9781137277800 01 prexviii...occupations, income and social class 124 income inequality, taxation,...

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Contents

List of Illustrative Material ixList of Abbreviations xiiiAcknowledgements xvForeword xvi

1 Is there a European society? 1Europe’s debatable boundaries 8Identifying sub-regions of Europe 12Conclusion 25

2 The people of Europe 28Life expectancy 30Birth rates 34Death rates 40Immigration and overall changes in population size 40Marriage and family 46Conclusion 55

3 Identities: religion and ethnicity 57European religion 61Ethnicity, immigration and cultural diversity 77Conclusion 86

4 Europeans at work 88Employment sectors organized by type of product 88Types of occupation 105Conclusion 118

5 From occupations to classes 121Occupations, income and social class 124Income inequality, taxation, transfers and public services 129Conclusion 145

6 Delineating the class structures of contemporary Europe 147Class and citizenship 152Classes and power 155Conclusion 167

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viii Contents

7 The wider implications of class 170Education and social mobility 171Health and life expectancy 178Class and political identity 181Conclusion 189

8 How many Europes? 190Norden 193South-West Europe 195Central Eastern Europe 197Further Eastern Europe 198North-West Europe 200The anglophones 201Conclusion 203

Statistical Appendix 209References 218Index 223



1

Chapter 1

Is there a European society?

Many books present the social structures of individual states or more generally those with advanced economies. Far fewer define social structures for world regions, and the exercise might be questioned. That there should be something both coherent and distinctive about an individual country is usually taken for granted, which is why we are not surprised to see studies of the society, politics or economics of particular states. It is usually assumed that the actions of states – government and law – produce certain social characteristics. Taken for granted though it may be, that is in fact quite a strong assumption, as it means accepting that government and law are important in shaping societies. Do states play a part in determining how many children are in the typical family, or the ages at which people typically die? In the next chapter we shall discover that they certainly do, but it is important to recognize that the assumption might at some points be questioned. The nature of that assumption becomes clearer if we ask whether we would expect to find books about the social structure of a geographical entity below the level of the state. There is indeed a more than 1000-page-long sociology of Catalonia, in the Catalan language, La societat catalana (Giner, 1998). Catalonia is a very distinctive part of Spain with a high level of political autonomy, and a government able to make its own laws on many social and economic issues within the framework of overall Spanish law. The idea that a political variable is important therefore remains. Similarly, a British person would probably be less surprised to see a study of the social structure of Scotland than one of Yorkshire.

Behind these questions lie some larger ones. Sociologists often use states as synonyms for societies. For example, we might use ‘Poland’ and ‘Polish society’ interchangeably. Is that justified? Poland is an important case in point. For two centuries until 1918 the country was completely absorbed into three other states: Germany, Russia and (affecting a smaller part of its territory) the Austro-Hungarian Empire. None of these three entities was itself a simple nation state. Russia had over centuries expanded from a base around Moscow to embrace a vast ter-ritory inhabited by people of very diverse ethnic, cultural and religious



2 Society and Social Change in 21st Century Europe

backgrounds. Was there a Russian society embracing everyone from the coast of Siberia to St Petersburg, from the Arctic Ocean to the Caspian Sea, during that period? The Austrian Empire also included many peo-ple from Slav and other linguistic cultures. Meanwhile, Prussia, the German political entity that had also gained control of western Poland, had during the second half of the 19th century constructed, through treaties, trade agreements and war, a state (which it officially called an empire) of all German-speaking regions outside Austria and Switzer-land, and the disputed Alsace and Lorraine territories on its border with France. (It captured Alsace and Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, but lost them to France after World War I.) When, if ever, did these empires become ‘societies’? Did Poland cease to be a society when it no longer had a state?

The Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian Empires all extended their rule over contiguous, if sometimes culturally diverse, territories. Certain western European states constructed far-flung, marine empires across the world: France, Great Britain, the Dutch Republic, Portugal, Spain and (within Africa only) Belgium. Where these were contiguous – as in the case of Ireland when a colony of Britain, or the Near East under French control – there were long-standing attempts by the impe-rial powers to incorporate them within the imperial state itself rather than to have them as colonies. When the colonies were further afield (in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, the Indian subcontinent or the Far East) the situation was far more ambiguous. What implications should that have had for the idea of, say, Irish or Algerian as opposed to British or French societies?

After its defeat in World War II, Germany, which had been a single country since only 1870, became two separate states. On one side was the Federal Republic of Germany, with eventually 64 million people, a capitalist economy, parliamentary democracy and closely allied to the other states of western Europe and the United States. On the other side was the German Democratic Republic, with 16 million people, a state socialist economy and dictatorship and closely allied to the then Soviet Union and the other states of central and eastern Europe. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, Germany was reunited as a single state, though one should more correctly say ‘united’, as this is a newly defined Germany: for the first time a unified German state renounced its claims over parts of Poland. Since the early 1990s, the statistics for the whole of Germany have been presented together as those of one coun-try, and for many comparative studies of economy, politics and society we now take it for granted that this relatively new entity constitutes a



Is there a European society? 3

single unit. Should we do this? Did political unification suddenly create a unified society? Meanwhile, the Czech and Slovak Republics, which until 1993 constituted the single state of Czechoslovakia, now appear as two separate units, the combined population of which is slightly smaller than the old German Democratic Republic. Were those countries that were part of the same society until 1993 suddenly becoming two differ-ent ones? Or were they always two separate societies artificially joined by a single state from 1918 to 1993? Similar questions arise elsewhere. The three countries of Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) are three separate states, but for many institutions they are more similar to each other than, say, southern Italy is to northern Italy, or Catalonia is to many other parts of Spain.

If we go back much further in time to the period between the fall of the Roman Empire and the 16th century, we find very few stable political entities and use the term ‘state’ only as an anachronism. Rulers established a hold over certain territories and retained these, usually by force of arms, for a while; then a neighbouring ruler might con-quer them. These patchworks of territory were often not contiguous. It would make no sense at all to ask whether the Aquitaine region of France became part of English society during the times that English kings managed to control it; it is not clear whether English society itself existed in that period. Until the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century it might have been more accurate to speak of a Catholic society extending across the whole of western and most of central Europe, a society that had in some areas existed continuously since before the fall of Rome, but in Nordic lands only from around the year 1000. The Catholic Church regulated a wider range of areas of life than did secular rulers during that period, and in some respects more than states do today. Provided they obeyed the Church, paid their taxes and did not rebel, rulers were not very interested in the lives and welfare of their subjects. On the other hand, beneath the overarching power of the Church the lives of ordinary people were conducted at a far more local level than we experience today. There were virtually no means of transport for them, and unless they could read, they would have little chance of knowing about the world beyond the scope of their nearest market town. ‘Societies’, with their distinctive customs and ways of life, could be very local indeed.

A major politico-legal change is usually dated from 1648, when the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in the German cities of Osnabrück and Münster ended the Thirty Years War that had torn apart much of northern Europe in a politico-religious struggle, and




the even longer 80-year war between Spain and the Dutch Republic. The treaties asserted the rights of what became known as states to seek self- determination and not to accept the long-standing but ineffective claims to sovereignty over them of the papacy and the German-based entity that called itself the Holy Roman Empire. However, that does not mean that we can date the career of all European states from around that time. Germany and Italy, the two countries at the heart of the papal-imperial system, remained patchworks of small monarchies, dukedoms, free cities and Church-controlled territories until the late 19th century. Further east, beyond the realm of western Christianity and in the land of the Orthodox churches, there was a wide diversity of social groupings, some of which were similar to medieval and early modern western European state formations. Gradually these were con-quered by or merged into the two great competing forces in the east: the Muscovite, eventually Russian, state and the Islamic Ottoman Empire in modern Turkey.

More significant social changes occurred from the late 18th century onwards. States were by then inhabiting more or less contiguous territo-ries, though they continued to invade each other from time to time, and some were busy establishing overseas empires. Following the revolution of 1789 and especially during the Napoleonic years (1797 to 1815), the French engaged on a project to build a tightly integrated, modernizing, nationally based state to unite the very diverse populations inhabiting the territory long known as France, in order to forge a population that could provide effective armies and an improved economy. Napoleon Bonaparte then sought to found republics based on the same principles by invading the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, parts of Germany and Italy and elsewhere. This set in train rival nation-building pro-cesses among its neighbours. The British moved ahead with a process of industrialization and further imperial conquest. The former was primarily a product of private enterprise, while the latter was a state project and required nation-building. British national elites took little interest in the industrial economy until France, Germany and others appeared to rival the country’s industries. These rivals, arriving later on to the scene, used state policy to provide an infrastructure, includ-ing roads and railways, as well as skills, and eventually (starting in Germany) social policies to stabilize the insecure lives of industrial workers who might otherwise become rebellious. By the late 19th cen-tury one can see states as active builders of societies, not just of realms and points of military strength. These states were rarely democratic, but they were embarking on a road towards democracy, as elites were




becoming increasingly aware of their dependence on the loyalty and active cooperation of the majority of populations, whose lives had so often been ignored under past regimes. It was at the same time that the academic discipline of sociology was established in order to study these processes. It now began to make some sense in certain contexts to use, say, ‘France’ as a synonym for ‘French society’.

When thinking of states as large aggregations of people, as socie-ties, rather than as political entities, it is usual to use the term ‘nation state’. I have avoided that term in this book. Behind it lies an essentially 18th-century idea: first that nations exist as real communities in a pre-state reality and second that the boundaries of states should corre-spond to the boundaries of nations. This idea was extremely powerful in mobilizing European peoples living under what at least some among them regarded as foreign rule to struggle for independence. It was especially important in encouraging independence movements against the Habsburg Empire among Czechs and Slovaks (acting together), Italians (in the parts of that country that had been conquered by the Habsburgs) and Hungarians. The last-mentioned conflict resulted in the compromise formation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867. The nations identifying themselves in these cases were often based on the possession of a shared language different from that of the imperial power, though Czech and Slovak were separate if closely related lan-guages, and until the end of the 19th century there was no unified form of Italian, rather a set of very diverse dialects. There was also often a past, pre-conquest history of political unity, though in the Italian case that stretched back to the Roman Empire, which had itself seen ‘Italy’ as only a part of its territory.

Yet the idea that ideally nations should form states failed to recognize that it was often states that had formed nations. France, like Russia, had been formed as a geopolitical centre (in this case around Paris and the so-called Île-de-France) and gradually extended the territory over which it ruled, breaking down local systems of rule, law, custom and – though not until the late 19th and early 20th centuries – language. Fewer countries demonstrate the complexity of relations between nation and state than Belgium, the territory of which was for centuries an important site of major wars, including both 20th-century world wars. Modern Belgium was formed in the 1830s from a territory of the former Austrian Netherlands, parts of which had once been ruled over by the dukes of Burgundy – geographically remote from Belgium and itself notionally part of France. Following succession problems in the Burgundian dynasty, it had passed to the control of the Spanish branch




of the Habsburg family and became known as the Spanish Netherlands until, following war between Spain and Austria (and much of the rest of western Europe), the Austrian branch of the Habsburgs absorbed it dur-ing the 18th century. Napoleonic France conquered the territory in the early 19th century, but following the fall of Napoleon in 1815 it became part of the Netherlands. However, in 1832 the Belgian elite rebelled against Dutch rule and following a short war established Belgium as an independent state for the first time. Its eventual boundaries were deter-mined by the outcome of conflict, and the territory continues today to be divided into a Dutch-speaking (or Flemish) majority, a large French-speaking minority and a very small German-speaking minority. Has there been a historic Belgian ‘nation’?

The joint results of successful national revolts against ‘foreign’ rule, the collapse of some cross-national states into their composite parts (e.g. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), and the nation-building activities of established states mean that many contemporary European states can be seen as nation states, but there are important exceptions. The United Kingdom formally recognizes four component nations: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Republic of Ireland does not officially see itself as a nation state, because part of the island of Ireland (Northern Ireland) remains part of the United Kingdom. In Spain, many Basque and Catalan people consider that they constitute separate nations. The population of Ukraine is divided between a majority who see themselves as Ukrainian and a minority who identify with Russia.

Today we might also question the idea of national societies in a dif-ferent way. The world’s most important corporations now operate across a large number of states, with employees often performing dif-ferent kinds of task in different countries. For example, a firm might have its headquarters (and key managerial staff) in Switzerland, have its design, research and development activities and staff in California, its products manufactured in Brazil and China, its clerical support and customer relations services in India and sell its products (shaping more or less uniform tastes) partly in shops all over the world and partly through Internet sales located nowhere in particular but fiscally based in Ireland or Luxembourg, where business tax rates are particularly low. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the different kinds of work that people do have a considerable impact on their lives in general, particu-larly by determining their incomes. These activities of global firms lead to different concentrations of different kinds of workers in different countries and world regions. Are there therefore corporate societies




as well as national ones? Multinational enterprises seem often to have been more successful than states in integrating people from multiple national backgrounds into their workforces. Should we, for example, speak of ‘McDonald’s society’ as we do ‘Italian society’? Do employees of these firms have lives, not just working lives, that are shaped more by the corporation than by the community in which they live? This question will be mainly encountered by those studying Third World countries, where the lives of the employees of multinationals are likely to be very separate from other local people, regulated by a corporate rather than a community timetable, and where they often live in com-munities formed by corporate compounds, in the manner of European colonialists from the 15th to the 20th century.

These considerations must all be borne in mind as we return to our initial question: Is there a European society? What should we expect from a sociology of Europe? Some authors have attempted to answer these questions, but they usually end by finding more national differ-ences than similarities (e.g. Leonardi, 2012; Mau and Verwiebe, 2010). Such conclusions are not surprising. Is there any point in putting, say, the United Kingdom alongside Slovakia rather than alongside its former colony and fellow anglophone Australia, or France alongside Latvia rather than its francophone neighbours and former colonies in North Africa? Does the similarity of relative geographical closeness make more sense than the closer similarity of average income and sta-bility of political institutions? For the member states of the European Union (EU) there is a stronger potential rationale, in that the EU does form a layer of government that generates laws and policies that might hypothetically be shaping the societies of those states in the same way that we take it for granted that states themselves shape their own societies. This becomes an important hypothesis in its own right, well worth studying: how do the actions of a supranational body of that type compare with the society-forming capacities of states? However, the question is made difficult to answer by the fact that some countries have been members of the EU for 60 years, others for less than ten, with Norway and Switzerland only partial members.

But what if one adds countries to the east of the EU member states: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine? And those parts of ex-Yugoslavia that have not (yet) become EU members: Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina? Or Albania and Turkey, clearly within (or in Turkey’s case partly within) Europe as a geographical entity? Would there be any point in a study of all of Europe if the EU did not exist, if there were no state-like institution in the region? Would there be any




point in a study of, say, the whole of Asia or Africa, world regions without such an institution? A major issue here is the doubtful real-ity of these entities. They originated as divisions of the world made by the ancient Greeks, who, especially in the case of Asia, had very little knowledge of the extent of the land masses and islands that lay beyond the small parts they had actually visited. From the 15th century onwards, when Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, English, French and other explorers embarked on the process of European discovery of the rest of the planet, they took these limited concepts of the world’s continents with them, constantly expanding their application. There is therefore no reason at all why we should take these designations of world regions as having any serious meaning apart from convenient ways of indicat-ing very large territories.

Europe’s debatable boundaries

The ancient Greeks used the term Europa to designate a small area, part of what they called Thrace, occupying much of today’s Bulgaria, part of northern Greece and western Turkey. It was moved northwards and westwards by ecclesiastical writers in Charlemagne’s kingdom in the 8th century seeking to designate the zone of western Christianity (and thus excluding the original Greek idea). Today Europe is normally seen as having three reasonably clear physical boundaries, but one very vague one (see Figure 1.1). To the north it is bound by the Arctic Ocean as that sea passes the coast of northern Norway. To the west is the Atlantic Ocean beyond Ireland, except that Iceland further to the north west is usually included, especially as it is culturally and linguis-tically part of Scandinavia. (Greenland, even further to the north west, is strictly speaking part of Denmark, but its population is very small.) To the south is the Mediterranean Sea, which was not at all a relevant boundary to the Romans, whose empire’s southern extent was rather the Sahara Desert. For much of post-Roman European history it has, however, marked a boundary between the Christian and Muslim worlds, which has at times had considerable social and political as well as religious importance. At the southern tip of Spain, the gap between Europe and the region commonly known as the Near East is very narrow indeed, but for centuries its religious significance has been fundamental. This southern border becomes ambiguous at its eastern corner, where it encounters Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the large mass of Turkey. It is on that eastern side that the geographical identity




of Europe becomes difficult. If the boundary is held to follow not the Mediterranean itself but the ancient Greeks’ original idea of the flow of water through the Bosphorus and into the Black Sea (placing part of Turkey in Europe and the rest in Asia), then these countries can be defined as constituting the Middle East, outside of Europe except for the western part of Turkey. As the eastern boundary runs north we confront the large question: Is Russia part of Europe? In the 18th and 19th centuries both Russia and the Ottoman Empire, based in mod-ern Turkey, were definitely considered part of the diplomatic world of Europe, but the issue has long been politically contentious within those countries themselves, with changing regimes bringing differ-ent perspectives. Looked at purely in terms of physical geography, it is possible and conventional to trace a line running north east from the Black Sea across the north of the Caucasus Mountains, picking up the river Volga where it enters the Sea of Azov and running north with it to the Ural Mountains, which then extend north almost to the Arctic Ocean. This is a boundary that bisects Russia, like Turkey, into a European and an Asian part, a distinction often recognized by Russians themselves.

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FIGURE 1.1 Europe, as broadly conceived.




A sociological study of Russia, which would be partly devoted to identifying possible differences between these two parts, would be an interesting exercise, but it is beyond our present scope. From the time of their conquest in the early 18th century the three small Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) were part of Russia, but they declared their independence after the fall of the Soviet Union, and are now recognized as independent states with membership of the EU. Outside the EU but within the Volga-Urals definition of Europe are Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Within the former Soviet Union, Belarus and Ukraine had been formally independent states, though they remained very closely linked to Russia. South of the Caucasus and continuing east of the Volga-Urals line are other former parts of the Soviet Union and of pre-1917 Russia that are now independent countries, from Georgia to Kazakhstan. World organizations established in the days when the Soviet Union existed – such as the United Nations (UN) and all its associated bodies or the world Association football body, FIFA, and other international cultural and sporting organizations – included the whole of the Soviet Union, and therefore these territories, within an extended idea of ‘Europe and Central Asia’, the latter being a 19th-century Russian concept. This continues to be their practice today. However, in this book I exclude Russia and Central Asia from the idea of Europe, but Russia itself is included in several discussions as an external comparator.

Defined in this way, Europe has today two troublesome frontiers. The first is this geographically problematic eastern one with Russia. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of central Europe, which Russia’s political elite had long seen as a buffer between their country and western Europe in general and Germany in particu-lar, joined both the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This brought to Russia’s borders NATO, the transatlantic military alliance formed after 1945 under US leadership to counter a perceived military threat from the Soviet Union. The move occurred when post-Soviet Russia was extremely weak. Subsequently the coun-try has developed a strong oil- and gas-based economy and has moved to counter any further moves east by the EU and NATO. The main focus of this concern to date has been on Ukraine, much of the popula-tion of which would like to accept the western embrace, but where a minority prefers a closer relationship with Russia. By 2014 this issue had become militarily contested.

Europe’s other problematic boundary is that to the south and south east. This has broadly defined the boundary between Christendom and




the Islamic world since the ending of Islamic rule over parts of Spain and Portugal and the conquest of Christian Byzantium by the Islamic power that came to be called the Ottoman Empire, both events occur-ring during the 15th century. The latter brought the territories we now know as Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and the former Yugoslavia (except for the areas now known as Croatia and Slovenia), as well as Greece, under Ottoman rule. Much of the population remained Orthodox Christian, but some converted to Islam, particularly in Albania and Bosnia- Herzegovina. Greece secured independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1832, and parts of the Balkan region had been reconquered by various Christian powers by the 19th century. Following its military defeat in World War I the Ottoman Empire was dismembered, its core in Turkey remaining, however, as a large state formation. The state of Yugoslavia was formed to bring together var-ious parts of the Balkans, a mixture of peoples of Catholic, Orthodox and Islamic origins. It lasted until 1990, when it collapsed in violent inter-communal attempts at ‘ethnic cleansing’ among the different cultural and religious groups.

Also divided between Greek Orthodox Christianity and Islam is the island of Cyprus. Ruled over by the United Kingdom from the late 19th century until a successful violent struggle for independence ended in 1960, the island was then plunged into conflict between the Orthodox Greek-speaking majority mainly in the south and the Islamic Turkish-speaking minority mainly in the north. The Greek and Turkish governments became militarily involved in the dispute, and in 1974 the island was partitioned. What is today known as the Republic of Cyprus is in effect the southern, Greek part. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus governs the north, but this regime has not been recognized by most international organizations. As a result there are few statistics on that territory, and it has been difficult to include it within the scope of this book. Reference to ‘Cyprus’ therefore refers to the southern Republic of Cyprus and not to the whole island. (The same applies to our use of ‘Ireland’ to refer to the Republic of Ireland in the south of that island, the north-western part being included within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.)

Relations between some European countries and some parts of the extra-European Islamic world are again contentious and the cause of various kinds of violence. While the problems of this relationship date back to the Crusades, today they are more a by-product of difficult relations between the United States and the Arab world, a theme that is beyond our scope in this book.




Identifying sub-regions of Europe

The definition of Europe is contested not only by geographers, but by actual political conflict. It is a world region containing a wide range of different kinds of society, though with less variation than we would encounter in a study of the whole world. In wealth it ranges from some of the world’s richest societies in the north west to some middle-income ones in the east, but with no examples of the levels of poverty that can be found in sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 1.2 presents data for

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MaltaPortugalSlovakia

LithuaniaEstoniaGreeceRussiaPoland

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TurkeyBelarusBulgaria

ChinaMacedonia

SerbiaAlbaniaBosnia

UkraineGeorgia

IndiaMoldova

Source: World Bank 2015a

FIGURE 1.2 Per capita gross national income in purchasing power parities, US$, European countries and various comparators, 2013.




2014 (the most recent available at the time of writing) for average per capita national income expressed in US$ and calculated by the World Bank to represent purchasing power. That is, rather than just calculate the exchange value of different currencies, which is subject to fluctuations that have nothing to do with varying standards of living, the World Bank relates incomes to prices. The objective is to measure income in terms of the bundle of goods that people living in the country concerned can buy. The figures are expressed as national averages and therefore do not take account of inequalities within countries. This is a topic to which we shall return in later chapters. All European countries are covered, as well as Japan, Russia, Turkey and the United States (our four external comparators), the two largest countries in the developing world, China and India, and some cases of extreme wealth and poverty.

The richest country in the world in 2014 was the small oil-rich Arab state Qatar with US$146,178 per capita. Second was Macao, the small, former Portuguese colony now part of China with US$139,762. The richest European country, again a small one, was Luxembourg at US$91,048, some way ahead of Norway at US$64,893. The world’s two poorest countries in 2013 were both in sub-Saharan Africa: the Democratic Republic of Congo with a per capita purchasing power income of US$745 and Burundi at US$770. No European society was anything like as poor as that, though Moldova had a lower income than India, while several countries in eastern Europe and ex- Yugoslavia were poorer than China.

There is a very clear geography to the relative wealth of European (and indeed other) countries. All countries in North-West Europe (i.e. north of the Alps and the Pyrenees and west of the frontier with the for-mer Soviet bloc and ex-Yugoslavia) have higher per capita incomes than the rest of Europe – with the United States ranking alongside the richest European countries. Japan falls between the ‘poorest’ country in the north west (France) and the richest in the south (Italy). The southern group (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the two small islands Cyprus and Malta) in general stands ahead of all eastern cases, though Slovenia and the Czech Republic are now wealthier than Malta, Portugal and Greece, while Slovakia, Estonia and Lithuania are wealthier than Greece. Turkey stands lower than all of South-West Europe and sev-eral central and eastern European countries. Below we discuss in detail potential geographical groupings within central and eastern Europe. For the present we can note that those in the centre (the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland) and the Baltics are wealthier than all those further east and in ex-Yugoslavia, except for Slovenia




among the latter. Those central countries and the Baltic states were the first ex-Soviet countries to be admitted to the EU on the grounds of their relatively advanced economies. The Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland are a geographically compact entity and were known as the Visegrád group, named after the castle in Hungary where their leaders met in 1991 to discuss their future within Europe. Russia has a per capita income similar to this group and the Baltic states, but all other eastern countries have lower incomes. Particularly notable are the low levels in the countries of the former Yugoslavia apart from Slovenia. These countries were torn apart by the civil war that followed the collapse of Yugoslavia.

In terms of economic structure, most western and several eastern European countries can be regarded as becoming post-industrial, in that after an extensive period of industrialization growth is now mainly in certain services sectors. Within that generalization there is diversity in the balance between manufacturing and services, while some countries in the central part of the continent are still major industrial producers and a few in the east continue to have large agricultural sectors.

Apart from some doubtful cases in the east, all European coun-tries are at least formally democratic. Several countries in the north west have had democratic traditions for most of the 20th century – the majority uninterruptedly since the end of World War II. Greece, Portugal and Spain ceased to be dictatorships in the 1970s, while most countries of the former Soviet bloc acquired free elections only after 1990. With the exception of Albania and the European part of Turkey all European countries have had mainly Christian pasts, as is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Several major historical fissures have set different parts of the region on diverse paths, and it is these that justify the focus of a sociology of Europe on the identification of both similarities and differences. Given the diversity of the region, it does not make sense to ask if there is such a thing as ‘a’ European society. It is, however, interesting to ask if Europe consists of 30 or more national societies, each of which is quite distinct, or whether some groups of countries share certain similarities. The questions then become: Can we identify distinct sub-regions of Europe? And what would we gain from seeing Europe in terms of these rather than as a collection of distinct nation-state societies?

Important stereotypes abound, based on major compass points, and we have already used some of these in considering differences in per capita national incomes. There is a popular stereotype of a difference between a north and a south within western Europe: the former being




associated with prosperity, a dominance of formal organizations and hard work, a largely Protestant religious background and wet weather; and the south being seen as less wealthy, with a dominant family life, informality and a relaxed approach to work, Catholic and sunny. There is then an east–west division, with the former emerging from Russian domination, poor and disorganized, and the latter wealthy and efficient, perhaps under heavy American influence. A primary objective of a sociology of Europe must be to do better than this, though ele-ments of this crude picture do remain in more sophisticated accounts.

Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) trail-blazing account for this type of analysis was restricted to western Europe only (as well as the anglo-phone world). It was based not on stereotypes but on struggles that took place among key social groups to gain control of the process of industrialization and modernization from the 19th century:

• Conservative, primarily landed, interests mainly concerned with protecting not only their own privileges, but more generally a hier-archical Christian society. Esping-Andersen saw these as dominant throughout Continental western Europe.

• New capitalist groups with liberal ideas in relation to modernization but at least as hostile to attempts by workers to organize themselves as were conservative landed groups. Esping-Andersen saw these as important in the anglophone world. Within Europe this meant just one state, the United Kingdom, until Irish independence in the 1920s. Most other such countries lie outside Europe: the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

• The new groups of mainly manual workers being produced by indus-trialization. They lacked not only the wealth of traditional landed and new industrial capitalist groups, but also the embeddedness in traditional community of many rural workers – though these too were affected by the upheavals of modernization, industrialization and urbanization. These new groups were insecure outsiders, lacking citizenship and other rights, unless they organized themselves into parties and trade unions. They acquired their greatest strength in the Nordic countries.

This threefold division of the opposed forces that through their exchanges and conflicts constructed the industrial world is a familiar and important one. It designates the three great political families that can be found in the party structure of many societies: conservative, lib-eral and socialist or social democratic. It also lies behind Max Weber’s




seminal conception of the three forms of social division as being those based on status (traditional elites), class (bourgeois property owners) and party (the organized working class). Esping-Andersen argued that the power balance between these forces varied in different parts of the industrializing world, leading to certain differences in their social struc-ture. This therefore becomes a key hypothesis in accounting for dif-ferences among groups of countries in Europe and other modernizing parts of the world, and the general idea behind it will be of importance in subsequent chapters.

Esping-Andersen’s main aim in this classification was to account for something narrower and more specific: differences in the kinds of social support offered in different countries to protect workers from insecurity in employment, old age and poor health. The Scandinavian countries and eventually Finland developed the most generous egalitarian systems of social support as a set of universal social rights, releasing workers from their dependence on the labour market (where their position was usually weak) for important aspects of life. This was logically consist-ent with the particular strength of organized labour in that part of the world. The United Kingdom, the United States and other anglophone countries developed residual systems where workers had to prove des-titution to be eligible for help – politically dominant capitalist interests wanting to reduce intervention in the labour market as much as possi-ble. When conservative, mainly rural, elites were dominant, they sought to reproduce in the welfare support system the status-based hierarchies from which they buttressed their own positions. They therefore opted for relatively generous systems of social support, but based closely on employees’ work status. Instead of universal schemes as in Scandinavia, conservative elites devised a range of insurance schemes for specific occupational groups. The original and boldest examples of this were introduced in Germany in 1889 under the chancellorship of Count Otto von Bismarck, and occupationally based insurance schemes are usually known as Bismarckian (Palier, 2010).

One might reasonably question whether the design of social sup-port systems provides an adequate basis for a classification of entire societies – surely a case of the tail wagging the dog. But behind this spe-cific application Esping-Andersen’s scheme was based on his broader stylized histories of different patterns of class relations. It is these that have given his approach continuing resonance in attempts to find sub-regions within Europe going far beyond classifications of social policy. Social support systems might be just one outcome of differences in these arrangements, and we might search for others. The potentiality




of the class-based account for more general analysis is increased when we see that it is in turn rooted in some other aspects of social structure, in particular the results of the religious conflicts that dominated Europe and produced major divisions across it from the 16th century onwards.

The Catholic Church was historically associated with traditional monarchies, even if on occasions specific kings or emperors were at war with it, and the two institutions engaged in mutual defence against newly emerging forces with power bases outside landed wealth, mainly urban and, by the 19th century, industrial property. Logically, the newly emerging bourgeois forces often associated themselves with the Protestant movement. However, in the circumstances of the 16th to 18th centuries it was virtually impossible to establish regimes that were not monarchies, and Protestants found supportive kings and queens in England, Scandinavia and some, especially northern, parts of Germany, as well as in Switzerland and the Dutch Republic (which eventually became a monarchy). Where the Catholic Church domi-nated, conservative institutions and values prevailed; the impact of bourgeois challenge was blunted. Liberal capitalist groups were often likely to associate with secularist, anti-clerical movements. However, the Catholic Church was deeply entrenched in the minds and lives of the mass of the population, and when by the late 19th century workers began to organize their own movements, the Church was able to establish its own forms of these, challenging the secular ones being set up by socialist movements. With the exception of Calvinism, the Protestant churches were less successful in sustaining the kind of popular loyalty that could sustain mass mobilization and founded few workers’ movements.

Presented in this schematic way, we can see how the Esping-Andersen scheme reaches deep into the historical forces that produced the main fault lines in western Europe. Lutheran Protestantism became well established in Scandinavia, and when the labour movement began to organize it experienced no splits based on religion and could develop a united strength. The Continental states that developed conservative social insurance schemes did so on the basis of Catholic ideas as well as post-feudal ones.

However, when we look more closely, the simple threefold scheme begins to fragment. The Nordic story holds up well, and one must remember that Esping-Andersen is Danish, but the two other groups are difficult to sustain. First, why is England, or the United King-dom, not part of the Nordic group? It had a Protestant monarchy and was indeed the leading modernizing, industrializing country, with a




powerful trade union movement. Also within the anglophone group if beyond the range of our present study, Australia and New Zealand had powerful early labour movements. Was Esping-Andersen taking the United States as the paradigm case of an anglophone group of countries without deeper inspection of the other cases? The answer is more complex and more favourable to the Esping-Andersen the-sis. In the mid 20th century the United Kingdom (along with Aus-tralia and New Zealand) did belong very much to the Nordic model of welfare states and followed Esping-Andersen’s arguments about the kind of society in which these would develop. Indeed, universal social benefits systems are often called Beveridgean, after Sir William Beveridge, the founder of the British universalist social insurance sys-tem during World War II. In classifying Britain as a country where an early-established bourgeois elite was able to resist the labour move-ment’s demands, Esping-Andersen was looking to an earlier 18th- and 19th-century period. However, looking at welfare systems in the late 1980s he found evidence that led him to classify the United Kingdom as having the residual welfare state that one might predict on the basis of that earlier history. It was as though British history from 1945 to 1980 had eventually given way to an earlier trajectory, and that Esping-Andersen’s focus on the late 18th century provides a more accurate guide to the 21st century than does the country’s history in the mid 20th. The British story demonstrates the complexity of trying to put hybrid cases into classification systems that require them to fit snugly into a single box; it also raises interesting questions about when older layers of social relations might be able to reassert themselves over later developments.

It would seem unambiguous that Germany is the paradigm case for the Bismarckian system, but here too there are problems. When Bismarck united the disparate and fragmented regimes of the German lands into a single state dominated by Prussia, there were parts that were mainly Catholic and others mainly Protestant. Prussia was pre-dominantly Protestant and imposed a Protestant hegemony on the rest of the country. This eventually changed; having initially decided that Catholics, liberals, socialists and Jews were all enemies of the new German state (Reichsfeinde), the regime found it had defined too many enemy forces and accepted the Catholic Church as one of the friends of the regime (Reichsfreunde). However, the ruling groups remained primarily Protestant, and it is not easy to see Bismarckian institutions as the straightforward expression of a European conservatism defined essentially by a Catholic tradition. Catholicism as such is clearly not




the fundamental variable here. The other countries included in Esping-Andersen’s Bismarckian group are rather diverse. Austria and Hungary (formerly united under the Austro-Hungarian Empire) would be better candidates for paradigmatic status among those other countries, as they have had Bismarckian insurance schemes but are predominantly Catholic; the Netherlands and Switzerland, on the other hand, have had an elaborate compromise among Catholic, Calvinist and lay cultures.

Far more problematic have been the southern European Catholic cases with Bismarckian schemes: Italy, Portugal, Spain as well as Orthodox Greece. Most observers (e.g. Ferrera, 1996; Naldini, 2003) have amended Esping-Andersen’s scheme by making a separate group of these countries on the basis of the role of the family in their welfare states. German and other North-West European social insurance sys-tems are described by Esping-Andersen and others as ‘familist’ in that they envisaged a ‘male breadwinner’ establishing rights that could also benefit his non-working wife and children. In the south, familism has instead meant that the family has primary responsibility for its own social support, leading to lower levels of state social policy than in the north-western cases. As we shall see in Chapter 4, familism in all Bismarckian countries did seem to have delayed the entry into the labour force of married women during the 1970s and 1980s, compared with both the anglophone and Nordic cases, but the difference of emphasis in the meaning of familism between the northern and south-ern countries has been very important.

More difficult is the location of France in this scheme. It has had a Bismarckian system, but during the formative years of the late 19th and early 20th centuries the country was deeply divided between Catholic and secular forces. Much of this conflict centred on the role of the state, in particular in relation to the family. At that time secularists shared the Catholic aim of keeping women to the role of mothers, but for a different reason: concern over France’s low birth rate and a need to resolve it by encouraging motherhood. This difference of motive led to important changes in French policy later in the 20th century, includ-ing policies for encouraging mothers to participate in the paid labour force, as will be seen in Chapter 4. For the present we need to note that France does not conform fully to the Bismarckian stereotype.

Esping-Andersen restricted his study to non-communist industrial economies and therefore did not include central and eastern Europe. However, to the extent that his account concerns the formative years of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it should be possible to embrace those countries that had been part of the Austro-Hungarian or German




Empires (the Czech and Slovak lands, Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary and much of Poland). These have had elements of the Bismarckian system in a way that countries that were either independent or part of the Russian or Ottoman Empires did not. Although the Soviet Union imposed major changes on all these systems, we may make an initial attempt to differentiate within central and eastern Europe by bracketing the ‘ ex-Bismarckians’ together, and provisionally leaving as another group all those cases that were outside Austrian and German influence. Social policy in the Tsarist Russian Empire had been very poorly developed, and after 1917 a communist system was installed and then imported into all countries that were absorbed into the Soviet sphere of interest after World War II. This provided an extensive universal welfare state, limited eventually only by the deteriorating standard of living in the Soviet bloc. It was, however, partly administered by local Communist Party cadres and therefore was not based on citizenship rights as in Scandinavia but on political favours. Poland is complex in this context. It was less industrialized than the other truncated Bismarckian cases, and while Silesia had been within Austro-Hungary and the rest of the western part had been incorporated within Prussia and then Germany until 1918, the eastern regions had been part of Russia until that time.

Other studies have also attempted classifications of countries, mainly on the basis of social and labour policy issues and mostly restricted to western Europe. A comprehensive summary of many of the findings is to be found in the European Commission’s report on industrial relations in Europe in 2008 (European Commission, 2009). It was based on a number of studies of comparative European industrial relations and welfare states, including Esping-Andersen (1990) but also making use of Ebbinghaus and Visser (1997), Crouch (1993, 1996), Schmidt (2002, 2006) and Kohl and Platzner (2007). This led it to identify the following:

• North (the Nordic countries);• Centre West (Germany and the smaller countries of North-West

Europe); • South (the southern countries of the pre-enlargement EU); • West (Ireland and the United Kingdom); and • Centre East (the ex-communist EU member states).

This scheme appears purely geographical, but the studies on which it was based were more concerned with power relations within countries – either class relations of the kind proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990)




that are discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5 or long-term state strate-gies towards organized interests (Crouch, 1993, 1996; Schmidt, 2002, 2006). The Commission’s authors then made some changes to their scheme, based on observations of major institutional differences in industrial relations organization. They allocated Slovenia outside the Centre East and put it with Centre West. They also put France with the South. These were justifiable switches when the focus was on indus-trial relations systems alone and as they exist now, as opposed to social policy or earlier political development paths. The authors also expressed some doubt about the allocation of Finland (ambiguous between North and Centre West) and Hungary (ambiguous between Centre East and South).

Since this EU report was prepared, Bohle and Greskovits (2012) have provided a means of analysing differences among Central East Europe countries, distinguishing among:

• the Visegrád group, referred to above (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, to which they provisionally added Croatia);

• the Baltic states, together with Bulgaria and Romania; and• the lone case of Slovenia, which had been part of Yugoslavia and

not the Soviet bloc.

All these accounts, being based mainly on EU member states, leave out the most eastern parts of Europe and most of ex-Yugoslavia. With the analysis presented in the following chapters there is occasion to revise and refine these classifications and propose an amended version, not least because the approach taken so far in the literature does not take account of the major ruptures since the early 20th century, apart from the Russian Revolution, and in particular the major changes that took place after the end of World War I (when the former dependencies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire acquired independence) and World War II (when most western welfare states took their predominant modern form).

However, as a useful starting point the existing literature suggests we make the following broad and provisional potential distinctions among European societies. They will be used only as a starting point and convenient shorthand, and as we proceed we shall challenge and deconstruct their terms:

• The Nordic countries, with universalist welfare states: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and possibly Iceland. (To form a noun




from Nordic we sometimes use ‘Norden’. Strictly speaking the term Scandinavia indicates a language group and therefore does not include Finland, whose language is completely different.)

• The anglophone countries with residual welfare states: Ireland and the United Kingdom, which many observers would expect to find having important similarities with the United States (and also with Australia, Canada and New Zealand).

• North-West Europe (NWE), with Bismarckian, occupationally based welfare states: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, with a question over the allocation of France.

• South-West Europe (SWE), with Bismarckian, family-based welfare states: Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain.

• Central East Europe (CEE), the ex-state socialist successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, with a question over the allocation of Poland, which had a shared German/Russian and partly Austrian legacy.

• (Highly provisional) Further East Europe (FEE), the previously Russian-dominated states: Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine and possibly Poland.

• (Even more provisional) All of ex-Yugoslavia (ex-Y) apart from Slovenia and Croatia (Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Kosovo enclave and possibly – though not part of Yugoslavia and often in conflict with it and some of its successor states – Albania).

These groups make some initial sense in terms of similarities of social history. They are also more or less geographically contiguous (Figure 1.3). This latter point adds to the convenience of using them as recognizable starting points, but it does raise the question of whether physical geography should play such a major part. The primary justifi-cation for so doing takes us back to the land-based military foundation of political rule in pre-modern Europe. In some cases it is clear that a dominant power shaped the identity of a wider geographical region: the United Kingdom over Ireland; the Catholic Church over SWE (but not Cyprus and Greece); the Austro-Hungarian Empire over CEE; Russia over FEE. The Nordic countries comprise a geographically distinct part of Europe, have at times come under each other’s domination and, with the exception of Finland, have very similar languages. NWE has been dominated at various times by France or Germany, though only




for short periods, punctuated by wars, and therefore not as enduringly as with the dominance of major powers in the other listed groups of countries. NWE – the core of the continent – thus remains something of a residual group, a fact which is itself a clue to the difficulty of identify-ing any predominant form of European society – a question to which we shall return in Chapter 8.

In distinguishing different countries and parts of Europe we have implicitly used a wealth criterion. The countries of Norden and NWE are in general richer than those of SWE, which are, with important exceptions, richer than those in CEE, which in turn are richer than those in FEE or ex-Y. Are the differences between these different sub-regions anything other than a reflection of this fundamental point of difference in national incomes? In the following chapters this question is tested by setting up what is called a null hypothesis. We first assume that there are no differences among groups of countries other than those associated with differences of national income. If some countries have positions that do not seem to be explained in this way, further investigation is presented to determine whether these exceptional cases seem to constitute groups, initially using the sub-regional groups listed

Nordic Countries

AnglophoneCountries

Central EastEurope (CEE)

South-West Europe(SWE)

North West Europe(NWE)

Further EastEurope (FEE)

Ex-Yugoslavia(ex-Y)

Turkey

ShetlandIslands(UK)Orkney

Islands(UK)

Faroe Islands (DK)

Strait of Gibraltar

R u s s i a

Finland

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

Belarus

Poland

Rus.

Germany

Austria

Slovenia

Denmark

Sweden

Norway

Netherlands

Ukraine

Moldova

Bulgaria

Macedonia

KosovoMontenegro

SerbiaBos.-herz.

Croatia

Slovakia

Hungary

Romania

France Switz

Spain

Italy

Portugal

MaltaCyprus

Algeria

Tunisia

GreeceAlbania

GeorgiaAzerba-

ijan

Belgium

UK

Iceland

Ireland

Lux. Czech R.

Armenia

Bay ofBiscay

English Channel

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

NorthSea

NorwegianSea

Black Sea

AegeanSea

WhiteSea

BarentsSea

Sea ofAzov

IonianSea

B a l ti c

Se

aG

ulf

of

Bo

t hn i a

Mediterranean Sea

Pechora Sea

Ca

spian Sea

Sicily

THE ARCTICOCEAN

FIGURE 1.3 Possible regional divisions of Europe.




above but approached from a willingness to explore other possibilities if that is where the data lead.

We consider the identification of exceptional cases on an objective basis by using the procedure described in Box 1.1. In brief, this enables us to determine for each case the value it would have on the dependent variable if it were fully determined by the equation of the relationship between the variables for all cases. We can then compare the actual value of the variable for a given case with its predicted value. Countries will be defined as ‘exceptional’ when their actual value for a variable is + or − more than half the standard deviation for the variable in ques-tion across all cases. They will be described as ‘very exceptional’ when their actual value is + or − more than the standard deviation. These terms are explained in Box 1.1.

Box 1.1 Methodological note

When we have a set of statistics on two variables for a number of cases, we can plot one variable on the horizontal (x) axis of a graph and the other on the vertical (y) axis. We can then use statistical techniques to work out the straight line that represents the best fit across the plots. This calculation will also give us an equation in the form y = mx + c, where x and y represent the scores on the two variables, m measures the angle of slope of the line, and c the intercept or the point where the line crosses the y access. If the x and y variables are positively related, the line will slope upwards from left to right. If they are negatively related, it will slope downwards and the equation will have a minus sign: y = −mx + c.

If there is a strong relationship between the two variables, the plots will all be quite close to the line. An example will be found in Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3, which plots religious belief against attendance at reli-gious services. Not surprisingly, the line slopes upwards, showing us that attendance is higher where beliefs are strong. An example of a weaker relationship is shown in Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3, which plots the percent-ages of populations that are foreign-born against mean per capita annual income. The line slopes upwards, showing that overall as income rises immigration increases, but the relationship is weak; several countries stand a long way from the line.

We can calculate the strength of the relationship between the variables by calculating a statistic known as the coefficient of determination, which is usually symbolized as r squared (r2). The higher the coeffi-cient, the more closely related are the two variables. If the relationship is perfect r2 = 1. If there is no relationship at all r2 = 0. In Figure 3.2, r2 = 0.7487. In Figure 3.3, r2 = 0.2871.




Conclusion

The main justification for a sociology of ‘Europe’ is not that it con-stitutes a coherent group of similar countries, a single ‘European society’, but that it brings together a fascinating mix of similarities and differences. It is the only part of the world that has experienced a lengthy history of gradual development from subsistence agriculture to an advanced services-based economy within a framework of diverse centres of political and religious power. The only other parts of the world with similarly lengthy histories leading to advanced economies – Japan and possibly China and Russia – lack the diversity of politi-cal and religious centres that makes Europe so complex. The other advanced economies, in North America and Australasia, had histories

A further way of measuring the spread of a number of cases across a variable is to calculate the standard deviation. This statistic expresses the extent to which the scores of all the cases depart from the mean score. If all scores are close to the mean, the standard deviation will be low. If there is a wide variety, it will be high. The standard deviation is useful to us at a number of points in this book. On many of the variables that we examine we would expect countries’ scores to vary according to their national incomes – as with the example from Chapter 3 mentioned above. It is then interesting if a country has a score that is considerably higher or lower than we might expect on this basis. But how do we know whether a country is exceptional, rather than just having a score that is a bit higher or lower than we might expect? For a variable where the r2 score is weak, we would need a country to have a far more exceptional score before we took notice than for one where it is strong. One way to get beyond a subjective evaluation of this is as follows. Using the equation of the straight line of best fit, we can calculate what score a particular country ‘ought’ to have on the y axis by applying the equation to its score on the x axis. This is its predicted score. We can then subtract this predicted score from the actual one to indicate how far the actual score departs from the predicted one. We shall be more impressed by the size of a departure the smaller the overall variation in the y scores. To express this, we can divide the gap between actual and predicted score for an individual case by the standard deviation. The result is known by statisticians as the z statistic. In this book we shall follow the rule of thumb of regarding countries as being ‘exceptional’ on a variable when their actual value for a variable is + or − more than half the standard deviation. They will be described as ‘very exceptional’ when their actual value is + or − more than the standard deviation.




punctuated by abrupt transformations through colonial invasion. Simi-lar points apply to Latin America. It is therefore as a laboratory for the study of long-accumulated patterns of difference and similarity that a sociology of Europe attracts us. The issue remains of whether there is today anything that distinguishes ‘Europe’, or major parts of it, from other advanced regions of the world. Wherever possible, therefore, comparisons will be made with Japan, Russia and the United States in order to explore whether there really is any European distinctiveness. Where possible, Turkey is also included as a country partly within Europe and partly within ‘Asia’.

In each chapter evidence is assembled to answer the questions: Are there groups of European countries or just individual cases, and how do these groups and cases compare with the three main extra-European comparators? If we find groups, how do these compare with the provisional list set out above, and how much do they vary from topic to topic? The aim of each of the following chapters is to cover as many European countries as possible, but this will often mean excluding several of those in the east, for which few comparable data are available. Since it is not possible to discuss more than 40 countries through a set of national narratives, we can achieve compa-rability only by placing considerable reliance on statistics that sum-marize a situation across as many countries as possible. This imposes a number of limitations. First, we can use numbers for comparative purposes only if we can be fairly confident that they have been col-lected on more or less comparable bases. There would be little point, say, in comparing two countries’ statistics for religious observance if one source used the numbers of people attending religious services regularly while the other merely asked people if they had any religious beliefs. This mainly limits us to statistics collected by international organizations, such as Eurostat (the statistical agency of the EU), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and various UN agencies. Even then, one cannot be certain that these bodies have had access to adequate sources, as these are primarily national. The richest data for Europe are produced by Eurostat, but they are mainly concerned with EU member states, though sometimes with associate members, such as Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Turkey, or candidate members, such as Serbia. Similarly the OECD mainly collects data for its members, the 34 richest nations in the world. This excludes the poorest European states, including some EU




members, though it includes Japan and the United States and occa-sionally provides information on Russia.

A further limitation to a project that tries to cover so many countries on a comparable basis is that not much use can be made of studies of individual, or small groups of, countries. Most of the knowledge that we have of societies comes from research with this more limited geo-graphical scope. We shall try to make use of some particularly strong examples of such work, but much has had to be sacrificed.

A final crucial question concerns the issues that are relevant for a study of social life. This involves a major exercise of subjective judge-ment. However, an uncontentious starting point is the basic demogra-phy of birth and death, as these processes provide the populations that are the main object of our study. This leads us quickly into patterns of marriage and other forms of sexual partnership, the structure of families and immigration. These are the topics of Chapter 2. Such a discussion brings us to religion, as religious belief and authority have so often defined approaches to marriage and childbirth, and to questions of different cultures and ethnic groups, as these are also highly relevant to the demography of a society. These and some other aspects of social identity are considered in Chapter 3.

One might argue that the next most important things that character-ize people’s lives and differentiate them, that make them who they feel themselves to be, are their leisure pursuits, such as culture and sport. Unfortunately few useful comparative data exist on these; some use is made of what there is in Chapter 8. However, it is not possible to enjoy many cultural and sporting activities without income. Also, for most of their adult life the great majority of people spend the largest single portions of their waking lives in work. I have therefore placed economic activity – the kinds of production being carried out in various countries and the types of occupation that these provide – in Chapter 4. This leads logically to consideration of the different levels of income and social ranking that different kinds of work provide and therefore to the structure of inequality and class. This is considered in Chapters 5 to 7. Finally, Chapter 8 returns to the issues of whether we can identify particular types of European society and whether all or any of these appear distinctive in a wider international perspective.



223

4th century 61, 775th century 63, 777th century 611000 313th century 20014th century 6315th century 7, 8, 11, 62–4, 72,

172, 19516th century 3, 17, 62–3, 67, 69, 78,

194, 2081598 6417th century 77, 2021648 31685 6418th century 4–6, 9, 10, 17–8, 65–6, 74,

77, 88, 100, 142, 172, 198–2001789 4, 65–6, 18219th century 2, 4–6, 9–11, 15, 17–9, 43,

57, 59, 66, 74, 77, 79, 84, 86, 91, 96, 100, 122, 142–3, 148–9, 154, 163, 169, 183–4, 200, 208

1815 4, 61830s 51832 6, 111870–71 21889 1620th century 5, 7, 14, 18–9, 21, 50, 54,

73, 77, 78, 84–6, 91, 96, 100, 102, 122, 133, 143, 148, 150, 153, 158, 163, 169, 181, 183–4, 186, 195, 202, 208

1917 10, 20, 67, 144, 1941918 1, 3, 20, 76, 1971920s 15, 101, 2031922 43, 1821924 1821930 421930s 40, 42, 88, 1011933 66, 2001938 671940s 101, 1941943 671944 1821945 10, 18, 42, 67, 144, 150, 159, 2081949 33, 43, 72–31950s 59, 67, 79, 80, 2031960 11, 32, 421960s 35, 74, 79, 80, 150, 1941961 43

1970 131, 176–7, 1851970s 14, 19, 54, 101, 143, 150, 158,

176, 1821973 194, 202–31980 18, 131, 1591980s 18–9, 85, 131, 159, 177, 2021989 30, 33, 38, 43, 60, 144, 2081990 2, 11, 14, 28, 37–8, 43, 49, 54,

60, 73, 86, 102–4, 180, 192, 194, 198, 200, 210–1

1990s 58, 74, 83, 102–4, 131, 176, 177, 186

1991 14, 58, 72, 76, 1021993 3, 60, 1021995 49, 502000 28, 49, 54, 131, 160, 176, 21021st century 18, 78, 1632006 160, 1802008 45, 74, 89–91, 105–6, 108, 140,

178, 2032010 35–6, 39, 60, 70–1, 76, 85, 110,

112, 114–5, 131, 140–1, 145, 178

2011 40–1, 50, 54, 72–3, 95, 138, 140, 166, 216

2012 29, 44–5, 49–51, 83–4, 102, 134–5, 139–41, 211–2, 214–5, 217

2013 49, 502014 10, 12–3, 44, 59, 82, 84, 86,

140–1, 159, 2112015 28, 35–6, 39, 210

Abruzzo 212administration, administrative 28,

90–3, 183Afghanistan 83Africa 2, 7, 8, 12–3, 29, 39, 46, 63, 68,

81, 185ageing 39, 40, 46agnostic 66, 69, 71–2, 75–6agriculture, agricultural 14, 25, 30, 33,

88–90, 95, 98, 100, 107–10, 117, 119, 126, 145–6, 159, 171, 181, 187–8, 194, 202

Ahles, L. 37, 218Albania 7, 11, 12, 14, 22–3, 31–2, 36,

40, 54, 69, 192, 210, 215alcohol 30, 32, 180

Index



224 Index

Algeria(n) 2, 23, 63Alps 9, 13, 83, 197, 200Alsace 2, 212Alvaredo, F. 140Amsterdam Institute for Advanced

Labour Studies (AIAS) 159, 163–4, 218

Andalucia 212anglophone 7, 15–6, 18–9, 22–3,

35, 38, 71, 107, 109, 111, 116–7, 135–6, 135, 136, 144, 154, 175–6, 192, 201–3

Aquitaine 3, 212Arab 11, 13Aragón 212architect(ure) 91Arctic Ocean 2, 8, 9, 23aristocracy, aristocrats 63, 65, 145,

148, 153–5, 171, 173, 202Asia(n) 8–10, 26, 39, 52

Central 10, 29, 59East 29South East 29

assortative mating 130Asturias 212asylum 44, 46, 80–1, 84, 86atheism, atheist 48, 58, 65–7, 69, 71,

72, 75–7, 198Atlantic Ocean 8–10, 23Augustine, St. 63–4Australasia 25Australia 7, 15, 18, 22, 31, 57, 192Austria(n) 2, 5, 6, 12, 19, 20, 22–3,

31, 35–7, 41, 44–6, 51, 58, 69–72, 78, 83–5, 94, 96–8, 103–4, 109–12, 114–6, 118–9, 124, 126, 128–9, 131, 134–5, 137, 139, 160–1, 163–5, 182, 192, 196, 200–1, 206, 210, 214, 216–7

Austro-Hungar(y)ian Empire 1, 2, 5, 19–22, 60, 66, 83, 192, 197

authority(ies) 27, 60, 62–4, 66–7, 105, 107, 119, 121, 148, 151, 185, 196, 201

Auvergne 212Avignon 63Azov, Sea of 9, 23

‘baby boom’ 42Baden-Württemberg 89, 99, 212Balkan(s) 9, 11, 63ballet, 205Baltic (states) 10, 13–4, 21, 46, 49, 55,

59, 66, 83, 96, 105, 113, 117–8, 120, 131, 144, 191, 194–5, 199, 203–5, 215

Bangladesh 68

Baptist (churches) 66, 74Barcelona 99Basilicata 212Basque 6, 61, 78 (see also País Vasco)Basse Normandie 212Bassin Parisien 212Bavaria, Bayern 73, 99, 212Beamter 149Belarus 7, 10, 12, 22–3, 31, 36, 40, 54,

60, 69, 95–6, 98, 119, 144, 159, 192, 199, 210

Belgium, Belgian 2, 5, 6, 12, 22–3, 31, 35–6, 41, 44–5, 50–1, 65, 67–72, 76, 80–1, 84, 94, 97–8, 102–4, 110, 114–5, 131, 134–5, 137, 139, 160–1, 163–5, 182, 188, 192, 194, 200–1, 206, 210, 214

Bendix, R. 154, 218Berlin 33, 43, 60, 73, 99, 104, 212Bible 62biotechnology 68birth(s) 27, 29, 34–5, 39, 46, 48–9, 55,

79, 101, 176rate 19, 34–5, 37, 39, 40–2, 46–7

Bismarck, Otto von, Bismarckian 16, 18–20, 22, 192

Black Sea 9, 23Blossfeld, P. 130, 218Bohemia 60–1Bohle, D. 21, 218Bolzano 212Bonaparte, N. 4, 172 (see also

Napoleon)book 205Bosnia-Herzegovina 7, 11–2, 22, 31–2,

36, 58, 69, 95–6, 98, 192, 210Bosphorus 9Bourbon 172Bourdieu, P. 171, 218bourgeois(ie) 16–8, 148, 154, 183Bourgogne 212Brazil 6, 31, 51Breen, R. 176, 218Bremen 73, 99, 212Bretagne 212Britain, British (see under Great

Britain)Buddhist(s) 68–9, 75Buehn, A. 160, 221building industry 89Bulgaria(n) 8, 11–2, 21–3, 31, 36, 41,

45, 69–72, 93–4, 96–8, 102–3, 105, 110–2, 114–5, 131, 136, 144, 161, 165, 178–80, 191–2, 198–9, 206, 210, 214

Burgundy 5Burundi 13



Index 225

Busemeyer, M. 175, 218business 6, 93, 106, 148 (see also

executives)interests 152services 90–3, 97, 100, 118, 157,

187, 191, 198, 201, 203 Byzantium 11, 42, 62–3

Caesar 63Calabria 212California 6Calvin, J. Calvinism 17, 19, 64–5, 72,

74, 181, 200Campania 212Canarias 212cancer 180Cantabria 212capital city 33, 59, 99, 100, 200capital 42, 143, 154

cultural 171gains 132

capitalism(t) 2, 15–7, 33, 100, 143, 144, 147–8, 151, 162, 172, 186, 202

cardiovascular disease 32, 180care (social) 30, 37, 46–7, 80, 92, 102,

116, 132, 137, 173, 183 (see also childcare and under services)

Caribbean 2, 29, 39Caspian Sea 2, 9, 23caste 172Castilla – La Mancha 212Castilla y León 212Catalonia, Catalan, Cataluña 1, 3, 6,

61, 78, 99, 197, 212Catholic (Roman) 3, 11, 15, 17–9, 22,

37, 38, 48–50, 52–3, 58, 61–70, 72–7, 79, 82, 85, 87, 102, 171, 181–3, 195–7, 199, 200, 202–3, 208

Caucasus 9, 10Central Asia (see under Asia)Centralny 99Cesko 60Champagne-Ardenne 212Charlemagne 8child(ren) 1, 19, 34–5, 38, 40, 42,

46–9, 68, 77–9, 100–2, 121, 123, 127, 130, 132, 137, 149, 171, 174

childbirth, childbearing 27, 29, 35, 37, 39, 42, 46–7, 49, 128

childcare 37–8, 47, 55, 127, 128

childhood 34, 122childminding 37childrearing 47

China 6, 12–3, 25, 30–1, 50, 51

Christendom 10, 62Christian(ity) 4, 8, 11, 14–5, 48, 59,

61–3, 66–72, 74–5, 78, 82, 100, 175, 181–3, 190, 195, 199

Christian democracy, democrats 175, 182

church 3, 4, 17–8, 22, 37–8, 48, 49, 52, 62–7, 69, 72–4, 76, 100, 171–2, 181–3, 196–8, 200, 203 (see also under Catholic, Orthodox)

of England 73–4of Scotland 74

citizen(ship) 15, 20, 29, 34, 42–4, 72–3, 79, 84–6, 150–3, 184–6, 189, 204, 215

services 90, 92, 95, 98, 104, 116, 118–9

civil service, servant 149, 155–6Class, social 16–7, 20, 27, 58, 66, 75,

chs 5 to 7 passim, 205, 208 political 59, 60, 158ruling 106, 153, 182, 189working 16, 122, 129, 143, 146,

148–50, 154–5, 161, 170, 181–3, 186

clerical (workers) 6, 108, 110–2, 115, 117–8, 125–6, 128–9, 146, 216

clothing 80industry 100–1

cogestion 164cohabit(ation) 48, 50–5colony, colonies, colonial 2, 7, 13, 26,

68, 79, 80, 83, 85–6, 214commerce 89communism, communist 19, 20, 38, 67,

72, 150, 159, 162–3, 177, 181–3, 186, 195, 197

Congo, Democratic Republic of, 13Congregationalist 66Conservative 15–7, 175, 181–3, 188Constantinople 62, 199Construction industry 88–9, 98, 100,

119corporation, corporate 6, 7, 92, 106,

124, 132, 145–6, 162, 203Corse 212craft (workers) 107–8, 171–2,

187, 217crime 40Crimea 59Croatia(n) 11–2, 20–3, 31–2, 36, 41,

45, 47, 49, 58, 70–1, 82–3, 94, 96, 98, 105, 110–2, 114–5, 118, 160, 161, 165, 178–9, 192, 197–9, 206, 210

Crouch, C. 20–1, 160, 162, 218



226 Index

Crusades 11, 61culture, cultural 1, 2, 8, 10–1, 14, 19,

25, 27, 30, 49, 56–7, 59, 61, 65, 66, 68, 75, 77–9, 84, 87, 93, 106, 121–4, 130, 132, 147, 151–2, 168, 171, 173–5, 180, 186–7, 189, 191, 204–6, 208

Cyprus 11–3, 22–3, 31–2, 36, 39–41, 45, 49, 50, 63, 69–71, 82, 94–8, 102–3, 110–6, 118, 161, 165, 192, 194–8, 205–6, 210

Cyrillic script 69Czech (Republic) 3, 5, 12–4, 20–3,

31, 36, 38–9, 41, 44–5, 49–52, 54, 60–1, 65, 69–72, 76, 94, 96, 98, 102–3, 105, 109–10, 112, 114–5, 118–9, 124, 129, 131, 134–7, 139, 144, 161, 165–6, 178–9, 192, 194, 196, 198, 206, 210, 214, 216–7

Czechoslovakia 3, 6, 60–1, 76, 96, 131, 151, 197–8, 204–5

dance 205Danube, River 9, 200daughter(s) 29, 47, 171, 173death(s) 27, 29, 41, 43, 55, 62,

63, 176rate 40–1, 191, 196, 199

decile (of income distribution) 138–9, 146, 166

democracy, democratic 2, 4, 14–5, 42, 149, 151–4, 158, 182, 184–6, 188, 193

demography, demographic 27–8, 34–5, 40, 46, 55, 57, 67, 178

Denmark, Danish 3, 8, 9, 12, 17, 21, 23, 31, 36, 41, 44–5, 49, 51, 60, 70–1, 73, 85, 94, 98, 103–4, 107–8, 110, 112, 114–5, 118, 124–5, 128, 131, 134–7, 139–42, 161, 165, 178–9, 188, 191, 194, 203, 206, 210, 214, 216–7

dictator(ship) 2, 14, 150, 152, 182, 185–6, 203

diet 32–3, 39, 180–1, 196disease 32, 123, 180‘distressed’ countries 83, 214divorce 48–53, 60Dolnoslaskie 212domestic (services) 37, 39, 92, 101,

174, 183Dutch (see under Netherlands)

earnings 33, 121–5, 127–33, 142, 144, 148, 172 (see also income)

Ebbinghaus, B. 20, 218

economy, economics 1, 2, 4, 10, 14, 19, 25, 27–8, 35, 37–8, 44, 45–6, 54, 56, 59, 60, 68, 87–8, 91–101, 104–5, 107–9, 113, 116, 118–20, 125–6, 128, 130–1, 143–9, 151–2, 154, 156–63, 167–8, 173–4, 176, 178, 180–2, 184–5, 189–91, 194–8, 202–3, 208 (see also sectors, economic)

education 90, 92, 105–6, 116, 121–6, 130–2, 137, 147, 152, 157, 171–81, 183, 189, 205, 208

Egypt 8election(s) 14, 150, 154, 158, 164, 184,

186 (see also vote)electricity 89, 90elementary work(ers) 107–12, 115,

117, 124–6, 129, 138, 146, 176, 217

elite 4, 6, 10, 16, 18, 65, 101, 122–3, 126–7, 144–6, 152–3, 258–9, 159, 167, 172–3, 186, 196–7, 201–2

emigration (see under migration)Emilia-Romagna 212employment 16, 37–8, 47, 52–3, 80, 88,

90, 93–105, 107, 109–12, 116–8, 127–8, 130, 143, 149–51, 158–60, 175, 180, 183, 185, 189, 191, 194, 196, 198–9, 201, 203–6 (see also work)

engineer(ing) 91–2England, English 3, 6, 8, 9, 17, 23,

28, 43, 65, 73–4, 78, 82, 122, 142, 150–1, 154, 172, 182, 191, 197, 201–2

East 212North East 212North West 212South East 212South West 212

Enlightenment 65entertainment 90–2Esping-Andersen, G. 15–20,

154, 218Estonia(n) 10, 12–3, 22–3, 31, 36,

41, 45, 49–52, 55, 69–71, 75, 82, 85, 94, 98, 102–3, 107, 109–10, 112, 114–5, 118, 134–9, 161, 165, 178–80, 192, 199, 206, 210, 214

ethnic(ity) 1, 27, 57–9, 77–9, 81, 85, 86

cleansing 11, 58minority(ies) 46, 57–8, 83, 151

Euro 60Eurobarometer 68, 70–2, 74, 76,

204–5, 207–8, 218–9



Index 227

Europe, potential regions of (see also Anglophone, Nordic)

Central East (CEE) 22–3, 30, 38–40, 44, 52–3, 60, 83, 86–7, 96–8, 102, 104–5, 111, 113, 116, 135–6, 138, 141, 144, 146, 164, 166–7, 176, 180, 186, 190, 192, 196–8

Central and Further Eastern (CFEE) 83–6, 214

ex-Yugoslavia (ex-Y) 22–3, 30, 40, 192

Further East (FEE) 22–3, 30, 39, 40, 49, 50, 83, 86, 93, 96–8, 104, 111, 113, 116–20, 135–6, 138, 144, 146, 164, 176, 180, 192, 196, 198–9, 204

Nordic and North West 83–6, 98, 104, 111, 113, 117–20, 214

North West (NWE) 22–3, 37–40, 67, 69, 98, 116, 120, 131, 135, 138, 146, 167, 176, 190–2, 194–5, 199–201, 203

South-West (SWE) 22–3, 39, 40, 53, 83, 104, 111, 113, 116–9, 125, 135–6, 138, 146, 176, 180, 191–2, 195, 198–9, 201, 203–4

European Commission 20, 28, 180, 219

European Economic Area 42European Economic Community 203Eurostat 26, 28, 40–1, 45, 47, 49, 54,

80, 94, 98, 103, 136, 160, 178, 210, 212, 215, 219

Eurozone 45, 194executives, business 124, 126, 143, 153,

155exclusion 152, 184–5, 189extractive industries 88–91, 95Extremadura 212

factory 93, 125–6, 148–50, 153, 179familism, familist 19family 1, 15, 19, 22, 37, 46–8, 50, 55,

100, 122–3, 127, 131, 137, 143, 171–3, 175, 183, 192, 195–6

Far East 2, 67farmer(s) 155, 171father(s) 37, 171–2, 176–7, 183female 29, 30, 37, 38, 52–3, 100–5,

116–7, 119–20, 128–31, 146, 183–4, 191, 194, 196, 198–9, 201, 203, 210–1, 216–7

Ferrera, M. 19, 219fertility 34–7, 39

total fertility rate (TFR) 35–39, 41, 42, 55

FIFA 10financial services 90–1

Finno-Ugrian 62fishing, fisheries 89, 90Flemish 6fluidity, social 174, 176–7Fodor, É. 38, 219food 29, 80, 89, 180–1

industry 89, 90, 102Foral de Navarra 212 forests, forestry 89, 90Förster, M. 141–2, 144, 219France, French 2–8, 12–3, 19, 21–3,

28, 31–3, 35–7, 41, 44, 46, 49–51, 54, 55, 61, 63–71, 76–7, 79, 80, 82, 84, 87, 94, 97–100, 103, 105, 110, 112, 114–6, 118, 131, 134–5, 137, 139, 140, 142, 149, 160, 161, 164–5, 172, 176–7, 182–3, 188, 192, 194–6, 199–201, 204, 206, 210, 212

Franche-Comté 212Franco-Prussian War 2Friuli-Venezia-Giulia 212fruit 32

Galicia 212galleries, art 205–6gas 10, 89, 90, 194gender 29–31, 53, 58, 80, 100, 113,

118–20, 125, 127–9, 131, 149, 178, 180, 184–5, 187–9, 208

Geneva 64Genoa 99 geography, geographical 1, 5, 7, 8, 9,

10, 12–4, 20, 22, 27, 33, 43, 58, 64–6, 72–3, 77–8, 95–7, 113, 117–8, 180–1, 190–1, 193, 199

Georgia 10, 12, 23, 192German(y) 1–4, 6, 10, 12, 16–20, 22,

23, 28, 31, 33–37, 39, 41, 43–48, 51, 55, 60, 63–74, 78, 80, 83–4, 86–7, 94, 96, 98–100, 102–4, 110–2, 114–9, 124–6, 128, 131, 134–5, 137, 139, 142, 149–52, 154–5, 161, 163–5, 175–7, 182, 187–8, 192, 194, 196, 200–2, 204, 206, 210, 212, 215–7

Democratic Republic 2, 3, 13, 43, 72–3, 104

Federal Republic of 2, 43, 72–3, 104, 200

Giner, S. 1Gini C., Gini coefficient 133–5, 137,

138, 165Glass, C. 38, 219Goths 77Government 1, 7, 28, 34, 37–8, 43, 59,

64, 80, 86, 100, 106, 108, 130–3,



228 Index

145, 149, 152, 154, 156–8, 162, 167–8, 183, 193, 201, 203

Great Britain, British 2, 4, 11, 18, 65, 67, 84, 91, 163, 182, 202–3 (see also under United Kingdom)

Greece, Greek 8, 9, 11–4, 19, 22–3, 31–2, 36–7, 41, 44–5, 49–51, 59, 60, 62–3, 68–72, 76, 78, 83–4, 94, 96–8, 102–3, 105–6, 109–12, 114–6, 118–9, 131, 134–7, 139, 149, 150, 152, 161–2, 165, 182, 186, 188–9, 192, 194–8, 201, 205–6, 210

Greenland 8Grenoble 99Greskovits, B. 21, 218gypsies 78, 87

Habsburg 5, 6, 195, 200Hamburg 73, 99, 212Haute Normandie 212health(y), unhealthy 30, 32, 39, 122–4,

137, 156, 170, 178, 180–1, 196services 29, 39, 40, 46, 90 (see also

under services)Hessen 73, 212heterosexual 52–4Hiekel, N. 50, 219hierarchy, hierarchical 15–6, 108, 111,

123–4, 146–8, 174, 187–9Hindu 68–9Hitler, A. 67Holy Land 61homosexual 47, 50, 52hotel(s) 89, 92, 95household 47–8, 99, 127–31, 133–5,

145, 194, 196, 198–9, 201, 203, 212

Hun(s) 77–8Hungary, Hungarian 5, 12–4, 19–23,

31, 36, 40, 41, 44–5, 50–2, 54–5, 58, 60, 65–6, 69–72, 78, 83, 94, 98, 102–3, 105, 110, 112, 114–5, 117–9, 131, 134–5, 137, 139, 144, 151, 161, 165, 176–9, 192, 197–8, 200, 206, 210, 214

husband 48, 102, 128Hussites 72

Ibanez Garzaràn, Z. L. 37, 219Iceland 8, 9, 12, 21, 23, 26, 28, 31–2,

36, 40, 44–5, 70–1, 76, 85, 134–5, 139, 191, 194, 210, 214

ICTWSS 159–60, 162Identity (ies) 8, 22, 27, 57–87

passim, 122, 151–2, 170, 181, 184–8, 193, 195, 197–8

Île de France 5, 33, 212

Illes Balears 212Immigration (see under migration)inclusion 152, 162, 184–5, 189income 6, 27, 33–4, 53, 56, 99, 100,

106, 109, 121–7, 129–48, 151–3, 155, 157–9, 165–7, 171, 174–6, 179, 180, 186–7, 189, 192, 194, 196, 198, 203, 217

national 7, 12–14, 23–5, 31–3, 35–6, 39, 40, 48, 52–5, 81–2, 86, 96–9, 109, 111, 113, 135–6, 140, 142–3, 145, 190–3, 198–9, 204–6, 212

India(n) 2, 6, 12–3, 31, 50–1, 68, 172, 192

Indonesia 68industry, industrial(ization), industrial-

ized 4, 14–7, 19–21, 30, 43, 74, 80, 88, 96, 98–102, 107, 109, 111, 113, 117–20, 125–7, 129, 144–51, 153–6, 159, 167–9, 172–3, 180–5, 187–91, 195–7, 201–3, 208

inequality (ies) 13, 27, 33, 43, 122–4, 129–38, 140, 143–5, 147–51, 156–9, 165–7, 174–5, 177, 179–80, 185, 190–1, 194, 196, 198, 203

information services 90–3, 95technology 43, 91, 95, 97, 173

intermarriage 58, 78–80International Labour Organization

(ILO) 26, 88–9, 91, 105, 110, 112, 114–5, 219

International Monetary Fund (IMF) 136

investment(s) 130, 132, 143–4, 203Iran 83–4Iraq 44, 83–4Ireland, Irish 2, 6, 8, 9, 11–2, 15,

20, 22–3, 31, 35–7, 40–1, 43–5, 48, 51, 54–5, 61, 65, 67, 69–72, 74, 78, 82–5, 98, 102–4, 107, 110, 112, 114–5, 117–8, 131, 134–40, 160–1, 165, 176–7, 180, 182, 188, 192, 194, 196–7, 201–4, 206, 210, 214

Iron Curtain 83ISIC 89–93, 97, 104, 217Islam(ic) 4, 11, 40, 48, 54, 58–9, 61–3,

66, 68–9, 76, 79, 83, 185, 191–2, 195, 198

Israel 8, 176–7Italy, Italian 3–5, 7, 12–3, 15–17, 19,

22–3, 28, 31–3, 36, 41–2, 44–7, 49, 51, 55, 61, 63–5, 68, 70–2, 79, 83–6, 94, 98, 100, 102–3, 105, 109–12, 114–5, 119, 122, 131, 133–42, 160–1, 165, 176, 178–9, 182–3, 186, 191–2, 194–7, 204, 207, 210, 212, 214



Index 229

Japan 12–3, 25–7, 30–2, 34, 36, 39, 49–51, 54–5, 68, 74–5, 82, 93, 94, 96–8, 103, 134–6, 138–41, 144, 161, 163, 165–7, 190–1, 203–4, 210

Jew(s), Jewish 18, 48, 62, 65–7, 69, 75, 78, 79, 86–7, 148

Judaism 62, 66

Kalmijn, M. 52–3, 220Kazakhstan 10Keynesian 158Kiernan, K. 50, 220Kiev 59king(s) 3, 17, 33, 63, 79, 148, 201–2Kitschelt, H. 188, 220Klammer, U. 37, 218, 220Knegt, R. 149, 220Kocka, J. 149, 220Kohl, H. 20, 220Kristensen, P. H. 107, 220Kujawsko-Pomorskie 212

labour 42, 67, 83, 143, 148–9, 201, 203 (see also work)

camp 67force 37–8, 55, 100–2, 104, 116,

119–20, 127–8, 130, 176, 179, 183, 210

law 149market 147, 168–70, 176movement 167, 181, 195, 196policy 20shortages 67, 80, 101, 119, 158

Labour party (ies) 159, 169, 181Land, Länder 28, 72–3, 99, 104, 212landlord 202language 5, 22, 61, 78, 82, 84,

151, 193Languedoc-Rousillon 212Latin America 26, 29, 39, 67, 68, 85,

191Latvia(n) 7, 10, 12, 22–3, 31, 36, 40,

41, 45, 49, 55, 69–71, 74, 76, 82, 85, 94, 98, 110–2, 114–6, 136, 161, 165, 192, 194, 199, 207, 210, 214

law 1, 5, 7, 48, 52, 148, 149, 162, 171, 172, 201–2

lay, laïque 19, 200Lazio 33, 99, 212Lebanon 8legislation 149–50, 156Leonardi, L. xv, 7, 220liberal 15, 17–8, 151–2, 181, 183–4,

189, 202libraries 205–6, 208Liefbroer, A. C. 50, 219

Life 3, 15–6, 27, 29, 30, 34, 37–8, 41–4, 50, 54, 77–8, 89, 106, 122–4, 147, 170–2, 182–3, 186, 197, 201–3

chances 33, 122–4, 127, 154, 168, 174

expectancy 30–3, 35, 39, 40, 178–9, 191, 196, 198–9, 204, 212

style, 122–4, 127, 146–7, 151, 171, 174, 180–1, 186

Liguria 99, 212Limousin 212Lipset, S. M. 154, 218Lithuania 10, 12–3, 22–3, 31, 36, 40–1,

45, 49, 50, 55, 65, 69–71, 94, 98, 109–12, 114–5, 136, 161, 165, 192, 199, 207, 210, 214

Llena-Nozal, A. 141–2, 144, 219Lódzkie 212logistics 97, 126Lombardia 212London 33, 74, 99, 212longevity 30, 32–3, 35, 39, 40, 42, 55,

178, 180, 191Looman, C. W. N. 32, 220Lorraine 2, 212Lotz, M. 107, 220Lubelskie 212Lubuskie 212Luijkx, R. 175, 218Lukes, S. 156, 220Luther, Lutheran 17, 49, 64–5, 181,

182, 195–6, 200Luxembourg 6, 12–3, 22, 31–2, 35–6,

41, 44–6, 48, 51, 54, 70–1, 81, 94–8, 102–4, 107–17, 119, 134–5, 137, 139, 161, 163, 165, 182, 192, 196, 200, 201, 203, 210

Lyon 99

Macau 13Macedonia 7, 22–3, 26, 31, 36, 45, 58,

69, 95–8, 160, 192, 210Mackenbach, J. P. 32, 180, 220Madrid 33, 99, 212Male 19, 29, 30, 41, 100–1, 117, 127–

9, 131, 133, 146, 149, 169, 179–81, 184, 211, 216, 217

Malopolskie 212Malta 12, 13, 22–3, 31–2, 36, 41, 44–6,

49, 70–1, 94–5, 98, 110–7, 161, 165, 192, 194–6, 207, 210

man, men 19, 29, 30, 32, 35, 48, 57, 80, 100, 101, 116, 122, 127, 128, 130–1, 150, 155, 171, 176–81, 183–4, 188, 201, 208

management, manager, managerial 6, 89, 90, 102, 106–8, 110–2, 114, 116–7, 121, 124–6, 128–9, 138,



230 Index

143–6, 148–50, 153, 155, 157–9, 164, 167–8, 187–9, 191, 196, 199, 201, 203, 216

manufacturing 14, 38, 80, 88–90, 92–3, 96, 98–101, 105, 117, 119, 169, 173, 180–1, 188, 194, 196, 198

Marche, Le 212marriage, married, 19, 27, 37, 46–55,

72, 77, 79, 101, 128, 130, 191, 194, 196, 199

rate 50–3, Marx, K., Marxism(t) 155, 160–1Mary, mother of God 183 material production 89, 90, 96, 98,

109, 116, 118services 89, 95–6, 98

Mau, S. 7, 220Mazowieckie 33, 212McDonald’s 7Meardi, G. 164, 220meat 32Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 73, 212medieval 4, 61, 64, 72, 200Mediterranean 8, 9, 44, 61, 62

diet 32–3, 180, 196Méditerranée 212Melanesia 68Methodist 66, 74Middle Ages 202Middle East 9, 68, 185Midi-Pyrenées 212Midlands (English)

East 212West 212

migration, migrants 40, 42, 56–7, 84–5, 87, 210

emigration 35, 43–6, 85, 143, 214immigration, immigrants 24, 27, 35,

40, 43–6, 67–9, 77, 79–86, 189, 193, 214

military 4, 10–1, 22, 58, 59, 61mobility, social 171, 173, 176–7Moldova 7, 10, 12–3, 22–3, 31, 36, 40,

54, 60, 69, 83, 95, 96, 98, 144, 159, 192, 199, 210

Molise 212monarch(y) (ies) 4, 17, 66, 74, 171–2Montenegro 7, 22–3, 26, 31, 36, 45,

58, 69, 95–8, 160, 192, 210Montenegro, C. E. 160, 221Moravia, 60–1Morocco 83–5, 214mortality 29, 32, 34, 180Moscow 1mother, motherhood 19, 37–9, 46, 48,

101–2, 171, 183Münster 3, 65

Murcia 212museum 205–6music(ians) 57, 80, 121–2, 171Muslim 8, 62, 68–9, 71, 73–5, 78, 81,

85, 87

Nafilyan, V. 141–2, 144, 219Naldini, M. 19, 220Napoleon(ic) 4, 6, 65, 172 (see also

Bonaparte)nation(s), national(ist), nationality 1,

4–8, 10, 12–4, 23, 25–6, 28, 30–2, 35–6, 39, 40, 42–3, 48, 54–61, 63, 67, 74, 78–9, 81–2, 86, 88, 91, 97–8, 104–6, 109, 111, 113, 118, 125, 129, 132, 135–6, 140, 142–5, 149, 153, 158, 168, 176, 183, 185, 189–95, 197–200, 204–6, 210, 217

Nazi(sm) 59, 66, 75, 86, 150Near East 2, 8Netherlands, Dutch 2, 4–6, 8, 12, 17,

19, 22–3, 28, 31, 35–7, 41, 44–5, 51, 65–72, 74, 80, 85–6, 94, 96–8, 102–5, 109, 110, 112, 114–8, 131, 134–5, 137, 139–40, 161, 163, 165, 176–7, 181–2, 188, 192, 194, 200, 202, 207, 210, 214

New Zealand 15, 18, 22, 192Niedersachsen 73, 212Nigeria 31, 215Nomenclature of Territorial Units for

Statistics ( NUTS) 28, 99non-believer(s) 75–6Nord Pas de Calais 212Norden, Nordic 3, 15, 17–23, 35, 38,

48–50, 52, 54–5, 65, 69, 83, 98, 105, 109, 113, 116, 120, 131, 136, 138, 140–1, 146, 160, 163–4, 178, 180, 182, 190–1, 193–7, 199–201, 203–4

Nordrhein-Westfalen 28, 73, 212North America 25, 29, 39, 202North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) 10, 194Northern Ireland 6, 11, 61, 74, 182,

212Norway, Norwegian 3, 7–9, 12–3, 21,

23, 26, 31–2, 36, 44–5, 49, 51, 54, 69–71, 78, 85, 94, 98, 103, 105, 107, 109–10, 112, 114–5, 118, 131, 134–7, 139–42, 161, 165, 176, 178–9, 188, 191, 194–6, 203, 210, 214

occupation(s) 27, 66, 105–13, 117, 121–5, 127–30, 132–4, 137, 143, 147–8, 151, 153–8, 171–4, 176, 180, 185, 187–9, 199, 205, 208, 216–7 (see also work)



Index 231

mobility 176–7occupationally based welfare state 16,

22, 192occupation, military 85Oceania 29, 39Oesch, D. 187–8, 221opera 122, 205operators, plant and machinery 108,

217Opolskie 212organization(s), organizational 15,

21, 91–3, 106, 124, 146–8, 154–6, 159, 161–2, 167–70, 176, 181, 185, 187–90

international 10–1, 26, 50, 84, 131, 133–4

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 26, 50–2, 103, 131, 134–9, 141, 144–5, 157, 160, 165–6, 178, 219, 221

Orthodox (Church) 4, 11, 19, 37, 49, 50, 52–3, 58–9, 62–3, 66–7, 69, 70, 72, 74–6, 85, 182, 190, 192, 195, 197–9, 208

Osnabrück 3, 65Ost, D. 164, 221Ottoman (Empire) 4, 9, 11, 20, 58, 63,

66, 69, 78, 192, 195, 197–9

País Vasco 212 (see also Basque)Pakistan 68Palier, B. 16, 149, 221papacy, pope 4, 62–4, 148, 200parents 34, 46, 78, 121, 123, 130, 132,

137, 171, 173–4, 177Paris 5, 33, 99, 212Paris School of Economics 140part-time (see under workers)party(ies) (political) 15–6, 20, 57, 66,

149–50, 154, 159, 161, 167, 169, 176, 181–6, 188, 195–7

Passeron, J. C. 171, 218Pay de la Loire 212peasant(ry) 144, 148, 183pension(s), pensioners 39, 121, 132,

135, 164Picardie 212Piemonte 212Piketty, T. 121, 140, 142–3, 153, 158,

221Platzner, H.-W. 20, 220Podkarpackie 212Podlaskie 212Poitou-Charentes 212Poland, Polish 1, 2, 12–4, 20–3, 28,

31, 33, 36, 38, 41, 45, 49, 51, 54–5, 60–1, 65–72, 76, 84, 94, 96, 98–9,

102–3, 105, 110, 112, 114–5, 117, 124–6, 129, 131, 134–5, 137–9, 144, 161, 163, 165, 176–9, 192, 197–200, 207, 210, 212–3, 215–7

police, policing 92, 132, 137policy 4, 19, 20, 150, 175 (social 16,

19–21, 38, 55, 102, 130, 150, 158 (see also social policy)

politics 1, 2, 28, 124, 150, 153, 181, 185, 195

politique sociale 150Pomorskie 212poor 48, 60, 68, 81, 93, 99, 121–4,

126, 132–3, 146, 180, 182 (see also poverty)

countries 13, 15, 26, 29, 30, 32–7, 39, 43, 46, 67, 82, 85, 93, 111, 135, 138, 191–2, 194, 199, 203

Poortman, A.-R. 50, 219pope (see papacy)population 3–6, 8, 10–1, 17, 24, 27–30,

34–5, 39–46, 58–61, 63, 65–70, 73–5, 77–9, 81–7, 102–4, 131, 141, 143–5, 148, 153, 157, 161, 181, 186, 194, 196, 204, 208, 210, 214

Portugal, Portuguese 2, 8, 11–4, 19, 22–3, 31, 36, 41, 45, 50–1, 62, 64, 70–2, 79, 80, 83–4, 86, 94, 96–8, 103, 105, 110–2, 114–5, 117–8, 131, 134–42, 150, 161, 165, 172, 178–9, 182, 186, 188, 192, 194–6, 203, 205, 207, 210, 215

post-industrial(ism) 14, 98, 100, 113, 119–20, 126, 148, 151, 167, 169, 173, 183, 184, 187–9, 195, 197, 208

poverty 12–3, 33, 43, 93, 149 (see also poor)

power 3, 5, 11, 16–8, 20, 22–3, 25, 37, 38, 57–67, 78, 86, 106, 123–5, 143, 149, 152–65, 167, 170–1, 183–5, 195, 197

precariat 126, 146, 151, 171Presbyterian 66profession(al) 66, 90–1, 106–12, 114,

116–7, 119, 122, 124–5, 127–8, 138, 144–6, 155, 157, 168, 171–2, 187–9, 191, 196, 199, 201, 203–6, 208, 216

proletarian 127, 183property 16–7, 48, 97, 121, 130, 132,

144, 149–50, 155, 169Protestant 3, 15, 17–8, 37, 49, 50, 52,

53, 64–7, 69, 70, 72–5, 77, 82, 87, 181, 182, 190–1, 193, 197, 199, 200, 202, 208

Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 212



232 Index

Prussia(n) 2, 18, 20, 67, 149, 197Puglia 212purchasing power (parities) 12–3, 33,

81Pyrenees 9, 13, 83, 212

Qatar 13queens 17question sociale 149–50

radio 204railway 4Reagan, R. 158real estate (services) 90–1, 121Rechtsprechung 202recreation 90, 92redistribution 132, 136, 157, 189refugee(s) 43–4, 46, 68, 80, 83, 85–6,

185region(al) 2, 3, 7, 11, 14, 20, 22–3, 28,

33, 52–3, 55, 58–60, 82–4, 95, 99, 100, 107, 109, 116–7, 119, 135–6, 176, 180, 182, 190, 192, 193, 195–9, 201, 204, 208, 212–5 (sub-region 12, 14, 16, 23, 33, 38, 191, 201, 203–5)

world 1, 6, 8, 12, 26, 29, 30, 32, 39, 44, 55, 64, 82, 136

Rehm, P. 188, 220rentier 143, 153representation, worker 162restaurant(s) 89, 92–3, 95revolution 161

French 4, 65–7, 77, 172, 182, 200industrial 172, 202, 208Russian 21, 67, 194, 197

Rheinland-Pfalz 73, 212Rhône-Alpes 212rich 99, 100, 121, 123, 132–3, 143,

145, 153, 155, 168, 171, 173, 180, 182 (see also wealth(y))

countries 12–3, 23, 26, 30, 33–5, 43, 46, 191, 203–4

Rioja, La 212road 4, 30Rocha, R. 107, 220Rodríguez Menés, J. 187, 221Roman empire (including Holy Roman

empire) 3–5, 42, 62–4, 77, 200Romania 11–2, 21–3, 31, 36, 41, 45,

69–72, 93–4, 96–8, 102–3, 105, 107, 110–5, 117–8, 131, 136, 144, 161, 163, 165, 178–9, 191–2, 194, 196, 198–9, 204, 207, 210, 215

Rome 3, 33, 62–4, 99Rugby football (see under football)Russia(n) 1, 2, 4–6, 9, 11–5, 20–2,

25–7, 30–2, 36, 39, 40, 49–52, 54,

55, 59, 60, 63, 66–9, 74–5, 78, 83, 85, 93, 95–8, 100, 102–3, 119, 131, 134–6, 138–9, 144–6, 151, 160–1, 165–7, 190–2, 194, 197–8, 203–4, 210, 214

Saarland 73, 99, 212Sachsen 73, 212Sachsen-Anhalt 73, 212Sahara (Desert) 2, 8, 12–3sales (workers) 6, 89, 91, 108, 110–2,

115, 117–8, 126, 128–9, 132, 146, 216

Sami 78Sardegna 212Saudi Arabia 31Saxonberg, S. 38, 221Scandinavia(n) 3, 8, 16–7, 20, 22, 37,

46, 62, 65, 68, 74, 79, 97, 135, 176Schleswig-Holstein 73, 104, 212Schmidt, V. 20–1, 221Schneider, F. 160, 221school 40, 93, 101, 122–3, 127, 173, 174science, scientific 32, 68, 77, 88, 90–1Scotland, Scottish 1, 6, 33, 43, 61, 65,

74, 182, 201, 212Scott, J. 188, 221sectors, economic 14, 43, 80, 88–102,

104–5, 107, 116–9, 144, 145, 150, 156, 157, 160, 175, 183, 185, 187–91, 194, 198 (see also under individual sectors)

secular, secularism, secularist, seculariza-tion 3, 17, 19, 37, 38, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 72, 76–7, 79, 86, 175, 182–3, 190–1, 193, 195–6, 200

self-employment, self-employed 149, 150, 159–61, 187–8

Serbia 7, 12, 22–3, 26, 31, 36, 40, 44, 58, 69, 192, 210

services (sectors) 14, 25, 37, 38, 80, 88–93, 119, 120, 150, 183, 185, 198

business (including financial) 90–2, 97, 118, 145, 157, 187, 191, 198, 201, 203

citizenship (including public) 90, 92, 95, 98, 100, 104, 116, 118–9, 132–3, 136–8, 158, 184, 188, 201, 203

health (and care) 29, 39, 40, 46–7, 80, 92

material 89, 90, 95–6 personal 80, 89, 90, 92, 95transport 91workers 108, 126, 128–9, 146, 159,

187, 216services, religious 24, 26, 66, 75–6, 79sexual relations 47 (partnership,

union) 27, 48, 50, 55, 78–9



Index 233

shadow economy 146, 159–61shareholders 144Shinto 75shop(s) 6, 89, Siberia 2Sicilia 212Sierra Leone 30–1Sikhs 68Sinzheimer, H. 149, 221skill(ed) 4, 42, 105–13, 115, 117–20,

124–6, 129, 146, 155, 157, 168, 171–5, 183, 186–7, 194, 201, 203, 216

semi- 109, 118, 125–6, 129, 146, 168

Slaskie 212Slav 2, 62Slovak Republic, Slovakia 3, 5, 7, 12–4,

20–3, 31, 36, 41, 44–5, 49–52, 55, 60–1, 65, 70–72, 76, 94, 96, 98, 102–3, 105, 108–10, 112, 114–5, 117–9, 131, 134–7, 139, 144, 161, 165–6, 178–80, 192, 194, 196, 198, 207, 210, 215

Slovenia 11–4, 20–3, 30–2, 36, 41, 44–5, 49–51, 54–5, 58, 70–1, 83, 85, 94, 98, 102–3, 105, 109–10, 112, 114–5, 117, 131, 134–5, 137, 139, 144, 161, 165–6, 178–9, 192, 194, 196–9, 204, 207, 210, 215

social democracy, social democratic 15, 154, 159, 169, 175, 181, 188, 195, 198

social policy 4, 16, 19–21, 38, 55, 102, 130, 150, 158

social support 16, 19socialism, socialist 15, 17, 18, 22, 38,

43–4, 48, 54–5, 58–9, 69, 72–3, 97, 100–4, 117, 144, 149, 159, 169, 177, 181–3, 186, 188, 192, 197–8

sociology 5, 7, 14–5, 25–6, 153, 155, 171, 208

Solidarnosc 38, 163Somalia 83–4son(s) 29, 47, 171South Africa 31, 51Soviet Union 2, 10, 13–4, 20–1, 30, 38,

55, 59, 67–8, 72, 77, 82–3, 85–6, 117, 119, 144, 146, 150–1, 194, 197–200

Soziale Frage 149Sozialpolitik 150Spain, Spanish 19, 28, 41, 45, 49, 51,

55, 64, 68, 76, 78, 80, 83, 94, 105, 131, 150, 161, 165, 176, 182, 203, 207, 210, 212, 215

Spanish Netherlands 6sport(ing) 10, 27, 30, 57, 122, 204,

205, 208

St Petersburg 2Stand 151Standing. G. 126, 151, 221state 1–7, 10–1, 14–5, 17–9, 21–2, 26,

28, 38, 40–7, 49–51, 55, 57–61, 64, 66–9, 72, 74–6, 78, 81–3, 86, 96–7, 103, 107, 134–7, 139, 144, 148–9, 150, 157, 161, 168, 175, 180, 196, 199, 200, 202–6, 208

welfare 18–22, 34, 42, 47, 121, 128, 149, 158, 183, 191–2, 195

Statistisches Bundesamt 73, 104, 217, 222status, social 16, 57, 118, 147–9, 151,

154–5, 175, 178stratification, social 147, 154suffrage 149, 150, 152Sweden, Swedish 3, 12, 21, 23, 31–2,

36, 41, 44–5, 47, 49, 51, 54, 60, 67, 69–71, 76, 78, 83–5, 94, 97–8, 102–4, 107–8, 110, 112, 114–5, 118, 131, 134, 137, 139–42, 161, 165, 175–9, 187–8, 191, 194, 199, 205, 207, 210, 215

Swietokrzyskie 212Switzerland (Swiss) 2, 4, 6, 7, 12, 17,

19, 22, 26, 31–2, 35–6, 44–6, 49, 51, 65, 67, 69–71, 74, 76, 84, 94, 97–8, 102–4, 107, 110, 112, 114–8, 124–5, 129, 131, 134–5, 139–41, 161, 165, 181–2, 185, 187–8, 191–2, 196, 200, 202–3, 210, 215–7

Syria 8, 44, 83Szelewa, D. 38, 221

tax, taxation 3, 6, 66, 72–3, 129–40, 142, 145, 152–3, 156–9, 165–7, 176

technical, technician(s) 90–1, 108–12, 114, 116–8, 124–8, 146, 152, 155, 187–8, 216

technology 91, 157, 173biotechnology 68information 43, 91, 95, 97

television 121, 204textile industry 100–1Thatcher, M. 158theatre 205–6, 208third world 7, 68Thirty Years War 3, 65Thrace 8Thüringen 73, 212tobacco 32, 156Toscana 212total fertility rate (TFR) (see under

fertility)trade 2, 89, 90, 93, 157, 173, 202trade union(s) 15, 18, 38, 100, 149–50,

154, 157, 159–69, 175, 181, 183, 188, 191, 194, 196, 199, 201, 203



234 Index

training, vocational 106, 172–5transfers (financial) 60, 128, 130,

133–5, 137–40, 142, 166transport 3, 42, 77, 89–91, 96, 126,

132, 137Trentino 212Turkey 4, 7–9, 11–4, 23, 26, 30–1, 36,

39, 40, 42, 44–5, 47–9, 54, 58, 62, 68–71, 76, 80, 83–5, 104, 134–6, 138–9, 160–1, 163, 165–7, 178–9, 190–1, 203, 210, 214

Turkic 42

Ukraine, Ukrainian 6, 7, 10, 12, 22–3, 31, 36, 40, 59, 60, 66, 69, 83, 86, 95–6, 131, 144, 159, 192, 199, 210

Umbria 212unemployment pay 47, 135United Kingdom (UK) 6, 7, 11–2,

15–18, 20, 22–3, 28, 31–3, 35–7, 41, 43–5, 51, 60–1, 66–71, 73–4, 76, 79, 80–6, 94, 96–9, 103, 105, 107, 109–10, 112, 114–8, 122, 124–6, 129, 131, 134–40, 142, 145, 150, 158, 161, 164–6, 175–7, 180, 182, 187–8, 191–2, 194, 196, 201–4, 207, 210, 212–3, 215–6

United Nations (UN) 10, 26, 29, 35–6, 39, 81, 88–9, 105–6, 222

Population Division 36, 39, 222United States 2, 11, 13, 15–6, 18, 22,

26–7, 29–32, 35, 37, 39, 49, 50–2, 54–5, 57–8, 67–8, 74, 82, 86, 93, 100–2, 131, 136, 138, 140–6, 150, 152, 158, 160, 166–8, 183, 190–2, 195, 200, 202–3, 215

Ural Mountains 9, 23

Valencia 212Valle d’Aosta 212Van Bavel, J. 131, 222vegetables 32, 180Verweibe, R. 7, 220Vienna 64, 200violence 11, 59, 61, 64, 68, 74, 77, 150Visegrád (group) 14, 21, 198Visigoths 77Visser, J. 20, 218Volga (River) 9, 10vote(rs), voting 152–3, 159, 164, 181–

6, 188 (see also election(s))

Wales 6, 74, 122, 212war(fare) 2, 4–6, 14, 17, 23, 29, 41–2,

44, 54, 57–9, 63, 65, 68, 77, 79, 80, 83, 86, 143, 158, 172, 182, 185,

192, 198–200 (see also Thirty Years War World Wars I and II)

Warminsko-Mazurskie 212Warsaw 33, 99water 9, 89, 90, 170wealth(y) 15, 17, 34, 93, 99, 100, 121,

123, 130, 132, 137–8, 140, 142–6, 148, 151–3, 155, 157–8, 165, 167–9, 171–3, 180–1, 186, 189 (see also rich)

national 12–3, 15, 23, 29, 30, 32, 34–5, 37–9, 43, 46, 48, 52, 68, 82, 85, 92, 97, 113, 116–8, 120, 135, 190–1, 194

Weber, M. 15, 122, 147–8, 151, 154–5, 159, 167, 238

welfare state (see under state)Westphalia, Treaty of 3Wiedemeyer, M. 37, 218Wielkopolskie 212wife, wives 19, 48, 80, 100, 128, 149,

171housewives 102

Winkler, H. A. 64, 222woman, women 19, 29, 30, 34–5, 37–9,

47–8, 53–5, 58, 80, 100–2, 104, 114–9, 127–31, 146, 148, 152, 155, 171, 176–81, 183–5, 187–9, 191, 194–6, 199, 208

work 6, 15–6, 19, 27, 30, 33, 37–9, 44, 48, 53, 55–6, 80, 84, 87, 88–120 passim, 121–9, 130, 143, 145–6, 148, 157, 167, 173, 175, 179–181, 183–4, 187–9 (see also labour, occupations, self-employment, skill; and under class, working)

workers, workforce 4, 6, 7, 15–7, 42, 92, 93, 96, 100–1, 107–9, 111, 113, 116–9, 124–6, 138, 146, 149–51, 155, 159, 160, 162, 169, 171, 173, 181–9, 194–5, 198, 201, 203, 205–6, 217 (see also clerical, craft, elementary, sales, services)

manual 15, 107, 110–2, 115, 117–9, 124–6, 149–50, 155, 159, 169, 173, 181–4, 186–9, 195

non-manual 107, 119, 124, 148, 150, 181, 183, 186–7, 189

part-time 37, 55, 127–8workplace 38, 102, 121, 123, 125works council 162–4World Bank 13, 26, 40, 104, 160, 210, 222World Health Organization (WHO) 31,

210, 222World War I 2, 11, 21, 41, 58, 61, 78,

101, 143, 195, 200



Index 235

World War II 14, 18, 20–1, 40, 54, 58, 60, 75, 80, 101, 153, 158, 180, 185, 192, 200

World Wealth and Income Database 140, 222

Wschodni 99

Xenophobia(ic) 185–6

Yalta Conference 150Yorkshire 1; and Humber 212

youth 175, 184Yugoslavia 6, 7, 11, 13–4, 21–3, 32,

39, 49, 50, 58–60, 69, 82–6, 104, 144, 150, 192, 197–99 (see also ex-Yugoslavia under Europe)

Zachodniopomorskie 212zero-hours contracts 126



9781137277800 01 prexviii...occupations, income and social class 124 income inequality, taxation,...

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