8. target & vital areas
TRANSCRIPT
International Atomic Energy Agency
8. Target & Vital Areas
8. Target & Vital Areas
Information presented, developed and compiled in this workshop is intended for persons
working professionally in the management and regulation of research reactor facilities
National Training Workshop on Nuclear Security of Research Reactors
Place and Date
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Session Objectives
At the completion of this session participants
should be able to:
1. Understand the unacceptable consequences
2. Understand the target identification process
steps for unauthorized removal and sabotage
3. Recognize the Categorization tables in NSS #13
and NSS #14 are used to identify targets of
unauthorized removal
Information presented, developed and compiled in this workshop is intended for persons
working professionally in the management and regulation of research reactor facilities
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The consequences may have:
• Political and organizational impacts
• Economic Impact
• More than just financial cost of clean up
• Health effects
• Long-term damage to environment
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Unauthorized Removal as Defined by International
Community
Severity of potential unauthorized removal
consequences is based on quantity, the form
and isotope of the NM
Categorization tables in CPPNM and Code of
Conduct
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Sabotage is defined by State
Severity of potential sabotage consequences
is based on the thermal power and
effectiveness of mitigating safety systems
• Dose rate at site boundary
• Facility condition (core melt)
State should identify multiple unacceptable
radiological consequence limits to establish
graded security against sabotage
• PPS should protect against any sabotage
scenarios exceeding unacceptable
radiological consequences criteria
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Target Identification Process
Two target identification processes:
• Unauthorized removal
• Sabotage
Target identification provides the basis for PPS
design, by focusing on what to protect to
prevent unacceptable consequences
Target identification addresses:
• Areas
• Materials
• Critical systems, operations, equipment (target
sets)
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Steps in Unauthorized Removal
Target identification
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• Identify nuclear and radioactive material inventory
• Compare to tables in NSS # 11 and NSS #13
• Determine category of target materials
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Unauthorized Removal--Identify Target
Nuclear Material (NSS#13)
• Protect nuclear material from unauthorized
removal that could lead to:
• use in nuclear explosive device or
• subsequent dispersal
Radioactive Material (NSS#14)
• Protect radioactive material from unauthorized
removal that could lead to use in a:
• radiological dispersal device or
• radiological exposure device
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IAEA Categorization of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC 225/Rev 5)
Table 1. Categorization of Nuclear Material
Material Form Category I Category II Category IIIc
1. Plutoniuma Unirradiatedb 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg
but more than 500 g
500 g or less
but more than 15 g
2. Uranium-235 (235U) Unirradiatedb
– uranium enriched to
20% 235U or more
5 kg or more Less than 5 kg
but more than 1 kg
1 kg or less
but more than 15 g
– uranium enriched
to 10% 235U but less than
20% 235U
10 kg or more Less than 10 kg
but more than 1 kg
– uranium enriched
above natural, but less
than 10% 235U
10Kg or more
3. Uranium-233 (233U) Unirradiatedb 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg
but more than 500 g
500 g or less
but more than 15 g
4. Irradiated Fuel
(The categorization of irradiated fuel in the
table is based on international transport
considerations. The State may assign a
different category for domestic use, storage,
and transport taking all relevant factors into
account.)
Depleted or natural
uranium, thorium or
low-enriched fuel
(less than 10% fissile
content)d/e
a. All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238.
b. Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 1Gy/hr
c. Quantities not falling in Category III and natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium should be protected at least in
accordance with prudent management practice.
d. Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to States, upon evaluation of the specific
circumstances, to assign a different category of physical protection.
e. Other fuel which by virtue of its original material content is classified as Category I or II before irradiation may be
reduced one category level while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds 1 Gy/hr (100rad/hr) at one meter
unshielded.
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Summary Table - Categorization of
Radioactive Sources Safety Guide RS-G-1.9
Category Relative Danger Activity Ratio (A/D)
1Extremely
DangerousA/D ≥ 1000
2 Very Dangerous 1000 >A/D ≥ 10
3 Dangerous 10 > A/D ≥ 1
4Unlikely to be
Dangerous1 > A/D ≥ 0.01
5Most Unlikely to
be Dangerous0.01 > A/D
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Examples of Categorization of
Radioactive Sources
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Category Sources and Practice
1 Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs), Irradiators,
Teletherapy sources, Fixed multi-beam teletherapy (gamma
knife) sources
2 Industrial gamma radiography sources, High/medium dose rate
brachytherapy sources
3 Fixed industrial gauges that incorporate high activity sources,
Well logging gauges
4 Low dose rate (LDR) brachytherapy sources, Industrial gauges
that do not incorporate high activity sources, Bone densitometers,
Static eliminators
5 LDR brachytherapy eye plaques and permanent implant sources,
X-ray fluorescence devices, Electron capture devices, Mossbauer
spectrometry, Positron emission tomography (PET) check
sources
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IAEA Categorization of Radioactive Sources
RS-G-1.9 Table 2
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Sabotage
Adversary applies energy directly to nuclear/radioactive material to cause dispersal
• Explosive or incendiary device used
to disperse material
Adversary uses energy present in material or system to
cause dispersal
• Requires initiating process upset and disabling
mitigation systems
e.g. disabling primary cooling system (initiating
event) and backup cooling capability (mitigating
systems), and resulting in core overheating
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Steps in Sabotage Target identification
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Review safety analysis report and power history to
develop sabotage scenarios relative to DBT
Define target sets which would result in unacceptable
consequences as determined by the State
Identify vital areas to be protected
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Vital Areas
If required, vital areas should be established
• Vital Area: an area inside a protected area containing equipment, systems or devices, or nuclear material, the sabotage of which could directly or indirectly lead to high radiological consequences (NSS #13, NSS #16)
Vitals areas should provide additional layer to the protected area for detection, access control, and delay
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Summary
State needs to define unacceptable radiological consequence thresholds
Target Identification Process/Steps differ between unauthorized removal and sabotage
Categorization tables in NSS #13 and NSS #14 are
used to identify targets of unauthorized removal
Vital areas contain targets that could yield high
radiological consequences (as determined by the
State)
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