Charles S. Peirce’s Ethics of Terminology revisited

Assistant Professor, PhD Torkild Thellefsen, Department of Communication, Aalborg University

Introduction – the need of a stringent terminologyIn 1902, the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce wrote the essay The Ethics of Terminology (CP 2.219-2.226). Bearing in mind Peirce’s development of the pragmaticistic doctrine, which this essay is part of, this is one of the most important contributions Peirce ever made to the method of developing good science. It addresses the core of conducting and communicating science; the increased awareness on how to develop concepts, which are so precise that they can contain and communicate the complexity of abstract ideas and theories. Indeed, this forces the researcher to be very thorough in his descriptions and definitions of new theories and hence concepts. Peirce wrote the essay because he needed to stress the importance of making precise scientific language and, indeed, his most important errand was to mature the language of philosophy so it would match the level of matureness of natural sciences. I do not think Peirce ever reached this goal in the general state of philosophy, since not all philosophers were willing to reach the same level of conceptual awareness. However, Peirce believed that philosophy simply needed a strengthening of terminology.

Concerning the matter of philosophical nomenclature, there are a few plain considerations, which the writer has for many years longed to submit to the deliberate judgment of those few fellow-students of philosophy, who deplore the present state of that study, and who are intent upon rescuing it therefrom and bringing it to a condition like that of the

natural sciences, where investigators, instead of condemning each the work of most of the others as misdirected from beginning to end, co-operate, stand upon one another's shoulders, and multiply incontestable results; where every observation is repeated, and isolated observations go for little; where every hypothesis that merits attention is subjected to severe but fair examination, and only after the predictions to which it leads have been remarkably borne out by experience is trusted at all, and even then only provisionally; where a radically false step is rarely taken, even the most faulty of those theories which gain wide credence being true in their main experiential predictions. To those students, it is submitted that no study can become scientific in the sense described, until it provides itself with a suitable technical nomenclature, whose every term has a single definite meaning universally accepted among students of the subject, and whose vocables have no such sweetness or charms as might tempt loose writers to abuse them,—which is a virtue of scientific nomenclature too little appreciated. (CP 5.413)

Furthermore, I think the answer to why Peirce did not and could not reach this very idealistic goal lies within his doctrine of pragmaticism. The meaning of concepts is formed through use and experience. The field of philosophy is very broad and rather inhomogeneous since there are many different uses and experiences with concepts. Consequently, this results in many different meanings regarding the use of concepts. Hence, it is impossible to create a common and yet precise meaning of philosophical concepts. However, this does not mean that we cannot strive towards that goal. Instead, we must identify the meaning of philosophical concepts in relation to knowledge domains. A knowledge domain is a domain for social activity that, due to its special knowledge interests, is demarcated from other knowledge domains. In knowledge domains, knowledge seems to be organized and thus identifiable in respect to the telos of the given knowledge domain. The telos, which is unique for every knowledge domain, has special epistemological qualities attached to it. In Thellefsen 2002 and 2003, I have defined the telos as the fundamental sign

of the knowledge domain. Furthermore, it seems to be the case that in order to define and organize concepts within knowledge domains, we must identify the fundamental sign of the knowledge domain or else it is impossible to define the true meaning of the given concepts.

In Thellefsen 2003 and Thellefsen & Jantzen 2003, I have defined a method that is capable of identifying the fundamental sign of a given knowledge domain. I call this method the knowledge profile and the process of identifying the fundamental sign is called knowledge profiling.

However, I believe, the ethics of terminology stand for a very important contribution to the study of terminology, unfortunately often neglected. Indeed, I will do my utmost to bring Peirce’s ethics of terminology into focus again.

Peirce believed that the most successful sciences were the sciences that had developed precise nomenclatures (CP 2..224). However, one hundred years later, science has developed in a way that Peirce may have suspected but that he could not have known for sure, namely that science has become more and more interdisciplinary. This means that there are even more focus on how to develop terminology. The aim of this article is to outline the most important issues in Peirce’s ethics of terminology and further to outline some important features in today’s ethics of terminology presenting research results from my own studies of terminology. My studies of terminology are indeed inspired by Peirce’s pragmaticism; therefore this article must be seen partly as a homage to Peirce’s ethical codex and an attempt to bring this codex even further and partly as an attempt to stress the necessity of conducting conceptual hygiene with regards to own developed concepts removing unnecessary and disturbing connotations from these concepts. Thus, the difference between Peirce’s ethics of terminology from 1902 and the ethics of terminology from 2003 lies in how to combine concepts from different knowledge domains. I will return to the problems of how to combine concepts that have emerged within different

epistemologies. I will use the concept semiotic constructivism as an example of a concept combination that indeed contains some misleading connotations.

One of the most important questions Peirce attends with his pragmaticism is why it is necessary to develop a stringent and precise terminology. In his essay Peirce writes:

So that it is wrong to say that a good language is important to good thought, merely; for it is of the essence of it. Next would come the consideration of the increasing value of precision of thought as it advances. Thirdly, the progress of science cannot go far except by collaboration; or, to speak more accurately, no mind can take one step without the aid of other minds. Fourthly, the health of the scientific communion requires the most absolute mental freedom. […] At the same time, a general agreement concerning the use of terms and of notations--not too rigid, yet prevailing, with most of the co-workers in regard to most of the symbols, to such a degree that there shall be some small number of different systems of expression that have to be mastered--is indispensable. Consequently, since this is not to be brought about by arbitrary dictation, it must be brought about by the power of rational principles over the conduct of men. (CP 2.219)

The answer to the question stated above can be summarized in the following points:

1. Good thought evidently needs a good language 2. Increasing precision of thought as it develops.3. Science and thus knowledge is social.4. Scientific development requires freedom of thought.5. There has to be a general agreement on the use of concepts.

This means that in order to conduct good science, we first need good thoughts. I believe Peirce would call good thoughts innovative scientific ideas derived from the process of abduction. Once having thought good thoughts, these thoughts need to be sharpened through precise definitions e.g. in a nomenclature or a thesaurus or simply considerations about the order of words. The social nature of science and knowledge refers to the general state of knowledge. Being a realist, Peirce defined knowledge as general; this becomes clear in the following quote:

”No general description of the mode of advance of human knowledge can be just which leaves out of account the social aspect of knowledge. That is of its very essence. What a thing society is! The workingman, with his trade union, knows that. Men and women moving in polite society understand it, still better. But Bohemians, like me, whose work is done in solitude, are apt to forget that not only is a man as a whole little better than a brute in solitude, but also that everything that bears any important meaning to him must receive its interpretation from social considerations” C. S. Peirce, MS 1573.273 (undated)

The fourth point is an idealistic point, which I will not discuss here. The fifth point is important since the agreement on conceptual meaning ensures a conceptual homogeneity, which makes it possible to develop a stringent terminology for a given knowledge domain.

Summing up, the main point in this introduction is that the development of a stringent and precise terminology is essential to science. The next question follows almost immediately: How do we develop a stringent terminology?

The development of terminologyIn CP 2.226, Peirce outlines seven points that are important when developing terminology. The rules Peirce outlines all apply to his main task: the maturing of philosophical terminology. However, as general rules, they are still very

useful and, most importantly, they can be used as guidelines in scientific areas outside philosophy.

First. To take pains to avoid following any recommendation of an arbitrary nature as to the use of philosophical terminology.Second. To avoid using words and phrases of vernacular origin as technical terms of philosophy.Third. To use the scholastic terms in their anglicised forms for philosophical conceptions, so far as they are strictly applicable; and never to use them in other than their proper senses.Fourth. For ancient philosophical conceptions overlooked by the scholastics, to imitate, as well as I can, the ancient expression.Fifth. For precise philosophical conceptions introduced into philosophy since the middle ages, to use the anglicised form of the original expression, if not positively unsuitable, but only in its precise original sense.Sixth. For philosophical conceptions which vary by a hair's breadth from those for which suitable terms exist, to invent terms with a due regard for the usages of philosophical terminology and those of the English language but yet with a distinctly technical appearance. Before proposing a term, notation, or other symbol, to consider maturely whether it perfectly suits the conception and will lend itself to every occasion, whether it interferes with any existing term, and whether it may not create an inconvenience by interfering with the expression of some conception that may hereafter be introduced into philosophy. Having once introduced a symbol, to consider myself almost as much bound by it as if it had been introduced by somebody else; and after others have accepted it, to consider myself more bound to it than anybody else.Seventh. To regard it as needful to introduce new systems of expression when new connections of importance between conceptions come to be made out, or when such systems can, in any way, positively subserve the purposes of philosophical study.

This codex is developed with respect to philosophy. However, this does not mean that it cannot be used elsewhere where stringency and conceptual awareness is necessary. As stated in the beginning, Peirce developed his ethical code within his doctrine of pragmaticism. To get a deeper understanding of the ethical code, we need to address the doctrine of pragmaticism.

The ethics of terminology revisited"Pragmaticism consists in holding that the purport of any concept is its conceived bearing upon our conduct." (CP 5.442) This is one of the main points in Peirce’s doctrine of pragmaticism. The meaning of a concept resides in its consequences. This means that by identifying consequences of a particular concept, we gradually learn more about the concept. Consequences are representations of a given concept since they are able to represent the given concept, thus consequences are signs. However, when dealing with terminology, we operate with related terms instead of consequences. Related terms imply a more stringent approach to concepts since related terms are tested consequences. In Thellefsen and Jantzen 2003, we discuss how consequences become related terms “We understand relations as consequences. To become related terms, consequences have to be tested through the use and experience of the researchers within a given knowledge domain. If the consequence fails the test, it may wither away. Positively tested consequences become general relations and general relations are related terms and only general relations can be related terms”. (Thellefsen & Jantzen 2003 p. 19) Consequently, the official meaning of a scientific concept resides in its related terms. In such cases, the interpretative freedom is very small. There has to be a general agreement within the particular knowledge domain concerning the use of concepts and related terms. Eventually, this means that tacit knowledge is not scientific. However, a hundred years ago, Peirce could not have been aware of the how interdisciplinary science has become when he wrote the Ethics of Terminology. The interdisciplinary aspect of science has a tremendous impact upon developing terminology. Therefore, I believe it is necessary to add a few more rules to Peirce’s seven rules; these new rules primarily concern the process of

combining concepts. We need to focus not just upon how to develop philosophical concepts; we need to focus on how to combine concepts in general stemming from different knowledge domains. However, before combining concepts, we have to investigate the epistemological bases of theories in order to see whether the theories are compatible. If we choose to e.g. combine pragmatic semiotics with discourse analysis, we have to investigate pragmatic semiotics and discourse analysis to see if they are compatible. We have to define what part of the discourse analysis we need in order to define semiotic discourse analysis. Are we able to pick what we need from the theories of discourse analysis without being guilty of acts of unethical behaviour in terms of terminology? In order to answer this question, let us take a closer look at how to combine concepts.

Semiotic constructivism: combining concepts and displacement of meaning In 2001, I introduced the concept semiotic constructivism (Thellefsen 2001). At that time, I was unaware of the epistemological problems that could occur when combining theories that rest upon very different epistemological bases. The combination of semiotics and constructivism has some disturbing connotations that need to be dealt with before constructivism can be used in a pragmatic semiotic context. The basic problem is that the concept of constructivism, covering the area from social constructivism to radical constructivism, is primarily anchored within an anthropocentric nominalism, whereas the pragmatic semiotics is based upon a non-anthropocentric metaphysical realism. Without going into detail here, the main difference is that constructivists claim that we construct our understanding of the world, thus our worldviews are social constructions. Consequently, scientific theories are social constructions, whereas a pragmaticist would claim that we do not construct our worldview. The understanding is beforehand part of the potential of signs. We use abductive logic as a method to discover the world. We discover consequences and consequences are representations of real objects. Hence we do not construct, we discover. Peirce says: “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object

represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality" (CP 5.407). How do we solve this epistemological problem? Let us take a closer look at the concept combination semiotic constructivism. The combination of semiotic constructivism could be called a conceptual construction simply because I combine two concepts. In this concept combination constructivism is the basis of the combination and therefore the combination is based within the epistemology of constructivism. The order of concepts indicates that semiotic constructivism is a constructivism that is sharpened by semiotics.

Figure 1. In this concept combination, constructivism is the concept basis. Basis means that the entire concept combination rests upon the epistemology of constructivism. In other words, semiotic is to be regarded as a prefix sharpening the meaning of constructivism. The prefix indicates that it is a semiotic constructivism we are dealing with, not a social constructivism or a radical constructivism, etc.

However, we still have a problem with this concept combination. Pragmatic semiotics and constructivism are two concepts that do not easily harmonize. But if we try to analyse the reason for creating the concept combination and analyze the consequences of the concept combination, maybe we can cope with the epistemological problems. The reason for combining the concepts in the first place was to indicate that by combining different concepts, we might get some interesting consequences that may lead towards new insight. Indeed, the process

of combining different concepts is a way to not only discover meaning but a way to equip the concept with a telos. If we look at figure one, the telos in this combination is the prefix semiotic. The concept of constructivism is to be regarded as a passive and abstract entity that becomes goal oriented once we prefix a word to it. Having introduced the concept of semiotic constructivism, according to Peirce, it is my duty to make it as precise as possible and to free the concept of epistemological problems. Therefore, I will define semiotic constructivism as the process of combining concepts in respect to the rules of the ethics of terminology. This removes the focus from the aspect of constructivism. Instead, the focus will be on the process of combining concepts and then investigating the consequences of these combinations. Semiotic constructivism, where constructivism refers to e.g. social constructivism is a false combination in the sense that the epistemological basis of semiotics and social constructivism is incompatible. It seems to be impossible to combine the constructivist aspect with the aspect of discovering. Whereas semiotic constructivism in the sense of combining concepts and investigating consequences is a valid combination.

Summing up, when combining concepts that originate from different knowledge domains, we have to make a thorough investigation of the epistemological basis of the concepts to see if the concepts are compatible. If the concepts are non-compatible as was the case with semiotic constructivism, I suggest finding another concept combination that is able to express the theoretical viewpoint. If the concept combination is nearly compatible it is necessary to make precise the meaning of the wanted theoretic viewpoint. Returning to Peirce’s ethics of terminology, I add the following points:

Eight. When combining concepts be careful to examine the epistemological basis of the concepts in order to ensure that the concepts are compatible. Nine. Always be sure to use the most precise state of the concept either as a concept combination e.g. biosemiotics or as a precision phrase in order to express the meaning of the concept or phrase.

Ten. Always return to selected concept combinations and be ready to sharpen the meaning of the combination if the focus of the concept alters. For an overview, I resume the ten rules of ethics of terminology

The ethics of Terminology revisited

First. To take pains to avoid following any recommendation of an arbitrary nature as to the use of philosophical terminology.Second. To avoid using words and phrases of vernacular origin as technical terms of philosophy.Third. To use the scholastic terms in their anglicised forms for philosophical conceptions, so far as they are strictly applicable; and never to use them in other than their proper senses.Fourth. For ancient philosophical conceptions overlooked by the scholastics, to imitate, as well as I can, the ancient expression.Fifth. For precise philosophical conceptions introduced into philosophy since the middle ages, to use the anglicised form of the original expression, if not positively unsuitable, but only in its precise original sense.Sixth. For philosophical conceptions which vary by a hair's breadth from those for which suitable terms exist, to invent terms with a due regard for the usages of philosophical terminology and those of the English language but yet with a distinctly technical appearance. Before proposing a term, notation, or other symbol, to consider maturely whether it perfectly suits the conception and will lend itself to every occasion, whether it interferes with any existing term, and whether it may not create an inconvenience by interfering with the expression of some conception that may hereafter be introduced into philosophy. Having once introduced a symbol, to consider myself almost as much bound by it as if it had been introduced by somebody else; and after others have accepted it, to consider myself more bound to it than anybody else.

Seventh. To regard it as needful to introduce new systems of expression when new connections of importance between conceptions come to be made out, or when such systems can, in any way, positively subserve the purposes of philosophical study.

Eight. When combining concepts be careful to examine the epistemological basis of the concepts in order to ensure that the concepts are compatible. Nine. Always be sure to use the most precise state of the concept either as a concept combination e.g. biosemiotics or as a precision phrase in order to express the meaning of the concept or phrase.Ten. Always return to selected concept combinations and be ready to sharpen the meaning of the combination if the focus of the concept alters.

Concluding thoughtsI am not aiming to say that we cannot combine concepts based on different epistemological bases. Indeed, this can be very fruitful. However, I would like to stress that when combining such concepts, in order to behave scientifically correct, it is necessary to thoroughly investigate these concepts in order to clear the epistemological problems that may occur. As discussed earlier in the paper, combining pragmatic semiotics and constructivistic theories seems very difficult. However, if a scientist thoroughly investigates the consequences that may occur from such a combination, something fruitful can occur. It is my humble hope that scientists will use the revisited ethics of terminology when developing concepts that stem from different scientific areas. It is far too easy to combine different concepts in order to create an ear catching concept. However, science is not about creating ear catching concepts making the single scientist known and famous. According to Peirce, it is about reaching a higher level of yet fallible but stable truth. This is an idealistic goal that has indeed suffered from failure many times due to the financial state of science today. However as idealistic it may sound, it is necessary to maintain a high level of scientific

integrity to maintain scientific credibility. Therefore, science is not about the single scientist becoming famous but about science as the method to discover reality. As Peirce puts it in CP 2.219, “…the progress of science cannot go far except by collaboration; or, to speak more accurately, no mind can take one step without the aid of other minds.”

LiteraturePeirce, C. S. (1931-1966). Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols.,

ed. by Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, A. W. Burks. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press.

Thellefsen, T. (2001): “C. S. Peirce's evolutionary Sign : an Analysis of Depth and Complexity within Peircean Sign Types and Peircean Evolution Theory”. SEED (Semiotics, Evolution, Energy, and Development) http://www.library.utoronto.ca/see/pages.htm.

Thellefsen, T: (2002). "Semiotic Knowledge Organization : theory and method development." Semiotica 142: 71-90.

Thellefsen, T., Brier, S. and Thellefsen, M.: (2003) "Indexing and significance-effect : A Peircian semiotic and cognitive semantic approach to the analysis of the problems of subject searching". Semiotica 144: 177-218

Thellefsen, T. (2003). “Pragmaticism and the role of Terminology”. Impact. www.impact.hum.auc.dk

Thellefsen, T. (2004). “Knowledge Profiling: the Basis for Knowledge Organization”. To appear in Library Trends 2004

Thellefsen, T. & Jantzen, Christian (2003) “What Relations Are: A Case Study on Conceptual Relations, Displacement of Meaning and Knowledge Profiling” Temporary published: http://www.hum.auc.dk/markk/sko.html

Thellefsen, T. “The Fundamental sign”. Accepted in Semiotica.