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Accounting, Organizations and Society xxx (2012) xxx–xxx

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Accounting, Organizations and Society

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Committed to professionalism: Organizational responses of mid-tieraccounting firms to conflicting institutional logics

Michel W. Lander a,⇑, Bas A.S. Koene b, Shelly N. Linssen b,1

a HEC Paris, 1, Rue de la libération, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, Franceb Rotterdam School of Management Erasmus University, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands

a b s t r a c t

0361-3682/$ - see front matter � 2012 Elsevier Ltdhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2012.11.001

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 1 39 67 97 08; faE-mail addresses: [email protected] (M.W. Lander), b

Koene).1 Consultant.

Please cite this article in press as: Lander, M.firms to conflicting institutional logics. Accoun

We study how mid-tier accounting firms deal with changes in their institutional environ-ment that resulted in a shift in emphasis from the trustee logic to the commercial logic. Wefind that these mid-tier firms selectively adopt practices related to the commercial logic,while retaining a principal commitment to the trustee logic. Interviews with high levelinformants in these firms show how specific strategic choice opportunities serve as inde-pendent critical events framing practice-adoption decisions. Main strategic issues for themid-tier firms relate to the changing role of the accountant and changes in organizationalstructure and practices. As these issues fundamentally challenge characteristics of theirprofessional identity, there is internal resistance against this transformation. Non-partnered accountants mainly challenge new roles that upset their extant work routines,whereas partners resist changes affecting their autonomy. These types of resistancedirectly impact the strategic organizational responses of the accounting firms to institu-tional pressures.

� 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction

Over the past two decades the accounting professionhas come under increasing institutional pressure. Financialglobalization (Arnold, 2009) along with technical innova-tions (Brock, 2006) and a broad shift towards neo-liberalprinciples of market economics (Puxty, Wilmott, Cooper,& Lowe, 1987) are changing the face of accounting. In re-sponse, the accounting profession is changing with a lead-ing role for the largest, multinational accounting firms(Cooper & Robson, 2006) that have created a distinct trans-national field (Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007). Thebig 4 firms developed a new, commercial business modelfor their operations (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006)reflected in their attitudes in the regulatory arena (e.g.

. All rights reserved.

x: +33 1 39 67 70 [email protected] (B.A.S.

W., et al. Committed to pting, Organizations and So

Cooper & Robson, 2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005)but also in the management of their professionals(Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian, & Samuel, 1998; Hanlon,1996; Kornberger, Justesen, & Mouritsen, 2011).

For other (smaller) actors this has created a professionalfield full of tension between the traditionally dominanttrustee – or fiduciary – logic and an increasingly pervasivecommercial – or corporate – logic (Dezalay, 1995; Hanlon,1996; Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 2005). In prior studies ofprocesses of institutional change, scholars have pointedto the importance of institutional tension based in theincompatibility of competing institutional logics (Seo &Creed, 2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Thornton et al.,2005). Institutional logics reflect the socially constructedbasis of ‘‘historical patterns of material practices, assump-tions, values and beliefs, and rules by which individualsproduce and reproduce their material subsistence, orga-nize time and space, and provide meaning to their socialreality’’ (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804). They shapehow organizations and individuals behave and thereby af-

rofessionalism: Organizational responses of mid-tier accountingciety (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2012.11.001

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2012.11.001

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2 M.W. Lander et al. / Accounting, Organizations and Society xxx (2012) xxx–xxx

fect organizational structures and processes (Greenwood,Diaz, Li, & Lorente, 2009). While logics are fundamentaland influential, organizational fields are rarely subject toa single dominant logic. Rather, firms have to contend withmultiple, often contradicting logics that affect institutionalstability and change (c.f. Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis &Lounsbury, 2007; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Reay & Hinings,2005; Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 2005). The institutional log-ics perspective thus moves beyond the basic constrainingnature of single logics, highlighting the ‘‘partial autonomyof actors from social structure’’ (Thornton, Ocasio, &Lounsbury, 2012, p. 7).

Following Lounsbury’s (2008, p. 354) lead we look athow the recognition of ‘‘multiple logics, and thus multipleforms of institutionally-based rationality . . .can providenew insight into practice variation and the dynamics ofpractice.’’ We do this through the documentation and anal-ysis of the heterogeneity of organizational responses ofmid-tier accounting firms to the institutional pressuresfacing the accounting industry. Where most studies exam-ining institutional change focus on elite actors (Greenwood& Suddaby, 2006) or mavericks (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay,& King, 1991), the core of an organizational field consists ofmainstream firms. The number of studies examiningchange within this group has remained limited (Hardy &Maguire, 2008). While studying the transformation of thelargest accounting firms into Managed Professional Busi-nesses (MPBs; Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown,1996), Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings (2002) notedthat the regional and local firms in their study only hadmodest sympathy for this new structure and were largelyindifferent to what these firms where doing. To some ex-tent, the mid-sized firms define themselves by how theyare different from the big 4. One of our respondents de-scribed it as: ‘‘Saying that we want to look like the big 4 is likeswearing in a church!’’ (A3). We investigate the strategic re-sponses (Oliver, 1991) displayed by mid-tier accountancyfirms in the Netherlands in the face of conflicting demandsof the trustee and commercial logic.

These mid-tier firms present an interesting sample forthree reasons. First, although still quite large in size (bothin terms of employees and revenues), they are moreembedded in their local national institutional context (Ra-mirez, 2009). They are, for example, more dependent onnational associations as sites of professionalization thanlarge professional firms that develop and provide muchof their training in-house (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Ramir-ez, 2009). Second, our mid-tier organizations tend toserve smaller, more local clients than the big 4. Hence,they face different client demands (Ramirez, 2009). Third,non-partnered professionals still have a great deal ofinfluence on the day-to-day operations of our mid-tierfirms, given the relatively small size of the professionalcadre and the relatively easy access to the strategic apexof the firm. Still, the increased importance of the commer-cial logic has created a situation where the conflicting de-mands of the commercial and the trustee logic ‘‘createambiguity and the concomitant need for sensemakingabout the implications of logic changes’’ (Thorntonet al., 2012, p. 7) also for our mid-tier firms. When exter-nal expectations regarding conflicting logics are unclear

Please cite this article in press as: Lander, M. W., et al. Committed to pfirms to conflicting institutional logics. Accounting, Organizations and So

there is room for managerial discretion (DiMaggio,1988; Oliver, 1991). It is therefore unlikely that strategicresponses to conflicting logics will be similar across allactors populating an organizational field (Pache & Santos,2010). Given the relative paucity of empirical research onthe topic (Thornton et al., 2012), we investigate how ourmid-tier accounting firms deal with the two logics avail-able for sensemaking and legitimation of choices regard-ing the future course of their activities.

Besides the relevance to institutional theory, an analy-sis of mid-tier firms also further illuminates our under-standing of the evolution of professions. Essentiallysociological literature identifies professions as occupa-tions with special power and prestige, which weregranted a privileged position because they fulfilled spe-cific societal needs and maintained norms through theapplication of specialized bodies of knowledge and be-cause they were ‘‘devoted to the service of the public,above and beyond material incentives’’ (Larsson, 1977,p. x). While institutional scholars in general do not ques-tion the original ethical values espoused by the profes-sions, authors in the sociology of professions literatureare much more skeptical, and some even question if thisfocus ever really existed (cf. Abbott, 1988; Haskell,1984; Larsson, 1977; Reed, 1996). Larsson (1977) for in-stance argued that professionalization is mainly a processof creating scarcity of resources in order to control themarket for expertise. In a related argument Abbott(1988) saw professionalization as a way to create amonopoly for skills and services. This critique of profes-sional self-regulation overly driven by economics is simi-larly heard in discussions about the consequences of thedevelopment of large firms into more commercially ori-ented firms (Wyatt, 2003). Discussing the tension be-tween economic and professional motivation, Freidsonargues that although a shifting focus to profit is in itselfnot unethical, the maximization of profit is (Freidson,2001). According to Greenwood (2007) the original bal-ance may have been disturbed to the detriment of profes-sional behavior.

By exploring the ways in which the mid-tier accountingfirms deal with the tensions between the traditionallydominant trustee logic and the commercial logic, we makethree contributions. In relation to our understanding of theprofessions, insight into the sources and motives for resis-tance to certain structures and processes associated withthe commercial logic forms our first contribution. Whileour study is certainly not the first to investigate resistanceto commercial practices in accounting firms (Covaleskiet al., 1998; Dirsmith & Covaleski, 1985; Hinings, Brown,& Greenwood, 1991; Kornberger, Carter, & Ross-Smith,2010), we do find different motives underlying this resis-tance in this group of firms. In part, we observe a frag-mented and pragmatic implementation of elements ofthe new logic as mid-tier firms select only those elementsthat have the perceived potential to resolve concrete man-agerial challenges regarding specific strategic issues. Thetrustee logic thus continues to exercise its effect throughthe embedded action of (managing) partners as well asnon-partnered accountants, whom are unwilling to forgotheir professional traditions and norms, because of their



M.W. Lander et al. / Accounting, Organizations and Society xxx (2012) xxx–xxx 3

vested interests, but also in order to maintain professionalstandards in the client’s interests.

Second, we contribute to the literature on institutionallogics and change. Fundamental changes in environmentalconditions lead to organizational change (Romanelli &Tushman, 1994). Within the accountancy sector, changessuch as increased regulation, automation of services andchanging client demands have recently punctuated a longperiod of stability. These significant environmental jolts(Meyer, 1982) are hypothesized in prior literature to resultin revolutionary transformations of organizations ratherthan their evolutionary development (Greenwood &Hinings, 1996; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Tushman &Romanelli, 1985). Yet, this is not what we observe in ourgroup of mid-tier firms. Our work on the micro-levelshows co-existence of old and new values and beliefs(Brock, Powell, & Hinings, 2007) in the early phases ofinstitutional change in this segment of the accountingindustry. The mid-tier firms respond by addressing sepa-rate and specific strategic and structural issues, as invokedby the new logic. In their response they do not necessarilydraw on the new commercial logic, but on elements of thelogic that, for them, is most applicable to the situation athand. As such we find a process of blending experimenta-tion2 where actors use field logics as institutional toolkits,a finding that bears close resemblance to Swidler’s ‘‘culturaltoolkit’’ argument (Swidler, 1986) and Thornton’s logics per-spective where actors balance elements of multiple logics tofit the particularities of a specific situation (Thornton, 2004).Our work therefore offers insights in the early stages of theorganizational sedimentation process (Cooper et al., 1996)related to field level institutional change, rather than evi-dence of a comprehensive transformational embrace or out-right rejection of the structures and processes associatedwith the novel commercial logic.

Our third contribution is to the literature on Profes-sional Service Firms (PSFs) as we address the issue of gen-eralizability of extant findings to other (segments of)professional fields (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). Whileacknowledging that the big 4 have a profound influenceon the accounting profession and its regulation (Cooper &Robson, 2006), the change in institutional logics and asso-ciated practices (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) in thesefirms cannot straightforwardly be extrapolated to theother actors in the accounting industry. While the big 4firms are dealing with multinational clients in a supra-national arena, our mid-tier firms are well-established intheir national setting, engaging primarily with local clientsand experiencing greater influence of national professionalorganizations (Ramirez, 2009). Our findings indicate thatthe commitment to the traditional trustee logic is consid-erably stronger within this group of more locally groundedfirms. Thus, Greenwood and Suddaby’s (2006) finding thata group of elite firms pushes a comprehensive and consis-tent agenda propagating the commercial logic does nottranslate to the group of mid-tier firms. This suggests thatorganizational responses to conflicting or changing logicsmay differ systematically across the different demographic

2 This termed was suggested by one of our reviewers.


strata into which organizational fields tend to be seg-mented (Ramirez, 2001).

Theoretical orientation

Shifting institutional logics

The accounting industry has always faced contradictingexpectations from a professional and a commercial logic.Yet traditionally the professional trustee logic (Suddaby& Greenwood, 2005) in which professional values and afeeling of societal guardianship is central to the profes-sional identity was dominant. Professional audit practicesare the core of the accountants’ activities and as theseactivities mean applying an esoteric body of knowledgeto complex problems, they enjoy high levels of discretionand autonomy (Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1990).Additionally, senior members, who typically own andmanage the firms, are responsible for their particular prac-tice areas and hence place priority hereon. In practice thismeans that the strategy of the firm can be described as theaggregate of the partners’ individual interests (Pinnington& Morris, 2003). In terms of organizational systems andpractices, these firms rely primarily on informal and colle-gial control mechanisms at the expense of more formal andhierarchical systems (Greenwood et al., 1990).

However, recently the accounting industry experienceda number of upheavals that challenge traditional profes-sional practice and the centrality of the trustee logic. First,computer aided audit systems have reduced the complex-ity and labor intensity of the audit process (Brock, 2006). Inthe Netherlands, the introduction of a standardized soft-ware language XBRL results in increased efficiency andultimately less billable hours in the consolidation practice(ING Economic Bureau, 2010). On the client side, the in-creased emphasis on costs and the internet and mobiletechnologies that allow for shopping around, adds to thepressure on audit fees (Ahroni, 1999). Second, due to glob-alization, accountancy organizations now have to deal withinternational standards and needs of their internationalclients (Nachum, 1996). This brings new knowledgerequirements for accountants and challenges in the localintegration of global standards (Botzem & Quack, 2009).Third, statutory protection for providing services has beenreduced or removed (Hart, Schlesinger, & Maher, 1992).This results in growing intra- and inter-professional com-petition (Gray, 1999). Fourth, the Sarbanes-Oxley act hasalso induced changes in the organizational structure ofaccounting firms (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), increas-ing organizational process controls and reducing theimportance of the individual accountant. In the Nether-lands, for those firms that perform statutory audits of an-nual and consolidated accounts, the Wet toezichtaccountantsorganisaties (Wta; law on the supervision ofaccounting firms), has been implemented. This law entailsthat accountancy firms require permits for statutoryaudits, the allocation of which is determined by a numberof stringent quality demands. This has led to a decrease inthe number of firms allowed to conduct audits. The Wtahas created a large barrier of entry as the costs of these




permits are significant. There are the direct costs of obtain-ing and maintaining this permit as well as indirect costsstemming from the investments firms have to make intheir quality systems (ING, 2010). Finally, firms facechanges in client demands. Clients are not only more crit-ical towards the service they receive, but also demandmore and different services, i.e. full service advice (ING,2010). As such, the role of the traditional accountant isslowly being shifted towards that of an advisor to the firm(Ramirez, 2009).

The accounting profession at crossroads

These developments shift the control over professionalsfrom the professionals to market competition and hierar-chical control through management in organizations (Han-lon, 1996, 1997). This directly weakens the effects of socialclosure and economic monopoly, two important historicalfoundations for maintaining the professions. Social closureis the process by which jurisdictional boundaries aredrawn around a particular set of knowledge and skills tomake it possible for a profession to ensure quality andcompetence by providing special educational credentials.Economic monopoly both ensures the quality of the profes-sion as well as the discipline of its members by mutingcompetition (Freidson, 2001). Related, economic monopolyensures the development and maintenance of quality be-cause it allows the professions, for instance, to set tariffsand entry barriers and prohibit advertising (Freidson,1984; Suddaby et al., 2007). While the accounting industryhas always faced conflicting demands from the profes-sional and the commercial logic, the aforementionedchanges pushed accounting firms to rationalize their ser-vice delivery process replacing the traditional partnershipform by the MPB form (Cooper et al., 1996), which empha-sizes the efficiency of structures and processes. Addition-ally the large accounting firms broadened their activitiesto consultancy services (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006).This has led them to forego their professional indepen-dence (Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Rittenberg, 2003) and anemphasis on the application of expertise in the interestof public service (Pinnington & Morris, 2003) for the con-cept of value added (Covaleski et al., 2003; Pinnington &Morris, 2003). Following the shift to a more commercial lo-gic the large accounting firms also developed more deliber-ate management practices. To assure efficiency and avoidstrategic drift (Lorsch & Tierney, 2002) the large account-ing firms introduced formal strategic planning and gover-nance, emphasized marketing and work with centralizedfinancial systems (Morris & Pinnington, 1998).

Institutional dynamics and strategic responses

Changing institutional demands naturally result in achanged organizational field. On the field level, the litera-ture on institutional logics shows four possible outcomesof the clash between logics: the incorporation of elementsof a new logic into the dominant one (e.g. Glynn, 2000), thehybridization of elements of both the old and new logic(e.g. Colyvas & Powell, 2006; D’Aunno, Sutton, & Price,1991; Purdy & Gray, 2009), a shift from the old dominant


logic to the newly introduced logic (e.g. Thornton, 2002;Zilber, 2002) or the permanent co-existence of both logics(e.g. Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Reay &Hinings, 2005, 2009; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000).

While in these studies the effects on the macro-level areevident, the processes by which micro-level dynamics leadto these outcomes are rarely investigated. Oliver (1991, p.145) points to the lack of ‘‘attention to the strategic behav-iors that organizations employ in direct response to theinstitutional processes that affect them.’’ Drawing on insti-tutional and resource dependence theory she describeshow organizations within the field react and behave. Tocope with institutional demands firms can employ five dif-ferent strategic responses: (1) acquiescence, organizationsaccede to institutional pressures; (2) compromise, organi-zations seek a balance to manage inconsistencies betweeninstitutional expectations and organizational objectives;(3) avoidance, organizations try to preclude the necessityof conformity; (4) defiance, organizations actively resistinstitutional expectations; and (5) manipulation, organiza-tions actively try to redefine the institutional expectations.Following the publication of this seminal work, a produc-tive research stream developed to uncover which strategicresponses are employed by firms in various settings.

However, in most studies, authors discuss firm re-sponses to changes in specific institutional practices ratherthan wholesale shifts between logics. Additionally, thepossible responses of these firms are generally limited toacquiescence/adopt or defiance/non-adopt of a specificpractice. For example, adoption or resistance has beeninvestigated for cesarean surgeries (Goodrick & Salancik,1996), university recycling programs (Lounsbury, 2001),divisionalization (Thornton, 2002), issue managementpractices (Greening & Gray, 1994), work family issues(Milliken, Martins, & Morgan, 1998), and TQM systems(Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997). In a significantly smal-ler set of studies, authors went beyond the dichotomy ofadoption/non-adoption and directly investigated all fivestrategic responses, however again these studies focusedon single practices, rather than broader shifts in logic(e.g. Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995).

Several in-depth case studies look at field level changesin institutional logics, but in these studies the simultaneityand congruence of strategic responses by firms areimplicitly assumed rather than formally investigated (e.g.Hoffman, 1999; Townley, 2002). Thornton et al. advocatefurther study of the effects of macro-level logics on the mi-cro-dynamics arguing the simultaneous existence of multi-ple institutional logics and addressing the need to furtherinvestigate how logics relate to changes in identities andpractices (Thornton et al., 2012).

A review of accounting research points to a similar lackwhere research on ‘‘practice’’ development has been extre-mely fruitful but ‘‘has tended to ignore broader institu-tional dynamics in favor of more micro-processualstudies of how accounting systems shape and are shapedby intra-organizational dynamics’’ (Lounsbury, 2008, p.356). For example, studies of large accounting firms showthe importance of the new role of managers for theadvancement of the commercial logic. Kornberger et al.(2011) point out how in these firms the role of the manager




serves as a ‘rite of passage’ in the corporate career whereindividuals learn to navigate a complex network of multi-ple players in a new role connected to the ongoing ratio-nalization and economization of the firm. In similar vein,Covaleski et al. (1998) as well as Dirsmith et al. (1997)highlight how management by objectives threatens thecore professional characteristics of autonomy and partnerdiscretion and how they subsequently subvert, transformand bend the practice.

While investigating such specific practices is importantas they invariably alter professional identity, we are inter-ested how mid-tier firms adapt their whole portfolio ofstructure and processes in view of the growing importanceof the commercial logic. Besides documenting the organi-zational responses of mid-tier accounting firms, we are fur-ther interested in their underlying rationale for thedemonstrated strategies. In previous studies authors showthat encroachment on professional autonomy has been astrong driver for resistance against novel practices. Theyalso show that organizational members differ in their opin-ions with regard to these practices (Covaleski et al., 1998;Dirsmith et al., 1997; Hinings et al., 1991). Recently, Pacheand Santos (2010) have argued that the type of strategic re-sponse given by firms is not solely determined by externalforces but rather by the internal representation of theseexternal forces. Their study highlights the importance ofperceptions of the existing internal audiences of the rele-vant external forces and the logics by which they operate(Friedland & Alford, 1991). We further investigate thisdiversity in opinions by evaluating how attitudes towardsstrategic responses differ between partnered and non-partnered accountants in our mid-tier accounting firms.

In this study we thus investigate how mid-tier account-ing firms deal with the multiple, conflicting logics availablefor identity formation and practice development in theirfield of accounting practice. We specifically address howintra-organizational representation of these logics takesshape and affects firms’ responses to the main strategicchallenges in the field.

Methods

Rationale

The aim of this research is to elaborate our current the-oretical understanding (Lee, Mitchell, & Sablynski, 1999) ofthe impact of multiple institutional logics and the hetero-geneity of organizational responses. Similar to Greenwoodand Suddaby (2006) we use inductive reasoning to maporganizational responses to institutional pressures as per-ceived in the demographic of mid-tier accounting firms.In order to document ‘‘changes in structures and systems’’and ‘‘the ways in which these changes coincide with insti-tutional templates’’ large scale comparative studies arenecessary (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996, p. 1047). Theyare necessary as changes involve difficult to measure con-cepts (e.g. resistance) and radical changes take lengthyperiods of time. Hence we opted for a qualitative, multiplecase study (Eisenhardt, 1989) and use event sequencing ofhistorical and contemporary processes (Lee et al., 1999)


within and between cases. In order to disentangle the pro-cess of organizational change we draw on interview andarchival data.

Research context: The Dutch accountancy sector

The accountancy firms included in the sample aredrawn from the 22 largest accountancy firms listed directlybehind the big 4 firms. In terms of size (turnover and num-ber of full-time employees) mid-tier firms differ substan-tially from the big 4 accounting firms. In the ranking oflargest accounting firms in the Netherlands the big 4 arefollowed by three firms with profits in excess of €100 mil-lion and employing over 1000 fte. The following six firmshave over €50 million in profits and employ over 500employees. Finally, the remaining 13 mid-tier firms haveprofits in excess of €15 million and employ more than150 employees (www.accountant.nl).

Data sources

We define our sample geographically, which is a triedand tested sampling method for professional organizationswhose operations are contingent on the jurisdiction inwhich they are active (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Ruef& Scott, 1998) Our data was collected from 2009 to 2011,under the jurisdiction of the Nederlandse Beroepsorganisa-tie voor Accountants (NBA; Dutch Accounting Association).

Our primary sources of data are interviews with 34 se-nior-level informants within 11 mid-tier accounting firmsin the Netherlands with turnover ranging from €17.4 to215.7 million and 161 to 1950 employees (see Table 1).Our informants were theoretically sampled on a numberof characteristics (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). First, the infor-mants needed to have insight in the strategic plans of thefirms. Preferably – and most of our informants were –the informants needed to be (managing) partners and assuch have decision making authority. Secondly, the infor-mants represented the different service areas of the firmsuch as the audit branch, the consolidation branch andthe fiscal branch.

As we study conflicting institutional logics we are tap-ping into cognitive aspects such as perceptions, thoughtand interpretation. Therefore, we are at the risk of severalbiases (Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997). In order to mitigatesubject biases, we used multiple informants (at least three,save for one firm where only the managing partner con-tributed to the study) per firm. The added benefit of usingmultiple informants is that it often results in richer data(Schwenk, 1985). In the first instance, the managing part-ner or director was contacted and informed about thestudy’s objectives and asked to participate in an interview.Subsequently, using snowball sampling (Kerlinger, 1986),we asked the first informant to specify at least two otherpotential informants. The interviews ranged from one toone and a half hour in length. We always started by askingfor background information on the firm as well as theinformant. Hereafter, open-ended questions were used toelaborate on five important forces for change in theaccounting industry. Open-ended questions lead to higheraccuracy in reports (Miller et al., 1997). Examples of ques-


http://www.accountant.nl


Table 1Informant information.

Firm/informant number Informants

A1 Turnover = € 215.7 million CEO (20 years at firm)A2 National senior manager (3 years at firm)A3 # FTE = 1950 Managing partner (8 years at firm)A4 OOB licensed Regional managing partner (25 years at firm)B1 Turnover = € 115.5 million Regional managing partner (7 years at firms)B2 Managing partner audit (9 years)B3 # FTE = 1160 Managing partner accountancy (2 years at firm)

OOB licensedC1 Turnover = € 111.7 million Senior policy maker HR (5 years at firm)C2 Regional managing partner (9 years at firm)C3 # FTE = 1280 Director general business affairs (15 years at firm)D1 Turnover = € 97.2 million National managing partner (28 years at firm)D2 Regional managing partner (12 years at firm)D3 # FTE = 866 Managing partner (12 years at firm)D4 OOB licensed National managing partner and member of the board (21 years at firm)E1 Turnover = € 68.8 million CEO (6 years at firm)E2 Managing partner and member of the board (40 years at firm)E3 # FTE = 756 Partner (2 year at firm)F1 Turnover = € 59 million Senior relations manager (1 year at firm)F2 # FTE = 636 Regional manager tax and international affairs (11 years at firm)F3 Regional manager accountancy (21 years at firm)G1 Turnover = € 53.5 million Managing partner and international representative (9 years at firm)G2 National managing partner and member of the board (29 years at firm)G3 # FTE = 465 Managing partner (18 years at firm)G4 OOB licensed Managing partner (22 years at firm)H1 Turnover = € 43.3 million Managing partner audit (15 years at firm)H2 Managing partner accountancy (16 years at firm)H3 # FTE = 476 Compliance officer and director of education (8 years at firm)I1 Turnover = € 29.6 million Senior Manager (3 years at firm)I2 Managing partner audit, member of the board (5 years at firm)I3 # FTE = 293 Director Audit (13.5 years at firm)J1 Turnover = € 21.3 million Managing partner (1 year at firm)

# FTE = 161K1 Turnover = € 17.4 million Regional managing partner (6 years at firm)K2 Regional managing partner (16 years at firm)K3 # FTE = 180 Regional managing partner (3 years at firm)


tions are: ‘‘What are the five most important changes inthe firm’s environment that led to changes in the mindsetof the firm?’’; and ‘‘Why were these changes seen asimportant in the firm?’’ Subsequent questions were usedto uncover the effects of these forces on the strategy and/or structure in the last 5 years within the informants’ firm.Example questions are: ‘‘What were the influences of thesechanges on organizational structures and practices?’’;‘‘What is the best response to the changes for your firmin terms of strategies, structures and practices?’’; ‘‘Whywas this response (not) chosen?’’ and; ‘‘Was there anyresistance to the changes in the firm?’’ All interviews wererecorded and transcribed. The total number of transcribedpages amounted to 1400 double-spaced pages. In order tominimize retrospective bias (Miller et al., 1997), we askedinformants to reflect on real time and retrospective changeor non-change events. This motivated informants to telltheir story on (non-)changes in their firm and the substan-tiation of accounts through instructive examples. We alsoprovided anonymity for both the informants as well asthe firms they represent to encourage openness with re-gard to the strategic responses of the firms (Miller et al.,1997). As our informants were at the heart of organiza-tional decision making, they were exceptionally knowl-edgeable and reliable regarding the events they were


asked to describe (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993; Seidler,1974). Subsequently, we compared responses of the multi-ple informants of a firm on these change issues. Substantialdifferences between the accounts of informants of thesame firm would indicate retrospective biases or an unre-liable interview protocol. In fact, we did not find significantdifference between the instructive examples of respon-dents of the same firm (Seidler, 1974).

With this approach our 34 informants provided a suffi-ciently rich sample, for three reasons. First, informantswere high-level firm members and therefore very suitablefor our objective. Second, together the studied organiza-tions represent 50% of the mid-tier firms in the Nether-lands. Third, in the first three firms we investigated, weinterviewed four respondents. However the added valueof the last interviews, in terms of additional insights, waslimited; we felt saturation was reached. Given the aboveand the fact that respondents indicated that these inter-views meant a significant time investments on their part,we decided to limit the number of informants to threeper firm if data saturation was reached. At this point wemust make one caveat. Within-firm consistency in ourinformants’ answers may, in part, be the consequence ofour sampling method. While snowball sampling is a com-mon method for obtaining informants, a possible disad-




vantage is that the principal informant will refer to like-minded additional informants. The resulting communitybias could limit the diversity of generated responses andultimately wrongfully anchor organizational responses.While we cannot rule out some level of bias we feel ourfindings are valid first, as we asked informants to describeconcrete examples of change and non-change eventswhich allow informants to tell their story and second weused secondary data sources for validation of the changeevents that our informants described in order to ascertaintheir accuracy, and mitigate potential subject bias (Jick,1979). Archival data on both changes in the industry andchanges within firms were consulted when available. Weused three different kinds of archival information. First,we used annual reports (2008–2010) of the professionalaccountancy association in order to determine key trendsas well as important legislative changes within the accoun-tancy industry. Secondly, we perused the companies’ web-sites to uncover any press releases (from 2008 to 2011) fordescriptions of major changes the firms have gone through.Finally, we used information drawn from industry journals(e.g. Maandblad voor Accountancy and Bedrijfseconomie(MAB; Monthly journal on accountancy and business eco-nomics)). Information herein was analyzed after the inter-views were held and was used to supplement both theinformation on forces for change in the field, as well aschanges that were initiated by various actors in the field.These data were primarily used to corroborate the infor-mation drawn from the interviews however at times itwas used to supplement our data.

Data analysis

The data analysis had both a planned and emergentcharacter. During the analysis the authors shifted backand forth between raw data and theory in order to makesense of the effect of conflicting logics on organizational re-sponses (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In doing so, we focusedon three basic questions: (1) what forces for change arementioned by the firm; (2) what elements of the firm didthese pressures influence; and (3) what were the organiza-tional responses given by the firm? The process involvedtwo distinct steps.

Stage 1. Case studies were written for each of the firmsin the sample based on informant quotes as well as archi-val data (Graebner, 2009) and varied in length between 20and 40 pages. In these case studies, first, the drivers ofinstitutional change that resulted in conflicting institu-tional logics were coded. Following common inductiveprocesses, we went from broad generic classification ofthe issues related to the questions above in the first codinground, to more specific categories in coding round twosuch as drivers stemming from rules and regulation, orautomation of processes. These drivers were subsequentlyanalyzed for their relation to the two existing institutionallogics. However, as it is difficult to empirically identifyinstitutional logics we followed Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen,and Van de Ven (2009) by searching for indicators of theselogics in our data. We looked in particular for evidence ofnorms, beliefs and values associated with each of theselogics such as quality standards and professionalism for


the trustee logic and efficiency and profitability for thecommercial logic. For the organizational points of conten-tion we open-coded first for broad categories (e.g. accoun-tant to advisor, organizational governance, etc.). Thesebroad categories were specified to the particular issuespertaining to that category (i.e. for organizational gover-nance: background management & decision making).When coded, these organizational points of contentioncould be grouped in two categories (Table 2) of strategicthemes for our mid-tier firms: (1) the changed role of theaccountant; and (2) changes to the organization’s structureand practices.

In the third round we looked for specific examples ofthe categories. For example, for organizational governance,the authors coded whether a firm engaged in directive orconsensus decision making.

The final step in writing the individual case studies wascoding the organizational responses (Oliver, 1991) to eachof the organizational points of contention. We excludedthe avoidance strategy, as in all our cases the firms en-gaged with at least one of the logics legitimating theirpraxis. If firms continued to comply with the demands ofthe professional/trustee logic, they acquiesce to these de-mands. If they felt that they needed to reconcile demandsfrom both logics, firms are assigned the compromise strat-egy. If firms chose to follow the new commercial logic on aparticular issue, they are assigned the defiance strategy asthey are defying the old logic. Finally, if firms went beyondwhat was demanded by the commercial logic, we classifytheir strategy as manipulation, as they are trying to changethe logic to their standards.

Independent of each other, two authors coded these re-sponses and tactics in order to ensure consistency. Theinterrater reliability score was .84, indicating good reliabil-ity (Cohen, 1968). When assigned responses differed, theauthors discussed and determined the appropriate coding.Table 3 provides the coding scheme for firm A document-ing the various strategic responses for specific strategicissues.

To investigate internal representation we coded for twoclusters of representation. In professional accounting firms,internal representation seems to be particularly salientwith professionals who have been socialized in their pro-fession and are committed to maintain its values, mainlybased on the long established trustee logic. To capturethe impact of internal representation, we coded for twogroups: non-partnered accountants and accountants whowere partners of the firm.

Stage 2. Once all case studies were written and coded,we conducted a cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989).This cross-case analysis served two purposes. First, bycomparing the perspectives of the firms, we establishedan overview of the institutional pressures on these firmsthat could be related to the trustee logic or the commerciallogic. This overview is presented in the first part of ourfindings section.

Secondly, we analyzed the strategic responses to insti-tutional pressures of the firms in our sample for the mainstrategic issues identified. In addition to the executedstrategy, we also looked at the reasons the informants gave



Table 2Organizational change categories.

Role of the accountant Organization

Accountant to advisor Organizational governanceCore business(consolidation-advise) Background management/board membersTraining Decision making/voting (all-directive)(Advisory) services Performance pay systemFormal business development Division profitsRange of services, specialist concept Evaluation functionalityClient acquisition (reactive–proactive) Organizational structureCold acquisition (Merging) number of locationsAutomation of services Critical massPortals/online service Separation audit and advisoryXBRL Service lines

Staff servicesInternationalizationNetworkClients/services

Table 3Organizational response strategies and tactics.

Examples of strategies for organization A Strategy Quote

Role of the accountantAccountant to

advisorCore business Defiance R1: Yes, we are trying to increase the number of advisory products

Training Manipulate R1: We have created a bachelor in cooperation with a university to train our peopleto be able to advise clients

(Advisory) services Formal businessdevelopment

Defiance R2: We have hired a business manager, and with him a strategy for new productdevelopment mainly related to automation

Range of services,specialist concept

Defiance R2: We want to provide business through a full service concept, but also want to holdon to the bottom of the market

Automation ofservices

Portals/online service Manipulate R1: We are way ahead in terms of web based access. We give presentations on it, toshow that

XBRL Compromise R3: We do too little. However, it is a key point for us to increase efficiency in the audit

OrganizationOrganizational

governanceBackgroundmanagement/boardmembers

Acquiesce R1: A non-professional needs to be very good to be accepted by a professional, Idoubt we would accept a non-professional at a similar level

Decision making/voting

Compromise R1: I would be in favor of more directive decision making, but you need to knowwhen you are directive or when you need to convince

Performance paysystem

Division profits Acquiesce R2: Another sore spot is the reward system. Everyone gets the same based on a pointsystem, but we do not have a differentiated performance pay system

Evaluationfunctionality

Defiance R2: Our performance system has criteria such as how good are you with your clients,what is your profitability and how satisfied are your people

Organizationalstructure

(Merging) number oflocations

Acquiesce R3: It has been debated whether to merge locations, however a lot of people wereagainst it

Critical mass Defiance R2: You need a large club to get scale advantages from you IT investments, as well asbeing able to specialize

Separation audit andadvisory

Acquiesce R3: Our firm still has a mixed practice, so we did not separate audit and advice

Service lines Compromise R1: It is a matrix structure organized geographically and through service linesStaff services Defiance R1: We have staff services with their own directors, who all report to one partner

Internationalization Clients/services Defiance R1: Being in an international network allows you to service your clients in a uniformmanner


for their particular strategy. The outcomes of this analysisare presented in the second part of our findings.

Findings

Multiple logics, conflicting demands

For the mid-tier accounting firms, we see that there is aclash of logics and that the drivers of this clash place diver-gent demands on the organizations. In the next section we


describe how conflicting demands produce heterogeneousresponses. Table 4 shows how both logics relate to themain drivers of change (strategic challenges).

Trustee logic. The original trustee logic (Thornton et al.,2005) places emphasis on professional values and techni-cal expertise of the accountants. Following this logic, allorganizational systems should be geared to accommodatethese demands. Firms deliver a narrow range of profes-sional auditing-related services, around which the firm isorganized. Consensus decision making is the norm and




decision making is done at the local offices. Profits areshared and accountants and partners are not directly heldaccountable for their financial performance (Greenwood &Suddaby, 2006). The issue of accountability is directedmostly towards professional norms and values and thequality of the auditing practice.

Several of the pressures faced by the set of mid-tierfirms support these values. The more stringent rulesand legislation put forward by the professionalassociations as well as the government reinforce theimportance of the technical qualities and fiduciaryresponsibilities of the accountants. If these quality stan-dards are not met, permits to conduct audits of annualaccounts will not be provided. Two such permits exist,of which the OOB-permit for organizations of publicimportance (i.e. banks, public firms, as well as stock-listed firms) sets the most stringent demands. The ‘nor-mal’ permit allows accounting firms to audit organiza-tions that exceed the threshold for mandatorydeposition of annual accounts. These pressures forcedfirms to invest in quality systems. Coupled to the assur-ance of quality through legislation is the automation ofthe processing of invoices as well as through theintroduction of XBRL systems, which provide real-time information on the company’s finances. XBRL out-put is increasingly requested by banks when decidingto provide loans. Clients also stimulate the trustee logicas they increasingly demand that their accountants areavailable and knowledgeable on their particular situation,as well as locally present. This requires generalistknowledge on the part of the accountant, localdecision making capabilities and a large number of localoffices.

Commercial logic. Although from a trustee logic perspec-tive the drivers of change demand a focus on, and aninvestment in the attainment of high quality standards,they at the same time force firms to be more commerciallyoriented. The investments in quality systems as well as inautomation systems and XBRL demand a certain scalewithin the organization in order to make investmentslucrative. This however puts a strain on existing practicessuch as collegial decision making and local presence.Additionally, when the core product of the accountant,the consolidation of annual accounts, becomes automated,the corresponding profit margins drop significantly. As aresult, the accounting firms seek other sources of revenue.We observe that most firms start developing specializedadvisory services. This shift to more advice type of servicesis also demanded by the clients. Clients want to be advisedon ways to improve their bottom line. This again stimu-lates the formation of advisory services. Additionally,international firms demand their mid-tier accounting firmto venture internationally, which brings about new sets ofcontrol and performance management processes to im-prove coordination, at the expense of collegial con-trols present under the trustee logic. Finally, theeconomic crisis has also impacted the mid-tier accountingfirms directly, forcing them to proactively approach clientsand provide a broader range of services with higher profitmargins.


Organizational responses to conflicting demands

The two logics thus present contradicting demands onhow firms should organize themselves in terms of strategy,structure, systems and processes. Our data show that thebalance between these views differs between organiza-tions and between strategic issues. This leads to differentorganizational responses on specific strategic issues. Thesefindings will be discussed next. We sequentially analyzeorganizational responses to the strategic issues aroundthe two main themes: the changing role of the accountantand the implications for organizational structure. Our find-ings show that organizations are not consistent in theirchoice of strategic responses. Rather for each strategicchoice, the firms make a separate evaluation of what logicto follow.

At times, organizations are not able to conduct thestrategy they want because of internal resistance. Consid-ering the two clusters of internal representation we there-fore also analyzed how our respondents position partnersand non-partners towards the different strategic issues,thus identifying the locus of resistance towards institu-tional change.

The changing role of the accountant

Changes in government legislation have, besides forcingthe mid-tier accounting firms to focus on quality, alsointroduced elements of free-market competition the indus-try. Additionally, diminishing revenues from their corebusiness (consolidation and auditing of annual statements)due to technological improvements and changing clientdemands, force the mid-tier firms to change. Clients nowexpect their accountants to advise them on how to im-prove their business. Related to this changing role, our datashow that the firms need to decide: (1) to which degreeand how do they want to make the transition possible;(2) what services they want to deliver; (3) how much effortthey place in client acquisition; and (4) how heavily theyinvest in automation of their services. Table 5 providesan overview of firm responses with regard to the changingrole of the accountant. In general there are in three groupsof firms that can be clustered together based on their incli-nation to adopt practices from the new logic.

Almost all firms recognize that, as their core business ischanging, the role they play as an accountant also has tochange. They try to do this in two ways. First, almost allfirms – except for firms D and K – express the need to auto-mate the process of creating annual accounts. Althoughthey continue to see this part of their work as important,it is no longer the main source of income. Hence it needsto be as efficient as possible. As one respondent illustratedhis firm’s defiance strategy:

‘‘We have digitalized the consolidation department. It isreally an assembly-line idea. The creation of annualaccounts needs to be efficient. This together with advisoryservices is essential. Both need to be perfect, it is not thatone is less than the other, but you just need to automatethose things that can be made more efficient’’ H1.



Table 4Drivers of strategic change and their effects according to the trustee and commercial logics.

Example quotes Effect according totrustee logic

Drivers Effect according to commerciallogic

Example quotes

E1: Regulation for accountancyfirms has changed to such asextent that we have made ouraudit branch a separateentity. Responsibilities andduties are such that they arein line with AFM demands.We have increased our qualitywe now have tighterprocedures

More stringentcertification demandsplace emphasis onquality controls andprofessional values

Rules andregulation

The increased quality demandsrequires firms to invest in qualitysystems and controls, thisrequires sufficient size (criticalmass) to make this worthwhile

E1: The investment in qualitydue to increased regulation hascost us tons of money and had atremendous impact on theorganization

K2: Introducing a quality systemcosts money and as a result youneed to expand

F3: When you look at theregulatory changes, this hashad a tremendous impact onthe internal organization ofthe firm

D1: This forces us to sendfinancial messages via theinternet at an agreedstandard. A few years ago, thegovernment forced us to signa covenant to deliver financialstatements in XBRL format

Automation and standardreporting languagesystems place emphasison quality controls andprofessional consistency

Automationand XBRL

Automation and standardreporting language systemsreduce profits from core product,the annual statement, forcingaccounting to engage in differentservices

B2: Another big change has ofcourse been technology. Theinvoice processing, which weused to do in the past isdisappearing because ofcomputers. This means we needto change our business modelfrom making figures toexplaining them. When you gofrom producing to explainingfigures; that demands a differentskill setE1: XBRL should reduce theadministrative burden by beingable to quickly connect with thebanks, tax authority andchamber of commerce. Thisshould really improve efficiencyand is a very excitingdevelopment

A1: We have an internationalnetwork that others do nothave, but we also have apersonal approach that fitsour customer segments. Theydemand this of us

Clients demand localpresence and generalistapproach of theiraccountant

Clientdemands

Clients not only demand anannual statement, but alsoadvice on how to improve theirperformance. Additionallyinternational clients demandinternational services

C1: Clients have less interest inlooking back, they have got thatcovered with their bookkeepingsoftware, what they seek is apartner in business that will helpthem look forward

H1: Our clients want theiraccountant close by, so that ifsomething goes wrong youcan quickly react. Because weknow the local network wecan help in all sorts of ways

F2: Clients are no longerinterested in the annualstatement; they are interested inwhat they can do with thosefigures

Economic/marketconditions

The dire economic situation ingeneral and the difficult marketconditions in the accountingsector in particular have pushedfirms to place emphasis on newbusiness generation anddevelopment, efficiency andchange in services

C2: Well what you see is that thecrisis actually ensures changetakes place automatically; youend up with lower profits so youneed to do something.

J1: I think the accountancymarket will continue toconsolidate. It is very scary as itlooks like there is overcapacityon the supply side


Please cite this article in press as: Lander, M. W., et al. Committed to professionalism: Organizational responses of mid-tier accountingfirms to conflicting institutional logics. Accounting, Organizations and Society (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2012.11.001


Table 5Firm specific responses relating to the role of the accountant.a

Role of the accountant Acquiescence Compromise Defiance Manipulation

Accountant to advisor Core business K B, C, D, E, G, I A, H, J FTraining J, K C, D, E, G, H A, B, I

(Advisory) services Formal business development E, K A, B, D, H, J IRange of services, specialist concept B, D, E, G, H, I, K A, C, F, JCold acquisition B, C, H, J F, K D, G, I

Automation of services Portals/online service E, I B, C, H, J A, FXBRL D, K A, C, E, I B, F, J

a Firms have not commented on all strategic choices. If that was the case they were not assigned a strategy.


The primary reason why firms differ with regards to theextent in which they embrace the new role of the accountlies in the value they attach to the old role. During theinterviews, it became clear that strategies in relation tothe changing role of the accountant were often adaptedin the face of internal resistance by non-partner accoun-tants and in some cases by partners. This is illustrated inTable 6.

Firms B, C, E, G, H and I are somewhat between logics, asthey perceive the need to change their service portfolio butdevelop it in an ad hoc manner with their core service, theconsolidated account, as basis for these advice services.They also have not yet developed specialized services toany great extent, although some specialized services forspecific industries are present. Respondents from thesefirms emphasize the need to limit their diversification tocompetencies within the accountancy profession:

‘‘[The advisory services] are clearly financial and accoun-tancy related. Risk management, insurance, independence,integrity, those are the most important elements, so weclearly do not see ourselves as a consultancy firm’’ D4.

‘‘At one point you lose your way. You end up offering a typeof service of which you think ‘what has that got to do withaccountancy?’ That’s what you see happening with the big4. . .I think it is important that you can still see a clear linkwith the original professions. Management consulting issomething completely different. I think it’s dangerous’’ G3

‘‘You have to offer things you are good at. We are goodwith numbers, so offer services involving numbers. Thequestion is do we really know anything about strategy?Is that part of the job of an accountant? What are the bor-derlines? I think every firm can make its own decision, butwe try to reflect if we are not moving to far away from ourcore qualities’’ H3.

However, most also indicate that their accountants ‘‘ingeneral resent change and if it where up to them, in ten yearstime they would still do the same thing’’ (H3), and that

Table 6Locus of resistance to the changing role of the accountant.

Role of the accountant

Accountant to advisor Core businessTraining

(Advisory) services Formal business developmentClient acquisition Cold AcquisitionAutomation of services XBRL


‘‘change leads to fear and fear leads to resistance’’ (E1). Theydescribe them as ‘‘used to looking to the past not the future’’(C3), preferring ‘‘not to have too much contact with difficultclients’’ (K2) and in general question what this changemeans for them. Therefore, these firms offer their accoun-tants training options to provide them with the necessaryskills and prepare them for change. However, a numberof respondents indicate the transition is a lengthy process.

Firms A, F, and J – have fully embraced the new role.They invest heavily in developing new products; offer awider range of services, complemented with industry spe-cific or product specific specialized services. To achievethis, they sidestep the accountants who stick to their oldrole:

‘‘However, we do this with a lot of non-accountants. Weare more and more attracting people from a different back-ground, with other competencies. I don’t believe you canretrain accountants’’ J1.

In firm J, accountants that did receive training opportu-nities openly rebelled to the point where the board wasasked to intervene. Another example is firm F; the first tohave relation managers. As ‘‘the average accountant doesnot have the communication or commercial skills necessary’’(F3), they often attract non-accountants, who brainstormfree of charge with clients to discover their needs. Subse-quently the back office caters to these demands and deliv-ers the services, ranging from accounting, organizational orlaw related advice.

The final set of firms – firms D and K – still comply pre-dominantly with the trustee logic. Although firm D per-ceives the need to develop new products and invests inthem, it is not investing significantly in automation in or-der make the creation of annual accounts as efficient aspossible. Some informants indicate this is mostly due toinertia rather than professional determination:

‘‘With these things [innovations in XBRL and services]things need to hurt first before we start acting. . ..during

Accountants Partners

A, C, D, E, F, H, I, J, K KE, G, I, JD, K KD, G, H, I, K G, H, I, KB B, D, K




partner meetings we’ve talked about it but nothing hap-pens. Entire groups are just not entrepreneurial enough;partners are not entrepreneurial enough to see that nowis the time to be creative. First things really have to starthurting before anything will actually change’’ D3.

‘‘People don’t want to look too far ahead as long as moneykeeps rolling in.’’ K1

Another new technique introduced because of in-creased market competition is cold calling. This practicewas frowned upon and deemed unprofessional until rela-tively recently. Although a number of firms (D, G and I)make use of it, most firms resist or sparingly use this prac-tice, both at the level of the non-partnered accountant andthe partner. Almost all firms remark that their relationshipwith clients is based on trust: ‘‘it’s a trusting relationship,you’re not selling pens or coffee machines, we are sellingadded value in a trusting relationship’’ (H2). They describetheir role as shifted from a ‘‘controller to an advisor’’ (A1,H1), ‘‘a sparring partner’’ (B1) or even to ‘‘a general practi-tioner’’ (F2). Hence most agree that they need to competeon quality through specializations and not on price andthat ‘‘accountants are hesitant to use it [cold calling] as theyfeel they need this trust relationship’’ (K1).

In all, the shifting role of the accountant is not whole-heartedly embraced by partners and non-partners alike.Partners perceive the need to complement their existingpractices with advisory services, as long as it relates totheir original profession. Non-partnered accountants how-ever are fearful and resistant to this change as it forcesthem to draw on a completely different set of abilities ascompared to their original work. This results in differingorganizational responses ranging from limited addition ofadvisory services to addition of related services by trainingaccountants or by decoupling the back office from thefrontline or hiring non-accountants. With regard to thepossibility of advertising and a more pro-active market ap-proach, firms obtain new leads in various ways. Neverthe-less, cold calling is still considered undesirable for the mostpart as it violates the trust relationship with clientsrespondents perceive to be essential for selling their advi-sory services.

The changing organizational practices

The drivers for change do not only influence the role ofthe accountant, they also influence organizational prac-tices. Main drivers here are: imposed rules and regulationthat demand high control of quality; developments intechnology that require more formal organization, a coher-ent organizational system, and ‘critical mass’; the global-ization of clients has led firms to join internationalnetworks, which in turn demand certain changes in struc-tural arrangements; and, demands of clients for more spe-cialized advisory services that again have implications for‘critical mass’. Our data show that organizations have todecide how they respond in four important ways: (1) firmsmake choices about their governance system (maintaintheir traditional form of organizational governancethrough collegial decision making, place the managementof the firm in the hands of a non-professional, or engage


in directive decision making); (2) firms need to decide ontheir management control systems, moving from tradi-tional professional and collegial controls to performance-pay systems that can stimulate new client acquisitionand successful delivery of new advisory services; (3) firmsreevaluate their organizational structure following morestringent quality demands; and (4) firms need to decidehow to respond to the increasing client demand for inter-national services. Table 7 provides an overview of firm re-sponses with regard to organizational structures andpractices.

All firms agree that given their shift to more specializedservices and automation they need critical mass, either byconsolidating locations or by increasing the size of theiroffices:

‘‘That [critical mass] is just necessary for the continuity ofyour services, but also for your people. You enter as juniorand when you are alone, what opportunities for personaldevelopment do you have?’’ H2

‘‘If you want to compete, you just need volume in order tooffer specialized services and to be able to make future ICTinvestments. You need it to ensure the quality to be able tomake the move from a lot of administrative work to moreadvisory services and to act as coach of an entrepreneur’’F3.

Similarly, most firms have separated their audit branchfrom their other services although this is not required bylaw for this group. Again this change is made to ensurequality:

‘‘Mostly in order to ensure quality, in order to be able to dosufficient audits and to ensure control. I am convinced thatif you conduct too few audits, you start making mistakes’’F3.

Although consolidation of a number of offices has takenplace in some firms, they also all agree that they require alocal presence to best service their clients:

‘‘Well actually if you look at the situation from a costreduction perspective, it is of course important to havefewer offices. But when you look from a commercial per-spective and the way we are positioned in the market –for small and medium-sized firms – you have to show yourface in the market. Also, I believe that the offices can’t bethat big that people are scared of the sheer size of an office.You need to meet their way of doing business’’ B1.

We start to observe differences in firm responses whenit comes to topics that affect the vested interests of thepartners: the decision making process, performance-payschemes and the presence of non-professionals as manag-ers. We can discern two clusters of firms. The first clusterof firms (A, B, C, D, E, G, H, I and K) makes little changeswith regard to their organizational practices and continuesto adhere to the demands of the trustee logic. Most firmsstill have partners who manage the firm through collegialdecision making processes. These processes however, areslightly more directive to reduce differences in implemen-tation of strategic decisions.



Table 7Firm specific responses relating to organizational structures and practices.a

Organization Acquiescence Compromise Defiance Manipulation

Organizationalgovernance

Background management/boardmembers

A, B, D, F, G, I C, H, K E, J

Decision making/voting C, H, K A, B, D, E, G, I J F

Performance pay system Division profits A, E, G, H, I, J, K C B, D, FEvaluation functionality K C, F, H, I, J A, D, E

Organizational structure (Merging) Number of locations A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, KCritical mass C, D, F, G, H, I, K A, B, E JSeparation audit and advisory A, K C B, D, E, F, H, IService lines A, H B, D, G, IStaff services C A, B, D, F, G, H, I, J

Internationalization Network E, J, K C, F, H, I G DClients/services E, J B, F A, G D

a Firms have not commented on all strategic choices. If that was the case they were not assigned a strategy.


‘‘It’s a little back and forth. Sometimes people are fed upwith the constant discussion and want the board to bemore directive. On the other hand if you are too directiveyou get criticism, we are all partners with a vote, and theyall want to use it. So you need balance’’A1.

Within and between these clusters there again is greatdivergence in the practices these firms adopt and resist.For some firms in the first cluster, informants point tothe diverse constellation of practices and partners (D4) ortheir own little islands (I3) as the reason for their resis-tance. They want to ensure that ‘‘their own people comefirst. . .and just as long as things get arranged for their office’’(A4). Other informants point to the differences with the big4 firm that they left, as the desired freedom that they didnot had there, but do have in their mid-sized firms.

‘‘At least we have the illusion, and I think that it is true inpractice, that we have the freedom to create and developour own ideas, celebrate our successes but also bear theconsequents of our ways of working. Just the freedom ofentrepreneurship that you lack in any big office’’ G1.

Therefore most firms indicate they decide on the strate-gic plans centrally but ‘‘locally they have the freedom to putit into practices as you think best’’ (E1).

This is clearly related to the clear absence of non-pro-fessional managers and the reason is unambiguous:

‘‘I think that if you are in a managing position and youdon’t know what is happening with the clients, that is justnot good. You need to have day-to-day experience’’ B1.

Another practice these firms resist is performance-payschemes, because there is not ‘‘much applause for it’’ (E1).As local presence is necessary, as long as there is agree-ment on the roles in the firm and on how partners contrib-ute and as long as offices do not seriously underperform,partners do not perceive the need to change the equal prof-it sharing system. In fact:

‘‘But in the really big offices, you can see it gets greedy,with those differentiated profit shares focussed on individ-ual performance. It may be that it is necessary in largefirms in order to keep it manageable. But undoubtedly itwill lead to political games that are not in the interest ofthe entire organization’’ G3.


One informant goes even further by stating that the rea-son they have not implemented such a system is that: ‘‘Wedon’t have profit maximization as a main goal. We justwant to earn enough to continue the business and be ableto offer a certain level of quality in our services’’ (C1).

Finally some firms decide to cater to the internationalwishes of their clients, most by joining an internationalnetwork as they do not want to open up offices abroad.This however is clearly related to client demand.

The second cluster of firms consists of only two firms –firms F and J – that have adapted most of their structures tothe new commercial logic. Firm J has a non-professionalmanaging partner, whereas Firm E has office managers incharge of its local offices. Firms F and J have abandonedcollegial decision making in favor of more directive forms.As firm J indicates:

‘‘We do not discuss strategy monthly because we just don’tallow it. We did that before but in order to create a steadycourse we stopped. Otherwise you keep changing direc-tion’’ J1.

Firm F also works with differential performance-paysystems for partners and employees (‘‘Yes, we have perfor-mance-pay systems down to the secretary including a share inthe profit’’, F2) and has high levels of directive decisionmaking. At the same time, however, Firm J has decided tocreate more and smaller offices throughout its region, sig-nificantly smaller than the average office of the other mid-tier firms but more importantly which would not bestaffed with accountants.

‘‘Imagine a nice place where you can meet with clients,where you can discuss strategy, where there are big white-boards. Well you don’t need accountants there; we haveput them together in one office.’’ J1.

However, firm J is an exception. Overall there is rela-tively little change in the practices and structures of mostorganizations. Where resistance to changes in the role ofthe accountant was located more at the level of non-part-nered accountants, the resistance against changes in orga-nizational structure and practices is solely attributed to thepartners. Especially with regard to the governance of thefirm, almost all informants indicated that a non-profes-sional as managing partner would not be accepted as they



Table 8Locus of resistance to the organizational structure and practices.

Organization Accountants Partners

Organizational governance Background management/board members A, B, D, F, G, IDecision making/voting A, C, G, I

Performance pay system Division profits E, G, H

Organizational structure (Merging) Number of locations DService lines A

Internationalization Network D, G


believe a firm grasp of the profession is necessary to runthe firm. Similarly most partners still want a say in thestrategic direction of the firms, hence these firms still em-ploy, for the majority, collective decision making pro-cesses. The sources of resistance are shown in Table 8.Clearly our mid-tier firms have little interest in changingthe basic structure and identity of their accounting firms,cherishing their professional norm of autonomy.

Discussion

In this study we set out to investigate organizational re-sponses by mid-tier accountancy firms in the face of con-flicting institutional logics. While most studies describehow institutional changes trigger institutional action byeither elite (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) or maverick ac-tors (Leblebici et al., 1991), we focused on mainstream ac-tors in an organizational field. Based on our analysis ofinterviews with 34 top management level informants of11 mid-tier accounting firms and an investigation of sec-ondary material, we make three main contributions. Weenhance understanding of how the characteristics ofaccounting as a profession affect organizational resistanceand change in mid-tier firms. Second, we shed light on theconcrete organizational responses in mid-tier accountingfirms to institutional change. Third, we question the gener-alizability of PSF research.

Sociology of professions and organizational resistance

Our first contribution is to the literature on the sociol-ogy of professions and our understanding of the driversof change in the accounting industry. Academics have beencritical about the motivations of professionals for main-taining their status. They have challenged the extent towhich claims to social closure and economic monopolyare legitimated by the profession’s societal function andresponsibility (Reed, 1996; Tinker, 1985). Instead theysee these activities merely as means to constitute and con-trol the market by creating scarcity for their resources (Fre-idson, 1984; Larsson, 1977). As the accounting industrydeveloped, the shift in emphasis from trustee logic to com-mercial logic (Dezalay, 1995; Hanlon, 1996) and its conse-quences have been referred to as evidence of this position.While big 4 firms argued for the necessity of an evolutiontowards a more client-oriented and more consciouslymanaged firm in order to provide high-quality accountingservices (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), indicative of thedifficulty of this move away from the trustee logic are


the ENRON scandal (Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Rittenberg,2003) and the recent fines imposed on the big 4 firms foraudit failure (Financial Times, 2012a, 2012b). Accordingto Wyatt, greed has influenced professional accountantssuch that the ‘‘core values of the professional firm wereundermined by primarily commercial interests’’ (Wyatt,2003, p. 6) and Greenwood (2007) argues that the balancebetween profits and professionalism has shifted to the det-riment of professional behavior. Academics note that theshift has led to an emphasis on profit-maximization (Elliot,1999 in Samuel, Covaleski, and Dirsmith (2009)). This shiftinherently also meant the adoption of new sets of organi-zational structures and practices associated with this com-mercial logic (Cooper et al., 1996; Greenwood & Suddaby,2006; Hanlon, 1996, 1997).

In our sample, we observe that the choices that the mid-tier firms make in terms of their structures and processesdraw on both economic and professional rationales. How-ever the professional logic seems to remain dominant. Whilethe leadership of these firms understands that they have tooffer more advisory related services because their core prod-uct will no longer be profitable in the near future, the typesof services they offer are closely related to their original pro-fession. They argue that to offer anything not connected tothe profession would endanger professional standards. Inprofessional services firms, the individual professional’sjob description and identity are directly informed by thestandards of the profession that to a large extent also makeup the organization’s institutional environment (Green-wood et al., 2002; Scott, 2008; Suddaby & Greenwood,2005). Furthermore it is part of the professional’s identityand responsibility to actively maintain the professionalinstitution, thereby resisting the commercial market logic(Freidson, 2001). Similarly, while the big 4 attract differentsorts of experts to provide their advisory services, 9 out ofour 11 firms dismiss this idea. Of course, commercial andeconomic arguments do play a role. Most firms decide toautomate their consolidation services as well as remainclose to the clients as these clients demand their local pres-ence. However, they argue from a professional perspectivethat the separation of audit and advisory is necessary to en-sure continued quality of both. Also most firms do not en-gage in cold calling as yet again this goes against theirprofessional identity and is not helpful given the long-termtrust relation they seek with their clients. In all, while ofcourse the aim of these firms is also to make a profit, whichin itself does not contradict the professional ethics and ser-vice to society ideals (Freidson, 2001), their explanations forreported changes are very much geared towards maintain-ing professional standards and the quality of services. These




findings mirror what Hanlon (1997) found in the law indus-try where professionals in smaller firms continue to draw onmuch of the social service ethos and rhetoric and are hostileto managerialism. In sum, we argue that the sun is not set-ting on professionalism in mid-tier accounting firms. Theirembeddedness in the original professional logic with anemphasis on service ethic is still strong and is supportedby the type of relationship requested by their local clients.

A second insight we draw from our firms is thatalthough in some cases top management does see the meritof a proposed change, often it is unable to align its internalconstituency. While partners underscore the need to offeradvisory services in order to ensure profitability, non-part-nered accountants resist this practice as they are risk averseand afraid of the implications of this shift. Hence a slowprocess of training and formal business development isput in place to provide them with skills and knowledge nec-essary to make the change. We also find evidence of resis-tance at the level of the partners. Covaleski et al. (1998)as well as Dirsmith et al. (1997) find in their studies onthe introduction of management by objectives that admin-istrative partners wish to control and shape behavior ofpractice partners and non-partnered accountants but thatthis is resisted by practice partners as it limits their auton-omy. We see a similar resistance to structures and pro-cesses that limit partner autonomy. In the firms in oursample most managing partners and practice partnersalike, are still actively involved in the delivery of servicesand as such resist the same practices and structures. For in-stance they resist the merging of locations, very directiveforms of decision making, individualized performance-paysystems and the presence of non-professional managers.

For future research it could be of interest to explore whatthe shift from the trustee to the commercial logic, and theconcomitant development of organizational structures andprocesses, means for the non-partnered, non-managingaccountants. While our informants report them to be in gen-eral risk averse, the reason for their resistance is still unclear.Their importance as a source of resistance however is clearas firms do have to adapt their organizational responses tomove them into the zone of acceptability (Ansari, Fiss, & Za-jac, 2010; Lewis & Seibold, 1993; Radnor, Feller, & Rogers,1978) for this group of professionals.

Organizational responses, archetype change and institutionallogics

Our second contribution is to the literatures on organiza-tional responses, archetype change and, particularly, insti-tutional logics. Studies of organizational responses toinstitutional pressures (Oliver, 1991) are numerous but of-ten focus on the adoption or non-adoption of specific prac-tices (e.g. Ang & Cummings, 1997; Fiss & Zajac, 2004,2006; Goodrick & Salancik, 1996; Greening & Gray, 1994;Lounsbury, 2001, 2007; Milliken et al., 1998; Rao & Sivaku-mar, 1999; Thornton, 2002; Westphal et al., 1997). Also,studies investigating the field level end-states in institution-ally complex fields show a number of different outcomeslike a shift from the old dominant logic to the newly intro-duced logic (e.g. Thornton, 2002; Zilber, 2002); the introduc-tion of elements of a new logic into a dominant one (e.g.


Glynn, 2000) or the hybridization of elements of both theold and new logic (e.g. Colyvas & Powell, 2006; D’Aunnoet al., 1991; Purdy & Gray, 2009). However, little is knownregarding the micro-level processes of how organizationsand actors respond to competing institutional pressures, inwhich the process of field level change has yet to be playedout. In this paper, we look at how accounting firms strategi-cally respond and develop their portfolio of practices. Doingthis, we heed the call for more research connecting field log-ics, organizational practices and industry institutionalchange (Lounsbury, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012) and providefurther insight into early stage blending experimentation byorganizations: a situation where organizations experimentwith the development of novel practices following changesin the inter-institutional system that shift the relativeimportance of multiple field-level logics.

Besides clearly documenting how the existing institu-tional logics place conflicting demands on our samplefirms, we find that in their responses to pressures fromthe trustee and commercial logics, our mid-tier firms donot choose one consistent strategy vis-à-vis the institu-tional pressures. Mid-tier accounting firms respond selec-tively and independently to strategic and structuralissues invoked by the new commercial logic. Most firms re-main adherents to the trustee logic in which they are stillheavily embedded (Granovetter, 1985; Greenwood & Hin-ings, 1996; Maguire, 2007; Oliver, 1997). Due to the previ-ously mentioned sources of organizational resistance andthe perceived suitability of elements of both logics forresolving concrete managerial challenges, strategic re-sponses to the challenges of the new commercial logic dif-fer substantially between firms. Thus we see a fragmentedimplementation of elements of the new logic, not based onthe internal coherence of the logics at hand. This is in linewith a toolkit perspective of logics where logics guide indi-vidual’s focus of attention, but where the activation of as-pects of specific institutional logics is contingent on theirapplicability and relevance in a specific situation (Thorn-ton et al., 2012, p. 84). Our findings thus indicate that rel-evant situational cues come from both the issue at handand the organizational role of the actors involved. Our ac-tors seem to draw on logics as sort of cultural toolkits (Swi-dler, 1986), highlighting their partial autonomy from socialstructure, allowing them to pick and choose their re-sponses. However, while dependent on situational cues,our findings indicate that we cannot place the mechanismof action completely outside the person. A criticism on theoriginal cultural toolkit-perspective is that it is without aclear mechanism of motivation. This criticism is motivatedby the finding of earlier research that much cultural infor-mation is inherently contradictory and cognitively storedwithout ‘truth value’, it therefore cannot be a theory ofmotivation (e.g. DiMaggio, 1997). According to Boltanskiand Thévenot (1991) the role of values in a toolkit perspec-tive is for justification, rather than moral motivation. Wewould argue that our mid-tier accountants do not justselectively use applicable institutional logics for analysisand decision justification. While they draw on both eco-nomic and professional rationales, their argumentation re-flects both elements of rational justification and moralmotivation drawn from the relevant fundamental institu-




tional logics in the inter-institutional system – the profes-sional and market logics (Thornton et al., 2012). This moralmotivation is especially pronounced with regard tochanges that impact the values associated with their origi-nal professional identity that have been imprinted throughsocialization.

Our findings thus highlight the relevance of further re-search into how situational and positional circumstancesaffect individuals’ focus of attention and their evaluationof applicability and relevance of institutional logics in deci-sion-making processes. Furthermore, further investigationof how actors choose and use elements of logics for justifi-cation and/or moral motivation of choices in processes ofinstitutional change seems warranted to better understandthe dynamics of practice developments in fields governedby multiple conflicting institutional logics.

Our finding that these mid-tier accounting organiza-tions draw on institutional logics as a toolkit contradictsexpectations of integral change towards organizationalarchetypes based on the new (commercial) institutional lo-gic. Institutional logics involve values and beliefs by whichindividuals produce and reproduce their material subsis-tence (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). As such they directlyinfluence organizational structures and processes (Green-wood et al., 2009). This is closely related to the conceptof interpretive schemes which underlie organizationalarchetypes. Archetypes are interconnected structures andsystems that together support the particular values andnorms at the heart of the substantiated interpretivescheme (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993). This would thusmean that logics and archetypes should form logical andinterrelated practices which should be shown in a similarconfiguration. Examples are studies of the developmentof Multidisciplinary Practice in accounting firms (Green-wood et al., 2002) or the Managed Professional Businessin law firms (Cooper et al., 1996) as archetypes that reflectthe emphasis on the commercial logic.

Such coherence however is not observed in our group ofmid-tier firms. The toolkit approach our mid-tier firms em-ploy to deal with each of the specific issues they face, re-sults in hybrid structures on the organizational level(Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury,2011). These organizational strategies in the face of institu-tional complexity resonate with the process of sedimenta-tion in the development between archetypes (Cooper et al.,1996). However, while sedimentation is a process of be-tween-archetype changes by coupling mutually constitu-tive interpretive schemes on top of each other, we areunsure if this is the case for our mid-tier firms. The firmscontinue to draw heavily on the professional interpretivescheme and move only in small incremental ways towardsa more commercial scheme. However, as we are still in theearly stages in the transformation of the mid-tier segmentof the accounting field, it is too soon to judge if this is thestart of a process of between archetype change or a withinarchetype change. This may well be a case of what Morrisand Pinnington (1999) imply as a ‘‘more recursive andreflexive model where old and new values and systemsinteract and reinterpret each other’’ (Brock et al., 2007, p.244). An interesting area for future research here is theinfluence of a hybrid organizational structure on organiza-


tional objectives such as performance and professionalism.As archetype theory is premised on configurational theoryin which organizational structures and practices act in acomplementary way (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993), in thisperspective using a toolkit approach leads to blending oflogics and subsequent loss of coherence between organiza-tional systems and processes. Additionally, given thatmany of the mid-tier firms experience internal resistanceto these espoused changes, it begs the question if these hy-brid firms will be equally successful in achieving theirobjectives.

On the institutional field level, there is evidently not awholesale move to the commercial logic in the accountingfield. Where the commercial logic and its related archetypeis present in the big 4 firms, among mid-tiers we are in aperiod where several competing organizational designs ex-ist. As such, the process of diffusion looks more like a pro-cess of institutional bricolage (Aldrich, 2010) and wecannot detect any logical interrelatedness of practices.Considering the institutional development of the field ofaccounting it thus seems warranted to further follow upand investigate the ways in which the theorization of thecompeting logics (Greenwood et al., 2002) and the incre-mental adaptation of organizational practices result incompeting and evolving organizational designs.

Generalizability of PSF research

A third contribution we make is to the literature on PSFsby addressing the issue of generalizability (Von Nord-enflycht, 2010). Much of the findings relating to the shiftfrom the trustee to the commercial logic are premised onevidence from case study research (Malhotra, Morris, &Hinings, 2006). There are however, certain contingenciesthat raise questions regarding the generalizability of theextent of this shift across different strata of professionalfields (Cooper et al., 1996; Pinnington & Morris, 2003) aswell as between professions (Malhotra & Morris, 2009).Our findings offer insights in both types of generalizabilityissues and heed the call for research that goes ‘‘beyond thelarger firms’’ (Malhotra, Morris, & Hinings, 2006, p. 198).

In terms of inter-professional comparisons, Malhotraand Morris (2009) suggest a number of contingencies thatcan explain differences in support for the trustee or com-mercial logic. First, PSFs that draw on normative knowl-edge (e.g. law firms) are likely to have a professionalorganizational form, whereas those PSFs that draw on syn-cretic knowledge (e.g. accounting firms) are likely to have aprofessional-bureaucratic hybrid organization. Also, strongsocial closure should lead to limited specialization andresistance of diversification. Additionally, a high degreeof face-to-face interaction with clients should lead to alarge number and more dispersed offices. Overall, the accu-mulated studies suggest that accounting firms, because ofthese characteristics have moved more to the MPB form(cf. Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) whereas law firms moreclosely resemble a sedimented form remaining closer tothe professional form (Ackroyd & Muzio, 2007; Pinnington& Morris, 2003). Our findings however paint a slightly dif-ferent picture. Our mid-sized accounting firms follow thesame path as medium-sized law firms in which profession-




alism remains dominant. For instance, mirroring Cooperet al. (1996) we also find that democracy is importantand compensation schemes remain tolerant in terms ofperformance. Additionally, we find that they maintain alarge number and often dispersed local offices due to clientdemands and engage in limited specialization and resistdiversification even though social closure has been less-ened of late. Our findings thus suggest that the extent ofsocial closure, the degree of face-to-face interaction orthe type of knowledge employed may account for someof the differences in organizational forms between profes-sions; but that the extent of embeddedness of small andmedium-sized firms in their local institutional context isalso of significant influence (Greenwood et al., 2002; Ra-mirez, 2009) and leads to similar developments for mid-tier firms in the fields of accounting and law.

Within professions there are segments that have differ-ent and even conflicting value positions (Strauss, 1975)due to these differences in embeddedness. Evaluating var-iation in organizational forms among professional serviceorganizations Malhotra et al. (2006) indicate the need forfurther investigation of these ‘‘within-profession’’ differ-ences. Where Hanlon (1997) already found divergent re-sponses to the commercial logic in the law industry withprofessionals in smaller firms continuing to draw on muchof the social service ethos and rhetoric, we find that thechanges in the big-4 accounting firms identified by Green-wood and Suddaby (2006) cannot straightforwardly beextrapolated to the mid-tier firms in the accounting indus-try. As these firms remain more embedded in their localinstitutional context, they are more dependent on the na-tional associations as sites of professionalization than largeprofessional firms that develop and provide much of theirtraining in-house (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Ramirez, 2009).Also they service a different type of clientele (Ramirez,2009) and their professionals have greater influence onthe day-to-day dealings within their firms. In contrastthe big 4 in Greenwood and Suddaby’s (2006) researchare operating in an international arena, dealing with multi-national clients in a supra-national arena. Our mid-tierfirms are well-established in their national professionalarena and our findings indicate that professional normsare stronger with this group. This echoes the finding ofGreenwood et al. (2002) who noted that the regional andlocal firms in their study had only modest sympathy forthe new organizational form of the big 4 firms. We clearlysee the group of mid-tier firms responding to the conflict-ing institutional logics that have been recognized in previ-ous research on the big 4 accounting firms. However, whilethese large firms had a relatively comprehensive/consis-tent agenda pushing the commercial logic, our study sug-gests that organizational responses to conflicting orchanging logics may be subject to different dynamicsacross different sets of actors within an organizationalfield. Greenwood and Suddaby (2006, p. 44) documentedorganizational change within the big 4, and asked: ‘‘howinfluential are professional norms when required to stretchacross very different organizational members, rangingfrom elite, central firms, to modestly sized, local firms?’’We would argue that they are quite strong for both part-nered and non-partnered professionals in mid-tier


accounting firms. In order to address the issue of general-izability both across and within professions we call for fu-ture micro-level research in order to determine how and towhat extent embeddedness in local institutional environ-ments explains the continued adherence of mid-sizedand small firms to the trustee logic and as a consequenceits related organizational form.

Acknowledgements

Michel W. Lander would like to thank the AXA ResearchFund for its financial support and Bas A.S. Koene would liketo thank the Erasmus Trust Fund and the Stockholm Centrefor Organizational Research for their support.

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