abusive state, Such critics often justify domination with thc argument that thc alien state is the bearer of a universal culture and the source of precious rights for the dominated; ill shon, a n y ofcivilization in Ihcnativedarkness.

Yet thc racism inhrrer in c~~ltural Darwinism i s explicit in such Ibrmulatirms. As Clu-istopher Miller remarks of African pre-independence [End Page 591 movements, "nationalism" in this period designates any form of resistance to colonialism and involved an assertion of African rights. Rnd.~mcntalto this nalionalis~~l u,as it? opp.lsi1ion to Eunipean aothoritg. wlmle\er ils institulional form or ohjxti\es; independently, that is. of that authorityk form of self-legilin~atbn [121]. In other wonls, even r democratic colonialism, il il were no1 a paradox, would bc illegitu~ute because the uniulfillcd right to self-determinmion would belie the pl-etended quality b d on h e gneralizarion of individual rights.

Michigan 7 week juniors Cosmo~oli tanism

AT: NAZI GERMANY PROVES NATIONALISM IS BAD

HITLER WASN'T A NATIONALIST

Resina, 03 (Joan, Professor of Romance Studies and Comparative Literature at Cornell University, diacritics, 33.3/4 46-74, projectmuse)

"Nationalism," says Fukuyama, "is therefore fully capable of replacing dynastic and religious ambition as a ground for imperialism, and did precisely that in the case of Germany" [266]. But this is to beat one dog for another's mischief. It is to think of nationalism as the cause of imperialism, even though the former has often been immolated to the latter. Germany is a case in point. Nationalist feeling ran high there after the turn of the nineteenth century, reaching a feverish pitch after World War I. But it is worth remembering that Hitler was not a nationalist in a strict sense. Had he been one, [End Page 581 he would have satistied himself with the reversal of the humiliating treatv of Versailles and at most with the Anschluss of the European areas settled by ethnic Germans. He would not have squandered his initial successes in pursuit of unlimited Lebensraum in the East and of racial domination worldwide. Hitler of course knew what he really was about, and declared it in a letter to Hermann Rauschning: The "nation" is a uolitical expedient o f democracy and Liberalism. We have to get rid o f this false conception and set in its vlace the conception o f race, which has not been yet politically used up. The new order cannot be conceived in terms of the national boundaries of peoples with a historical past, but in terms of race tlzat transcends tlzose boundaries. . . . I have to liberate the world from dependence on its historical past. Nations are the outward and visibleJorms ofour history. So I have to fuse these nations into a higher order $1 want to get rid of the chaos of an historic past that has become an absurdity. [qtd. in Finkielkraut, In the Name 5 I ] An antinationalist who knew that the nation is a liberal and democratic idea, Hitler was motivated by a materialist universalism based on biological "values." Like a full-fledged postnationalist, he despised the historical atavism of selr-governing peoples and dreamed of a loftier dispensation based on the transcultural notion of race. Race solidarity would sweep away the historical clutter, which, to this visionary of a new world order, looked as absurd as it does today to those who ridicule the struggle for identity of slalclcss peoples. Hitler's lack of interest in settling historical claims through geography led him to remove them by displacing conflict to the biological terrain. His vision has fallen into extreme disrepute, as has that of its main competitor, Communism's own narrative of universality beyond the fetters of the past and the subjectivities of the present. Ironically, it was Liberalism that revamped the idea of superseding history in a world order free from cultural or spatial attachments and populated by "citizens" from whom national identity had been extirpated like a useless and potentially harmful organ and replaced with placebo identities based on subjective dispositions, such as consumer or sexual "preferences," or the more or less fanatic dependence on services tailored to individual profiles.


I ALTERNATIVE FAILS

APPEALS TO THE NATION ARE VITAL TO RESISTING CORPORATE DOMINATION-THE DISCOURSE OF THE DEMISE OF THE NATION-STATE 1s IRRESPONSlRLE AND FACILITATES BOTH CORI'ORATE AND NATIONAL POWER INTERESTS

Brennan, 01 (Timothy, professor of cultural studies, comparative literature, and English at the University oS Minnesota, "Cosmo-Theory", The South Atlantic Quarterly? 100.3, projecl muse)

In this atmosphere, it is common~lace for even progressive iournalists to assume that "common-sense international law" should "transcend outdated sovereign rights.!, 2 Onc gcncrally does not ewn feel thc nced to defend this proposition today. The ~rpmted ass~unplinn is that ordiniu'y people have the samc access to cducati~~n. funding. and trakel that intellectuak and businessprople do. and that they can exploit the same global networks of ct~mmunration in a r:uiely uf foreign langl~dges. Such mistaken nssnmptions are the product of Lhe cosmopolihnism ofculturi~l politiciails who actually do live tr.~nsnalionally. and whosc humanistlethiwl oullot>k enli\,ens

md. in some ways. softens I I X ~ policy suggs~iuns in the public sphel-C. Among the issues forgotten here are those key advantages nations provide the global subalterns they wish to free from the lvranny of the national state-advantages that are p y And yet, anv prosessive vision todav depends on such myths. For, outside cosmopolis, thev represent the onlv basis for 0rEanizing opposition to the corporate carnivale~~ue flo echo Stallyhass and white agin). The pos~tive connotations oTcosrnopoljtanlsm in colbqui?l usagc

msoirrcprt.ssihlethat we continuallv see the critic discoveri in^" an ethical stance that balefullv. and without his or her wanting it to, homologizes itself with corwrate interests, cchoina official American langua~e, repeating forgotten earlier movements. and demanding no payment from public sentiment. The stance is often consonant with power, and ruffles no feathers. National sovereinntv is said to have been transcended, the nation-state relegated to an [End Page 6721 obsolete form, and the present political situation is seen as one in which newlv dcracinated populations, NGOs, and web users are outwitting a new world order in the name of a boldlv new. onlv partiallv defined, transnational sphere. 23 It is primarilv the cultural discourse of cosmopolitanism-a friendly discourse-rn prevents intellectuals from contestinp this fallacious account of materialities, blinded as thev are by the euphoria of a good will that is convenicntlv good business for them and theirs. For what we are reallv seeing is not a popular transnationalism but the substantively altered competition arnonp national states-the movement from smaller polities 10 nZe,!?UStUteS (with China being the last remining credible adversary to the irnited St tes) . If the world Were globalized in the way 11 is discussed in much of cultural theory, we would not be seeing such hard negotiations amonp the member states of the European Union nor the defections from it; we would not have the trade showdowns that pcriodicallv arise between the United States and Japan. the Uniicd slates and Mexico; or haween ~ e n e z u c ~ a and B~azil: and we would not have the national disparities exisling in wage levels, ecological legislation. or the rights of judicial r e d r e s s - d i s p ; ~ i t i ~ s that arose historically as a rcsuh of the dilferenr

ethnic compositions of thr workforce as WCII as distinct II~I~OW~I-putitical uditions. Corporations depend on these disparities, and thev are enforced only bv the policing o~erations of national governments. Equally. Iwwever. such disparities an be smuggled in thrnugh the back doorcvcn as their

effectiveness is usherd out the front. Tu put this more hlnntly. nations continuc to exist because the major ulavers have a vested interest in their contin~ing. Working people need nations in order to have sometme to complain to: corpotations nced nations in order 10 ensure a lack of fair competilion iind tlm absence oi an equality of law. so that adynamic flux can be mahtaincd withn a sating of monopoly. What ensures Lhe conlinnity of an albcit altered ratinn-slate sylem is the desirability olchoices for wpil;~l mobility, so that capital can move when it finds too many regulations in one locale and more nmmeble legislation elsewhere. This son of flux aUows bidding and outbilkling among the cl~ents of mnnopnly, and stands in as an imposter for thc "free market" by simuluting it. It is no1 that no novclty cxists in the subsequent demographic creations ofthis system-that Lkre is no reithly to

what comopolitanism calls new "world subjects," new diilsporic communities. urnnoled :md resoorceful. 24 B u ~ if One JlleanS bv nlobalization the creation of new "world subiects" [End Page 6731 who are not bound bv the laws and territorial limitations of localitv-or, indeed. are necessarily happv in their uurootedness-one is indulging in a fiction. and is either missing the point or obscuring it bv looking at svmptoms whose significance is alwavs exaxgerated.

THEIR ALTERNATIVE REJECTS ALL FORMS OF IDENTITY-IT CEDFS THE POLITICAL TO THE RIGHT AND MAKES MORE EXTREME FORMS OF IDENTITY INEVITABLE

Hayward, 04 (Clarissa Rile Hayward, Ohio State University Department of Political Science, Constitutional Patriotism and Its Others, the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2004 http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/intranet/poltheory/Constitutional~Patriotism.pdf')

As Ihs debate hetwccn cusmopolit~ns and civic nationalists has unfolded in lerent years. there secms ti1 have cmeqed i~ nur-consensual disxitkfxtion with both exmemcs. Oosmupolilanis~n-

valued by Inally for the ways it can cxpand the boundaries nfmo~:ll concern- seems plagued by sigoilicnnt binding problems. As noted aborc. democracv re~uires cohcsion. It requires some form of civic bond sufficicnllv strong that it defines a political people that might, at leas1 in principle, be self-governing. Liberal democrats who adopt a cosmopolitan stance, some critics argue, inadvcrtentlv create what William Connolly characterizes as an identitarian "black hole."7 Thev cede the political field, that is to say, to those who would promote politically efficiacious ethnic. racializcd, and gendered nationalisms.8


I ALTERNATIVE FAILS L

NO ALTERNATIVE-A FOCUS ON DISCOURSE AND P O W R DOESN'T CAUSE POLITICAL CHANGE

MeClean, 01 (David, Ncw School University, "The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope", http://www.american- philosophy .org/archi ves/past-confe~nce-progrilrns/pc200 1/Discussion%~20papers/david~mcclean.ht~n)

Or we misht take Foucaub who, at k s t . has providexi 11s with what may ~ e a s o n a b l ~ be described w a very long and eccentric footnote to Nictzschc (1 have once k e n accused. by a Poucaltian

true believer. of "pekiing'. ~ o n c a u ~ t with o t k r similar r e m k s ) . Foucault, who has provided the Left of the late I 960s tln.oogh the pitscnt with S U C ~ notions as "govcrnmentality," 3'L"~iit: wi~rclimlugy,u "disco~rse" ' ' p o ~ e r ' ~ and "ethics," seating or redcfininp their meaninp. has made it overabundantly clear that ail of our moralities and practices are the successors of previous ones which derive fromcertain

coufiguraticms ofsnvoirad con~iais;u~ce arisinc from or created by, respectively, thc discourses of the various scieoiific schoo~s. BUI I have not yet found in anything Foucault wrote or said how such observations may be translated into a volitical movement or hammered into a political document or theory (Ict alone public policies) that can be iustified or founded on more than an arbitrary aesthetic experimentalism. ln fact, Foucault would have shuddered if any one cvcr did. since he thought that anything as grand as a movement wcnl far beyond what he thought appropriate. This leads me to mildly re~tabi~i~ntc ~ a b e r m ~ , for at ~e;csr he has h e n usetill in exposing Fuucault's shottcomings in this reg:utI, just as he hfls been uscful in cxposing lhe shortcomings of others enamored wirh the abstractions of various Marxian-Freudii~n social

critiques. u ~ o r wme rewon, a least paltially cxplimtd in Richard ~ o r t y ~ s AchievinE o u r ~ounmy, a book that I think is long overdtxl, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those iust mentioned, and a litanv of others includin~ Derrida, D e l e u z e , ~ ~ t a r d . Jamson. and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their . . narrativc attempts to suggest OOI~CV urescnptlons (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelcssness, poverty. market greed, national k l l igere~~ce mil rdcism. 1 w~)uld like to soggmt chat it is lime for American social critics who arc cnamored with this group, Ihuse who aclnally want tn be relevant. to recognize that they ha\.e a disease. and a disease ~egxdinp whlch I mysetf must rememhcr to stay Lithful ro my own twelve step pmgr.am of recovery. The disease is the need for el~borate theoretical "remedies" wnppcd in neoloeical and muhi-syllabic jargon. These elaborak theoretical remedies are more "interesting." to be sure, th;m the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in val-ioiis contrxls. or whether private propcny should be pmtected by the state. or tegarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such aatcmcnts as "We don1

likc m stave" and 'We iie to speak our minds withnut fear of deathm and "We l i e to keep our c h i i e n safe from powny"). As Rony pots it, "When One of todav's academjc leftists says that SOIIE topic has been 'inadeqoatcly theorized; you can be pretty certain thnt he o r s k is going to drag in either philosophy of h n ~ u a ~ e , Or Lacanian psvchoanalvsis. or solnc tm~-Marxisl version UP economic determinism. . . . Thcx fi~tile anempts to philowphi~e om's 'sway into political

rehvanceaTe a svmptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach lo the problems of i ts countn;. Discneanement from practice produces theoretical h a l l u c i n a t i o n ~ c i t ~ l i c s mine).({) o r hh" Ikwey put it in his The Nccd for aRecovery ofl'hilosophy. "1 believe t k ~ t philosophy in America will be lost between chew~ng a historicalcud long since reduced ti> woody fiber, or an apologetics for low causes. . . . . m a ncholaslic, schematic tbr~nalism. unless it can somehow bring to consioosncss America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action" Those who surfer or have suffered fro111 this disease Rony refer:: to as the Cultural Len. which lefl is juxlaposed to the Political l ~ f l that Kony prctcrs and prefers fur good reason. Anmher atvihute of the Culiurnl Len is that its members fancy themselvc? pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the Wesl. rather than some of the barhwous methods fur ilch~ving those successes, as

mostly cvil. and who view anylhing Lilir national pride as equally evil even when t h a ~ pride is tempered with tlic knowlcdgc and dmiusiun of the nation's shoncomings. In othcr words, the Cultural Left, in this c o u n t y too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. A ~ ~ R M I Y C ~ K C C ~ I ~ ~ g ~ t % t h a ~

this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I th"k it may alw bc dimstrous fur our social hopes. as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talcnts to better use if thev burv some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forec public and political possibililics in a spirit of determination a indeed, achieve Our COUntrY - the country oTJefferson and King: the country of lohu Dewcy and Malcum T;; the country of Franklin Roosevclt and Bayard Kustin. and of the later Geurge Wallace and the later Barry Cioldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to thc American sucirty. the time is always ripe to seize the opponunity to help create the "beloved comniunity." o m woven with the thtead of agapc into a conceplualty singlc ye1 diverse tapestry thnt shoots for nothing lcss llnn a wiz inlnl-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein bolh stme sex unions aM1 faitli-based initiatives will be ahle to be part of the same social ~ a l i t y . one wherein business interests and the university .are not seen as bcloaging to two

sepmte pdaxies but w part of the same answcr to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory tooiher imp~wnr questions thilt ;lr~ ICSS bcdarrling and "intcrcstinf" but more imponant to the pmspect of oru tloomhing - questions such as "How is it possible to dcvelop a citizenry that cherishes a celtain hexis, one which prizes rb character ofthe Samaritan on thc road to Jericho aimost more than any olher?" or "How can wc sqonrc the polilkal dogma that utidergirds the hntasy of a missile defense system with the need to meat America as bill one memher in a ci+mmunity of nations under a "law of peoples?" The m w public philocopher might seek to understand labw law and military and made thcory and doctrine as much theories of surplus vaiur; the logic of internatio~ii~l markets and wade agreenwnts as much as critiques of commodification, and thc politics of cumpkxity as much as the politics of power

(all or which can still he done from our c ~ i r s . ) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where inlellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the oflicers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difticult and often unpleasant, imverfect decisions that affect olher peoples' lives. and it means making honest attempts to Lruly understand how those institutions actuallv function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates bv true policy pros who actually know what they arc talkinn about but who lack awareness of thc donnxdtic assum~tions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from ~hilosovhers and culture critics with their snobish disrspecr fur the so-called "managerial class."

Michigan 7 week juniors 67 Cosmopolitanism

ALTERNATIVE FAILS

ALLOWING THE REJECTION OF NATIONALISM TO BE THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF OPPOSITION TO THE PLAN GIVES NATlONAldSM I'OWER AND PREVENTS ITS ARANDONMENT

Calhoun, 02 (Craig, president of the Social Science Research Council and a professor of sociology and history at New York University, "Imagining Solidarity: ECosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and thc Public Sphere," Public Cultidre 14.1 (2002) 147- 17 1 http://muse.ihu.edu/iournals/public culture/v0l4/14.1calhoun.html)

Central to both cosmopolitanism and constitutional patriotism is an image of "bad nationalism." Nazi Germanv is paradigmatic. but morc recent examples. like Slobuddn Milt)sevic's Scrh nationalism, also inlwm thc theories. At the core of each ins1:mm; as senerally understood, is an ethnic

solidarity that triumphs ovcrcivility and liberal values and ultimately tltrns 10 horrific \;MICIIC~. Indeed. the negative force of the nationalist imaginar~ is SO

strong that each of these theoretical positions is defined more than its advocates admit by its opposition to nationalism--by the Other it would avoid. But advocates of "postnational" society do themselves, and theory, no favors by equating nationalism with ethnonationalism and understanding the latter primarily through its most distasteful examples. Nations have often had ethnic vedi~rees and employed ethnic rhetorics, but they are modern products of shared political, cultural, and social particivation, not mere ~assive inheritances. To treat nationalism as a rclic of an earlier order, a sort of irrational expression, or a lund of moral mistake is to fail to see both the continuinp power of nationalism as a discursive formation and the work--sometimes positive--that nationalist solidarities continue to do in the world. As a result, nationalism is not easily abandoned cven if its myths, contents, and excesses are easilv debunked. 4 Not only this, the attempt to equate all nationalism with problematic ethnonationalism [End Page 1501 sometimes ends up placing all "thick" understandings of culture and the cultural constitution of political practiccs. toms. and identities on the nationalist side of the dichotomv. Only quite thin notions of "political culture" are retained on the attractive, postnationalist side. 5 The problem here is that republicanism and democracy depend on more than narrowly ~olitical culture--thcv dcpcnd on richer ways of c~n~ti tut ing life together. Recognizing this, Habermas suggests that "the qumtiun arises of whether then: cxista a funcliundl equivalent for the fusion of. the nstion of citizens

with theethnic nation." 6 H c i s right that democracy has depended on national identities to a meater demec than manv critics of nationalism recognize. His formulation. however, tends to equate all nationalism with ethnic nationalism. " ~ h e ~ ~ r i ~ ~ - ~ t a t c owes ils historical success to the faa that it suhslituted relations of sohd,uitv between the citizens for the disinteeratinr cornoralive ties of early modern %lclety. But this re~oblican achievement - - . is endangered when, conversely. the integrntivc force of the natic~n of citizens is traced back to the prepolilical fi~a of a qnaqi-natural people. that is, to somethk: inkpendent of. and prior to tllc

political opinion- and will-formation ~f the citizens thcIns~l\~S." It is true that nationalist rhetoric often invokes the notion of a prevolitical people as the basis for all legitimate politics. Relying only on the negative image, though, leads Habermas to neglect . . - - . .

the im~ortance of other nationalist imaginaries to the nUI-tUranCe of democratic politics. The fo~lndi~lpoftheUnited Stntes anti subscoocnt U.S. co~a~itutionalism oCfcr one useful eramole. 11 is true rhal the colonisls-Iumed-ni~tiun~lisls lhuuehl of thcmsel\,es la r~elv as bearers of "thc rkhts 01 freeborn Bnrlishmen." But - . lheir appeal was not. in the mam. to an ethnic identity. Crucially. in fact. it was m appeal to an idcnrity t'orged by public discourse itsrlf. 6 [End Paxe 1511 This is pan of what .h-endl celebrated, s c e i n ~ rhc Revolutiun as a prime example of the cap~city of public life for world-making. founding. l In this sensc, the nation seems more a common projccl, mediated by public discol~rse and the coileclive lormation of culture, 1h;m simply an inheritance.

THE ALTERNATIVE IS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE

Robbins, 97 (Bruce, teaches English and Comparative Literature at Rutgers University, Theory & Event, 1 :2, "Cosmopolitanism and Boredom", Project Muse)

Nussbai~m thus a p p w s to hegin from a very diffcrcnt principle than the w-callrd cuhurnl left. BUI she ton insists on obligations and commitments that refuse to slop short at the borders 01-the

nation. (And m so doing, one mght s ly she aL~n exposes some crypttlnormativity among the culturalists.) Resuscitating a cosmopolitan ideal loosely attributed to the Stoics. Nussbaum bravely calls for a primary allegiance to 'the worldwide communitv of human beings.' Just how brave this proposal is can be measured by the massive hostility it provokes. It is auite a spectacle. With a few exceptions, liberals and conservatives join in a shockinglv smooth bipartisan consensus against this or any challenge to the American nation. Michael Walzcr, forgetling what Stalin did lo those he calfcd cormopolitans. tries to lxcosmo~~lilattism with the brush ulStnlinism. Foreigners wn't be granted thc lnoralrights of fcllow citizens. says Nathan (;tlzer. Otherwise, we wc~uld be fnrced to allow an onlimited number nf't'hird World refugees into the CIS. (A Ileal bit olilloeic. on a p:u with believing that wcialism means having to shar2 your toothbnlsh.) Our boat is ti~ll. But cosmopoli1anism itself is empty. Accnrding to Robert Pinsky, il's as cmply of affect md constituzucy as Esprranto. Cosmopolilanism is 'a view of the world 1hat would be tmc only il people were not driven by emuliuns.'


ALTERNATIVE DOESN'T SOLVE PUBLIC SPHERE

ENGAGING THE RIGHT POLITICALLY CAN TRANSFORM THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND IS VITAL TO ENACTING REFORMS

McClean, 01 (David, New School University. "The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope", http://www.amrican- philosophy .orglarchives/past~conferenceeprograms/21 IDiscussion%20pape~~/david~mcclean. htm)

Our new president, possessing no towering intellect, talks of a people who share a continent, but arc not a nation. He is right, of course. We are only beginning lo l e m to put tribal loyalties aside and to let ourselves take seriously other more salutary possibilities. though we delude ourselves into believing that wc have made great progress. Perhaps so-called "compassionate conservatism," though a gimmick to win a political contest. will bear a small harvest of unintended and positivc consequences, although 1 remain dubious about this if the task of thinking through what it might actually mean remains the chore of Georgc W. Bush. But if the not-too-Neanderthal-Right is finally willing to mect thc not-too- wacky-Left at a place of dialogue somewhere in the "middle," then that is good news, provided the Left does not miss the opportunity to rendcvous. Yet, there is a problem here. Both the Cultural Left and the Cultural Right tend to be self-righteous purists. The best chance, then, is for the emergence of Rorty's new Political Left, in conjunction with a new Political Right. The new Political Left would be in the better position of the two to frame the discourse since it probablv has the better intellectual hardware (it tends to be more open-minded and less dogmatic) to make a true dialogue work. They, unlike their Cultural Left peers, might find it more useful to be a little less inimical and a littlc morc sympathetic to what the other side might, in good failh, believe is at stake. They might leave bchind some of the bangage of the Cultural Left's endless ruminations (Dewey's philosophical cud chewing) about commodity fetishization. or whether the Subject has really died, or where crack babies fit into neo-capitalist hegemonies, and ioin the political frav by parsing and exposing the more basic idiotic claims and dogmas of witless politicians and dangerous ideologues, while at the same time finding common ground, a larger "We" perspective that includes Ronald Reagan and Angela Davis under the same tent rather than as inhabitants of separate worlds. Thc operative spirit should be that of fraternal disagreement, rather than self-righteous cold shoulders. yet I am not at all convinced lhat anything 1 have described is about to happen, though this essay is written to help force the issue, if only a little bit. I am convinced that the modern Cultural Left is far from ready to actuallv run the risks that come with being taken scriouslv and held accountable for actual volicy-relevant prescriptions. why should it? It is a hell of a lot more fun and a lot more safe pondering the intricacies of high theory, patching together the world a vriori (which means without any real consideration of those officers and bureaucrats 1 mentioned who are actually on the front lines of policy formation and regulation). However the risk in this apriorism is that both the conclusions and the criticisms will miss the mark, regardless of how g m t the minds that are engaged. Intellectual rigor and complexity do not make silly ideas politically salicnt, or Icss pernicious, to paraphrase Rorty. This is not to say that air-headed jingoism and conservative rants about republican virlue aren't equally silly and pernicious. But it sccms to me that the new public philosopher of the Political Left will want to pick better yardsticks with which to mcasure.herself. IS it really possible to philosophize by holding Foucault in one hand and the Code of Federal Regulation or the Congressional Record in the other? Given that whatever it has meant to be a philosopher has been under siege at various Icvcls, 1 see no reason why referrins to the way things are actually done in the actual world (I mean really donc. not done as we might imagine) as we think through issues of public morality and social issues of iustice shouldn'l bc considered a viable alternative to the way philosophy has proceeded in the past. Instead of replacing epistemology with hermeneutics or God knows what else as the foundation of philosophical practice, we should move social philosophers in the direction of becoming more like social and cultural auditors rather than further in the direction of mere culture critics. We might be able to recast philosophers who takc-up questions of social justice in a serious way as thc ones in society able to traverse not only disciplines but the distances between the towers of the academy and the bastions of bureaucracies seeking to honestly and sometimes dishonestly assess both their failings and achievements. This we can do with a special advantage over economists, social scientists and policy specialists who me apt to take the narrow view of most issues. We do have examples of such persons. John Dewey and Karl Poppcr come to mind as but two examples, but in neither case was there enough grasp of the actual workings of social institutions that I believe will be called for in order to properly minister to a nation in need of helpful philosophical insights in policy formation. Or it may just be that the real work will be pcrformcd by philosophically grounded and socially engaged practitioners rather than academics. People like George Soros conlc to mind here. But there are few people like George Soros around. and I think that the improbability of philosophers emerging as a special class of social auditor also marks the limits of socid hope, inasmuch as philosophers are the class most likelv to see Ihc places at which bridges of true understanding can be buill not only between an inimical Right and Left. but between public policy and the deep and relevant reflections upon our humanity in which philosophers routinely engage. If philosophers seek to remain what the public thinks we are anyway, a class of persons of whom it can be said, as Orwell put it, One has to belong to the intelligen~sia to believe things like that; no ordinary man could be such a fool, then I do not know from what other class of persons to turn to navigate the complicated intellectual and emotional obstacles that prevent us from the achievement of our country. For I do no1 see how policy wonks, political hacks. politicians, religious ideologues and special interests will do the work that needs to be done to achievc the kind of civic consensus envisioned in our Constitution and Declaration of Independence. Without a courageous new breed of public intellectual, one that is able to help articulate new visions for community and social well being without f m of reaching out to others that may not share the namow views of the Cultural Left and Cultural Right, I do not see how America moves bevond a mere land of toleration and oligarchv.


I COSMOPOLITANISM CAUSES INTERVENTION I COSMOPOLPTANLSM NECESSITATES HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Hayden 05- Senior Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Wellington-(Patrick, "Cosmopolitan global politics ", Pg 90, Ashgate Publishing, January 2005)

In contrast, the cosmopolitan perspective of the responsibility to protect 'implies an evaluation of the issues from the point of view of those seeking or needing support, rather than those who may be considcring intervention' (ICISS 2001: 17). Consistent with the three-fold duties associated with the basic human rights approach, the responsibility to protect includes three integral component" (1) the resaonsibilitv to react to an actual or apprehended human catastrophe, ( 2 ) the resvonsibility to prevent it. and (3) the responsibility to rebuild after the event. Thc comprehensively humanitarian dimensions of the responsibility to protect ihercfore extend beyond the 'Lraditional. narrow perception of securitv' in order to address threats to human security that 'deeply affect and involve individual human beings in fundamental ways' (ICISS 2001: 15). For this reason, the potential use of military intervention for human protection aurposes is an obligation borne by states and the global community in order to protect 'the security of people against threats to life, hcalth. livelihood, personal safety and human dignityl(ICISS 2001: 15). Therefore what is suggested here is that any legitimate military action can only be iustified from a cosmo~oIitan pers~cctive that intemates human securitv and the right to peace with the criteria of just war theory. Contraiy to realist assumptions such a perspcctive regards war as generally illegitimate and requires strong justification for particular instances of warfare as genuinely humanitarian exceptions to an otherwisc comprehensive interdiction of the use of military As a humanitarian exception armed conflict should only be recognized as legitimate in so far as it is undertaken not for the purpose of enhancing a state's power or furthering its 'national inlerests', but to arotcct the rights of fellow human beings and restore a secure and peaceful social order. The resort to armed force ought only to be contemplated and undertaken in thc name of humanity-as the universal community of all persons conceived as equal rights-holders-and not of states per se. Just as we can acknowledge the wrongness of crimes anairzst humanity, so too can we admit the rightness of act in^ on behalf of humanity. While states may function as the primary actors m a legitimately just conflict any threat or use of force must be governed by universally binding principles, and states-particularly the major powcrs-should accept that the threat or use of force must be part of an integrated, usually multilateral strategy (such as with a UN Security Council resolution specifying a clear mandate and detailing the arrangements under which forcc will be used) employed in conjunction with nonviolcnt diplomatic, political and economic mechanisms.


COSMOPOLITANISM FAILS

COSMOPOLITANISM'S INABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR REALISM PREVENTS IT FROM SOLVING--THERE'S NO WAY TO ACCOUNT FOR THE NATION-STATE'S MONOPOLY ON VIOLENCE

Scheuerman, 05 (William, Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, December, http://www.politicalreviewnet.com/polrev/reviews/CONS/R 1351 0487 052 1005363.asp)

Nonetheless, it would probably be a mistake to dump realism in the trash can of critical intellectual history. Most obviously, the ambitious models of global cosmopolitan governance presently embraced by many critical theorists invite realist counterarguments. Despite its many flaws, realism offers a rich source for theoretical skepticism about cosmopolitanism: any plausible model of cosmovolitanisn~ will simply have to be able to respond successfullv to realist reservations. Cosmopolitans unable to tackle forcefully realist criticisms risk reproducing the theoretical and political errors of earlier models of global federalism or world gOVernment. Likc Bettrmd Russell and the othcr "worhl fcdcralists" or "one-

worlders" who prnliferated after the horrjfic bon~bings of Himshim and Nagasaki, their otherwise normativelv attractive efforts to transform global p0ljtics are likelv to KXIlain ineffective. Unfortonarcly, a fair-mindud examination of thc Rcent critical theory literature suggests that it fiils miserably on Ulis SCUE.[I] F i~r rou many ol its cummcnts about realist theory are misleading and downright ignorant. and there is little evidence of sustained lhcorclcal analysis. My impression is ihnl most contemporvy cosmopolitan-minded critical theorists pnssess 31 most o ntdimentary fbmiliarity with the realist tradition. For example, one lypically encounters the claim that a d e f e n . ~ of the modem nation- state constitlltcs n cnrc rcalisl mncr, despite [he [act that the arch-re:ilisl Morpenllrau not only repwt~dly underscored the anachronistic chaactcr o l l k natiotl-warn, bur also prnposed ambitious

land s~ill onrealizedt models for the s~tpranationai contmlofnuclm wcapmls. The failure to address realism seriously is especially troubling in light of the Achilles' heel of recent critical theorv versions of cosmovolitanism. "Our (e.g., critical theory) side," with some notable exceptions (Mary Kaldor, to mention one candidate) has had relatively little to say about the changing nature of warfare, state violence, and the uglier facets of interstate relations-in short, with precisely those issues which realists have been preoccupied. Dcspitc o~lrrelative silcncc on these qocstioss, ctitieal theory models for global govrrnana: tencl to ionk most nmhitious and utopian whcn they are at stake. Thus, in Habermas's recent model ol cosmopnlitan democracy, core social policy a d regulatory tasks are to b? let1 II> the hands of regional political and econc~mic bklcs (for example. the E u m p n Union), whereas acctlrity and peace-keeping fitnctions apparently are to he undertaken by 3 strengthened and democratized United Natium. In othcr words. thc most explosive features of polilics directly related la lk stata's monopoly over violence are to be institutionally transformed even morc dramattally and radically lhan the

(admittedly cnntn,versial) tasks of social and econnmic regulation. ~ f c o u w . an obvioos qllcstion immediately presents i~self: by what political process might the great powers (and es~ecially the United States) be forced to subiect their awesome military privileges to decision makjng by a supranational organization potentially dominated by representatives of poor non-western countries? If I am not mistaken, one searches in vain in recent cosmopolitan critical theorv for a satisfactory answer to this ~ue~ f ion . When discuss~ng this issue, Hahermas. for example lends to emphasize the potential virtues of transforming the Hnmpean Union into el effecliw 'glohal player" on the f b r r i ~ n scene.[2] Ye1 his argnmenls abo111 thc EU hardly do juslicc to the ndicnl (indocd. rcvolutionwy) implicnliuns of thc claim thal a p o w a f ~ ~ l democfiflized supctnalionnl body is the most sppropriate institulional site fc~r determining the fundamental question of ww (ta peace.

UNIVERSALIZING IDENTITY THROUGH COSMOPOLITANISM RISKS CHEATING A GI.ORAL NATlON RASED IJI'ON AMERICAN IDENTITY


The debate over the fate ofthe nation today takes place as a debate over nations as such. With some exceptions, no fundamental distinction is entertained between those created by imperial expansion and those created, some [End Page 6851 three centuries afterward, by the peoples resisting that expansion. To argue today that the nation is dead is then doubly vexed: on one hand, for ignoring the prognoses of policvmakers who know quite well this isn't so; on the other. for borrowing uncritically from the perspective of policvmakers who would like to replace many states (seen as pathetically belated, fictional, and unviable) with one or two-a trulv "world state" whose character and systems of value they had a crucial role in determining. In this latter case, they would not (of course) be explicitly built in the name of any existing nation, only serving its interests in a mediated way. Here we return to the cosmopolitan fantasy that has existed in the medieval church and, in its modern form, in Kant's Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay (1795). However. now it is conducted under the rubric of a realpolitik composed of rapid deployment forces, carrier jets, cruise missiles, and satellite surveillance. A national idea based on Amcrica as a "universal nationn-hegemonized through popular culture. fashion. and the Internet-can be imagined for the first Lime. The global management problem, many now argue, has been solved, and thus Kant's ideal is possible for the first time. The real debate-although it is never put in these terms-is this: Is the alobe now manageable? If so, then it is on its way to becoming a single nation, which is the situation that most cultural theory refers to--fatally and cosmovoIitica11~-as "transnationalisn~."


COSMOPOLITANISM FAILS

THEIR ARGCMENTS ABOUT WHY CRlTICAL THEORY CAUSES POLILT CHANGE ARE EMPIRICALLY FALSE AND HORRIBLY OUT OF TOUCH-COSMOPOLITANISM IS EASILY COOPTED AND DOESN'T UNDERSTAND THE WORKINGS OF PRESENT GOVERNMENTS


Apal from their internal contradictions, such mcapes are a ruse, for they conceal a homology among intellectual sectors that is visible only in institutional settings. In fact, this invocrltion of "complicity" in theory is one of several ways in which theory's conccpts outwit protest. stealing its

energies and replacing it with anarchist values that can in practice only arise in public spaces that arc ncoliberal. The cultural theorist weirdlv misrecognizes him- or herself in the cram mirror of povernment policy, as recent U.S. scandals show, even as they archive stark examplcs of intellectual flow: the Christian Right uses sexual harassment strategies in order to impeach the "abortion President"; Deleuzo-Foucauldian atlacks on aovernmentalitv reverberate against a chorus of Republican calls to get thc "government off our backs"; the ecstatic attention to the "subiect" coincides with reduced access to citizenship in Europe and North America: a nolitics of identitv intersects with perfect congruency the demands of fashion's nichc marketinn; and, above all, thc obsolescence of sovereignty achieves its "radical" eloquence at about the moment NATO discovers rogue ethnics in the Balkans insisling on a horrific, recidivist principle like that of the nation-state. The positions on either side of thesc paradoxical binarisms are. not equivalent since,forrnalisms never are. They are, however. related: and they strengthen one another in the public sphere-not as a result of conspiracy, and in the name of different gods. But above all, naively, as though intellectuals did not work for anyone. or had no home. The discourse of cosmopolitanism develops within fields of acade~llic subspecialization against the background of broader and more popular discourscs. The relationship of theorv lo official policv-making or to the media is almost never svstemalicallv worked out. Ucultural theory has usually heen vigilant about calling its own bluff when it came to methodology-providing methodological selGcriticisms as integral parts of its argumcnt+osn~o-thtx has nevefihclcss been sqaearnish about analyzing the place of the researchers themselves in fm~newcxks of mutual interest. What is the economic function of the culturalist intellectual? Where do we place the anthropologists, [End Page 6761 sociologists. literary critics, and cultural studies prc3fessors in the vectors of the U.S. econorny? What relationship do we have to the state? Cosmo-Theory Above all. my choice of the term c-osnzo-theory is to suggest an unacknowledged consensus+ne that constitutes a constellation of related premises and values. However unacceptable it might bt: merely to group together critics of different trainings. styles, and concrete beliefs in pursuit of a collective point, it is equally unacceptable to avoid synthesizing a visible trend in public discourse. or to avoid an attempt at chlrracterizing it as such. Proposing to offer such a characterization clarifies issues that would not be clarified otherwise, and it goes some way toward offering an expressive and alienated truth. At any rate, that wo~~ld be my defense for using a term that many will at first consider narrow or conflating, but that is marking a collection of tendencies that arc familiar. I indicate in my footnotes some of the representative work in which the following features can be found so as not to leave matters anonymous. or to create the impression that. I imagined or invcnted them. What 1 am calling COS~O-theorv begins usually by citing a very long tradition of writing and thinking on extranational impurities, where the point is made that human pc~pulations exist in no discrete cultural, ethnic, or political realm. This unassailable observation, however, tends to be accompanied by more questionable corollaries. Striking in its general contours is the following: First, the coupling of an overdeveloped sensitivitv to signilkant cases of mixed forms of cultural life-usually related in vivid. anecdotal form-with a relativelv weak understanding of processes of power, labor management, tenitoriai control, or eovernance, as though its usefulness to arguments about forms of government depended on it being shielded from unseemly power. A strong descriptive armature tends to be coupled with a weak sociological imperative. It is a discourse of "processes," "movements," unfoldings rather than designs. projects, or campaigns. Life is described as what happens to people. 31 It is not as though therc were no role for agency in such theories. which on the contrary rely on excited exaggerations of activity, cxxativity. and plebeian initiative. But agency is almost never seen in moments of civic participation. It is primarily about subject formation. Agency, in fact, tends to be seen as a gradual process of coming to accept a fait accompli, [End Page 67'71 and learning to mobilize it. Modernity is ar lurge-a phrase that inreresingly implies pervasiveness as well as culpability (as though modernity were a perpetrator who had not yct been caught). Second, cosmo-theory depends on exaggerating the degree to which people in thc outlying districts of what one critic calls the "globd ecunxne" have actually broken with the past. 32 In cosmo-theory. modernity is generally considered to be ubiquitous-its penetration complete, and largely welcome. Here one is struck by -- the relative absence of any substantive proof for this penetration of metropolitan style, pace. or value, which is almost always overstated. Even now, the villages of rural India or of Latin America-with or without television-are hardly in modernity in any sensc meaningful to cosmopolitans. Quite apart from what the cosmo-theorists are arguing, the world is largely outside modernily, although being in and oul. in this sense. is naturally always a matter of degree. The point, however, is that a vroiection into a dcsircd future is often mistakcn in lhcsc analvses for a documentable nrcsent.


I COSMOPOLITANISM FAILS

COSMOPOLITANISM IS COMPLETELY UNPRACTICAL-IT IGNORES THE REALITY OF THE NATION STATE.

Glazer in 96 (Nathan, Professor emeritus, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University. For Love of Country, "Limits of Loyalty," cd. Cohen, Pg. 62-63)

I have practical objections to this, but also, I believe, principled objeclions. The practical objections are immediately raised by the example of thc Cuban refugees, and they are numerous. Is our government to treat the fleeing Cubans the way it would, for examplc, American citizens, permanent residents. immigrants who have gone through the proper procedures. or rcluugees who have established their bona fides as escaping from persecution'? If so, then what distinctions should it make among those who wish to settle in this country'? Should it make none? Should it defer in the matter of immigration policy to some world body, a committee of the United Nations, perhaps'? Is this what the status of world citizenship suggests or requires? Any immisant or refugee policy Dresupuoses a state, with rules that differentiate among thosc who are allowed entry. in what status and with what rights. This vresu~position docs not mean that those outside the boundaries of the state are without human claims, naked rights, rights that have bcen in large measure suecifked and defined by international protocols. So, we will join in feeding the Rwandan refugees, perhaps join in protecting them, but we will not, for example, give them rinhts to enter the United Stales. All these commitments to others' claims and rights involve costs, in money and lives, and these costs are not assessed against the world, but against the citizens and soldiers of a specific country, the only entity that can lay taxes and require soldiers to obey orders. It is perhaps this reality that also givcs the citizens of a state the ethical right to make distinctions. It is hard to see, practically, how to move beyond a situation in which the primarv Dower to Erant and sustain rights rcsts with constituted sovereign states. 1 suspect that one reason why cosmopolitanism could make sense to the philosophers Martha Nussbaum has studied is that they were citizens of a "cosmopolis"-a near- universal statc and civilization-whose uniformity in rights and obligations was mirrored by a uniformity in city layouts and architecture. (Even their cosmopolitanism, however, may have been stretched when they thought about barbarians and Parthians.) But our situation is radically dil'lerent.

COSMOPOLITANISM IS UNPKACTICAL AND MOST PARTS OF THE WORLD WOULD NOT ENDORSE IT.

Glazer in 96 (Nathan, Professor emeritus, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, For Love of Country, "Linlits of Loyalty," ed. Cohen, Pg. 63-64)

But there is a meaning and significance to boundaries, in personal life and in political lifc, as wcll as a practical utility. Most people around the world seem to want their governments to be smaller and less distant than they are now, rather than give power to larger, more cosmopolitan power centers. Consider how in this ccntury empires have been reduced to a host of squabbling countries-the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian, with perhaps the Chinese next. In our own countrv. federalism shows surprising life, and many want to devolve more and more functions that have been taken on by the national government to thc states and beyond that, to cities, counties, even individual schools. Cosmi~politan values have made considerable headway certainly in the more deve lo~d part of the world, where, for exanlple European loyalty slowly gains on national loyalty. But in t h ~ developing world. we should realize, resistance to cosmopolitan values is strong. The advocacy of cosmopolitan values is often vicwed suspiciouslv as an arrogant insistence by formerly colonial Dowers that their values. Western values, be adopted. Even Singapore, that model of successful modernizalion and Westernization in thc economic sphere. is no candidate for cosmopolitanism in thc political arena, or when it comes to culture. Cosmopolitan political loyalty is a difficult concept to make real and to free from, its inevitable connection with the Western coltural tradition. That, after all. is where it comes from. We see fragments of cosmopolitanism emerging as various international treaties and commitments bcgin to limit the behavior of states for the good of the cntire world, as m agecments on the environment. on the trealment of refugees, on thc rights of women, but all are contcsted vinorously. all deoend on the acceptance of sovereign states to make them effective. and even the oldest international agreements, on the use of violence to settle international disputes and on the kind of weapons that may be used in warfare, are renularly transgressed.


COSMOPOLITANISM FAILS I

COSMOPOLITANISM IS IMPOSSIBLE--THE NATION STATE IS THE ONLY OPTION WE HAVE.

Glazer in 96 (Nathan, Professor emeritus, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, For Love of Country, "Limits of Loyalty," ed. Cohen, Pg. 63-64)

Ideally, one can envisage on one hand an extension of such understandings, and their greater effectiveness in time, together on thc other hand with a devolution of many powers and functions to lower lcvcls of government, not as remote as the national government or the even more remote international agencies, and closer to people, which is what il seems most people want. Daniel Bell once wrote that our national stales seem too small for some functions, too large for others. In an age of powerful multinational corporations. aspiring multinational institutions, and a svrcading demand for the recognition of specific identities that we call "multiculturalism," that certain seems to be thc case. But the process of change must be mediated by the only institutions that have legitimacy and wower, national states. There is no other way to im~lement those asuects of cosmonolitanism that appeal to us. Regarding manv other aspects (for example, political loyalty, culture) we mav uroperlv rcmain skeptical whether a cosmopc~litan world would be better than the one we have.

COSMOPOLITANISM IS DEPENDENT ON THE NATIONSTATE.

Himmelfarb in 96 (Gertrude, Professor Emeritus of the Graduaic School of the City University of New York, "The Illusions of Cosmopolitanism," For Love of Countrv, ed. Cohen, pg 76)

As for more specific principles and policies that Nussbaum presumably chcrishes-the social programs associated with a welfare state. or public education, or religious libertv and tolerance, or the prohibition of racial and sexual discrimination-these depend not on a nebulous cosmopolitan order bul on a vigorous administrative and legal order deriving its authoritv from the state. The first requirement of a welfare state is a state. So too the first requirement of international cooperation, which Nussbaum regards as essential for economic devclopmcnl, environmental protection, and "quality of life issues," is Lhc existence of states capable of undertakinn and enforcing international agreements. "International" has "national" as its necessary and primary ingredient.

COSMOPOLITANISM ROBS PEOPLE OF THEIR IDENTITY AND DESTROYS THE SELF.

Himmelfarb in 96 (Gertrude, Professor Emeritus of the Graduate School of the City University of New York, "The Illusions of Cosmopolitanism," For Love of Country: ed. Cohen, pg 77)

ABOVE ALL. WHAT COSMOPOI,ITANISM OBSCURES. EVEN denics, arc the givens of life: parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritaee. history, culture. tradition. communitv--and nationality. These are not "accidental" attributes of the individual. They are essential attributes. We do not come into the world as floating, autonomous individuals. We come into it complete with all the particular. defining characteristics that KO into a fully formed human being, a being with an identity. Identity is neither an accident nor a matter or choice. It is given, not willed. We may. in the course of our lives, w'ecl or alter one or another of these givens, wrhaps for good reason. But we do so at some cost lo the self. The "urotcan self." which aspires to create an identitv de novo. is an individual without identity. just as the uerson who repudiates his nationality is a person withoul a nation. To pledge one's "fundamental alleniance" to Cosmo~olitanism is to try to transcend not only nationality but all the actualities. particularities. and realities oS life that constitute one's natural identity. Cosmopolitanism has a nice, high-minded ring to it, but it is an illusion, and, like all illusions, perilous.


COSMOPOLITANISM FAILS L

INTERNATIONALISM FAILS--lT LEADS TO A KEJECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

Scarry, 96 (Elaine, English Professor a t Harvard University, "The Difficulty o f Imagining Other People," For Love of Country, ed. Cohen. Pg 99-10)

But on close inspection such attempts to replace internationalism often turn out to entail a rejection of constitutionalism in favor of unanchored good will that can be summarized under the heading of venerous imaginings. It is therefore important to come face to face with the limit since in scveral different spheres an overly optimistic account is used to legitimate the bypassing oSlegill provisions and constitutional ~rocedures. My worry about the cosmopolitan bypassing of constitutionalism is twofold. The first is the erasure of any authorizing base for the ethical principle one wants to see enforced: if twentv scholars from twenty diSfercnt countries believe a certain right should be protected, they may feel, as they speak with one another, that their views rise above "mere"' nationalism: but in fact their views only reprcscnt the beliefs of twenty peovle (a much smaller number than the population of even the smallcst country), unless the populations ofthe various geographical areas from which they come have themselves voted to uphold the given right. Human rights are universal in content. bul they are parlicular in their base of authorization and enforcement. My second ground of concern, the one to which I address myself here. is the misconception of the imagination thal often inspires the wish to rise above parochial constitutionalisms.

ITS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESCAPE WESTERN IDENTITY-COSMOPOLITANISM JUST GLOBALIZES WFSTERN CULTURE AND THE MARKET

Zolo in 97 (Danilo, Professor of Political and Legal Philosophy at the University of Florence, C o s m o ~ o l i s : Prospects for World Government, Polity Press, Pg 136-137)

Finally, in the opinion of Portinaro, the phenomena of globalization and interdependence induced by the hegemony of western culture and economy fail through the evident asynchrony of development and heterogeneous interests and values to put an end to friend enemy juxtapositions or to the national and internalional tensions produced by the inequality of power. In the face particularisms which make non-negotiable dcmands in so far as they are anchored to the code of collective membership and identities, the liberal utopia more than ever lays bare its limitations and normative emphasis. For not only does the global market not operate as a vehicle for the neutralization of conflicqs and the procedural reduction of politics, but the process of nlobalization ol' thc economv and westernization of the world risks driving the world to ecoloPical coIlapse. Yet again, modernization is revealed as something quite other than the progressive and universalist pro.ject it claims to be.24 One may not share, or one may share only in part, the pessimism of this analysis. For the complex. multifaceted reality of non-governmental international associationism may be credited with a degree of political potential - though certainly not a current political relevance - which will justify some moderate expectation of the spread of an internationalist. pacifist cullure resistant to western hegemony. Furthermore, one can point to the fact that today a feature long seen as among the most elementarv and biologicallv anchored reasons for conflicl between states - temtorial controversies - seems to have become largely obsolete. Howevcr, in my opinion, the vrofoundly ambi~uous character of the processes of globalization remains uncluestionable and. rebus sir srattrihus, so does their total unsuitability to stand as the foundation of cosmopolitan uacifism and transnational democracy. Wkdt western cosmopolitans call 'global civil society' in fact goes no further than a network of connections and functional interdependencies which has developed within certain important sectors of the 'global markel', above all finance, technologv. automation, manufacturing industry and the service sector. Nor, moreover, does it go much beyond the optimistic expectation of affluent Westerners to be able to feel and be universallv recognized as citizens of the world - citizens of a welcomin~. peaceful. ordered and democratic 'global village' -without for a moment or in anv way ceasing to be 'themselves'. i.e. western cili~ens.


I COSMOPOLITANISM FA1 LS I RESISTANCE TO GLOBAL COSMOPOLITANISM MEANS THAT GLOBAL APPROACHES WOULD NOT CAUSE WORLD PEACE.

Zolo, 97 (Danilo, Professor of Political and Legal Philosophy a t the University of Florence, C o s m o ~ o l i s : Prosvects for World Government, Polity Press, 137-138)

The rheloric of civil globalization and of a rising 'cosmo~olitan citizenship' underestimates one of the most characteristic and most serious conseaucnces of the way in which westernization is cultural homoeenization without integration the esteemed citizenships of the West and the countless masses belonging to regional and subcontinental areas without thc development and a high rate of demographic growth. This anta.qonism assumes the form o f a mass migration of individuals often possessing a good level of knowledge and practical skills but economic all^ and voliticallv very weak. Indeed . they are tantamount to agents without citizenship and without birthrights, who, th-arks to their capillary infiltration into the interstices of western socicties. exercise an irresistible pressure for equality. Far from expressinn the maturing of a sense of cosmo~olitan belonging. the response of countries threatened by this 'universalist' pressurc - in terms both of the rejection or violent expulsion of immigrants, and of thc effective negation of their status as civil subjects - is fast becoming one of the most grievous chapters of the civil and volitical historv of western countries. And all s ims voint to a worsening of the situation ovcr the coming decades. It is thc Marshallian notion of citizenship itsclf that is being challenged at its very roots, in that growing numbers of subjects not belonging to the western indigenous majorities are clamouring to become citizenspleno jure of the countries where they live and work. represents a radical challenge in that the very relationshiv between 'citizen' and 'foreigner' is distoaed by the scale of migrations and their uncontrollabilitv and irreversibility. It is also an explosive challenge because it tcnds to disrupt not only the elements of the 'prepolitical' constitution of citizenship, but also the sociological processes of the formation of collective identities and. in addition, the structures which provide the foundation for the rule of law. It is to these structures that the vressinn demand is addressed for 'multi-ethnic' recognition, not onlv of the individual rights of immigrant citizens. but even of the ethnic identities of minorities characterized bv a considerable cultural distance from their host societies. We should therefore distinguish verv clearlv between the holistic character of some of the dramatic problems that currentlv assail the ~olitical agenda of international institutions - the containment of armed conflict, preservation of the fundamental rights of citizens and foreigners, protection of the environment, demographic equilibrium - and the thesis which arwes that such ~roblems we solvable only 'eloballv'. that is, bv resortinn to a su~ranational authority or at least bv graduallv laving the groundwork for its advent. For the first point rel'ers to issues which it would be unrealistic lo contest, but the second is by contrast m ermneous inference. To say that 'global' ~roblems reauire an intense activity of co-ordination and co-operation between the manv national. transnational and international agents involved - in other words, that they require the formation of 'international regimes' is auite different from belief in the thaumaturgic effects of a cosmopolitan implosion of international power such as would lead to a drastic reduction in the com~lexilv of the world 'political environment'.


COSMOPOLITANISM FAILS- CAUSES TOTALITARIANISM

A COSMOPOLITAN WORLD GOVERNMENT WOU1,I) HE 'L'O'l'Al.ITAR1AN-VIOLENCE IS lNEVITABLE AND COSMPOLITANISM WlLL BE DEPLOYED TO STAMP IT OUT

Zolo in 97 (Danilo. Professor of Political and Legal Philosophy at the University of Florence, Cosmopolis: Prosaects for World Government, Polity Press, Pg.

Theorists of cosmopolitan pacitism, with the sole exception of Richard Falk have considered the Gulf war to be a just, or at least "justified", war. But, imprisoned in Lhe Eurocentric schema or the domestic analogy, cosmopolitan pacificism fails to perceive the dangers present in an institutional outlook which continues in traditional fashion to enshrine the hegemony of the western powers. Instead it remains stuck in the mould of a hierarchical and monocentric world order. And it deceives itself in believing that it can use the doctrine of human rights as a basis, or as the ideological flag, of an order which is univcrsally just because it conforms to western values. It appears not to realize that the established set of international political and economic relations has been overtaken by a cataclysm and that the situation is now very far from being onc of equilibrium. Thc balance of hostility between the two great nuclear powers has now been replaced by an explosion of local conflicts which is, for the present at least, unsustainable. On top of this there is added the list of fresh planetarv risks: population explosion, large-scale migration. ecological disorder. proliferation of nuclear weapons, increasingly unequal division of wealth between countries. The Third World is now a concept of the past, but the headlong growth of some formerly underdeveloped countries, especially those within the Pacific rim, is presenting an awkward challenge to the economic and technological hegemony of the western powers. What we are witnessing, therefore, despite the progress since westernization of the world is violcnce and fragmentation of the international arena. In such an 'environment' cosmopolitan pacifism reveals itself as no more than a simplisticallv Hobhesian theorv. whose intended rcsponse to disorder is the rudimentam violence of a supranational Leviathan. Its interpretation of the mechanisms of functional interdependence in world markets of goods. finance and communications is to see these as processes of social integration of the planet which will bring about a 'global civil society'. In both of these two respects cosmopolitan pacifism shows itself to be lacking in thc 'reauisitc varietv' to map out a path LO peace in a world of growing com~lexitv. A world povcrnment which developed out of existing international institutions and which based itself on the cosmopolitan model would of necessity be a despotic and totalitarian Leviathan, condemned to resort to the use of crushing militarv measures in response to the inevitable proliferation of violence.

A WORLD GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE TO WIELD DANGEROUS AMOUNTS OF POWER.

Zolo,97 (Danilo, Professor of Political and Legal Philosophy at the University of Florence, Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government, Polity Press, Pg. 152-1 53)

The suggestion of the use of a 'global civil societv' lacks all foundation as does the hypothesis of a transnational democracy rounded on such a societv. A world government interpretable as the projection of current intcmational political and cconomic institutions could not emerge as anything other than a despotic and totalitarian Leviathan, which would have no other option open to it than to counter the predictable spread of anti-cosmopolitan terrorism with methods of an equally terrorist nature. processes of cultiirstl and economic globalization which are the driving forces todav behind relations of functional interde~endence within the 'world svstem' are manifestlv failing to woduce cultural and economic integration within the unitarv framework of a 'world societv'. On the contrary. on both the cultural and the economic level, phenomena of globalization appear to be destined to produce further differentiation and fragmentation of the international arena over the next few decades. terms such as global civil societv. universal citizenship, world constitutionalism and transnational democracv mav be said to belong to a stronglv on wishful thinking. Furthermore, not only are the objectives they refer to almost certainly unrealizable in the foreseeable future, they are also of limited desirability. For it is hard to see wherein lies the attraction of a world authority whose scope ol' action is not limited to guaranteeing a 'minimal oolitical order' - to use thc apt expression owcd to Hedlcy Bull - but aims instead, in accordance with the ideology of the 'western globalists'. to establish an 'optimal political order'; i.e. a guarantee of stable and universal peace, distributive justice, the delinition and protection of rights. the ecological integrity of thc weighting bctwccn available resources and demographic growth. A cosmouolitan authoritv of this tvpe. however much it might strive to set up a liberal democracy, could not fail to be pervasive and intensely interventionist, therebv giving rise to a political system describable as 'cvolutionarv rcercssivc'. inasmuch as it would work towards a drastic reduction in thc complexitv and differentiation of the international system.


AT: NATION STATE COLLAPSE INEVITABLE I GLOBALIZATION WON'T DESTROY THE NATION STATE

Resina, 03 (Joan, Professor of Romance Studies and Comparative Literature at Cornell University, diacritics, 33.314 46-74, projectmuse)

This emigration without ever leaving one's footing in the old forms characterizes the present wavering between the old Lcrritorial niches and the new postnational networks. From this perspective, globalization's rcconfiauration of traditional volitical patterns does not diminish the nation's role; it resituates it in relation to other forms of political- geographical integration. In fact, globalization presumes a plurality of spaces. not superseding but ~ u a l i f ~ 7 i n ~ the former hegemony of the nation-state. In other words, global forces act differently upon the space that used to be monopolized by the nation-state, contributing to the reappearance of previously hidden territorial identities or to the appearance of new ones. The urgency with which the national question has emerged over the last two decades suggests that globalization. althourh unuuestionably transforming the meaning and instmmentalitv of the nation, may be strengthening rather than eroding its symbolic value. Its traditional role in unifying opinion around some elementary but widelv accepted values remains indisoensable in the new ~ loba l order, at whatever territorial scale of political action one chooses to enter. That is why, to the chagrin of analysts who would rather ignore the auestion of scale, substate political-neographical formations mimic or claim national form on the basis of an internal set of values, which may range from those of a civic to those of a traditional culture. But the same applies at a scale larger than the nation-stalc. By entrusting the European Union's legitimation to a common praxis of opinion and will formation fed li-om the roots of European citizenship 115 11, Habermas shows himself relying on methods of unification that were historically implemented by nation-states. Evcn if "citizenship" denotes for him a political rather than a cultural form of membership, the idea of roots feeding the opinion and the will of European citizenry suggests the persistence of the need for popular legitimation. That need presupposes a traditional form of subject- formation that has long been replaced by a fleeting consensus orchestrated by the media conglomerates in complicity with or against (as the case may be) whatever remains of state control of information.


.. AT: ADORN0 CRITIQUE OF NATIONALISM

ADORNO'S CRITIQUE OF NATIONALISM IGNORES ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF NATIONALISM AND LEGITIMIZES THE STATE'S SUPPRESSION OF MINORITIES

Resina, 03 (Joan. Professor of Romance Studics and Comparative Literature at Corncll University. diacritics, 33.314 46-74, pro.jectmuse)

Nationalism, in this sense, has nothing to do with the "vatholonical preiudice" Adorno held it to be. His own prejudice in this matter kept him from heeding his observation that thought must go not only beyond the fetish of public opinion but also "beyond its confirmation by the given facts" [198]. A dangerous proposition, no doubt, but one that is in tune with Adorno's confidence that thought, like art, holds the sole potential lo resist the negativity of adrninistcred reality. His assumption that nationalism inevitably means collective self-praise motivates his assessmenl that there cannot be healthy national sentiment [118]. This position is understandahlc in view of the historical experience that was uppcrrnost in Adorno's mind, but, by circumscribing his understanding of nationalism to that experience, he accommodatcd thought to the limitations of ad hoc political reality, betraying thought's potential to free concepts from thc tyranny of sanctioned Qcts. But even if one sticks to observable facts, a questionable that. in thc present world system, "at least in the non-underdeveloped countries nationalism has lost its real basis and has become the full-blown ideology it has always been" 11 181. It is not clear what Adorno means by "real basis," whether popular legitimacy, cultural traditions, the territorial range, or just a self-justifying raison d'etre. But one thing is clear: in using the word "countries," he falls prey lo the conventional identification of societies with the states that rule them. He succumbs. that is, to what Herminio Martins has called "the rule of methodological nationalism" [qtd. in Agnew 171, meaning the reduction of all politically significant spaces to the nation-state norm. With a similar lack of critical finesse. he asserts rather dogmatically that all national sentiment must inevitably slide down the path of inflated self-assertion. Nowhere does he address the issue of precisely why the line of national legitimacy happens to coincide with the line of economic development, as if nationalism were permissible to the poor. who may thus have a "real basis" for ideological backwardness as well. Nor does he ask himself, or the historical record. whether it is possible for processes of self-determination to escape the lopic of self- absolutization. And he certainly does not consider if the refusal of legitimacy to national sentiment may be comnlicit with a state ideo1o.y that subiunates both minorities and individuals as soon as it prevails as the ultimate referent for social life.


JARGON BAD

THE USE OF JARGON IS A SMOKESCREEN TO DISCONNECT THEORY FROM REALlTY AND MAKE IT POLITICALLY RELEVANT

McClean, 01 (David, New School University, "The Cultural Left and the Limits o l Social Hope", http://www.american- philosophy.org/archives/pastLconference~programs/pc2OO1/Discussion%20papers/david~mcclean.htm)

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition arc watuilouslv reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinrring to Marxian ontology and is oftcn iust a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure. iar~on-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it thc lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passaye of actual laws, and the amendment of existinn regulations that minht actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally ernewe from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis. and no self-respecting Pragmatist can'rcally take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more imvortant than Spirit and Utopia. Like light rain released from pretty clouds too high in the atmosphere, the substance of this prose dissipates before it can reach the ground and be a useFul component in a discussion of medicare reform or how to better regulate a pharmaceutical industry that bankrupts scnior citizens and condenms to death HlV patients unfortunate enough to have been born jn Burkina Faso - and a regulatory regime that permits this. It is often too drenched in abstractions and references to a narrow and not so merry band of other intellectuals (Nictzsche, Bataille, Foucault, Lukacs, Benjamin) to be of much use to thosc who are the su~posed subject matter of this preternatural social iustice literature. Since I have no particular allegiance to these other intellectuals; no particular impulse to carry their water or defend their reputations, 1 trv and forget as much as I can about their writings in order to make space for some new approaches and fresh thinking about that important question that always faces us - "What is to be done?" 1 am. I think, lucky to have taken this decision before it had become too late. One might argue with me that these other intellectuals are not looking to he taken seriously in the construction of solutions to specific socio-political problems. They are, after all, philosophers engaged in something called philosophizing. They are, after all, just trying lo be good culture critics. Of course, that isn't quite true. for they often write with specific reference to social issues and social justice in mind. even when they are fluttering about in the ether of high theory (Lukks. for example, was a government officer, albeit a minister of culture, which to me says a lot). and social justice is not a Platonic form but parses into the specific quotidian acts of institutions and individuals. Social justice is but the genus heading which may be described better with reference to its species iterations- the various conditions of cruelty and sadism which we wittingly or unwittingly permit. If we wanted to, we could reconcile the grand general theories of these thinkers to specific bureaucracies or social problems and so try to increase their relevance. We could construct an account which acts as a bridge to relevant policy considerations. But such attempts. usually performed in the reams of secondary literature generated by their devotees. usually nmke things even more bizarre. In any event. I don't think we owe them that amount ofeffort. Aftcr all, if they wanted to be relevant they could have said so by writing in such a way that made it clear that relevance was a high priority. For Marxians in general, everything tends to get rcduccd to class. For Lukgcs everything tends to get reduced to "reification." Rut society and its social ills are far too inlricate to gloss in these ways, and the engines that drive competing interests are much more easily explained with reference to animal drives and fears than by Absolute Spirit. That is to say, they are not easily explained at all.

502.heidt silber peterson keenan.neg.cosmopolitanism

Documents