STUDY GUIDE CP | Claire Ma | University of Pennsylvania (2019 COMPS) | ** DO NOT CITE **

Comparative Politics

Table of Contents1. Overview: Time, Space, and Comparative Politics8• Gerardo Munck and Richard Snyder, “Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics,” Comparative Political Studies 40, 1 (January 2007): 5-31 plus 45-47 [rejoinder to Mahoney]8• James Mahoney, “Debating the State of Comparative Politics (Comment on Munck & Snyder),” Comparative Political Studies 40, 1 (January 2007): 32-36.8• Lichbach & Zuckerman, “Paradigms and Pragmatism” (L&Z, ch 1 – skim summaries of other chaps)82. The Anticipation of Comparative Analysis in the 19th Century9[HISTORY AS STAGES: ADAM SMITH, KARL MARX]9• Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (excerpts) from M. Cohen and N. Fermon, eds. Princeton Readings in Political Thought (Princeton University Press, 1996), 314-3349• Karl Marx, extracts from Communist Manifesto; Wage Labour and Capital; and Capital, Vol I in Robert Tucker, ed. The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: Norton, 1978), 473-500, 203-217, 403-4179[EVOLUTIONARY FUNCTIONALISM: HERBERT SPENCER, EMILE DURKHEIM]9• Herbert Spencer – as discussed in Jerzy Szacki, “The Evolutionist Sociology,” in History of Sociological Thought (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1979), 206-229.9• Emile Durkheim – chapters discussing The Division of Labor in Society and Suicide in Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life and His Work (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 147-178, 191-2259[A WEBERIAN SYNTHESIS?]9• Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1, ed. Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978): xxxxiii-xl (G. Roth: Introduction); 19-28 (social action); 212-231, 241-245 (ideal types of authority)9• Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribner’s, 1958), 13-31, 155-1819>> RECOMMENDED (overview)10- Rudra Sil, “The Classical Predecessors of Contemporary Social Theory” (ms – for course use only)103. Universalist Grand Theory: The Case of the ‘Modernization Paradigm’11[FROM EUROPEAN SOCIAL THEORY TO AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE]11• Andrew Janos, Politics and Paradigms (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 36-6411• Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (1951), 76-9111[CORE EXAMPLES OF MODERNIZATION THEORY]11• Alex Inkeles and David Smith, Becoming Modern (Harvard University Press, 1974), 154-17511• Gabriel Almond, “A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics,” in Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 3-2511• Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 1-1511• Karl Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Participation,” in J. Finkle and R. Gable, eds. Political Development and Social Change (New York: Wiley, 1966 ) 384-40511[TENSIONS WITHIN THE PARADIGM?]11• Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 32-9211• Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1966), xi-xviii11• Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 5-3012>> RECOMMENDED (critical commentaries)12- Rudra Sil, “Order and Change in Comparative Social Theory” (manuscript – for course use only)12- Reinhard Bendix, “Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 9, 3 (April 1967): 292-346, esp. 313-346124. Recognizing Variation: From ‘Backwardness’ to the World-System and the State13[THE IDEA OF RELATIVE BACKWARDNESS]13• Paul Baran, “On the Political Economy of Backwardness,” The Manchester School (1952): 66-8413• Reinhard Bendix, “Relative Backwardness and Intellectual Mobilization,” from Bendix, Unsettled Affinities, ed. J. Bendix (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1993), 85-102.13[DEPENDENCY AND THE WORLD-SYSTEM]13• Andre Gunder Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment” in Charles Wilber, ed. The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (New York: Random House, 1984), 99-108 [reprinted from Monthly Review, 18, 4 (1966): 17-31].13• Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16, 4 (1974): 387-41513[BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN]13• Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol, eds. Bringing the State Back In (1985), 1-28.13• Eric Nordlinger, “Taking the State Seriously.” in Samuel Huntington and Myron Weiner, eds. Understanding Political Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 353-39013[PROGRESS OR REINVENTING THE WHEEL?]14• Gabriel Almond, “The Return of the State,” American Political Science Review 82, 3 (1988): 853-87414• Eric Nordlinger, Response to “The Return to the State” APSR 82, 3 (1988): 875-88514• Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics,” American Political Science Review 85, 1 (March 1991): 77-96145. The Return of Universalism After the Cold War? Post-Industrialism to Globalization15[OVERVIEW]15• Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest (Summer 1989), 1-1815• Etel Solingen, “The Global Context of Comparative Politics” (L&Z, ch 9)15[POST-INDUSTRIALISM AS PRECURSOR TO GLOBALIZATION?]15• Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 3-4515• Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization (Princeton University Press, 1997), 67-107 .15• Terry N. Clark and Seymour M. Lipset, “Are Social Classes Dying?” versus Mike Hout, Clem Brooks, and Jeff Manza, “The Persistence of Class in Post-Industrial Societies,” in Clark and Lipset, eds. The Breakdown of Class Politics (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 39-72.15[GLOBALIZATION & ITS HOMOGENIZING EFFECTS]15• Susan Strange, “The Defective State,” Daedalus 124, 2 (Spring 1995): 55-7415• Philip Cerny, “Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action,” International Organization 49 (1995): 595-62515[THE SURVIVAL OF STATES and VARIATION – and COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS!]16• Peter Evans, “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in the Era of Globalization,” World Politics 50 (1997): 62-87.16• Linda Weiss, “Globalization and State Power,” Development and Society 29, 1 (2000): 1-15.166. Navigating Foundational Divides: Agency/Choice – Institutions/Structures - Ideas/Identities17[OVERVIEW]17• Mark Lichbach, “Thinking and Working in the Midst of Things” (L&Z, ch 2 – esp. pp. 56-71)17[RATIONAL-CHOICE]17• George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 18-4717[CONTEMPORARY STRUCTURALISM / HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM]17• Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 1999 (2): 369-404.17[SOCIAL / CULTURAL ANALYSIS]17• Lisa Wedeen, “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science,” American Political Science Review 96, 4 (December 2002): 713-72817[INTEGRATIVE MOVES?]17• Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1995): 936-957.17• Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action Theory,” in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds. Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford University Press, 2012), 186-208.18• Rudra Sil, “The Foundations of Eclecticism: The Epistemological Status of Agency, Structure, and Culture in Social Theory,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12, 3 (2000): 353-387.18[THE COMPARATIVE METHOD – A CLASSIC VIEW]19• Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 65 (1971): 682-69319[UNIFIED METHODOLOGY, TWO CULTURES, OR HETEROGENEITY WITH TRADE-OFFS?]19• Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba (KKV), Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), ch 1,19• David Collier, James Mahoney, and Jason Seawright, “Claiming Too Much: Warnings About Selection Bias,” in Brady & Collier eds. Rethinking Social Inquiry (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 85-10219• James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, “A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research,” Political Analysis 14 (2006): 227-249.19• Debate Over "Two Cultures": Henry Brady, "Do Two Cultures Imply Two Scientific Paradigms?" Colin Elman, "Duck Rabbits in Social Analysis," and Goertz and Mahoney, "Reply to Brady and Elman," all in Comparative Political Studies (published online Nov 30 -Dec 6, 2012).19• Ed Schatz, “Ethnographic Immersion and the Study of Politics,” in Schatz, ed. Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power ( University of Chicago Press, 2009).20[IS MULTI-METHOD RESEARCH THE PROMISED LAND?]20• Evan Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy in Comparative Politics”, American Political Science Review 99, 3 (2005): 435-452.20• Ariel Ahram, “Concepts and Measurement in Multimethod Research,” Political Research Quarterly 20, 10 (2011): 1-12.20• Amel Ahmed and Rudra Sil, “When Multi-Method Research Subverts Methodological Pluralism – Or, Why We Still Need Single Method Research,” Perspectives on Politics 10, 4 (2012): 935-953.20• Rudra Sil, “The Division of Labor in Social Science Research: Unified Methodology or ‘Organic Solidarity’?” Polity 32, 4 (Summer 2000): 499-531.20>> RECOMMENDED218. Political Community I: Nations, National Identity, Ethnic Divisions22[CLASSIC VIEWS OF NATION AS LINKED TO MODERNIZATION, MODERN STATES]22• Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 39-6222• Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States"22• Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983), 11-4922[CONCEPTUALIZING IDENTITY]22• Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (New York: Penguin, 1991), 15-4222• Walker Connor, “A Nation is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a …?” from Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 90-117.22• Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity, Race and Nationalism,” Annual Review of Sociology 35 (2009): 21-42.22• Asutosh Varshney, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict,” in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds. Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford University Press, 2012), 274-298.23[CONTENDING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES]23• David Laitin, Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba (University of Chicago Press, 1986), 136-169.23• James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, 1 (February 2003): 75-9023• Anthony Marx, “The Nation-State and Its Exclusions,” Political Science Quarterly 117, 1 (2002): 103- 126.23• Evan S. Lieberman and Gwyneth H. McClendon, “The Ethnicity–Policy Preference Link in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Comparative Political Studies (published online, October 29, 2012): 1-29.239. Political Community II: State-Formation and State-Society Relations24[THE STATE AS AN OBJECT OF ANALYSIS: OVERVIEW]24• Joel Migdal, “Researching the State” (L&Z, ch 7).24• John Campbell, “States, Politics and Globalization: Why States Still Matter,” in J. Hall, J. Ikenberry and T. V. Paul, eds. The Nation-State in Question (Princeton University Press, 2003), 234-259.24[STATE FORMATION IN THE WEST]24• Charles Tilly, “War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-18724• Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 1-9, 38-4724• Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton University Press, 1994), 153-18024• Saylor, Ryan, and Nicholas C. Wheeler. 2017. “Paying for War and Building States.” World Politics 69 (02): 366–408. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887116000319.24• Nicholas Wheeler, “The Noble Enterprise of State-Building: Reconsidering the Rise and Fall of the Modern State in Prussia and Poland,” Comparative Politics (October 2011): 21-3825[STATE FORMATION ELSEWHERE]25• Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 3-4125• Crawford Young, “The Nature and Genesis of the Colonial State,” in Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 43-7625• Jeffrey Herbst, “States and War in Africa,” in John Hall, John Ikenberry and T. V. Paul, eds. The Nation- State in Question (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 166-181.25• Cameron Thies, “National Design and State-Building in Sub-Saharan Africa,” World Politics 61, 4 (2009): 623-669 [engages HERBST]2510. Differentiating Regimes: Democracy, Authoritarianism and Hybrid Regimes26[THE ‘BIG’ ARGUMENTS]26• Barbara Geddes, “What Causes Democratization?” in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds. Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford University Press, 2012), 317-33926• Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959), 27-53, 64-7026• Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton University Press, 1963), 3-26, 473-50526• Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chap 2.26• Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” in L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner, eds. The Global Divergence of Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ Press, 2001), 93-11226[DIVISION/COHESION & DEMOCRATIC STABILITY]26• Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 25-5226• Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," Journal of Democracy 4, 4 (1993): 18-3827• Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton University Press, 1993), 163-185.27• Barry Weingast, “Democratic Stability as a Self-Enforcing Equilibrium,” in Breton et al., eds. Understanding Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 11-46.27• Brownlee, Jason. 2011. “Executive Elections in the Arab World: When and How Do They Matter?” Comparative Political Studies 44 (7): 807–28.27• Dan Slater and Erica Simmons, “Coping by Colluding: Political Uncertainty and Promiscuous Powersharing in Indonesia and Bolivia,” Comparative Political Studies (Sept 13, 2012).28[A HISTORICAL TURN? VARIED PATHWAYS, DIVERSE INSTITUTIONS]28• Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, “The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond,” Comparative Political Studies 43 (2010): 931-968;28• Amel Ahmed, “The Existential Threat: Varieties of Socialism and the Origins of Electoral Systems in Early Democracies,” Studies in Comparative International Development 48, 2 (2013): 141-171.28[POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN AUTHORITARIAN & HYBRID REGIMES]28• Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 13, 2 (2002): 51-65.28• Yonatan L. Morse, “The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism (Review Essay),” World Politics 64, 1 (2012): 161-198.28• Milan Svolik, "Which Democracies Will Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers, and the Dynamic of Democratic Consolidation," British Journal of Political Science 45, 4 (2015): 715-738.28>> FOR FURTHER READING:28- ON PARTIES, SOCIAL CLEAVAGES & ELECTORAL SYSTEMS:28DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT/PERFORMANCE:28DEMOCRACY AND INEQUALITY:29MORE ON authoritarian & HYBRID REGIMES:29ON INFORMAL ASPECTS OF REGIME & INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:2911. Challenging Political Order: Perspectives on ‘Contentious Politics’30[CLASSIC PERSPECTIVES]30• Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 92-12230• Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 1-11.30• Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 3-4330• James Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 28-4830[FROM PRFERENCES TO MOBILIZATION: DIFFERENT PATHWAYS]30• Tim Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989”, World Politics 44:1 (1991), 7-4830• Sidney Tarrow, “States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements,” in D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald, eds. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 41-6131• Elisabeth Jean Wood, “An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador,” Comparative Political Studies, 34, 8 (2001): 862-88.31[IDENTITIES & FRAMES IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS]31• Meyer N. Zald, “Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing,” in D. McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (Cambridge University Press. 1996), 261-74.31• Deborah Yashar, “Resistance and Identity Politics in an age of ‘Globalization,’” American Academy of Political and Social Science (special editors Patricia Fernández Kelly and Jon Shefner, 2007).31[CONTENTION WITHIN THE SYSTEM?]32• Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow, “Ballots and Barricades: On the Reciprocal Relationship Between Elections and Social Movements,” Perspectives on Politics 8, 2 (June 2010): 529-542.32• Emmanuel Teitelbaum, “Mobilizing Restraint: Economic Reform and the Politics of Industrial Protest in South Asia,” World Politics 62, 4 (October 2010): 676-713.32[TOWARDS SYNTHESIS? OR NEW KINDS OF MOVEMENTS?]32• Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, “Comparative Perspectives on Contentious Politics,” in L&Z, ch. 10 [also re-read brief section on social movements in Sil & Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism,” pp. 418-9]32>> FOR FURTHER READING:32GENERAL OVERVIEWS32CASE STUDIES OR SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS:3212. Comparative Political Economy: States and Markets34[OVERVIEW: DEFINING THE FIELD]34• Mark Blyth, “An Approach to Comparative Analysis or a Subfield Within a Subfield? Political Economy” (L&Z, Ch 8)34[ANTICIPATING THE FIELD]34• Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon, 1944), 56-7634• Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), 7-2834[THE ‘DEVELOPMENTAL STATE’ DEBATE]34• Chalmers Johnson, “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: the government-business relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” in Frederic C. Deyo, ed. The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 136-16434• Robert Bates, “Governments and Agricultural Markets in Africa,” in Bates, ed. Toward a Political Economy of Development: A Rational-Choice Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 331-358.34• Adnan Naseemullah and Caroline Arnold, “The Politics of Developmental State Persistence: Institutional Origins, Industrialization and Provincial Challenge,” Studies in Comparative International Development 50 (2015): 121-142.34[TURNING BACK THE CLOCK: COLONIAL LEGACIES AND DEVELOPMENT PATHWAYS]35• Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1-2335• Tuong Vu, “State Formation and the Origins of Developmental States in South Korea and Indonesia,” Studies in Comparative International Development 41, 4 (2007): 27-56.35• James Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 1-8, 87-102, 309-31935[BACK TO THE WEST: VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM]35• Peter Hall and David Soskice, “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism” (excerpt) in Hall and Soskice, eds. Varieties of Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2001), 1-21.35• Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, “Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies,” in Streeck and Thelen, eds. Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies (Oxford University Press, 2005), 3-3935• Jonas Pontusson and Damian Raess, “How (and Why) Is This Time Different? The Politics of Economic Crisis in Western Europe and the Unites States,” Annual Review of Political Science 15 (2012): 13-3336• Timo Fleckenstein and Soohyun Christine Lee, “The Politics of Postindustrial Social Policy: Family Policy Reforms in Britain, Germany, South Korea, and Sweden,” Comparative Political Studies (published online 2012): 1-30.36>> FOR FURTHER READING:36GENERAL/CLASSICS:36ON THE “RESOURCE CURSE”:36ON SOCIAL POLICY & WELFARE STATES:36SOCIAL CAPITAL / TRUST AND SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES:36MORE ON DEVELOPING & POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES:3613. The Global/International Economy and National Politics38[LOCATING THE INTERSECTION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY & COMPARATIVE POLITICS]38• Gunnar Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 3-14, 23-3738• Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Cornell University Press, 1986), 17-3438• Ronald Rogowski, “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade,” American Political Science Review 81 (December 1987): 1121-1137.38[THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: OPTIMISTIC, CRITICAL AND CAUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES]38• Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 96-13438• Giovanni Arrighi, Beverly Silver and Benjamin Brewer, “Industrial Convergence, Globalization, and the Persistence of the North–South Divide” (1999), as reprinted in J. T. Roberts and A. B. Hite, The Globalization and Development Reader (Wiley 2007), 320-33439• Robert Wade, “What Strategies are Viable for Developing Countries Today? The World Trade Organization and the Shrinking of ‘Development Space’,” Review of International Political Economy 10, 4 (2003): 621-644.39[HISTORICAL AND IDEATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY]39• Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, “The Future of Globalization,” Cooperation and Conflict 37, 3 (2002): 247-26539• Dani Rodrik, “When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 28, 1 (Winter 2014): 189-208.40[HOW “HARMONIZED” IS THE GLOBAL ECONOMY?]40• Layna Mosley, “Workers’ Rights in Open Economies: Global Production and Domestic Institutions in the Developing World,” Comparative Political Studies 41 (April 2008): 674-71440• Nita Rudra, “Openness and the Politics of Potable Water,” Comparative Political Studies 44 (2011): 771-803.40• Jeffry Frieden, “The Governance of International Finance,” Annual Review of Political Science 19 (2016): 3.1-3.1640>> FOR FURTHER READING:40GENERAL:40ON GLOBAL POLICY DIFFUSION/NETWORKS:40ON GLOBAL FINANCE & POLITICAL ECONOMY:41GLOBALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS:4114. What Lies Ahead? Area Studies, the DART Debate, and Space for Gender42[ON AREA STUDIES]42• Charles King, “The Decline of International Studies: Why Flying Blind is Dangerous,” Foreign Affairs (July-August 2015).42• Thomas Pepinsky, Thomas. 2015. Making Area Studies Relevant Again, Chronicle of Higher Education, at: http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2015/02/12/how-to-make-area-studies-relevant-again/42Hall, Peter, and Sidney Tarrow. 1998. “Globalization and Area Studies: When Is Too Broad Too Narrow?” The Chronicle of Higher Education, January 23, 1998.42• Chs. 1 and 13 in Patrick Koellner, Ariel Ahram, and Rudra Sil, eds., Comparative Area Studies: Methodological Rationales and Cross-Regional Applications (Oxford University Press, January 2018):42[ON DA-RT: Data Access & Research Transparency]42• Arthur Lupia and Colin Elman. 2014. “Openness in political science: Data access and research transparency.” PS: Political Science and Politics 47(1):19–24.42• Symposium on "Transparency in Qualitative and Multi-Method Research," QMMR Newsletter 13, 1 (Spring 2015): 13-20, 22-31. Contributions by Mark Trachtenberg; Katherine Cramer; Sarah Parkinson and Elisabeth Wood; and Timothy Pachirat.42• Symposium on DA-RT, Comparative Politics Newsletter (Spring 2016): 25-52. Contributions BY Lee Ann Fujii, Peter Hall, Mala Htun, Marc Lynch, Rudra Sil et al., and response from Lupia/Elman.42[MAKING SPACE FOR GENDER IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS]42• Amy Mazur, “Comparative Gender and Policy Projects in Europe: Current Trends in Theory, Method, and Research,” Comparative European Politics 7, 1 (2009): 12-36.42- Teri Caraway, “Gendering Comparative Politics,” 169-7542- Lisa Baldez, “The Gender Lacuna in Comparative Politics,” 199-20542

PART I: EMERGENCE & TRAJECTORY OF SOCIAL THEORY

 

1. Overview: Time, Space, and Comparative Politics

 

• Gerardo Munck and Richard Snyder, “Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics,” Comparative Political Studies 40, 1 (January 2007): 5-31 plus 45-47 [rejoinder to Mahoney]

An overview of what research in CP looks like, using articles published in the three leading journals of the field; the authors are responding to arguments in the field about scope/methods, dichotomy of approaches (which the authors argue is exaggerated and false), and methodological problems with the ways in which data is used, theories generated, and theories tested.

 

• James Mahoney, “Debating the State of Comparative Politics (Comment on Munck & Snyder),” Comparative Political Studies 40, 1 (January 2007): 32-36.

Response to Munck & Snyder's criticisms and observations about comparative politics by looking at three other journals in the discipline and arguing that some of the trends that Munck & Snyder describe are not reflected with this new data.

 

• Lichbach & Zuckerman, “Paradigms and Pragmatism” (L&Z, ch 1 – skim summaries of other chaps)

Ch 1 provides an overview of the book, which discusses main theoretical, methodological differences in the approach to studying comparative politics.

 

2. The Anticipation of Comparative Analysis in the 19th Century

 

[HISTORY AS STAGES: ADAM SMITH, KARL MARX]• Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (excerpts) from M. Cohen and N. Fermon, eds. Princeton Readings in Political Thought (Princeton University Press, 1996), 314-334

Liberal political economy in which a "natural economic order" comes about through competition, self-interest, and individual entrepreneurism. The free market, if allowed to function "laissez-faire" i.e. with little gov't intrusion, will function under an invisible hand and reach an equilibrium. Gov't should be involved, however, in protecting property, providing military protections, justice, and public goods such as infrastructure and education of which the cost can be defrayed by building in some revenue-raising mechanism.

 

• Karl Marx, extracts from Communist Manifesto; Wage Labour and Capital; and Capital, Vol I in Robert Tucker, ed. The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: Norton, 1978), 473-500, 203-217, 403-417

Communist Manifesto articulates the goals of communists to serve as an umbrella alliance with multiple working class parties, while also describing different socialist movements and arguing that each is either reactionary or fundamentally bourgeois in its desire to perpetuate the bourgeoisie. Wage Labor and Capital describes how the changes in capital have created incentives for capitalists to further exploit labor, rather than granting more leisure, and the devaluing of skills and worker individuality.

 

[EVOLUTIONARY FUNCTIONALISM: HERBERT SPENCER, EMILE DURKHEIM]• Herbert Spencer – as discussed in Jerzy Szacki, “The Evolutionist Sociology,” in History of Sociological Thought (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1979), 206-229.

An account of Spencer's theories of evolutionism, which go beyond Darwinism to explain the development of society and 10 main assumptions of how the world works. These assumptions rely heavily on universalism across contexts and societies, and describes the emergence of society and governance as a result of population growth, and the rise of social divisions and class as a result of militancy. Spencer differentiates between militant and industrial societies, the former being the "early" stage and the industrial being the ideal result of evolution of societies.

 

• Emile Durkheim – chapters discussing The Division of Labor in Society and Suicide in Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life and His Work (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 147-178, 191-225

Durkheim uses his theory of suicide to explain how man may react when faced with weakening social bonds. He describes three different types of social factors that characterize suicide - egoistic, altruistic, and anomistic. These three arise essentially out of problems with the bond or regulation between man and society, though Lukes argues that Durkheim's theory has problems given his failure to argue for a direct connection between suicide and psychological instability, as well as his failure to treat the social factors as norms in and of themselves (rather than deviances or absence of norms). While certain rates of suicide are considered normal, Durkheim argues that the only remedy to suicide is to strengthen the social bonds between individuals by organizing economic life around occupational groups, and re-asserting social ties.

 

[A WEBERIAN SYNTHESIS?]• Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1, ed. Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978): xxxxiii-xl (G. Roth: Introduction); 19-28 (social action); 212-231, 241-245 (ideal types of authority)

An account of how societies are organized, specifically based on social actions that encompass behaviors of individuals that are oriented specifically towards other people. Weber describes three different types of authority - legal, traditional, and charismatic - and how these authorities claim authority, establish their legitimacy for authority, and have staff/followers.

 

• Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribner’s, 1958), 13-31, 155-181

An argument that links the "protestant ethic" described by Richard Baxter to the development of modern capitalism. Weber argues that Protestantism, while it emphasized asceticism, viewed God's will as pointing individuals to labor that would create great wealth, and it was one's calling to follow this direction. The challenge then, to the individual amassing great wealth, was to abstain from using this wealth for idleness and "sinful" wasting of time. The emphasis on ascetic behavior despite wealth accumulation led to the accumulation of capital as people saved, and division of labor as God determined the most efficient, wealth-producing labor for individuals.

 

>> RECOMMENDED (overview)- Rudra Sil, “The Classical Predecessors of Contemporary Social Theory” (ms – for course use only)

 

3. Universalist Grand Theory: The Case of the ‘Modernization Paradigm’

 

[FROM EUROPEAN SOCIAL THEORY TO AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE]• Andrew Janos, Politics and Paradigms (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 36-64

An account of the main paradigms and development of those paradigms, starting with Parsons and Gerschenkron, and the emergence of new theories to challenge to the "one pathway" theory in two post war decades with Pye, Moore, Bendix, and Huntington.

 

• Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951), 76-91

A theory that outlines five limited dichotomies that describe how people make choices i.e. a "theory of action" particularly in response to certain "dilemmas."

 

[CORE EXAMPLES OF MODERNIZATION THEORY]• Alex Inkeles and David Smith, Becoming Modern (Harvard University Press, 1974), 154-175

A response to critics, arguing that the factory can function as a "school in modernity" and that workers who either move from rural to urban to work in factories, live in rural and work in factories, or grew up in urban and work in factories, all experience an increase in "modernity" (as measured by OM scores in their interviewing process) the longer they work in factories.

 

• Gabriel Almond, “A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics,” in Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 3-25

Describes political systems by the functions that they have - the functional categories of input and output functions - and argues that Parsons' approach to modernization may be flawed. They advance a "dualism" argument in which political structures that are associated with "primitive" systems are also present in "modern" systems, thus characterizing ALL systems as transitional.

 

• Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 1-15

Proposes 5 categories of societies to describe 5 "stages" of economic growth - traditional, preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, and high mass consumption (maturity). Functions within the modernization framework of a single path, described here economically, towards a modern or mature society. Going beyond the age of high mass-consumption is difficult to predict, though high birth-rates may be relevant as people focus on larger families and less on consumption [though this is informed by the baby boom, and we're seeing decreasing birth rates now].

 

• Karl Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Participation,” in J. Finkle and R. Gable, eds. Political Development and Social Change (New York: Wiley, 1966 ) 384-405

A discussion of indicators of social mobilization, how they can be measured, and their predicted effects on political implications such as development of the state (as pressures increase for government capacity and services) and increases in political participation. A quantitative model [which I skipped] measures social mobilization across multiple countries on the indices of seven indicators of social mobilization.

 

[TENSIONS WITHIN THE PARADIGM?]• Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 32-92

A critique of modernization and its assumed benefits - Huntington argues that modernization, which can be understood as having two categories (social mobilization and economic development), is actually destabilizing while modernity (having been achieved) is stable. Modernization is destabilizing because it increases the awareness of people to issues of inequality, demands for government services, and shifting norms that can create uncertainty and conflict. With the absence of political institutions, this political energy can create violence and instability as traditional social groupings are disrupted and groups gain consciousness, including attempts to use the government for redistributive purposes.

 

• Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1966), xi-xviii

Moore posits three pathways to modernization, with India as a fourth pathway because it doesn't quite fit into the other three. The three pathways - bourgeois revolution (from below), abortive (leads to fascism), and communist - depend on the role that the landed upper classes and the peasantry play, as these pathways are defined by the relationship between the classes and their roles.

 

• Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 5-30

Gerschenkron makes the argument that backward countries develop differently than advanced countries, so they do not follow the same pathways or underlying mechanisms to modernization. He argues that backward countries have different characteristics and rely closely on the adoption of technology (from more advanced countries) to achieve growth, experience growth differently ("spurt-like" rather than the gradual growth like that in England) as well as more pressures for "bigness" in factories and plants.

 

>> RECOMMENDED (critical commentaries)- Rudra Sil, “Order and Change in Comparative Social Theory” (manuscript – for course use only)

An overview of the rise and fall of the modernization paradigm, starting with Parsons' structural-functionalism that was then adopted/assumed by modernization theorists, and its main methodological problems, namely the assumption of universalism, uni-directional, organismic notion of society (based upon an analogy that was "taken too far"), dichotomous modern-traditional development towards a Western-informed (namely U.S. political and social system) modernity.

 

- Reinhard Bendix, “Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 9, 3 (April 1967): 292-346, esp. 313-346

[Did not read]

 

 

4. Recognizing Variation: From ‘Backwardness’ to the World-System and the State

 

[THE IDEA OF RELATIVE BACKWARDNESS]• Paul Baran, “On the Political Economy of Backwardness,” The Manchester School (1952): 66-84

Discusses the challenges that face "backward" countries and the failure of the middle classes to bring about economic growth and change. In general, capitalism had benefited the West but fails to bring sustained growth to many countries which lack the infrastructure and the will for long-term investments that are required to build the foundations for economic growth. The political and social structures also pose as obstacles. The instances in which countries have gone through revolution and achieved growth - France, Britain, and the U.S. - had to "sweep away" the older institutions and rebuild them with new willingness for enterprise, "combined effort of popular forces, enlightened government, and unselfish foreign help."

 

• Reinhard Bendix, “Relative Backwardness and Intellectual Mobilization,” from Bendix, Unsettled Affinities, ed. J. Bendix (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1993), 85-102.

 

[DEPENDENCY AND THE WORLD-SYSTEM]• Andre Gunder Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment” in Charles Wilber, ed. The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (New York: Random House, 1984), 99-108 [reprinted from Monthly Review, 18, 4 (1966): 17-31].

Argues that underdevelopment is not so much an "earlier stage" before economic development than it is a historical product of the development of capitalism, specifically the satellite system in which underdeveloped countries form satellites-metropolis arrangements where the city (core) interacts with satellites (periphery) which are underdeveloped communities and siphons off resources to other satellites through unequal terms of exchange. Frank examines the cases of Chile and Brazil, as well as comparing Japan to Latin America, to make his argument that historical development of capitalism is leading to underdevelopment in these countries.

 

• Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16, 4 (1974): 387-415

An argument that capitalist vs. socialist development must be seen "in totality" and thus as a single world-system that moves together. Socialist countries cannot exist in a world-system that is capitalist, and capitalism is exploitative as it structures societies into positions of core, periphery (weak states), and semi-periphery (semi-periphery is the mechanism to reproduce the basic exploitative structure and could be exploited or exploiter). He addresses the remnants of feudal forms by referencing Frank's argument that underdevelopment (and thus feudal forms that persist) are the result of development of capitalism, rather than "past stages" that are moving in the direction of inevitable development. He addresses the question of the development of a socialist system by arguing, in the concepts put forward by Mao, that socialist change is a process that must involve the entire world-system, not just events in particular nation-states.

 

[BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN]• Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol, eds. Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1-28.

Skocpol outlines several different approaches to including the state as an actor, or at least an important factor, in analyzing politics. She specifically describes two approaches - the state as an actor, and the state as an organizational arrangement - that can influence how we understand politics. The first approach (the state as an actor) treats states as having goals autonomous from interest groups or other social pressures, and research in this vein may focus on the role of agencies, civil servants, bureaucrats, and the military to use resources and direct them towards some goals. The second approach (the state as an organization) treats states less as having autonomous goals, and more as an influence on how social groups may form, political priorities are chosen, and collective action achieved. In other words, the second approach looks at the effect that states, through their organizational arrangement, have on "patterns" in politics.

 

• Eric Nordlinger, “Taking the State Seriously.” in Samuel Huntington and Myron Weiner, eds. Understanding Political Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 353-390

A critique of the state-centered approach that calls for more careful definitions of what is meant by "state autonomy." Nordlinger argues that the state's autonomy should not be seen as oppositional to societal preferences, since the state could use its influence and strength to shift societal preferences, and instead the state should be judged upon a typology that looks at both societal support and autonomy. To define state autonomy and its explanations, Nordlinger presents 4 properties (MIRV - malleability, insularity, resilience, and vulnerability) that are explained by 4 features (boundedness, differentiation, cohesiveness, and policy capacity).

 

[PROGRESS OR REINVENTING THE WHEEL?]• Gabriel Almond, “The Return of the State,” American Political Science Review 82, 3 (1988): 853-874

An argument against statist critiques, asserting that statist movement doesn't adequately look at the evidence of the body of research that has been done in structural-pluralist functionalism and that it is unfair to characterize this theoretical tradition as "societally reductionist." Almond gives examples of prior work [which I skipped] that has addressed the role of state autonomy, alongside the role of interest groups and social pressures, and argues that while neo-Marxism is perhaps the only branch that does deserve critique as a tradition that failed to look at the role of the state, the pluralist and structural-functionalists do not deserve to be called reductionist. Overall, he argues that the statists are closer to using mainstream understandings in political science and also threaten to loosen concepts that had improved under the shift from institutionalism to realism.

 

• Eric Nordlinger, Response to “The Return to the State” APSR 82, 3 (1988): 875-885

Response to Almond's critique of statism's characterization of prior political science; argues that references to state autonomy in the literature cited in Almond's piece, in which the authors are referring to the state in four different ways (the four strategies) .

 

• Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics,” American Political Science Review 85, 1 (March 1991): 77-96

A critique of statist approaches - specifically Nordlinger, Krasner, and Skocpol - that argues that the statist goal of narrowing definitions of the state serves to mask important and interesting questions rather than illuminating them. He argues that the statist approach to delineating boundaries ignores the ways in which boundaries are constructed, and how these boundaries can be used to create political power, come from within the state, and create an image of separation where there may be none. He discusses the history of political science as a discipline in its treatment of the state, and explains that the best way to examine the state is an alternative way encapsulated by his 5 propositions in the conclusion that characterize the state in a broader way than the statist approach.

 

5. The Return of Universalism After the Cold War? Post-Industrialism to Globalization

 

[OVERVIEW]• Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest (Summer 1989), 1-18

Fukuyama's famous argument that the end of large scale conflict and seemingly inevitable death of Marxism-Leninism in the USSR and China are leading the world towards a Western capitalist, consumerist global society. He reinstates the view that countries are developing towards a similar model of the West, and argues that this also signals the end of ideological battles, which will give way to apolitical, technical questions.

 

• Etel Solingen, “The Global Context of Comparative Politics” (L&Z, ch 9)

A review of the different ways in which the domestic and international can be viewed together, specifically the "second image" effects in which the domestic structures and institutions react to those on the outside (inside-out). The literature can be roughly arranged into three paradigms -structure (including dependency theory, state theory, and theories about sovereignty), rationality (agency of leaders and how private and state actors respond to the international context, with ability to strategically act beyond the confines of a "structure"), and culture (transnational networks and social relations, international law). Solingen discusses the big questions that come from each of these three traditions, spending time comparing and contrasting the economic trajectories of East Asia and the Middle East.

 

[POST-INDUSTRIALISM AS PRECURSOR TO GLOBALIZATION?]• Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 3-45

An argument about a post-industrial society that will be characterized by a greater role for science, technological, theoretical knowledge, and research and design. Bell describes his own intellectual path to getting to this "end point," starting with his observation of the shift in occupations from goods-producing to a service economy, and the accompanying changes that have emerged i.e. the greater importance of theoretical knowledge, more control of tech and tech assessment, and the creation of a new "intellectual tech."

 

• Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization (Princeton University Press, 1997), 67-107 .

A theory of postmodernization and how as economic development stabilizes, the emphasis on growth gives way to an emphasis on individual well-being. Inglehart argues that cultural values are closely clustered together by regions, as well as patterns that show the more economically developed a country is, the more post-industrialized as evidenced from "values" pulled from the World Values survey. As a country becomes more post-industrialized, it is more closely linked to democratic political regimes..

 

• Terry N. Clark and Seymour M. Lipset, “Are Social Classes Dying?” versus Mike Hout, Clem Brooks, and Jeff Manza, “The Persistence of Class in Post-Industrial Societies,” in Clark and Lipset, eds. The Breakdown of Class Politics (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 39-72.

Clark & Lipset argue that class is dead because of modern changes (post-industrialist values, changes in family size, decline in traditional hierarchies, more individualism; Hout, Brooks, and Manza counter (as sociologists) and argue that although class HAS undergone changes, it is still very influential and entrenched in social stratification.

 

[GLOBALIZATION & ITS HOMOGENIZING EFFECTS]• Susan Strange, “The Defective State,” Daedalus 124, 2 (Spring 1995): 55-74

An argument that the state has declined dramatically in authority due to the obsolete role of the state in protecting national security. As the main motivation for state competition changes from territorial to market share in the economy, the motivations for states to act has changed from military/defense-oriented concerns to economic, trade issues. Much of these structural changes are due to technological or scientific advancements, and a shift of state responsibilities towards the internationalized market.

 

• Philip Cerny, “Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action,” International Organization 49 (1995): 595-625

An argument about globalization's effect on collective action, specifically through the discrepancy that is created when economies of scale no longer fit with the structural scale/level of the national state i.e. the state at the nation level. The state's authority, legitimacy, policymaking capacity, and policy-implementing effectiveness will be eroded as it struggles to balance its functions as a space for civil associations (for legitimate collective action) and entrepreneurial associations, and has a harder time providing public goods in a globalizing context. As a result of these difficulties, the state becomes a "residual state."

 

[THE SURVIVAL OF STATES and VARIATION – and COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS!]• Peter Evans, “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in the Era of Globalization,” World Politics 50 (1997): 62-87.

An examination of whether the state can experience "eclipse" i.e. the disappearance of the state, or also referred to as "statelessness." Evans describes how the state may become more dependent on trade, but that state capacity is important in determining how successful the state is in a global economy. Better state capacity and effective state action are associated with more successful, higher economic returns, and more robust civil society.

 

• Linda Weiss, “Globalization and State Power,” Development and Society 29, 1 (2000): 1-15.

Weiss challenges the assumption that globalization hurts state power, and argues that it is first important to define globalization as a DEFINITION and not by an assumed OUTCOME i.e. that a world market will be created alongside "global governance" and states, location, institutional constraints will weaken and fall away.

 

ABSTRACT: Globalization is widely perceived as the master concept of our time. Yet a consistent definition remains elusive. Ironically, while participants in the globalization debate disagree over the meaning and extent of the phenomenon, they are largely united in the view that globalization impacts negatively on state power. In many cases, definitions of globalization presuppose in a somewhat circular manner the very outcome (of state retreat) that demands empirical investigation. A more fruitful conceptualization allows for the possibility that globalization may actually complement and co-exist - as opposed to undermine or compete — with national socio-spatial networks of interaction. This in turn paves the way for a more nuanced appraisal of the differential impact of economic openness on the capacity for national governance. Specifying the conditions under which state capacities may be either enhanced or diminished, sidelined or strengthened, remains the key task for students of the politics of international economic relations.

  

6. Navigating Foundational Divides: Agency/Choice – Institutions/Structures - Ideas/Identities

 

[OVERVIEW]• Mark Lichbach, “Thinking and Working in the Midst of Things” (L&Z, ch 2 – esp. pp. 56-71)

 

[RATIONAL-CHOICE]• George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 18-47

A defense of rational choice as a normative theory that can give insight into how individual behavior is an optimal response to conditions and the behavior of other actors. He begins by discussing the differences between rational and non-rational approaches, and the requirements (both strong and weak) to assume rationality. Although rational choice has been criticized as unrealistic, Tsebelis offers five arguments for why RC could be seen as realistic approximations of human behavior (people conform with the behavior because they know they will suffer if they deviate; people learn and can make evaluations; people who are sophisticated will change their behavior to offset that of unsophisticated individuals; natural selection; and statistics).

 

• Margaret Levi, “Reconsiderations of Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis” (L&Z, ch 5)

[not assigned]

 

[CONTEMPORARY STRUCTURALISM / HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM]• Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 1999 (2): 369-404.

A comparison between rational choice (RC) and historical institutionalism (HI) that argues that the distinctions between the two are often overblown, and that there are good examples of how they are partially converging on how these approaches treat issues and analysis. Specifically, the most distinctive difference between RC and HI may be RC's assumption of equilibria and change as the transition from one equilibria to another, while HI preferences historical processes. Thelen then describes different facets of institutionalism, specifically path dependence, critical junctures, feedback effects, and evolution and change. In particular, Thelen emphasizes the importance of understanding how institutions are perpetuated and sustained over time, how the dynamics that support them are reproduced, and posits that by better understanding how institutions emerge, it will provide a better understanding of how institutions fall apart.

 

• Ira Katznelson, “Strong Theory, Complex History” (L&Z, ch 4)

[not assigned]

 

[SOCIAL / CULTURAL ANALYSIS]• Lisa Wedeen, “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science,” American Political Science Review 96, 4 (December 2002): 713-728

A comparison between RC and interpretivist approaches that argues that these two approaches have "incommensurable" differences. Weeden argues that culture should be seen as "semiotic" - that we should understand culture as 1) what symbols DO and 2) what things MEAN - and that this approach allows for better use of culture as a causal variable. She argues that culture can have both structure and agency, structure in the "system of signification" that culture entails and agency in that this system (the symbols, speeches, etc.) is created by agents.

 

• Marc Howard Ross, “Culture in Comparative Political Analysis” (L&Z, ch 6)

[not assigned]

 

[INTEGRATIVE MOVES?]• Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1995): 936-957.

Describes the three distinct approaches to studying institutions - historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism - and argues that they should be more open to interchange and enhancing how we understand institutions, how they originate, and how they develop and persist. He describes 3-4 distinctive features for each of the three types of institutionalism, and compares/contrasts the different approaches to argue that RCI may be the most elegant and systematic, but doesn't specifically describe the origins of institutions; HI is realistic and detailed in its use of historical development, but struggles to generalize; and SI focuses on explaining how the institutional context shapes behavior, but in aiming to describe the emergence of institutions and aggregate behavior of highly instrumental actors, the role of actual actors may be neglected. 

 

• Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action Theory,” in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds. Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford University Press, 2012), 186-208.

An examination of collective action as an important area for research, but an incredibly challenging one due the "spaghetti plate" of interacting variables that need to be addressed. Ostrom examines rational choice and argues that RC is but one model of how human behavior and strategies work, and that a more general theory of human behavior focused on reputation, trust, and reciprocity may be more flexible in accommodating the different scenarios of collective action. Specifically, these aspects are shaped by "structural variables" that Ostrom outlines, including size of the group, whether benefits are shared or subtractive, heterogeneity of the group, whether members of the group can communicate, and repetition of interactions (information about the past actions of other actors, how individuals are linked, and voluntary entry/exit).

 

• Rudra Sil, “The Foundations of Eclecticism: The Epistemological Status of Agency, Structure, and Culture in Social Theory,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12, 3 (2000): 353-387.

Describes the divides between rational choice (RC), culturalist (CU), and historical institutionalist/structuralist (HI) approaches that are difficult to resolve, specifically how each approach assigns epistemological primacy (i.e. which aspect is the most important in helping us understand social phenomena) to either agency (individual-based) or structure (collective-based), or idealist (norms, ideologies, etc.) or material (observable, consequences). Sil argues that in most claims of "bridging the divide" between the three approaches, scholars are still operating on the core, fixed assumptions from their school of thought/approach. The exception is "structurationism" which, while NOT new, allows for more fluid structures, incorporates the role of actors, uses historicity to capture change, etc. and allow for "epistemological flexibility" since they do not assume that there is a "prior epistemological primacy" in the agent-structure or material-ideal divide.

 

 

 

7. Trade-Offs in Empirical Analysis: Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed-Method Research

 

[THE COMPARATIVE METHOD – A CLASSIC VIEW]• Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 65 (1971): 682-693

A description of the comparative approach to studying political science; Lijphart argues that analysis by comparison is a strategy rather than a technique or form of measurement, a method that is scientific but is not "the scientific method." He describes the differences between experimental, statistical, and comparative methods, and how experimental methods are often limited in political science due to feasibility and ethics, and statistical work tries to approximate what could have been done experimentally. Comparative work is weaker in terms of its scientific rigor, but it can be a better option when there are not enough cases to make statistical work convincing. The main challenges to comparative work are the limited cases and many variables, and Lijphart offers four approaches to address these challenges - increasing the number of cases, focusing on specific variables, choosing similar cases, and reducing the "property-space" of analysis by combining variables. He also briefly delves into the different types of case studies, and the main features of these approaches.

 

[UNIFIED METHODOLOGY, TWO CULTURES, OR HETEROGENEITY WITH TRADE-OFFS?]• Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba (KKV), Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), ch 1,

KKV's guide to how to ask research questions in a way that leads to valid inferences - they argue that qual and quant research are different only in matters of style and approach, but that the underlying logic remains the same. KKV describe the characteristics of scientific research and offer components for research design - question, theory, collecting data, and using data - that highlight a particular approach to social science research that acknowledges the uncertainty in knowledge and the importance of tight connections between theory and data.

 

• David Collier, James Mahoney, and Jason Seawright, “Claiming Too Much: Warnings About Selection Bias,” in Brady & Collier eds. Rethinking Social Inquiry (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 85-102

A response to the "dire warnings" by other researchers such as KKV in the dangers of selection bias - the authors argue that, while selection bias poses problems for quant researchers in how it affects the slope in regression analysis (by flattening the slope, due to the change in the truncated sample), it affects qual research in cross-case analysis (since "pairs" are essentially being compared, and truncated samples resemble those in regression analysis) but it has less of an effect on within-case analysis, which utilizes different tools of causal inference and relies instead on identifying causal processes rather than on relationships between the variables.

 

• James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, “A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research,” Political Analysis 14 (2006): 227-249.

A comparison of qual and quant approaches in ten different areas of research, and how they might lead to misunderstandings. [See Abstract] "The quantitative and qualitative research traditions can be thought of as distinct cultures marked by different values, beliefs, and norms. In this essay, we adopt this metaphor toward the end of contrasting these research traditions across 10 areas: (1) approaches to explanation, (2) conceptions of causation, (3) multivariate explanations, (4) equifinality, (5) scope and causal generalization, (6) case selection, (7) weighting observations, (8) substantively important cases, (9) lack of fit, and (10) concepts and measurement. We suggest that an appreciation of the alternative assumptions and goals of the traditions can help scholars avoid misunderstandings and contribute to more productive ‘‘cross-cultural’’ communication in political science."

 

• Debate Over "Two Cultures": Henry Brady, "Do Two Cultures Imply Two Scientific Paradigms?" Colin Elman, "Duck Rabbits in Social Analysis," and Goertz and Mahoney, "Reply to Brady and Elman," all in Comparative Political Studies (published online Nov 30 -Dec 6, 2012).

A response to Goertz and Mahoney that argues that the characterization of "two cultures" to describe qual and quant research traditions assumes too much that these two approaches function in different paradigms. Instead, they should be seen as operating in the same paradigm and focused on the goal of creating models to understand political and social phenomena. Brady outlines the aspects of the Goertz and Mahoney piece that he liked, and the parts with which he has "concern", describing that he himself has a vested interest in qual work though he believes that G&M oversimplify and caricature quant researchers.

 

• Ed Schatz, “Ethnographic Immersion and the Study of Politics,” in Schatz, ed. Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power ( University of Chicago Press, 2009).

The introduction to a book on political ethnography, which outlines the main areas in which ethnography may be defined and how the approach can contribute to political science - through creating evidence, challenging boundaries, epistemological innovation, and normative grounding - and how political ethnographers differ from one another [I skipped the specifics on the authors included in the volume]. 

 

[IS MULTI-METHOD RESEARCH THE PROMISED LAND?]• Evan Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy in Comparative Politics”, American Political Science Review 99, 3 (2005): 435-452.

Argues that there are "synergistic qualities" between LNA and SNA i.e. large and small N analyses that, when combined, are stronger than they would have been separately. Lieberman calls this approach the "nested analysis" approach. [See ABSTRACT]. "Despite repeated calls for the use of "mixed methods" in comparative analysis, political scientists have few systematic guides for carrying out such work. This paper details a unified approach which joins intensive case-study analysis with statistical analysis. Not only are the advantages of each approach combined, but also there is a synergistic value to the nested research design: for example, statistical analyses can guide case selection for in-depth research, provide direction for more focused case studies and comparisons, and be used to provide additional tests of hypotheses generated from small-N research. Small-N analyses can be used to assess the plausibility of observed statistical relationships between variables, to generate theoretical insights from outlier and other cases, and to develop better measurement strategies. This integrated strategy improves the prospects of making valid causal inferences in cross-national and other forms of comparative research by drawing on the distinct strengths of two important approaches."

 

• Ariel Ahram, “Concepts and Measurement in Multimethod Research,” Political Research Quarterly 20, 10 (2011): 1-12.

A discussion into the problems facing MMR, specifically differences in how concepts are defined and measured in quant vs. qual research approaches. Ahram uses examples from three books that use MMR techniques [I skipped these sections with the specific references] and argues that the ways in which to address "mechanism muddling" and "conceptual slippage" may not be able to address the issues to the satisfaction of both quant and qual researchers. Standardizing concepts and definitions will move the field in a quant direction, while searching for more flexible definitions will allow for qual research to pursue its goals of capturing multiple pathways but diverges from quant approaches.

 • Amel Ahmed and Rudra Sil, “When Multi-Method Research Subverts Methodological Pluralism – Or, Why We Still Need Single Method Research,” Perspectives on Politics 10, 4 (2012): 935-953.

A response to the discipline's push towards MMR to argue that single-method research (SMR) should be maintained, given its ability to foster expertise and innovative applications if scholars are allowed to develop and hone one particular methodological approach. Sil and Ahmed do not argue that MMR is not useful, but rather they question whether it should be uniformly and unquestionably seen as a best practice. They first outline the origins of MMR and the discipline's move towards encouraging MMR work, and then they argue that MMR works best when the methods from which it draws are similar ontologically, have comparable fundamental levels of generality, and arise from the same foundational assumptions of causation. They discuss how there may be costs to over-emphasizing MMR, demonstrating these possible costs by describing three exemplary works of single-method research and arguing that these would have been harmed if SMR is too heavily discouraged. Ultimately, pluralistic approaches to methods and the fostering of communication between methods - not just mixing methods for MMR approaches, but conversations between different SMR - is the best way for the discipline to move forward.

 

• Rudra Sil, “The Division of Labor in Social Science Research: Unified Methodology or ‘Organic Solidarity’?” Polity 32, 4 (Summer 2000): 499-531.

[Not assigned]

 

>> RECOMMENDED

- John Stuart Mill, "Of the Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry," in A System of Logic (Toronto: University

of Toronto Press, 1974), 388-406

- John Gerring, "Causation: A unified frame- work for the social sciences," Journal of Theoretical Politics

17, 2 (2005): 163–98.

- Sidney Tarrow, “Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science,” American Political

Science Review 89, 2 (1995): 471-474.

- Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview," International Organization 53 (Fall

1999): 161-90.

- Mark Bevir, “Political Studies as Narrative and Science,” Political Studies 54 (2006): 583-606.

- Marcus Kreuzer, “Historical Knowledge and Quantitative Analysis: The Case of the Origins of

Proportional Representation," American Political Science Review 104, 2 (2010): 369-392 (focus on

general argument, esp. pp. 369-371 and 383-385).

- Anna Grzymala-Busse, “Time Will Tell? Temporality and the Analysis of Causal Mechanisms and

Processes,” Comparative Political Studies 44, 9 (2011): 1267-1297

 

 

PART II: SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF INQUIRY – AN INCOMPLETE OVERVIEW

8. Political Community I: Nations, National Identity, Ethnic Divisions

 

[CLASSIC VIEWS OF NATION AS LINKED TO MODERNIZATION, MODERN STATES]• Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 39-62

A discussion of nationalism and how it emerges - Gellner mainly argues that - as opposed to nationalism's vision and story of itself as an "awakening" of dormant national forces and enriched by symbolism drawn from peasant culture - nationalism comes from high culture's dominance over other competing cultures and the selection (which is unpredictable) of a specific culture (among other cultures) with which to promote political legitimacy. In other words, political legitimacy becomes lodged in a particular "high culture" which then translates into a widespread nationalism and then engenders nations. Gellner provides a fictional illustration of how nationalism might arise in a characteristic fashion in his example of "Ruritanians" and the "Empire of Megalomania" at the end of the chapter. [I had some difficulty following this argument, so could use some clarification

 

• Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States” in

Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 255-279.

A discussion of how "primordial discontents" i.e. issues arising from ascriptive tendencies are activated even more when a state begins to modernize. Different groups that are identified by their primordial characteristics (race, blood lines, region, religion, etc.) become aware of the need or desire to fight for the "prize" of control over the sovereignty, and as a result this fractures the nation into different conflicting groups. Geertz gives several examples, most in detail on Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and the Tamil-Singhalese conflict and policies for Singhalese pushed by leadership after independence from the British.

  

• Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983), 11-49

An argument that nations are essentially "imagined communities" since people rely upon the idea of communitarian connection with people they have never met or will never meet. The nation is also limited, regardless of how large it is and how many people in includes. Anderson specifically focuses on the role of capitalism, and within capitalism the spread of print technology as books became a capitalist enterprise. The combination of capitalism and books i.e. print technology helped to centralize languages and create imagined communities that coalesced around print languages such as Latin.

 

[CONCEPTUALIZING IDENTITY]• Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (New York: Penguin, 1991), 15-42

Smith argues that national identity shares particular characteristics that make the nation very different than the state - the state refers to the institutions, while the nation refers to a psychological (though he doesn't use this word) kind of bond that is rooted in culture and community. He describes the creation of ethnic community i.e. ethnie and how it is similar to the concept of the nation - in order to better understand how the "nation" emerged, it is helpful to consider how "ethnie" contributed.

 

• Walker Connor, “A Nation is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a …?” from Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 90-117.

A detailed description of the words that are incorrectly used to describe nationalism, starting with a discussion of how the confusion in the usage between "nation" and "state" has created conceptual and intellectual muddiness. The other words that Connor describes include: ethnicity, primordialism (from Geertz), pluralism, tribalism, regionalism, communalism, parochialism, and subnationalism. Each describes some kind of grouping and fracturing along identity lines, but do not serve as adequate substitutes for "nationalism."

 

• Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity, Race and Nationalism,” Annual Review of Sociology 35 (2009): 21-42.

A discussion into the development of ethnicity, race, and nationalism studies (I've abbreviated as REN is some of my notes). Brubaker describes two trends that have emerged in the study - the interdisciplinary, integrated nature of the field of study, and the development of resources that allow for the study of REN without resorting to "groupist" assumptions that treat REN as "units" or enclosed entities. Brubaker cites examples from recent work that demonstrate aspects of the substantive and methodological approaches to the field that show these two trends. He also creates "clusters" to describe the field (clustering REN into dimensions rather than as race, ethnicity, and nation as three categories) as well as the approaches "beyond groupism" that look at the construction of groups over time, space, and place, as well as cognitive perspectives that help explain why groupism has such a hold (e.g. heuristic value of using groups).

 

• Asutosh Varshney, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict,” in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds. Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford University Press, 2012), 274-298.

[Not assigned]

 

[CONTENDING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES]• David Laitin, Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba (University of Chicago Press, 1986), 136-169.

[Not assigned]

 

• James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, 1 (February 2003): 75-90

[I skipped the method and empirics of this article] A multivariate analyses of several factors that could contribute to civil wars, including the prevalence of ethnic groups and indicators for economic status (e.g. poverty levels through income measurements), terrain, population, and measurements of civil liberties and democracy. The authors find that, contrary to conventional wisdom that claims that civil wars are more common where there are plural societies and tensions between ethnic and religious groups with grievances, the indicators for conditions of insurgency - political instability, poverty i.e. weakness in states, which characterized most states after decolonization, rough terrain, and large populations - are much more likely to predict civil war.

 

• Anthony Marx, “The Nation-State and Its Exclusions,” Political Science Quarterly 117, 1 (2002): 103- 126.

An argument of the nature of nationalism and how it is constructed - Marx challenges other assumptions of nationalism (liberal conceptions of inclusion, the "spontaneous" and linguistic-focused explanation by Anderson that assumes inclusion, and the "state-led nationalism" of Gellner that also assumes inclusion) by arguing that the nation-state sometimes has a rational incentive to exclude particular groups. This exclusion is often in service of creating an "us-them" type of divide that strengthens the core constituency e.g. scapegoating groups for economic troubles, though there can be unintended consequences if the excluded group mobilizes and resists. Ethnicity and race are more ascriptive characteristics that serve as easier exclusionary identities than that of class, which can be assumed to change and is more dangerous strategically for elites who may fear that exclusions on the basis of class will destabilize the economy.

 

• Evan S. Lieberman and Gwyneth H. McClendon, “The Ethnicity–Policy Preference Link in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Comparative Political Studies (published online, October 29, 2012): 1-29.

An empirical study of ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa that examines the link between ethnic identity that policy preferences. The authors argue that ethnic identity, understood in an "ascriptive" way that is measured by language, DOES have an influence on policy preferences in that there are significant differences in policy priorities between ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa. They test the probability that individuals select a given issue as the number one priority, and test how ethnic identity influences the accuracy of the probabilities from the actual survey results. They also test several other factors that could influence the link - culture, political relevance of the group, material heuristics i.e. wealth gaps - and find that while culture doesn't show a strong relationship, the political relevance and high disparities in wealth are associated with stronger disagreements about public policies between ethnic groups.

9. Political Community II: State-Formation and State-Society Relations

 

[THE STATE AS AN OBJECT OF ANALYSIS: OVERVIEW]• Joel Migdal, “Researching the State” (L&Z, ch 7).

 

• John Campbell, “States, Politics and Globalization: Why States Still Matter,” in J. Hall, J. Ikenberry and T. V. Paul, eds. The Nation-State in Question (Princeton University Press, 2003), 234-259.

An argument against the main "conventional" assumption that globalization is deteriorating the capacity of states, focusing on how economic globalization's effects have been greatly exaggerated (both shown empirically with changes in trade and FDI , which while it has increased, has remained in the same developed countries) and also how states are not completely helpless against the pressures of globalization. Campbell lists seven different "mechanisms" or mediating factors that change how globalization might affect states: the states can block, translate, reverse, compensate pressures and build capacity, use institutions, and be formed/influenced by institutions in how actors form preferences re globalization.

 

[STATE FORMATION IN THE WEST]• Charles Tilly, “War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-187

Tilly argues that the government, by creating the situations for violence and subsequently protecting people from this violence, is doing the same thing as racketeering and is thus comparable to organized crime. He argues that the development in Europe has shown that the legitimacy and illegitimacy of violence - who could wield it and be considered a legitimate user of violence - has narrowed over time, and protection has become a business that arises as a development in the successive stages of capitalism. He argues that states essentially have four activities that they pursue - war making, state making, protection, and extraction - and that these four activities plus the reactions they engendered have influenced the way in which states are formed.

 

• Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 1-9, 38-47

The introduction of Levi's book and the conclusion of the chapter on the Theory of Predatory Rule - Levi focuses on how states develop through the decisions that rulers make in how they will produce state revenue. She argues that rulers are essentially predatory - in that they try to extract as much revenue as possible out of the population - but these purposes might differ (could be personal, could be altruistic, could be corrupt, etc.) but rulers are constrained by the their ability to bargain, the transaction costs, and their discount rates. The variation in these constraints explains the variation in the decisions that rulers make across the different cases (there are four in Levi's analysis) in policy on state revenue.

 

• Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton University Press, 1994), 153-180

A comparison between the Hansa (city-league) and the sovereign state in examining why the sovereign state "won out" as the "best" and most commonly used institutional arrangement. Spruyt argues that the sovereign state was able to better organize so that the state could raise revenue, fund troops, and fight in wars in a "survival of the fittest" but ALSO could be politically entrepreneurial as to decrease the transaction and information costs, create credibility and guarantees in agreements, as is copied by political elites as a "best practice" form of institutional arrangement. Overall, Spruyt describes this process as "micro-macro" or "agent-structural" since part of the process is driven by the structure's change through Darwinian processes, and the other part of the process is agent-driven by political entrepreneurs who are making decisions to copy arrangements, and people are "voting with their feet" by moving out of institutional arrangements that do not serve them as well.

 

• Saylor, Ryan, and Nicholas C. Wheeler. 2017. “Paying for War and Building States.” World Politics 69 (02): 366–408. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887116000319.

A historical analysis followed by a quant analysis that tests the bellicist theory that argues that war makes states because wars are costly and create a revenue imperative for the staet to build and strengthen fiscal institutions. The authors examine four different historical cases - France, England, Poland-Lithuania, and Argentina - as well as six different European polities in their quantitative analysis to argue that wars do not necessarily lead states to strengthen their fiscal arrangements. The reason behind this variation is due to the make-up of the leading political coalition in power - if the coalition is made up of mostly net creditors, their interests are in a stronger fiscal infrastructure to prevent the devaluing of the debts owed to them through currency devaluation and inflation; if the coalition is made up of mostly net debtors, then these debtors could benefit from currency devaluation and inflation, since they could pay back their debts with less valuable money than previously.

 

• Nicholas Wheeler, “The Noble Enterprise of State-Building: Reconsidering the Rise and Fall of the Modern State in Prussia and Poland,” Comparative Politics (October 2011): 21-38

[NOT ASSIGNED]

 

[STATE FORMATION ELSEWHERE]• Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 3-41

Migdal examines the emergence of many new states in the period from 1947 to 1965 as decolonialization and independence movements occurred. He argues that the variation in the ability of states to become weak or strong, with many Third World states weak as they are unable to exercise social control over all their people, is the result of forces that push back against the state's ambitions to become predominant. In societies, social control is exercised by organizations that make the rules - if the state is unable to dominate this role, then there are other social organizations that compete and influence the behavior of people, sometimes organizing them into resistance against the state.

 

• Crawford Young, “The Nature and Genesis of the Colonial State,” in Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 43-76

Young examines the earlier history of "colony" and the cases of Ireland and Venice as colonies in the development of the European concept of the "strong state" to require "empire" building i.e. the acquisition of overseas domains as part of the empire. However, these overseas domains were never really seen as part of the state, but rather as "alien" and distinct in both place and people from the metropolitan of the colonizer. Young examines Africa in particular and argues that the African colonial state was seen as external to the European colonizer, and thus the colonies had substantial latitude to shape the "state" in Africa which only came under pressure when the emergent civil society began to push back for liberation.

 

• Jeffrey Herbst, “States and War in Africa,” in John Hall, John Ikenberry and T. V. Paul, eds. The Nation- State in Question (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 166-181.

A discussion of African states - which have seen the most conflict and are dysfunctional - and whether it can be expected that African states will follow the bellicist theory in reflecting the same relationship between war and state-building that occurred in Europe. Herbst argues that the nature of the conflict in Africa is fundamentally different than that which occurred in Europe - since most of the conflict in Africa has been civil war, the dynamics of interstate war do not apply. Specifically, the ability to build up a tax institution has not occurred and nationalism is incredibly difficult to create in African states when the war is internal. Boundaries are also seemingly fixed, and there is no resulting political change in borders from conflicts. Herbst argues that, since taxes and nationalism are crucial to the state's ability to mobilize and thus the survival of a state, the African states may face many years of conflict and difficulty in state-building.

 

• Cameron Thies, “National Design and State-Building in Sub-Saharan Africa,” World Politics 61, 4 (2009): 623-669 [engages HERBST]

Examines the effect of political geography - specifically, the constraints placed upon state-building by the fixed borders that have been "hardened" by norms of territorial integrity promoted by the UN, and the lack of interstate war in Africa - on the success of state-building. Thies presents a response to Herbst in examining how the lack of war, the role of fixed borders, and resulting political geography of state building in sub-Saharan Africa affect the predicted future of post-colonial states. Thies specifically examines three strategies that rulers may take that Herbst says can increase the capacity of the state (e.g. manipulating citizenship rules, intervening in traditional land-tenure patterns, promoting national currency to cultivate nationalism), measuring state-capacity by looking at the tax ratio and road density (both measurements of the reach of the state in collecting revenue and reaching citizens) and instead argues that these strategies either have had NO effect or have HURT state capacity, with the exception of national currency that could work but is difficult or risky to implement.

 

 10. Differentiating Regimes: Democracy, Authoritarianism and Hybrid Regimes

 

[THE ‘BIG’ ARGUMENTS]• Barbara Geddes, “What Causes Democratization?” in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds. Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford University Press, 2012), 317-339

[NOT ASSIGNED]

 

• Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959), 27-53, 64-70

Lipset argues that democracies and their stability are influenced by two major factors - their effectiveness and their legitimacy. Stability is also closely linked to economic development, since the more economically developed a nation is, the more likely democracy is stable and persists. Some of this is attributed to education - as people become more educated, they tend to be more receptive to democratic principles - as well as to economic classes and the nature of class stratification. Increases in wealth and education shift the politics of different class groups and their relationship to one another. In terms of legitimacy, this is affected with political change occurs