a betting market: description and a theoretical explanation of bets in pelota matches
DESCRIPTION
A Betting Market: Description and a theoretical explanation of bets in Pelota Matches. Loreto Llorente. Josemari Aizpurua. Universidad Pública de Navarra, Pamplona, Spain. Objective. Study the Pelota betting system Description of the betting system The game The betting system - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Loreto Llorente
Josemari Aizpurua
Universidad Pública de Navarra, Pamplona, Spain
A Betting Market: Description and a theoretical explanation of
bets in Pelota Matches
Objective
• Study the Pelota betting system– Description of the betting system
• The game
• The betting system
– Explain theoretically the existence of a bet
– Study empirically this betting market: field data analysis
Introduction
Financial markets
Betting markets
- Odds systems
- Pari-mutuel betting
- Odds offered by bookmakers
- Point spread offered by bookmakers
Sauer 1998
The Pelota betting system
• Two teams, the reds and the blues play by taking turns to hit a ball against a wall in a place called fronton.
54 m
12 m11m
The Pelota betting system
THE GAME
• When a team makes an error, the opponent scores one point.
• The team that accumulates a fixed number of points (40) wins the match.
Jai Alai game
• Bettors bet one against another
THE BETTING SYSTEM
• The middleman gets a commission
• Bets can be place at any time
• Odds vary but are fixed in a bet
MIDDLEMAN(16% of the earnings)
YOUYOUR OPONENT
“6 TO 100”
Two teams playing
• Throughout the whole game you can see on a screen the effective odds in the market and the score at the moment
sr = red team’s score
sb = blue team’s scoreR srB sb
Odds Scores
R = Amount of money you risk if you bet on red team
B = Amount you risk if you bet on blue team
• The odds consist of two numbers
• The higher number is always the same (100) and the other varies as points are played
The odds
The game has just started
– The score is zero - zero
– One bet on the reds: you play the lottery
• 84 if reds win, -100 if blues win
– One bet on blue
• 84 if blues win, -100 if reds win
Example:100 0100 0
sr = red team’s score
sb = blue team’s scoreR srB sb
Odds Scores
R = Quantity of money you risk if you bet on red teamB = Quantity you risk if you bet on blue team
• Reds score 15 point. – The score is 15 zero to reds.
– The odds are 100 to 2 on reds
– One bet on blues
– One bet on reds
• 1,68 if reds win, -100 if blues win
• 84 if blue win, -2 if reds win
100 152 0
• Reds score 1 point. – The score is 1 - zero to reds. – The odds are 100 to 90 on reds– One bet on reds: 75,6 if reds win, -100 if blues win– One bet on blues: -90 if reds win, 84 if blues win
100 190 0
• Reds score 15 points. – The score is 15 zero to reds.
– The odds are 100 to 2 on reds
– One bet on reds
• 1,68 if reds win, -100 if blues win
– One bet on blues
• 84 if blue win, -2 if reds win
100 152 0
Odds Scores
• Near the end – The score is 39 to 38 to the reds
– The odds are 100 to 40 on the reds
– One bet on reds: 33,6 if reds win, -100 if blues win
– One bet on blues: -40 if reds win, 84 if blues win
100 3940 38
• At the end of the game.
The middleman
– The middleman is paid by the people who have lost.
– He gets 16% (commission).
– The middleman pays people the amount won.
Odds Scores
Theoretical explanation of a bet
Assume all individuals are equal
• Expected utility theory (EU)– Risk-averse individuals there are no bets– Risk-neutral individuals when commissions,
there are no bets– Risk-taking individuals they decide to bet
all their wealth
We look for theoretical explanation of bets in the fronton and we find it
• Rank dependent expected utility model (RDEU) by Quiggin.
Wi-OR
OB
Wi+OR
Sb=1
Sr=1
S0
Final wealth if r
Final wealth if b
OR / OB
Wi
OB
Wi
Consumption set without commissions
risk averse’s IC
when pr/pb= OR/OBwhen pr/pb> OR/OBwhen pr/pb< OR/OB
Under EU there are no bets!
Theoretical explanation of a bet (2)
EU
r = the reds winb = the blues winWi = i’s wealthSr = #bets on r
Assuming equal individuals
– Under EU there are no possible bets• Sr EU ({(W - Sr OR, W + Sr OB); (1-pr, pr)}) = (1-
pr) u(W - Sr OR) + pr u(W + Sr OB)
• Sb EU ({(W + Sr OR, W - Sr OB); (1-pr, pr)}) = (1-pr) u(W + Sr OR) + pr u(W - Sr OB)
• There are no possible bets :– If OR/OB > pr /(1-pr) everyone willing to bet on the blues
– If OR/OB < pr /(1-pr) everyone willing to bet on the reds
– If OR/OB < pr /(1-pr) everyone bets 0
– RDEU: possible find bets (interior solution)
• Sr RDEU ({(W - Sr OR, W + Sr OB); (1-pr, pr)}) = q(1-pr) u(W - Sr OR) + (1- q(1-pr)) u(W +Sr OB)
• Sb RDEU ({(W - Sb OB, W + Sb OR); (pr, 1-pr)}) = q(pr) u(W - Sr OR) + (1- q(pr)) u(W +Sr OB)
• Existence of a bet requires
)('
)('
1 xU
yU
p
p
O
O
r
r
B
R
Optimum s.t.
Theoretical explanation of a bet (3)
x = final wealth if r
y = final wealth if b
Optimistic bettors!
Decreasing MgU(W)
)('
)('
1 yU
xU
p
p
O
O
r
r
B
R
)('
)('
)1(
)1(1
xU
yU
pq
pq
O
O
r
r
B
R
)('
)('
)(1
)(
yU
xU
pq
pq
O
O
r
r
B
R
)1()(1 rr pqpq
Wi-OR
OB
Wi+OR
Sb=1
Sr=1
S0
Final wealth if r
Final wealth if b
OR / OB
Wi
OB
Wi
Under RDEU there are possible bets
between optimistic bettors!
Under RDEU individual’s probability of outcome is weighted depending on the outcome’s rank, thus we find possible bets when individuals are optimistic.
optimistic’s IC:
Theoretical explanation of a bet (4)
)1()(1 rr pqpq )(1
)(
r
r
pq
pq
)1(
)1(1
r
r
pq
pq
Consumption set with commissions
CS’s slope betting on reds =
OR/OB(1-t)
•Wi
OB (1-t)OB
Wi-OR
Sb=1
Sr=1
S0
•
•
Final wealth if r
Final wealth if b
Wi
CS’s slope betting on blues =
OR(1-t)/OB
Wi+(1-t)OR
Under RDEU with optimistic individuals there are possible bets even with commissions!
Theoretical explanation of a bet (5)
Betting on f:
Empirical analysis
Odds; favorite favorite
(Of , Ol) Cases winnes lf losses f
l
(1000, 900) 121 62 (0,51) 0,48 59 (0,49) 0,43
(1000, 800) 68 29 (0,43) 0,51 39 (0,57) 0,4
(1000, 700) 39 25 (0,64) 0,55 14 (0,36) 0,37
(1000, 600) 51 38 (0,75) 0,58 13 (0,25) 0,34
(1000, 500) 48 41 (0,85) 0,63 7 (0,15) 0,3
(1000, 400) 33 21 (0,64) 0,68 12 (0,36) 0,25
(1000, 300) 28 20 (0,71) 0,74 8 (0,29) 0,2
(1000, 250) 12 8 (0,67) 0,77 4 (0,33) 0,17
(1000, 200) 28 27 (0,96) 0,81 1 (0,04) 0,14
(1000, 150) 16 16 (1) 0,85 0 (0) 0,11
(1000, 120) 11 11 (1) 0,88 0 (0) 0,09
(1000, 100) 20 20 (1) 0,89 0 (0) 0,08
(1000, 80) 9 9 (1) 0,91 0 (0) 0,06
(1000, 60) 3 3 (1) 0,93 0 (0) 0,05
(1000, 50) 2 2 (1) 0,94 0 (0) 0,04
• Data from 27 matches f = favourite l = long-shot
Betting on l:
This upper bound on the worst outcome: subjective probability weight (worst outcome)
lf
ff
l
OtO
tO
1
1
0
fl
ffl
l tOO 11 0
ll
ll
f
OtO
tO
1
1
lf
llf
f tOO 11
Worst outcome's probabilities weights
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1
Real frequency of the worst outcome
Weig
ht
att
ach
ed
(in
ferr
ed
fro
m o
dd
s)
(frequency "favorite w ins", a non-favorite bettor's w eight)(frequency "favorite losses", a favorite bettor's w eight)
Empirical Analysis (2)
p72.0104.0 865.02 R
Long-shot bias
cc
c
pbp
bp
1
839.02 R
Bettors
- Optimistic
- Overestimate low probabilities and underestimate high ones
55.0 84.0 cb
• Description of the betting system• Theoretical support for the existence of a bet• Empirical study
Summary and Conclusions
Opinions are welcome!