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DOI: 10.1177/0022343303040001842

2003 40: 5Journal of Peace Research

MARY CAPRIOLI and PETER F. TRUMBOREDomestic Behavior

Ethnic Discrimination and Interstate Violence: Testing the International Impact of

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5

Introduction

Much research in the field of internationalconflict studies has been predicated on thenotion that states duplicate their patterns of domestic political behavior in the inter-national arena (Chan, 1997; Doyle, 1986;Maoz & Russett, 1992; Russett, 1993, 1990;

Wilkenfeld, 1973). In particular, the litera-ture on the liberal peace makes this linkagebetween domestic and international behaviorexplicit. The liberal peace literature identifiesa set of benign domestic policies and prac-tices reflecting shared norms of peacefuldispute resolution and respect for the rule of law, and emphasizes their pacifying inter-national impact. The literatures on ethnicnationalism and conflict from the fields of comparative politics and international

© 2003 Journal of Peace Research,vol. 40, no. 1, 20 03, pp. 5–23 Sage Publi cations(London, Thousand Oaks,CA and New Delhi ) [0022-3433(200301)40:1; 5–23; 028842]

Ethnic Discrimination and Interstate Violence:Testing the International Impact of DomesticBehavior*

MARY CAPRIOLI

Department of Pol i t i cal Science, Uni versi ty of Tennessee

PETER F. T RUM BORE Department of Pol i t i cal Science, Oakland Uni versi ty

It has been shown in the work of Ted Gurr and others that ethnic discrimination can lead to ethno-political rebellion, and that rebellion often leads to interstate conflict. The authors seek to discoverwhether rebellion is the only meaningful link between ethnic discrimination and international violence.Many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence results in a greaterlikelihood of state use of violence internationally. This argument is most fully developed within feministliterature; however, research in the area of ethno-political conflict has also highlighted the negativeimpact of domestic discrimination on state behavior at the international level. The analysis builds upon

the literature linking domestic gender inequality and state aggression to other inequalities createdand/or sustained by the state. Using the Minori ties at Risk (MAR) and Mili tarized Interstate Disputes(MID) datasets, the authors test whether states characterized by higher levels of discrimination againstethnic minorities are more likely to exhibit higher levels of hostility or to use force first when involvedin international disputes. Group-level data in MAR are used to create a set of state-level variablesmeasuring the extent of formal and informal discrimination against minority groups. The authors thentest whether states with higher levels of discrimination against minority groups are more likely to relyon force when involved in an international dispute, controlling for other possible causes of state use of force. Ultimately, the authors confirm their hypotheses that states characterized by domestic inequal-ity with regard to ethnic minorities are more likely to exhibit higher levels of hostility and to use forcefirst when involved in an interstate conflict.

* The data used in this article can be found at http: //www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.asp. Address correspondence [email protected] or [email protected].











which they test the impact of ethnic dis-crimination, however, limits the generaliz-ability of their findings. The authors arespecifically interested in the impact of trans-national ethnic ties, particularly ethnic

alliances, on dyadic conflict and cooperation.They hypothesize that high levels of dis-crimination against an ethnic group will leadto higher levels of conflict between the dis-criminatory state and a rival state controlledby the ethnic kin of the oppressed group.Moore & Davis find, however, that the treat-ment of ethnic minorities has little overallimpact on dyadic relations (1998: 98).

Several factors lead us to be cautiousabout drawing general conclusions about theimpact of ethnic discrimination on inter-national conflict based on the findings dis-cussed above. First, the authors’ analysiscovers only a single year of dyadic inter-actions, 1977–78, and thus their findings aregeneralizable only so far as that year istypical. Second, and more importantly, theirfocus on the impact of discrimination as a

trigger for conflict in dyads characterized byan ethnic alliance further narrows the generalapplicability of their null finding. We believe,however, based principally on insightsderived from feminist international relationsscholarship, that domestic ethnic discrimi-nation may have an independent impact onthe likelihood of violent interstate conflict,which is both separate from rebellion and notdependent upon the existence of an ethnic

alliance between an oppressed ethnic minor-ity and a nearby kin state.

It has been argued that hierarchicalpatterns of dominance and subordination,whether based on class, caste, gender, race, orethnicity, are ubiquitous across the inter-national system (Tickner, 1992). The normsand patterns of behavior that accompany suchrelationships of dominance and subordinationpose particular challenges for the maintenanceof international peace and stability. Somescholars argue that a conception of power as

domination and control is used as therationale for subjugation, thus leading togreater societal violence, which may in turnlead to greater interstate violence (Iannello,1992).

Indeed, scholars have highlighted the roleof structural hierarchies in perpetuatingviolence against women, and by extensionother disadvantaged groups (Almond &Verba, 1963; Gailey, 1987; Eckstein, 1966;Iannello, 1992; Tickner, 1992). Followingthis logic, a society that arbitrarily discrimi-nates against some of its citizens – a state inwhich political and economic inequalities areperpetuated through policy and social prac-tice – should be more likely to exhibitviolence in their foreign policy as they exter-nalize a world-view centered on their ownsense of superiority and their perception of power as finite. States that are not organizedaccording to strict hierarchical models,whether they are based on class, gender, orethnicity, should be more likely to treatothers, regardless of differences, as equal and

due equal treatment.This is more than just an abstract issue of social justice. A domestic political and/orsocial atmosphere in which formal and infor-mal modes of discrimination are common-place may translate into higher levels of international violence by states exhibitingsuch atmospheres, an argument that can befound in some of the feminist and demo-cratic peace literature (Caprioli, 2000; Har-

rington, 1992; Weart, 1994). Empirical testsof this proposition demonstrate that higherlevels of domestic gender inequality areassociated with higher levels of interstateviolence (Caprioli, 2000; Caprioli & Boyer,2001). This leads us to expect that domesticequality in general will help predict state useof force internationally, thus verifying thetheoretical link between domestic discrimi-nation and interstate violence.

If our assumptions about the maligneffects of domestic inequality are correct,

M ary Capri ol i & Peter F. Trumbore ET H N I C D ISCRIMINATION 7








other forms of domestic discrimination andinequity beyond that related to gender shouldproduce similar effects on international con-flict. While a case has been made that genderinequity is the most obvious and widespread

manifestation of hierarchical social structures(see Tickner, 1992), discrimination andinequality based on ethnic difference is alsocommonplace throughout the internationalsystem. It has been argued that in manystates, if not the majority, it is on the basis of ethnicity that political and economic accessand power are limited and inequality is justified and maintained (Bell-Flailkoff &Markovits, 1995; Yack, 1999). Issues of ethnic membership determine access toresources and control in that a person’s socialand economic position accords not onlystatus but also access to political and econ-omic systems (UN, 1984: 17).

Gurr (1993: 34) makes the case that theinequalities dividing majorities fromdisadvantaged minorities are ubiquitousacross regimes, the enduring legacies of

historical processes of conquest, state build-ing, migration, and economic development:‘Every people who established an empire orsettled frontiers, who conquered nonbeliev-ers or civilized natives, who built a modernstate, did so at the expense of weaker and lessfortunate peoples’. Patterns of political andeconomic disadvantage were thus the almostinevitable result of relationships of domi-nance and subordination established through

these processes. ‘Groups that won out in con-quest, state building, and economic develop-ment established patterns of authority andvarious kinds of social barriers to protecttheir advantages, including the policies andpractices for which we use the shorthandlabel of “discrimination” ’ (Gurr, 1993: 36).At the same time, as many if not most of these groups resisted subordination, theirresistance was taken as justification fordeeper restrictions, which over time laid the

basis for persistent inequality (Gurr, 2000).While formal state practices of discrimi-nation have become gradually less commonin the past thirty years, ‘Group discrimi-nation as a matter of social practice nonethe-

less is widespread and often persists despitepublic policies that guarantee freedom fromdiscrimination’ (Gurr, 2000: 107).

Indeed, higher levels of social discrimi-nation can lead to more violent internationalbehavior. Rummel (1997: 170) argues that‘when political power is centralized, non-democratic, and highly dependent uponone’s social group membership, be it race,religion, ethnicity, or some cultural division,then collective violence is also highly likely’.In the light of the above discussion on thelinks between gender equality and interstateconflict behavior, we expect that states thattypically exhibit ethnic discrimination andviolence in their domestic relations will alsoexternalize those behaviors.

Given the above discussion, we contendthat the treatment of ethnic minorities by the

state is a potentially important predictor of astate’s likelihood to use force and to use forcefirst in international disputes. Van Evera(1997: 29) makes this connection explicitwhen he hypothesizes that the more severelynationalities oppress minorities living intheir states, the greater the risk of war. Thus,in keeping with other equality-based expla-nations for state use of force internationally,we posit that states that repress or discrimi-

nate against minority groups within theirterritory exhibit domestic policies of violenceand inequality that are transferred to theinternational arena. This hypothesized effectof state discrimination and violence againstminorities would be an overall greater likeli-hood of violent international behavior. Sucha finding would add further depth to theestablished literature pointing to the role of domestic political factors in predicting stateviolence at the international level.

j our nal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 40 / number 1 / january 2003 8








Hypotheses

Based on our previous discussion of thepossible connection between domesticinequality and interstate violence, we have

formulated the following testable hypoth-eses:

(1) The higher the level of domestic ethnicdiscrimination, the greater the likeli-hood that a state will exhibit higherlevels of hostility during interstate dis-putes.

(2) The higher the level of domestic ethnic

discrimination, the greater the likeli-hood that a state will use force firstduring interstate disputes.

Research Design and Methodology

Beyond theoretical inquiry, this project usesstatistical analysis to test the hypotheses,which will be analyzed using a large N, cross-

national, longitudinal study of state behavior,coding for discrimination against ethnicminority groups while controlling for othervariables known to predict foreign policybehavior. Our unit of analysis is the state, forwe are interested in predicting the behavior of states in interstate disputes. We use a monadicanalysis, for theory leads to the expectationthat a state characterized by policies of dis-crimination and violence against its own

citizens will be more violent in interstate dis-putes. In other words, we are testing whetherstate policies and practices of domestic dis-crimination have an independent effect onthe state’s international dispute behavior,rather than whether specific characteristics of the target state will influence the behavior of the actor. We do, however, introduce certaincontrol variables into our models to accountfor certain dyad characteristics that have beenshown to affect a state’s likelihood of usingforce in an international dispute. These

control variables are described in detail in thefollowing section.

Data for this project come from threeprimary sources. Measures of domesticpatterns of ethnic discrimination, trans-

national distribution of ethnic groups, andrebellion activity are taken from the currentversion of the Minorities at Risk (MAR)dataset (Gurr, 1999). To test the impact of these domestic-level variables, data on inter-national conflict behavior is taken from theMilitarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset(Bremer, 1996) and a separate dataset on firstuse of force in such disputes (Caprioli &Trumbore, 2000).

To build the dataset on first use of force,we began with the set of all MIDs from 1980through 1992. All states involved in disputesin which violence was not used were codedas no first use of force. When only one statein a dispute dyad used force, it was coded asfirst user of force by default. For those dis-putes in which both sides used force, first usewas determined by collecting contemporary

news accounts using the parties to thedispute and dispute start and end dates asrecorded in the original MID data as stan-dard Lexis-Nexis search parameters.Determination of first use is based on broadagreement on the facts between separateaccounts from independent news organiz-ations, or confirmation of the facts of a casefrom multiple, independent sources withinthe same story.3 Keesing’s Record of World

Events was used as a secondary resource tohelp clarify ambiguous cases and to provideinformation on disputes for which Lexis-Nexis searches returned no matches.


3 For example, a 1983 dispute between Afghanistan andPakistan was coded as Afghanistan first use of force on thebasis of news reports from United Press International andChina’s Xinhua General News Service, which bothreported Afghan Air Force attacks on a valley in westernPakistan near the Afghan border. An August 1980 disputebetween Israel and Syria was coded as Syrian first use of

force because Associated Press accounts quoted both Syrianand Israeli military sources as in agreement on the detailsof an aerial clash over southern Lebanon.








Our quantitative analysis focuses on theperiod 1980–92. The time-frame for thisstudy is an artifact of the data used in theanalysis. While the Minorities at Risk datasetcovers the period 1945 through 1998, and

MID includes all militarized interstate dis-putes from 1816 to 1992, the data on firstuse of force is only coded from 1980 to 1992.This is a result of the limitations of theprimary database used to construct the firstuse of force dataset, Lexis-Nexis, which con-tains few news accounts from the periodprior to 1980. Given this limited temporaldomain, caution about the generalizability of any findings is warranted.

In addition to building the dataset on firstuse of force, we also adapt the group-leveldata available from the MAR project to state-level variables measuring the extent of statepolicies and social practices of discriminationagainst minorities. Specific details on howthe state-level discrimination variable wasconstructed appear in the following section.After adapting the MAR group-level data to

state-level data and combining those vari-ables with the MID dataset, we add our newvariable for first use of force and severalcontrol variables before running our statisti-cal analysis. We add to the analysis controlsfor other possible influences on state conflictbehavior, including ethnic rebellion, demo-cratic homogeneity, major power in dispute,average economic growth, number of alliance partners, single day disputes, trans-

national ethnic ties, and contiguity. All of thevariables appearing in the analysis aredescribed in detail below.

Logistic regression4 is performed to test

the hypotheses using the MID dataset, whichmeasures interstate conflict. MID identifies944 incidences of states involved in interstatedisputes in which force was threatened, dis-played, or used, representing the total

number of militarized, international disputesoccurring during the period 1980–92. Therewere a total of 139 states that were involvedin these 944 disputes. A militarized inter-national dispute between two states would,therefore, be coded as two disputes, one foreach country involved. This project testswhether higher levels of domestic ethnic dis-crimination result in a greater likelihood thata state will employ a higher level of hostilityin a dispute and be more likely to use forcefirst during an interstate conflict from 1980through 1992. Interpretation of the substan-tive impact of our significant substantivevariables is done using odds as described byTabachnick & Fidell (1996: 607–608). Theodds ratio is the increase or decrease of theodds of being in one outcome category whenthe value of the predictor increases by one

unit, adjusting for the impact of othersignificant predictors. Increases in the valueof the predictor by more than one unitincrease the odds of being in one outcomecategory accordingly.

Dependent Variables

First Use of Force This is a dichotomousvariable generated as described above. It is

coded 1 if the state was the first to use force,and 0 otherwise.

Hostility level This variable, taken fromMID, measures the highest level of hostilitydirected toward an adversary by a state in amilitarized interstate dispute. This is coded as:(1) No militarized action5

(2) Threat to use force


4 The SAS statistical package is used for the multinomiallogistic regression. For those who are familiar with SASoutput, it is noted that SAS produces the opposite signthan that produced by all other statistical packages. As aresult, we have flipped the signs of all parameter estimatesfrom the raw SAS output so the findings fit with intuitive

statistical logic. See Tabachnick & Fidell (1996: 609-633)for a comparison of the logit results from SAS and otherstatistical packages.

5 The first coding of no militarized action does not appearin MID during the time-frame of this study.








(3) Display of force(4) Use of force(5) War

Independent Variables

Ethnic Discrimination Index The indexvariable measures the extent of formal statepolicies and social practices of political6 andeconomic7 discrimination, as well as re-medial efforts, if any, applied by the state toresident minority groups. This variable is acombination of both the political and econ-omic discrimination variables found withinMAR, which uses an identical ascending five-point ordinal scale for both categories of dis-crimination. The index was ultimatelycreated by averaging the political and econ-omic discrimination scores.

The political and economic discrimination

scores were first coded for each state as thehighest level of political or economic dis-crimination for any ethnic group within thatstate at the time of a militarized dispute inwhich the state is involved.8 In the Minorities

at Risk Project, the extent of discrimination,both political and economic, is determined foreach group relative to other groups in society.The pertinent question is whether members of a group are, or have been, deliberatelyrestricted in their access to economic resourcesor political participation and influences incomparison to other social groups (Gurr,1993: 42). It is necessary to note that theethnic discrimination index is not a proxy forregime type. The correlation between thisvariable and a state’s democracy score is notsignificant.

Control Vari ables

Ethnic Alliance The ethnic alliance vari-able represents one of two controls for thepossible effects of transnational ethnic ties.

Scholars who have studied the connectionsbetween violent ethnic conflict at the domes-tic level and violent interstate conflict haveargued that when ethnic boundaries crossstate borders, the likelihood of violent con-flict between states increases (Brown, 1996;Davis, Jaggers & Moore, 1997; Lake &Rothchild, 1998; Moore & Davis, 1998;Stedman, 1996; Trumbore, 2000; Van Evera,1997). The ethnic alliance variable, derived

from MAR data on the geographic distri-bution of ethnic groups, describes the con-dition in which the ethnic group controllingone state in a dispute dyad is an at-riskminority in a contiguous target state. In such


6 Values for political discrimination are defined as follows(Gurr, 1993: 47):(0) None.(1) Substantial underrepresentation in political office,

participation, or both, due to historical neglect or restric-tions. Explicit public policies are designed to protect orimprove groups’ political status.(2) Substantial underrepresentation due to historicalneglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberateexclusion. No protective or remedial public policies.(3) Substantial underrepresentation due to prevailingsocial practice by dominant groups. Formal public policiestoward the group are neutral, or, if positive, are inadequateto offset discrimination.(4) Public policies, formal exclusion or recurring repres-sion, or both, substantially restrict the group’s politicalparticipation in comparison with other groups.7 The values are defined as follows (Gurr, 1993: 45):(0) No discrimination.(1) Substantial poverty and underrepresentation in desir-able occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, orrestrictions. Public policies are designed to improve thegroup’s material well-being.(2) Substantial poverty and underrepresentation due tohistorical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No socialpractice of deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion. Noremedial public policies.(3) Substantial poverty and underrepresentation due toprevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formalpublic policies toward the group are neutral or inadequateto offset active and widespread practices of discrimination.

(4) Public policies, formal exclusion or recurring repres-sion, or both, substantially restrict the group’s economicopportunities relative to other groups.

8 This practice is followed for all variables taken fromMAR. There is an important theoretical reason for ourdecision to use the highest level of discrimination recordedfor any ethnic minority group within the state’s population.We argue that these variables reflect the upper limit of the

types of policies and practices that societal norms presentwithin the state will allow. This is also consistent with themethodology employed by Moore & Davis (1998).








cases, ethnic ties act like an alliance, increas-ing a state’s willingness to intervene on behalf of its embattled kin and thus increasing thelikelihood that the state will become involvedin a conflict against its kin’s oppressors

(Moore & Davis, 1998; Siverson & Starr,1991). It is a dichotomous variable coded 1if there is an ethnic alliance, 0 otherwise.

Divided Ethnic Group This is the secondcontrol variable introduced to account forthe possible impact of transnational ethnicties on the likelihood of violent interstateconflict. Specifically, the likelihood that anethnic conflict will spill over to become aninterstate conflict is greater when ethnicrebels in one state can seek shelter or estab-lish bases of operation among their ethnickin in a neighboring state (Brown, 1996;Lake & Rothchild, 1998; Trumbore, 2000).This is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if anat-risk ethnic minority group resides in bothstates of a militarized interstate dispute dyad,0 otherwise.

Rebellion Including rebellion allows us tocontrol for two possible alternative expla-nations for a state’s use of force in an inter-national dispute: diversion and conflictspillover. Diversionary theories of inter-national conflict argue that state leadersinitiate international conflicts to divertdomestic attention from internal problemsand rally public support behind the regime

(Gelpi, 1997; Haas & Whiting, 1956; James& Oneal, 1991; Miller, 1995; Ostrom &Job, 1986; Wright, 1965). An ongoingethnic rebellion is the type of internalproblem that could trigger such a diversion-ary use of force. In addition to creatingincentives for diversion, prior research alsoshows that ethnic rebellion can lead to stateuse of force at the international level throughthe mechanism of conflict spillover (Trum-bore, 2000). Thus, including a measure forthe presence of ethnic rebellion activity in

the state allows us to control for these twopossible alternative explanations for thephenomena we seek to identify, while testingfor the independent impact of ethnic dis-crimination. We create a dichotomous vari-

able from the MAR data9 indicating eitherthe existence of domestic rebellion ‘1’, MARcodes 1–5, or the absence of domestic rebel-lion ‘0’. MAR reports group rebellion levelsannually from 1985 onward. Prior to 1985,rebellion levels are reported decennially.Dispute dates were checked against thegroup narratives and chronologies developedby MAR to ensure temporal consistency withthe dependent variables.

Democratic Homogeneity Internationalmilitarized disputes involving only demo-cratic regimes are coded into a dichotomouscontrol variable in accordance with demo-cratic peace theory, which holds that demo-cratic states will rarely if ever use force againsteach other (Benoit, 1996; Bremer, 1992;Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman, 1992; Gled-

itsch & Hegre, 1997; Ray, 1995; Rummel,1995; Russett, 1993; Small & Singer, 1976).The variable for democracy is first calculatedfrom the Jaggers & Gurr Polity III dataset(1996) into a continuous term from –10through 10, with 10 being the highest scorefor democracy. The continuous score wascalculated by subtracting the autocracy scorefrom the democracy score [(democracyscore) minus (autocracy score)]. States with

scores of 6 through 10 are considered democ-racies. Finally, states in disputes exclusively


9 Gurr codes the rebellion variable as follows (1993: 94–95):(0) None reported(1) Political banditry, sporadic terrorism, unsuccessfulcoups by or on behalf of the group(2) Campaigns of terrorism, successful coups by or onbehalf of the group(3) Small-scale guerrilla activity(4) Large-scale guerrilla activity, distinguished from small-scale by a large number of armed fighters (more than1,000) carrying out frequent armed attacks over a substan-

tial area(5) Protracted civil war, fought by military units with baseareas








among democracies were coded as ‘1’ with allother disputes coded as ‘0’.

Major power in dispute Literature oninterstate conflict shows that disputes among

minor powers are more likely to be violentwhile disputes with at least one major powertend to be less violent (Russett & Oneal,2001). An additional body of literatureargues that satisfied powers and developedstates are less likely to use force internation-ally (Brawley, 1993; Kacowicz, 1995; Lemke& Reed, 1996; Morgan & Campbell, 1991;Rousseau et al., 1996). Major powers areidentified by the Correlates of War data asChina, France, Russia, the UK, and the USAat various points during the time period(Singer & Small, 1993). As states, not dis-putes, form the unit of analysis in thisproject, the ‘major power in dispute’ variablewas coded for each state on the basis of whether a major power was present when thestate entered the dispute. For example, MIDdispute number 2,347 began in April of

1981 between Honduras and Nicaragua,with the United States joining the dispute inMarch of 1983. The major power in disputevariable is coded as ‘0’ for Nicaragua andHonduras and ‘1’ for the United States.

Economic Growth This variable intro-duces an additional control for diversionaryuses of force. Miller (1995) uses decliningeconomic growth as a proxy for regime popu-

larity and finds that when economic growthdeclines, states become more likely to useforce in the international arena. This variablewas calculated based on information foundin the PENN World Table by Summers &Heston (1991) and represents the five-yearaverage percent change in real GDP percapita calculated annually.

Number of Allies This variable representsthe number of states sharing membership ina defense pact or an entente. These data are

available from the COW Alliance dataset(Singer & Small, 1993). Some scholars arguethat alliance ties diminish the likelihood of war (Bremer, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita,1981; Maoz & Russett, 1992; Weede, 1983),

while others (Rousseau et al., 1996) reportthat alliance ties do not decrease the likeli-hood of conflict. The number of alliancepartners may help deter attack, therebyreducing the number of militarized disputesa state is involved in, or may increase thenumber of militarized disputes a state isdrawn into as alliance partners join anongoing dispute.

Contiguity It is understood that anytheory of interstate conflict must control forgeographic proximity since the use of forceis only possible when at least one state canreach the other with its military assets(Russett, Oneal & Cox, 2000; Starr &Most, 1976). Simply put, states are morelikely to become engaged in an inter-national dispute with a contiguous state

(Bremer, 1992; Diehl, 1991; Gleditsch,1995; Goertz & Diehl, 1992; Rummel,1994; Maoz & Russett, 1992, 1993; Siver-son & Starr, 1991). This is a dichotomousvariable coded ‘1’ if the states involved in adispute share a land boundary or are sepa-rated by less than 150 miles of water and‘0’ for noncontiguous states. The datacome from the COW contiguity dataset(Gochman, 1991).

Single Day Disputes This variable isnecessary to control for uses of force by localmilitary units acting on their own initiativeor that of individual commanders that maynot reflect actual government policy to useforce within the context of the dispute inquestion. This is consistent with the practiceof those who study war initiation, in whichan ‘attack in strength’ criterion is used tocontrol for the actions of rogue units orsmall-scale patrols operating outside central









authority (Small & Singer, 1982). Thisdichotomous variable is coded ‘0’ formultiple day disputes and ‘1’ for single daydisputes.

Results

This project tested the following two opera-tionalized hypotheses with regard to domes-tic ethnic discrimination – both of whichwere confirmed:

(1) The higher the level of domestic dis-crimination against ethnic minorities,the greater the likelihood that a state willexhibit a higher level of hostility duringinterstate disputes.

(2) The higher the level of domestic dis-crimination against ethnic minorities,the greater the likelihood that a state willuse force first in interstate disputes.

As outlined above, the independent variableswere ethnic discrimination index, rebellion,

democratic homogeneity, major power indispute, average economic growth, numberof alliance partners, divided ethnic group,ethnic alliance, single day disputes, and con-tiguity. Although the ethnic discriminationindex variable is correlated10 with rebellion(see Gurr, 2000, 1993), the inclusion of rebellion with the discrimination variabledoes not bias the model.

Ethnic discrimination index The resultsshow that domestic ethnic discrimination isstatistically significant, and in the expecteddirection, for both level of hostility and firstuse of force. Proceeding along the ethnic dis-crimination continuum of no discriminationto public policies of formal exclusion, recur-ring repression, or both, states at the highestlevels of discrimination against ethnic

minorities are six (6.08)11 times as likely touse force first in international disputes. Simi-larly, a state with no domestic discriminationagainst its ethnic minorities is nearly five(4.84) times less likely to exhibit higher levels

of hostility in international disputes than astate exhibiting the highest levels of ethnicdiscrimination.

Control variables Economic growth wassignificant in predicting first use of force andlevel of hostility during disputes. The resultsof our tests showed that the lower the level of economic growth or greater the economicdecline, the greater the likelihood that a statewill use force first and exhibit higher levels of hostility in interstate disputes. This is alsoconsistent with the diversionary theory of conflict literature and echoes Miller’s (1995)specific findings concerning economicgrowth and conflict behavior. The majorpower variable was also significant, withmajor powers less likely to use force first orto be involved in more violent interstate dis-

putes. In addition, the number of alliancepartners helps predict the level of hostility astate will exhibit in a dispute and first use of force. The lower the number of alliance part-ners, the greater the likelihood that a statewill exhibit a higher level of hostility and useforce first in interstate disputes. This is con-sistent with research arguing that alliance tiesdiminish the likelihood of war (Bremer,1992; Maoz & Russett, 1992).

The control variable for single day dis-putes was significant for first use of force aswell as hostility level, revealing that singleday disputes are more likely to be violent innature. The control for divided ethnic groupswas significant for first use of force but notfor hostility level. This first finding is


10 Please refer to the appendices for a table of variable cor-relations and descriptive statistics. None of the correlatedvariables introduced autocorrelation into the model.

11 This is calculated by multiplying the odds ratio estimatefor the ethnic discrimination index variable, .1879 and

.4158, by 4, the number of units of the predictor repre-senting a change from a condition of no ethnic discrimi-nation to the highest level.








consistent with cases of ethnic conflictspillover in which an interstate conflict istriggered by either ‘hot pursuit’, governmentforces chasing suspected ethnic rebels acrossinterstate borders (Brown, 1996; Lake &Rothchild, 1998), or ‘defensive inter-ventions’, aimed at cross-border ethnicenclaves, supply lines, or supporters

(Stedman, 1996). The insignificance ofhostility level for divided ethnic groups maybe the result of the relatively large number of missing cases for that variable. The remain-ing control variables – ethnic alliance,rebellion, democratic homogeneity, andcontiguity – showed no statistical signifi-cance.


Table I. The Impact of Domestic Discrimination on State Use of Force Internationally, 1980–92

A B Models + Level of force First use of force

Discrimination index .1879* .4158****

(.0944) (.0883)Democratic homogeneity .1069 .3372

(.3656) (.3233)Major power in dispute –.8732**** –.8380****

(.2164) (.2162)Avg. economic growth –5.1930* –8.2860****

(2.1989) (2.1465)No. of allies –.0191** –.0205**

(.0068) (.0073)Contiguous actors .0177 –.1074

(.2387) (.2209)

Divided .2478 –.4702*(.2366) (.2285)

Ethnic alliance .3533 .4471(.6532) (.5407)

Rebellion –.0380 .3913(.2380) (.2247)

Single day dispute –.5738** –.4549*(.1980) (.1828)

Intercept –3.4257**** –1.1119***(.3292) (.2986)

Intercept 2 .8831**

(.2707)Intercept 3 –3.7820****

(.3967)Log likelihood 72.0050 141.3266Differential test 2

Model significance p < .0001 p < .0001N 564 717

+ The SAS statistical package was used to run the logistic regressions. The table includes parameter estimates withstandard errors in parentheses. To aid in interpreting the results and to conform to other statistical packages, theparameter estimates have been multiplied by –1 (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996: 609–633, for further explanation of this procedure).

* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001; **** p <.0001








Conclusions

As evidenced by the statistical significance of ethnic discrimination in our analysis, domes-tic equality should be considered an important

predictor of a state’s likelihood to exhibithigher levels of force when involved in aninternational dispute, and also use force firstunder such circumstances. Our conclusion,therefore, is that higher levels of discriminationagainst ethnic minorities increase the likeli-hood of violent state behavior when engagedin international disputes. While controlling forcontiguity, alliances, average economic growth,major power in dispute, democratic homo-geneity, rebellion, ethnic alliance, dividedethnic group, and single day disputes, thosestates with lower levels of political and econ-omic discrimination against ethnic minoritygroups are less likely to use force, or use forcefirst in international disputes.

This study adds additional support toother studies highlighting the malignantimpact of gender inequality on international

use of force and lends further credence totheories linking domestic and internationalviolence. In general, domestic ethnicinequality is sustained by intolerance and ahierarchical organization, both of whichtranslate into a world-view that necessarilyplaces some people or states as superior toothers. The presence of domestic ethnicinequality, therefore, increases the likelihoodthat states will be more violent during inter-

state disputes as they project this inequalityand hierarchy into the international arena.Thus our findings complement those of thedemocratic peace literature. Weart (1994),for instance, finds that states do not go to warwith other states that are perceived as equal.Even at the most basic level, domestic ethnicequality impacts foreign policy.

Foreign policy goals to minimize interstateviolence, therefore, might well be focusedon an international agenda aimed at thereduction or elimination of discriminatory

government policies and social practiceswithin states. Earlier research has convinc-ingly demonstrated that domestic ethno-political conflict results from theaccumulation of group grievances rooted in

patterns of political and economic disadvan-tages and discrimination against minoritygroups (Gurr, 1993, 2000). We also knowfrom prior research that as the severity of ethno-political conflict rises, the likelihood of conflict spilling over into the internationalarena to become interstate conflict increasesas well (Trumbore, 2000). However, our find-ings here demonstrate that state policies andsocial practices of discrimination againstminority groups have an independent impacton the likelihood of state violence at the inter-national level. This further clarifies the rangeof policy options the international com-munity must be willing to consider in orderto preserve international peace and security inthe modern era.

Our own findings, as well as those men-tioned above which have identified connec-

tions between ethnic rebellion and interstateviolence, imply a twofold strategy of inter-national intervention aimed at containingethno-political violence while addressing theroot causes of insurgency. Given that deter-rence can break down and containment fail,the surest way to prevent domestic ethnicconflict from leading to interstate violence isto stop the process before it starts. The onlyway for the international community to do

this, other than by supporting extreme levelsof state repression to keep simmering ethnicconflict from boiling over into full-scalerebellion, is to address rebellion’s root causes– discrimination and inequality againstminorities in ethnically divided societies.

That means finding, promoting, andhelping to implement effective means of political power-sharing while working tolevel the economic and social playing fieldbetween disadvantaged minorities and themajorities with whom they live. In short, the









international community’s best chance tohead off the threats to international peace andsecurity that can grow out of ethnic conflictlie in pursuing proactive policies of preventa-tive diplomacy (Jentleson, 1998, 2000).

The complication is that this course of action is also the most difficult for the inter-national community to accomplish for a hostof reasons, not the least of which are persist-ing norms of state sovereignty that inhibitstates from interfering in each other’s inter-nal affairs. Domestic political constraintsalso factor into the equation, further compli-cating the issue. In those countries, such asthe United States, which have historicallybeen expected to take a leading role in anyinternational response to ethnic conflict,domestic constituents are more likely tosupport military action aimed at restrainingaggression than to support interventionsdesigned to bring about social and politicalchange in other states (Jentleson, 1992). Insum, to deal effectively with the challenge tointernational peace and security posed by

ethno-political conflict, the internationalcommunity will have to overcome not onlythe constraints of an international system inwhich state sovereignty remains paramount,but also domestic political resistance to ‘med-dling’ in the internal affairs of other states.However, given the connections betweendomestic patterns of discrimination andinequality and the likelihood of stateviolence during interstate disputes revealed

here, an interventionist international policyaimed at minimizing and eventually elimi-nating domestic inequity in ethnicallydivided societies seems a necessary routetowards securing future international peaceand stability.

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Appendices


Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics

N Minimum Maximum Mean s.d.

Ethnic discrimination index 907 .00 4.00 2.3363 1.3922Rebellion 939 0 1 .55 .50Ethnic alliance 938 .00 1.00 3.412E-02 .1816Divided ethnic group 940 .00 1.00 .3713 .4834Avg. economic growth 815 –.200838 .18446148 – 4.5395E-02Contiguity 944 .00 38.00 4.3994 5.7026Allies 881 .00 41.00 14.2917 13.7251Democratic homogeneity 942 .00 1.00 7.219E-02 .2589Major power in dispute 944 .00 1.00 .3252 .4687Single day dispute 944 0 1 .40 .49Hostility level 686 2 5 3.65 .61

First use 899 .00 1.00 .3404 .4741Valid N (listwise) 531









Appendix 2. Correlations






5.fullethnic discrimination and interstate violence: testing the international impact of domestic ...

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