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72 EO 13526 3.5(c)

APPROVED FOR RELEASED:22-Feb-2012

2 November 1973OCI-1855-73

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: TROUBLED ALLIANCE: Western Europe, the US,and the Middle East Crisis

Note

This memorandum does not presume to prophesythe net outcome of the Middle East crisis or ofthe many issues in negotiation between Washingtonand its European allies. It does seek to summarizehow the Europeans responded to the events in theMiddle East and to explain why they acted--orfailed to act--in the way that they did. There-after the discussion assesses this response inthe perspective of their interests in the MiddleEast, in detente, and in the general atmosphereof the Atlantic relationship. The final sectioncontains some tentative judgments about the short-term outlook in the aftermath of the crisis andthe implications for the longer-haul--particularlyfor security and economic matters.

Precis

The rift between Western Europe and the US that hasdeveloped over the Middle East war is particularly s'eriousbecause it occurs at a delicate point in Atlantic relations.Western Europe's differences with Washington over the handlingof the crisis spring in part from Europe's growing dissatis-faction with US policy in the Arab-Israeli dispute. But these

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differences also have roots in specific economic, security,and political issues, and in the growing divergence betweenus over the fundamental purposes of the Alliance. Thatdivergence has been made even more evident in recent monthsby the review of Atlantic relationships in the context ofthe Year of Europe.

Official Western European opinion over the past severalyears has become increasingly critical of Washington's al-leged complacency over the need for an early Middle Eastsettlement and its strong support of Israel's terms for ne-gotiations with the Arabs. Although Israel has retained ameasure of popular support in Western Europe since the 1967war, responsible officials have displayed growing impatiencewith the Arab-Israeli impasse and concern over the accompany-ing threat to continued access to vital oil supplies. Someof the Allies, moreover, believe that US support for Israelhas facilitated the extension of Soviet influence in theMiddle East and has increased the hostility of radical Arabregimes to conservative Arab governments that are most friendlyto the West. There is also an element of resentment againstthe predominant role played by the US and the USSR in an areawhich Western Europe has long viewed as its own "natural"sphere of influence.

The immediate cause of the rift, however, was the WesternEuropeans' conviction that the US had failed to consult themfully on its assessments and intentions, while at the sametime it was negotiating with the Soviets to arrange the Secur-ity Council's cease-fire resolution. The allies also feltstrongly that the US, having taken unilateral decisions, thentried to use NATO and detente to gain support for the US ap-proach on matters outside the geographical area covered by theNATO treaty. Their concern was even more aroused by the USdecision to alert its forces in Europe without prior consulta-tion. The Allies are still without full understanding of thefacts that led to this decision.

Even before these misunderstandings, the ongoing negotia-tions to devise a restatement of Atlantic principles had exposedthe extent to which traditional European-US ties have weakened.A fundamental aspect of the current state of this relationshipis Western Europe's desire to develop a stronger "Europeanidentity" and to maintain a certain distance from the US.

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The familiar concepts of "interdependence," "partnership,"and "Atlantic community" no longer evoke the same responseon the Continent. These formulas, in fact, no longer com-mand the support of many Europeans, because they have cometo symbolize a one-way relationship, inequality, and Europeansubservience to US interests.

Nothing, however, that has happened either in the currentcrisis or before alters certain realities central to the longhaul in US-European relations. Resentful though it is, Europeis not prepared to go it alone. Unless things get very muchout of hand, the main casualty is likely to be some illusionsabout the Alliance, but not the Alliance itself. To theEuropeans, the North Atlantic Treaty still reflects the in-divisibility of our common security, and the US presenceprovides the indispensable link to the US deterrent. NATOitself is still the mechanism for coordinating the defensecontributions of the members, debating defense strategy, andconsulting about common security concerns.

But the North Atlantic Treaty is not a European commitmentto a global alliance. The Europeans are under no illusionthat NATO provided them any voice in shaping US policies inVietnam or even in the Middle East. They feel no obligationto underwrite policies they did not help to formulate. Theydo not believe that the determination of where Europe's broaderinterests lie should be determined solely by its special rela-tionship with the US. And they consider NATO only one of themany institutions in which the US, Europe, and the rest of thefree world must reach an accommodation on matters that uniteand divide us.

In the period ahead in which the organization of a Europeanunion will remain incomplete, there will be the very practicalproblem of how to deal both with "Europe" and with its individualmembers. Certainly the larger countries and to a considerableextent even the smaller ones would be loathe to relinquish theopportunity to "talk directly" with Washington. On the otherhand, on those matters that fall within the purview of theEuropean Communities, the individual members can now make onlylimited commitments to the US. The EC's political consultationmachinery is also gradually increasing its cognizance of foreignpolicy issues affecting Europe as a whole. In the security

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area, the Eurogroup has taken on some importance as a mechanismfor coordinating its members views on defense spending, armsprocurement, and so on.

From our experience thus far in dealing with this devel-oping Europe, no clear guidelines have emerged. The Europeansthemselves are divided on what they should wish us to do; insome instances it has been advantageous to US interests thatwe have waited for a common European policy to emerge; in otherinstances, we have found it difficult to negotiate changes inEuropean positions that were contrary to our interests.

In any event, the dominant note in Europe right now isambivalence. Europeans are torn between imperatives of unityand imperatives of interdependence with the US. They are un-certain how commited the US remains to European unity. Thereis bound to be sharper attention to where the US and Europeaninterests parallel and where they diverge. If the processserves to clarify communication, there may be some compensa-tions--however painful the strains will be.

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: TROUBLED ALLIANCE: Western Europe, the US, andthe Middle East Crisis

Table of Contents

1. Impact of the Crisis............................. Paras. 1-4

2. Middle East Interests and Policy Divergences.... Paras. 5-7

3. The Detente Equation. ............................. Paras. 8-12

4. Broader Atlantic Attitudes....................... Paras. 13-18

5. Crisis Aftermath: Short-Term Outlook........... Paras. 19-22

6. The Longer Haul................................. Paras. 23-29

Annex A: Elaboration on the Positions of KeyEuropean Allies and Canada

United Kingdom......................... Page 13

France................................ Page 14

West Germany........................... Page 16

Italy................................. Page 17

The Benelux States..................... Page 19

European Communities .................. .Page 21

Canada................................ Page 22

Annex B: State Department Memorandum on the Allied

Response to the Middle Eastern Crisis

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Impact of the Crisis

1. The West Europeans had no collective policy towardthe Middle East when the crisis broke and they have none now.Although Israel has retained a measure of popular supportduring the long stalemate since 1967, official opinion hasbecome increasingly impatient and dominated by growing concernfor continued access to vital oil supplies. However, despitethese shared attitudes and painful awareness of their lackindividually of any real influence in the area, the EC Nine'sefforts to concert their Middle Eastern policies have beenabortive in the past and largely ineffectual on this occasion.At the outbreak of hostilities, the Nine met, issued a declara-tion calling for a cease-fire linked to "true negotiations",and agreed to suspend arms shipments to belligerents--a mereratification of the embargoes they had already institutedindividually. A subsequent effort to issue a new declarationfailed completely--principally because of France's efforts tocondemn "massive" arms shipments to the Middle East (those ofWashington and Moscow) and its refusal to have the Nine merelyendorse UN resolutions that had been rammed through, it charged,by US and Soviet collusion.

2. Lacking therefore any collective position, all theEuropean countries responded to the crisis according to per-ceptions of their own national interests, their fears fordetente and an energy crisis, and in the case of France andBritain, their modest hopes of being honest brokers. Thepolicies of "even-handedness" typically enunciated were forthe most part beneficial only to the Arabs. The arms embargothat France established after the 1967 war applies only toIsrael, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. Although Paris allowedspare parts to continue to flow to Israel after the war started,it swept under the rug Tel Aviv's charges that the Mirages soldto Libya wound up on the Sinai front. Britain is presumed tohave continued to honor arms contracts concluded with non-combatant Arab states before the outbreak of hostilities.Rome, facing a politically explosive oil shortage this winterand fearful of the protests of its Communist Party, declinedto permit the Israelis to purchase ammunition from US stocksin Italy. The Netherlands was helpful about US overflightsfrom West Germany and took a sufficiently pro-Israeli stanceto have since come under severe pressure from the Arabs.Belgium mostly wavered.

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3. West Germany and Portugal did agree not to impedethe US resupply effort. Portugal did so in anticipation ofstriking a better bargain in the forthcoming negotiations onthe renewal of our base rights in the Azores. Bonn initiallyaccepted our argumentation, but with the achievement of thecease-fire and the Arabs' protests becoming more strident,it abruptly terminated on 25 October any further use of Germanports and US bases for the replenishment program. Britainraised obstacles to the use of UK bases by US intelligenceplanes. Spain announced in advance its denial of US basefacilities; Italy, Greece, and Turkey all officially refusedboth facilities and overflight rights, although neitherAthens nor Ankara refused the Soviets a limited number of over-flights. On the other hand, neither Italy nor Greece posedany restraints on the operations of the Sixth Fleet from itshomeports in those countries.

4. The response in NATO to US overtures that the alliesremonstrate with Moscow that its resupply program endangereddetente was similarly unenthusiastic. While some of the alliesmade bilateral overtures to the Soviets, several complained oftheir lack of information about US diplomatic moves or cautionedthat any concerted approach would be counter-productive.Secretary-General Luns observed that the conflict, in whichhighly sophisticated weapons were used by both sides, mighthave military implications that should be examined by NATO,and he subsequently argued that Soviet interest in detente is"opportunistic" and "tactical". At the other extreme, a rank-ing French foreign ministry official emotionally castigatedthe US for "trying to use NATO and detente to gain support forthe US approach to the Middle East situation." At the meetingof the North Atlantic Council on 26 October, the French repre-sentative again denounced the US for keeping its Allies inignorance of its dealings with Moscow, for invoking NATO'ssupport on matters outside the geographical area covered bythe NATO treaty, and for alerting its forces in Europe withoutconsultation. Several of the Allies directly associated them-selves with France's complaint; all of them share its concern.

*See Annex B, State Department Briefing Memo on theAllied Response to the Middle Eastern Crisis that lists USconsultations with the Allies, the Allied response to specificUS requests, and public statements on the crisis by the Allies.

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Middle East Interests and Policy Divergences

5. To understand why the new war has so sharply dividedthe US from its European allies, the issues must be examinedat various levels--the first being our differences over theMiddle Eastern problem itself. Some of these differences arehistorical and emotional. Although many Europeans would ac-cept that the US presence has been the bulwark against Sovietexpansion in the area, not all do. Some still recall thatthe last attempted assertion of Western European power in theeastern Mediterranean--the Suez Crisis--was strongly opposedby both Washington and Moscow. Others believe that Washington'sdogged support of Tel Aviv for a quarter century has facilitatedthe extension of Soviet influence or set the radical Arabsagainst conservative regimes that are more friendly to theWest. Still others find it unacceptable that superpower ri-valry or condominium should be manifest on Europe's southernflank or dominate an area that Europe sees as its own "natural"sphere of influence.

6. These background differences go far to account forthe fact that for some time we and our allies have not lookedat the Middle East with the same perspective nor shared thesame sense of urgency about the need for a Middle Eastern set-tlement. This divergence over priorities has, of course, beenaggravated by the problem of oil supplies. With most of theEuropean countries relying on Arab sources for about 70 percentof their imports of crude and with several of them having nonationally-owned oil companies, the "oil weapon" has a cloutin European capitals that it does not have in Washington--especially so when the US has by no means committed itselfto share its own sources in the event of an emergency. More-over, for the Europeans, the oil question is closely linkedto the longer-term commercial and political relationship thatthey hope to have with the Arabs. So long as deliveries areperiodically disrupted by war, Europe will find it difficultto move ahead with schemes for converting the oil trade intoa more durable and mutually beneficial association with theMiddle East based on trade preferences, investments, techno-logical aid, etc.

7. Finally, there has also emerged in the last few yearsincreasingly sharp differences over tactics on how to move towarda settlement. Tel Aviv's insistence on "total security" is in

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European eyes an excessive claim. Moreover, the Europeansthink Israel's refusal to explore alternatives to bilateralnegotiations with the Arabs based on its territorial holdingsis made possible on the one hand only by the US commitment--and made necessary on the other by Moscow's commitment to itsArab clients. As the Europeans see it, this had led not onlyto stalemate, but to the virtual denial of a voice for Europein the bargaining over real estate in which its interests areat least as immediate as those of the dominant powers. Ostensi-bly, US acceptance of the Four Power talks was a gesture tothose interests. But while the US quickly found that thosetalks would become an instrument by which the French and Britishcould join the Russians in pressing for an imposed settlement,the two European powers soon found that the talks were quicklyfrustrated by the basic conflict between the Big Two.

The Detente Equation

8. The rift between us and our Allies over the newcrisis has its roots not only in divergent interests in theMiddle East itself but also in Europe's views of the broadspectrum of superpower relationships--and more particularly,in the uncertainties associated with the movement from Cold Warto detente. Although both the US and Europe have contributedto that movement, the two sides have too frequently been outof phase: the excesses of enthusiasm and eagerness that theUS has often worried about in the Allies' approach have oftenbeen followed by similar concerns on their side that the USis too euphoric.

9. The balance sheet that the Europeans draw up ondetente leaves them ambivalent and uncertain. On the oneside they see the negotiated settlement of the Indochina war,the strategic arms limitations agreements, the improved -com-munications between Moscow and Washington, the better prospectsfor trade, and so on. In principle, and to a very considerableextent, in practice, they applaud these achievements as gainsfor themselves. On the other side, however, they worry aboutthe risks of strategic parity, the signs of growing isolationismin the US, strains in the relationships between the superpowersand their allies, and bilateral agreements that have unclearmeanings for the common security.

10. Although comment so far is skimpy, the events of thepast three weeks have doubtless raised on the other side of the

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Atlantic the same questions about the parameters of detente thatthose events have raised on this side. If it is the specialresponsibility of Moscow and Washington to prevent an outbreakof hostilities that carries the risk of nuclear confrontation,the Europeans ask, why was the consultative machinery notoperative prior to hostilities in this instance? If Moscowand Washington could find a meeting of minds after the resupplyefforts of both, why could they not have reached such an under-standing before? And if such a meeting of minds was reached,then why should there follow an alerting of US forces and anatmosphere of imminent danger comparable to that engendered bythe Cuban missile crisis?

11. It is too early to know whether the answers to these

questions will find general acceptance in European opinion.One determinant will be whether the facts, including thoseabout the Soviet posture, are made known more clearly to theEuropean allies. But even with those facts in their possession,the Europeans may assess the circumstances differently and ar-rive at different conclusions.

12. Some will very likely agree that the achievement ofa cease fire without an even more dangerous confrontation isproof of the effectiveness of the channels of bilateral com-munication that have been established between the two superpowers.But it must also be anticipated that other, less reassuringconclusions will also be reached. As noted, some--like Luns--have already said that the crisis demonstrated that thefoundations of US-Soviet detente are basically flimsy andmeaningless. Those Allies that have complained about a dis-concerting lack of information on US intentions will concludethat the price of detente is the absence of any sharing ofconfidences within the Alliance. And given the recriminationsthat have been exchanged across the Atlantic, a substantialnumber of Europeans will be confirmed in the view that whenthe chips are down, the US decides, it consults after, and itexpects from those consultations an endorsement of actions ithas already taken.

Broader Atlantic Attitudes

13. Fundamentally, therefore, the cross-Atlantic disputeover the Arab-Israeli war is only another manifestation ofproblems that have occupied us in the past. The specific is-sues are economic, security, and political, and in various

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ways and in a variety of fora we have in recent months been

chipping away at those differences with some success. But

they are all subsumed within the broader question of the kind

of relationship we want to have in the future with a slowlyuniting Europe which has replaced imperial responsibilitieswith economic and commercial interests around the world. Itis US relations with this new Europe and with our Canadianand Japanese allies that Dr. Kissinger raised in his speechof last 23 April.

14. Most Europeans initially saw in Dr. Kissinger's

suggestion that we draw up a new set of principles to revita-

lize the Atlantic relationship a wholesome return of American

interest to Atlantic affairs and a welcome endorsement of

the new "Europe as a significant power on the world scene.For a variety of reasons, however, that welcome has gradually

petered out. To begin with, since the invitation followed

upon several years in which US relations with Europe were al-

most totally dominated by loud disputes over commercial and

monetary matters, some Europeans found cause for suspicion

even in the timing of the invitation. Moreover, they worried

that the invitation proposed to deal with--and presumably tolink--the various unresolved issues between us; that it

referred--somewhat cryptically they thought--to the need to

review strategic doctrine in the light of our changing situ-

ation; and that it was also to include Japan.

15. As the Europeans were also quick to recognize, Dr.

Kissinger's bid was tendered to a "Europe" that does notexist. That the Six became the EC-Nine the previous January

was a notable achievement; the Communities--with their institu-

tions, the customs union, the single agricultural market, andan expanding range of common policies--have in fact, political

as well as an economic significance; and the agreement reached

at the summit meeting of October 1972 to establish a "EuropeanUnion" during this decade was a serious if still unelaborated

commitment. But the present community is a construction of

delegated powers that remain very limited; the powers of itsinstitutions are jealously circumscribed by the member states;

and the arrangements by which those members are attempting to

concert their foreign policies are still only consultative

in character. "Europe" per se is therefore not equipped to

address the range of questions raised by Dr. Kissinger. Farfrom feeling any special affinity for Tokyo, it regards Japan

principally as a problem and a competitor. And of all the

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basic issues on which the European countries lack a consensus,their positions on the future shape of a European defenseorganization and its link to the US are the least formed andthe most ambivalent.

16. Europe's hesitant response to Dr. Kissinger'soverture has therefore been a source of impatience, irrita-tion, and frustration all around. For their part, theEuropeans feel that they deserve a greater understandingof the still-amorphous state of European union. They thinkthat if the US wants to hear a "European voice" it must allowEurope time to decide what it wants to say. Although theyaccept that there are still issues that can only be treatedbilaterally between the US and the individual countries, theybelieve that there is growing number of issues which requirethat the bargain be struck between the US and the collectiveEurope. When the US tries to reach preliminary understandingswith the three or four larger members, those left out suspectthat the tactic is to "divide and rule" or to create a European"directorate" that would further impede integration. As forthe US insistence that it participate in the EC's deliberationsbefore its policies are "set," the Europeans feel this a claimto privilege that Washington itself would never reciprocate.

17. Thus, what started out as an endeavor to reaffirman identity of Atlantic interests that we take for grantedhas tended instead to demonstrate the extent to which thoseties have weakened. Certain key words that have becomepoints of controversy in the negotiations are symbolic of thedistance between us--and of the European desire to maintainthat distance. The French could be brought to participatein the exercise at all only if it were accompanied by acommitment from their partners to proceed further to developa "European Identity". The Europeans have consistentlyrejected what they call "globalization"--that is, they willnot allow the US to lump the issues together in one bargainingpot and they resist in particular any attempt by Washington tobargain its security commitment against European monetary andcommercial concessions. Similarly, the concepts "interdependence,""partnership," and "Atlantic community"--the standard descrip-tions of our common aspirations for years--are now close toanathema to many Europeans, and not just to the French. Theyhave become so because, in European eyes, these terms seem intoo many instances synonyms for a one-way relationship, in-equality, and European subservience.

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18. It is in this perspective--of a relationship thatis already troubled--that the consequences of the new riftover the Middle East must be weighed. Since it is unknownwhether the recriminations will continue and what furtherharm they will do, and since one can only speculate on theconclusions that both sides will finally draw, any damageassessment must necessarily be very tentative. Nevertheless,there are a few observations that can be made--some applicableto the immediate future--some for the longer haul.

Crisis Aftermath: Short-Term Outlook

19. With respect to our differences over the MiddleEast itself, this may initially be a case in which nothingsucceeds like success. The Europeans will share the generalrelief if the cease-fire is now followed by negotiations.That satisfaction, however, may be shortlived. Should thetalks proceed under US and Soviet auspices, Europe will bereminded once more of its exclusion. If it is the Arabs'scenario to further deploy the oil weapon when those talksreach a dead end, it is Western Europe (and Japan) that willbear the brunt. Thus Europe is going to put strong pressureon the US for two things--to participate in an oil-sharingscheme and to push Israel to respond to Arab demands. Andhow well the US companies succeed in servicing those countriesin which they still dominate the market will determine whatpart of the market--if any--they continue to hold.

20. That the crisis and its aftermath will facilitateearly progress on the broader range of trade and monetaryissues between us is unlikely. Some of these issues are oflong standing, they grew out of genuine differences of interest,and in the end they will have to be settled by give-and-takeat the bargaining table. But the crisis is not going to makeit easier for the US to do business with Europe in this area.For example, although the Arabs do not appear as yet to haveseriously considered using the "dollar weapon", the possibilitythat they might adds urgency to the problem of the dollar over-hang. A Western Europe, less competitive because of risingenergy costs or facing balance of payments problems resultingfrom them, is not likely to be more liberal-minded in themultilateral trade talks. But far more important than thesespeculative possibilities is the question of atmosphere. Al-though the Europeans have stoutly resisted any "linkage" ofissues on our part, their own response on specific questionswill be a function, at least in part, of the state of thetotal relationship.

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21. As for detente, the suspicions of Moscow in WesternEurope--more lively than Washington once anticipated--will insome quarters be deepened, and some Europeans will calculatestill higher the risks of relaxation. To the extent thatany Europeans had exaggerated expectations, this may be again. But, while detente may originally have been a Frenchidea, many West Europeans now view it as a game between thetwo superpowers that has relegated Europe to the sidelines.The questions they will therefore ask are whether the outcomewas a manifestation of the continued reliability of deterrencein an era of strategic parity or whether there is already anegative tilt against the West. And they may wonder whetherthe new lines of communication between Washington and Moscowbetter serve to avoid confrontation or to maintain condominiums.

22. Whatever answers to these questions Europe eventuallyreaches, it seems doubtful that the last few weeks have in-creased Europe's confidence either in itself or in its relation-ship with the US. At the meeting of the North Atlantic Councilon 26 October, the British and the Dutch voiced understandingof the special responsibilities that the US bears as a super-power. As Ambassador Rumsfeld noted, however, they as wellas the others knew that they had been exposed to risk withouttheir consent, and they were "embarrassed" to have been ignored.While Europe may have appeared deaf to our common interests,the Europeans feel that those interests should have been deter-mined in common.

The Longer Haul

23. Whether Europe will see for itself any ready avenueof escape from a dilemma that derives basically from itsinequality is also doubtful. To the extent that Europe feelsits security the more precarious, the indicated course is tocling more strongly to the US presence--whether it is threatenedby MBFR, Washington's budget problems, or the negotiations inSALT II. But it has also become a political imperative inEurope to seek to draw some line between itself and the US.Thus, there will be new calls to expedite the movement towarda European construction that is meaningful--politically,militarily, and economically. The shocks administered by theMiddle East crisis may stimulate such calls, but this kind oftraumatic experience is unlikely to make materially easier theproblems that the integration movement regularly encounters.

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24. The counterpart of an uncompleted Europe's dilemmais the difficulty that the US will continue to have in knowinghow to deal with it. During the Year of Europe discussions,convinced "Europeanists" urged Washington to "act as if Europealready existed." To do so could encourage the development ofa more united Europe; it would not necessarily meet all thepractical concerns of either side. Europe's structure islikely to be messy for the remainder of the decade at least.Moreover, the labored progress it has made toward unificationhas assured that--particularly in the economic area--its effortsto establish a regional identity will coincide with and sometimescomplicate the efforts to institute the new rules that are re-quired to regulate the entire industrial free world.

25. Nevertheless, a complete rupture between the US andEurope is not conceivable in the foreseeable future. Resentfuland shaken though it may be, Europe is not prepared to go italone, it has no way to counter the leverage that Washingtonhas because of Europe's ultimate dependence on the US for itssecurity, and it will console itself that in most other areasof the world there is no such divergence between Europe andthe US as the war in the Middle East has revealed. Therefore,unless things are permitted to get very much out of hand onboth sides, the main casualty of the Middle East crisis islikely to be some illusions about the Atlantic relationship,not the Alliance itself.

26. To the Europeans, the North Atlantic Treaty remainsan essential. The Treaty still embodies for them the solemnrecognition by both sides of the indivisibility of our commonsecurity. It provides for the continued presence of US forcesthat remain in European eyes the visible and indispensablelink to the US deterrent. After the failure of the EuropeanDefense Community, the North Atlantic Treaty made is possiblefor Bonn to make a contribution to the common defense withoutawakening the fears of the past. It still performs thatfunction, and indeed, it has helped to mitigate concern overGermany's political and economic revival. With the qualifiedexception of France, NATO is the mechanism for coordinatingthe defense contributions of the individual members, debatingstrategy, and consulting about policies that affect the securityof the geographic area to which the treaty applies. The NorthAtlantic Council is also a forum in which we may consult aboutpolicies which, although not military in character, may affect'our common concerns.

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27. But for the Europeans, there are a number of thingsthat NATO and the Treaty are not. It is not a global allianceand it is not synonymous with The West. Europe is under noillusion that NATO gave it any role in the making of US policytoward Vietnam--or even Israel; it feels no obligation to sup-port policies that it did not help to shape. Similarly, whileFrance is the author of the concept of an "independent Europe",European opinion quite generally now accepts that decisionson where Europe's interests lie cannot be determined solelyby its special relationship with the US. In the broad spectrumof problems involved in the multilateral trade negotiationsand in the talks on international monetary reform, the Europeansare fully aware--and they expect Washington to be aware--thatwhile there must be cooperation between us, there is alsocompetition. In their view, not NATO, but the OECD, the GATT,the IMF, the Group of Twenty, and so on, are the venues inwhich the required bargains should be reached. Even in thesecurity area, we have had to accept the advantages and theproblems associated with the movement toward the emergence ofa "European" policy--such as the establishing of the Eurogroupand the caucusing of the EC Nine at the Conference on Securityand Cooperation in Europe.

28. Nor has.this been as troublesome as might have beenfeared. Despite our initial apprehensions about the role ofthe EC Nine in the CSCE, we have found the Nine's positionsquite adequately hard-headed, and their prior coordinationhas usefully contributed to unity and purpose on the Westernside. Although MBFR touches upon Europe's basic security re-requirements, the Western Allies resumed the negotiationswith the East this week in Vienna in better order than hadearlier seemed possible. The differences we have with Europeabout the new international payments system are unlikely tobe ironed out until well into 1974, but some limited progresshas been made toward the outlines of an eventual agreement.Despite the raucous dispute this week over agriculture, theorganization of the future trade talks has begun.

29. Whether the question is the immediate Middle Eastcrisis or the ongoing economic and security problems facingthe US-European relationship, the dominant note in Europeright now is ambivalence. Europeans are torn between impera-tives of unity and imperatives of interdependence with the US.They are uncertain how committed the US remains to Europeanunity. Whether the current crisis continues to intensify these

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misgivings or impels all parties toward more serious effortsto resolve them is still to be tested. There is bound tobe sharper attention to where US and European interestsparallel and where they diverge. If the process serves toclarify communication, there may be some compensations, how-ever painful the strains will be.

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Annex A: Elaboration on the Positions of Key EuropeanAllies and Canada

United Kingdom

London claims to be following an "even-handed" policytoward the Middle East. On balance, however, historic links,vast financial interests, and a heavy dependence on oil fromthe area make it pro-Arab. Still, the government cannotignore the substantial pro-Israeli sentiment in the country.Both major parties have sizeable numbers who support Israel.In the case of the opposition Labor Party, these include asignificant number of its intellectuals and donors. By tiltingtoward the Arabs, however, London hopes to retain some goodfaith among the Arab states in order to play a key diplomaticrole in settling the dispute. Although their offers to con-tribute to an emergency force were refused, the British areparticipating in the airlift of troops and supplies to theceasefire areas.

The British already have expressed their concern that theSoviets are bent on altering the balance of power in Europe intheir favor as well as undermining the military and politicaleffectiveness of NATO. The Middle East conflict is going tomake them even more conservative and conscious of security,particularly in the MBFR talks. Late last week, Prime MinisterHeath emphasized that "questions of national security andmilitary need should be looked at with a cautious eye."During the initial round of the MBFR talks, the British werethe most skeptical and recalcitrant of the Western countries.Although they have been less stubborn in recent months, follow-ing a re-evaluation of their force reduction policy last summer,they also submitted a long paper to NATO analyzing Sovietmotives in participating in the talks. London feels thatMoscow will not adopt a serious negotiating posture in Viennaand will try to prolong the force reduction exercise as longas possible.

London still places high value on its ties with the USand wants to cooperate on many international matters, particu-larly in trade and monetary negotiations. Nonetheless, theBritish are impelled toward a more independent stance bytheir growing perception of the extent to which US and Britishinterests diverge on certain issues--as in the Middle East,

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where London saw its investments and its oil supplies threatenedby US action--and by their developing ties with Europe. Londonstill is at some pains to prove its "European credentials" toskeptics, particularly the French, and such proof is sometimesat Washington's expense.

The government is trying to soft-pedal US criticism ofits European allies over the Middle East. A Foreign Officespokesman earlier this week said that the government has nointention of fueling the public debate and that ministers willsay as little as possible on the subject of alliance differences.Other spokesmen have indicated that London assumes that Washing-ton's criticism was not directed at the UK but at the otherEuropean countries. In contrast, much of the British presshas been highly critical of recent US actions and the handlingof the Middle East crisis in all respects. In the opinion ofmuch of the press, the US should have consulted its alliesbefore the alert.. Moreover, many newsmen feel that US actionshave shattered hopes for a "year of Europe" and frayed Atlanticrelations. As one editorial in the highly respected LondonTimes noted, there was "puzzlement, even pain" that PrimeMinister Heath's loyalty to the President through some darkmoments should be forgotten.

France

A key objective of France's position on the Middle Eastis designation of the Security Council as the "appropriateauspices" for settlement negotiations, thereby assuring Parisa "great power" role in the process and in the subsequentimplementation. After the hostilities broke out, the Frenchcanvassed the nations involved, seeking a ceasefire directlylinked to negotiations for an overall settlement. In addition,Foreign Minister Jobert made an informal mediation offer.

French representatives have reiterated that any agree-ment must comply with Security Council Resolution 242 andthat Israeli withdrawal must be complete. Moreover, the USand USSR must use their influence with the belligerents--aposition somewhat in conflict with France's rejection ofsuperpower initiatives--and must cease arms resupply. Parisdoes not consider its own deliveries--ostensibly limited tonon-belligerents--a problem.

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These positions reflect France's continued determinationto resist having any significant aspect of its foreign policysubsumed in a broader context, particularly one such as NATO,where the US view is predominant. They also further illustrateFrench resistance to notions of "partnership" and "interdependence"with the US. If France were included among the "great powers"in any settlement of the Middle East problem, however, thiswould ease its embarrassment at being excluded from the US-Soviet consultations. Paris would hope to gain credit withthe Arabs by defending their interests in the negotiations.

The French have been sharply critical of Washington's al-leged failure to consult and inform NATO about its Middle Eastinitiatives, and of its attempt to "exploit" NATO and detenteto gain support for those initiatives. A ranking Quai officialexpressed France's displeasure with recent events and emphasizedits disagreement with the US view of the Middle East situation.He criticized the US and Soviet resupply efforts, Washington'sfailure to exert pressure on Israel in the past six years,and the US presentations on the Middle East to NATO. In theNorth Atlantic Council, Paris took the lead in upbraiding theUS for asking for diplomatic support while withholding vitalinformation.

France's concerns over the Middle East problem are closelyrelated to its skepticism over recent developments in detente.Long fearful of "superpower collusion," Paris has been especiallysuspicious of US-Soviet intentions since the summit meetingbetween Nixon and Brezhnev. The French found the agreement onprevention of nuclear war particularly disturbing. Developmentsin the Middle East are seen as an example of the way in whichthe superpowers would make major decisions affecting Europewithout adequate consultations. Similar fears prevent Francefrom participating in the MBFR talks.

These latest developments have added a new dimension toexisting problems in Franco-American relations. France'scriticisms of US positions on trade and monetary matters, onMBFR, and on the Atlantic Alliance have centered around thesame suspicion: that the US intends both to exploit Europe and,in collusion with the Soviets, to impose policy decisions inEurope. The French government--and the opposition--is splitover the thrust of France's Middle East policy. Public opinionremains generally pro-Israeli, even--according to a recent poll--if the Arab boycott should threaten France. Despite thisopposition, no change in Paris' pro-Arab policy seems in theoffing.

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West Germany

West Germany has consistently called for non-involvementin the Middle East conflict, constructive relations with allparticipants, and a refusal to provide arms to likely belligerents.Nevertheless, Bonn expressed "understanding" for the US conten-tion that the Soviet airlift endangered detente and requireda resupply of Israel from depots in the Federal Republic. Withthe ceasefire, however, the West Germans "requested" that theUS halt its resupply effort, citing heavy Arab pressures, fearsof a retaliatory oil embargo, and a disinclination to stay outof step with other European states. Bonn was also miffed thatIsraeli flag vessels were used and that the US had embarrassedBonn by keeping it in ignorance of this intention.

When the extent of US displeasure with the FRG's positionbecame clear, the West German leaders apparently decided toback off. Secretary Kissinger, after talks with the Germanambassador, concluded that the primary concern had been theuse of Israeli vessels and that Bonn would not object if theUS resumed deliveries in a less obtrusive manner.

Whether West Germany's policies enjoyed widespread publicsupport is hard to gauge. General sympathies for Israel wereprobably balanced against fears of an oil embargo. Moreover,while some newspapers were critical of Bonn's stand on re-supply, others complained of a US disregard for alliedsensibilities. In the political arena, the opposition didcriticize the government for abandoning the US. That criti-cism is shared by some in Chancellor Brandt's own coalition.

Differences over the Middle East come at a time whenGerman leaders are having increasing difficulty in reconcilingtheir interests with those of the US and with the demands ofEuropean integration. The timing of the dispute over resupplyis particularly inauspicious because Bonn currently is renego-tiating a bilateral offset agreement with Washington. The gapis fairly wide and Bonn may now offer a new argument: that itcannot possibly condone use of offset funds to support the re-.supply of belligerents in the Middle East. Nonetheless, allresponsible West German politicians see the need for US friend-ship and support and, despite increased self-confidence and aconviction that US involvement in Europe will decrease, givethat friendship a high priority.

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The Middle East conflict has probably heightened Bonn'sconcern that its interests in detente do not fully coincidewith those of the US. Specifically, many German leaders fearUS and Soviet efforts to establish world-wide co-responsibilitywill override US relations with the EC and NATO and sometimesconflict with the EC's own perceived interests elsewhere. Ingeneral, however, Bonn has avidly supported East-West detenteand sees such exercises as CSCE and MBFR as the logical exten-tion of its own bilateral--and largely successful--Ostpolitikinto the multilateral arena. The Germans see in MBFR thealternative to unilateral US troop cuts. They want commit-ments that the Bundeswehr will eventually be cut back andseek to avoid a reduction area limited to the two German states.In CSCE, Bonn wants Eastern agreement to freer movement and norestrictive language on peaceful border changes.

Italy

Although Rome has tried to convey the impression of an"even-handed" response to the Mid-East war, its reaction hasbeen conditioned all along by a fear of antagonizing the Araboil-producing states. Italy imports almost all of its crudeoil. It receives about 66% of its supply from Iran and theMid-East. About 19 percent comes from Libya alone, wherethe Italian state oil company's extensive development programthere is just beginning to pay off in expanded production.The loss of any of these sources would aggravate a politically-explosive fuel oil shortage that is expected to hit the countrythis winter.

Rome's reluctance to jeopardize its generally good rela-tions with the Arabs is the best explanation for the refusalto permit resupply of Israel from Italian soil or overflightsof Italian territory by US resupply aircraft. In one of themany post-mortems on the conflict, the influential Socialistbudget minister has called for an effort to further solidifyties with the Arab oil producers. He envisions a transformationof relations with the Arabs, along with increased technicalcooperation, exchanges of goods and services, Arab participationin the building of plants, and granting of stock-holding rights.

Official reaction was also conditioned by the certaintythat a tilt toward Israel would evoke strong protest from thepowerful Communist Party. The Communists have lately been pur-suing a more constructive opposition that has aided the new

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center-left government in resolving several sensitive domesticconflicts. Consequently, the foreign minister's officialstatements have been carefully balanced to avoid antagonizingthe government's domestic opponents as well as the Arabs. Postcease-fire statements by government and opposition party leadersindicate a general approval of the government's course. Afrequent theme in these comments is that the EC countries canbest contribute to peace in the area by contributing to thedevelopment of the Arab countries.

The Italian press has taken the US to task for dealing-with the USSR over the heads of the allies, and Italian offi-cials have occasionally expressed general misgivings about theeffects on the alliance of US-USSR sunmitry. However, Romerecognizes that only the US can deal authoritatively withsituations requiring superpower accord. Two weeks before theoutbreak of hostilities, for example, Foreign Minister Morotried to prod Italy's EC partners into "needling" the US toget talks underway. Moreover, in official Italian reactionpresented to the US on 1 November, the Italian ambassadorunderlined the importance of detente and acknowledged thatdetente must be based on a dialogue between Moscow and Washington.

Italy has traditionally been one of our most dependableallies and has frequently defended US interests in the faceof strong domestic criticism. Rome's reluctance to go alongwith the US in the Mid-East is the exception rather than therule. Although the Italian representative to NATO associatedhimself with the critical statements of the French, the Italiansremain favorably disposed to close cooperation with the US. Inan editorial that may foreshadow a rethinking of the Italianreaction, the influential daily La Stampa has been sharplycritical of Europe's failure to back the US.

Over the longer term, however, Rome's responsiveness toUS interests may be lessened somewhat by its commitment to theEuropean Community. While public opinion polls over the lasttwo decades have consistently shown that the Italians feel theclosest affinity for the US, recent opinion trends on specificissues suggest that the Italians have begun to identify theirinterests more closely with their EC partners than with theUS. Moreover, a united Europe independent of the US, as op-posed to a close partnership with the US, is now clearly thepreference of the general public, leading by more than three-to-one among the educated elite. These trends would probably

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be reinforced if the EC moved in directions especially favorableto Italian interests, such as the adoption of an effectiveregional development policy.

The Benelux States

The initial Dutch reaction to the new outbreak of fightingin the Middle East was pro-Israeli, a sympathy born of the fatesuffered by Dutch Jews during World War II. Although the Haguejoined the other EC states in an arms embargo to the combatants,it otherwise played its usual role of preventing EC endorsementof positions inimical to Israeli interests.

This role has earned the Dutch the special enmity ofthe Arab states, which on 23 October began imposing completeembargoes on their oil exports to the Netherlands. Ratherthan modify their policy in response, the Dutch are attemptingto stretch out their reserves, to convince the other EC states--by pressure in the EC, if necessary--that The Netherlands problemis a common one, to enlist US help, and to convince the Arabsthat Dutch policy has been even-handed.

Thanks to Arab actions, the Dutch have found themselvesin the same boat as the US, and few frictions have emerged.The Dutch have suggested that the US has not kept them ade-quately informed during the crisis, however.

The crisis, then, has tended to obscure differences inperspective and national interest that have been emerging betweenthe US and The Netherlands on political and security issues.The Dutch, with a left-center government for the first time inyears, are in the midst of a generational change of politicalleadership that has been accompanied by a drift away from theirtraditional role as one of the staunchest European allies. Itsnew leaders have an almost ideological commitment to detente,evidenced by their active role at CSCE. They have been as sup-portive of the US on MBFR as any ally, but they have partedcompany when suggestions have surfaced of prior US-USSR agreement.

The Dutch attempt to move in new directions has createdtensions among the politicians and between them and the civiland military servants.

Belgium has tried to keep its head down during the MiddleEast crisis, to stay in the good graces of all sides, and to

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protect its parochial interests. It embargoed arms shipmentsalmost immediately and declared its neutrality; it has urgedthe EC states to contribute a contingent to the UN peace-keeping force to bolster this neutral image. It has alsosought to reduce exports of some petroleum products, even toother EC states.

The Belgians resented the absence of US consultationduring the crisis, apparently more bitterly than most, anddeclined US urging 'that CSCE be used as a pressure point onthe Soviets. Indeed, Brussels at one point called for an endto "massive" arms shipments to the Middle East, a posture theFrench unsuccessfully urged on most other West European states..

Even so, frictions with the US have not been as seriousover the Middle East crisis as they have been over the detenteissues so dear to Belgian hearts, and particularly over MBFR.The Belgians are, perhaps next to the French, the most convincedof the European allies that the US will eventually sell themout. At the preliminary MBFR talks, they were among the mostobstinate in promoting a louder voice for themselves and theother European states, going so far as to boycott Allied con-sultations.

Issues such as the Middle East and US-European relationsdo not compare in the public mind with the problems the Flemingsand Walloons have in living with one another--the issue onwhich governments stand or fall. The present government is acoalition of the three established parties; and they largelyagree on foreign policies.

Luxembourg traditionally feels ignored by the US whenimportant issues are at stake; it has not made much of a fussabout not being consulted during the Middle East crisis. Theevents of the last several weeks, however, have apparently re-inforced the belief that US and West Europeah interests arerapidly diverging. Its primary concern during the crisis hasbeen to assure its oil supplies in the absence of any domesticrefining capacity.

The preoccupation is its relations with the other WestEuropean states. It is successfully attempting to establisha role for itself in the "new Europe" as a financial hub. Itdoes not expect to exert much influence on such matters asCSCE and MBFR. While Luxembourg would value closer relationswith the US, it apparently believes matters closer to homerequire priority attention.

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