62404529-wills-3-digest

Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)

Marcela Rodelas v. Amparo Aranza

G.R. No. L-58509; December 7, 1982

Facts:

Petitioner-appellant filed a petition with the CFI-Rizal for the probate of the holo will of

Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was

opposed by appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla

Frias and Ephraim Bonilla. The grounds of their opposition are as follows:

1. Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce

the will within twenty days of the death of the testator.

2. The alleged copy of the will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was

not intended to take effect.

3. The original must be presented and not the copy thereof.

4. The deceased did not leave any will.

The appellees also moved for the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the will. The

appellees' motions were denied. They filed a Motion for recon. Motion for Recon was

approved. Appellant's motion for recon was denied. Appellant appealed the case to the CA

which certified the case to the SC on hte ground that the appeal does not involve questions

of fact.

Issue:

Whether or not a holo will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a

photostatic copy.

Ruling:

Yes. a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because

comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs.

Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or

destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who

have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall

produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity."

But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a

photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other

similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be

exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of

the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of

the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

Spouses Roberto and Thelma Ajero v. Court of Appeals and Clemente Sand

G.R. No. 106720; September 15, 1994

Facts:

The decedent names as devisees Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente

Sand, Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa Sand, and Dr. Jose

Ajero and their children.

The petitioners filed a petition for the allowance of decendent's holo will.

Private Respondnet opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's

body nor the signature therein was in decendent's handwriting; it contained alterations

and corrections which were not duly signed by the decedent; and the will was procured by

pets through improper pressure and undue influence. Dr. Jose Ajero also opposed the

petition. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran,

Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its

entirety, as she was not its sole owner.

The trial court admitted the holo will to probate. On appeal, the said decision was reversed

and the pet for probate was dismissed. The CA found that the holo will failed to meet the

requirements for its validity. I held that the decedent did not comply with Arts 813 and

814.It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated,

or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made

thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.

Ruling:

1. Refer to Art. 839.

These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition

to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the

instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;

(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;

(3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was

executed; and,

(4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the

decedent.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the

validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the

testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions

cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament

void.Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-

compliance with the provisions of Article 814.


Kalaw vs. Relova:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the

testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not

thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased,

corrected or interlined. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or

insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their

presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in

disallowance of such changes.

It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and

dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that

which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article

810).

2. The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of

the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct

and must be affirmed.As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass

only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional

instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and

pass upon certain provisions of the will. In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably

stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late

father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the

same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly

dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.

--


Sofia Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, Rufina Gomez, Oscar Jugo Ang, Carmelita Jugo

G.R. No. L-62952; October 9, 1985

Facts:

Martin Jugo named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only

executor of his estate. The will clearly stated that the testator was legally married to a

certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita. He stated

that since 1952 he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living

with petitioner as husband and wife. The testator and the petitioner herein were married

in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs,

namely his legal wife and his children (Oscar & Carmelita) his entire estate. He devised the

free portion thereof to herein petitioner.

The pet filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased. The

legal wife and her children filed an opposition.

The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that the testator admitted to

cohabiting with the pet. The Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on

the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. The respondent

court set aside the decision of the CFI. It declared the will to be valid except the devise in

favor of the pet pursuant to Art, 739 in relation with Art. 1028.

Pet filed a motion for recon - denied.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after

declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on

to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein

petitioner.

2. Validity of hte disposition in favor of the pet.

Ruling:

1. No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be

validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the

devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an

examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not

inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not

powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of

the Will.

In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because

of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have

been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing

upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The

probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically

void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be

passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

2. Invalid. Refer to Art. 739.

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the

spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by

preponderance of evidence in the same action.

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:

The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to

testamentary provisions.

The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private

respondents:

First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the

meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee.

Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance

of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary

evidence.

In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the

will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.

Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as

man and wife, as already married, was an important and specific issue brought by the

parties before the trial court, and passed upon by the Court of Appeals.

Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who

opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator.


Polly Cayetano v. Hon. Tomas Leonidas and Nenita Campos Paguia

G.R. No. L-54919; May 30, 1984

Facts:

Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters,

private respondent Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as surviving heirs.

Hermogenes Campos adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the

deceased. Eleven months after, Nenita filed a pet for the reprobate of a will of the deceased

which was allegedly executed un the US.

Nenita alleged that after the testatrix death, her last will and test was presented, probated,

allowed, and registered in Philly.

The pet for the reprobate of the will was opposed. Pet filed a motion to dismiss opposition

stating that he has been able to verify the veracity of the will and now confirms the same to

be truly the probated will of his daughter.

The lower court admitted the will to probate. Hermogenes filed a pet for relief, praying

that the order allowing the will to be set aside was secured through fraudulent means.

Motion for recon denied.

Meanwhile, pet died and left a will, which incidentally has been questioned by the

respondent.

Issues:

Validity of the provisions of the will.

Ruling:

Petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's

will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law

for him. - Without merit.

Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the

respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have

sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen

and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. -Art. 16, 1039.

The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is

the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law

does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to

a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would

be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the

specific provisions of Philippine Law.

Vda. De Molo v. Molo

90 Phil 37

Facts:

The proponent of the will is the widow of the testator, while the opponents are nephews

and nieces of the testator. Petitioner filed a pet for the probate of a will executed by the

deceased on June 20, 1939. The will was denied probate on the ground that it did not

comply with the formalities prescribed by law. In view of the disallowance, the widow filed

another petition for the probate of a copy of another will executed on August 17, 1918. The

will was admitted to probate in spite of the opposition of the appellants. The will of 1939

contains a revocatory clause expressly revoking the will of 1918.

Ruling:

The will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of ‘dependent relative

revocation.’ Under this doctrine, the rule is established that where the act of destruction is

connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the

testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new disposition

intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the

efficacy of the new disposition; and if for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a

substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in force.


Teodora Caneda v. Court of Appeals and William Cabrera

G.R. No. 103554; May 28, 1993

Facts:

Mateo Caballero executed a last will and testament in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting

witnesses. The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It was

declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal

properties to Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo,

Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the

testator.

Four months after the execution of the will, Mateo himself filed a petition seeking the

probate of his will. The testator passed away before his petition could be heard.

One of the legatees named in his will sought appointment as special administrator of the

estate. The estimated value of the estate was 24K. Petitioners, claiming to be nephews and

nieces of the testator, instituted a 2nd petition for the intestate proceeding of the estate

and opposed thereat the probate of the testator's will.

Benoni Cabrera died, hence, the probate court appointed William Cabrera as special

administrator. Petitioners opposed the probate on the ground that the testator was

already in poor health when the will was executed. Petitioners likewise question the

genuineness of the testator's signature.

One of the attesting witness and the notary public testified that the testator was of sound

mind. The probate court rendered a decision declaring the will as the last will and

testament of the deceased.

The pets elevated the case to the CA on the ground that the will in question is null and void

for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective. The appellate court affirmed

the decision of the trial court. MR denied.

Issue:

Validity of the attestation clause.

Ruling:

Invalid. It is contended by petitioners that the aforequoted attestation clause, in

contravention of the express requirements of the third paragraph of Article 805 of the Civil

Code for attestation clauses, fails to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses

the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses,

likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each

other.

While the will recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the

presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were

used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses

subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of

each other.

The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for

his signature and on the left hand margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the

instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words "as his Last Will and

Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of the testator and in

the presence of each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer

to the witnesses, it must, however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing

in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately follows the words "he has

signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on

the left hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis , is the

statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the

testator and of one another.

It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect

or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here

sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the

aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely

involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the

application of the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in the pertinent provision

thereon in the Civil Code(Refer to Art, 809)

While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and

at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be

conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witness affixed their respective signatures in

the presence of the testator and of each other since, as petitioners correctly observed, the

presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does

not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the

testator and of each other. The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where

the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or occasions and in various

combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity.


Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina Palang and Herminia Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 116668; July 28, 1997

Facts:

Miguel Palang contracted his first marraige(1949) with Carlina Vallesterol. They had one

child, Hermina Palang(1950). Miguel left to work in Hawaii a few months after the

wedding. He returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit was in 1964. The trial court found

evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he

came back for good in 1972, he refused to live with the PRs.

Miguel contracted a 2nd marriage with Erlinda Aglipay (1973). Two months earlier, M and

E jointly purchased an agricultural land. They also bought a res. lot. In 1975, M and C

executed a Deed of of all their conjugal prop to Herminia Palang. M and E produced a

son(Kristofer). In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage. Miguel died 2 yrs later. RPs

instituted an action for the recovery of ownership and poss with damages against pet in

the RTC of Urdaneta. PRs sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly

purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with the pet. The trial court dismissed the

complaint. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the trial court's decision.

Issues:

1. Ownership of the two pieces of property subject of this action;

2. Kristofer's heirship and filiation.

Ruling:

1. In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the

business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually

contributed money to buy the subject Riceland. On the date of conveyance, petitioner was

only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner

of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that she

contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price. Petitioner now claims that the

riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the

nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the

operation of Article 148 of the Family Code.

2. "inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of

illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto

should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for

the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for

recovery of ownership and possession."

Manuel Reyes v. Court of Appeals and Julio Vivares

G.R. No. 12099; October 30, 1997

Facts:

On January 3, 1992, Torcuato Reyes executed his last will and testament. He bequeathed all

his prop to his wife Asuncion (Oning) and his brother Jose. The will consisted of two pages

and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso,

Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated

the executor and in his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. PR filed a

petition for probate of the will. The recognized natural children of Torcuato with Estebana

Galolo and Celsa Agape filed an opposition. The court declared that the will was exec

according w/ the forma prescribed by law. However, it ruled that Asuncion was never

married to the deceased (Hence, dispo made in will is invalid). Julio Vivares filed an

appeals before the CA with the allegation that the oppositos failed to present ay comp.

evidence taht Asuncion was legally married to another person. The CA affirmed the trial

court's decision but with the modification that dispo in favor of Oning was valid.

Ruling:

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic

validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due

execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the

testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication

prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will's provisions. The intrinsic validity is not

considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been

proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic

validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the

probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The

intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because "practical considerations"

demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are of

doubtful legality. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under

exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation

constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. The lower court was not

asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result,

the declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did not have to be

scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes

as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and

which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.


Ursulina Ganuelas v. Robert Cawed

G.R. No. 123968; April 24, 2003

Facts:

Celestina Ganuelas executed a Deed of Donation of real prop covering seven parcels of land

in favor of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas .Celestina executed a docu purporting to set aside

the deed of donation. More than a month later, Celestina died(1967) without issue and any

surviving ascendants and siblings. After Celestina's death, Ursulina had been sharing the

produce of the donated properties with private respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al.,

nieces of Celestina. In 1982, Ursulina secured tax decs in her name over the donated props

and since then, she refused to give private respondents any share in the produce. PRs filed

a complaint against Ursulina. The complaint alleged that the Deed of Donation executed by

Celestina in favor of Ursulina was void. The trial court rendering judgment declaring null

and void the Deed of Donation and ordered the partition of the estate of Celestina.

Issue:

Donation inter vivos or mortis causa??

Ruling:

TC decision affirmed! Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the

former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until

the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee

until the death of the donor-testator. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and

accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code, except

when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the

donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills,

otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.

The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,

what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or

naked) and control of the property while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad

nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in

the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that

any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior

to the death of Celestina.

The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other

interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to

Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime. More importantly, the provision in the deed

stating that if the donee should die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed

rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem

disposition.

As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis

causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee.

More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis

causa. As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the

formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with,

failing which the donation is void and produces no effect.


Spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125888; August 13, 1998

Facts:

A deed of donation was executed by Aurora Montinola. It named as donees her

grandchildren. The deed also contained the signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of

their acceptance of the donation. Aurora drew up a deed of revocation and caused it to be

annotated as an adverse claim on hte title. She filed a petition in court for the cancellation

of the transfer on the ground that the transfer was mortis causa - thus, void because it did

not comply with the formalities of a will. The donees opposed the pet. The trial court

judgment holding that the donation was one inter vivos. She elevated the case to the CA.

Meanwhile, Aurora died. Shortly after A's demise, a manifestation and motion was filed by

Ernesto Sicad and Evelyn Sicad alleged taht they had become the owners of the prop by

virtue of a deed of definite sale. The CA affirmed the TC's decision.

Issue:

Character of the deed of donation.

Ruling:

The evidence establishes that Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect

only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the sale

of the property for such period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the deed

reading: "however, the donees shall not sell or encumber the properties herein donated

within 10 years after the death of the donor." The actuality of the subsequent insertion of

this new proviso is apparent on the face of the instrument: the intercalation is easily

perceived and identified — it was clearly typed on a different machine, and is crammed

into the space between the penultimate paragraph of the deed and that immediately

preceding it.

Not only did Aurora Montinola order the insertion in the deed of that restrictive proviso,

but also, after recordation of the deed of donation, she never stopped treating the property

as her own. She continued, as explicity authorized in the deed itself, to possess the

property, enjoy its fruits and otherwise exercise the rights of dominion, paying the

property taxes as they fell due — all these she did until she transferred the Property to the

Sicad Spouses on July 10, 1990.

As already intimated, the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and

the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its

execution. In this respect, case law has laid down significant parameters.

The Incompetent Carmen Caniza v. Court of Appeals, Pedro and Leonora Estrada

G.R. No. 110427; February 24, 1997

Facts:

Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College

of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent

by judgment of the QC RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.

Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities

which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was

appointed legal guardian of her person and estate. Amparo commenced a suit to eject the

spouses Estrada from the said premises. In their Answer, the defendants declared that they

had been living in Cañiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful

service they had been considered by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact

executed a holographic will by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in

question.The MTC rendered judgment in favor of Caniza. The RTC reversed said decision.

The appellate court affirmed the RTC's judgment.

Issue:

Evangelista's authority.

Ruling:

The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her

intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial

guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be

inconsistent with the ward's will.

A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed

or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be

claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal

property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838,

id.). An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by

his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime

for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the

owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the

house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.

Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the

person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly

installed her as the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN

CANIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any


province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary

for the management of her properties . . " By that appointment, it became Evangelista's

duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure

her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends. It

also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Cañiza's

property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right

to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the

ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from

anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this

purpose.

--


Heirs of Jesus Fran v. Hon. Bernardo LL. Salas

G.R. No. L-53546; June 25, 1992

Facts:

Remedios Tiosejo died with neither descendants nor ascendants; she left real and personal

properties located in Cebu City, Ormoc City and Puerto Bello, Merida, Leyte. She left a last

will and testament wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives(b,s,n,n) all her

properties. She designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as executor.

Jesus Fran filed a pet for the probate of Remedios' will. The pet alleged that Rosario was

not physically well. Tan signed a waiver in favor of Fran on hte third page of the pet.

The PRs (sisters of the deceased) filed a manifestation, alleging that they needed time to

study the petition bec. some heirs have been intentionally omitted. PRs did not file any

opposition. The pet thus became uncontested. The probate court rendered a decision

admitting the will to probate. Pet filed an Inventory of the Estate, copies thereof were

furnished to the PRs. A Project of Partition was submitted by hte exec to the court. The PRs

still did not make any objections. TC issued its Order approving the partition. Thereafter,

the aforesaid branch(which issued the order) was converted to a Juvenile and Domestic

Relations Court.

PRs filed with the new branch a MR of the probate judgment and the order of partition.

Pets challenged the juris of the court. Respondent Judge issued an order declaring the

testamentary dispos as void.

Issue:

1. GAD of respondent Judge.

Ruling:

1. Yes. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction when he granted the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and thereafter set

aside the probate judgment of 13 November 1972 in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, declared the

subject will of the testatrix a forgery, nullified the testamentary dispositions therein and

ordered the conversion of the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.

After the probate court rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and there having been

no claim presented despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner Fran submitted a

Project of Partition which private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco voluntarily

signed and to which private respondent Espina expressed her conformity through a

certification filed with the probate court. Assuming for the sake of argument that private

respondents did not receive a formal notice of the decision as they claim in their Omnibus

Motion for Reconsideration, these acts nevertheless constitute indubitable proof of their

prior actual knowledge of the same. A formal notice would have been an idle ceremony. In

testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the project of partition, which is

normally an implementation of the will and is among the last operative acts to terminate

the proceedings. If private respondents did not have actual knowledge of the decision, they

should have desisted from performing the above acts and instead demanded from

petitioner Fran the fulfillment of his alleged promise to show them the will. The same

conclusion refutes and defeats the plea that they were not notified of the order authorizing

the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence and that the Clerk of Court did not notify them of

the date of the reception of evidence. Besides, such plea must fail because private

respondents were present when the court dictated the said order.


Joseph Cua v. Gloria Vargas

G.R. No. 156536; October 31, 2006

Facts:

A parcel of land(99 sqm) was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. The heirs executed a

notarized extrajudicial settlement among themselves, partitioning and adjudicating unto

themselves the lot in question, each of them getting a share of 11 sq meters. Among the

heirs, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. Florentino, Andres,

Antonina, and Gloria did not sign the document. The document was published for three

consecutive weeks. An extra-j settlement with sale was again executed. Once more, only

E,V,J,Z, and R signed and their shares were sold to Joseph Cua. According to Gloria, she

came to know of hte settlement only when the original house was being demolished. She

also claimed that she was unaware of the first document. She sent a letter to petitioner in

order to redeem the property.

When Gloria and Jose failed to reach an amicable settlement, the former filed a case for

annulment of the EJS and legal redemption of the lot. After trial on the merits, the MTC

rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The MTC upheld the sale to petitioner because

the transaction purportedly occurred after the partition of the property among the co-

owner heirs. The RTC affirmed the MTC decision.

On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts. MR denied.

Issues:

1. Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure

to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the

extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published;

2. Whether the written notice required to be served by an heir to his co-heirs in connection

with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before partition under Article 1088 of the

Civil Code can be dispensed with when such co-heirs have actual knowledge of the sale.

Ruling:

1. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs

who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact

of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and

was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate.

In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed

either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before

the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do

not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is

invalid insofar as they are concerned.

*This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary

rights to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually

participated in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to

petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same.

Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article

1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were

never notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs.

2. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in

some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the

time advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-

heir thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his

or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption.

It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the

vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best position to know the other co-owners

who, under the law, must be notified of the sale. This will remove all uncertainty as to the

fact of the sale, its terms and its perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the

alienation is not definitive. As a result, the party notified need not entertain doubt that the

seller may still contest the alienation.

Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement,

there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to

petitioner given the former's obvious willingness and capacity to do so.


Cresencia Tubo Rodriguez v. Evangeline Rodriguez

G.R. No. 175720; September 11, 2007

Facts:

Juanito Rodriguez owned a 5-door apartment. In 1983, he executed a "Huling habilin at

testamento' giving petitioner Cresencia Tubo Rodriguez, his live-in partner, apartments D

and E, and his children Benjamin(deceased husband of respondent), apartment A;

respondent Buenaventura, aprtment B; and Belen, apartment C.

However, in 1984, the deceased executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in favor

of the petitioner.

In 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents,

alleging that she is the lawful and registered owner of the property, and that in 1984, she

allowed respondents to occupy hte units. However, without her knowlege and consent, the

respondents separately leased the units to Magpantay, Navarro, and Escota.

Respondents claimed ownership of hte property by succession. They alleged that the deed

of sale was simulated and void. The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondents.

The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. MR

denied.

Issue:

1. Possession of the property.

2. Ownership

Ruling:

1. *Petitioner alleges that as the registered owner of the subject property, she enjoys the

right of possession thereof and that question of ownership cannot be raised in an

ejectment case unless it is intertwined with the issue of possession. While the court may

look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure to determine the nature

of possession, it cannot resolve the issue of ownership because the resolution of said issue

would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not proper in the summary action for

unlawful detainer. Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the

Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership of the specific apartments

disregarding the fact that the same is not probated yet and that the testator changed or

revoked his will by selling the property to petitioner prior to his death. -ya! duh!

--> Being a summary proceeding intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting

actual possession or right to possession of property, the question of title is not involved

and should be raised by the affected party in an appropriate action in the proper court.

2. However, when the issue of ownership is raised the court is not ousted of its jurisdiction.

Section 16 of Rule 70.(ROC) All that the trial court can do is to make an initial

determination of who is the owner of the property so that it can resolve who is entitled to

its possession absent other evidence to resolve ownership. But this adjudication is only

provisional and does not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving

title to the property.

*Wills - The lower courts considered the following documentary evidence in arriving at

their respective decisions: 1) Huling Habilin at Testamento 2) Deed of Sale 3) TCT No. in

the name of the petitioner; and 4) Partition Agreement executed by both the respondents

and the petitioner.

Based on the foregoing documentary evidence, we find that there is preponderance of

evidence in favor of the petitioner’s claim. Respondents failed to prove their right of

possession, as the Huling Habilin at Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no legal

effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have force or validity it

must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. Article

838 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o will shall pass either real or personal property

unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.” As the will was not

probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto cannot be given

effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in

the determination of the issue of possession.

Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor of the petitioner, Juanito

Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the

time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to dispose of it

during his lifetime.


Teresita Bordalba v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112443; January 25, 2002

Facts:

A lot located in Mandaue City was originally owned by the late Carmeno Jayme and

Margarita de Jayme. In 1947, an EJP was executed. Distributed as follows:

1. 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private

respondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia

and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose

heirs are private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;

2. 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P.

Bordalba; and

3. 1/3 to an unidentified party.

Nicanor's house stands on the land adjudicated to the heirs. Sometime in 1964, pets

mother, filed with the RTC an amended application for the registration of the lot. Nicanor

and Asuncion filed their opposition contending that said application included the 1/3

portion inherited by them in the extra-judicial partition. The case was dismissed.

Subsequently, pet filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for a free patent. Pet was

successfullly granted a free patent. Thereafter, pet caused the subdivision of the lot into 6

lots. The private respondents filed with the RTC, the instant complaint against the

petitioner and the director of the BOL. The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by

pet, declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation. However, it declared

that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue are

purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and consequently upheld as valid

the sale of the lot. Both petitioner and private respondents appealed to the CA which

affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.

Wills Issue:(ito lang ata)

WON the PRs are the legal heirs of the deceased.

Ruling:

Other than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was presented

by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may assert his right

to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.

Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 118464; Decemebr 21, 1998

Facts:

Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-owners of a

lot in Lucena City. Lourdes died without issue. PRs, claiming to be the collateral relatives of

the deceased Lourdes, filed an action for partition. Conti refused the partition on the

ground that PRs failed to produce any document to prove that they were the rightful heirs

of Lourdes. When Ignacio died, he was substituted as party-defendant by his kids.

PR Lydia Sampayo presented an original copy of her cert. of live birth to prove that she

was one of the nieces of Lourdes. Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel tried to prove that

they were the siblings of Lourdes by presenting their baptismal certs together with the

birth cert of Manuel.

Rosario claimed that Lourdes agreed to leave her share of the property to them. However,

no will, either testamentary of holo, was presented by pets to substantiate this claim. The

TC declared PRs as the rightful heirs of Lourdes. It further ordered PRs and pets to submit

a project of partition. Pets elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the assailed decision.

MR denied.

Issues:

1. WON the settlement of the estate is a condition precedent before the commencement of

any action pertaining to hte deceased.

2. WON PRs are the rightful heirs of the deceased.

Ruling:

1. No. The title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his

heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims of administration

and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and

expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the

intestate, from himself to his heirs.

Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the

action been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with

extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the summary settlement of

estates of small value. But what private respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation

of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited from her through intestate succession.

This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-owners. Rule 69, Sec. 1)


2. Yes. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted are competent

and adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo.

Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations

to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death

to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. Legal or intestate succession

takes place if a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has

subsequently lost its validity. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,

or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the

decedent. It was established during the trial that Lourdes died intestate and without issue.

Private respondents as sister, nephews and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives

of Lourdes.


[G.R. No. 156819. December 11, 2003]

ALICIA E. GALA, GUIA G. DOMINGO and RITA G. BENSON, petitioners, vs. ELLICE

AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, MARGO MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, RAUL E. GALA, VITALIANO N. AGUIRRE II, ADNAN V. ALONTO, ELIAS

N. CRESENCIO, MOISES S. MANIEGO, RODOLFO B. REYNO, RENATO S. GONZALES,

VICENTE C. NOLAN, NESTOR N. BATICULON, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the

decision dated November 8, 2002 [1] and the resolution dated December 27, 2002 [2] of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71979.

On March 28, 1979, the spouses Manuel and Alicia Gala, their children Guia Domingo,

Ofelia Gala, Raul Gala, and Rita Benson, and their encargados Virgilio Galeon and Julian

Jader formed and organized the Ellice Agro-Industrial Corporation. [3] The total

subscribed capital stock of the corporation was apportioned as follows:

Name Number of Shares Amount

Manuel R. Gala 11, 700 1,170,000.00

Alicia E. Gala 23,200 2,320,000.00

Guia G. Domingo 16 1,600.00

Ofelia E. Gala 40 4,000.00

Raul E. Gala 40 4,000.00

Rita G. Benson 2 200.00

Virgilio Galeon 1 100.00

Julian Jader 1 100.00

TOTAL 35,000 P3,500,000.00 [4]

As payment for their subscriptions, the Gala spouses transferred several parcels of land

located in the provinces of Quezon and Laguna to Ellice. [5]

In 1982, Manuel Gala, Alicia Gala and Ofelia Gala subscribed to an additional 3,299 shares,

10,652.5 shares and 286.5 shares, respectively. [6]

On June 28, 1982, Manuel Gala and Alicia Gala acquired an additional 550 shares and 281

shares, respectively. [7]

Subsequently, on September 16, 1982, Guia Domingo, Ofelia Gala, Raul Gala, Virgilio Galeon

and Julian Jader incorporated the Margo Management and Development Corporation

(Margo). [8] The total subscribed capital stock of Margo was apportioned as follows:


Raul E. Gala 6,640 66,400.00

Ofelia E. Gala 6,640 66,400.00

Guia G. Domingo 6,640 66,400.00



TOTAL 20,000 P200,000.00 [9]

On November 10, 1982, Manuel Gala sold 13,314 of his shares in Ellice to Margo. [10]

Alicia Gala transferred 1,000 of her shares in Ellice to a certain Victor de Villa on March 2,

1983. That same day, de Villa transferred said shares to Margo. [11] A few months later,

on August 28, 1983, Alicia Gala transferred 854.3 of her shares to Ofelia Gala, 500 to Guia

Domingo and 500 to Raul Gala. [12]

Years later, on February 8, 1988, Manuel Gala transferred all of his remaining holdings in

Ellice, amounting to 2,164 shares, to Raul Gala. [13]

On July 20, 1988, Alicia Gala transferred 10,000 of her shares to Margo. [14]

Thus, as of the date on which this case was commenced, the stockholdings in Ellice were

allocated as follows:


Margo 24,312.5 2,431,250.00

Alicia Gala 21,480.2 2,148,020.00

Raul Gala 2,704.5 270,450.00

Ofelia Gala 980.8 98,080.00

Gina Domingo 516 51,600.00

Rita Benson 2 200.00



Adnan Alonto 1 100.00

Elias Cresencio 1 100.00

TOTAL 50,000 P5,000,000.00

On June 23, 1990, a special stockholders’ meeting of Margo was held, where a new board of

directors was elected. [15] That same day, the newly-elected board elected a new set of

officers. Raul Gala was elected as chairman, president and general manager. During the

meeting, the board approved several actions, including the commencement of proceedings

to annul certain dispositions of Margo’s property made by Alicia Gala. The board also

resolved to change the name of the corporation to MRG Management and Development

Corporation. [16]


Similarly, a special stockholders’ meeting of Ellice was held on August 24, 1990 to elect a

new board of directors. In the ensuing organizational meeting later that day, a new set of

corporate officers was elected. Likewise, Raul Gala was elected as chairman, president and

general manager.

On March 27, 1990, respondents filed against petitioners with the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) a petition for the appointment of a management committee or receiver,

accounting and restitution by the directors and officers, and the dissolution of Ellice Agro-

Industrial Corporation for alleged mismanagement, diversion of funds, financial losses and

the dissipation of assets, docketed as SEC Case No. 3747. [17] The petition was amended

to delete the prayer for the appointment of a management committee or receiver and for

the dissolution of Ellice. Additionally, respondents prayed that they be allowed to inspect

the corporate books and documents of Ellice. [18]

In turn, petitioners initiated a complaint against the respondents on June 26, 1991,

docketed as SEC Case No. 4027, praying for, among others, the nullification of the elections

of directors and officers of both Margo Management and Development Corporation and

Ellice Industrial Corporation; the nullification of all board resolutions issued by Margo

from June 23, 1990 up to the present and all board resolutions issued by Ellice from

August 24, 1990 up to the present; and the return of all titles to real property in the name

of Margo and Ellice, as well as all corporate papers and records of both Margo and Ellice

which are in the possession and control of the respondents. [19]

The two cases were consolidated in an Order dated November 23, 1993. [20]

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the SEC cases, the shares of stock of Alicia and Ofelia

Gala in Ellice were levied and sold at public auction to satisfy a judgment rendered against

them by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 66, in Civil Case No. 42560, entitled

“Regines Condominium v. Ofelia (Gala) Panes and Alicia Gala.” [21]

On November 3, 1998, the SEC rendered a Joint Decision in SEC Cases Nos. 3747 and 4027,

the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. Dismissing the petition in SEC Case No. 3747,

2. Issuing the following orders in SEC Case No. 4027;

(a) Enjoining herein respondents to perform corporate acts of both Ellice and Margo,

as directors and officers thereof.

(b) Nullifying the election of the new sets of Board of Directors and Officers of Ellice

and Margo from June 23, 1990 to the present, and that of Ellice from August 24, 1990 to

the present.

(c) Ordering the respondent Raul Gala to return all the titles of real properties in the

names of Ellice and Margo which were unlawfully taken and held by him.

(d) Directing the respondents to return to herein petitioners all corporate papers,

records of both Ellice and Margo which are in their possession and control.

SO ORDERED. [22]

Respondents appealed to the SEC En Banc, which, on July 4, 2002, rendered its Decision,

the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Hearing Officer dated November 3, 1998 is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one hereby rendered granting the appeal, upholding

the Amended Petition in SEC Case No. 3747, and dismissing the Petition with Prayer for

Issuance of Preliminary Restraining Order and granting the Compulsory Counterclaim in

SEC Case No. 4027.

Accordingly, appellees Alicia Gala and Guia G. Domingo are ordered as follows:

(1) jointly and solidarily pay ELLICE and/or MARGO the amount of P700,000.00

representing the consideration for the unauthorized sale of a parcel of land to Lucky

Homes and Development Corporation (Exhs. “N” and “CCC”);

(2) jointly and severally pay ELLICE and MARGO the proceeds of sales of agricultural

products averaging P120,000.00 per month from February 17, 1988;

(3) jointly and severally indemnify the appellants P90,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

(4) jointly and solidarily pay the costs of suit;

(5) turn over to the individual appellants the corporate records of ELLICE and

MARGO in their possession; and

(6) desist and refrain from interfering with the management of ELLICE and MARGO.

SO ORDERED. [23]

Petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the

petition for review and affirmed the decision of the SEC En Banc. [24]

Hence, this petition, raising the following issues:

I

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS ILLEGAL AND

CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY THE PURPOSES AND MANNER IN WHICH RESPONDENT

CORPORATIONS WERE ORGANIZED – WHICH WERE, E.G. TO (1) “PREVENT THE GALA

ESTATE FROM BEING BROUGHT UNDER THE COVERAGE (SIC)” OF THE COMPREHENSIVE

AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP) AND (2) PURPORTEDLY FOR “ESTATE

PLANNING.”

II


WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED (1) IN SUSPICIOUSLY RESOLVING THE

CASE WITHIN TWO (2) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF RESPONDENTS’ COMMENT; AND (2) IN

NOT MAKING A DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES OF FACTS AND INSTEAD RITUALLY

CITING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION A QUO WITHOUT DISCUSSION

AND ANALYSIS;

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ORGANIZATION OF

RESPONDENT CORPORATIONS WAS NOT ILLEGAL FOR DEPRIVING PETITIONER RITA G.

BENSON OF HER LEGITIME.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT PIERCING THE VEILS OF

CORPORATE FICTION OF RESPONDENTS CORPORATIONS ELLICE AND MARGO. [25]

In essence, petitioners want this Court to disregard the separate juridical personalities of

Ellice and Margo for the purpose of treating all property purportedly owned by said

corporations as property solely owned by the Gala spouses.

The petitioners’ first contention in support of this theory is that the purposes for which

Ellice and Margo were organized should be declared as illegal and contrary to public

policy. They claim that the respondents never pursued exemption from land reform

coverage in good faith and instead merely used the corporations as tools to circumvent

land reform laws and to avoid estate taxes. Specifically, they point out that respondents

have not shown that the transfers of the land in favor of Ellice were executed in

compliance with the requirements of Section 13 of R.A. 3844. [26] Furthermore, they

alleged that respondent corporations were run without any of the conventional corporate

formalities. [27]

At the outset, the Court holds that petitioners’ contentions impugning the legality of the

purposes for which Ellice and Margo were organized, amount to collateral attacks which

are prohibited in this jurisdiction. [28]

The best proof of the purpose of a corporation is its articles of incorporation and by-laws.

The articles of incorporation must state the primary and secondary purposes of the

corporation, while the by-laws outline the administrative organization of the corporation,

which, in turn, is supposed to insure or facilitate the accomplishment of said purpose. [29]

In the case at bar, a perusal of the Articles of Incorporation of Ellice and Margo shows no

sign of the allegedly illegal purposes that petitioners are complaining of. It is well to note

that, if a corporation’s purpose, as stated in the Articles of Incorporation, is lawful, then the

SEC has no authority to inquire whether the corporation has purposes other than those

stated, and mandamus will lie to compel it to issue the certificate of incorporation. [30]

Assuming there was even a grain of truth to the petitioners’ claims regarding the legality of

what are alleged to be the corporations’ true purposes, we are still precluded from

granting them relief. We cannot address here their concerns regarding circumvention of

land reform laws, for the doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes a court from

arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is

initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. [31] Since primary

jurisdiction over any violation of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3844 that may have been

committed is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),

[32] then it is with said administrative agency that the petitioners must first plead their

case. With regard to their claim that Ellice and Margo were meant to be used as mere tools

for the avoidance of estate taxes, suffice it say that the legal right of a taxpayer to reduce

the amount of what otherwise could be his taxes or altogether avoid them, by means which

the law permits, cannot be doubted. [33]

The petitioners’ allegation that Ellice and Margo were run without any of the typical

corporate formalities, even if true, would not merit the grant of any of the relief set forth in

their prayer. We cannot disregard the corporate entities of Ellice and Margo on this

ground. At most, such allegations, if proven to be true, should be addressed in an

administrative case before the SEC. [34]

Thus, even if Ellice and Margo were organized for the purpose of exempting the properties

of the Gala spouses from the coverage of land reform legislation and avoiding estate taxes,

we cannot disregard their separate juridical personalities.

Next, petitioners make much of the fact that the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed

Decision a mere two days from the time the respondents filed their Comment. They

alleged that the appellate court could not have made a deliberate study of the factual

questions in the case, considering the sheer volume of evidence available. [35] In support

of this allegation, they point out that the Court of Appeals merely adopted the factual

findings of the SEC En Banc verbatim, without deliberation and analysis. [36]

In People v. Mercado, [37] we ruled that the speed with which a lower court disposes of a

case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed,

magistrates are not supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have

been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that jurists study a case long

before the deadline set for the promulgation of their decision has arrived. The two-day

period between the filing of petitioners’ Comment and the promulgation of the decision


was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the decision.

As long as the lower court does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor

of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, it cannot be taken to task for rendering its

decision with due dispatch. The Court of Appeals in this intra-corporate controversy

committed no reversible error and, consequently, its decision should be affirmed. [38]

Verily, if such swift disposition of a case is considered a non-issue in cases where the life or

liberty of a person is at stake, then we see no reason why the same principle cannot apply

when only private rights are involved.

Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are

conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. They carry even

more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of a lower fact-finding

body. [39] Likewise, the findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as the SEC, will not

be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of

said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial

evidence. [40]

However, in the interest of equity, this Court has reviewed the factual findings of the SEC

En Banc, which were affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, and has found no cogent

reason to disturb the same. Indeed, we are convinced that the arguments raised by the

petitioners are nothing but unwarranted conclusions of law. Specifically, they insist that

the Gala spouses never meant to part with the ownership of the shares which are in the

names of their children and encargados, and that all transfers of property to these

individuals are supposedly void for being absolutely simulated for lack of consideration.

[41] However, as correctly held by the SEC En Banc, the transfers were only relatively

simulated, inasmuch as the evident intention of the Gala spouses was to donate portions of

their property to their children and encargados. [42]

In an attempt to bolster their theory that the organization of the respondent corporations

was illegal, the petitioners aver that the legitime pertaining to petitioners Rita G. Benson

and Guia G. Domingo from the estate of their father had been subject to unwarranted

reductions as a result thereof. In sum, they claim that stockholdings in Ellice which the late

Manuel Gala had assigned to them were insufficient to cover their legitimes, since Benson

was only given two shares while Domingo received only sixteen shares out of a total

number of 35,000 issued shares. [43]

Moreover, the reliefs sought by petitioners should have been raised in a proceeding for

settlement of estate, rather than in the present intra-corporate controversy. If they are

genuinely interested in securing that part of their late father’s property which has been

reserved for them in their capacity as compulsory heirs, then they should simply exercise

their actio ad supplendam legitimam, or their right of completion of legitime. [44] Such

relief must be sought during the distribution and partition stage of a case for the

settlement of the estate of Manuel Gala, filed before a court which has taken jurisdiction

over the settlement of said estate. [45]

Finally, the petitioners pray that the veil of corporate fiction that shroud both Ellice and

Margo be pierced, consistent with their earlier allegation that both corporations were

formed for purposes contrary to law and public policy. In sum, they submit that the

respondent corporations are mere business conduits of the deceased Manuel Gala and thus

may be disregarded to prevent injustice, the distortion or hiding of the truth or the “letting

in” of a just defense. [46]

However, to warrant resort to the extraordinary remedy of piercing the veil of corporate

fiction, there must be proof that the corporation is being used as a cloak or cover for fraud

or illegality, or to work injustice, [47] and the petitioners have failed to prove that Ellice

and Margo were being used thus. They have not presented any evidence to show how the

separate juridical entities of Ellice and Margo were used by the respondents to commit

fraudulent, illegal or unjust acts. Hence, this contention, too, must fail.

On June 5, 2003, the petitioners filed a Reply, where, aside from reiterating the contentions

raised in their Petition, they averred that there is no proof that either capital gains taxes or

documentary stamp taxes were paid in the series of transfers of Ellice and Margo shares.

Thus, they invoke Sections 176 and 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, which

would bar the presentation or admission into evidence of any document that purports to

transfer any benefit derived from certificates of stock if the requisite documentary stamps

have not been affixed thereto and cancelled.

Curiously, the petitioners never raised this issue before the SEC Hearing Officer, the SEC En

Banc or the Court of Appeals. Thus, we are precluded from passing upon the same for, as a

rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below,

for points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower

court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as they

cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of due process

impel this rule. [48] Furthermore, even if these allegations were proven to be true, such

facts would not render the underlying transactions void, for these instruments would not

be the sole means, much less the best means, by which the existence of these transactions

could be proved. For this purpose, the books and records of a corporation, which include

the stock and transfer book, are generally admissible in evidence in favor of or against the


corporation and its members. They can be used to prove corporate acts, a corporation’s

financial status and other matters, including one’s status as a stockholder. Most

importantly, these books and records are, ordinarily, the best evidence of corporate acts

and proceedings. [49] Thus, reference to these should have been made before the SEC

Hearing Officer, for this Court will not entertain this belated questioning of the evidence

now.

It is always sad to see families torn apart by money matters and property disputes. The

concept of a close corporation organized for the purpose of running a family business or

managing family property has formed the backbone of Philippine commerce and industry.

Through this device, Filipino families have been able to turn their humble, hard-earned life

savings into going concerns capable of providing them and their families with a modicum

of material comfort and financial security as a reward for years of hard work. A family

corporation should serve as a rallying point for family unity and prosperity, not as a

flashpoint for familial strife. It is hoped that people reacquaint themselves with the

concepts of mutual aid and security that are the original driving forces behind the

formation of family corporations and use these tenets in order to facilitate more civil, if not

more amicable, settlements of family corporate disputes.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

November 8, 2002 and the Resolution dated December 27, 2002, both of the Court of

Appeals, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

62404529-wills-3-digest

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