Phenomenology of the Event: Waiting and Surprise

Dastur, Francoise, 1942-

Hypatia, Volume 15, Number 4, Fall 2000, pp. 178-189 (Article)

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Phenomenology of the Event:Waiting and Surprise1

FRANÇOISE DASTUR

Translated by Françoise Dastur, translation revised by the editor

How, asks Françoise Dastur, can philosophy account for the sudden happeningand the factuality of the event? Dastur asks how phenomenology, in particular thework of Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty, may be interpreted as offering suchan account. She argues that the “paradoxical capacity of expecting surprise is alwaysin question in phenomenology,” and for this reason, she concludes, “We should notoppose phenomenology and the thinking of the event. We should connect them; open-ness to phenomena must be identified with openness to unpredictability.” The articleoffers reflections in these terms on a phenomenology of birth.

Can philosophy account for the sudden happening and the factuality of theevent if it is still traditionally defined, as it has been since Plato, as a thinkingof the invariability and generality of essences? This is the general questionfrom which I will begin. The question of time and of the contingency of timehas always, as Edmund Husserl recalls at the beginning of his On the Phenom-enology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1991), constituted the most cru-cial problem for philosophy. This problem marks the limits of its enterprise ofintellectual possession of the world. For time, which is, as Henri Bergson said,the stuff of which things are made,2 seems to escape conceptual understandingin a radical manner.

As Maurice Merleau-Ponty shows in his Phenomenology of Perception (1962),philosophy can give neither a realist nor an idealist solution to the problemof time. It does not succeed in locating it either in things themselves or inconsciousness. If, on the one hand, we consider time to be no more than a

Hypatia vol. 15, no. 4 (Fall 2000) © by Françoise Dastur

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dimension of reality, we can no longer explain the relationship between whatcomes first and what follows. The succession of events can only be establishedby consciousness, a consciousness which requires, in order to have a generalview of the succession of events, not to be completely immersed in time. Butwhat if, on the other hand, we consider time to be a mere construction of con-sciousness? Temporality itself becomes incomprehensible, insofar as it is theessence of time to be incompletely present to consciousness, to remain incom-pletely constituted, as Husserl would say. For time, precisely, is not identical tobeing, it is a process which is always in becoming. It is always of the order ofthe process, the passage, and that which comes. Therefore realism (which im-merses the subject in time to the point of destroying all possibility of a time-consciousness) and idealism (which places consciousness in a position of over-viewing a time which no longer proceeds), are both unable to clarify what theypretend to explain, that is, the relation of consciousness to time. For in bothcases, what remains out of range for a philosophical inquiry which wants to seein time either a reality or an idea is precisely its transitional character, its non-being or non-essence, which is not, but proceeds.

Philosophy cannot succeed in accounting for the passage of time when ittakes the form of a simple realism or idealism. In both cases it is led, inescap-ably, to think of the connection of the different parts of time as already realizedeither in the object or in the subject. But this “time-synthesis,” far from beinggiven, must on the contrary be considered the most difficult philosophicalproblem. Its solution should be considered the most important task of philoso-phy. This “true” philosophy, which would be neither realist nor idealist, shouldbe able to account for the discontinuity of time and for the fact that there are,for us, events.

Such a philosophy should be able to explain the discontinuity of time, orwhat we could name the structural eventuality of time.3 The word eventual-ity should not be taken here in its normal meaning of possibility.4 Speakingof the eventuality of time does not mean that time could “be” or “not be.” Itshould, in my view, mean that time is in itself what brings contingency, un-predictability, and chance into the world. I would like to demonstrate that this“true” philosophy which could take into account the contingency of time isnothing other than phenomenology itself.

What is phenomenology, in fact? For Husserl, it was nothing other thanthe restitution of the most original idea of philosophy which found its firstcoherent expression with Plato and Aristotle and which constitutes the basisof European philosophy and science. Husserl does not see in phenomenology,as did Hegel, who was the first to make an important use of this word, a merepropaedeutic to philosophy as such. He considers phenomenology to be theproper name of a philosophy which no longer situates truth beyond phenom-ena. And when Heidegger declares in one of his Marburger Vorlesungen that

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“there is not an ontology besides phenomenology but scientific ontology isnothing else than phenomenology” (Heidegger 1979, 98), he situates himselfin continuity with Husserl while giving a more radical form to his thinking.Beyond all that separates them, what unites both thinkers is precisely the ideathat there is nothing to look for behind phenomena, behind what shows itselfto us. The object of philosophy is nothing other than phenomenality itself. Itis not the ideal world of a being-in-itself which would be completely separatedfrom us. This is why Heidegger appropriates the maxim of the return “to thethings themselves” (Heidegger 1962, 50) with which Husserl first defined thetask assigned to phenomenology (Husserl 1970b, 252). The question is there-fore to find an access to the phenomena themselves, because, as Goethe al-ready said, “they are in themselves the doctrine” (Goethe 1968, 432).5 Thetask is to abstain from all speculation, such as metaphysical construction,which could lead to the elaboration of an abstract ontology. And one shouldput aside all psychological deductions which endeavor to identify phenomenaand subjective experience.

But this does not mean that phenomenology can be identified by the meredescription of what is given to experience. When Heidegger, in section 7 ofBeing and Time, declares “And just because the phenomena are proximallyand for the most part not given, there is need for phenomenology” (Heidegger1962, 60), he only appropriates one of Husserl’s ideas. As early as in The Ideaof Phenomenology, Husserl had declared that the task of phenomenology doesnot consist only in looking at things as if they are “ ‘simply there’ and just needto be ‘seen,’” but in showing how they constitute themselves for a conscious-ness which is no longer considered, as it had been in classical philosophy,the mere container of their images (Husserl 1964, 9). To let the constitutiveoperation appear, which is at the origin of the completely constituted objectwhich comes into view for us, requires that the existence of this object be, asHusserl says, put into brackets or put to one side. This epoché, this suspensionof the ontological validity that things have for us in daily life is, according toHusserl, what indicates in a decisive manner the access to the philosophicalattitude. But this does not amount to the philosopher turning away from thereal world in order to access a celestial world of eternal essences. On the con-trary, one lets things appear as they are given as phenomena in the naturalattitude which is ours in daily life. In this way, one becomes attentive to theirmodes of appearing and givenness. What Husserl calls “phenomenologicalreduction” does not permit one to escape from the sensible to an intelligibleworld. It does not permit a movement of becoming into the stability of idealessences. It lets appear the temporal character of what is given to us. It letsappear the process of phenomenalization at the origin of what we call “reality.”Husserl calls “transcendental phenomenology” this kind of philosophy whichallows us to attend to the apparition of that which transcends consciousness,

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that is, to the birth of the object which consciousness constitutes as its op-posite.

Husserl cannot remain on the level of a static phenomenology which couldonly account for the already constituted object, for what is empirically given.Very early on he feels compelled to develop a genetic phenomenology whosetask is to elucidate the process at the origin of the opposition of subject andobject. The entire phenomenology of temporality that Husserl develops in hisLessons in 1905 can be considered as a phenomenology of the advent of thesubject to itself. For what is at stake in these Lessons is to bring to light whatHusserl calls “what is ultimately and truly absolute” (Husserl 1962, 216): thisenigmatic intimacy of consciousness and time at the origin of the doubleconstitution of world and subject. Such a task is paradoxical. It means allowingthe appearance of the conditions of all appearing and bringing to light theprocess of “the segregation of the ‘within’ and the ‘without’” (Merleau-Ponty1968, 118) which Merleau-Ponty says is “never finished” (jamais chose faite)(1968, 237), but, on the contrary, always in becoming. Husserl tries in his Les-sons to reconstitute “after the event,” with the help of such concepts as pro-tention, retention, and original impression, the movement of the temporal-ization which remains in itself invisible. In this regard he remains in closeproximity to Kant, who had always affirmed the invisibility of time and whodefined schematism, the process by which consciousness constitutes the ob-ject, as “an art concealed in the depths of human soul” (Kant 1933, 183).

The phenomenology of the becoming of subject and world can thereforeonly be a phenomenology of the inapparent (Phänomenologie des Unschein-baren), to quote one of Heidegger’s expressions from his last seminar in 1973(Heidegger 1977, 137). But in his structure of eventuality this inappearanceor invisibility of time does not refer to a level transcending perception. On thecontrary, it refers to the genesis of perception itself. The limit that phenom-enology encounters here is not external but internal. It can only be discoveredin and by the phenomenological attitude. For such an invisibility is not, asMerleau-Ponty rightly underlines, an absolute invisibility, but the invisibilityof this world. It is the dimension of invisibility which is implied in the visibleitself and which can therefore only be discovered within the visible (1968,225). This is the reason why, in his unfinished last book The Visible and theInvisible (1968), Merleau-Ponty sketches the outlines of an “ontology fromwithin” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 225), of an “endo-ontology” (226) which con-stitutes the true achievement of his Phenomenology of Perception (1962).

But is such a phenomenology of becoming, which identifies itself with anontology which remains internal to phenomenality, and which pretends to letthe dynamic character of phenomenality appear, already in itself a phenom-enology of the event? For is it possible to think the coming of time, its advenire,its coming up to us, without properly thinking its sudden rise, its coming out of

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itself, which refers to the Latin verb evenire, literally ex-venire, from which theword “event” comes?

But what is an event, in fact? At first, we can only define it as what was notexpected, what arrives unexpectedly and comes to us by surprise, what de-scends upon us, the accident in the literal meaning of the Latin verb accidofrom which the word accident derives. The event in the strong sense of theword is therefore always a surprise, something which takes possession of usin an unforeseen manner, without warning, and which brings us towards anunanticipated future. The eventum, which arises in the becoming, constitutessomething which is irremediably excessive in comparison to the usual repre-sentation of time as flow. It appears as something that dislocates time and givesa new form to it, something that puts the flow of time out of joint and changesits direction.

So the event appears as that which intimately threatens the synchronyof transcendental life or existence, in other words, the mutual implication ofthe different parts of times: retention and protention for Husserl; thrownnessand project (Geworfenheit und Entwurf) for Heidegger. The exteriority of theevent introduces a split between past and future and so allows the appear-ance of different parts of time as dis-located. The event pro-duces, in the literalmeaning of the word, the difference of past and future and exhibits this dif-ference through its sudden happening. The event constitutes the “dehiscence”of time, its coming out of itself in different directions, which Heidegger calls“ekstasis,” the fact that it never coincides with itself, and which Levinas namesdia-chrony (Levinas 1987, 32). For the event, as such, is upsetting. It does notintegrate itself as a specific moment in the flow of time. It changes drasticallythe whole style of an existence (Husserl 1970a, 31). It does not happen in aworld—it is, on the contrary, as if a new world opens up through its happening.The event constitutes the critical moment of temporality—a critical momentwhich nevertheless allows the continuity of time.

This non-coincidence with oneself which allows the possibility of beingopen to new events, of being transformed by them or even destroyed by them,is also that which makes of the subject a temporal being, an ex-istant being, abeing which is able constantly to get out of itself. Openness to the accident istherefore constitutive of the existence of the human being. Such an opennessgives human being a destiny and makes one’s life an adventure and not theanticipated development of a program.

It becomes clear that a phenomenology which obeyed its own injunctionto return to things themselves could not be content to remain an “eidetic”phenomenology—the thinking of what remains invariable in experience. Itmust become, according to the young Heidegger’s terminology, a “hermeneu-tics of facticity”6: an interpretation of all that can be found in existence and isnot reducible to ideality, which is essentially variable and transitory. Such a

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phenomenology could no longer be a thinking of being and essence only. Itmust also be a thinking of what may be and of contingency. It should not beonly a thinking of the a priori of phenomenality. It must also be a thinking ofthe a posteriori and of the “after event.” The question is not to oppose radicallya thinking of being or essence to a thinking of the other or of the accident.Rather it is a matter of showing how a phenomenology of the event consti-tutes the most appropriate accomplishment of the phenomenological project.It is not the destitution or the impossibility of phenomenological discourse, assome thinkers of the radical exteriority of the Other—I mean Levinas, but alsoDerrida in his last writings—seem to believe.

What in Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology could make possi-ble a phenomenological thinking of the event? We should try to answer this ina synthetic and organized manner in order to defend the thesis of a possiblephenomenology of the event. For the moment I must be content with somereflections on the possibility of a phenomenological discourse on the phenom-enon of expectation and surprise which could be derived from the analyses ofHusserl and Heidegger.

Against all expectation, even if it has been partially expected and antici-pated, such is in fact the “essence” of the event. Based on this we could saywithout paradox that it is an “impossible possible.” The event, in its internalcontradiction, is the impossible which happens, in spite of everything, in aterrifying or marvelous manner. It always comes to us by surprise, or from thatside whence, precisely, it was not expected. The difficult task of phenomenol-ogy is therefore to think this excess to expectation that is the event. The phe-nomenology of eventuality is in a similar position to the phenomenology ofmortality. Death, as an event, is also that which always happens against allexpectation, always too early, something impossible that nevertheless hap-pens. It comes to us without coming from us. It takes place in the impersonalmanner of this event that happens also to others and it is the most universalevent for living beings. One could say that death is the event par excellence,except that it is never present, it never presently happens. It does not open upa world, but rather closes it forever. It does not constitute a blank or gap insidetemporality or a diachronic moment which could be the origin of a new con-figuration of possibilities. It is the simple, simultaneous destruction of syn-chrony and diachrony. That is why death, far from being an event, has beenlegitimately defined by Heidegger as the possibility par excellence (Heidegger1962, 307). Death remains for us a possibility that we will never realize, noteven in suicide, which is only a way of escaping the essential passivity of deathwhich defines human existence most deeply (see Heidegger 1962, 299–311).

But if death is for us the pre-eminent possibility, as Heidegger says, this

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implies a redefinition of the traditional concept of possibility. For in the phil-osophical tradition, possibility is opposed to reality. It is considered somethingless than reality. But here, in the light of death, possibility is defined as some-thing more pre-eminent than reality and cannot be compared to it. In the phe-nomenological perspective, possibility is the locus of excess with regards toreality. This allows us to consider possibility as a higher category than reality.Possibility is something other than a category which is a structure of things. Itis a structure of existence, an existential, as Heidegger calls it, since the modeof being of human existence is not the mode of being of the res (that is,realitas), but the mode of being as having to be (in other words, as possibility).Because the human being is a mortal being and, in existing, has a constantrelation to its own death, it constantly remains in the mode of possibility. Itremains in the mode of a structural anticipation towards its own being, whichremains unrealized for as long as it exists.

In fact, this determination of possibility as existential in Heidegger hadalready been prepared in Husserl’s intentional analysis. Husserl himself un-derlines in his Cartesian Meditations (1960) the originality of this kind of in-tentional analysis in comparison with the ordinary, unbracketed analysis ofhuman life. This originality comes from the specificity of intentional life thatcan never be understood as a totality of data, but rather as an ensemble ofsignifications. What does it mean for consciousness to be in the mode not ofsomething “already given,” but of signification? According to Husserl it im-plies “a surpassing of the intention in the intention itself,”7 in other words, thefact that the intentional act always exceeds what is given in itself.

Phenomenological explanation deals not only with given data, but withpotentialities. This means that phenomenology is not merely the theory of thecorrelation of noesis and noema, or of the cogito and of its cogitatum, but es-tablishes the principle of the necessary surpassing of the intentum in the intentioitself. This implies that the cogitatum, the “object” of consciousness, is nevergiven once and for all. It can always be explicated in a more complete mannerin regard to the context in which it appears, or, as Husserl says, in regard toits internal and external horizon. The original operation of the intentionalanalysis consists in unveiling the potentialities implied in the actual state ofconsciousness. The intentional analysis can therefore be considered as the ba-sis of a phenomenology of expectation. This is a phenomenology of the ten-sion of consciousness towards an object which remains open to the validationor invalidation of its anticipations according to the development of forevernew horizons.

We could even say that excess is the rule here, because there is always anaddition in what is experienced which can never be completely correlatedwith the intention. It can even be considered as at the origin of the intentionalmovement itself, in the sense that a total fulfillment of intentionality, or a

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complete adequacy of the signification to the object, would entirely destroythem. It becomes clear that, according to Husserl, there is a parallel betweenthe perception of an object and the perception of the other human being. Inboth cases, there are parts which are not perceived, but are only “appresented,”as Husserl says. This means that their existence is co-implicated in what isactually perceived: for example, the hidden faces of a cube, or the actual ex-periences (die Erlebnisse) of others. That there is a part of experience not ac-tually present is the rule of intentional phenomenology, since the mere idea ofa complete fulfillment of the intention would destroy the basis of intentional-ity. The intentional relation to the other human being cannot be understoodas a special case of the general intentional relation to objects. On the contrary,it must be understood as the very matrix of intentionality. It unfolds itselfwhere expectation will never be completely fulfilled and where the menace ofnon-fulfillment can never be completely avoided.

If there is the foundation for a phenomenology of expectation in Husser-lian intentional analysis as well as in Heideggerian existential analysis, couldone find the basis for a phenomenology of surprise in these philosophies? Isnot the very idea of a phenomenology of surprise an absurdity? We know thatit is possible and even necessary to hope beyond all hopes and to “expect theunexpected” as Heraclitus says in fragment 18 (Heraclitus 1987, 19). To mymind there is no doubt that Husserl and Heidegger were able to thematize thisopenness to the indetermination of the future, but what is happening whenthis excess implied in the event fractures the horizon of possibilities in such amanner that the mere encounter with the event becomes impossible? How canwe account for these moments of crisis, of living death, of trauma, when thewhole range of possibilities of a human being becomes unable to integrate thediscordance of the event and collapses completely?

Two examples could be mentioned here: the mourning of a loved one andreligious conversion. In both cases a transition is made not with regards to aloss of a particular possibility but with regards to the radical loss of the totalityof possibilities which we call a world. In such critical periods, we experience ourincapacity to experience the traumatizing event. In spite of having expectedthe death of somebody seriously ill, it remains a surprise. It feels beyond allanticipation. What happens is “not included in the program.” It is the un-foreseen, in the true sense of the word. It is what contradicts and ruins expec-tation in its very structure.

Such experiences are very rare, and Husserl and Merleau-Ponty explainthat ordinary experience presupposes an originary faith in the stability of theworld and the presumption that experience will always have the same “style”(Merleau-Ponty 1968, 3–4; Husserl 1970a, 31). But we find a striking image ofsuch “existential” crises in psychosis. The schizophrenic, for example, experi-ences the loss of what seems evident to other human beings. S/he experiences

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the loss of world and the breaking of the ordinary coherence of experience.8

S/he is therefore condemned to terror and to the impossibility of communicat-ing with things and other human beings. Such a subject has lost the ability ofopening oneself to eventuality and of experiencing the reconfiguration of pos-sibilities that a new and unexpected event requires from us. For it is the eventitself which requires integration in a new configuration of possibilities. Onedoes not decide freely to change one’s world, or to become converted. We canspeak of the event neither in the active nor in the passive voice. It can changeus and even “happen” to us only if we are in the right disposition. This is pre-cisely the “disposition” which is missing in the psychotic person.

We can speak about the event only in the third voice and in a past time,in the mode of “it happened to me.” We never experience the great events ofour life as contemporaneous. This is quite clear as far as the first great event ofour life is concerned. We did not ask for our birth, and this is testimony to thefact that we are not at the origin of our own existence. To be born means thatwe are conditioned by a past that was never present to us. It can only be ap-propriated by us later, by assuming these determinations of our existence thatwe have not chosen. There is therefore a surprise in us in relation to our birth.It is the permanent surprise of being born which is constitutive of our being.It is testimony to the uncontrollable character of this proto-event. In eachnew event there is a repetition of the proto-event of birth. It is as if we re-experience, in a new event, this radical novelty of what happens for the “firsttime,” as well as the impossibility of coinciding with the event itself, which inits sudden apparition disconnects the past from the future.

The existing being has no control over such a surprise and it is in a way theevent which gives the order here, but to be ordered requires the collaborationof the one who obeys. One is not completely passive in relation to the event,even if its meaning still remains obscure. We keep trying to give a meaning toit. It is only in relation to this attempted interpretation of everything thathappens (and this interpretative behavior is nothing other than the being inthe world of the human) that an event can be experienced as a trauma. Husserland Heidegger both saw a passivity within our intentional activity itself and afacticity of existence which can only be assumed and not chosen. Husserl didso with his theory of passive genesis or synthesis. Heidegger did so by tightlyconnecting facticity as the being thrown to the world of the human being andexistentiality as the incorporation of facticity into the configuration of theproject of this prospective being that Heidegger calls man.

We should not oppose phenomenology and the thinking of the event. Weshould connect them; openness to phenomena must be identified with open-ness to unpredictability. This paradoxical capacity of expecting surprise isalways in question in phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty declares in The Visibleand the Invisible that “philosophy has never spoken . . . of the passivity of our

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activity, as Valéry spoke of a body of the spirit” (1968, 221). This passivity of ouractivity is nothing other than the process of temporalization which happens inus as thinking beings without being the product of our thought. For as Merleau-Ponty underlines, “I am not even the author of that hollow that forms withinme by the passage from the present to the retention, it is not I who makesmyself think any more than it is I who makes my heart beat” (1968, 221).New as our initiatives may be, they come to be born in this field of being thatis human spirit, in which something, or the absence of something, can beinscribed. A great, contemporary French phenomenologist, Henri Maldiney,created a new word, “transpassibilité,” to express our capacity to undergo events,insofar as this implies for us an active opening to a field of receptivity (Mal-diney 1991, 114). To lack the capacity to open oneself to what happens, nolonger to welcome the unexpected, is in fact a mark of psychosis.

Phenomenology privileges neither the interiority of expectation nor theexteriority of surprise. It establishes as preliminary to experience neither thereceptivity of the subject nor the activity of the object. It tries to think thestrange coincidence of both. One could demonstrate that Heidegger tried tothink this almost unthinkable coincidence of Being and “man.” He attemptedthis by means of the word Ereignis. Ereignis means not only “happening” (theordinary meaning of the word in German) but also, following its double ety-mology in both popular and scientific use, “appropriation” and “appearing toview.” In taking this position I am arguing against those contemporary thinkerswho have declared that the thinking of the event and the thinking of the otherrequires a mode of thinking other than the phenomenological one. There canbe no thinking of the event which is not at the same time a thinking of phe-nomenality.

NOTES

We very warmly thank the editor of Études Phénoménologiques for permission to re-produce this version of the article. Ed.

1. Lecture given in Prague, September 1998, in the seminar organized by theInstitute of Philosophy. Simplified English version of “Pour une phénoménologie del’événement: l’attente et la surprise,” Études Phénoménologiques 25, 1997: 59–75.

2. See, for example, Bergson (1963, 71–72) and Bergson (1944, 371–72).3. See, in this regard, the remarkable article by Claude Romano, “Le Possible et

l’événement” (Romano 1993), from which I have drawn much inspiration.4. Here, the reader should be aware of differences between the connotations of

éventualité in the sense given to this word by Françoise Dastur here and eventuality inEnglish. Eventualité, in this context, refers more generally to possibility, chance, un-certainty, contingency, and the hypothetical, whereas the English eventuality referseither to that which ultimately results, or to a possible, fixed event. Ed.

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5. Cited in Heidegger (1976, 12).6. “Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)” was the title of Heidegger’s summer

semester course of 1923. See Heidegger (1923).7. See Husserl (1960, 48): “Phenomenological explication makes clear what is

included and only non-intuitively co-intended in the sense of the cogitatum (for ex-ample ‘the other side’) by making present in phantasy the potential perceptions thatwould make the invisible visible.”

8. See, for example, the discussion in Blankenburg (1991), cited in Dastur (1997).Ed.

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