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Index

AAK, 69, 279elections 2007, 204elections, 2002, 70excluded from PDK/LDK coalition, 208Jessen-Petersen visit to, 82LDK coalition with, 99leadership vacuum, 128outreach, political, 83PDK, cooperation with, 98weakness without Haradinaj, 232

ABA, CEELIfear of politics, 13, 55, 66

Aceh, Ahtisaari and, 113agriculture, 248Ahtisaari, Martti, i, v, 1, 214

appointment, 111background, 112bias, accused of, 192Bildt and, 118candor to Serbs, 120challenges in negotiations, 124, 125, 127efforts to discredit by Serbia, 127envy of, 139influence in Europe, 171mediation of end to NATO bombing,

51Namibia, and, 115Nobel Peace Prize, 1, 111personality, 114qualifications, 111, 114reputation for toughness, 113role in 1999, 103Russian politics, sophisticated about,

132Serbian attack on, 154staff, attitude toward, 115, 117style, 118toughness, 115Troika and, 191, 192warnings to Contact Group, 174

Albaniaaccess to international trade, 244after World War II, 19, 20arms route for KLA, 44Chicago-Kent activities in, 14, 39collapse of, 35corruption, source of, 61destination of refugees, 48, 49envy of Kosovar Albanians, 23final status, attitude toward, 101founding of, 17Greater, 19Hoxha regime fears, 21recognition, 217recognition of Kosovo’s independence in

1991, 26refugee camps, 14, 48support for KLA, 29, 35, 37threat to Yugoslavia, 20tracking refugees in, 40unification with Kosovo, 2, 6, 19, 28, 94waystation for KLA recruits, 36

Albania, Greater, 17Albanians

expulsion as Milosevic goal, 51Albright, Madeleine

Pocantico Declaration, 177Rambouillet, 46, 47

leadership over Kosovo, 105side letter promises, 72Veton Surroi, work with, 59

role in 1999, 103role in Clinton Administration, 46

alienationAlbanians from Yugoslav politics, 18

Amato, Giulano, 111American University in Kosovo, 246American war movies

source of KLA training, 49Amnesty International, 13, 275

289

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Cambridge University Press978-0-521-11624-4 - The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the AhtisaariPlanHenry H. PerrittIndexMore information

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290 INDEX

Ancient ethnic hatreds, 14Annan, Kofi

Ahtisaari, selection of, 114support for Final Plan, 170

Arbour, Louise, 46Arta

website, 38Artemije, 152Ashton, Harry E. “IV,” 46Austria

support for final status negotiations,142

autonomyalternative to independence, 44, 94as slippery slope, 45during World War II, 19fighting word for Albanians, 92final status possibility, 92insincerity of proposals for, 159less than in 1989, 93Milosevic fear of, 45offered in negotiations, 157revocation of, 2, 6, 25, 27, 28risks of, 125Tito promised, 19within Ottoman Empire, 16within Serbia, 63, 64within Yugoslavia, 2, 6, 14, 18, 22, 28,

33within Yugoslavia threatened, 25

autonomy within SerbiaSerbian proposal not credible, 267Serbian Troika proposal, 197Troika questions about, 198, 201

Badinter Commission, 121Bajram Curri, 14, 36Baker, James, 104Balaj, Idriz, 84banking system, 246Basque separatism, 45, 108, 136

Solana concern about, 202Batakovic, Dusan, 154, 159BBC, 38, 67, 238Begovic, Boris, 141Bela Crkva, 48belligerent occupancy, 55, 64, 65

obligations, 64Beqaj

Besim, 71Berisha, Kole, 135, 158Biden, Joe, 130

Bildt, CarlAhtisaari and, 118, 139Ahtisaari envied by, 139background, 81, 139candidate for final status envoy, 111envoy envy, 188fear of Kosovo as failed state, 133Ischinger meeting with, 194op-ed on Kosovo’s final status, 81Steiner opposition to, 81

Black, Joshua, 15, 130Blackbirds, Field of, 16, 26, 97, 152Blair, Tony, 107, 193Bogdanovic, Goran, 141Bosnia, 2, 6, 13, 14, 17, 21, 24, 31, 32, 139

arms for KLA, 49Contact Group originated regarding, 80end of war freed Milosevic to focus on

Kosovo, 34influence on final status negotiations, 126model for Kosovo, 125, 147, 152, 169partition of, 54protracted fighting, 33Republika Srpska, secession of, 94Rudnick in, 55settlement excluded Kosovo, 33U.S. delays regarding, 105U.S. interests in, 104

Botsan-Kharchenkoinfluence in Moscow, 195

Botsan-Kharchenko, Aleksandar, 193personality, 195position, 133

boys and mentargets of Serb forces, 48

Brahimaj, Lahi, 84Britain

independence, commitment to, 119recognition, 217

British Foreign Servicetilt toward Serbia, 193

Bukoshi, Bujar, 26, 45, 60loyalty to Rugova, 50refusal to support KLA financially, 61warnings about Thaci, 50

Burkina Faso in Mali case, 121Burns, Nicholas, 207

background, 106, 129confrontation, avoidance of, 106deadline communicated to Quint, 183Europeans, work with, 184Pocantico Declaration, 177






INDEX 291

policy continuity, stressed need for,193

Security Council, abandonment of, 184violence, warnings about, 275

Bush Administrationassertiveness, 126foreign policy success, Kosovo an

opportunity for, 106Kosovo, initial skepticism over, 91, 105Kosovo, support for Clinton policy,

105nervousness of EU about, 133policy toward Kosovo, 91unilateralism, effect of, 180unpopularity of, 126

Bush, GeorgeTirana Statement, 181, 183, 193

Caglavica, 6, 8, 9Calmy-Rey, Micheline, 108Campbell, Greg, 52Ceku, Agim, 233

background, 158embarrassment of, 185Haradinaj, dominated by, 176popularity, 158prime minister, appointment as, 158restlessness in 2007, 185Rice, meeting with, 185Thaci, tensions with, 176unilateral action, 160Wisner reassured, 182Wisner, cooperation with, 183

Chechnya, 45Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 51, 103Chetniks, 19Chicago-Kent College of Law, i, iii, 13, 14, 39,

65, 76, 78activities after war, 52April, 2004 symposium, 229Charles Rudnick, 55early presence in Prishtina, 41refugee relief efforts interrupted, 50resources loaned for reconstruction, 55students threatened in Mitrovica, 53work with refugees, 39

China, 80, 106, 108, 137, 217Christmas warning, 104Churkin, Vitaly, 132, 257Clark, Wesley

leadership over Kosovo, 15, 105Solana and, 202

Clinton Adminstration, i, 15, 46Bush Administration disdain for, 193commitment to Kosovo, 105frustration with Europe, 104Kosovo, policy toward, 104leadership regarding Kosovo, 105NATO, leadership of, 105policy doubted by Bush Administration, 105Republican opposition, 104Rice criticism of, 105Security Council, and, 276

Clinton, BillPocantico Declaration, 177

Commander Remi, 44, 49Community of St. Egidio, 43community rights, 143, 145, 155, 166Contact Group, 131

2004 riots, reaction to, 802006 goal, 159Ahtisaari warnings to, 175Ahtisaari, guidance to, 114, 119, 141clarity, commitment to, 131composition, 3control over final status, 101cooperation, Russian, 174decentralization as mandate of, 146description, 80efforts to divide, 127Eide, and, 89final status, 2005, approach to, 88Italy as junior member of, 188Jessen-Petersen’s position toward, 81meeting, 25 July 2007, 191NATO’s reliance on, 102negotiated solution as goal of, 121partition, rejection of, 189, 196perceptions about status quo, 127reluctance to discuss final status, 81review of final Ahtisaari Plan, 163Rice presentation to, 27 September 2007,

202riots, 2004, reaction to, 104Russia, accommodation of, 132Russian cooperation in, 131Secretary General, report to, 195Security Council dependence on, 175Serbia, goals regarding, 128Troika and, 184Troika, organization of, 191, 195U.S. pressure on, 106U.S. role in, 130

Cook, Robin, 46






292 INDEX

corruption, 60, 61, 74, 89, 243AAK/LDK coalition, 233judicial, 245LDK, in, alleged, 99link, perceived, to informal system, 75over-regulation furthers, 248political alienation results from, 267public opinion about, 250target of Thaci government, 230targets, 250threat to democratization and economic

development, 249Croatia, 6, 17, 21, 24, 26, 31, 32

arms for KLA, 49conflict ended, 33end of war freed Milosevic to focus on

Kosovo, 34EU accession, 96pressure by Germany to recognize, 134source of Serbian visas, 41

Cubrilovic, Vaso, 19cultural cooperation, 159Cursed Mountains, 15Cyprus, 108, 133, 199, 217

Daci, Nexhat, 73, 142, 233Belgrade, willingness to talk to, 88defeat by Sejdiu, 158elections 2007, 204overreaching of political capital, 158polls, 116, 234removal of, 158

Danjean, Arnaud, 107Dart, Tom, 272Dayton Accords, 2, 33, 104

model for Kosovo, unsuitable as, 125decentralization

fourth round of technical negotiations, 149necessary for final status, 125negotiation, final, over, 155second round of techical negotiations, 148subject of first round of technical

negotiations, 145third round of technical negotiations, 149

Decentralizationessentiality of, 143Final Plan, 169goal of, 146

Declaration of Independence, 214Defenders at Home, 32, 251democratization, 1, 50, 60, 61, 71, 75, 77, 221

alienation, 252

dependence on elected leaders, 222Haradinaj’s prime ministership, and,

83Jessen-Petersen attitude toward, 83

demography, 18DiCarlo, Rosemary

background, 129Europeans, work with, 184Pocantico Declaration, 177

Dida, Agron, 56, 62concern over cellphone procurement, 56meeting with Thaci, 56plans for Internet infrastructure, 56refugee relief efforts, 56

Dinaric Alps, 15Djindjic, Zoran

assassination, 92assassination attempts, 77assassination of, 77assassination, effect of, 77, 78, 92, 96assassination, impact of on security for

Ahtisaari, 164elections, 68, 115final-status, attitude toward, 96internationals hailed, 69Kostunica opposition to, 96Kostunica, more moderate than, 86Milosevic, distancing from, 77political capital, limitations on, 96political skills respected, 69popularity in West, 78

Doctors Without Borders, 13, 188Dole, Robert

independence, support for, 105donors’ conference

July, 116, 228, 243Douste-Blazy, Philipe, 107Draskovic, Vuk, 141, 142, 165Drenica, 15, 20, 28, 36Dugolli, Bujar, 233Durres, 36

port, 244

Eagleburger, Lawrence, 104Economy

economic orthodoxy, 66economic outlook, 101, 241economic reconstruction, 72, 116impact of final status on, 166macro-economic policies, 248market economy, 50subject of techical negotiations, 154






INDEX 293

tax policy, 248viability necessary, 73

Eide, Kai, 89appointment, 88candidate for final status envoy, 111recommendation assumed Security Council

resolution, 95report, 92report to Security Council, 89report, criticisms of, 92

electionsclosed lists, 71local and national, relationship of, 60UNMIK’s fear of eary, 61

electricity supply, 47, 51, 74, 243Elephant Round

July, 116, 159entrepreneurship, 245envoy envy, 139, 140

Bildt and, 188ethnic balance

expulsion of Albanians, 48ethnic tolerance

postindependence, 237EU, 3, 4, 54, 173, 192, 217, 240, 249, 263

achievements, 173Albania’s accession to, 94, 101Balkan integration, 120civil administration in Kosovo, difficulty in

organizing, 189civil administration of Kosovo, difficulty in

organizing, 189Contact Group, overlapping membership,

80counterbalance to U.S. power, 180credibility, 265decision making, capacity for, 265desire for U.S. pressure, 180desire to prove effectiveness, 133divisions within, 133divisions, Serbian exploitation of, 127doubts about independence, 173German presidency of, 187importance to members, 133integration of Serbia and Kosovo into, 196Jessen-Petersen, service with, 81Kosovar Albanian frustration with, 185Kosovo’s integration into, 166Lavrov and, 175ministerial meeting, 8 September 2007, 199missed opportunities, 188postponement agreed to, 182

pressure on U.S., 193Quint influence on, 192reluctance without Security Council

resolution, 177representatives in final status process, 136responsibility for Pillar IV, 54Russian support for mission, 192Sarkozy and, 181Security Council resolution, dependence on,

174Serbia alienation from, 219Serbia, policy toward, 264Serbia, preconditions for membership, 262Serbian integration into, i, 2, 77, 96, 107, 112Serbian membership in, 96Special Representative under Final Plan,

167split as Russian goal, 193split with U.S., 127split, effect on Russia, 187split, Russian awareness of, 174supervision of independence, 169U.S. accommodation to, 126U.S. relation with, 193uncertainty about final status, 109unity, 172, 179unity, cracks in, 265unity, lack of, 173

EULEX, 167divided authority, postindependence, 224Kosovo constitution, under, 227six-point plan, 224slow deployment, 224threatened by EU split, 265transition complicated by Moscow, 251UN approval of, 224UNMIK, impasse with, 230

European Security and Defense PolicyMission, 167, 169

European unity, 172, 175importance of, 133lack of perceived, 137two-edged sword, as, 199

EuropeansAlbanian perceptions of, 15, 72Burns and DiCarlo work with, 184Russia, policy toward, 103Russian effect on, 179Russian more important than Kosovo, 179U.S. pressure on, 98U.S. unilateralism, attitude toward, 180unity, lack of, 187






294 INDEX

EUSR, 167

Feith, Pieterbackground, 137elections, postindependence, 234

Ferizaj, 15, 26Final Plan

Annex I, 167Annex II, 168Annex III, 168Annex IV, 168Annex V, 168Annex VI, 168Annex VII, 168Annex VIII, 169Annex IX, 169Annex X, 169Annex XI, 169Annex XII, 169General Principles, 167legal arguments against, 271risks of renegotiating, 196

final statusacceptability of to people of Kosovo, 174Albanian preoccupation with, 73Bildt doubts about, 188Contact Group 2006 statement, 131content uncertain, 72deferral of, 76defined 2006 Serbian political campaign,

160delays in, i, v, 1, 3, 4, 63, 65, 72, 73, 75, 76, 81,

87, 101, 109, 178, 184focus of 2004 riots, 79

delays in, 2004 riots ended, 78, 80, 81delays in, 2007, 176delays in, Bildt reaction to, 81delays in, effect on Kosovar Albanian

politics, 98delays in, Eide and, 89delays in, ended by Eide Report, 111delays in, favored by Serbia, 91delays in, June 2008, 182delays in, opposed by ICG, 91delays in, preferred by Serbia and Russia,

186delays in, Serbian commitment to, 127delays in, Steiner thought necessary, 81delays in, to placate Serbia, 78delays in, U.S. opposition to, 106dependence on international politics, 129dependence on standards, 81

discomfort, international, about, 76essential features of, 95focus of negotiations, 157French attitude toward, 107Germany’s support for, 134impatience for, 72independence, Kosovar Albanian

interpretation, 79international community indecision about,

76investment, effect on, 73Jessen-Petersen’s commitment to, 81Kostunica determined to derail, 85launch of talks, 81March 2007 goal, 161NATO, dependence on, 109negotiations to be completed by end of

2006, hopes for, 158negotiations, geopolitical environment, 126negotiations, Kosovar Albanian

participation, 100negotiations, management of, 95negotiations, U.S. participation in, 129opportunity for EU, 133options under Resolution 1244, 123preoccupation, 77risk of Kosovar Albanian disappointment

in, 176Russia, part of larger game for, 174Security Council approval, 124Security Council resolution, product of, 95Serbia’s opposition to, 85, 120Standards before, 75technical negotiations, difficulties in, 156two-step approach, 88UN assessment of readiness for, 88UN staff as barrier to, 72

First Balkan War, 16First World War, 6, 16, 17Fleiner, Thomas, 141France

Germany, key to, 188policy change toward Kosovo, 107recognition, 217Serbia historically favored by, 107

frozen conflictKosovo as, 199

G17+, 96, 97, 171, 172Gaza, 199geopolitical context

differences between 1999 and 2006, 126






INDEX 295

Germanyleadership in 2007, 187politics regarding final status, 134Quint unity, key to, 192Quint, challenge to, 187recognition, 218Serbia historically opposed by, 107unilateral independence, reluctance to agree

to, 184Gervalla, Bardosh, 23Gervalla, Jusef, 23Gjakova, 15Gjilane, 15Gjinali, Agim, 55, 62

navigation of road congestion, 55plans for reconstruction, 56

Goldberg, Philip, 129government in exile, 50governmental effectiveness, 71

constitutional framework, 69decentralization as threat to, 146, 148divided authority after independence,

224education, 246Eide assessment of, 88eroded by political parties, 71Haradinaj and, 83improving, 78international law, 123LDK/AAK, 128limitations on postindependence

sovereignty, 223limited by de-facto decentralization, 146over Kosovo Serb areas, 226postindependence, 221prerequisite to statehood, 226relation to Final Plan authorities, 227Serbia’s attempts to sabotage, 252Serbia’s loss of, over Kosovo, 44Thaci’s discipline on cabinet, 223trash collection, 7ultimate test for Thaci, 230

governmental effectiveness after 2006, 158grand coalition, 70, 99

Haradinaj as member of, 83Thaci resisted, 223unity team as de-facto, 129unity team as substitute for, 184

Greater Albania, 50Greece, 98, 108, 134, 135, 187, 199Greicevci, Lirim, 28, 37Guehenno, Jean-Marie, 170

Haber, Emily, 135Haekkerup, Hans, 71, 109Hammes, Thomas, 49Haradinaj, Daut, 233

conviction, 83Haradinaj, Ramush, 9, 37, 44, 69, 128

acquited, 208acquittal, 83arrest, 99arrest, political effect of, 128attractiveness to LDK dissidents, 233Ceku relations with, 158challenges, postindependence, 232charisma, 83charm, 82decentralization steps toward, 147effectiveness, 83elections, 2001, 115elections, 2002, 116elections 2007, 204elections, postindependence, demands for,

234English competence, 83excluded from PDK/LDK coalition, 208exclusion from government, 232grand coalition, member of, 83grand coalition, part of, 70ICTY indictment, 84ICTY indictment, agreement with

Jessen-Petersen, 84ICTY indictment, contents, 84ICTY indictment, reaction to, 84ICTY indictment, rumored, 84international pressure on, 99Jessen-Petersen attitude toward, 82Jessen-Petersen visit to, 82Jessen-Petersen, relations with, 99Jessen-Petersen’s attitude toward, 84Kosumi, selected as prime minister, 84negotiations, excluded from, 100obstructionism not feared, 176opposition leader, as, 232outreach, political, 83participation in 2006 reorganization of

PISG, 157political force, as, 99political power, 176politics, entry into, 69polls, 116, 234posters on independence day, 232pressure, international, against prime

ministership, 83






296 INDEX

Haradinaj, Ramush (cont.)prime minister, appointment, 83priorities in 2003, 70provisional release, 99, 128reputation in international community, 82resignation as prime minister, 84Schook and, 232Steiner consulted with, 71strong leadership, 88talents, 232targeted as KLA leader, 36Thaci opposition to, 99Thaci, challenges to, 230Thaci, conflict with, 98, 129, 176Thaci, cooperation with, 98Thaci, exclusion of, 99threat to Thaci’s leadership, 231ties with internationals, 232UNMIK, critical of, 82vacuum, political, 184vacuum, political, without, 176

Hasani, Enver, 252Haziri, Lufti, 142, 147, 155, 233

pessimism, expression of, 149style in negotiations, 144

Hegennauer, Joe, 41evacutation from Kosovo, 46goals for UNHCR in Kosovo, 41

Heintz, Steven, 177highways, 244Holbrooke, Richard, 13, 14

advocacy of seat at the table for KLA, 42backing from NATO, 39Bosnia, leadership regarding, 104cease-fire in October 1998, 38Clinton Administration, role in, 105failure to address Kosovo, 33first meeting with KLA, 39Pocantico Declaration, 177role in Clinton Administration, 46

Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement, 38, 39, 45Holkeri, Harry, 80

final status constraints, 109independence, attitude toward, 80resignation, 81

housing stock, 74Hoxha, Enver, 19, 20, 21, 23

attitude toward Kosovar Albanian militants,23

concerns about Soviet Union, 23Human Rights Watch, 10, 13, 79Hungary, 23, 25, 133

Hyseni, Skender, 251

Ibar River, 5boundary for ethnic split of Mitrovica, 53conditions north of, 101exclusion of Albanians north of, 57Kosovo Serb autonomy north of, 148Kosovo Serbs mostly south of, 93partition, and, 93

ICO. See International Civilian OfficeICR, 167. See International Civilian

Representativedivided authority, postindependence, 224Final Plan, 169

ICTYHaradinaj, rumored indictment of, 83

Ilic, Sladjan, 86, 148attack on, 87Jessen-Petersen, meeting with, 86opposition to, 87

illusion of progress, 76independence, 4, 6, 26, 28, 33, 36, 50, 64, 80,

119, 193, 267, 269agreement unlikely, 94Ahtisaari as pathway to, 120Albania’s attitude toward, 101alternatives to, 95, 221, 267autonomy preferred by Serbia, 92avoidance of discussion, 75British support for, 107conditional, 169constitutional framework as step toward, 63de facto, 124declaration coordinated with United States,

207declaration of, 1, 3de-facto, 95, 105, 123devolution of power by UNMIK as pathway

to, 71effect of Serbian nationalism on, 78European doubts, 199European expectations of, 199European scepticism about, 187eventual result of restored autonomy, 45expectations of Kosovar Albanians, 3final status, outcome of, 79French support for, 107, 189German support for, 134goal of KLA, 49goals of, 221ICG support for, 91ICJ advisory opinion, 224






INDEX 297

impact on international relations, 255impatience for, 72, 116implications for diplomacy, 1inevitability, 127inevitability of, 130, 175, 202inevitable, 95, 128insisted on by Albanians, 98insisted on by Kosovar Albanians, 3international indecision about, 76international opposition to, 72Jessen-Petersen’s commitment to, 81KLA hope, 42Kurti’s views on, 228legal arguments, 120legality of, 271Macedonia attitude toward, 102necessary for economic development, 166opposed by Serbia, 97plan did not use word, 164politically incorrect, 64power to declare, 164preferred to autonomy, 34preparation for, 73price for, 77recognition, 124, 160recommended in Ahtisaari Report, 165Resolution 1244 no barrier, 207Robert Dole supported, 105Russian and Serbian acceptance of, 127Serbian acceptance as precondition for EU

membership, 264Serbian accommodation to, 77Serbian acquiescence, 96Serbian attitude toward, 85Serbian challenges to, 1Serbian opposition to, 120Serbian recognition of, 262Serbian refusal to recognize, 217significance, 73sovereignty limited, 223supervised, 3supervision of, 166, 169supported by Rugova, 32U.S. commitment to, 107U.S. interests in, 106U.S. recognition, unilateral, 198U.S. support for, 193undermined by Rugova’s support for

autonomy, 44unilateral after delay, 181unilateral as Plan B, 177unilateral U.S. recognition, 126

unilateral, as threat to Security Council,180

unilateral, dangers of, 173unilateral, impact on U.S.-Russian relations,

178unilateral, Kosovar Albanian threat of, 185unilateral, Quint attitude toward, 182unilateral, support for, 175unilateral, U.S. and EU support for, 192unilateral, U.S. commitment to, 183unilateral, utility of, 179won in 1999, 76

independence day, icelebration, 214popular mood, 213popular opinion, 215

independence day 2008, 211independence declaration, 26, 114independence neutrality, 160Independent International Commission on

Kosovo, 76, 81Indonesia

Ahtisaari visit to, 182Russia, support for, 182

informal systemcorruption, relationship to, 249utility of, 3, 21, 26, 66, 75, 241

Ingis, Stuart P., 13insurgencies elsewhere

effect on, 45intelligence gaps, 272interethnic relations

polls, 116, 240interim government, 54

discomfort with, 61Krasniqi as Minister, 55legitimacy, 59rebuffed by UNMIK, 54UNMIK relations with, 61UNMIK, relationship with, 59

Interior Ministry Police (MUP), 27, 28attacks on villages, 47poor coordination with VJ, 45

International audiencessplit over Kosovo’s future, 98

International Civilian Office, 167International Civilian Representative, 167international community

control over Ceku and Sejdiu, 176failure to perceive Kosovar Albanian

strengths, 13, 42, 55, 59, 66, 75, 76, 228Haradinaj, attitude toward, 82






298 INDEX

international community (cont.)Serbia, optimism about, 92Thaci, pressure on, 99

International Court of Justice, 2, 224, 225advisory opinion on independence, 224, 225precedent, 121Serbia versus NATO members, 66

International Cricis Group, 13, 91international expenditures, 242international law, 45, 269

arguments, opposing, 120limited role, 272recognition, criteria for, 124role of, 255, 269

International Military Presence, 167, 169International Steering Group, 167international strategy

in 1998, 45international trade, 244Internet

Chicago-Kent database for UNHCR, 41economic development, potential for, 248infrastructure, 56, 243Internet cafes, 245intrastructure, 74potential to facilitate economic

development, 55use by Chicago-Kent, 40use by KLA and its supporters, iv, 38, 153,

243use for refugee relief, 46use to support refugee relief, 42

investmentsdeferred until final status decided, 74foreign, 247

Iraq Wareffect of, 65, 106, 126, 133, 153, 180, 187, 193,

258, 265, 276, 277, 283Ischinger, Wolfgang, 80, 94, 134, 136, 228, 278

admiration for, 193Ahtisaari Plan, refusal to renegotiate, 196background, 193Botsan-Kharchenko and, 194, 195challenge of European unity, 195crucial to German support, 199goals, 194limitations of Quint, recognized, 194Solana concerns about, 203Solana instructions to, 195Solana, promised to consult, 203Solana, selection by, 194Steinmeier and, 200

successes in diplomacy, 268tirelessness of, 194Troika, member of, 193two-Germanies model, 200

ISG. See International Steering GroupIslamic extremism

fear of, 18, 50, 98, 106, 153, 252, 253, 267fear of emphasized by Serbian Orthodox

Churth, 98risk of, 221

Isolation of Kosovo, 73Italy, 19, 135, 269

independence, doubts about, 187Quint, challenge to, 187unilateral independence, relutance to agree

to, 184Ivantsov, Petr, 116

Jaksic, Marko, 141, 144, 151Jashari, Adem, 36

1998 massacre, 36independence day posters, 215massacre of, 37

Jeremic, Vuk, 172, 263partition disavowed as goal, 186Rice meeting, 186Rice visit, 183Troika and, 197Troika, attitude toward, 196

Jessen-Petersen, Soren2004 riots, on, 81appointment, 81, 104, 278appointment, preconditions for, 81background, 81Bildt op-ed, reaction to, 81Bildt op-ed, respect for, 82discretion, broader, 109final status discussions with Steiner, 81Haradinaj indictment, attitude toward, 84Haradinaj indictment, reaction to, 84Haradinaj reputation, 82Haradinaj, allowed to become prime

minister, 83Haradinaj, attitude toward, 82, 84Haradinaj, pressure not to allow Haradinaj

as prime minister, 83Haradinaj, relations with, 99Haradinaj, visit to, 82Haradinaj’s arrest, management of, 99Haradinaj’s provisional release, 99Ilic, and, 86Ilic, meeting with, 87






INDEX 299

Kosovar Albanian participation, insistenceon, 100

Kostunica, attitude toward intransigence of,86

LDK/AAK coalition, allowed to continue,84

leadership, 88opposition to by Serbia, 127outreach to Serb community, 85, 86political leaders, attitude toward, 82Tadic, and, 85unity team and, 129

Jiang, Hua, 115, 116, 151Journalists

coverage of conflict, 37Jovanovic, Cedomir, 68, 97, 172, 262

Kasdanow, Tina, 207KFOR, 6, 7, 8, 10, 123, 279

2004 riots, 110deployment, initial, 52divided authority, postindependence, 224establishment of, 51evacuation of UN and KPS personnel,

19 February 2008, 218Final Plan, under, 167firmness after independence, 219French elements ineffective, 53gaps filled by KLA, 52inactive to prevent violence, 53indigenous political institutions, need for,

61occupation of factories, 57perceptions of Kosovar Albanians, 73Resolution 1244, 108security, determination to maintain, 110struggle with KLA, 53UNMIK relied on, 109

Khalilzad, Zalmaistatement, August 2007, 191

Khalizad, Zal, 184Ki Moon, Ban

support for Final Plan, 170KLA. See Kosovo Liberation Army

trainingKoha Ditore, 59

coverage of 1998 Serbian action, 38work with international press, 38

Kohl, Helmut, 135Kojen, Leon, 141, 142, 144, 150Kosovar Albanian

institutions, weakness of, 95

optimism, unrealistic, 128political elites, 2, 3

represented by Rugova, 59Rugova and Surroi, 59

Kosovar AlbaniansAhtisaari as direct path to independence,

120annoyed by preoccupation with refugees, 43atrocities against, 47attitude toward Haradinaj, 82attitudes, 116, 240Belgrade, direct talks with, 88capacity in negotiations, 157casualties in 1981 riots, 22concessions, need for, 127confidence, postwar, 62constructiveness in negotiations, 147defense of homes, 31defiance, effect of, 189demonized by Milosevic, 24demonstrations, 22demonstrations, 2007, 274dialogue with Kosovo Serbs, 43dismay at further delay, 183Djindjic assassination, attitude toward, 78dominance of government, 80, 125education under parallel system, 57effect of counterinsurgency tactics, 44effect of restored autonomy, 45effectiveness in negotiations, 100entitlement to independence, perceived, 76envied Albania, 23envy of Albania, 21exclusion from courts, 28exclusion from factories after war, 57expectations, 3expertise needed, 61expulsion from jobs, 25, 26, 57, 61expulsion from Kosovo, 14, 46, 48expulsion homes, 37fragmentation, 66fragmentation, political, 176gains might come at expense of Kosovo

Serbs, 45growth of insurgency, 31Haradinaj critical of, 82historic claims, 18Hoxha fear of, 21impatience for final status, 75independence insisted on, 98independence, long quest for, 6informal activities, 75






300 INDEX

Kosovar Albanians (cont.)international sympathy, 2interviews, 4isolation by UNMIK, 100KFOR welcomes, 7Kosovo Serbs, attitudes toward, 74Milosevic promise to deal with, 39mistrust of Kosovo Serbs, 1Mitrovica, 5mixed marriages, 17Muslim identity, 252negotiations, weaknesses in, 100parallel system, 26partition, attitude toward, 72, 96passive resistance, 28perceptions of UNMIK, 73political fragmentation, 70, 98political power, 3, 22poorly organized, 25preoccupation with final status, 72proximity to Kosovo Serbs, 17rage spilled over into 2004 riots, 79reaction to Jashari Massacre, 36refugees, UNHCR work with, 41religion, 18religious extremists, 252relocation to Turkey, 19resentment toward Kosovo Serbs, 151resistance to foreign occupation, 28respect for Rugova, 60resumption of pre-Milosevic jobs, 57revenge against Serbs, 53Rugova as spokesman for, 59Rugova as symbol to, 44scepticism about KLA, 34self government, 71Serbia characterized as terrorists, 88Serbian antagonism toward, 159Serbian attitude toward, 261service in Yugoslav army, 37shift of opinion away from Rugova, 34shift of sentiment after Dayton Accords, 34SRSG, pressure on, 75Standards before Status, opposition to, 75style in negotiations, 144support for Rugova, 27targets, 2targets of KLA, 53tasted freedom under Tito, 27Tito’s accommodation’s effect on, 22U.S., perception of, 72UNMIK perceived as occupier, 7

UNMIK, perceptions of, 3, 109view of UNMIK, 63violence, potential for, 251waited for comprehensive settlement, 33weaknesses of, 197Wisner counselled patience, 183World War II, 19

Kosovoassembly under Final Plan, 169independence, declaration of, 124independence, U.S. demands for, 92independence, unilateral declaration of, 94partition as price for independence, 96politics, postwar, 60referendum on independence, 64uniqueness of, 167

Kosovo Liberation Army, 279absorption into KPC, 158action against Kosovar Albanian opponents,

53adequacy of light arms, 49agreement to disarm and disband, 51Albanian, smuggled arms through, 14annihilation of, 46, 49arms, scarcity of, 35assuring international support, 50beachhead for corruption fears, 61benefitted from counter-insurgency, 44breakdown of ceasefire, 40ceasefire 1998, 42checkpoints, 43condition in December 1998, 43containment of conflict, 50contempt of political elites for, 60contrasted with 2008, 221corruption rebutted, 61cost of being clandestine, 34crackdown by MUP, 34credibility with population, 28criteria for negotiations, 42criticism of Rugova, 44criticized as secret-police front, 35decapitation strategy against, 29defender of families, 36Defenders at Home, 251defiance of internationals, 49diaspora support, 50diplomats willing to deal, 39doubts about existence, 37drove MUP out, 34early attacks, 32, 33early initiatives, 32






INDEX 301

early recruits, 27effect on postwar politics, 3elections 2001, 69elections, desire to split vote, 61elections, influence in, 61emergence as political force, 106exaggerated expectations, 44excesses criticized, 98existence acknowledged by LDK, 38experience proved useful, 101explosion of recruits, 36fears of, postwar, 61financial support, 61financing of, 66formation, 27founding of, 32fourth generation warfare, use of, 49fragmentation of, 42, 44, 45freer operations after Albania collapsed, 35gradually recognized as political force, 39Greater Albania, disavowed as goal, 50growing financial support, 35growing organization of, 35growing public support, 34growing public sympathy, 34growing strength in 1998, 36handful of extremists charge, 38Haradinaj, 9, 69, 83heroes, as, 52Holbrooke, first meeting with, 39increasing aid from population, 34increasing scope of operations, 34intelligence, 32intelligence about, 273interim government, 54Jashari as father of, 36journalists publicized, 38Krasniqi’s role, 55led insurgency, 2limited political capability, 50limited support from Albanians, 35logistics coordinated from Tirana, 37loose association with village defense forces,

45LPK origins, 32Malisheva as stronghold of, 43melting into civilian population, 37merger with LKCK, 32military doctrine, 49military strategy, 44Milosevic downplayed, 35Milosevic’s 1998 offensive against, 36

needed for negotiations, 39negotiations with, 42obscurity, 37operation of facilities after war, 52optimism in late 1998, 50origins of, 28Pajaziti, 29perseverance, 49political power, UNMIK fear of, 70popular mandate, possibility of, 70postwar threat, 73PR campaign, 38pressure on Bukoshi to support, 50prospects for success, 28provision of basic services, 53provoking Serb reaction, 50public relations value of Serbian human

rights abuses, 43public skepticism, 34publicity from Jashari Massacre, 36Rambouillet, 2, 46Rambouillet, attitude toward, 47, 59reconstitution after Serb attacks, 49recovery from summer offensive, 42recruits, 37recruits had difficulty finding, 37reluctance to negotiate, 42resentment after war, 52, 53resentment of, 69resistance to international pressure, 49respect for greater than for UN, 53retreat from Serb attacks, 37Rexhepi, physician for, 70role after war, 52, 53Rugova downplayed, 35Rugova opposition to, 44Rugova, poor relations with, 45Rugova, undermined support for, 60seat at the table advocated by Holbrooke,

42Serb attacks on, 37Serbian assaults on strongholds of, 36Serbian Reaction to, 14Serbian searches for, 37shaped international opinion, 3sought recruits with military experience, 37split between leaders of, 98status under Holbrooke-Milosevic

Agreement, 39summer offensive, 37support from elements of LDK, 34target of VJ mobiliation in 1998, 46






302 INDEX

Kosovo Liberation Army (cont.)targeted collaborators, 49tensions with established political elite, 47terrorist organization, portrayal as, 50Thaci, 9, 37Thaci’s postwar leadership, 54took the initiative against Serb forces, 34training, 28, 36, 49training in Albania, 36training of police, 53two distinct groups, 32UNMIK wary of, 82utility of human rights violations, 50violence by imitators, 53vote, efforts to split, 69, 70War Veterans Association, 5watched by KDOM, 39welcomed by population after war, 52

Kosovo Police Service, 7, 9establishyment of, 51

Kosovo Property AgencyFinal Plan, 169

Kosovo Protection Corps, 158establishment of, 51Kosovo Security Force, replaced by, 169

Kosovo Security Force, 169Kosovo Serb

autonomy within Kosovo, 125Kosovo Serbs

attitudes, 116, 240autonomy within Kosovo, 98Belgrade controlled, 197Belgrade, ties to, 125conflict, renewal of, 94education agreement 1998, 43education in Serbian language, 168elections boycott, 204, 235ethnic tolerance, post-independence, 237fear of Kosovar Albanians, 5, 22frightened by 1981 riots, 24Haradinaj, attitude toward, 82human rights violations against, 150Ilic, 86independence from Kosovo, 98interests in 1998, 45interviews, 4intimidation after 2008, 237Kosovar Albanian attitudes toward, 211Kosovo Assembly reserved seats, 69Kostunica uninterested in, 93links to Belgrade, 69loss of political dominance, 22

militancy, 44minority status, 155mistrust of Kosovar Albanians, 1mixed marriages, 17neglected by Serbian negotiation team, 145participation in final status negotiations,

141partition, opposition to, 93political dominance, 24political leadership, 3political participation, 43, 91, 98, 149, 223,

240political participation as goal, 264political participation discouraged by

Belgrade, 251, 277political participation disfavored by

Albanians, 151political participation in 2004, 99political participation limited, 73political participation opposed by

extremists, 88political participation under

decentralization, 146, 170, 251political participation under Final Plan, 3political participation urged, 86, 88political target of Milosevic, 24preparation for violence, 219pressure from Belgrade, 127protection in Final Plan, 169proximity to Kosovar Albanians, 17religion as source of tension, 18resented by Kosovar Albanians, 151resented UNMIK, 73returns, 149, 155security, 95, 128, 132targets in 2004 riots, 8, 9targets of 2004 riots, 79territory controlled by, 147undrepresentation on negotiating team, 141UNMIK, opposition to, 76UNMIK, perceptions of, 109UNMIK, resentment of, 7violence, potential for, 251

Kosovo Trust Agency, 5, 247early concerns, 72Final Plan, 169Shala’s role in, 55

Kostunica, Vojislavco-chair of Serbian delegation to final status

negotiations, 141demonstrations, 67, 115Djindjic, opposition to, 96






INDEX 303

Eide Report, statement to Security Councilon, 91

election as president, 68elections, 2000, 115elections, 2000, after, 68elections, January 2007, 171independence day, 217international meeting with, 86internationals hailed, 69intransigence of, 97legalistic arguments, 271military support for, 68Milosevic, distancing from, 77nationalist, as, 85nationalist, more than Milosevic, 86Nikolic and, 172partition as inconsistent with position, 93personality, 68, 85, 97political base, 96political campaign 2006, 160political position, 97politics, manipulation of, 86president, inauguration as, 68president-elect, as, 67prime minister, 116, 172refusal to meet Ahtisaari, 163resentment, exploited, 261response to Ahtisaari, 120revenge, threatens, 204Rohan, meeting with, 68rudeness, 159, 196Svilanovic and, 172Tadic more moderate than, 85Troika, attitude toward, 196Troika, initial meeting with, 94

Kosumi, Bajram, 84, 142dismissal as prime minister, 158weakness of, 128

Kouchner, Bernard, 54, 109background, 188Belgrade, trip to, 189confusion created by, 188delay proposed, 181, 189impact on negotiations, 188partition, floated, 189, 196Plan C, doubts about, 184Russia has us over a barrel, 179Troika, support for, 191unresponsive to locals, 62

Krasniqi, Jakup, 32, 43, 55, 75applicable law, suggestions on, 57effectiveness challenged, 59

enthusiasm for e-commerce, 56independence day, 213initiative, took, postwar, 61LDK, relations with, 212meetings with Chicago-Kent, 56member of KLA General Staff, 55plans for economic development, 56potential, 222reconstruction plans, 55UNMIK’s early mistakes, 57

Krasniqi, Remli, 223Krejziu, Kadri, 233Kukes, 36kula, 17Kulakaj, Toni, 236Kunczik, Michael, 229Kurd, 45Kurti, Albin, 146, 274

independence will make little difference,228

labor markets, 244Labus, Miroljub, 96, 97Lavrov, Sergei, 93, 114

attitudes toward Kosovo, 131background, 132Botsan-Kharchenko, instructions to, 195cooperation, 174EU and, 175Ischinger and, 194Putin and, 257Straw warnings to, 175

Law Faculty, 57, 78isolation of, 66reaction to Chicago-Kent visit, 58Steiner appearance at, 75

LDDestablishment by Daci, 158

LDK, 26, 32, 69, 158, 233, 280AAK, coalition with, 99admitted existence of KLA, 38biased view of KLA, 38blockage of new entrants to politics, 77coalition with PDK, 208defections to KLA, 34dominance of politics, 44elections, 2001, 115elections, 2002, 116elections 2007, 204fragmentation after 2006, 158funded by Three Percent Fund, 35grand coalition, role in, 99






304 INDEX

LDK (cont.)Haradinaj, coalition with, 83Haradinaj, ties to, 232news blackout, 38PDK coalition with, 223political strengths, 231potential postwar, 61resentment on independence day,

212Sejdiu, general secretary of, 70Sejdiu’s control over, 231support, grassroots, 60, 71Thaci, resentment of, 230threatened by KLA, 35undemocratic, 60warnings about Thaci, 50

Legitimacy, political, 61Lehne, Stefan, 136, 143, 154lignite, 243Limaj, Fatmir, 233LKCK, 32LPK, 28, 32, 280LPRK, 280Lukovic, Milorad, 77

Macedonia, 6, 15, 21, 49Albanian autonomy within, 102Albanian unrest in, 160Albanians, 93breakup as result of Kosovo conflict, 50conflict, 102, 115destination of refugees, 48entry point, 41entry point for Kosovo, 55ethnic composition, 102final status, attitude toward, 101Jessen-Petersen, service in, 81Kosovo, attitude toward, 102partition posed risks to, 197party leaders, 50refugee camps, 37

Malloch-Brown, Mark, 193Mansfield, Anna, 130market economy, 74, 167, 241, 245

informal system, contribution to, 75McClellan, Mike, 77Merkel, Angela, 134

Ischinger and, 194leadership, 135UNOSEK and, 187

migrationYugoslavia sought to encourage, 21

Mijatovic, Bosko, 141Miliband, David, 193Military Technical Agreement, 51Milosevic, Slobodan, 2

diplomatic skills, 44education agreement with Rugova, 43expulsion of Albanians, 14ouster as opportunity to deal with final

status, 81popular support, 261rise to power, 24U.S. discredited, 105

minority rights, 4, 143, 144, 146, 155, 159, 165Mitrovica, 5, 11, 15, 21

Albanians as targets, 53conditions, late 2008, 238division of, 148fault line for partition, 53KFOR and KLA roles after war, 53Kosovo Serb autonomy north of, 148partition, and, 93reaction to independence, 219Serbs looked to Belgrade, 69

mixed marriages, 17Montenegro, 15, 21

Albanian unrest in, 160Albanians, 93confederation with Kosovo and Serbia,

203ethnic composition, 102final status, attitude toward, 101independence of, 102politics in, 102Yugoslavia, part of rump, 63

Montenegro, Albanian population, 102Montgomery, William

analysis of Serbian politics, 96Muharremi, Robert, 252Mukja Agreement, 20municipalities

cooperation, 168creation of new, 149Kosovo, in, 145number of, 146

Murati, Rexhep, 57dean, acting, 57

Murati, Valon, 32, 33, 71Muslim, 18, 252

NamibiaAhtisaari and, 113

National Democratic Institute, 146






INDEX 305

National Security Council, 106, 178doubts about independence, 130meeting, November, 2007, 206

NATO, 2, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 46, 49, 51, 52, 118,123

1998 activation order, 39aggression, portrayed, 66Albania’s desires to join, 94bombing campaign, 47, 105bombing campaign, Ahtisaari role

regarding, 113British position in 1999, 107capitulation by Milosevic, 51causes of intervention, 38conflict, in the middle of, 94Contact Group, overlapping membership,

80Contact Group, reliance on, 102deployment slow, 52drawdown of forces, 92Eide and, 88Final Plan, 169French leaks, 107Haradinaj critical of, 82Haradinaj indictment, reaction to, 84illegal attack on Serbia, accused of, 98KFOR, establishment of, 51legacy of bombing campaign in Russia, 258Macedonia, intervention in, 102organization, 109popular support in Kosovo, 52presence in Kosovo under Resolution 51, 70Rambouillet as precursor to intervention by,

47Rambouillet proposal, 46reputation tested by Kosovo, 110riots, 2004, assessment of, 79security, responsibility for, 73Solana and, 202UNMIK relied on, 109

negotiationdynamics, 125

negotiationsSeptember 7–8, 159February–March 2007, 165staffwork for, 145

New Serbia Party, 171Nikolic, Tomislav, 171, 264

Kostunica, and, 172Nojkic, Randjel, 141Nordic countries

attitudes toward final status, 136

occupation, i, 3, 14, 57occupation by NATO feared, 43Ohrid Agreement, 102Open Society Institute, 39Operation Kosovo, 13, 39

leadership of, 46Optor, 68ORA

opposition, in, 99OSCE, 8, 13, 54, 200, 247, 280

limitations of KVM mission, 42limited involvement with final status

negotiations, 115local institutions, limited contact with, 66responsibility for Pillar III, 54Rohan, represented by, 68role after war, 52role under Holbrooke-Milosevic

Agreement, 39Ottoman Empire, i, 2, 16

Albanian officials in, 16

Pacoli, Bexhet, 233Pallaska

Dastid, 235partition, 72

decentralization as pathway to, 147, 148Djindjic and, 96European support for, 196Final Plan as precusor to, 170independence for Kosovo Serbs, 98independence, pathway to, 94Kouchner floated, 189Kurti opposition to, 146Macedonia or Montenegro, 93Pandora’s Box, 93pathway to independence, 93rejected by Contact Group, 119rejected by Serbia, 197risks of, 196Serbia disavowed as goal, 186Serbian opposition, 94strengthened by six-point plan, 225Troika resisted, 195UDIR, association with, 95

PDKAAK, cooperation with, 98Belgrade, willingness to talk to, 88blockage of new entrants to politics, 54, 61,

69, 77, 83, 222, 223, 231coalition with LDK, 208elections 2007, 204






306 INDEX

PDK (cont.)excluded from coalition, 83, 99fissures within, 231Jessen-Petersen visit to, 82LDK coalition with, 223LDK, relations with, 212opposition, in, 99popular support, limitations on, 231

Peja, 15KLA role after war, 52

Petrich, Wolfgang, 177Pettifer, James, 107Pierce, Karen, 137PISG, 3, 63

authority over north, 93composition of, 69devolution of power to by UNMIK, 76frustration with UNMIK’s slow devolution

of power, 71limitations on influence in Mitrovica, 69returns, promotion of, 150threat, perceived, to Serbs, 73UNMIK, tensions with, 88

Plan Balternative to Security Council resolution,

177European reaction to, 184Security Council discussions, 181U.S. commitment to, 177, 183Unity Team, discussions of, 177

Plan C, 181, 182, 183European reaction to, 184

Planners in Exile, 32, 251Pocantico Declaration, 177political alienation, 234

results of, 266political leadership

younger generation and, 70political trustee, 65political trusteeship, 63polls, 116, 235postindependence

challenges, 223Preshevo Valley, 15, 197

Albanian secession from, 98Albanians, 93

press conferencePrishtina presentation of Ahtisaari Plan,

164Prince Lazar, 15, 16, 26, 97Prishtina

conditions in December 1998, 42

privatization, 65Ahmet Shala, 71blockage of by internationals, 5, 14, 25, 55,

66, 74, 76, 247economic impact, 242privatization court, 247proceeds from, 154success, 247

Prizren, 9, 10, 15Prizren, League of, 16Project Bosnia, 13protective zones, 144, 147, 152, 154, 159, 168Public opinion

postindependence, 230public relations

export of art, sport, and culture, 229ineffectiveness of Kosovo government, 229

publicly owned enterprises, 168Pudojevo, 15Putin, Vladimir, 4, 257

assertiveness, 126Bush, meeting with, 178intransigence, 177Kosovo as source of leverage, 258Lavrov and, 257optimism about, 178political influence, 103popularity, 177public opinion, response to, 256signals of hardening position, 116, 258U.S. confrontation advantageous, 258

QuintContact Group, relation to, 80deadline, U.S., 183description, 80Germany and Italy biggest challenges to, 187Germany key to unity, 192independence as goal of, 115independence, recognition of, 192Ischinger recognized limitations, 194Italy and, 199Italy least helpful member, 188limitations of, 268NATO reliance on, 103resentment by nonmembers, 80Russia and, 175Russia, intelligence on, 174Security Council, abandonment of, 184Spain’s exclusion from, 199Troika and, 184Troika as substitute for, 191






INDEX 307

Troika, organization of, 191unilateral declaration of independence, and,

184unity essential, 192

Racak, 2, 46Rafuna, Alban, 9Rafuna, Gani, 216Rama, Fahri, 27Rambouillet Conference, 2, 46, 47, 59

final-status promises, 72KLA attitude toward, 47precursor to NATO intervention, 47Surroi, role in, 59tension between Thaci and Rugova, 59Thaci at, 47, 59, 60US side letter, 64

Rankovic, Aleksandar, 20, 21recognition, international, 11, 94, 124, 175, 217,

218, 226, 257conditioned on Ahtisaari Plan, 169European reluctance, 173Plan B, 177Security Council, threat to, 180U.S. Commitment to, 183

referendum, 19, 26, 64, 65, 112refugee camps, 14, 37refugees

Chicago-Kent work with, 39coordination of relief for, 40inability to return to Kosovo, 48role after war, 52status in Albania, 40stripped of identification documents, 48tracked through Internet, 40under Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement, 14,

39, 41, 43Rehn, Oli, 136religious and cultural heritage

negotitions over, 154religious sites

security of, 11, 95, 128, 152, 154, 156,168

remittances, 242Report by Ahtisaari to Security Council, 165Republika Srpska, 93, 125

model for decentralization in Kosovo, 146model for Kosovo, 147protest of independence, 219

Resolution 1244, 2, 6authority for EU mission, 189authority for UNMIK, 54

competing interpretations of, 123framework for final status negotiations, 271implementation, early, 52interpretations, competing, 63, 121interpreted narrowly by Prishtina Legal

Advisor’s office, 108locally elected institutions, devolution of

power to, 63origins of, 51plans for final status, 73repeal after independence, Russia blocked,

224replacement, 95, 159Russian acquiescence to, 103Serbian authority, extinguished, 86sovereignty of Serbia, 123UNMIK authority under, 108Yugoslavia’s sovereignty, 65

Responsibility to Protect, 122returns, 149Rexhepi, Bajram, 9, 70

2004 riots, and, 79Rice, Condoleezza

Contact Group presentation, September 27,2007, 202

deadline, declined, 186doubts over Kosovo policy, 105Germany, work with, 184Secretary of State, as, 106Serbia meeting with, 186unity team meeting with, 185unity team, invitation to, 183

Riots, 1981, 112riots, 1989, 114riots, Belgrade, February 2008, 217riots, March, 2004, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 21, 28, 116

causes, 79Contact Group reaction to, 104damage done by, 80decisions resulting from, 80disputes about nature of, 79effect, 92effect on final status negotiations, 78, 79essential to final status, 275Haradinaj criticism of, 82Jessen-Petersen assessment of, 79Kosovo Serbs, effect on, 101NATO’s disorganization, 110spur to negotiations, 273stimulus for final status talks, 81stimulus to international community, 80threat hanging over negotiations, 95






308 INDEX

riots, Serbian, 19 February 2008, 218Robertson, George, 111Rogers, Chad, 146Rogozin, Dmitry, 219Rohan, Albert, 4, 278

Ahtisaari insisted on, 114Ahtisaari, relationship with, 116appointment, 114background, 116chairman of final status meetings, 142Kostunica, observations about, 86Kostunica, visit to, 68OSCE, representative of, 68style, 117

Romania, 25, 108, 134, 199, 217Rudnick, Charles, 14, 39

establishment of ABA/CEELI office,55

history in Balkans, 55Rugova, Ibrahim, 9, 26, 60

Belgrade, willingness to talk to, 88chairman of negotiating team, 142counselling patience, 34criticism of wartime actions, 60death, effect of, 157decline of influence, 34, 44, 60, 106downplayed KLA, 34, 35education agreement with Milosevic,

43elections, 2001, 115elections, 2002, 116grand coalition, role in, 99house, activities at, 62iconic status, 44, 60illness and death, 129impotence in Dayton, 33inactive in negotiations, 142interim administrative council, 63international favour for, 61laissez-faire approach attractive to

internationals, 61limitations of leadership, 158limitations recognized, 39loyalty of Bukoshi, 50news blackout, 38opposed bloodshed, 33opposed by militants, 27, 32opposition to resistance, 27parallel system, 26passivity, 128poor relations with KLA, 45popular support after war, 61

portrait removed on independence day, 212postwar passivity, reason for, 59president, 70publicized Serb violence, 34Rambouillet Conference, 59refusal to support KLA financially, 61role in interim government, 54Steiner consulted with, 71support for independence, 32symbol to Kosovar Albanians, 44Thaci, exclusion of, 99Thaci, tension with, 59unity team, and, 129

rule of lawdeficit, 245

rule of law reformmissteps, early, 66

Russia, vi, 1, 3, 4, 6, 17, 51, 192, 256acquiescence, 127acquiescence, impact of, 175agreement desirable, 95Ahtisaari sophisticated about, 132Ahtisaari’s goals, 127attitudes, initial, 126capitalism as imperial tool, 259compromise, impossibility of, 256compromise, impossibility of compromise,

255Contact Group as bridge to, 103Contact Group, member of, 80Contact Group, split in, 172cooperation, early, 131delay in Security Council, urged, 171delay preferred, 186draft resolutions opposed, 184draft resolutions, opposition to, 182EU hopes for, 177Europe divided as goal, 260European policy toward, 103European split, awareness of, 174European split, effect of, 186European split, perceived, 259Final Plan, sabotage of, 224force threatened, 219Georgia, invasion of, 257Germany and, 187goals, 206hopes for, 178independence, opposition to, 91, 217interests in Balkans, 256interests regarding final status, 131intransigence, 182






INDEX 309

Ischinger, hopes for, 194Ischinger, trip to, 194Italy and, 188lack of interest in merits, 276legal arguments, 120leverage over Europe, 174mistakes, 206, 260need to statisfy, 119negotiation, refusal of, 181objections, no rational basis for, 174opposition result of other interests, 257options limited, 219overplayed hand, 265political conditions changed, 103position in 1999, 127Quint blamed, 184representation of, 132resistance to devolution of power, 71Resolution 1244, blocked repeal after

independence, 224role in 1998 negotiations over bombing

campaign, 51Security Council impasse, reaction to, 186security, threats to, 250Serbia, influence over, 219Serbia, strategic relations with, 259Serbia’s need for support from, 95split between U.S. and EU as goal, 199SRSG, constraints on, 108SRSG, pressures on, 75torpedoed Troika by commitment to Serbia,

205Troika and, 192Troika representative, 193Troika, support for, 195U.S. accommodation to, 126U.S. dilemma for, 265U.S. relations with, 106, 193U.S. unilateralism as goal, 193UNMIK, perceptions of, 77UNMIK’s authority, view on, 64veto, 174, 177, 180

Samardzic, Slobodan, 141, 142, 144, 196Troika and, 197

Sarkozy, Nicolas, 133crucial role, 189delay proposed, 181, 188impact on negotiations, 188opportunities, presented new, 181U.S., attitude toward, 188U.S., tilt toward, 181

Sasha, 195. See Botsan-Kharchenko,Aleksandar

Sauer, Kai, 116, 117, 163, 257background, 116

SawyersJohn, 137

Schafer, Michael, 133background, 135Tadic, closeness to, 135

Scheib, John, 55political trusteeship concept, and, 65

Schlagheck, Bernhard, 116Schook, Steven, 108, 232Schroeder, Gerhard, 113

Russia, contract with, 187Russian relations, concern with, 187Steinmeier and, 187

Second Balkan War, 16security

apprehension about, 73Belgrade destabilized, 127Final Plan, 169Haradinaj as guarantor of, 176Kosovar Albanians’ commitment to, 208Kosovo Serb fear of Kosovar Albanians,

79long-term threat to, 252NATO’s responsibility, 73necessity of, 2, 4, 6, 14, 25, 35, 40, 45, 47, 51,

52, 64, 73, 119, 143, 164, 167Security Council, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 70, 275

abandonment of, 184approval, need for, 124authority to make Kosovo independent, 98constraints on UNMIK, 76Contact Group, overlapping membership,

80control over final status, 101delay, 171desirability of involvement, 277discretion of, 123diversity of opinion within, 176draft resolutions, 181early Kosovo resolutions, 39Eide report, 89establishment of UNMIK, 54EU support for independence, 172European split, effect of, 186European unity and, 173failure in, 173Final Plan, implementation outside, 220final status, implementation of, 95






310 INDEX

Security Council (cont.)frozen conflict, and, 173future of, 278hopes, 170impasse, 173, 176, 178impasse, effect on Russian and Serbian

policy, 186July, 116, 182June and July, 116, 179limitations of, 255, 275meeting, February 18, 2008, 217mission, fact-finding, April 2007, 177need for resolution, 138negotiations mismanaged, 179new resolution, 159, 160origins of Resolution 1244, 51outlook in spring of 2007, 175oversight of UNMIK, 108pessimism, 179, 183plans for final status, 73power to impose independence, 124receipt of Final Plan, 171resistance to devolution of power, 71resolution preferred to Plan B, 177resolution recommended by Plan, 164resolution, drafts of, 174resolution, essentiality of, 174resolution, need for, 189Russia, impact of acquiescence, 175Russian veto, 127transmittal of Plan and Recommendation,

165U.S. pressure on, 106veto, 174veto, Russian, 132, 172, 177, 178vote, forced, 180

Sejdiu, Fatmir, 4, 157, 158, 278background, 158elections, postindependence, 234Haradinaj influence with, 176independence day, 213LDK support for, 158LDK, control over, 231polls, 116, 234potential, 222president, as, 158, 208prioities in 2003, 70reluctance to alienate U.S., 184Rice meeting, 185Rugova replaced by, 157statement on negotiations, 157support within LDK limited, 158

self determination, 270September 11, 2001 attack

effect on U.S. policy toward Kosovo, 106Serbia

“Albanian Problem,” 19Academy of Sciences report, 22accommodation of, 95acquiescence, 127aggression against, perceived, 76Ahtisaari’s attitude toward, 127Ahtisaari’s final presentation, 164Albanian claims to territory, 18Albanians, disdain for, 201annexation of Kosovo, 17antagonism toward Albanians, 159assassination of Djindjic, 77attitude toward independence in 1998, 42authority over religious sites in Kosovo, 152autonomy of Kosovo within, 92autonomy proposal, 157, 198, 201autonomy, revocation of, 25breakdown of cease-fire, 40breakup as result of Kosovo conflict, 50British support for, 193bulward against Islamic extremism, 98coalition government, 116, 172coalition governments, 96confederation with Kosovo and

Montenegro, 203conflict, renewal of, 94criminality of Kosovo, allegations of, 98debt, foreign, 168delay preferred, 186delegation to final status negotiations, 141democratic bloc, weakness of, 96Democratic Opposition of Serbia, 67, 68, 96dialogue with Kosovar Albanians, 43diaspora influence in U.S., 95diaspora, influence of, 130Djindjic, effect of assassination, 77dominated Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 17effect of NATO bombing, 51efforts to discredit Ahtisaari, 127Eide, and, 88elections 2008, 208elections, 2000, 115elections, impact on 2006 deadline, 160elections, January 2007, 171EU integration, 4, 260European integration, 97evasion of sanctions, 35final status perceived as independence, 120






INDEX 311

four D’s strategy, 127geography, 15goals, 127government’s weakness, 95Haradinaj, attitude toward, 82historic myths, 255, 261hopes for moderation disappointed, 85ICJ advisory opinion, sought, 225ICJ case, 226ICTY, failure to cooperate with, 97impotent to block final status, 95impotent to reassert control over Kosovo,

95incentives, 262independence day, 217independence day statement, 217independence from Ottoman Empire, 16independence, opposition to, 95indifference to Kosovo Serbs, 77indifference to Kosovo, perceived, 77infeasibility of sovereignty over Kosovo,

119integration of north Kosovo into, 93intensified counterinsurgency, 36international community optimism about,

69intransigence, 98, 120, 172, 174intransigence helped Europe unify, 267intransigence in negotiations, 149intransigence, political attractiveness of,

196Italy and, 188Jessen-Petersen’s effort to improve relations

with, 85Kosovar Albanians, refusal to deal wtih,

88Kosovo cooperation with, 197Kosovo Government, no contact with, 108Kosovo Serbs as citizens of, 155Kosovo Serbs as pawn of, 241Kosovo, autonomy within, 63Kostunica manipulation of anti-Kosovo

politics, 86lack of interest in merits, 276legal arguments, 120links to municipalities in Kosovo, 148long-term interests, 96Macedonia sympathy for, 102message to international community, 98military action improbable, 251Milosevic appeal to nationalism, 24Milosevic as President of, 24

Milosevic control of security apparatus, 25Milosevic, overthrow of, 67Milosevic, support for, 26Milosevic’s hold weakened, 67missteps, 267moderation of opposition sought, 95Montenegro confederation with, 102mucipalities, direct ties with, 168nationalism, 1, 16, 25NATO and, 6, 202need for consistent message, 120negotiating position, 98negotiations, effectiveness in, 100occupation of Kosovo in 1912, 17opposition to Final Plan, 164opposition to independence, 97, 128opposition to independence, management

of, 127opposition to Kosovo Serb participation in

politics, 45, 74, 87, 155, 239opposition to privatization, 76options limited, 219overplayed hand, 265partition, acquiescence to hoped for, 93partition, rejection of, 196partner in resolving final status, expected,

78Partnership for Peace, 262political changes postwar, 66political destabilization, Western fear of, 78political elites, 22political fragmentation in 1998–1999, 44political leadership, limitations of, 96political parties, 96political reform, 69, 92political reform, 2003, 116political situation, 2000, 115political turmoil, 78politics, effect of Djindjic assassination, 78politics, postindependence, 264Preshevo Valley, 15, 93Radical Party, 96reaction to 1981 riots, 22reaction to final plan, 163reaction to NATO campagin, 66reform, 92, 98, 107reform complicated by European disunity,

265rejection of final status process, 127rejection of independence, 3religious heritage, concerns about, 151report on Albanians, 19






312 INDEX

Serbia (cont.)Republic within Yugoslavia, 21response to independence, 219response to resistance, 31responsibility to protect, 121restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy, 44returns, emphasis on, 150Rice meeting, 186riots, 20 February 2008, 218Russia, strategic relations with, 259Russia, tilt toward, 219Russian support for, 132sabotage of independence, 251scorched earth policy in Kosovo, 47Security Council impasse, reaction to, 186security for religious sites, 95security, threats to, 250separation of Kosovo from in 1999, 76Serb migration into Kosovo, 21six-point plan and, 225sovereignty, 64sovereignty displaced by NATO, 271sovereignty forfeited, 121sovereignty, insistence on, 94sovereignty, loss of, 123, 131sovereignty, reassertion of, 92split in delegation to Troika, 197status under Holbrooke-Milosevic

Agreement, 39strategic interests, 261stripped refugees of identity documents, 48style of negotiating team, 144targets of NATO, 47Thaci, attacks on, 144Thaci, attempts to provoke, 197threats over unilateral declaration, 160UNMIK perceived as substitute for, 76UNMIK, opposition to, 76UNMIK’s authority view on, 64UNOSEK’s first visit to, 143Vienna meeting to discuss final Plan, 164violation of human rights, 34violence threatened by, 198violence, encouragement of, 251war crimes fugitives, 96

Serbian language, 15Serbian Orthodox

nationalism of, 98Serbian Orthodox Church, 16, 18

2004 riots, 8Final Plan, protection, 168nationalist, militantly, 152

Plan recommended protecting, 166restitution claims, 152subsidy of, 152tradition of resisting Muslim influence, 151

Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Kingdom of, 6, 17,102

Serwer, Daniel, 262precepts for international supervision, 227

Shala, Ahmet, 55, 71, 72, 243reconstruction plans, 55role in interim government, 55

Shala, Blerim, 142, 185Sharr Mountains, 15Shcherbak, Igor, 132Sigurimi, 23Simic, Aleksandar, 141, 144six-point plan, 225Skenderbeg, Gjergj Kastrioti, 15Slovakia, 108, 187, 199Solana, Javier

attitudes toward final status, 136Basque, concern about, 202European unity as goal of, 203Ischinger, instructions to, 195Ischinger, selection of, 194leadership, failures of, 266Montenegro, pressure on, 60, 102, 202Russia and, 175successes in diplomacy, 268support, growing, for independence, 183Troika, support for, 202

South AfricaAhtisaari visit to, 182

Soviet Union, 20, 23collapse of, 24

Spain, 45, 108, 134, 187, 199, 217, 269Ahtisaari visit to, 182Basque, Solana concern about, 202concerns with internal problems, 136

Srbica, 48, 53SRSG, 66, 81, 109

fear of KLA power, 70Haradinaj, control over, 176Jessen-Petersen’s appointment as, 81Jessen-Peterson’s first moves, 82Kouchner as, 188Kouchner as first, 54Michael Steiner, 75political parties, deference to, 71Security Council oversight, 108UN staff micromanaged, 80

Stambolic, Ivan, 24






INDEX 313

standards before status, 75Serbian insistence on, 120Steiner implementation of, 109

statehooddefinition, 124

Steiner, MichaelBildt editorial, reaction to, 81final status, attitude toward, 81final status, op-ed opposing, 81local institutions, consultation with, 71op-ed by, 82personal characteristics, 71, 75pressures, conflicting, on, 75priorities, 109Standards before Status, 75Standards before Status, defense of, 75successor’s focus on Standards, 81

Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, 184caution, political, 187concerns about, 187Ischinger and, 194, 200Russian relations, concern about, 187Schroeder and, 187

Straw, Jack, 175summer offensive, 37supervised independence, 120, 269Surroi, Veton, 59, 149

characterized as PR genius, 38comments on interim government, 59criticism of exclusion of Kosovo Serbs from

Serbian negotiation team, 141elections, postwar, 60hero of civil society movement, 59highly regarded by international

community, 59inaction, advocate for, 60interlocutor between internationals and

Kosovar Albanians, 59member of negotiating team, 142need for his support, 184opposition, member of, 99personal characteristics, 59political ambitions, 60public reaction to, 100represented traditional political elites, 59restlessness in 2007, 185Rice, meeting with, 185role of press in politics, 60Thaci, views on, 59Troika and, 197

Svilanovic, Goran, 172Switzerland, 23, 26, 36, 54, 55, 108

Tadic, Boris, 87co-chair of Serbian delegation to final status

negotiations, 141compromise, willingness to, 202DS, leader of, 85elections, January, 2007, 171European integration, commitment to, 97flexibility, postindependence, 263Germany and, 199independence day, 217Jeremic, and, 172Jessen-Petersen, and, 85Kostunica, outmaneuvered by, 97personality, 85politeness, 159, 164political base, 96political campaign 2006, 160political position, 97potential, 263president, reelected, 2008, 208promise of no violence, 204received Ahtisaari Plan, 164received final Ahtisaari Plan, 163Thaci, back channel to, 101Troika, initial meetings with, 94Troka, attitude toward, 196visit to Kosovo, 85weakness, 97

Taiwan, 199Talbott, Strobe, 51

role in 1999, 103Tatham, Michael, 137technical negotiations

need for, 143telephone system, 21, 46, 54, 62, 74, 243Teodosije, 153Terral, Jean-Francois, 107Thaci, Hashim, 4, 9, 37, 246, 278

2004 riots and, 79anticorruption commitment, 250Belgrade, willingness to talk to, 88Ceku relations with, 158Ceku, tensions with, 176coherent leadership, postindependence,

231corruption rebutted, 61criticism by Bukoshi and LDK, 50criticism of, 56Daci, tension with, 158development, 222discomfort with, 61effectiveness in negotiations, 100






314 INDEX

Thaci, Hashim (cont.)elections, 2001, 115elections, 2002, 116elections, 2007, 184, 204excluded from coaliton, 99excluded from LDK-AAK coalition, 83exclusion from coaliton, 128exclusion of those not tied to KLA, 83Haradinaj as alternative to, 232Haradinaj as competitor, 69Haradinaj, conflict with, 129Haradinaj, cooperation with, 98Haradinaj, excluded, from coalition, 208Haradinaj, opposition to prime ministership,

83Haradinaj, relations with, 232Haradinaj, split with, 98independence day, 212, 213independence day, speech in Serbian,

216inexperience, 59initial meeting with Chicago-Kent, 56initiative, took, postwar, 61interim administrative council, 63interim government, 54, 55internationals, cooperation with, 99Jessen-Petersen attitude toward, 82Jessen-Petersen visit to, 82LDK, relations with, 212LDK-AAK coalition, pressure to dissolve,

84need for cooperation by, 129need for his support, 184negotiation effectiveness, 100office, modest, 62opposition, leader of, 99outreach to Kosovo Serbs, 223, 239personal characteristics, 54, 56polls, 2008, 234postindependence

challenges, 223postindependence international politics,

223potential, 222pressure to allow factories to reopen, 54prime minister, 208prime minister, power to appoint, 70prime minister, selected, 70prime minister, selection of, 83priorities in 2003, 70Rambouillet, 46, 47, 59rebuff by UNMIK, 54

reluctance to alienate U.S., 184reputational challenge, 60resented by political elites, 60Rice, meeting with, 185rise to prominence, 47Serbian distaste for, 198Steiner consulted with, 71style in negotiations, 144Tadic, back channel to, 101Troika and, 197unity team, and, 129UNMIK relations with, 61, 62US protoge, 59vote, effort to split, 69

Three Percent Fund, 35, 61, 66Tito, 6, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27

concerns about Soviet Union, 23death of, 24investment in Kosovo, 242

Titov, Vladimir, 132intransigence about veto, 179

tourism, 248transatlantic unity, 264Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 201

Kosovar Albanian presentation on, 201Trepca, 21Troika, v, 3, 4, 191, 193, 195, 197, 199, 201, 203,

205, 206, 207, 209Ahtisaari and, 191Ahtisaari attitude toward, 269Ahtisaari’s involvement, 208Belgrade meeting, 196Botsan-Kharchenko and, 195breathing room, provided, 269charade, as, 192composition, 193concept paper, 201conclusions, draft, 202deadline of December 10, 2007, 196, 202,

205final options, 203final round, November 25–28, 2007, 204Germany key to, 199goals, 192, 194goals achieved, 206Ischinger crucial to, 194Ischinger crucial to German support, 199Kouchner support for, 189, 192model for future, 278negotiations, face-to-face, October 23, 1007,

203organizational meeting, August 9, 2007, 195






INDEX 315

partition on agenda, 94Plan B preempted by, 181Prishtina, trip to, 197proposals avoided, 200relations among members, 195report to Secretary General, 207report to UN, 204Round II, 197Round III, September 17–19, 2007, 201Russian commitment to, 261Secretary General supported, 195statement of conclusions rejected by

Belgrade, 204support by Solana, 136transatlantic unity, contribution to, 255,

264U.S. support for, 130, 198, 199U.S. undercut, allegations that, 205unity essential, 195

Tropoja, 36truehand

model for privatization, 65trustee occupant, 55Tschoepke, Ernst, 66Turkey

recognition, 217two-Germanies, 200

U.N.barriers to effectiveness, 138

U.S.coherence of effort, 130Contact Group, member of, 80divisions over Kosovo, 91exceptionalism, 126firmness essential, 264independence, commitment to, 119independence, steadfast support for, 130multilateralism, 265strategy in July 2007, 183tightrope, 198

UN Police, 10UN staff

SRSG needed to stand up to, 80UNMIK’s role, perceived as limited, 72, 76,

108underground businesses, 74unemployment, 74UNHCR, 54

Chicago-Kent database for, 42Chicago-Kent work with, 41evacuation in 1999, 46

Jessen-Petersen, service with, 81responsibility for Pillar II, 54tour of KLA region, 43

United Nations, i, v, 1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 54, 61,122, 255, 276

admission to, 121importance of, 137Jessen-Petersen, service with, 81utility of, 275

United Statesrecognition, 217

United States Information Service, 38, 43,281

United States Institute for Peace, 9, 13unity

U.S. and European, 95Unity Team

agreed to U.S. plan for independence, 208disgust, popular, with, 185establishment, 129fear of alienating U.S., 184fragmentation of, 184Hadley meeting with, 186Haradinaj and, 176participation in final status negotiations, 142Pocantico Declaration, 177reorganization after Rugova’s death, 158reproach by Rohan, 145review of final Ahtisaari Plan, 163Rice meeting, 185Rice meeting with, 183split, possibility of, 176, 183Troika and, 197Troika, presentation to, 201unified in dealings with Troika, 197violence, threat of, 274Wisner meeting with, 4 December 2007, 207

University of Prishtina, 7, 21, 22Haradinaj completed law studies at, 83isolation of, 66recruits for KLA from, 37Steiner appearance at, 75termination of Albanian-language

instruction, 25UNMIK slow to visit, 61weakness of, 75

UNMIK, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 61, 76, 116,128, 167, 170, 280

advisers wary of political leaders, 82antipathy for, 72applicable law, mistakes as to, 57authority, two different interpretations, 63






316 INDEX

UNMIK (cont.)barricade to independence, 76belligerent occupant as, 64bridge between Serbian Government and

Kosovo Government, 108capacity of declining, 94colonial occupier, perceived as, 76conflict, in the middle of, 94constitutional framework, 63, 69, 71decentralization originated with, 146declining presence, 101devolution of power, delays in, 73disruption of cellphone procurement, 56divided authority, post-independece, 224doubts about authority, 55elections, 69, 115EU as successor to, 138EU replacement of, 189EULEX and, 225EULEX, impasse with, 230four pillars organization, 54frustration with, 71gaps filled by KFOR, 52Haradinaj critical of, 82Haradinaj, control of, 128harmony, interethnic, as goal, 74illegitimacy, postindependence, 227impotence, postindependence, admitted,

225indiginous political institutions, need for,

61ineffectiveness, causes of early, 66infeasibility of continuing, 165interim government, relationship with, 59Kosovar Albanian preoccupation with, 77Kosovar Albanians isolated by, 100Kosovar Albanians, indifference to, 66Kosovar Albanians, lack of confidence in,

62Kosovo Serb resistance to, 148Kurti, detention of, 275leadership of, 104leadership, more forceful, 80limitations on influence in Mitrovica, 69limitations, source of, 228Moscow sabotaged phase-out, 251obstruction of reconstruction, 54organization, 54oversight of, 108partition result of early policies, 93PISG, oversight of, 70political fragmentation, fear of, 70

political parties, deference to, 71political trustee, as, 65politics, grassroots, 61Raj, neocolonial, perceived as, 73refusal to deal with interim government, 54regulations, 63representation, international, of Kosovo,

74resistance to devolution of power, 71retained ultimate authority, 63returns, statement on, 150scapegoat for international indecision, 76slow to organize, 52source of authority for, 54Strpce, as model, 87successes, 109target of 2004 riots, 79ultimate legal authority, 70unilateral declaration of independence,

confirmation of, 183unsustainability, 109

UNOSEK, 114organization, 116

UNPREDEP, 273Ustasha, 19

Vedrine, Hubert, 46Vetevendosje, 146, 275Vieira de Mello, Sergio, 109violence

potential for, 274potential for, postindependence, 251risks of, 206threats of, 222threats of, as spur to negotiations, 273threats, impact on negotiations, 255

VJ, 31, 45, 46attacks on villages, 47

Vllasi, Azem, 25Voice of America, 9, 38Vojvodina, 22, 133, 197Volker, Kurt, 198Vucic, Aleksandar, 264

Waguespack, Scott, 55involvement in reconstruction, 56visit to Law Faculty, 59

Walker, William, 2, 46, 273War Veterans Association, 5West Bank, 199Wisner, Frank, 4, 278

Ahtisaari Plan, refusal to renegotiate, 196






INDEX 317

autonomy proposal questions, 198, 201background, 129Botsan-Kharchenko and, 195Ceku, reassured, 182contingency planning, 207patience in Prishtina, counselled, 183Pocantico Declaration, 177policy continuity, stressed need for, 193Rice meeting suggested, 183style, 130Troika, member of, 193U.S. representative to final status

negotiations, 129unity team meeting, December 4, 2007,

207violence, warnings about, 275warnings against pressure on U.S., 185

women and childrentargets of Serb forces, 48, 58

World War II, 6

young peopleparticipation in politics, 27, 33, 77

Yugoslaviaaccommodation with Albania, 23Albanians in, 21assimilation of Kosovar Albanians, 23autonomy of Kosovo within, 63Bosnian war, 13breakup, 26, 31, 104breakup, causes of, 1, 134

breakup, republic boundaries as guide for,121

comprehensive solution to breakup of, 33constitution of 1974, 271declaration of independence from, 26distintegration, European role in, 174fear of Soviet Union, 20federalism, 21history, 6Kosovo as Republic, 28Kosovo economic development, 21Milosevic, rise to power, 24modernization, 21Montenegro in, 102need for forceful international intervention,

45obstructions to visas for Americans, 41press coverage of breakup, 38repudiation of Communism, 25scorched earth policy in Kosovo, 47self-determination in, 27sovereignty, Resolution 1244’s commitment

to, 65Tito’s death, 24U.S. reaction to breakup of, 104violence, role of, in, 273World War II, 19

Yugoslavia, Kingdom of, 17

Zeka, Kadri, 23Zemun Gang, 77






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