a. a. leontiev - psycholinguistic units and speech generation

5/22/2018 A. a. Leontiev - Psycholinguistic Units and Speech Generation

English translation 2006 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the Russian text excerpted fromA.A. Leontev, Psikholingvisticheskie edinitsy i porozhdenie rechevogo vyskazyvaniia,2d ed (Moscow: URSS 2003) chapter 2 pp 111 97 Published with the permission

Journal of Russian and East European Psychology,vol. 44, no. 4,JulyAugust 2006, pp. 788. 2006 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.

ISSN 10610405/2006 $9.50 + 0.00.DOI 10.2753RPO106104054404001

A.A. LEONTIEV

Psycholinguistic Units and

Speech Generation

22. The problem of inner speech appears to have been raised as a

syntactic problem by L.S. Vygotsky. We will have to return to this problem

to address it in detail, but for now it will suffice to state what is most impor-tant. Vygotsky drew a very clear distinction between inner and externalspeech, in terms of both their linguistic features and their psychological na-

ture, attributing three specific features to inner speech.

First, there is the abbreviation and agglutination of components of innerspeech. Inner speech is elliptical speech par excellence, forming itself as aunique stochastic, linear connection between semantic meanings (smysly)(see below for more about this idea) that have yet to be cast in actual verbal

form. This becomes possible due to the fact that inner speech is speech foroneself. Naturally, in order for these meanings to be able to function in lin-

guistic thinking they must have a material reference, but this reference can be

reduced to a minimum, for instance, to representation of only the initial letters

of words. Inner speech is, in this sense, speech almost without words.1

Second, there is the predicative nature of the components of inner speech:

it from the psychological perspective, it consists entirely of predicates. . . .The law for inner speech is: always skip the subject.2

Third, there is the specific semantic nature of the components of innerspeech, which we have just mentioned, and a high level of situational andcontextual dependence.


2d ed (Moscow: URSS 2003) chapter 2 pp 11197 Published with the permission

8 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY

According to Vygotsky, the transition from internal to external speech

is a restructuring of speech, a transformation of absolutely distinctive andunique syntax, of the semantic and sound structure of inner speech into other

structural forms characteristic of external speech . . . a transformation ofpredicative and idiomatic speech into syntactically articulated speech that iscomprehensible to others.3

This understanding of inner speech later drew extensive criticism. Indeed,it is not beyond reproach from the perspective of experimental validity, but,

unfortunately, the criticisms voiced were even less valid. B.G. Ananev and

L.I. Podolskii4 criticize the idea of predicativity, believing rather thatnominalization is typical for inner speech. Consider such sentences as:

Night. Stars.But here critics are obviously confusing predicativity (or, rather,verbality) as a linguistic concept and, so to speak, psychological predicativity.Of course,Night. Stars. are nominative sentences, but psychologically they

express something like [It is] night, [There are] stars, or Night [has setin] (not day), Stars [are visible] (and the moon is not), and so forth. TheKiev psychologist A.N. Raevskii, without evidence, decisively announced

that Inner speech is speech distinct from external speech not in terms of itsnature, but only in terms of certain external structural features. Attempts to

see it as speech with its own syntactic rules, different from ordinary speech,should be completely discarded.5

It should be certainly clarified that the description of inner speech pro-vided by Vygotsky relates specifically to inner speech, and not to the genera-

tion of external speech, that is, it has a somewhat indirect relationship toour subject. We introduced that description only because on the basis of

Vygotskys ideas, his follower, A.R. Luria, developed a doctrine of an innerdynamic scheme of utterances that constituted, from his perspective, a spe-cific stage of speech generation, the stage of intention (zamysel). This dy-

namic scheme breaks down in cases of so-called dynamic aphasia, as a resultof which overall thought, not taking the form of a known inner speech

scheme, does not extend beyond the bounds of generally unformed inten-tion.6Elsewhere, Luria speaks of encoding a thought into a verbal utter-ance, which goes through the stage of inner speech.7

Patients with dynamic aphasia

manifest extreme impairment in independent utterance: they note that they

are able to generate individual words (the elements of utterance) out of

order, but the scheme of the complete utterance (the linear scheme of thephrase) does not emerge. If, however, this linear scheme of the phrase is


JULYAUGUST 2006 9

utterance, pointing to the markers in sequence with his finger (for instance,

Iwantto walk); removing this external linear scheme of the phrase

will again make this utterance impossible.8

It is significant that analysis of aphasic impairment leads to a need to

attribute to this hypothetical link of speech generation the same characteris-tics that Vygotsky identified in inner speech.9In any event, the cycle of works

by A.R. Luria, L.S. Tsvetkova, and T.V. Ryabova [Akhutina] provides a solidbasis for talking about the reality of the existence of an inner program orinner scheme component in the verbal act that holds one of the first places

(in terms of order) in the overall mechanism of speech impairment, and thatis essential to correct speech generation.

The idea of such a link is completely alien to American psycholinguistics,and this clearly shows its longstanding linguisticality, about which we spoke

earlier: allowing for the existence of such a link requires from the start adenial of the principle of direct reflection of linguistic elements on psycho-

logical elements, since there may be no direct equivalent of the componentsand principles of the organization of inner speech (or inner scheme) in a

linguistic model of utterance. Therefore, it is very characteristic that, forinstance, D. McNeill, in attempting to interpret Vygotskys concept of inner

speech, reduces this concept to a certain rule of expansion of a grammaticaltree that is characteristic of a small child.10

23. If we presume the existence of a special link in the mechanism ofspeech generation that corresponds to the inner utterance scheme, it creates a

great temptation to project onto this link certain experimental data obtained

in a different context.First, such a presumption permits the localization of the order of expan-

sion that P. Gough writes about. If that is the case, we can presume that onthis level there is an order of appearance of the components of an utterancethat is independent of the actual sentences, with the subject of the utterance

always appearing before the object. If this is true, then it can be presumedthat the reversibility factor identified by Slobin is the result of an assess-

ment of the subjectobject relationship in the inner program link.On the basis of existing experimental findings, an attempt can be made to

determine more exactly the order of elements within the utterance scheme.H. Clarks findings are particularly interesting in this regard. In experimentson sentence production and on sentence association, he derived the follow-

ing (identical) order of elements, if they are arranged by degree of interde-pendence probability (in accordance with the relative correlations between



measured a value he called Ergnzungspotenz (the ability of a given class

of words to support the production of an entire utteranceits mnemonicforce, so to speak). It turns out that this value diminishes in the following

sequence: S >O >P >Ad.12Other authors obtained analogous results.13

In the previous book, we noted certain general patterns in the organiza-tion of utterance elements that are characteristic of communicative systems

that lack a linguistically conditioned sequence of words or classes of words,or where such a sequence plays a subordinate role. For example, there is a

syntactic model characteristic of sign lanugage. This model can be repre-

sented as S(At)O(At)VAd.The same model is characteristic of autono-mous speech; of the initial stage of verbal speech among the deaf (Boy bird

feeds); and of a certain stage in the development of child speech, specificallythe stage at which the utterance elements have already been identified, buthave not taken the shape of a morphemic paradigm.14 This deviates from

Clarks findings only in the placement of the attribute, but it is in this con-nection that Clarks findings are not indicative, since the attribute in his testsentences always stood in the first place and served as a type of reference

point in calculating the correlation.An experiment by Compton provided somewhat different results. He asked

subjects to augment sentences of the type,The ball is rolling

,either with anadjective modifier, an adverbial modifier, or through a negation. A single

model emerged: first the verb was modified by an adverb, then the noun, andfinally, negation was introduced. But during an analogous experiment using

erasures, such consistent findings were not obtained.15Unfortunately, thisexperiment was conducted on a very limited basis.

Flores dArcais tried to establish a correlation between perception and thechoice of the type of sentence syntax. It turned out that larger objects andobjects on the left portion of a picture (that appear to be moving from left to

right) have a tendency to be made into subjects: if objects appear to be mov-ing from left to right, the usual construction will be: The car overtakes thewagon. While given the opposite movement it would be: The wagon is being

overtaken by the car.16

24. In the works of D. Worth, and several other followers of N. Chomsky,

we encounter attempts to expand the theoretical basis of the transformational

model to allow it to cover all sentences intuitively characterized by one and thesame semantic invariant, that is, not only the type, the professor examines the

patient

the patient is examined by the professor, but also

the professorexamining the patient.17The application model of S.K. Shaumyan and P.A.S b l h i th i d l l t l i d d t f th l ti f


Soboleva who view their model as completely independent of the evolution of

JULYAUGUST 2006 11

Inasmuch as the application model has repeatedly, and quite thoroughly,

been described in Russian-language publications,18 and its structure is ex-ceptionally complex, we will not provide a detailed description here. We will

merely point to certain specific features of this model that are interestingfrom a psycholinguistic perspective.

First, unlike other models, it is a two-stage model in the sense that it con-

secutively generates objects of two types: language (genotypic) and speech(phenotypic). The first are called complexes: a complex is a set of ordered

elements, for which the order of registry is immaterial.19Information about

the complex does not contain details about actual grammatical features andcertainly not the sequence of grammatical elements in actual language; all of

these details appear only in chains, that is, during the transition to the pheno-typic stage. The primary task of the application model is the construction ofcorrect complexes and correct transformational complexes.

Second, transformations in the application model are not given (as, forexample, in Chomsky), but are calculated. Such a calculation is performedon the basis of phrase complexes already provided (word combinations) us-

ing two procedures: deriving the set of classes and applying certain limita-tion rules to this set. Thus, from the operand R3OR2O (interpreted as a

phrase such ashigh mountain

), we first get two columns of classes withtwenty-five potential combinations (these classes are generated by a word

generator of the sort depicted in Figure 1). Then, applying certain limita-tions, we extract from among them eight transformations (the first stage): (1)

vysokogornyi [high in the mountains]; (2) a transformation such asvysokii

rostom [of tall height] that could not be used in this phrase, but would be

possible in other, analogous phrases; (3) identical transformation; (4) vysota

gory, gornaia vysota [height of a mountain, mountainous height]; (5) vysotabyla goroiu [high as a mountain]; (6) gora byla vysokaia, vysitsia gora[the

mountain was high, mountain towers]; (7) vysitsia goroiu[towers like a moun-tain]; (8) transformations such as khoroshii obedkhorosho poobedal [good

supper supped well]. Analogous operations can be carried out with moreelaborate complexes, so the applicative model permits the most varied trans-formations within the bounds of the semantic invariant.

The aforementioned example makes it evident that the application model

has more power than the transformational model, allowing phrases andstrings of phrases that are not amendable to a unified interpretation in the

transformational model to be connected within a single system.20

However, itmust be pointed out immediately that the path of speech generation of trans-f ti i th li ti d l i l b t th t it h l i l


formations in the application model is so elaborate that its psychological


There are other factors that make the prospect of psycholinguistic inter-pretation quite improbable when using the application model. First, there is

the principle according to which this model is structured, going from moreelementary to more complex objects. It is doubtful whether an analogousstructure is applicable to objects within which psycholinguistics operates.

Second, the application model operates at all levels with the transforma-tional history of objects, and from the viewpoint of psycholinguistics, this

appears improbable. Third, it introduces linearity only at the very end, whilethe principle of linearity (in the form of Markov dependency) clearly plays amore significant role in the process of speech generation. Fourth, this model

is exclusively synchronous-descriptive, and in its present form it is clearly

not applicable, for example, to the formation of child speech.At the same time, the application model has much to recommend. Perhaps

it is best to view it as one of the possibleLCvariants, relating model interpre-tations with LP; in any event, the model requires psycholinguistic experi-

mental verification, which has yet to be conducted. 25. In this section we will briefly explore certain propositions devel-

oped within the framework of MPtheory that are important for us, leaving

aside the extensive literature in that area that is not relevant to this work.We will first explore the semantic synthesis model developed by I.A.

Melchuk. This model is based on the idea of a tree of meanings con-

structed using a basic semantic language consisting of three kinds of ele-ments: predicates, nouns, and adjuncts (an analogue of adjectives, adverbs,

etc.). The successive stages of synthesis are as follows: (1) semantictheselection for the semantic tree of all syntactic constructions that are actuallypossible and the corresponding Russian lexicon; (2) syntactic the determi

Figure 1. [Diagram of Word Generation]

head reads

white

whitens

bleacheryreading roomhead (dim.)


possible and the corresponding Russian lexicon; (2) syntactic the determi

JULYAUGUST 2006 13

for each syntactic tree; (3) morphologicalthe structure and placement of ac-

tual word forms.21The tools used in synthesis are: (a) a Russian semanticdictionary (the rules of transition from meanings to lexemes or combina-

tions of lexemes in the Russian language; (b) a Russian dictionary (a lexicon inwhich every word is given a morphological, syntactic, and lexical-semanticcharacterization); and (c) the rules for forming combinations of lexical units.

The Melchuk-Zholkovskii model is exceptionally appealing from apsycholinguistic standpoint and we will refer to it again. We will note that

the Osgood modelstands at the wellspring of this model.

We will also mention a lesser-known article by Sestier that proposes theidea of identifying a number of individual segments within a sentence, the

hierarchy among which is not indicated, the determining function of thesesegments in relation to the entire utterance.22

26. The viewpoint according to which the subject serves as a sort of

passive receiver of information during the perception of speechimplyingthat the psychological mechanism permitting perception is not the same asthe mechanism permitting speech generationhas been increasingly sub-

ject to doubt by psychologists and physiologists, as well as linguists. In thisregard, there are three main orientations that can conditionally be called the

acoustic, the motor, and the analysis via synthesis orientation.The traditional acoustic interpretation of speech perception is based on

the flow of speech being perceived in segments, step by step. For separatecommunication segments to be identified, they must correspond to certain

memory images. Once we have identified a sequential string of segments ofa lower (more elementary) level, we can copy this sequence as a single

segment onto a higher level. R. Jakobson rests his theory of binary differen-tial features of phonemes on this interpretation. However, the fundamentalpremises of Jakobsons model have not been borne out. First, it has been

discovered that information about each given phoneme is not concentratedin one speech sound, but is spread over several. Second, it turns out that the

transitions from sound to sound carry not less but, in many cases, more im-portant information for recognition than the so-called stationary sectorsdo. Third and finally, it has been brought to light that the physical character-

istics of phonemes are not invariant and they change in relation to their pho-

netic position.23

Contrasted with the acoustic theory, the motor or articulatory theory

presumes that speech perception is possible only where sensory features elicita certain reciprocal motor activity, as a result of which topological param-t f th i d fl f h d l d ithi th li t h


eters of the perceived flow of speech are modeled within the listeners speech


psychologists led by A. Liberman, belonging to the so-called Haskins group,

are particularly avid proponents of motor theory, along with the Leningradgroup of physiologists headed by L.A. Chistovich.

Adherents of each of these two theories consider the other to be abso-lutely false, although both theories are supported by facts. A particularlyheated polemic developed during the Eighteenth (Moscow) International Psy-

chological Congress in 1966. At a symposium entitled Models of SpeechPerception, R. Jakobson delivered an extremely aggressive talk, which was

followed by a number of responses from adherents of the motor theory.

Jakobson stated that the articulatory component of perception is optional; inspeech perception, with the primary aspect belonging to the sensory plane;

and speech perception is possible and logicalwithout the participation of themotor link.25This point of view is based, in particular, on certain data fromLenneberg relating to the anarthric child, who perceives speech without any

measurable peripheral muscle activity.26We will refrain from introducing thearguments of proponents of both theories, since these questions are onlymarginally relevant to our topic. We will limit ourselves to examining two

aspects of the problem: first, the question of which of the two schools ofthought more closely corresponds to the overall findings of psychology; and

second, we will explore the extent to which both schools of thought are irrec-oncilable and whether or not some middle ground might be found.

By and large, there is no doubt that motor theory corresponds muchmore closely to our current knowledge about the process of perception over-

all than to the articulation theory. A number of works (particularly in So-viet psychology) convincingly demonstrate the role of the motor component

in touch and sight.27A general theory of perception developed by the Sovietpsychologist, V.P. Zinchenko, includesas we mentioned in the first chapter[not translated here]the idea of the bodys reciprocal action to a perceived

object; his talk at the Eighteenth International Psychological Congress wasappropriately entitled Perception as Action. From the perspective of speech

perception, particularly relevant findings concern the human sense of pitch,since both abilitieshearing of speech and hearing of pitchare uniquelyhuman and genetically closely related. Zinchenkos experimental study dem-

onstrated that the motor component of the process plays the decisive role in

pitch perception.28

Such a decisive conclusion does not, however, necessarily imply the par-

ticipation of the motor component in every conceivable case of speech per-ception. The problem is that first of all, the arguments of adherents of the two

ti th i d t t k ffi i t t t ll t k


competing theories do not take sufficient account or actually take no ac

JULYAUGUST 2006 15

as spontaneous, or, on the other hand, imitative or stochastic speech, if we

use the terminology of F. Kainz). At the same time, physiologically, speechbehavior has to be quite multifaceted; suffice it to say that such common

components of speech as vocatives correspond to first-signal speech mecha-nisms. Second, in perception, the fundamental possibility of reliance on aninadequate motor component, demonstrated in experiments by A.I. Ioshpe,

and carried out under the direction of O.V. Ovchinnikova, have not beensufficiently taken into account. In these experiments the motor component of

pitch perception was modified: instead of formingsound hearing based on

the activity of the vocal cords, as would usually happen, for this purpose adevice was used that related different pitches to the degree of force applied

to a keyboard. It turned out that the development of the sense of pitch wasnot adversely affected by this.

Third (and by no means least in importance), the perception of speech, in

most cases, is not an elementary familiarization with its properties. When sucha familiarization has been achieved, it is possible to carry out an identifying(and reproductive) action. In this case, however, the act of identification re-

lies on another system of reference points and features. . . . To the extent thatthe object has been identified, the observer distinguishes new features in it,

groups them, and screens out a portion of the features that were distinguishedinitially.29He then combines the individual features into a sort of structure,

into integrated images that become operative units of perception. If speechperception follows this course or a close approximation (and we have no

reason to doubt that it does),30then, evidently, it will turn out that both theo-ries oversimplify this process.

Finally, it should be kept in mind that one and the same process may besupported by both a constructive and a statistical mechanism.31

To the extent that it is voiced, the thinking surrounding all of these ques-

tions is often a priori in nature. Nonetheless, an experimentally based answercan eventually lead to an easing of the contradictions that have arisen. Of

course, there is no reason to expect that this will undermine the fundamentalcorrectness of the articulatory theory.

We have yet to say anything about the third theory, the theory of analysis

by synthesis. It is primarily represented in contemporary psycholinguistic

literature by the works of M. Halle and K. Stevens. We will give an accountof the model they describe in the article, Speech Recognition: A Model and

Program for Research.32

This model, as seen in Figure 2, which is based onFigures 1 and 2 in the article cited, is also a model of speech generation, so the l i b th i th i t i tl ki th f th b


analysis by synthesis theory is strictly speaking a theory for the bearer


Storage

mechanism

Preliminary

phonetic

analysis

Datafrom

previous

analysis

Datafrom

previous

analysis

Comparer

Control

Phonetic

seq

uence

Storage

mechanism

Preliminary

phonetic

analysis

Generation

rule

Comparer

Control P

honological

sequence

Gene

ration

ru

le

Speech

gene

ration

stru

cture

Speech

signal

Phon

ological

sequence

[A

ModelofSpeechRecognition]

S

pectrum

a

nalyzer


JULYAUGUST 2006 17

The substance of the analysis-by-synthesis model can be expressed as

the idea that speech perception incorporates a number of blocks, each ofwhich contains the rules of speech generation plus the rules for correlating

the results of this speech generation with input signals. The figure showsphonetic and phonological blocks (or, using the terminology of transforma-tional phonology, phonemic and morphophonemic blocks); however the

same operations take place . . . at the highest levels of analysis possible. 34

The principle on which the model works could be called televisual; it

comes close to a hypothesis proposed by D. Worth.

The listener starts with the presumption of an input signal. On the basis of

that presumption he generates an inner signal, which is compared to the

perceived signal. The first attempt will likely be mistaken; if this is the

case, then a correction is made and used as the basis for subsequent pre-

sumptions that may be closer. This cycle is repeated (almost certainly

unconsciously) until the listener makes a choice that meets the corresponding

requirements. . . . The output is not a transformed variation of the input; it

is a program that must be followed in order to generate inner representa-

tions used for comparison.35

Words serve as the standard unit during input (in intelligent speech).

It can be seen that the organizational principle of this model correspondsto the overall conception of speech behavior set down in a book by Miller,Pribram, and Galanter; in particular, elementary action is seen as the unit of

speech behavior.In addition to the version of analysis-by-synthesis theory described here,

there is a later version primarily belonging to N. Chomsky. While the Halle-Stevens model is built on a bottom up principle, with the transition to high-level units taking place after the operations with lower units is completed,

Chomsky starts with the proposition that phonetic representation . . . can begenerated with a very small number of simple transformational rules used

cyclically, where the order according to which they are used (as we know

based on ideas arrived at independently) is determined by the syntactic struc-ture of the utterance.36

In contrasting his conception to the understanding of perception as a pro-

cess of sequential segmentation and classification, Chomsky believes that

the process of understanding the utterance presented can in part be re-

duced to the construction of an inner representation of its full structuralnature. . . . The listener perceives a certain ideal formation that corresponds

to the signal that was actually heard and that was generated by the phono


to the signal that was actually heard and that was generated by the phono


Such a top-to-bottom model, as can be seen, does not require motor

theory as an essential component, and many authors who uphold Chomskyspoint of view at the same time regard motor theory with a great deal of

skepticism.38

The analysis-by-synthesis model in its second version was used in anumber of experimental studies. We will cite two of them. The first belongs

to P. Lieberman. Investigating subjects perception of sentences with differ-ent degrees of redundancy in a variety of situations, Lieberman writes that,

The results of this experiment regarding perception can be interpreted in

light of a model of perception in which the listener hears an entire sentence

and produces a grammatical analysis of its meaning at the same time that it

is preserved in some form of short-term dynamic memory. The listener in

this model can use the results of operation on the higher levels to remove

the uncertainty on the lower levels.39

Another significant experimental work written by Miller was the article heproduced in collaboration with Stephen Isard, Some Perceptual Consequences

of Linguistic Rules, which is particularly interesting for its explanation ofexperimental data, as well as for its theoretical reasoning (chronologically, itprecedes Liebermans article, which, in part, is based on it).

The authors start with the supposition that the speaker or listener usesthree types of rules in selecting (or recognizing) words: grammatical, se-

mantic, and pragmatic. The study is based on the assumption that in order

to understand a sentence it is necessary to process the acoustic signal inaccordance with these linguistic rules. Linguistic rules usually serve to limitthe number of alternatives from among which the listener can choose.40The

units that the listener uses to operate will be syntactically completed, and, inorder to distinguish them, he must conduct a syntactic analysis, that is, apply

grammatical rules.He also uses semantic rules (to further reduce the number of alternatives).

Finally, pragmatic rules primarily relate to nonlinguistic information about

the context (or, rather, the situation) in which the sentence is used.One experiment studied the repetition of three types of sentences: gram-

matical (semantically and syntactically correct), anomalous (syntactically

correct, but semantically incorrect), and ungrammatical chains (incorrect inboth ways). It was anticipated that it would be hardest of all to repeat the last

of these and the easiest to repeat the first type of sentence. And that proved tobe the casethe proportions of correctly repeated sentences were respec-tively 88 6 percent 79 3 percent and 56 1 percent


tively 88 6 percent 79 3 percent and 56 1 percent

JULYAUGUST 2006 19

ence in the level of noise, for example, 63 percent of grammatical sentences,

but only 3 percent of ungrammatical chains, were repeated correctly. Par-ticularly important was the comparison of experimental results where sen-

tences of differing types were either presented together or separately: whensentences of differing types were presented together the subjects were forcedto constantly change the system of rules used to interpret the sentences. This

was reflected, in particular, in the fact that anomalous sentences were un-derstood much better when they were presented separatelythere was no

interference from grammatical sentences.

Miller and Isards experiments rather convincingly demonstrated, first ofall, the active nature of speech perception, that is, the fundamental correct-

ness of the analysis-by-synthesis model, and second, the independentnature of semantic and grammatical rules used in the perception of utter-ances. Unfortunately, as far as we know, the authors did not continue this

experiment, and, in particular, there was no attempt made to analyze speechperception in dealing with a nonnative language.41

Summarizing what has been said above, it can be asserted with a degree

of confidence that:(a) The analysis-by-synthesis theory is the most satisfactory from the

theoretical and experimental perspective;(b) In principle, it can be used with motor theory, that is, the idea of the

bodys reciprocal action is generally true; and(c) A number of less-studied factors may create an impression that the

motor principle is optional.We would like to stress that the analysis-by-synthesis theory absolutely

does not equate semantic and grammatical rules in the generation and per-ception of speech, even at a given stage. This is particularly relevant in termsof various heuristics used in one case or another. But the mechanism of

understanding does notfundamentally differ from the mechanism of utter-ance planning while it is being produced.42This is what makes it possible

to a limited degree, of courseto apply speech perception data in analyzingspeech generationsomething we took advantage of in this work.

We will base our subsequent discussion on these tenets.

27. The second problemto which we will devote a special section in

this chapter, in light of its particular importance for modeling a speakerslanguage abilityis the question of innate knowledge.

Chomsky first raised this question in 1959 in his sweeping review, pub-lished in the journal Language,of B.F. Skinners Verbal Behavior. In the

i h h l tt k d th th l i i th d l t f h


review he sharply attacked the theory explaining the development of speech


and process information in a variety of very special and apparently highly

complex ways which we cannot yet describe or begin to understand, andwhich may be largely innate.43Chomsky calls for a particular kind of re-

search, which has been undertaken.What is the nature of this innate ability? To put it in laymans terms, what

must it be able to do? The child who learns a language has in some sense

constructed the grammar for himself on the basis of his observation of sen-tences and non-sentences (i.e., using corrections by the verbal community).44

This question is examined in more detail in Chomskys book (Aspects of the

Theory of Syntax) and in the chapter, Innate Ideas (in J. Katzs Philosophy

of Language).

The basic hypothesis on which proponents of the idea of innate knowl-edge base their thinking is that:

the device that makes language acquisition possible contains, as an innate

structure, all the principles established within the theory of language. This

means that such a device presupposes:

(1) linguistic universals that determine the form of linguistic description;

(2) the form of phonologic, syntactic, and semantic components of linguis-

tic description;

(3) the formal nature of rules in each of these components;(4) a number of universal phonologic, syntactic, and semantic constructs on

the basis of which specific rules and specific descriptions are formulated;

(5) a methodology for selecting the optimal linguistic descriptions.45

In essence, this list is redundant, since the first four points are coveredby the concept of linguistic universals, if linguistics is understood in the

generative-grammar sense. The study of linguistic universals is the study of

the properties of any generative grammar in natural language.46Universals

are either formal or substantive; the first are essentially universal relations,and the second, to put it briefly, are universal elements.

According to the innate knowledge approach, a child formulates hy-potheses about the rules of linguistic description of the language to which

the sentences they hear belong (primary linguistic data). On the basis ofthese hypotheses, he then predicts the linguistic structure of future sentences

and compares these predictions to the sentences that arise, rejecting thosehypotheses that prove unjustified, and develops those that prove satisfactory.For him to be able to do all this, he must have, at a minimum, a capability

providing an invariant of a linguistic system (on the basis of which all pos-

sible specific systems are built) or an innate predisposition of the child to


sible specific systems are built) or an innate predisposition of the child to

JULYAUGUST 2006 21

and not its typological variations), and the ability to compare a specific sys-

tem with primary linguistic data, or a strategy for selecting an acceptablegrammar comparable to primary linguistic data.47

In formulating a theory of acquisition (we are far from having exhaustedhere even the most important tenets of this theory)Chomsky and Katz main-tained, for the most part, an a priori reasoningin the work of two other

authors the idea of innate knowledge was provided a specific basis. We arereferring to the work of McNeill, who traced the mechanism of childrens

acquisition of English, and Lenneberg, who studied the biological (i.e., in

our usagephysiological) preconditions for such acquisition.McNeills main work that we have access to is his article in the collection,

The Genesis of Language. There, following Braine,48

he introduces a distinc-tion between pivot-class words (P) and open-class words (O). The formerare words like more, big, bye-bye, in the phrases more milk, big

boat, bye-bye Daddy, while the latter are, correspondingly, the secondparts of these utterances. In other words, Pcorresponds to various predicat-ing words, while Ocorresponds to objects of this predication. In and of it-

self, this distinction is entirely sensible and logical; incidentally, it correspondsto the idea of the vector in utterance generation, which is discussed in the

following chapter. But McNeill presumes that the distinction betweenP

andOis innateor at least the ability to distinguish them is innate. The child

classifies randomly perceived elements of adult speech according to univer-sal categories exemplifying speech.49McNeill later asserts that baseline

grammatical relations are also part of innate language ability.50Among suchbaseline relations, he includes subject-predicate, predicate-object, modi-

fier in a nominal phrase-noun, and some others. McNeill also places theirinterrelations (hierarchy) within innate language knowledge.

Further components of McNeills model are tied to this initial assumption.

In the same collection with McNeills main work is a long article byLenneberg entitled, The Natural History of Language. This and other ar-

ticles by this author (The Capacity for Language Acquisition and TheBiological Perspective on Language) summarize separate parts of his majorbook published in 1967.51

Lennebergs main ideas can be summarized as follows. The childs capac-

ity to acquire a language is the consequence of an innate capacity (matura-tion) for the following reasons. First, the physiological substrate of this

acquisition is related to the physiological substrate of other child abilitiesthat are clearly innate (or at least abilities founded in innate features). Fori t th i l i t ti b t h d t di


instance there is a close interconnection between speech and motor coordi


mental retardation), then the speech function degrades as well. Third, speech

cannot be developed through exercise: if a child is at the babbling age, noth-ing will force him to truly speak before he matures.52

There are periods of child physical development that are optimal forlanguage acquisition, referred to by Lenneberg as critical periods.

With the exception of this last thesis and several others (that do not, how-

ever, belong exclusively to Lenneberg), his approach invites criticism, as J.Bar-Hillel has noted.53One can point, in particular, to the fact that his view-

point rests on various deductive conclusions, the validity of which are yet to

be proved; the entire manner of proofs is too artificialusing a comparisonof walking and writing and deriving from this comparison four criteria that

are then used in evaluating language.54

Actually, this reliance on deduction (arationalistic viewpoint as opposed to an empirical one) is also quite char-acteristic of Chomskys followers.

While Lenneberg is readily and extensively published in editions pro-duced by the followers and adherents of Chomsky and Millerand while heis frequently cited in the works of authors belonging to this schoolby no

means do his own views coincide with our views.Returning to the innate knowledge approach, we will make certain points

on this subject.We will start by saying that this approach very clearly reflects Chomskys

general thinking, which we discussed above. In other words, if a child hascertain abilities that cannot be explained based on what we know about the

genesis and mechanism of speech activity, this does not automatically implyrecognition of this as an a priori ability. What is a priori in regard to child

speech activity is not necessarily a prior in regard to his overall (i.e., innate)mental activity; it is entirely possible to presume that the given ability isassociated with a special functional specialization of mechanisms that were

formed in some other context. Before a definitive statement on this mattercan be made, it would be necessary to trace the genesis and the early stages not

only of the formation of speech ability but also other child abilities, to examinehow the childs relationship with the world as an integral system is formed.This is not being done by adherents of the theory of innate knowledge.

One of the rather paradoxical reasons for this self-limitation is that

Chomsky and many other adherents of the viewpoint are not consistentconstructivists in the sense in which this word is often used in our [Soviet]

psychology. For them, it is as if human behavior is made up of two compo-nents, which we will call biological and social. The social component is at f t t b th bi l i l t Th bi l i l


type of superstructure above the biological component The biological com

JULYAUGUST 2006 23

same laws as speech activity (it is guided by rules), but this applies specifi-

cally to social behavior. Behaviorism is criticized primarily for the fact thatits adherents apply simple models based on animals to more complex forms

of human behavior (such, for instance, is the spirit of Chomskys review ofSkinners book); they raise no questions about the possible existence of afundamental difference in the organization of processes that are not, strictly

speaking, social (such as perception) in man as compared with animals, andeven less so about whether indisputably biological behavior, including ani-

mals, may also rely on the principle of rules. Such a differentiation

between the biological and the socialis very characteristic of psychologicalthinking in the contemporary Westwith the exception, of course, of Marxist

works and the French sociological school. In fact, the answer to a questionoften does not take an eitheror form; in the case of higher forms of behav-ior we most often have andand.55

As it applies to the question at hand, the correctness or falseness of theinnate knowledge approach to a large degree (if not entirely) depends onwhether or not neurophysiological levels of organization of human speech

(and nonspeech) behavior are innate. Here, we cannot address this questionin detail, but one thing is completely obvious: that the a priori views we

expressed above about the possible open nature of the speech mechanism,are fully supported by the physiological data regarding the nomenclature

and interrelations of neurophysiological levels; if it is possible to talk aboutuniversals in speech behavior, then these universals are to a certain degree

universals of human behavior overall.From the perspective of contemporary Soviet psychology, the problem of

innateness must, evidently, be decided on the basis of the concept of afunctional system.56Applying that approach, however, the very framing ofthe problem turns out to be incorrect and demands reexamination.

Regardless, the fundamental tenets of the views held by Chomsky and hisfollowers about the problem of innate knowledge are not acceptable. In

future, we will not rely on the arguments of these authors and, where neces-sary, will attempt to limit ourselves to introducing only specific observa-tional and experimental data.

28. As can be seen from the content of this chapter, it is extraordinarily

difficult to put together, on the basis of numerous experimental studies, thatminimum of data that has actual heuristic significance for our problem, and

is not essentially tied to an a priori recognition of some model of speechgeneration. We will, however, attempt to do this.

1 Th i d bt th t i th ti f h t ti ti l b bilit


1 There is no doubt that in the generation of speech a statistical probability


integral and semantic units, but not to grammatical units; third, in the pro-

cess of speech there can be a sort of probability correction associated withthe constant influence of context.

2. A distinction should be made in a model of speech generation betweenthe problem of choosing one of many possible solutions and the problem ofmaking a particular decision (the carrying out of a chosen version of behav-

ior).3. A model of speech generation undoubtedly includes in some form a

block(or blocks) of long-term memory and a block (or blocks) of short-term

memory.4. A model of speech generation undoubtedly uses some form of a con-

structive principle such as the PSG principle, so that sentences that are morecomplex in terms of their construction require more complex operationalactivity.

5. The transformational complexity of a sentence is relevant to its psycho-logical complexity, although it is not clear in what form. In other words,some constructions are psycholinguistically ordinary and some are

psycholinguistically complex, requiring additional operations for speechgeneration or, alternatively, for interpretation.

6. The psycholinguistic structure of an utterance depends to a significantdegree on prelinguistic factors.

7. Within this structure one can tentatively identify the link of the innerscheme or the utterance program.

8. The utterance processing model must, evidently (at least in its gram-matical component), be the same for the generation and perception of speech).

Chapter 3

Plans: Their structure and realization

1. Naturally, before attempting a detailed analysis of the separate com-ponents of a model for the generation of speech utterances, or even before

listing such components, we should outline the most basic knowledge aboutthe fundamental structure of such a model and point out any features that are

not specific to our interpretation from one perspective or another and thatwill be common to any model of speech generation.

It is obvious, first of all, that any such model must have (a) an utterancemotivational stage. Actually, this stage lies beyond the bounds of a

h li i i d l h b if d i d i ill i l


h li i ti d l h b t if d t i t d it ill i l

JULYAUGUST 2006 25

The second stage that undoubtedly holds a place in any model of speech

generation is (b) the stage of intention (program, Plan) of the utterance.The third stage is (c) the stage of carrying out the intention (realization of

the plan). It is possible that this stage takes placepartially, of courseconcurrently with the second stage (i.e., while one part of the utterance isbeing realized, another is being planned).

The fourth stage, which may take place overlapping with the third is (d) thestage of comparing the realization of the intention with the intention itself.

It is easy to see that these stages correspond to the fundamental structure

of any intellectual act. We will review this structure.First, we must bear in mind the essential difference between two forms of

human behavior. We are referring to reflex behavior and intellectual behav-ior. The difference between them is that in the case of reflex behavior there isa rigid connection between the irritant or stimulus and the reflex reaction.

We do not extrapolate our model of becoming onto the future, but reactimmediately to it in accordance with the scheme of behavior that has takenshape in us through past experience, or has been endowed genetically (this

relates to an unconditional reflex activity). In the case of intellectual behav-ior there is no such rigid connection: we construct several potential models

of the future based on the situation as it stands and make a more or lessconscious choice of one of the possible reactions to the situation-irritant. In

other words, at the foundation of intellectual behavior lies mans ability toplan his actions based on the mediated nature of his specific activity.

Human intellectual behavior is comprised of separate intellectual acts,each of which generally consists of three phases. The first is orientation within

the situation, within the conditions of the problem, and the choice of a planof action. The second phase is the execution of the plan that has been se-lected. The third phase is the result attained with the intended objective. A

pupil who has to solve a math problem first weighs which way to solve it,then attempts to solve it, and, finally, looks at the answer key and is satisfied

that the answer is correct. A scholar formulating a new theory first studiesthe data available to him and proposes a certain hypothesis; he then carriesout an experiment to prove the correctness of this hypothesis, and, finally, is

satisfied with the correctness. A taxi driver heading for a particular destina-

tion in the city first thinks about what route would be the best, and thendrives until he reaches the desired destination.

Thus, the concept of an intellectual act is interconnected with the con-cept of activity.57An intellectual act is usually an act of activity or at leastf t i t f ti th t t th i l


forms a certain aggregate of actions that together comprise a more complex


ent phases. First, the planning of actions may involve speech, with the planned

actions being either verbal or nonverbal. In these two cases, the nature ofplanning is completely different. In the first case, there is a programming of

a speech utterance without a preliminary explicit formulation of a plan usinglanguage; the second is specifically the formulation of a plan of action in theform of speech. We are interested only in the first case. These two functions

of speech in the planning of activity should not be confused, as they occa-sionally are.58The fact that both types of planning are often called inner

speech seems to play a significant role in this confusion.

Second, the actions themselves can be verbal. At the same time, the inter-relations between verbal and nonverbal actions within an intellectual act can

be very different. Again, this difference can be twofold. This interrelationcan change first, due to a change in the length of a speech utterance given theexact sameness of the remaining components of the activity; and second,

due to the proportion of verbal actions in an activity overall, that is, as aresult of a change in the structure of that act.

Third, the comparison of the result achieved and the intended objective

can be verbal. This occurs in cases where the activity-act is rather complex,usually when the intellectual act is entirely or almost entirely theoretical (as

is often the case, for instance, in scholarly activities).The first functionspecifically, the use of speech in planning nonverbal

actsand the second function are the most typical speech functions in activity.It should be pointed out here that the very term speech activity contains a

certain inner contradiction. Speech activity as an independent, complete activ-ity-act is extremely rare; it is usually just one component of a higher-order

activity. A typical speech utterance is an utterance that in one way or anotherregulates the behavior of another person.59But this means that the activity canbe considered complete only if this regulation has been successfully achieved.

For instance, I ask the person sitting next to me at the table to pass me a pieceof bread. The act of speech activity (an intellectual act), if taken as a whole, is

not complete: the goal will be achieved only if and when the person sittingnext to me actually passes me the bread. Therefore, in talking about speechactivity we are not being precise: often this term does not indicate an isolated

activity-act, but a complex of speech acts, each of which has its own interme-

diate goal that is subordinate to the overall goal of the activity as such.However, this complex is also organized in a certain way. It is not a linear

chain of acts sequentially executed on the basis of a certain a priori programor on heuristic information. And the organization of this complex (in this

i l th h t) lik th i ti f t th t i


case simply the speech act) like the organization of any act that is a compo

JULYAUGUST 2006 27

of the activity-act overall, insofar as we understand acts as relatively inde-

pendent processes subordinate to the conscious goal.60In any event, speechaction presumes the setting of a goal, the planning, and the execution of the

plan (or rather program) and finally, the comparison of the goal and theresult, that is, it is a variety of an intellectual act.

From the perspective of psychology, a variety of types of speech utter-

ances can be identified. One of the most complete classifications of suchtypes was proposed by F. Kainz, who differentiated the following:

(a) Initiative speech or spontaneous speech. In this case, On his own

initiative and with his own choice of linguistic material, a person formulatesa subject and semantic content that he himself has acquired and developed

using the expressive capabilities of language;61

(b) Reactive speech, which Kainz understands as an answer to a questionposed by an interlocutor, where speech is not strictly speaking spontaneous

andalthough Kainz does not explicitly formulate thisin part goes beyondthe question of the nature of the capabilities used. In both regards, reactivespeech, depending on the type of answer, can come significantly close to

initiative speech (if the question demands something more than a yes orno answer);

(c) Imitative speech, arising most often in pathological cases and allow-ing for both an understanding of its meaning andin extreme casesa lack

of such understanding;(d) Automatic speech, usually associated with a dreamlike state of con-

sciousness (sleep, trance) or manifesting itself as a symptom of a specificmental illness;

(e) Stochastic speech (Reihensprechen), realized during the reproductionof excerpts of texts that have been memorized. Common phenomena thatfall into this category are a series of whole numbers, the alphabet, the names

of the days of the week, and the months, prayers, poetry, and other worksthat have been memorized, articles of the legal code (for lawyers), famous

quotations, well-learned and often-played roles (for actors), and so on.62

Even such a cursory description shows that the types of speech identifiedby Kainz have much in common and the distinctions he draws obviously do

not rest on unambiguous criteria. Further analysis reveals several aspects of

these criteria: (1) the utterance motivation (abc, d, e); (2) a constructive orstochastic principle of organization (a, bc, e) (in the case of dit is not clear);

(3) the extent to which consciousness is involved (c1, dc2, e).From American psychological work, we will introduce here the classifi-

ti f t f h b h i f d i B F Ski h li l


cation of types of speech behavior found in B F Skinner who relies exclu


According to Skinner, utterances can be divided into four main types: (a)

controlled behavior (see below); (b) mands; (c) tacts; (d) autoclitics.The term mand comes from the words command, demand, and counter-

mand. Into this category, Skinner puts utterances motivated, so to speak,from within. Mands can be of the following types: (a) a request, such as

The bread, please; (b) a command involving an additional, nonverbal rein-

forcement:Hands up(implying, Or Ill shoot); (c) a question, such as What

is your name?So mand is the equivalent of spontaneous speech. Con-

trolled behavior can be divided into: (a) echo-answers (imitative speech); (b)

textual behavior (behavior that follows a written text); (c) transcription, inwhich Skinner generally includes translation of a communication from one

form to another, for instance putting dictation into writing; (d) intraverbalbehavior, basically analogous to Kainzs stochastic speech, but also in-cluding association and translation. Tact (short for contact) is a sort of

speech behavior where the motivation comes from without, that is, it is theequivalent of reactive speech. Autoclitics are answers to answers that havealready been given like assertions, negations, qualifications, or quantifica-

tions of speech utterances.C. Fries bases his classification of forms of utterances on two criteria: the

ability of the utterance to begin a conversation where the speaker pronouncesit. As a result, he distinguishes three types of utterances: situational (ca-

pable of starting a conversation), continuing (not beginning, but belongingto the same speaker), and responding (not beginning, associated with a

switch to another speaker).64

J. Carroll65also bases his classification of speech utterances on two crite-

ria. The first is a functional criterion; the second is the sentential ornonsentential nature of the utterance, that is, whether or not it takes theform of a sentence. In Carrolls works, we have the following (examples

taken by us from Russian).I. Nonsentential forms of expression.

A. Greetings, and so on:Hi [privet]; Greetings [zdorovo]; See you soon[poka];Its been ages [Skolko let, skolko zim].

B. Appeals and other means of attracting attention:Hey! [Ei!]Ivan![Ivan!]

C. Nonsentential exclamations: Oh! [Okh!] What the hell![Chert poberi!]

D. Nonsentential responses: Yes[Da],No [Net],Hmm [Aga],Agreed[Idet],

Okay[Ladno].

II. Types of sentences.A. Existence assertions, usually expressed in English through the con-

t ti Th i


struction There is

JULYAUGUST 2006 29

In Soviet psychological and linguistic literature, a similar classification of

speech utterance forms, as far as we know, has been provided by two au-thorsone from the perspective of psychology and the other from a strictly

linguistic perspective. We are referring to A.R. Luria and G.A. Zolotov.A.R. Luria classifies utterances on different levels. Primarily, he distin-

guishes four main forms of utterances.

Affective speech is exclamation, interjection or customary expressions:

yea, yea; well, of course; oh, hell!These forms of speech do not generally

originate from some idea, they do not form a thought, they mostly express

certain inner affective states and express an attitude toward a situation.66

Oral dialogic speech is the equivalent of Kainzs reactive speech and

Skinners tact.

The question of one conversant is the initial, beginning stage or the stimu-

lus to speech; from it (and not from an inner idea) comes the answer of the

second conversant. The function of formulating the thought is taken on by

the conversant who is asking me a question. . . . A person who formulates

a verbal response to this question always knows the overall subject being

discussed.67

Oral monologic speech or a speech communication is different in that

the subject of communication originates not from the stimulus of the con-versation partner, and not from the situation under which association is tak-

ing place, but from a persons inner intention, which formulates this

communication, from the thoughts of the subject, from the content that thissubject wants to convey in an expanded utterance.68This is the equivalent ofKainzs initiative speech.

Finally, written monologic speech is a type of conversation without aninterlocutor. It brings all features characteristic of oral monologic speech to

their logical conclusion.Although Luria himself, like most other authors, does not explicitly for-

mulate the criteria he uses, it is fairly easy to infer them from his classifica-

tion. There are three: (a) motivation, (b) the constructive vs. the stochasticprinciple, and (c) the degree of consciousness, which distinguishes this last

type from all previous ones.

Furthermore, based on the work of G. Svedelius,69Luria provides a classi-fication of utterances for the communication of events and the communi-

cation of relationships (additionally, he compares utterances and pointingto an object, a variation on existence assertions). In the communication ofevents the specific interaction of things is formulated and conveyed: the


events the specific interaction of things is formulated and conveyed: the


relationships establishes the abstract-logical interrelations between a subject

and a feature: Socrates is a man. In the case of communications of relations,media of language play a role that is completely specific to language: they

form certain relations, abstracting certain features and, with them as a basis,identifying abstract relations that cannot be expressed using visual,nonlinguistic means.70

Such a distinction is by no means external, phenomenal; it is deeply rootedin the mechanism of linguistic thought.

Observation has shown that while the communication of events involves

visual thoughts, merely expressed in verbal form, the communication of

relationships demands the participation of operations using spatial rela-

tionships and the combining of correlated elements of the entire utterancein a single, simultaneous (quasi-spatial) structure. . . . The difference be-

tween these two constructions, which is clear for psychology, is supported

by neurolinguistic research. . . . A characteristic feature of these patients

[with damage to the parietooccipital region of the left hemisphereA.L.]

is the fact that logical-grammatical constructions that are different in terms

of their inner structure do not experience the same fate. While communi-

cation of events as a rule remains intact, communication of relation-

ships falls apart, and the patient loses the ability to use them.

71

G.A. Zolotova followed a fundamentally different path, being unfamiliar

with both Svedeliuss book and Lurias work, and relied exclusively on Rus-sian linguistic traditions. Without getting into all the ideas on this matter

expressed in the history of Russian linguistics, we will limit ourselves tointroducing the classification offered by V.A. Bogoroditskii. He distinguished

between sentences depicting a fact, sentences that determine the subjectrelative to its generic concept (this type of sentence is used when it is

necessary to define what the given subject is [for instance, the horse is ananimal]. In this case, the subject is a specific concept, the predicate indicatesthe generic concept to which the speaker relates the specific concept),72and

he distinguished between sentences that define the subject in terms of qual-ity. Sentences of this type are used when it is necessary to indicate one oranother quality of a subject, for instance, the wolf is gray.73

Zolotovas classification is somewhat more detailed.74 In particular, she

identifies: sentences that communicate: a quantity of items; a subject andobject of possession; a subject possessing a conditional feature; the state of a

subject; a phenomenon and its evaluation, revealing the content of one abstractconcept through another; the feasibility or the completion of an act; the cor-


p g ; y p ;

JULYAUGUST 2006 31

is preliminary, and by no means covers the diversity of forms of utterances

possible in the Russian language.Here we will bring our overview of the literature about classifications of

speech utterances to an end, although it is by no means exhaustive, and wewill try to explicitly formulate those criteria that (from our perspective) canand should be used in the psychological analysis of speech.

These criteria can be of three main types. We can conditionally designatethem as physiological, psychological, and linguistic. The reader, however,

should keep in mind that such a naming is extremely conditional. We will

include within the first group the criteria that are associated with the innerorganization of speech mechanisms. The second group contains the criteria

associated with the fundamental structure of an activity-act and thesociopsychological functions of speech (language) (forms and types ofspeech interaction in connection with its specific conditions).75The third

and final group includes the criteria associated with the particular features oflinguistic realization of utterances (forms of individual utterances . . . inclose association with the interaction of which they are elements).76

I. Physiological criteria(1) Orientation of the system of neurophysiological levels of speech be-

havior (what level is principal). This perspective gives us the following:(a) Communicative speech,

(b) Nominative speech,(c) Echoing speech,

(d) Choral speech.(2) The constructive, or stochastic, principle of speech generation, in par-

ticular the presence or absence of speech programming. This perspectivegives us the following:

(a) Active speech (mand),

(b) Reactive speech. Its status in this regard is unclear (compare the view-points of Kainz, Luria, and Skinner),

(c) Different types of nonstandard speech: their nomenclature is notclear. Compare Kainzs imitative, automatic, and stochastic speech;Skinners echo-answers, textual behavior, transcription, and intraverbal

behavior. This question can be left open, since in the present work we will

be dealing exclusively with active andto a lesser degreereactive speech.(3) The degree to which consciousness takes part. From this perspective,

at least the following can be identified:(a) Unconscious speech,(b) C t ll d h


(b) Controlled speech


II. Psychological criteria.

(1) The place of the utterance within the structure of the intellectual act orthe overall activity-act. From this perspective the following can be identified:

(a) Planning speech,(b) Speech act,(c) Comparing speech.

(2) Utterance motivation. From this perspective we can identify at leastthe following:

(a) Spontaneous speech,

(b) Situationally conditioned speech,(c) Contextually conditioned speech,

(d) Unmotivated speech.(3) The functional orientation of the utterance. From this perspective we

can identify quite a few types of utterances, of which we will note:

(a) A command or request,(b) A question,(c) A greeting,

(d) An exclamation (Lurias affective speech),(e) Autoclitics,

(f) A statement utterance.III. Linguistic criteria.

(1) Sententiality, that is, the expansiveness or nonexpansiveness of anutterance in a sentence. Here, we have the following:

(a) Nonsentential forms of utterance,(b) Sentential forms of utterance,

(c) Supersentential forms of utterance, corresponding to the order ofsentences,

(d) Suprasentential forms of utterance, corresponding to a part of the

sentence.(2) Logical-psychological types of utterances (communication of events

or communication of relationships, classifications of Bogoroditsky andZolotova).

(3) The correlation of utterances with a speaker. Here, Fries provides us

with the following:

(a) Beginning utterances,(b) Continuing utterances,

(c) Responding utterances.From this outline it can be seen that the types of utterances identified

i i it i ft l (f i t it i I 2 d


using various criteria often overlap (for instance compare criteria I 2 and

JULYAUGUST 2006 33

forms of communication could exist and be socially determined, differing

from other forms in only one single feature, and not always an essentialfeature at that; and it is no accident that the most widespread and most typi-

cal types of speech communication have the greatest number of features inthis outline. For instance, ordinary spontaneous speech is simultaneouslydefined (and is distinguished from any other type of speech) by features

I.1.a; I.2.a; 1.3.b; II.1.b; II.2.a or b; III.3.a, and so on.Departing somewhat from the main topic of this section, we will point out

that there are other criteria that can be used to classify speech utterances.

Along with forms of speech, it is also possible to distinguish types of speechor types of speech activity by whether or not they can both exist in the same

speaker (sound speech, mimic speech, etc.); by language function and speechfunction, attributing them to one or another utterance; proper speech and im-proper speech forms of utterance realization (i.e., the presence of functional

equivalents of speech on different levels and the level at which this equiva-lence is established), and so forth.78Not so long ago, A.A. Kholodovich79pro-vided an entire system of features that he used to characterize speech

typologically. He distinguishes: (1) the means of expression (sound, writing,gesture); (2) the presence or absence of a conversation partner; (3) the direc-

tionality (uni- and bidirectionality) of the speech act; (4) the presence of oneof many perceivers (individual or mass communication);80(5) the close-con-

tact or distance of the speech act. Other similar systems, which we will notnow discuss, are also possible.

We will now return to our main task and will set the boundariesrelyingon a specific classificationof those types of speech that we will be dealing

with. They will be:I.1.acommunicative speech,I.2.a and bactive and reactive speech,

I.3.b and ccontrolled and conscious speech,II.1.bspeech act,

II.2.a, b, and cspontaneous, and situationally and contextually condi-tioned speech,

II.3.futterances that are primarily statements,

III.1.bsentential forms of utterances,

II.2this feature is not relevant for us now,III.3this feature is not relevant for us now.

While the types of speech that we will be further analyzing have had atleast some psychological and psycholinguistic discussion, making it pos-ibl t i ti d t th t f h th t t i l d d h


sible to use existing data the types of speech that are not included here


therefore, their study has to start from the very beginning. It is natural that

thisalong with the limited scope of this bookhas led to the necessity ofcompletely abstaining from examining them, although making use of even

those materials relating to the rather narrow area of our interest would beextremely worthwhile.

2. We have already written quite a bit about the fundamental structure of

activity in our other works.81For this reason we will address this questiononly briefly, for purely heuristic purposes, so that the reader will not be forced

to search.

The specific nature of human activity is characterized by two main fea-tures. The first of them is goal-orientation, that is, the presence from the very

start of certain goals, the attainment of which marks the cessation of an ac-tivity-act. Activity is organized (consciously or unconsciously) in just thisway, so that this goal can be achieved with optimal means and the minimal

expenditure of time and energy. In addition to a goal, an activity-act is char-acterized by a particular motive; one and the same activity may be carriedout as the result of a variety of motives. One might save a drowning person

under the influence of an inner moral imperative, but one can also throwoneself into the water to save him in just the same way from a vanity-driven

desire to be a hero in the eyes of onlookers or to impress a specific person.The second feature is the structure of activity. It is made up of a sequence

of acts, of the components of activity, which are characterized by an inde-pendent interim goal. These acts can be of two kinds: external, practical and

inner, cognitive. Between the two (and, correspondingly, between practicaland theoretical activity overall), there is no fundamental boundary: almost

any activity-act incorporates both external and inner acts. Depending on thespecific circumstances under which the act is carried out, it may compriseindividual operations of either type.

We will introduce an example of an extremely simple activity-act: a pro-fessor, interrupting his lecture, walks up to the window and closes it. There

could be a variety of motives for this: there was a cold draft; or the profes-sor noticed that his audience was getting cold; or there was a loud noiseoutside, making it difficult to be heard; and so on. The goal: close the win-

dow. The action: to descend from the podium, walk up to the window, and

close the window. The operations associated with these actions are deter-mined by the height of the podium, the distance to the window, the con-

struction of the window frame, and so forth.If we attempt to find in this system a place for speech activity, or rather for

th t f h t 82 th b i th t i th di


the aggregate of speech acts 82 then remembering that in the preceding para

JULYAUGUST 2006 35

acts or a speech act (to simplify our discussion, from now on we will assume

that a speech utterance does not extend beyond the bounds of a single speechact) constitutes a particular instance of an act within an activity-act. In other

words, a speech act: (a) is characterized by its own goal or task (intermediatein relation to the activity overall and subordinate to the activity goal); (b) isgenerally determined by the structure of the activity overall and in particular

by those acts that preceded it within the activity-act (in the same way that theact of closing a window requires a series of preceding acts and cannot be

carried out or even programmed until this series has been completed); and

(c) has a specific inner structure that is conditioned by the interaction of itsfeatures that are tied to the structure of the activity-act and are common to

many activity-acts of the same type and to the specific conditions or circum-stances under which this act is being carried out in this particular instanceand at this particular time.

Let us attempt to address all of these aspects of the speech act in greaterdetail.

We generate a variety of speech acts, that is, we speak. Howif we

address the question in all its possible aspectsis it determined what speechmeans we use in a given instance? To make it easier for the reader to follow

the course of the discussion, we will take a hypothetical situation, one alreadyintroduced above: someone asks the person sitting next to him to pass the

breadand we will turn to this example from time to time.1. The first factor influencing the speech act is the overall predominant

motivation or motive of activity.83In this case it will be a feeling of hunger, aneed for food. So the range of speech utterances possible is immediately

reduced. We now have only such speech acts that can lead to the eventualresult, to the satisfaction of a needto feeling full.

2. The second factor is what P.K. Anokhin refers to as situational

afferentation: What we mean by situational afferentation is the aggregate ofall those external effects on the organism from a particular circumstance

that, together with the initial motivation, most fully informs the being of thechoice of action that best corresponds to the motivation at that moment. Thephysiological role and behavioral implication of the situational afferentation

derives from the fact that itprimarily due to the relative constancy of ac-

tion that characterizes itcreates in the central nervous system a rather wide-spread, integrated system of stimuli, a sort of neuronal model of the

situation.84

In other words, it is the limitations on the choice of action (andspeech action, in particular) that are imposed by the situation at the start ofth ti A d thi it ti i t i d f t f t hi h


the action And this situation in turn is composed of two factors which we


Factor A is the element within the situation that does not depend on the

given activity or on the actions that came before our action, but only pas-sively participates in the choice of method for carrying out the speech act. Of

course this independence, absoluteness is essentially relative; the veryfact that I wound up sitting at the dinner table is the result of my prior pur-poseful activity. However, in addition to this component, Factor A also en-

compasses a component not dependent on my previous activity, for instance,the fact that the bread basket turned out to be out of my reach. It is essential

to underscore that situational afferentation encompasses only what in the

situation influences the choice of action and not what influences the variabil-ity in the way that the chosen action is carried out.

Factor B is the element within the situation that is tied to previous ac-tions within the framework of the activity-act, which is created by theseactions. During the creation of the neuronal model of the situation (a

model of the past and of the present, in the words of N.A. Bernstein),Factors A and B are equivalent and undifferentiated; the difference be-tween them is purely genetic.

3. Thus, a model of the past and of the present has been created in us, inaccordance with which we must carry out our speech action. But it is obvi-

ous that the choice of actions possible in the given situationeven takinginto account the predominant motivationis still exceptionally large. And

the next factor to influence the choice of action is what Miller, Pribram, andGalanter call the image of the result, and what Bernstein calls the model

of the future.Modeling of the future is possible only through extrapolation of what

the brain takes from information in the current situation, from fresh tracesof immediately preceding perceptions, from all of an individuals precedingexperience, and, finally, from those active trials and probings that relate to

the class of actions that are still very summarily designated as orientationresponses. . . .85Unlike the model of the past and present, the model of the

future is probabilistic in nature. During any phase of extrapolation, the brainis capable only of outlining for the impending moment a sort of table ofprobabilities of possible outcomes.86

In contemporary Soviet physiology, an organisms appraisal of probabilis-

tic experience accumulated in the past and guiding assessments of probabili-ties in a model of the future is referred to as probability prognosis of activity.

What is the mechanism of such a probability prognosis?

The emergence of Situation A is a signal for the preparation of the organisms


The emergence of Situation A is a signal for the preparation of the organism s

JULYAUGUST 2006 37

past followed A with equal frequency (i.e., the less clear the prognosis is),

the broader the range of physiological systems that are mobilized in re-

sponse to the A signal. Such a preadjustment toactions in the impending

situation based on the probabilistic structure of past experience can be calledprobability prognosis.87

From the above it is clear that the probabilistic structure of past experiencein such an understanding is associated not with the frequency of the appear-

ance of particular stimuli in the past, but with the frequency of particularresponses to them by the living being. This understanding correlates with dataon the statistical organization of perception overall, and the perception of speech

in particular, explained in part in 3 of chapter 2 of this book.

I.M. Feigenberg has proposed the hypothesis that certain mental disor-ders seen in patients with schizophrenia are rooted in a breakdown in themechanism of probability prognosis. The schizophrenic is unable to correctly

assess the conditional probability of a particular outcome; his choice is ran-dom, and when it takes place, the phenomenon of split personality may

occur, since the patient perceives his behavior as inadequate. To jump ahead,we could also point out that a breakdown in probability prognosis on the

level of the fundamental organization of speech acts is associated with a

breakdown of probabilistic structure on other levels as well. In the words ofB.V. Zeigarnik, it can be observed that among schizophrenic patients, there

is a rich and multidimensional nature of associations, the phenomenon ofdisjointed speech, constructed and based on random associative coupling

of speech units. I.M. Feigenberg notes the

frequent use of words that are rarely encountered in the speech of healthy

people. . . . While in a given situation a healthy person will choose from a

large selection of possible associations or words that are frequently used

by others (or that have led to success) under similar circumstances in thepast; the mentally ill do not seem to take this frequency into account (there

is a leveling of the probability of selection).

From this viewpoint, the schizophrenic defect can be seen as a probabi-

listic disorganization of the use of information (past experience) stored in

the brain, as an increased entropy in the brain as an informational system.88

A similar picture emerges among patients with damage to the brains frontallobe, a condition referred to as frontal lobe syndrome. Using a method for

probabilistic analysis of perception proposed by E.N. Sokolov, Luria arrivedat the conclusion that among this group of patients, the process of collatingincoming information with an image or models of possible representation


incoming information with an image or models of possible representation


reading of a textthe impossibility of keeping oneself within the confines

of the systems for selecting connections that are provided in the text and theemergence of incidental connections, and the inability to inhibit them.90Es-

pecially characteristic are intellectual activity disorders such as the solvingof math problems: In them, as a rule, the phase of preliminary orientationwithin the conditions of the problem is completely, or, to a significantly de-

gree, absent, and the overall scheme (plan) needed to solve them does notemerge. This strategy-lacking process for solving problems turns into com-

binations of separate numbers, none of which usually have any relation to

the ultimate goal.91 However, as far as can be determined, this is not somuch a matter of the breakdown of the probability prognosis per se, as a

breakdown in the fundamental organization of the act, of its strategy.Up to this point we have been talking about the probabilistic experience

factor, based on the premise that our subject has in the past encountered a

situation analogous to the present one sufficiently frequent to be able to ac-quire this experience. However, one can imagine another possibility, onewhere the choice of action is not based on experience so much as on an

ongoing assessment of the significance of a particular action for behavior.Here we run into a range of questions that are associated with mathematical

problems about reaching an objective in a changing environment, questionsthat have been developed in recent years by I.M. Gelfand, V.S. Gurfinkel,

and the recently deceased M.L. Tsetlin. We are not here to look in depth atthe results they achieved; their application to speech activity demands its

own analytical monograph.92We will merely note that the situations in whichit is nece

a. a. leontiev - psycholinguistic units and speech generation

Documents

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problem of inner speech

restructuring of speech

articulated speech

idiomatic speech

speech foroneself

speech generation2d

psychological predicativity