7.strict liability

Law of Torts and Consumer Protection Act

Strict Liability/Absolute Liability

04/11/23 C J Rawandale, Associate Professor Email: [email protected]

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Introduction

To make one liable under law of torts one must prove violation of legal duty due to:

fault, negligence or wrongful intent of the defendant.

If there is no fault, or negligence or wrongful intent on the part of the defendant, then he will escape liability.


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Doctrine of strict liability is an exception to this general rule.

This doctrine makes some persons responsible for damages, their actions or products cause, regardless of any “fault” on their part.


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Strict liability often applies when people engage in inherently hazardous activities, such as doing ‘blasting’ in a city, or keeping wild circus animals.

If the blasting damages you-no matter how careful the blasting was – it is liable for the injury. Similarly if the animals escape and injure someone, the fact that the circus used the world’s strongest cages and the highest standard of care imaginable will not let it get off the hook.[1]

[1] http://law.freeadvice.com/general_practice/legal_remedies/strict_liabilty.htm


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Origin

This doctrine was given by Justice Blackburn in the famous case of:

Rylands v. Fletcher

In 1860, John Rylands contemplated the new reservoir constructed to supply water to the Ainsworth Mill. He did not know that he had triggered a chain of events which was to have a profound, if chaotic, effect on the development of the common law of tort. The litigation resulting from the escape of water from the reservoir via old mine shafts to Thomas Fletcher's mines progressed sedately through the courts from 1861 until 1868.


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Facts

Rylands and Fletcher were neighbours. Fletcher was running a coal mine on lease. Rylands desired to construct a water reservoir on his land for storing water and supplying it to the Ainsworth Mill. R gave this job to an independent contractor.

While working on the water reservoir, the workmen belonging to the independent contractor came across some old disused shafts. They did not properly pack those ones.


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After the completion of the work, when water was filled in the reservoir, those improperly packed old disused shafts succumbed to the pressure and water percolated through to the coal mine and Fletcher could not carry any work, thus suffered losses. He went to the court for redressal.


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First Stage:

A special case was stated by an arbitrator for the Court of Exchequer. The arbitrator found that the contractors, but not the defendants, had been negligent. On that basis, the question for the Court of Exchequer was whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages against the defendants.

The Court of the Exchequer, by a majority (Pollock CB and Martin B), decided in favour of the defendants. Martin B held that in such a case there could be no liability without negligence, because otherwise the defendant would be an insurer, which, in his view, would be contrary to legal analogy and principle.

Baron Bramwell dissented, holding that the defendant should be liable on the basis of strict liability.


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Second Stage:

The case went on appeal to the Court of Exchequer Chamber, where Blackburn J delivered the judgment of the Court, finding for the plaintiff Mr. Fletcher. Despite the absence of proof of negligence on the part of Mr. Rylands, he was held liable according to Blackburn J's classic principle:

“We think that the true rule of law is, that a person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape…”


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He further observed:

“… it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour, who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, … but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour's, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property … he should at his peril keep it there … or answer for the natural and anticipated consequences.”


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Third Stage:

The defendants appealed in the House of Lords and the plaintiff was again successful. The House of Lords aptly observed:

“If a person brings or accumulates on his land anything which, if it should escape may cause damage to his neighbours he does so at his peril. If it does escape and cause damage he is responsible, however, careful he may have been, and whatever precaution he may have to prevent the damage”.


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Essentials of Strict Liability

In Blackburn J's formulation, the rule applies to bringing onto the defendant's land things likely to do mischief if they escape, which have been described as 'dangerous things'.

Hale v Jennings Brothers, [1938] 1 ALL ER 579 at 583

Scott LJ referred to the rule as 'a broad principle … that the liability attaches because of the occupier of the land bringing onto the land something which is likely to do damage if it escapes'.


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Read v Lyons, [1947] AC 157 at 173 (HL)

Lord Macmillan stated that 'the doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher … derives from a conception of mutual duties of adjoining landowners and its congeners are trespass and nuisance'.

In the same case, Viscount Simon aptly put the essential conditions to make one liable under doctrine of strict liability as follows:

“Now the strict liability recognised by this House in Rylands v. Fletcher is conditioned by two elements which I may call the condition of ‘escape’ from the land of something likely to do mischief if it escapes, and the condition of “non-natural use of land”.


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1. Escape

Defendant would be liable only when there is escape of the object from land of which he is in occupation or control.

Read v Lyons, [1947] AC 157 at 173 (HL)

Appellant was employed as an Inspector of Ammunition. He was injured by the explosion of a shell while she was on respondent’s premises in the performance of her duties. Further there was no proof of negligence on the part of the defendant.

The Court held that the injury was caused on the premises of the defendants i.e. not outside, thus no escape thereby, the respondents were not liable.


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2. Non-natural Use of Land

Illustrations of natural use of land can be: storage of water in reservoir for mill or use, storage of one or two gas cylinder for domestic use, electricity connection to light the house, lighting an oil lamp in house etc.

Sochacki v. Sas, (1947) 1 All ER 344

B, who was a lodger in A’s house, lit a fire in his room and went out. While he was out, his room caught fire may be due to jumping of a spark. It spread and damaged A’s property in the rest of the house.

There was no evidence of negligence on the part of B. It was held that B was not liable under Rylands v. Fletcher since his use of the fire in his grate was an ordinary, natural, proper, everyday use of a fire place in a room.


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[Hostel Rooms at Cardiff- Students were not allowed to lit lamps as the hostel rooms had used wood. In such case it may amount to non natural use of land.

Or

lighting cigarette in the petrol pump or preparing food thereby may also amount to non natural use of land.]


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T. C. Balkrishna Menon v. T.R. Subramanian, AIR 1968 Mad. 151

The Court held that the use of explosives in an open field on the occasion of festival is a “non-natural” user of land.


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State of Punjab v. Modern Cultivators, AIR 1965 SC 17

Due to overflow of water from a canal damage was done to plaintiff’s property. The Supreme Court held that use of land for construction of a canal system is a normal use and thus not non natural use of land.


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Mukesh Textile Mills v. Subramanya Sastry AIR 1987 Kar. 87

A was owner of a sugar factory. B owned land adjacent to A’s sugar factory. A stored quantity of molasses and it escaped to B’s land and damaged his crop. B sued A.

Collecting molasses in large quantities was held by the Court to be non natural use of land and if a person collected such things on his land and escaped to neighbours land, he was liable.


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The rule has been applied in the following cases:

Water, Charing Cross Electricity Supply Co. v. Hydraulic Power Co [1914] 3 KB 772

Fire, Jones v. Ffestiniog Railway (1868) LR 3 QB 733

A motor vehicle, Musgrove v. Pandelis [1919] 2 KB 43, Perry v. Kendricks Transport Co [1956] 1 Weekly Law Reports 85 CA

Gas, Goodbody v. Poplar BC [1915] 84 LJ KB 1230


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Electricity, National Telephone Co v. Baker [1893] 2 Ch 186

Poison, West v. Bristol Tramways Co [1908] 2 KB 14

Paraffin, Mulholland and Tedd Ltd v. Baker [1939] 3 All England Law Reports 253

A blow lamp, [1957] 1 QB 496, CA

Colliery spoil tipped on a hillside without drainage provision A-G v. Cory Bros [1921] 1 AC 521

Raw polystyrene LMS International Ltd v. Styrene Packaging and Insulation Ltd. [2005] EWHC 2065 (TCC)


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However, the rule has been held inapplicable to:

An aeroplane, Fosbroke-Hobbes v. Airwork Ltd [1937] 1 All England Law Reports 108

An oil can, Wray v. Essex CC [1936] 3 All England Law Reports 97

A boiler without a safety valve Ball v. LCC [1949] 2 KB 159 and

Water piped to a block of flats, Transco plc v. Stockport MBC [2004] 1 All England Law Reports 589


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Exceptions to the rule of Strict Liability

In the following circumstances, the rule of strict liability is not applicable.

Plaintiff’s consent

Plaintiff’s own default

Act of third party

Act of God/Vis Major

Statutory Authority


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1. Plaintiff’s Consent

Where the artificial work is maintained with the plaintiff’s consent and for the common benefit of the defendant, this rule does not apply.

Balakh Glass Emporium v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., AIR 1993 Ker 342

The defendant was held not liable when water escaped from upper floor and damaged the lower floor because there was an implied consent by occupier of lower floor to the normal use of water by the occupier of the upper floor.

[water and fire- landlord and tenant relationship]


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Carstairs v. Taylor, (1871) LR 6 Ex. 217

Taylor, the landlord, rented his upper story to the plaintiff. Taylor, for the benefit of both maintained a rain water box for the benefit of both. Some rats gnawed the water box which resulted into escape of water and damaging the goods of the plaintiff. The defendant was held not liable as there was plaintiff’s consent and no negligence on the part of the defendant.


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2. Plaintiff’s own default


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3. Act of third party

Where escape is caused by the act of the third party over whom the defendant has no control, he will not be liable.

Rickards v. Lothian, (1913) AC 263

The plaintiff was tenant of the defendant on the second floor. On the fourth floor of defendant’s building a third party maliciously plugged up the waste pipes and opened the water taps. As a result, the plaintiff’s goods were damaged by the flow of water from the lavatory on the fourth floor.

The defendant was held not liable as it was an act of third party beyond his control and no proof of negligence on his part.


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4. Act of God/Vis Major

Ryan v. Young, (1938) 1 All ER 522

Driver of a lorry of the defendant died while driving the lorry which thereon ran on and injured the plaintiff. The driver before dying appeared to be in good health. Further defendant was not under duty to get the driver medically examined. There was no fault in the lorry.

The defendant was held not liable.


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State of Mysore v. Ramchandra, AIR 1972 Bom 92

Constructing a water storage to increase the supply of water is natural use of land and a permitted act, subject to application of emergency measure. One such measure is to make arrangement for outlet of water in case of emergency. It was not done in the present case which resulted into the damage to the property of one and great loss thereby.

The defence of Act of God was not allowed.


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5. Statutory Authority

Where the defendant is authorised or required under the law to accumulate, keep or collect the dangerous things which escape or cause mischief and injures the plaintiff, the rule of strict liability does not apply.


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Green v. Chelsea Waterworks, (1894) 70 LT 547

The defendants were authorised by statute to store water for the purposes of supply to the city. Owing to some accidental cause the water escaped and caused injury to the plaintiff.

The Court held that where the accumulation of water by the defendant was not for their own purpose, and where they had been authorised by statute to accumulate and keep it, they would not be responsible for any escape, unless it is result of the negligent act of the defendants.


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Applicability of the rule of strict liability in India

Rule of strict liability has been applied, upheld by the Indian Courts. However the oleum leak disaster case of 1985 sounded the death knell of this doctrine.

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086

Oleum gas leaked from one of the units of Shriram Foods and Fertilizers Industries in New Delhi. It resulted into death of one of the advocate and caused serious injuries to several others. A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was brought by way of public interest litigation.


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The Supreme Court of India rejected the application of the rule of strict liability in the following words:

“Law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast with the economic developments, taking place in this country…Law cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constrained by reference of the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any other foreign legal order.”


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The Court also observed:

“This rule evolved in the 19th Century at a time when all these developments of science and technology had not taken place cannot afford any guidance in evolving any standard of liability consistent with the constitutional norm and the needs of the present day economy and social structure.” It further held that, “Application of exceptions to this rule is inapplicable.”


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Bhagwati, C.J. assertatively announced the entry of the rule of absolute liability and held the Defendant liable in the following words:

“…an enterprise, which is engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous activity which it has undertaken.”


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Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 248

In this case, the rule of absolute liability applied in the oleum gas leak disaster case was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.

In December, 1984 Methyl Iso Cyanate and other toxic gases leaked from the Union Carbide Corporation India Ltd. at Bhopal. About 2660 people died, several thousand suffered serious injuries which did not die with that generation but also in cases got transferred to their next generation.

The Court on applying the principle of absolute liability held the defendant liable to pay US $470 Million dollars by way of compensation to the victims or relatives of the victims.


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Arun Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 2001 Delhi 140

In this case, a tigress chewed the hand of a three year old child. While holding the Zoo authorities liable the Court held that the zoo authorities being under absolute responsibility did not perform their part of duty and thus should be answerable to pay compensation.


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The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991

Section 2 (a) defines accident as follows:

“Accident means an accident involving a fortuitous, sudden or unintentional occurrence while handling any hazardous substance resulting in continuous intermittent or repeated exposure to death, of or injury to, any person or damage to any property but does not include an accident by reason only of war or radio-activity.”


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As per Section 3 (1) of the Act, where death or injury to any person (other than a workman) or damage to any property has resulted from an accident, the owner shall be liable to give such relief as specified in Schedule for such death, injury or damage.

Further, Section 3 (2) lays down that in any claim for relief under sub-section (1)…the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death, injury or damage in respect of which the claim has been made due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of any person.


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The above provisions appear to be of immense help and assistance to the victims of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity. Once one study Section 8, realises the hard reality. It reads as:

“1. The right to claim relief under sub-section (1) of section 3 in respect of death of, or injury to, any person or damage to any property shall be in addition to any other right to claim compensation in respect thereof under any other law for the time being in force.

2. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where in respect of death of, or injury to, any person or damage to any property, the owner, liable to give claim for relief, is also liable to pay compensation under any other law, the amount of such compensation shall be reduced by the amount of relief paid under this Act.


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Thank You!

7.strict liability

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