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A Bi-Modal ForceA Bi-Modal Forceforfor

the National Maritime the National Maritime StrategyStrategy

Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.

Naval Postgraduate SchoolNaval Postgraduate School

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Two PropositionsTwo Propositions

Since 1950 the national strategy has been Since 1950 the national strategy has been a forward maritime strategy with several a forward maritime strategy with several variations variations

The current variation should be supported The current variation should be supported with a “bi-modal” forcewith a “bi-modal” force

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1950s: Samuel P. Huntington’s 1950s: Samuel P. Huntington’s HeritageHeritage

His “Transoceanic Navy” supported a national His “Transoceanic Navy” supported a national maritime strategymaritime strategy

Not a speculation on a “new direction.” He Not a speculation on a “new direction.” He described what the nation was doing and the described what the nation was doing and the Navy roleNavy role

America didn’t need border defenses and we America didn’t need border defenses and we had command of the seahad command of the sea

The national interest was served best by forward The national interest was served best by forward ops for containmentops for containment

His strategy served the people. VisiblyHis strategy served the people. Visibly It helped structure the armed forcesIt helped structure the armed forces

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1970s and 1980s: 1970s and 1980s: The Zumwalt-Turner VariationThe Zumwalt-Turner Variation

Specified four “missions” of our NavySpecified four “missions” of our Navy Deterrence of nuclear warDeterrence of nuclear war Sea control to keep oceans safe for tradeSea control to keep oceans safe for trade Power projection overseasPower projection overseas Presence for peacekeepingPresence for peacekeeping

Why change? Because the SU wouldn’t tolerate Why change? Because the SU wouldn’t tolerate US supremacy at seaUS supremacy at sea

Continued the transoceanic strategyContinued the transoceanic strategy To confront all enemies overseasTo confront all enemies overseas Prominently the Soviet UnionProminently the Soviet Union And for positive influence on our friendsAnd for positive influence on our friends Prominently NATO and JapanProminently NATO and Japan

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1990s: After the Soviet Union’s 1990s: After the Soviet Union’s CollapseCollapse

Resulted in forces for two contingenciesResulted in forces for two contingencies Characterization: No peer competitor, small wars Characterization: No peer competitor, small wars

disregarded, sea control (still) assumeddisregarded, sea control (still) assumed Navy returned to simple Power ProjectionNavy returned to simple Power Projection Our large ships were cost-effective—in a sea Our large ships were cost-effective—in a sea

sanctuarysanctuary Fewer ships (and military overall) after 1990—Fewer ships (and military overall) after 1990—

but with more activitybut with more activity New capabilities: information technologies, long New capabilities: information technologies, long

range detection, precision weapons range detection, precision weapons

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2001: Regard for Terrorists and 2001: Regard for Terrorists and “Small Wars”“Small Wars”

More awareness of stateless enemiesMore awareness of stateless enemies Tension and competition between Tension and competition between

high- and low-end force advocateshigh- and low-end force advocates Enemies found ways to survive new US Enemies found ways to survive new US

capabilities; and ugly ways to attackcapabilities; and ugly ways to attack Terrorists made the Weinberger-Powell Terrorists made the Weinberger-Powell

Doctrine mostly irrelevantDoctrine mostly irrelevant Can a new doctrine replace it for stateless Can a new doctrine replace it for stateless

enemies?enemies?

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Characterizing the Bi-Modal ForceCharacterizing the Bi-Modal Force

Focuses on the emerging peer power at Focuses on the emerging peer power at one end of the spectrum of conflictone end of the spectrum of conflict

And on “small” operations at the other end And on “small” operations at the other end The two compositions are quite differentThe two compositions are quite different A “50-50 budget split” is not my positionA “50-50 budget split” is not my position Tensions (mostly healthy) must remain Tensions (mostly healthy) must remain

between high and low end advocatesbetween high and low end advocates

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The Peer Competitor: ChinaThe Peer Competitor: China

US aim is to influence, not fight, the Peoples’ US aim is to influence, not fight, the Peoples’ RepublicRepublic

Also to affect China by influencing her neighborsAlso to affect China by influencing her neighbors ““Win” in the long term is by economic and Win” in the long term is by economic and

political skills, not warfare. Or so we hopepolitical skills, not warfare. Or so we hope Strategy should look beyond contemporary Strategy should look beyond contemporary

issues (Taiwan and Korea)issues (Taiwan and Korea) Does the PLAN’s growing sea denial force Does the PLAN’s growing sea denial force

foreshadow sea control aspirations?foreshadow sea control aspirations?

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America’s China-Mode America’s China-Mode Force ElementsForce Elements

Continue strong Asian presenceContinue strong Asian presence Robust nuclear deterrent Robust nuclear deterrent Air and sea forces are central. We Air and sea forces are central. We

shouldn’t invade Chinashouldn’t invade China Our ISR advantage must be preservedOur ISR advantage must be preserved Our C2 advantage must be preservedOur C2 advantage must be preserved Logistics of forward support is expensive, Logistics of forward support is expensive,

but can be aligned against just one statebut can be aligned against just one state

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Small Wars and PeacemakingSmall Wars and Peacemaking

Terminology (stability ops, irregular wars, Terminology (stability ops, irregular wars, counterinsurgency, humanitarian ops, etc.) counterinsurgency, humanitarian ops, etc.) indicates the first difficulty in force designindicates the first difficulty in force design

DoD forces for messy (often non-DoD) DoD forces for messy (often non-DoD) command, control, authority, and command, control, authority, and governance indicates the second difficulty governance indicates the second difficulty (“The NCA is a hydra-headed monster”)(“The NCA is a hydra-headed monster”)

Force elements and command structures Force elements and command structures are different than for Chinaare different than for China

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America’s Small Wars America’s Small Wars Force ElementsForce Elements

Nuclear “deterrence” is near-meaningless Nuclear “deterrence” is near-meaningless Prevention of even one WMD attack is the aspirationPrevention of even one WMD attack is the aspiration

Ground forces are the central componentGround forces are the central component With air combat supportWith air combat support And air and sea sustainmentAnd air and sea sustainment

ISR will be more heavily HUMINTISR will be more heavily HUMINT But with high-tech scouts in distributed ops But with high-tech scouts in distributed ops

Navy C2 will be with “hastily formed networks” Navy C2 will be with “hastily formed networks” and must connect to the “1,000 ship navy”and must connect to the “1,000 ship navy”

Logistics must be ready to move forces swiftly Logistics must be ready to move forces swiftly and sustain it in diverse placesand sustain it in diverse places

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War In BetweenWar In Between

After “designing” bi-modal forces, next test After “designing” bi-modal forces, next test them against a threat “in the middle”them against a threat “in the middle”

We fought wars in Korea and Vietnam with We fought wars in Korea and Vietnam with forces designed for the Sovietsforces designed for the Soviets

Starting the bi-modal force is low risk—Starting the bi-modal force is low risk—assuming we don’t scrap existing “two assuming we don’t scrap existing “two contingency” forcescontingency” forces

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How to Transition GracefullyHow to Transition Gracefully

Start with operational training and Start with operational training and education for bi-modal operationseducation for bi-modal operations Exploits rapid personnel turnoverExploits rapid personnel turnover

C2 comes close behind: proper networks C2 comes close behind: proper networks and adaptive organizationsand adaptive organizations

Bi-modal equipment (ships, guns, tanks…) Bi-modal equipment (ships, guns, tanks…) will be in demand and followwill be in demand and follow

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Affordability: ChinaAffordability: China

We will try to influence, compete, or We will try to influence, compete, or collaborate with China without a warcollaborate with China without a war

And keep our economy strongAnd keep our economy strong Help our economy by keeping the military Help our economy by keeping the military

budget flatbudget flat Keep the seas safe and anticipate a PLAN Keep the seas safe and anticipate a PLAN

try for sea control try for sea control

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Affordability: “Small” OperationsAffordability: “Small” Operations

Small operations will be frequentSmall operations will be frequent Some will be long lastingSome will be long lasting Some will involve bloodshedSome will involve bloodshed

Force packages should be small, to Force packages should be small, to distribute or aggregate on demanddistribute or aggregate on demand

Do I need to say, “Try to be selective”?Do I need to say, “Try to be selective”?

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Affordability for BothAffordability for Both

Transoceanic operations are costlyTransoceanic operations are costly A uniquely American burdenA uniquely American burden Homeland security must blend domestic Homeland security must blend domestic

defense with overseas offensedefense with overseas offense Homeland security is an all-agencies thing Homeland security is an all-agencies thing

that we don’t shapethat we don’t shape

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In ConclusionIn Conclusion The National strategy has been and remains a maritime The National strategy has been and remains a maritime

strategystrategy Still transoceanic, but with a new wrinkle of homeland defenseStill transoceanic, but with a new wrinkle of homeland defense It has adapted to changes in the worldIt has adapted to changes in the world It is still expensive (especially logistically), but worthwhileIt is still expensive (especially logistically), but worthwhile

Another transition is underwayAnother transition is underway Respond with a bi-modal forceRespond with a bi-modal force Describe it well to hasten the transitionDescribe it well to hasten the transition

Present forces (the legacy) will be with us for a decade Present forces (the legacy) will be with us for a decade or moreor more

A safeguard against wars-in-the-middleA safeguard against wars-in-the-middle But same forces will play new rolesBut same forces will play new roles Pursue bi-modal force elements now—they take timePursue bi-modal force elements now—they take time