a critical analysis on political dynasty
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analysisTRANSCRIPT
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A RESEARCH
PRESENTED TO
THE COLLEGE OF LAW
POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILLIPINES
Mabini campus, Sta. Mesa, Manila
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
ON POLITICAL DYNASTY
SUBMITTED BY:
EMMANUEL S. CALIWAN
JURIS DOCTOR
2013
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON
POLITICAL DYNASTY.
EMMANUEL S. CALIWAN
"We must view public office as a way to serve the people, not to profit at their expense."
Jose W. Diokno
I.OUTLINE
II. ABSTRACT
A. Defining Political Dynasty
B. Current State of the Philippine Government and Election.
C. The Evils of Political Dynasty.
III. INTRODUCTION
A. HISTORY
A.1 Emergence of Political Dynasties
A.2 1987 Constitutional Provision on the ban for Political Dynasty.
A.3 The Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission.
A.4 Erap, Gloria and Election Problem of the Present.
IV. LEGAL ISSUES
A. Why Political Dynasty does pervade the Government if it is prohibited by the
1987 Philippine Constitution?
B. Is Referendum an answer?
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Sociological Analysis
A.1 Randy David Sociological opinion
B. Legal Analysis
B.1.Hector De Leons legal analysis
B.2.Retired Justice Isagani Cruz legal commentaries
B.3.Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas S. J. legal analysis
B.4.Senator Miriam Defensor Santiagos Senate Bill 2649
VI. CONCLUSION
VII. RECOMMENDATION.
A. Retired Justice Artemio Panganiban Options to stop political dynasties
B. RA 6735 Initiative and Referendum Act
VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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II. Abstract
Political dynasty refers to the situation wherein members of the
same family are occupying elected positions either in sequence for the same position,
or simultaneously across different positions1. In the Philippines, political dynasties
are prevalent in areas with more severe poverty. This paper will discuss using the
paradigm of critical legal studies to ascertain what are the impediments be it legal or
cultural on the passage of the Anti-Political Dynasty Act and what can be done
legally to pass such important measure in limiting or in a way diminishing corruption
in the governmental institution that we all belong.
First I will focus on Martial law days to the passage of the 1987 Constitution.
Focusing as well to the records of the Constitutional Commission particularly, on the
debate and inclusion of the provision, on the Anti-political dynasty. I will also discuss
1 Mendoza, Ronald Et al. Political dynasties and poverty: Resolving the chicken or the egg question
retrieved from http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48380/MPRA Paper No. 48380, posted 17. July 2013
14:23 UTC.
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why is there no law or any legislative enactment up until this very moment to give
teeth to the provision on political dynasty.
Secondly, I will lay down contemporary analysis using legal, sociological and
investigative reports and writings in relation to the issue of Political Dynasty. To give
more emphasis why is there such a need for a law or a statutory enactment to curb the
evils that Political Dynasty brings.
Lastly I will discuss alternative ways of creating an Anti-Political Dynasty
Law. And finally Ill try using the available Laws within the Philippines to propose
the creation of an act that will prohibit the existence of political dynasties. And
Research in different fields of social sciences--- from sociology, economics,
political economy, political science and even law shows the tendency of elites to
persist and reproduce their power over time, potentially undermining the effectiveness
of institutional reforms. One particular form of elite persistence is illustrated by the
existence of political dynasties. A natural question is whether certain political reforms
can break dynastic patterns and open up the political system.
In this paper I will show the need for a law that will curb the evil of political
dynasty by showing what political dynasty is doing to our society in general and
government in particular. What particular evils can be addressed by the Anti-Political
Law? And that such legislative construction can also be a powerful aide in stopping
corruption in the government specially needed in times like ours of different scams
left and right---PDAF, Malampaya and the list goes on.
The challenge lies on how would a law be passed that is in a way would limit
the people on congress. Congress as we all know by now in the word of the Retired
Justice Isagani Cruz is the principal protectors of political dynasties. As also
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observed by Fr. Joaquin Bernas S.J. that congress is the principle playground of
political dynasties.
But I believe that there is a way in this legal dilemma for it to be reconciled
and a law be passed in relation to giving teeth to the toothless provision of
constitution in political dynasty.
III. Introduction
The 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article 2, Section 26 restrictively provides:
The State shall guarantee equal access to public service and prohibit
political dynasty as may be defined by law.
Many Sociologists posits the idea that the Philippine Society revolves around
extended families. Given positive points in the arena of social and behavioral aspect
of human society. Yet in the political domain such positive concept alienates and
dehumanizes the citizenry willing to serve and a lot their talents in the development of
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our nation. To quote Senator Miriam Defensor- Santiago (extended family in politics
or Political Dynasty) finds its pernicious effects in the political arena where public
office becomes the exclusive domain of influential families and clans that are well
entrenched in Philippine politics. The monopoly of political power and public
resources by such families affects the citizenry at the local and national levels2.
2 Senate Bill 2649 ,Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
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HISTORY
Emergence of political dynasties3
The occurrence of political dynasties was believed to be first recorded in the
pre-Magellanic period. In his book The Making of a Filipino, Renato Constantino
pointed out that communities at this time were already accustomed to an early form
of government and politics. The pre-colonial society had the datu, raja, and
maharlika as rulers and stewards of tribal communities. According to Constantino,
their strong familial bonds espoused the development of the leadership and social
prestige of this ruling class. Perhaps the datu, raja, and maharlika class served as
archetypal models for the formation of political dynasties in the Philippines.
3 Records of the Constitutional Commission sited in Elefante, Fil V. How the Constitutional ban on
political dynasties came about. Philippine Graphic and How the Constitutional ban on political dynasties came to be. Philippine Graphic.
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During the Spanish colonial period, the term principalia was introduced. The
principalia embodied the new kind of local elite. To Constantino, the principalia was
composed of the wealthy landowners, many of whom were descendants of the early
datus and maharlikas. This time, the former datu has been entrusted with fiscal and
administrative duties and became adjuncts of Spanish power. From mere
administrators of socially-owned land during the pre-Magellanic period, the
principalia eventually became formal owners of these lands. The principalia, along
with the mestizos, illustrados, mestizo-sangley, creole, and Chinese mestizos
constituted the local oligarchs of the country.
In Landlords and Capitalists, political scientist Temario Rivera revealed that
about 87 families controlled the top 120 manufacturing companies from 1964-1986.
Sixteen of these familiesabout 20 percentwere involved in politics. Most of them
were members of the landowning elite that emerged during the 19th century,
including the Aranetas, the Cojuangcos, the Jacintos, the Madrigals, and the Yulos.
Through government influence, writes Rivera, landed capitalists caused the
diversion of state resources to traditional elite economic activities like sugar and
coconut milling, limiting further industrial diversification.
The third period was highlighted by the introduction of education and
suffrage by the US that catapulted the elites in the first local elections in 1903 and the
first national elections in 1907, Tuazon explained. The elites capitalized on
education to acquire new knowledge and information. Through education, both the
local and national elites obtained a new form of mechanism, which the French
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called cultural capital. Education was the ticket to
election participation and a prerogative of wealth. In history, the first elections only
catered to the propertied class, which comprised less than one percent of the
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population. William Howard Taft directed this first-ever election limiting the number
of participation only to the local and national elites.
A CenPEG study on familial membership in public offices (1907 -2004), that
is, from the 1st Philippine Assembly to the present Congress of the two Houses found
that Congress is home to 160 families that have continuously served each house with
two or more family members. In the 1946 Congress, out of the 98 congressmen
elected, 61 came from families with members in elective positions from 1907 to 1941.
The development of both the local and national elites enhanced their monopoly over
the landowning system, and businesses such as mining, logging, sugar, tobacco, real
estate, media, links to banks, and others.
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1987 Constitutions Provision on the Ban for Political Dynasty4
Before the Marcos dictatorship, in what has been described as an era of elite
democracy, political control was dominated by a relatively small class of political
families like the Ortegas in La Union, the Abads in Batanes, the Albanos in Isabela,
the Cojuangcos in Tarlac, the Laurels in Batangas, the Fuentebellas in Camarines
Sur, the Aquinos in Sorsogon, and the Cuencos and the Osmeas in Cebu, to name
some.
Under the authoritarian regime of Marcos, some survived and thrived like the
Ablans in Ilocos Norte, the Asistios in Caloocan, the Dys in Isabela, the Escuderos of
Sorsogon, the Josons in Nueva Ecija, and the Romualdezes in Leyte.
Brimming with idealism after Marcos ouster, the framers of the 1987
Constitution, painfully aware of the potential abuse and excess of allowing select
families to have political control, introduced Article II, Section 26, which states that
4 First three paragraph are taken from Rufo, Aries EDSAs failed legacy: Political dynasties, retrieved
from www.Rappler.com
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the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
The Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission5
Origin
The provision on political dynasties was proposed by Commissioner Jose
Nolledo during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission in 1986. As
originally worded, the provision was the State shall broaden opportunities to public
5 Elefante, Fil V. How the Constitutional ban on political dynasties came about ,referencing the
minutes of the meeting of the 1986 Constitutional Commission retrieved from
http://www.philippinegraphic.ph/index.php/main-story-graphic/102-how-the-constitutional-ban-on-
political-dynasties-came-about and http://www.philippinegraphic.ph/index.php/nation/111-how-the-
constitutional-ban-on-political-dynasties-came-to-be
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office and prohibit political dynasties. This was eventually changed during the
deliberations made by the Constitutional Commission on Sept. 23, 1986.
Comm. Nolledo vividly described the then political dynasties in this wise:
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As now appearing in many parts of our country, Mr. Presiding Officer, we
seem to approve of the practice that public office is inherited. Now, in
order to make this provision more palatable to the Members of the
Constitutional Commission, I have decided to restrict the meaning of
political dynasty as a suggestion to the forthcoming Congress of the
Philippines. x x x I am talking of this in terms of the scope of the term
political dynasty by saying that a prohibition against political dynasty,
Mr. Presiding Officer, is designed to avoid circumvention of the provision
limiting reelection of public officers to give a chance to others in running
for public office. I would like to be specific, Mr. Presiding Officer. In the
case of the local government officials like governors, for example, we
allow them to have two reelections. If he is reelected twice, he can no
longer run for reelection in which case, he will ask his close relative a
son or daughter or a brother or a sister to run for public office under
his patronage. And in this case, we circumvent the rule against further
reelection because it may also happen that his younger son may run for
governor and he is still strong enough to exercise moral as well as
effective influence upon the son. And the son becomes a subaltern,
subjecting himself to the will of the father who was apparently retired.
And so, in the case of a President, for example, under the provisions of the
Constitution, the President cannot run for reelection. So if the incumbent
President cannot run for reelection, she can ask, for example, Noynoy
Aquino assuming that he is already of age to run for President,
thereby negating the laudable purpose for prohibiting reelection. That
seems to me to be the meaning of political dynasty although Congress
may still widen the meaning of the term. In the case of a governor, Mr.
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Presiding Officer, if he has run for election for the same position, the
governor, who is now incumbent, must have built fortunes and even
private armies to assure the perpetuation through the election of close
relatives. His built-in advantages over his opponents will not widen
political participation in an election. x x x.3
Debate On Sept. 17, 1986, Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta asked two questions: How
do we broaden opportunities to public office and how do we prohibit political dynasties?
Are not these two goals too lofty and are they achievable at all?
Although this was initially decided by the Commission when we took into consideration
the report of the Committee on Local Governments, I still hope that the Commission will
see the proper light, Nolledo replied.
The Commission had junked the proposal to include the prohibition of political dynasties
in the local government section of the Constitution.
I am the author of this provision because I take into consideration the political realities
in the Philippines where we have small political kingdoms in different parts of the
country. I am talking of family dynasties. For example we have dynasties in Luzon, in
Visayas and in Mindanao, Nolledo added.
It seems to me that public office becomes inherited, he said. Our government becomes
monarchical in character and no longer constitutional. And so, I plead to the Members of
this Commission to please approve this provision.
Nolledo added that it would be better to leave the matter of determining the
circumstances under which political dynasties should be prohibited.
This Commission will not determine hard and fast rules by which political dynasties
may be condemned, Nolledo said. But I think this is a very progressive provision and,
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in consulting the people, the people will like this provision. I hope the commission will
hear the plea of our people.
Villacorta acknowledged that there was merit to Nolledos proposal. However, Villacorta
said that Congress would want to be clearer as to the contemplation of the committee
with respect to this prohibition of political dynasties.
Father and Son
I would recommend that Congress may take this into account; the son may not
run because the father has an edge because he controls the incumbent governor and his
son is now running, Nolledo said.
In other words, the Commissioner is mandating Congress to pass laws that will prohibit
a next of kin or a member of a nuclear family from running in the same public office, am I
right? Villacorta asked.
Under the circumstances, the son may not run but later on, when the governor is no
longer incumbent and the sun wants to run, he can run later. I think there is an
interregnum; there is a period during which he cannot run, but he is not prohibited,
Nolledo explained.
The Commissioner is referring only to the same public office, Villacorta said.
To the same public office or to another public office, Nolledo answered.
Incumbency
Nolledo then used an example to clarify his proposal.
Why do we not make it like this: the husband is the president and he died: the wife runs
for President? Nolledo said. In that case, I think the Congress may take into account
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that the husband is no longer incumbent. He is dead and may not have control of the
facilities of the government. There is no undue advantage that may take place. Perhaps
the rule against political dynasty may not apply to such kind of a situation.
In other words, the Commissioner is limiting the concept of political dynasty to a
situation where the next of kin is an incumbent, Villacorta said.
That is only an example, Nolledo replied. There may be other circumstances that we
may not now foresee.
Ople continues the debate
On Sept. 18, 1986, Commissioner Blas Ople once again raised the issue of
political dynasties after discussing the conceptualization of human life.
I really wish that there had been more time to develop a good debate concerning
political dynasties, Ople asked. What I can see here is that the first part of Section 23
would broaden the opportunities for public office and then contract the role of dynasties
so that there is a kind of mutual displacement. Would that interpretation be right? In
other words, we broaden public office at the expense of political dynasties?
That is correct, Nolledo replied.
Political dynasties thrive in many parts of the world and are contingent on many
factors, although they may be called with other names, Ople said. I think what is
abhorrent about political dynasties is the monopoly of political power is that right?
That is correct, Nolledo said.
Yes, another abhorrent part is that there is a class distinction involved here, Ople said.
Usually these are families favored by the accident of birth; meaning they were born to
families already with accumulated property. Therefore, that is the injustice that attaches
to political dynasties. At the same time, when we survey some of the interesting provinces
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around Metro Manila, I think they partake of the different characteristics of traditional
political power. I begin to thread on now on some sensitive spots when I point to
Batangas.
Laurel clan
Batangas is Laurel country, Ople explained. But in the case of Batangas, I
recall that Sotero Laurel was the Secretary of the Interior of the Aguinaldo government in
Malolos. Since the revolution, the Laurels have been a leading political family in
Batangas. We are privileged to have with us now, right here in this Commission, one
Laurel, one of the most eminent of them all. Under the commissioners definition of
political dynasties, would that encompass the Laurel family?
I have not actually studied the details involving the Laurel family, Nolledo answered.
But it seems to me that Don Pepito denies that he has any political ambition at all and
he said that the political dynasty provision should not apply to the Laurel family.
Nolledo then reminded his fellow commissioners that under his proposal, it would be up
to Congress to define the meaning of political dynasties.
But my concept is that Congress shall see to it that after the permitted reelection has
been exhausted, I think the close relatives should not inherit the position because of
undue advantage to others who are equally bright but do not possess the necessary
financial support, Nolledo said. Perhaps one may not run after the last reelection but
he can run later on. I am giving an idea to Congress. The denial is not absolute.
Relationships
We recommend to Congress that the prohibitions should just cover relationships
probably up to the third civil degree or degree of consanguinity or affinity, Nolledo said.
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We can limit only up to the third civil degree or fourth civil degree depending on the
wisdom of Congress.
Will a gifted child belonging to my family be eternally proscribed from presenting
himself for public office later on because of this disqualification? Ople asked.
No, Nolledo answered. As I said, we have not defined. It is up to Congress to state the
circumstances under which the prohibition may apply. In the case of my son, if I feel that
I have already exhausted my right to be reelected, as a manifestation of self-sacrifice and
out of delicadeza, I will tell my son not to run even if there is no prohibition against
political dynasty.
Ople suggested that there should be a measure of rationality and logic attached to the
provision to avoid the risk of violating the freedom of choice of voters.
They (voters) are entitled to as broad a freedom of choice as the environment can
provide and if they want somebody to run for office even if he is closely related to
someone in office, do we have the right to curtail the freedom of voters? Ople asked. I
believe that the roots of political dynasties, to the extent that these are repugnant in a
democratic society, are in the society itselfa feudal socioeconomic structurewhereby
those who were advantaged by the accident of birth and have been born to considerable
possessions and property can acquire an unfair advantage over others. But I think,
ultimately, the solution should be to reform those iniquitous social and political
structures, but we should minimize invasions into the domains of privacy of people, that is
the freedom of the electorate. The right to be voted upon is the inherent right of suffrage,
and I hope Commissioner Nolledo will accept that interpretation.
Regulation, not prohibition
On Sept. 23, 1986, Nolledo told his fellow commissioners that his proposal was
popular with the public.
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It seems to me that the resolution asking for a provision in the Constitution to prohibit
political dynasties is very popular outside but does not seem to enjoy the same popularity
inside the Constitutional Commission, Nolledo said. This provision will widen political
opportunities contrary to the opinion of Commissioner (Christian) Monsod because I feel
that when we talk of equal political opportunities, we have also to talk more or less of
equal conditions under which candidates run for public office. And with this provision,
Mr. Presiding Officer, we do away with political monopoly.
After acknowledging the opposition to his proposal, Nolledo suggested that what he
actually meant was to regulate political dynasties.
Now in order to make this provision more palatable to the members of the
Constitutional Commission, I have decided to restrict the meaning of political dynasty as
a suggestion to the forthcoming Congress of the Philippines, Nolledo said. I believe,
Mr. Presiding Officer, that this prohibition is not actually prohibitory but only
regulatory. I am talking of this in terms of the scope of the term political dynasty by
saying that a prohibition against political dynasty, Mr. Presiding Officer, is designed to
avoid circumvention of the provision limiting reelection of public officers to give a
chance to others in running for public office. I would like to be specific, Mr. Presiding
officer.
Nolledo used the Aquino family as an example to bolster his argument.
And so in the case of a President, for example, under the provisions of the Constitution,
the President cannot run for reelection, Nolledo explained. So if the incumbent
President cannot run for reelection, she can ask, for example, Noynoy Aquinoassuming
he is already of ageto run for President, thereby negating the laudable purpose for
prohibiting reelection. That seems to me to be the meaning of political dynasty although
Congress may still widen the meaning of the term.
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Opposition
Commissioner Monsod then asked permission to be recognized.
Monsod said the discussion on political dynasties was like a replay of the debate the
commission had in the Article of Local Governments when it was decided to junk the
proposal to ban political dynasties.
This body voted down a similar proposal on prohibition of political dynasties in the
Article on Local Governments, Monsod said. And here we are giving exactly the same
reasons; we are indulging in the same kind of debate on the same issue. Mr. Presiding
Officer, as we said before, the assumption here seems to be that we are underestimating
our people in their right to choose; we are trying to put a prescreening mechanism so that
public office is not after all accessible to all because we are going to prohibit or exclude
certain people from running for public office. And my point is, we should have a little
more faith.
We should give our people full choice. Let them run and let the people decide. That is
the essence of suffrage, Monsod added.
Deletion
Monsod then moved to have the section prohibiting political dynasties deleted,
saying that it has been argued and debated fully in the Article on Local Governments.
This body has already made a decision on the same point, and secondly, for the reasons
I have stated, I do not think we should curtail the right of the people to a free choice on
who their political leader should be, Monsod said.
I would like to comment on the assertion of Commissioner Monsod that this was already
adequately discussed, Nolledo replied. The issue, at that time, was whether to
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authorize Congress to include in the Local Government Code a provision against
political dynasty. And the issue here now is whether to put that as a declatory principle.
Ople then rose and asked Nolledo whether political dynasties were a cause or an effect,
considering the lopsided socioeconomic system in the countryside where the advantage of
birth favored those more likely to fall in the category of dynasties as Nolledo called them.
The reasons groups of families rotate power only among themselves is that they were the
only ones with the means for sustaining political campaigns, is that not correct? Ople
asked.
Yes, the Commissioner is correct, Nolledo replied.
In that sense, therefore, so-called dynasties are the effects rather than the causes of an
imperfect social and economic system, especially in the countryside, Ople said.
That is a factor to be considered, Nolledo answered.
Ople countered by suggesting that if political dynasties were the effect rather than the
causes of prevailing and traditional social structures that maldistribute opportunities,
should this Commission not attack the causes rather than the effects?
Ople also suggested that the word dynasty was probably being misapplied to
distinguished political families. He mentioned the political families of Cojuangco and
Aquino in Tarlac, the Padilla family in Manila and Pangasinan, the Rodrigo family in
Bulacan, the Laurel family in Batangas and the Sumulong-Cojuangco family in Rizal, and
the Calderon family in Nueva Vizcaya.
We see lots of evidence that in fact, people disadvantaged by the accident of birth have
indeed risen through their own efforts to become successful competitors of entrenched
political dynasties in their provinces and cities, Ople said.
Ople also asked Nolledo if the right of suffrage should not be abridged. Ople explained
that the right to vote and to be voted upon was derived from the same concept of the right
of suffrage.
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Nolledo denied that his proposal did not infringe upon the right of suffrage. We only
regulate the right of some people to run because we want to equalize the conditions
between the poor and the rich candidates, he said.
Pros and Cons
Commissioner Serafin Guingona then rose and supported Nolledo. Guingona
noted that the provision on political dynasties would be more acceptable to the
Commission if the word prohibit was changed to regulate and that the phrase as
provided by law be added.
Commisioners Rene Sarmiento and Minda Luz Quesada then rose to speak in favor of the
section on political dynasties.
Commissioner Florangel Rosario Braid then asked Nolledo if the prohibition on political
dynasties would lead to the development of a pluralistic society and widen political
opportunities.
Nolledo answered, yes.
Monsod then rose in defense of the deletion.
The matter was called for a nominal voting on the motion to delete the prohibition on
political dynasties. According to the minutes of the Constitutional Commission, there
were at least two roll calls made to settle the matter. In the end, the motion to delete the
prohibition was turned down by one vote. Seventeen voted to delete the prohibition while
18 voted for retention. Commissioner Hilario Davide abstained.
Monsod disagreed with the result and asked for a revote while moving to have recess for
lunch.
The session was suspended at 12:48 pm and resumed at 3 p.m.
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Resumption
Once the session resumed, Sarmiento opposed Monsods motion.
Davide, who abstained, sided with Monsod in calling for a revote. Davide added that
Monsods motion was in order.
The Presiding Officer, Commissioner Efrain Treas, then called for a vote on Monsods
motion.
Commissioner Luz Quesada questioned the ruling, prompting the presiding officer to say,
Let the whole Commission decide this matter.
At 3:13 p.m., Monsod then asked to have the session suspended for a few minutes. His
motion was granted.
When the session resumed at 3:27 p.m., Sarmiento rose and told the Presiding Officer
that Monsods motion was improper because under the rules being used by the
Commission, commissioners were not allowed to change their vote.
Monsod then withdrew his motion.
In the interest of the body so that we do not exacerbate the situation, I would like to
withdraw my motion, Monsod explained.
Davides proposal
Davide then suggested a compromise. He suggested that the word BROADEN
be changed to the following: ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO.
Then instead of OFFICE, I propose to substitute the same with the word SERVICE,
Davide proposed. So the entire section will read: The State shall ensure equal access to
opportunities to public service and prohibit political dynasties.
If we change OFFICE to SERVICE, we would refer to both elective and appointive
positions, Davide explained. And political dynasties do not necessarily apply to
elective positions alone. They would include appointive positions and perhaps more on
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the latter because it is easier to get a political appointment if somebody close to the
family is an elective official, but it is difficult to have a political dynasty on the basis of
election because election is an expensive exercise.I changed the word BROADEN to
ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS because what is important would be equal access to the
opportunity, he added.
Davides motion was accepted. But the fight was not over.
The Constitutions ban on political dynasties almost never saw the light of day.
When it was suggested that the ban be included in the local government section of the
Charter, the members of the 1986 Constitional Commission rejected the proposal.
Later, Christian Monsod, who was a member of the Constitutional Commission at that
time, went toe-to-toe with the bans proponent, Jose Nolledo, who wanted to have the ban
included in another section of the Charter. Monsod moved to have the prohibition deleted
from the proposed Constitution and the matter was put to a nominal vote.
Nolledos proposal survived by one vote, 17 votes in favor of deletion, 18 votes in favor of
retention. Hilario Davide, who later became Chief Justice, abstained.
Afterwards, Monsod tried to convince his fellow Constitutional Commissioners to vote
again on his motion. His move was opposed by Rene Sarmiento.
Sarmiento reminded his fellow commissioners that under the rules they have adopted,
they were not allowed to change their vote. Monsod conceded and withdrew his motion.
Davide then made a suggestion. He suggested that the wording of Nolledos proposal be
changed. He suggested that the word broaden be changed to the following: ensure
equal access to. Then instead of office, I propose to substitute the same with the word
service, Davide proposed. So the entire section will read: The State shall ensure
equal access to opportunities to public service and prohibit political dynasties.
Davides suggestion was accepted. But the fight against having the ban was not yet over.
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Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo rose and moved that the phrase and prohibit political
dynasties be deleted. Another Commissioner, Yusuf Abubakar, seconded Rodrigos
motion.
The presiding officer asked Davide to comment on the motion. Davide replied: I would
rather leave it to the Commission, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Nolledo immediately opposed Rodrigos motion.
Technicalities Raised
Rodrigo responded to Nolledos objection.
That is an amendment to the amendment which was neither accepted nor rejected,
Rodrigo replied. The proponent (Davide) says that he would rather leave it to the
body.
Then Serafin Guingona took the floor.
Yes, Guingona said. But would that mean that if it is deleted, we will not be able to
introduce further amendments along this line not exactly in the same words but still
referring to political dynasties, Mr. Presiding Officer?
Nolledo then raised a point of order. We have already decided to retain these words
including prohibition against political dynasty, as stated, Nolledo said. There was a
move to delete the provision and the substance of the provision is found in the term
political dynasties. The intention of the committee is to prohibit political dynasties and,
therefore, this intention must be correlated with the entire provision. Therefore, the
motion of Commissioner Rodrigio is out of order.
Rodrigo disagreed.
My motion is not out of order because what was voted down was the deletion of the
whole section, Rodrigo replied. And now, there is a reworded proposal, and I am
asking for a deletion of a portion of the reworded proposal. There is a difference. After
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the motion to delete the whole section was voted down, this amendment by substitution
was submitted. Andy my amendment to the amendment is to delete a portion of the
amendment by substitution. So that is not res judicata, if we were to use a judicial term.
Nolledo continued contesting Rodrigos proposed amendment.
The very life and substance of the provision is found in the words prohibit political
dynasties and I think it was in that sense that the Commission voted in favor of retaining
the provision, Nolledo said.
Rules
The discussion then focused on the rules of the Constitutional Commission.
Regaldo Maambong, another member of the Constitutional Commission, explained that
Nolledos point of order was covered under Section 50 of the Commissions rules, which
reads: A motion to strike out being lost shall not preclude an amendment or motion to
strike out and insert.
That is precisely the reason the committee and the Chair allowed Commissioner Davide
to introduce an amendment, because if it were not allowed and if we were to follow the
point of order raised by Commissioner Nolledo, there is no point of Commissioner
Davide standing up and amending the particular section not deleted by the decision of the
body, Maambong explained. So the amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo is quite valid
because of Section 50.
Nolledo remained adamant in his objection.
I would like to say that the motion of Commissioner Rodrigo is really a motion to delete
the very life of the provision, Nolledo said. So he is restating the original motion which
was already defeated.
Rodrigo disagreed.
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No, Mr. Presiding Officer, Rodrigo said. The substance of the provision, even before
the amendment, is to broaden the opportunities to public office.
That is not the substance, Nolledo immediately replied.
This matter of political dynasty is just a colatilla and in the reformulated amendment by
substitution, the substance is also to broaden opportunities to seek public office,
Rodrigo answered. As a matter of fact, I am asking for the deletion of and prohibit
political dynasties because, by prohibiting political dynasties, we do not broaden but
restrict opportunities for public office. That phrase is even incompatible, inconsistent
with the very substance of the proposed amendment.
Lost and Confused
Minda Luz Quesada then took the floor.
Parliamentary inquiry, Quesada said. Can we ask our parliamentarian,
Commissioner Maambong, clarification for us nonparliamentarians who are getting
confused with the rigmarole of rules that are being used?
Quesada added that she and several of the commissioners were getting lost somehow in
the process of the discussion.
Maambong turned to the Presiding Officer and was granted permission to explain.
Mr. Presiding Officer, let us translate the Rules into simple terms, Maambong said.
We have a formulation presented by the committee. Then there was a motion to delete.
The motion to delete was lost. What is the effect? We are back to square one. We still
have the formulation of the committee, which is now subject to amendment and that is
exactly what we are doing. When the motion to delete was lost, the original formulation
of the committee remains on record and it is now subject to amendment.
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Maambong explained that when the motion to delete was lost, it did not preclude an
amendment or motion to strike out and insert.
Meaning, we are back to square one, he said. We still have the original formulation
of the committee, which is now subject to amendment.
Quesada then asked if the basic concepts in the proposed provision could be changed.
We can change the concept; we can even change the whole provision because we are
now open to amendmentwe call it primary amendmentbecause the original provision
is now back in the committee report, since the motion to delete was lost, Maambong
explained.
More questions
Guingona then took the floor and asked if the Commission had approved
Rodrigos proposed amendment.
My opinion is, if the proposed addition is substantially the same as the portion that was
deleted, then that cannot be considered anymore, Rodrigo answered. But if it is not
substantially the same, then it cannot be considered.
Afterwards, the Presiding Officer recognized Nolledo and allowed him to take the floor.
I would like to respond to the statement of Commissioner Rodrigo that the prohibition of
political dynasties is only correlative to the first part, Nolledo said. I was interpellated
by Commissioner Ople and I agreed with him when he asked if it was the intention of the
committee to prohibit political dynasties in order to widen opportunities to public office
and I answered yes.
Nolledo reiterated that he disagreed with Oples view. Ople had earlier suggested that
prohibiting political dynasties would limit opportunities to public office.
Nolledo then asked Rodrigo if he wanted to hear the explanation again.
The gentleman has said enough, Rodrigo replied.
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Whatever way
After Rodrigo had his turn, Sister Christine Tan, another member of the
Constitutional Commission, asked to be recognized.
The Chair recognizes Commissioner Tan, the Presiding Officer said.
When Tan took the floor, she told her fellow commissioners that the main content of
what they voted on so passionately was the issue of political dynasties.
We can apply the law in whatever way we wish so that it comes out that we are not
returning what we tried to delete, but in our hearts we know that the main point was
political dynasties, she said.
She also wanted to be put on record that those who vote against deletion were voting
against political dynasties and those who vote for deletion wanted political dynasties to
be perpetuated.
Commissioner Crispino de Castro then took the floor and argued that the issue at hand
was not political dynasties. We are talking here of Rule X, Section 50 of our rules as
well explained and expounded by Honorable Maambong, de Castro said.
At this point, Commissioner Yusuf Abubakar took the floor.
It seems the debate centers on a proposition that is vital to our democracy, he said.
Elect their own
Abubakar sided with those in favor of deleting the phrase prohibit political
dynasties from the provision currently under debate.
How can we, on the assumption that we are only appointed, or even if we were elected,
suppress the voice of the people if they want an elected representative to continue with
one, two, three terms? he asked. So be it. We are not here to suppress that voice.
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He also reminded his fellow commissioners of the dictum that the voice of the people is
the voice of God. So I agree with the proposition of Commissioner Rodrigo, which is to
eliminate that portion and let the beginning stand and eliminate prohibit political
dynasties.
At this point, the Presiding Officer appointed Maambong as acting Floor Leader in the
absence of Commissioner Napoleon Rama.
Maambong then took the floor and announced that the Commissioners present were now
ready to vote on the motion to delete the phrase prohibit political dynasties.
A technicality
Sarmiento prevented the vote from taking place by reminding everyone that the
first attempt to delete the entire provision on political dynasties was rejected by a vote of
18 against 17.
He added that Rodrigos attempt to delete the phrase prohibit political dynasties, was
out of order.
My submission, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that the motion to strike cut is a violation of
what we have approved favourably this noon and a violation of Section 50 of our Rules,
Sarmiento said.
De Castro, who answered Sarmientos assertion, bluntly told Sarmiento to read the
second sentence of Section 50.
It states and I quote: A motion to strike outand that is the motion of Commissioner
Monsod to deletebeing lost, which was lost by questionable votes, shall not preclude
an amendment, De Castro explained.
De Castro also pointed out that Rodrigos motion was in reaction to Davides
amendment.
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Point of order
Rodrigo, who agreed with De Castro, then said: The body should vote on
whether to vote for or against my amendment.
Davide reacted to Rodrigos statement.
Mr. Presiding Officer, for the record, my amendment was not an amendment by
substitution, Davide said. My amendment is to change only the following words
broaden and office. And so, it is not to be considered technically as an amendment by
substitution.
Commissioner Jose Suarez took the floor and focused on Nolledos motion: And the
Gentleman is saying that because of such a development, that should practically bar any
futher motion to delete the substance of this particular provision?
Nolledo replied that Suarez was correct.
Before the motion to delete was filed by Commissioner Monsod, all the discussions were
centered on whether or not to prohibit political dynasties, Nolledo said.
And that is the reason the Gentleman is saying that the Honorable Rodrigo, with due
respect to him, is out of order in this regard, Suarez replied.
Rodrigo immediately responded to the development.
I am only asking for the deletion of a portion of the section as reworded by the
proponent, Commissioner Davide, Rodrigo said. I think the situation should be to let
the body vote on my amendment. Why prevent the body?
Commissioner Ambrosio Padilla, who was the vice president of the Constitutional
Commission, took the floor and tried to clear the matter up by suggesting that a vote be
taken.
Maambong then asked if Davides amendment had been accepted by the Commission.
Commissioner Gregorio Tingson told Maambong that Davides changes had already
been accepted.
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Since that is accepted, there is now a pending motion to amend the amendment of
Commissioner Davide by Commissioner Rodrigo, Maambong said. But just to keep the
parliamentary situation in order, we cannot proceed to that unless we resolve the point of
order raised by Commissioner Nolledo. And the point of order raised is that we cannot
vote on the motion of Commissioner Rodrigo to delete the words prohibit political
dynasties.
Maambong also pointed out that since the body was apparently split into those who
believed that Section 50 applied to the situation and those who believed otherwise, the
Presiding Officer must rule on Nolledos point of order.
The Chair rules that the point of order raised by Commissioner Nolledo is not well
taken because of Section 50, the Presiding Officer said.
Nolledo tried to appeal the ruling of the Chair but was thwarted by Maambong, who said:
An appeal to the ruling of the Chair is not debatable.
Maambong put the matter to the floor so that the body can vote on it.
The Commissioners upheld the ruling of the Presiding Officer with 18 votes in favor and
14 against with no abstentions. This paved the way for the Commissioners to vote either
in favor or against the phrase and prohibit political dynasties.
Aborted attempt
After the bell was rung and the Commissioners called in, Commissioner Colayco
tried to prevent the vote from taking place. I believe we are departing from past
practice, Colayco said. He warned that if this vote was taken, it would effectively
paralyze their proceedings. We will be back to where we were, he said. Again, what
will stop somebody with another amendment to amend the vote which, in effect, struck out
the section, which we have agreed upon by a vote of 18 to 17 to remain? Colayco added
that Rodrigos motion to delete the phrase was inconsistent with the first vote which
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approved the retention of the controversial provision. The Presiding Officer immediately
responded that Rodrigos motion was in order. Thereafter, Colayco conceded and
dropped his objection.
The vote
Maambong then reminded everyone that those who vote yes would be voting
for the deletion of the words and prohibit political dynasties while those who would
vote no were for the retention of the said phrase. The matter was finally put to the
floor. The results of the nominal voting were 18 votes in favor and 21 votes against. The
proposed amendment of Mr. Rodrigo is lost, the Presiding Officer said. Then
Commissioner Serafin Guingona proposed that the words as may be provided by law
be added. Davide objected, saying that that it was inappropriate to add such words to the
Declaration of Principles. Instead, Davide suggested that the phrase should be as may
be defined by law. Guingona agreed. Thus, the ban on political dynasties took its final
shape and was included in the present Constitution.
Erap, Gloria and Election Problem of the Present.
During the Presidency of the Ex-President Joseph Ejercito Erap Estrada
the main slogan of his political regime is Walang Kaibi-kaibigan, walang
kamaganak-kamaganak (No friends and no relatives...) but as history have judged
him of being the first president to undergo impeachment and the first one not to finish
his term due to EDSA 2 and the immediate ushering of PGMAs presidency. It is also
a known fact that Erap created his dynasty in the City of San Juan in Metro Manila.
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Wherein we can see that from his sons, wife and mistresses have all served in
different capacity in the government as mayor, congressmen and even senator. If
Makati is a Binay City San Juan is an Estrada City.
Going back to history as Erap left the Malacanang Palace the then Vice
President assumed Presidency as per the mandate of the Philippine Constitution. We
all know her as President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (PGMA) daughter of the Ex-
President Diosdado Macapagal. Her reign in power lasted for almost 9 yrs. President
Macapagal-Arroyo herself heads a political dynasty as so do many influential
senators and representatives, and local officials too all over the land. GMA has two
sons and one brother-in-law now as congressmen. She herself after leaving the
presidency still clings to power upon assuming a congressional seat in her hometown
in Pampanga.
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35
During President GMAs reign of power the Philippines saw one of the most
heinous election related crime in the countrythe Ampatuan Maguindanao massacre.
In a paper I wrote for PLSS (Philippine League of Sociology Students) Conference in
the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City I identified the psychoanalytic
sociological reason why the Ampatuan Clan6 did the unfathomable. Power and
remaining in power is the root cause of everything they clan wants to continue being
the local warlords of Maguindanao. Later in the analysis portion of this paper I will
present the analysis of one of the most respected sociologist in the country no other
than Prof. Randy David of UP.
6 As of the writing of this paper the case of the Ampatuan is still under litigation and the Ampatuan
members who are implicated for the crime are detained in Taguig BJMP.
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IV. Legal Issue
Just as been explained in the outline and abstract of this paper if the 1987
Philippine Constitution forbids the proliferation of political dynasty why legally
speaking, it still pervades the Philippine society and government?
Why if it is supposed to be one of EDSA 1s lasting legacies the dismantling
of political dynasties and oligarchs which invest political power and perks in only a
few still subsist today. Why then is Warlordism still rampant in different provinces all
across the Philippines?
Can Comelec the foremost commission handling election be empowered to do
away with this social ill that pervades and dehumanizes the power of the electorate?
Can we people of the Republic of the Philippines where the true sovereignty
resides exercise the power allotted to us by virtue of initiative and referendum, enact
this law that can ride us of this evil?
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In this paper I wish to answer these legal questions. And with the prayer that
the Congress, be cognizant of the social ills. That they may reflect on their every
action. That they may work upon in restoring the dignity and glory of their tarnished
institutions reputation7.
7 As of the writing of this paper the Institution of Congress is facing a problematic situation. Members
from both Senate and House of Representative are being implicated in a Billions of Pesos propensity
scam coming from PDAF and Malampaya. Senators Juan Ponce Enrile, Jinggoy Estrada and Ramon
Bong Revilla Jr. are the once being heavily implicated. It can be seen that the list even if it is not
representative enough shows that those implicated are coming from Political Clans or Political
Dynasty it can be remembered that Juan Ponce Enrile tried to put his son in one of the seats in senate.
While Jinggoy Estrada, son of Erap, belongs to the Clan of the Estrada of San Juan. And Bong Revilla
Jr. son of the previous Senator Revilla Sr., husband of the incumbent Congresswoman Lani Mercado,
father to Julo Revilla a seating mayor in the Province of Cavite.
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V. Analysis
"Republics are created by the virtue, public spirit and intelligence of the
citizens. They fall, when the wise are banished from the public councils, because they
dare to be honest, and the profligate are rewarded, because they flatter the people, in
order to betray them."
Justice Joseph Story
(1779-1845) US Supreme Court Justice
Sociological Analysis
Prof. Randy David the foremost Sociologist from the University of the
Philippines wrote in the Philippine Daily Inquirer8 that the main reason for the
proliferation of Warlordism in the Philippines particularly in the Ampatuan,
Maguindanao where the most heinous crime related to an election happened I
because they make used of their big clan as a political power to reckon with in his
own These people do not bother to recruit proxies to run for public office and
8 David, Randy Warlords in a Weak State Philippine Daily Inquirer (2009)
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represent their interests; they themselves become the officers of the state, bequeathing
public positions to their children as if these were part of the family heirloom. Their
private armies, usually entered as force multipliers in the war against terrorism
and crime, are paid for and maintained with government funds. Even the local police
are their police. The internal revenue allotment (IRA), given regularly to local
government units, becomes their private cash box. No government auditor would dare
question their expenditures. What we have here is the colonization of the weak state
by local warlords recycled as public officials. Prof. David further asserts that This
situation, so pervasive still in our country today, will not disappear as long as our
national politicians choose the path of enlisting outmoded local power systems into
their political parties, rather than patiently create modern organs of political
aggregation appropriate to a democracy. When the national leadership is strong and
rests on a clear popular mandate, it is in a better position to dismantle the
anachronistic local power centers that operate side by side state institutions. It need
not tolerate, or worse accommodate, the existence of parallel sultanates and their
abusive armies. But where we have an insecure leadership that colludes with a broad
range of non-accountable forces to keep itself in power, it is the modern state that
withers away. This, in a nutshell, is the story of our societys troubled transition to
modernity. The transition has not merely prolonged the life of feudal lords; it has
equipped them with the latest weaponry, and given them strategic positions in the
modern state from which they could continue their oppressive rule.
This analysis is akin to saying that political dynasties make used of their
position in the public office as a means of gaining power and dominion over other
individuals more equipped in serving the populace that them. And when they are
being treated they used the power of their private armies to dispatch of the so called
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enemy which happened to the family of Governor Toto. This is the evils that the
Commissioners of the Constitution sees but did not fully act with.
Legal Analysis
Hector De Leon on his book, Textbook on the Philippine Constitution.
Expressly mentioned that constitutional policy on the prohibition of political dynasties
expresses a national commitment to democratize election and appointment to
positions in the government and eliminate a principle obstacle to equal access to
opportunities for public service. The dominance of political dynasties not only kept
more deserving but poor individuals from running or winning in elections; it also
enabled powerful and affluent politicians to corner appointive positions for their
relatives and followers9. Retired Justice Isagani Cruz mentioned in a column
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer that (our election are) plagued by the
9 De Leon, Hector Textbook on the Philippine Constitution, pp.79(1994)
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41
unwelcome political dynasties enjoying special privileges in our republican society
that indulges the rhetorical shibboleth that all men are created equal. Since the
beginning of our elective government in the early 1900s, several families have
maintained their control of their respective constituencies, monopolizing political
power like royal prerogatives shared only among their members to the exclusion of
other citizens equally competent if not in fact better endowed10. He further asserts
that bottom line is that the provision is at best only meaningless embroidery in the
Constitution of 1987. He further blames the Constitutional Commission of 1986 for
this serious anomaly. He blames it for recognizing the problem but not doing anything
about it when it had the chance to do so while framing the present Constitution. He
blames its members for failing or deliberately refusing to directly prohibit and punish
political dynasties as inimical to republican government. The harmful dominance of
this greedy group was there for all to see, but all the commissioners did was look the
other way and innocently say in Article II, Sec. 26 of their magnum opus:
10
Cruz, Isagani End political dynasties, Inquirer (2007)
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The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law?
Constitutional Construction will tell us that the above quoted section is by its
terms not self executing as most constitutional provision are or should be immediately
effective without a need for statutory implementation section 26 is the opposite and
remains toothless unless activated by congress. Once again Hector De Leon is
persuasive saying that the State is expressly mandated to prohibit political dynasties.
Congress has no discretion on the matter except merely to spell out the meaning and
scope of the term11
.
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas S. J. a member of the constitutional commission and
current dean of Ateneo School of Law has another take to the matter referencing his
analysis on the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission As can be seen, it
is a limp-wristed provision. It is like most of the provisions in the Declaration of
Principles. They are not strict constitutional provisions which bind; they merely
served to shorten Commission debates. At best they invite Congress to accept an idea
11
De Leon, Hector Textbook on the Philippine Constitution, pp.79(1994)
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and to give it substance and form12. But Fr. Bernas has somewhat gives an idea on
how to go around the dilemma of a congress not willing to enact a law that will surely
hurt its turf. The same article written for the Philippine Daily Inquirer posits a
question Will a constitutional amendment by referendum and plebiscite, as
suggested by the currently disheartened Comelec Chair Sixto Brillantes, succeed in
drafting a provision that defines what political dynasty means?13
In 2011, Sen.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago filed Senate Bill 2649 on political dynasties. Her
Explanatory Note14
pretty much summed up the arguments expressed by others for the
passage of such a bill.
The Constitution, Article 2, Section 26 provides:
The State shall guarantee equal access to public service and prohibit
Political dynasty as may be defined by law. To give force and effect to
this provision, the playing field of the political arena should
12
Bernas S.J., Fr. Joaquin G. About Political Dynasties, Philippine Daily Inquirer (2013) 13
Id (2013) 14
Santiago, Miriam Defensor Senate Bill 2649, Fifteenth Congress First Regular session. Explanatory
note.
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be leveled and opened to persons who are equally qualified to aspire
on even terms with those from ruling politically dominant families.
Philippine society, many sociologists note, revolves around the system
of extended families. However, this extended family system, an
otherwise beneficial concept when applied to the social aspects of
human behavior, finds its pernicious effects in the political arena
where public office becomes the exclusive domain of influential
families and clans that are well entrenched in Philippine politics. The
monopoly of political power and public resources by such families
affects the citizenry at the local and national levels. The socio-
economic and political inequities prevalent in Philippine society limit
public office to members of ruling families. In many instances, voters,
for convenience and out of cultural mindset look up to these ruling
families as dispensers of favors, and thus elect relatives of these
politically dominant families.
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VI. Conclusion
"Law in the land died. I grieve for it but I do not despair over it. I know, with a
certainty no argument can turn, no wind can shake, that from its dust will rise a new and
better law: more just, more human, and more humane. When that will happen, I know
not. That it will happen, I know." Jose W. Diokno
The foregoing analysis speaks of the need to solidify the prohibition against
Political Dynasty. As Hector De Leon points out that Congress only needs to define
what is Political Dynasty is. But they are not doing anything since congress is the
breeding ground of this animal we call political dynasty. The perversities of Political
Dynasty still subsist. We can even see the great impact of political dynasty such as we
can now identify each city, province or region as belonging to a particular clan or
dynastic family who rule it. We have many politicians today monopolize the politics
on their respective provinces, like the Marcoses, Arroyos, Roman and Garcia of
Bataan, Singson of Ilocos Sur, Garcia and Osmena of Cebu, and Zubiri of Bukidnon.
They are all in their comfortable and privileged cocoon. Not funny anymore, even
Pacquiao, a Filipino sport icon now a congressman of Sarangani have his wife Jinky
as a candidate for Vice Governor of Sarangani province in the 2013 election. And it is
not just a matter of ruling it they are even siphoning the taxes that we pay for their
own personal gain so what we need are laws that will give execution to the provision
of the Constitution. We need to properly put a demarcation on the provision so that it
can penalize the transgressors and give leeway to those who can serve but cannot do
such thing because of the dynasty and its private armies. How can we do it?
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VII. Recommendation
How then can this provision be enforced and political dynasties ended, or at
least regulated? There are four possible options as per the Retired Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban namely legislative, judicial (and quasi-judicial), sovereign
and political15
.
First, is Legislative action? The no-brainer option is for Congress to enact a law
defining what a political dynasty is, what offices (elective and nonelective) are
covered, who may enforce the prohibition, and other details. While some senators and
congressmen have perfunctorily filed bills covering these topics, not one has been
seriously deliberated upon.
As of the writing of this paper, three bills have been endorsed since the
Thirteenth congress up until the Fifteenth congress Senate Bills and another three
House Bills have been filed but no second reading transpired. On the 13th Congress
15
Panganiban, Artemio Options to Stop Political Dynasties Philippine Daily Inquirer Nov.24, 2012
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47
the then Senator Alfredo Lim filed Senate Bill 1317. For the 14th
Congress Senator
Panfilo Lacson filed Senate Bill 1468 and for the 15th
congress Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago filed Senate Bill 2649 that is in Senate alone. In the House of
Representative Bayan Muna Party list and other progressive party list group joined
forces in filing for House Bills tackling the issue of Political dynasties. House bill
2493 Representatives Satur Ocampo and Teodoro Casio sponsored it on the 14th
congress. And on the 15th
congress House Bill 3314 has been sponsored by the
following Reps. Teddy A. Casio, Neri Javier Colmenares, Rafael V. Mariano,
Luzviminda C. Ilagan, Antonio L. Tinio, Emericiana A. De Jesus and Raymond V.
Palatino.
Realistically, such measures cannot be expected to be approved at this time.
After all, many legislators have relativesparents, children, siblings, and even
grandparentswho serve simultaneously in Congress and in other offices.
Tired of waiting for congressional action during the last 25 years, some
citizens have filed judicial petitions to compel the Commission on Elections to enforce
the constitutional prohibition by denying due course to certificates of candidacies of
close relatives.
Secondly, Judicial and quasi-judicial actions. However, these petitions are legally
untenable because the Comelec cannot legislate. Note that the Constitution prohibits
political dynasties, as may be defined by law. True, the Comelec has the power to
issue rules and regulations. However, such rules merely implement statutes. Without a
law defining political dynasties, implementing rules have no leg to stand on. How
about a judicial petition for mandamus to compel legislative action? I am afraid such
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48
recourse would also be iffy because courts can command the execution only of a
purely ministerial act, which jurisprudence defines as a simple, definite duty a
precise act accurately marked out If the law imposes a duty but gives the officer
[upon whom it is imposed] the right to decide how or when it shall be performed, the
duty is discretionary and not ministerial.
Under this test, the doubt that courts will direct Congress to pass an enabling law
since the duty is not clearly defined and precisely marked out.
Obviously, the constitutional ban on dynasties is not self-executing, unlike, for
instance, the term limits on congressmen (three consecutive terms) and senators (two
consecutive terms). Here, the courts and the Comelec can disqualify candidates using
the bare, but clear, certain and specific constitutional limits without need of an
enabling law. Otherwise stated, unlike the dynasty ban, term limits are self-executory.
Sovereign action. Probably frustrated by legislative inaction, Comelec Chair Sixto
Brillantes Jr. promised to start a peoples initiative for an anti-dynasty law. Now, this
is very novel. No law in our country has been approved via a peoples initiative.
However, there had been two unsuccessful attempts to change our Constitution via
this process. In Lambino vs Comelec (Oct. 25, 2006), the Supreme Court struck down
a peoples initiative to convert our presidential system to parliamentary on the
ground, among others, that an initiative can be used only for simple and easy-to-
comprehend matters, not for changing basic principles, or several provisions
which a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake.
Although this ruling involved Charter change, I believe that, by analogy, the same
reason stopping a Charter revision can be used to restrain a peoples initiative for an
anti-dynasty law. Being controversial, such a proposed law will need a deliberative
body in which the proposal can, to borrow the language of the Lambino decision, be
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drafted, defined, articulated, discussed and agreed upon in a mature and democratic
debate.
Political action. The fourth option, political action, may be the most doable under the
present circumstances. Simply stated, let the people decide by voting down candidates
who belong to the same family. Those who believe in this proposition can form
political movements like the Kamag-anak sa Politika Aayawan Lahat, or Kapal.
Others may use television, radio, newspapers, Internet and social media like
Facebook and Twitter. US President Barack Obama effectively used the social media
in his reelection bid. His young campaign organizers penetrated the voting population
so systematically and so effectively, converting what was predicted to be a close poll
into a one-sided Electoral College triumph.
Initiative and Referendum
Through RA 6735 (An Act providing for a System on Initiative and
Referendum) I firmly believe that we can find a solution for the problem of anti-
political dynasty bill not being enacted as a law. The law explicitly provides that: Sec.
2. of RA 6735 Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body
upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. It further defines what is the scope of the initiative, "Initiative" is the
power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitutions or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There is a specific type
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of initiative that can be used namely Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a national legislation. The law also define "Referendum" as the
power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called
for the purpose. The law further notes the requirement for the referendum on passing
a law Sec. 4. Who may exercise? The power of initiative and referendum may be
exercised by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays.
Sec. 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at
least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the
Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%)
of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every
five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. The proposition;
c.3. The reason or reasons therefore;
c.4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
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c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
Having the requirements provided by law the people can now legislate without
the congress.
This law was upheld and affirmed by the Supreme Court (SC) in the case of
Santiago vs. Comelec (1997) that provides power to the initiative and referendum on
national legislation. The doctrine underlined shows that RA 6735 has mechanisms for
crafting legislation at all layers of governance from barangay to national levels.
VIII. Bibliography
"We must believe in ourselves, in our capacity to overcome hardship, in our
ability to make the right decision." Jose W. Diokno
Primary Authority
1987 Philippine Constitution
Records of the Constitutional Commission
Republic Act No. 6735 The Initiative and Referendum Act
Official Gazette, Constitution Day, February 2, 2013
270 RA 106, Defensor Santiago vs. COMELEC March 19, 1997
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Secondary Authority
Bernas S.J., Fr. Joaquin G. About Political Dynasties, Philippine Daily Inquirer (2013)
Bernas, J.G. Constitutional Structure and Powers of the
Government: notes and cases 3rd ed. Manila: Rex Book Store
Agpalo, Ruben Statutory Construction, 5th edition Rex. 2003
Casio, Teodoro Et al. House Bill 3314 15th
Congress
Cruz, Isagani End political dynasties, Inquirer (2007)
Coronel, Sheila S. The seven Ms of dynasty building
David, Randy Warlords of a Weak State Philippine Daily Inquirer 2009
David, Randy The Case against Political Dynasties Philippine Daily Inquirer
David, Randy The Future of Political Families Philippine Daily Inquirer
Defensor Santiago, Sen. Miriam Senate Bill 2649, 15th
Congress
Defensor Santiago, Miriam Constitution Annotated, Central
Professional Books Inc. 1999
De Leon, Hector Textbook on the Philippine Constitution
Diaz, Noli C. Statutory Construction Rex Bookstore Inc.
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Elefante, Fil V. How the Constitutional ban on political dynasties came about. Philippine Graphic 2012
Elefante, Fil V. How the Constitutional ban on political dynasties came to be. Philippine Graphic 2012
Lacson, Sen. Panfilo Senate Bill 1468, 14
th Congress
Lim, Sen. Alfredo Senate Bill 1317, 13th
Congress
Lim, Sen. Alfredo Political Dynasty: Anaethema of Democracy
Privilege Speech, January 24, 2005
Panganiban, Artemio Options to Stop Political Dynasties Philippine Daily Inquirer Nov.24, 2012
Ocampo, Satur Et al. House bill 2493 14th
Congress.
Rufo, Aries EDSAs failed legacy: Political dynasties.