a critique of pure success: inchon revisited, revised, and

★ 505

THE U.S. armed forces planned and executed a counteroffensive inthe opening stages of a major war in 1950 that ranks as one of the

bolder surprise offensive operations of the twentieth century. During theKorean War General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and his joint staffcreated an apparent masterpiece centered on the Inchon landing—aflawless diamond in any tiara of historical military triumphs. Half a cen-tury later, Inchon remains largely free of any comprehensive analysis ofshortcoming because of its image of pure success. The favorable termi-nation of the operation was so obvious and compelling that few would

The Journal of Military History 68 (April 2004): 505–26 © Society for Military History

Russel H. S. Stolfi holds a B.S. in Civil Engineering (1954) and an M.A. and Ph.D.in Modern European History (1964, 1966) from Stanford University. After gradu-ation in 1966, he taught modern history for twenty-seven years as a professor atthe U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Over the same period, Stolfi served as a reg-ular, then reserve, officer in the U.S. Marine Corps (1954–85). He has writtenthree books centered on the Second World War, four major articles, and severalU.S. Department of Defense technical studies.

A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised,

and Contrasted✩

Russel H. S. Stolfi

Abstract

The Inchon landing was a strategical masterpiece followed by aground advance to Seoul so tentative that it largely negated the suc-cessful landing. The Inchon-Seoul episode typifies the U.S. style ofwar fighting in the twentieth century—successful maritime force pro-jection followed by less effective ground campaigning. To illustratethe greater possibilities in the ground advance, the author contraststhe opening days of the Inchon-Seoul operations with those of ananalogous German surprise offensive in the Baltic in 1941. Theauthor concludes that the German battle fighting style in mobile warwas superior, containing elements of boldness that could be appliedto improve U.S. ground warfare today.

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waste time reevaluating so foregone an historical interpretation. Yet his-torians and lay and professional readers alike can scarcely ignore theglacially slow advance on the South Korean capital of Seoul that followedthe capture of Inchon or escape the disquieting feeling that the landinghad become an end in itself rather than a means to the end of a quickseizure of Seoul and resulting destruction of the North Korean People’sArmy (NKPA) lying some distance away to the southeast.

The first part of the thesis of this article is that the landing itself wasa strategical masterpiece followed by an advance to Seoul in ground bat-tle so slow and measured that it constituted an operational disaster,largely negating the successful landing. The second part of the thesis isthat the Inchon episode typifies the U.S. style of war fighting in the twen-tieth century—successful distant force projection by sea followed by lesssuccessful campaigning in the ground theater. The author proposes tosupport the thesis of relatively slow and halting ground campaigning bythe United States—the great maritime projection power of the last cen-tury—through the use of historical analogy. The Inchon-Seoul situationwill be compared and contrasted with an analogous offensive associatedwith Germany—the premier ground power of the same century.

The search then is for a useful historical analogy, one that is similarin general situation and reasonably close technologically. The good newsis that war fighting in all times and all places has been dominated by fac-tors observed by Clausewitz as comprising a timeless climate of danger,uncertainty, exertion, and chance. The practical challenge is to select acredibly close general situation which includes similarly modern factorsof weaponry, transportation, and movement in space and time. One cangeneralize that Operation Chromite, the Inchon landing and advance toSeoul, was the centerpiece of an audacious U.S. surprise offensive ofgrand dimension and war-winning potential. An analogous German mil-itary situation including swift ground advances that would serve to illus-trate the art of the possible in Chromite could well be the northern partof the front in Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics in 1941. Although at first blush this opera-tion may seem to be an unlikely candidate, at second glance a funda-mental resemblance appears. One can generalize, for example, thatsimilarly to Chromite, the German border breakthrough and advance toDaugavpils (Dvina, Duenaburg), Latvia, in June 1941 was the center-piece of an audacious German surprise offensive of grand dimension andwar-winning potential.1

It can be further generalized that the U.S. high command basedChromite and its included Inchon landing on a vast maritime concen-

1. Russel H. S. Stolfi, Hitler’s Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted (Nor-man: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), chapter 4.

RUSSEL H. S. STOLFI

MILITARY HISTORY ★ 507

tration of force. U.S. military staffs, especially Marine Corps staffs havebecome large and unwieldy partly because of the special challenges ofembarkation and associated maritime movement and amphibious orport-area landings. Maritime embarkation, with its alleged unique tech-nical complexities, would seem to distance Chromite from Barbarossa,but the Germans faced similar demands. While the U.S. high commandembarked and moved combat formations and supplies over a sixty-five-hundred-mile sea route from California to Japan and Korea, the Germanarmy general staff embarked and moved larger numbers of troops andmore material over rail routes that extended as far as twelve hundredmiles. The U.S. embarkation processes were startlingly similar to Ger-man rail embarkation with the identical necessity for combat loading ofboth troops and supplies and the timing of their arrival in target areas.In a word, in the cases of Chromite and Barbarossa, the virtuosity of U.S.staffs in amphibious embarkation was paralleled by the skill of Germanstaffs in rail embarkation.

As concerns the principles of war that were of special importance inthe offensives, both the U.S. and German high commands faced one sodominant that neither operation could be conceptualized, let alone pro-ceed in any way, without its virtual guarantee. Following the NorthKorean surprise offensive against South Korea in June 1950, the NKPAdrove the U.S. and South Korean military forces into the southeasternextremity of the Korean peninsula around the city of Pusan. UnderUnited Nations (UN) auspices, General MacArthur made the daring deci-sion to execute an amphibious landing far behind the mass of the NKPAengaged on the Pusan perimeter and, by the threat presented, to force itswithdrawal out of South Korea. Faced with the choice of a location forthe landing, MacArthur largely personally made one of the boldest deci-sions in any war of the last century, to land immediately adjacent toSeoul, the political and communications center for all of Korea. A suc-cessful landing at Inchon, the port of Seoul, and a subsequent advanceto Seoul only twenty miles away would threaten the NKPA with totaldestruction rather than force a simple, harrowing withdrawal from thesouth. Local North Korean forces, however, could readily and quicklyblock the long, narrow, torturous channel approach to Inchon, making itimpossible for any landing force to approach the landing areas, let aloneseize them. To generalize, failure to achieve surprise at Inchon wouldnegate any possibility of decisive success in Chromite. In the actualevent, MacArthur’s daring decision to land at so unlikely a location fora major amphibious landing caught the North Korean high commandtotally off guard and was the dominant factor in the success of theoffensive.

In 1940 Adolf Hitler made probably the boldest political-militarydecision of the twentieth century: to attack the largest and most heavily

A Critique of Pure Success


armed power on the globe the next year and do so while still at war withanother major power. To have any significant chance of success over andabove other questions of relative strengths, space, and time, the Germanarmy general staff would have to achieve surprise. Given the strength ofthe Soviet armed forces and the size of the conceptualized area of deci-sive operations, the attack “made sense,” that is, had an acceptablechance of success, only with the attainment of surprise. The fact thatGermany and the Soviet Union were interacting within a functioningnonaggression pact made the secret concentration of 157 German divi-sions in attack positions along the contemporary peaceful frontieralmost impossible. The entire military concentration was dominated,therefore, by the challenges to achieve surprise from the highest strate-gic to the lowest tactical levels, such as the seizure of intact borderbridges.2 The Germans achieved surprise based on the incredibility ofsuch an attack under the strategic conditions of 1941 and the executionof the greatest set of deceptive measures in the history of warfare againsta defensively paranoid Soviet Union. The fundamental resemblancebetween the two offensives continues thereby with the dominance ofsurprise and its successful attainment in both cases.

The highest level schemes of maneuver in each offensive also showremarkable similarities. With the achievement of surprise, the U.S. highcommand anticipated a successful landing followed by the quick seizureof Seoul and the drive into the rear of the NKPA under simultaneousattack by strong U.S. and South Korean forces out of the Pusan perime-ter. Notwithstanding the supreme importance of a successful landing,Inchon was the means to the end of the quick seizure of Seoul and adrive through it across the rear of the main concentration of the NKPA.With the achievement of surprise, the German army general staff envi-sioned an immediate deep breakthrough of the Soviet border defenses inLithuania followed by the quick seizure of the Daugavpils, Latvia, bridgesand advance through the deep rear area of the Soviet Baltic Front. Theseizure intact of the two bridges over the great Western Dvina River atDaugavpils would breach the most significant natural barrier to theadvance on St. Petersburg (formerly Leningrad). Parallel with theChromite situation, the German breakthrough of the Soviet borderdefenses was the means to the end of the quick seizure of Daugavpils andthe drive to seize the St. Petersburg mobilization space.

Within the framework of the general analysis above, one divisioneach of the attacking forces largely carried the hopes for success of the

2. Russel H. S. Stolfi, “Barbarossa: German Grand Deception, and the Achieve-ment of Strategic and Tactical Surprise Against the Soviet Union, 1940–1941,” inDonald C. Daniel and Katherine Herbig, eds., Strategic Military Deception (New York:Pergamon, 1982), 195–223.

RUSSEL H. S. STOLFI


whole business. The U.S. 1st Marine Division seized the Inchon landingareas and led the advance to Seoul. The German 8th Panzer Divisionaccomplished a quick, deep breakthrough of the Soviet Lithuanian bor-der defenses and led the advance entirely across Lithuania to Daugavpilsin the adjoining formerly independent state of Latvia. The two divisionsfought with significantly different battle fighting styles, the U.S. divisionexhibiting slower, halting characteristics and the German unit fastermoving, more fluid attributes.

The obvious argument that the Marine division’s infantry fortressassault character and associated weapons and transportation doomed itto move more slowly to Seoul does not hold in the case of Inchon. The 1stMarine Division was organized to include a tank battalion, amphibioustractor battalion, motor transport (truck) battalion, and a fully motorizedartillery regiment. It came close, thus, to being a fully motorized infantrydivision. It was capable technically of putting together strong motorizedbattle groups to advance the modest distance to Seoul, but only if it couldtactically conceptualize a mobile style of battle fighting.

At Inchon, American Joint Task Force 7 completed two months ofplanning and movement by successfully landing the two assault regi-ments of 1st Marine Division during the late afternoon of D-day, 15 Sep-tember 1950. By midnight, the Marine assault regiments held a securelodgment ashore. Seoul lay twenty miles away across a well-developedroad and rail system. American theater intelligence had estimated that ifsurprise were achieved, few NKPA troops would be located betweenInchon and Seoul. At midnight the road to Seoul lay open. The strengthof the U.S. ground forces already ashore along with that of the followingKorean Marine, U.S. Army, and Marine combat forces, combined with aweak, surprised enemy and the short distance to Seoul, reveal a fleetingopportunity. At this moment, the words of Major General Oliver P.Smith, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, highlight theAmerican way in war. The general commented that “half the problemwas in getting to Inchon at all,” echoing America’s war fighting style ofdistant maritime force projection.3 Here we have America getting toInchon (brilliantly), seizing Inchon (brilliantly), and then as the follow-ing paragraphs will illustrate, more or less incidentally moving on toSeoul, the main objective of the offensive.

On D+1 and D+2, the Marine forces advanced so tentatively thattheir actions could be likened to continuing to hit the beaches. On thosetwo full days available for the advance to Seoul, 1st Marine Division

3. U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953, vol. 2, TheInchon-Seoul Operations, by L. Montross and N. A. Canzona (Washington: Head-quarters, U.S. Marine Corps, G-3, Historical Branch, 1954– ), 98. Hereinafter referredto as USMC, Inchon-Seoul (1954).



made doctrinaire, halting, phased advances to Ascom City and KimpoAirfield. (See Map 1.) Faced with weak, uncoordinated opposing forceson D+1, the two assault regiments continued to advance on line ratherthan put together a deep drive toward Seoul. The division displayed a fix-ation on coming abreast on phase lines and an inordinate concern overclearing, searching thoroughly, and rooting out minor resistance. Thelate afternoon events of D+1 illustrate the style of advance in terms ofthe 5th Marines. Second Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5), moving along thestretch of highway leading to Ascom City, “encountered only sniping,but it was early evening before the two hills [along the road] and sur-rounding low ground [south of the city] had been thoroughly searched.”4

The battalion commander then ordered 2/5 to dig in for the night of D+1southwest of Ascom in an area devoid of any significant enemy and afterhaving spent the previous daylight hours engaged against incoherentNorth Korean resistance. The weak enemy of D+1 presented further

4. Ibid., 139.

Map 1. Inchon to Seoul.

RUSSEL H. S. STOLFI


front collapsing opportunity for deeper daylight and further nighttimeadvances, opportunity that was missed because of the tentative style ofthe U.S. ground force.

This critical analysis of the cautious movement on D+1 would nothold much water for the battle at the water’s edge on Betio Island, TarawaAtoll, and the other small, fortress-like areas similar to Pelelieu, Iwo Jima,and Okinawa that demanded and got miniscule, methodical advances inthe Pacific during World War II. Chromite, indeed, demanded thefortress-attack-like surge on D-day exemplified by photographs of Marineswith scaling ladders going over the sea wall on Red Beach. The scene wasreminiscent of Marines huddling against and clawing their way over thelog wall at the water’s edge at Betio. Like it or not, however, the strategicraison d’être for Chromite was the quick seizure of Seoul and not theindispensable but intermediate step of the Inchon landing.

Mobile offensive operations demand an urgent style of battle fightingthat is supremely sensitive to opportunity and time. Unlike the situationa week later around Seoul, when the Marine Corps, Army, and KoreanMarines would be engaged in tough battle against a psychologically bal-anced and numerous enemy, UN forces confronted immediate successon D+2 (17 September). The American way in mobile offensives emergesin the words of the official history: “On Sunday morning, D+2, GeneralSmith was directed as landing force commander, to reestablish civil gov-ernment in Inchon,” a task that tied up Smith personally in consultingKorean officials and issuing proclamations on D+2 and being physicallypresent to make remarks at the city hall on D+3.5 One can find littlesense of urgency here in the conduct of operations. Theater headquar-ters had issued orders to the commander of ground forces ashore of noconsequence for the developing battle but in strong enough terms thatGeneral Smith felt bound to be present personally in a rear area remoteeven from the slow-moving battle. Greater urgency in the conduct of theadvance had been proposed by Major General Edward M. Almond, U.S.Army, commanding X Corps, earlier on 9 September. He had suggestedthat a battalion of 32d Infantry Regiment, 7th Division, be landed onGreen Beach with the mission “to move rapidly down the road to seizethe high ground south of Seoul, more than 20 miles inland.” The ideahad struck General Smith as extremely optimistic.6

The story developed thus far shows Chromite as a distant strategicconcentration of forces followed by surprise seizure of a beachhead crit-ical for a ground advance to Seoul. Barbarossa similarly comprised a vaststrategic concentration of forces followed on the Baltic front by the sur-prise breakthrough of a fortified frontier critical for a ground advance

5. Ibid., 143.6. Ibid., 44.



across Lithuania to Daugavpils in Latvia. To effect surprise, the Germansgradually built up their ground and air forces in the east for twelvemonths. Under cover of an ongoing war with Britain, the army generalstaff carried out the strategic concentration in four waves, with the firstthree holding the infantry divisions and masses of material. It moved thepanzer divisions with their largely offensive missions and distant objec-tives only at the last moment in the fourth wave.7 Through skill, chance,and the accommodating style of the Soviets, the Germans achieved thesame complete surprise in Barbarossa as the Americans had done inChromite. On 16 June 1941 the 8th Panzer Division, which was the Ger-man division analogous to 1st Marine Division in Chromite, was still sta-tioned near Prague five hundred miles by rail from its assault sector onthe Lithuanian border. In rail movements analogous to the maritimemovement of 1st Marine Division, the panzer division embarkation offi-cer loaded the division on 102 individual trains and delivered it con-cealed to assembly areas near the border by 1700 on 18 June. By B-day,22 June, 8th Panzer Division had edged immediately up against theLithuanian border. To complete the analogy, it now stood poised beforeSoviet border defenses in a situation parallel to 1st Marine Division atthe entrance to the Inchon shipping channel.

On B-day for 8th Panzer Division and D-day for 1st Marine Division,both formations scored decisive success. On these initial, analogousdays, the two divisions also quickly diverged into American and Germanstyles of conducting ground offensives. With its slowly moving style, theMarine division concentrated on securing a beachhead to a doctrinallyimposed phase line (the 0-1 line) and consolidating within it. Althoughencountering almost negligible resistance on the two main landingbeaches, the American division spent most of the hours of darkness indefensive positions facing toward several miles of space largely devoid ofany enemy. In contrast, 8th Panzer Division anticipated strong resis-tance and had a foot-marching infantry regiment attached to lead theinitial assault into anticipated field fortifications. Shortly after theSchwerpunkt (point of major effort) battle group advanced through thefield positions taken by the infantry regiment, it ran into stronger Sovietforces in concrete bunkers behind a one-hundred-meter-wide swath offelled trees. The division faced tactical, and the northern army groupstrategic, disaster with the halt of the Schwerpunkt force.

Similarly to the way General MacArthur had selected 1st MarineDivision as the operational instrument to effect the seizure of Seoul andthe collapse of the NKPA in South Korea, Colonel General (4-stars) ErichHoepner, Commander, Panzer Group IV, Army Group North, hadapproved a subordinate corps commander’s plan to use 8th Panzer Divi-

7. Stolfi, “Barbarossa,” 209–11.

RUSSEL H. S. STOLFI


sion as the operational instrument for the quick seizure of Daugavpilsand resulting strategic collapse of the Soviet Baltic Front. The Germandivision commander, Major General (1-star) Erich Brandenberger,according to a candid entry in the division war diary, had developed hisplan for the breakthrough of the border defenses based on a “false com-mand estimate of the enemy.”8 When hours counted if the Germans wereto travel the 190 miles to Daugavpils fast enough to seize it by coup demain, the division Schwerpunkt battle group was still halted in theSoviet border defenses almost five hours into the attack. At this momenton B-day, the Germans exhibited their tactical prowess in mobile war inwhat can be characterized as a breakthrough mentality. (See Map 2.)

Earlier on the morning of B-day, the division operations officer hadsignaled General Brandenberger from the command post that his south-ern secondary battle group was fluidly advancing through light resis-tance. Tasked to reach a distant first day’s objective, Brandenbergerswitched the division Schwerpunkt to the advancing force and at 0743rode over to accompany it east. During the planning for Barbarossa, heand the corps commander, General of Infantry (3-stars) Erich vonManstein, agreed that seizure of the intact bridges at Daugavpils in acoup de main would have to take place by the fourth day (B+3) of thecampaign. Manstein, accordingly, assigned the city of Ariogala, fifty-fivemiles from the border, as the objective for B-day. The target was daunt-ing with eighteen bridged rivers and streams to be crossed, unpavedroads clogged with massive German army and Luftwaffe traffic, andprobable stubborn Soviet resistance. Brandenberger, nevertheless, ridingclose to the front of the lead battle group, reached the Dubysa River justwest of Ariogala at 1530 on B-day. Meeting tough resistance in spite ofhis surprise arrival, Brandenberger on the spot ordered the battle groupto push across a reconnoitered ford immediately with the accompanyingpanzer battalion and the armored, three-quarter-track company of themotorized infantry battalion to take the city.

At this moment, the division commander and lead battle group laythirty-seven miles east of the other two-thirds of the division stillengaged in stiff combat near the German border. Only one other Germandivision could provide protection for the left flank of the battle group,and by midnight on B-day this adjacent 290th Infantry Division wasthirty-eight miles west. Such was the German breakthrough style thatthe corps commander himself rode into Ariogala at 1730 and, standingin a city street, gave Brandenberger oral orders to concentrate every

8. Frame (Fr.) 000641, Roll 483, Microcopy T-315, 8. Panzer Division, Ia,Kriegstagebuch, Feldzug im Osten 1941, 13.6 –20.7.41, Records German Field Com-mands, Divisions, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.(hereinafter referred to as Roll 483, T-315, NARA).



combat unit of the division there by midnight and advance on the Sovietair base at Kedainia thirty-three miles east. To execute the order, thedivision commander began to pull forward the two battle groups thatwere just finishing the border combat. Simultaneously, at Ariogala, heput together a new advanced detachment and ordered it east. Sevenmiles down the road at yet another river crossing site, it met “strongresistance,” words from the division war diary meaning combat with asizeable Soviet infantry formation supported by tanks and artillery.9

There, at 2300, B-day, Brandenberger halted to concentrate the division.

9. Fr. 000464, ibid.

RUSSEL H. S. STOLFI


Although tasked to take Seoul, 1st Marine Division found it difficultto break out of its World War II mold of securing beachheads. With aPacific island fortress assault mentality, the veteran division plannersconcentrated on securing a challenging but probably lightly held beach.The division had to be filled out with reservists from around the nation,embarked, and transported across the Pacific. Combined with animpending, immovable D-day, these factors gave the planners time to dolittle more than what was familiar from the Pacific war. As a result, theUnited States–UN offensive has been misleadingly generalized as anInchon landing rather than, more appropriately, an encirclement anddestruction of the NKPA in South Korea. The U.S. commanders at the-ater, corps, and division made no plans for a coup de main at Seoul thatwould immediately block communications between North Korea and theNKPA in the south. The situation was both tragic and unique because thetheater commander had selected a landing site so unlikely that little ini-tial resistance could be expected and yet so close to Seoul that it couldbe taken by a modest-sized motorized force exploiting the same surprisethat made the landing possible in the first place. What a motorized rein-forced infantry battalion could have done on D+1, that is, physicallyblock communications through Seoul, two divisions were needed toaccomplish for the same stakes but in a battle beginning a week later andlasting four additional casualty-filled days.

In contrast, around midnight on B-day, now fifty-five miles intoSoviet Russia, 8th Panzer Division headquarters labored in darkness toconcentrate the division at Ariogala. Earlier at 1650, the original Schw-erpunkt battle groups had disengaged from the border combat and by0215, B+1, in full darkness had reached Ariogala. The battle groups hadmoved forward through enemy stragglers across sixteen bridges andfords and had been halted only by corps traffic control officers whoordered them off the road for two hours. As daylight arrived, the divisionhad pulled together its combat elements and enough fuel and ammuni-tion columns to advance east, still with no friendly forces on its flanks.The play of chance in great offensives is illustrated by the remainder ofB+1, beginning with the panzer corps alert at 0930 that its organicreconnaissance aircraft had observed Soviet motorized columns severalmiles long and containing “300 to 400 tanks” heading west, apparentlyagainst 8th Panzer Division, to regain the big bridge over the Dubysanear Ariogala.10 Brandenberger deployed the division for defense, but theSoviet force during several tense hours veered north and late in the after-noon engaged instead the thirty-five-mile-distant 6th Panzer Divisionaround Raseinia. (See Map 3.)

10. Fr. 000650, ibid.



At this juncture, the German general commanding Panzer Group IVfaced a campaign-level decision of whether to turn around 8th PanzerDivision to help fight off the strong armored enemy or to head for St.Petersburg. Hoepner vacillated for several hours but then with impres-sive operational nerve at approximately 1800, B+1, ordered Mansteinand Brandenberger to continue the drive through Daugavpils to St.Petersburg. The division had been frozen in its forward position fortwenty-six hours, but at 1900, B+1, the lead battle group began toadvance east. Moving continuously through darkness, it would seizeKedainia at 0340, B+2, while thirty-two miles distant from the closestGerman formations on either flank.

Analogously, by midnight on D+1, 1st Marine Division had drivenfive miles from the Inchon beaches and been ordered to dig in for thenight. The next day, D+2, the division would take Kimpo Airfield at arelaxed pace characterized by the following deceptively reasonable offi-cial account: “Marching northwards through the outskirts [of AscomCity], Easy Company of [the spearhead] 2/5 was repeatedly held up bysmall pockets of resistance among the dwellings along each side of theroad. Captain Samuel Jaskilka’s veteran infantry reduced the positionsmethodically but the whole morning was used up in the process.”11 Mov-ing slowly as if across a small fortress island, the Marines reduced allpockets of resistance, thus giving opportunity to the enemy commanddefending Seoul to begin to regain its balance and gather forces for astrong defense of the city. In epic contrast in Barbarossa, the 7th PanzerDivision, advancing south of Brandenberger’s 8th Panzer Division towardMoscow, made an extraordinary drive with similar weapons, vehicles,and road conditions that illustrates a different battle style. From 1030 to2300 on B+3, the division advanced 135 miles [!] through the rear areaof the Soviet group of armies defending the way to Moscow among enemysupply columns and strong combat forces moving west. The division wardiary gives a brief sketch of the style of advance. As a division columnpassed through the main street of a Russian city and received significantfire, its commander would drop off a designated battle troop to break upthe enemy force, remount its vehicles, and catch up with the stilladvancing column.12

The 1st Marine Division would inch forward on D+2 to take KimpoAirfield while keeping on line for the advance to Seoul. To get at that cityfrom Inchon, the division would have to cross the Han River, but it gave

11. USMC, Inchon-Seoul (1954), 155.12. Fr. 000890, Roll 407, Microcopy T-315, 7. Panzer Division, Ia, Tages-

meldungen, 20. Juni–10. Juli 1941, Schuetzen-Regiment 6, Abt. Ia, 27. 6. 41, Mor-genmeldungen fuer die Zeit vom 25.6.41, 0900 Uhr bis 27.6.41, 0100 Uhr, RecordsGerman Field Commands, Divisions, NARA.


518 ★ THE JOURNAL OF


little serious thought to the surprise seizure of existing bridges. Such apossibility was terra incognita for both the division and corps headquar-ters. Even the crossing that succeeded on D+5, 20 September 1950, nearHaenju, was treated as a masterpiece of action. The official account,however, shows little urgency and much bureaucratically styled discus-sion, as for example: “Late in the afternoon [of D+3], both Corps andDivision issued orders . . . for crossing the Han.” Then, “General Smithasked for a conference the next morning [D+4] with General Almond. Heinformed the Xth Corps commander that he and his staff had given con-siderable thought to the question of a crossing site.”13 The commanderalso discussed bridging material and recorded the astounding fact thatcorps and division did not have enough “to cross such a wide stream.”14

After landing with forces from the United States and Japan to conduct aground offensive to take Seoul, the American ground forces would takesix days to move twelve miles to a crossing site on the Han and findthemselves without enough bridging material to cross and with no seri-ous concept for taking an existing Korean structure by surprise.

The 8th Panzer Division faced an analogous situation in its attemptto take a large city north of a big river at the beginning of a surpriseoffensive. In contrast to the relaxed American drive to the Han and itscrossing, the German commander generated an urgent drive that culmi-nated in the intact seizure of the road and rail bridges at Daugavpils. Theadvanced elements of the panzer division would arrive just out of sightof the bridges at 0530, B+4. To keep the drive going, the division com-mander had moved his battle groups continuously day and night fromlate B+1 toward a city 190 miles from the German border. Even a mod-est delay at any one of the thirty-six significant streams to be crossedfrom the German border to Daugavpils could have been fatal to the drive.The division, accordingly, marched bridging columns with the forwardbattle groups and assigned flak specifically to secure crossing sites fromair attack. To maintain high tempo, the division had attached to it twoteams of special operations troops for the surprise seizure of the largerbridges along the route and the master coup sought for Daugavpils. Theteams included personnel who spoke Lithuanian, Latvian, or Russianand were dressed in captured enemy uniforms, armed with both Sovietand German weapons, and mounted on captured Soviet vehicles.

The teams scored their first success with the intact seizure of thetwo bridges over the Mituva River at Jurbarkas, seven miles from the bor-der at 0600, B-day. Four days later at 0600, B+4, two teams at the frontof the division’s tank regiment moved out from forest concealment 1.6miles southeast of the Daugavpils bridges and boldly approached them.

13. USMC, Inchon-Seoul (1954), 183.14. Ibid., 184.



At the road bridge, one Soviet-like team moved in and among the realSoviet troops on the south bank and “shot them down.”15 The columnthen moved across the bridge to take a tiny lodgment and defuze thebridge demolitions. Immediately after the shooting began, the panzerregimental commander, personally accompanying his lead panzer bat-talion, crossed the intervening terrain and drove across the intact bridgeinto the city. A second tank battalion followed, accompanied by motor-ized infantry, artillery, and antitank guns. The Soviets reacted vigorouslywith local ground forces and low-level air attack but were unable eitherto regain or to destroy the bridges. (See Map 5.)

The Germans made the successful drive to Daugavpils with nofriendly forces on the flanks of a division advancing in an interruptedcolumn along approximately forty miles of unpaved road at any momentin time. What command quality allowed the Germans to develop so higha tempo of operations and sustain it logistically? Veterans of the deep1939–42 advances use the words “strong nerves” to define the leadershipquality. To create an uninterrupted advance and exploit fleeting oppor-tunity, the commander required strong nerves to fight off the inherentparalysis of decision making in war. The factors that comprise the cli-mate of war, especially danger, uncertainty, and chance, conspire toimmobilize commanders. Brandenberger exemplified strong nerves. Asthe chaos of mobile combat and distant resupply enveloped him and hisstaff, he neither halted nor slowed the advance of 8th Panzer Division.

Witness the chaos. After the great tank scare, the division advanceddetachment followed by the lead battle group moved out again towardsKedainia at 1750, B+1. (See Maps 3 and 4.) It signaled at 1945 that it wasin combat with a strong enemy but after a two-hour battle, radioed thatit intended to advance through darkness into the streets of Kedainia andarrive there by 0200, B+2. The advanced detachment arrived on sched-ule and the trailing lead battle group rode through it to take the bridgethere intact and report the city secured by 0340, B+2. Simultaneously, aground reconnaissance detachment reported a strong Soviet tank forcefive miles north of the city. Brandenberger, nevertheless, riding with thelead battle group, ordered it toward the city of Seta eleven miles east andtook the bridge there intact at 0743, B+2. Shortly afterward, a strongSoviet force attacked Seta from the east, then at 0900 another strongenemy force attacked Seta from the south, and at 1100 yet anotherstrong force attacked the battle groups and division command post backat Kedainia from the north. Each of these Soviet attacking formationsheld tanks and infantry with artillery support. Undeterred, the divisioncommander in the lead and his operations officer in the command postnear Kedainia not only repulsed the attacks, destroying fifteen Soviet

15. Fr. 00671, Roll 483, T-315, USNA.



tanks in the battle south of Seta alone, but pushed forward the lead bat-tle group another twenty miles to take the large city of Ukmerge at 1650.

But the test of nerves was not over. Two hours later at 1905, B+2, thedivision commander, still with the leading battle group, signaled the divi-sion command post that he was under attack by a strong Soviet tank andmotorized infantry force advancing from the direction of the Germanborder. The Soviets were able to make this startling attack because theother division battle groups now lay thirty miles west near Kedainia.Brandenberger had reached Ukmerge with an advancing mobile offen-sive perimeter surrounded on all sides by Soviet-held country. After atwo-and-one-half hour battle directed west, Brandenberger destroyedthe attacker, turned east again, and by midnight, B+2, took intact yetanother bridge, this time six miles northeast of Ukmerge. Then, frommidnight through 0330, B+3, 25 June, in complete darkness, the divisioncommander directed the refueling, remunitioning, and reorganization ofthe freshly concentrated two battle groups in order to set off now on twoaxes of advance toward Daugavpils. During the preceding drive, the divi-sion commander displayed nerves so strong, comprising a battle fightingstyle so fluid, and with a unit so like an operational perpetual motionmachine that the style and the organization should be studied as histor-ical models for emulation. It is not well known that the present IsraeliArmy as it was created between 1956 and 1967 modeled its battle fight-ing style on that of the German Army of 1939–45. The newly developingarmy was free to emulate any style in the world to master the elementalchallenge of Israeli political survival. It is a telling commentary on Ger-man virtuosity in battle that in the shadow of the holocaust, the IsraeliArmy chose the recent German style.16

During the analogous time of D+1 through D+3, 1st Marine Divisionadvanced at a slower pace. The division established O-A, O-1, O-2, andforce beachhead lines and a surfeit of short-range, intermediate objec-tives, including Ascom City and Kimpo Airfield. These control deviceshave seemed so correct and professional that they have come to beregarded as a natural order of things. It is not so much that phase linesand intermediate objectives have been little challenged as it is that theyhave seemed so necessary and natural that challenge cannot even be for-mulated. The halting of movement during the night, the incessant estab-lishment of night defensive perimeters, the absence of effective groundreconnaissance, and the location of the leader in the center of a “smallcity”17 called the division command post, all reflect combat in an island

16. Colonel Mandi Meron, Chief of Staff, Israeli Armored Force, discussion withthe author, Negev Desert, October 1968.

17. Major General Ernest Cheatham, USMC, Commander, First Marine Division,discussion with the author, Camp Pendleton, California, February 1984. The words

RUSSEL H. S. STOLFI


beachhead. Recognizing this historical condition, one can see large staffplanning bureaucracies rather than trim general staffs: the staff becomesan instrument to plan the travel of a division to a beachhead rather thanmaneuver a division out of it. In so constrained a battlefield, the divisioncommander can direct his fight from a large, immobile headquartersheavy with extraneous planners. Marine Corps doctrine with its equivo-cal axiom on the location of the leader in combat—the leader shall posi-tion himself where he can best control his forces—reflects the MarineCorps as prisoner of this historical condition. German doctrine was lessequivocal. It demanded that the leader be as far forward as possible“because in war the leader must see for himself.”18 The contrasting endresult: General Smith would fix himself in a large command post and editwritten orders for continuation of the battle the next morning out ofnight defensive positions while General Brandenberger would ridethrough the dark of night close to the front of his lead battle group andissue oral orders to keep the division moving.

For the commanders of Marine division, Army corps, and Theater,the evening of D+1, 16 September 1950, and the following two days weremost crucial for a timely advance to Seoul. The day before, their head-quarters had been fully occupied getting their forces ashore, but on thefollowing 16, 17, and 18 September, the division and corps commandersand MacArthur himself had the tactical opportunity and a strategicimperative to get to Seoul fast. Those leaders, however, committed them-selves to battle fighting quiescence as shown in the official account ofactivity that again seems to be natural, pertinent, and necessary to reachSeoul: “On the evening of D plus 1, General Smith had issued Opn 05-50, directing the 1st and 5th Marines to attack toward corps phase lineCC the next morning.”19 There is little action in this scene and muchwriting of orders for two regiments frozen in position for an entire night.In essence, General Smith has issued a written order not to exploit theopportunity offered by a weak and confused enemy to drive through thenight to Seoul, but rather to wait to advance the next morning to anintermediate phase line.

The official account continues on to describe the happenings of thenext morning, D+2, in the following also seemingly natural and obviousactions: “That morning [D+2] C in FE [Commander in Chief Far East][MacArthur] had been met by General Smith at Yellow Beach and wel-

are General Cheatham’s. The context was his statement generally: How can I considerthat I have a mobile division when my command post is the size of a small city?

18. Comments of the division commander, Generalmajor Gustav von Vaerst, Fr.000250, Roll 664, Microcopy T-313, 15. Panzer Division, Anlage zum Taetigkeits-bericht, Kommando, 15. Pz. Div., Anhaeltspunkte fuer die Motorisierte Gefechtsaus-bildung, Records German Field Commands, Divisions, NARA.

19. USMC, Inchon-Seoul (1954), 153.



comed to the 1st Marine Division command post. . . . There the Com-mander in Chief was briefed by the Division G-2 and G-3 on the militarysituation.”20 The question begs that since the Marine division was nowconducting an offensive eastward, why was not the division commanderleading it toward Seoul and why was not the theater commander press-ing him forward? It is a telling commentary on American battle fightingstyle that General Smith had determined that the best position for himto control the battle in the drive to Seoul was by being present to greetGeneral MacArthur back on the beach and conduct him to a prepared,bureaucratically styled briefing presented by two subordinate divisionstaff officers with him in attendance.

In summary, Chromite and Barbarossa comprise two of the boldestsurprise offensives of the twentieth century. Their vast dimensions allowone to generalize that they typify each the American and German wayin war. The two operations were fundamentally analogous historical hap-penings that not only allow one to establish each country’s way in warbut also to contrast their ground battle fighting styles. The article pre-sents the concentration of forces and the first four days of ground com-bat, analyzing the advances of two analogously tasked American andGerman divisions. Based on empirical historical data, the article showsthat both Americans and Germans were brilliantly successful in the sur-prise concentration of forces up against enemy territory, the Americansby sea and the Germans by land. The same hard historical data showsimilar success on the first day of ground combat, the Americans seizinga bridgehead ashore and the Germans penetrating deeply into Soviet-occupied Lithuania. After D- and B-days, however, the two ground forcesdramatically diverged in rates of advance and battle fighting style.

The American ground force moved slowly to the drumbeat of cau-tious, restrictive written orders that limited daily advances to distancesso small that it took eleven days to begin the attack into Seoul, which layonly 20 road miles distant from Inchon. The German ground forcemoved swiftly using oral orders that demanded continuous, unrestrictedadvance toward a target city reckoned to be four days away although 190miles distant. It would be tempting to obfuscate here in defense of theAmerican force by bringing out the usual suspects to explain the stag-gering contrast in rate of advance. Such an explanation would cite thefactors of force ratios, attacker’s casualties, defender’s posture, terrain,road net, weather, nightfall, and duration of operation to account for dif-ferences in performance by suggesting that the American force facedgreater challenges. A glance at the factors shows that the challenges weresimilar and therefore cannot account for the difference in performance.The swifter German rate of advance was based on a contrasting German

20. Ibid.

RUSSEL H. S. STOLFI


style of offensive battle highlighted by a leader positioned as far forwardas possible; a dominant operations officer heading a small, modestlyranked general staff, each issuing oral or short written orders; movementtwenty-four hours a day; constantly reorganizing battle groups; and vig-orous combat reconnaissance. The above elements of style that charac-terized German mobile war call for scrutiny for application to presentU.S. ground force operations. The point is not to make 1941 Germansout of twenty-first century Americans but to improve U.S. capabilities tocope with uncertainty and chance in war, as it were, to ride through therugged and uneven landscape of war rather than attempt to level it.21

21. R. H. S. Stolfi, German Panzers on the Offensive: Russian Front, NorthAfrica, 1941–1942 (Atglen, Pa., and Surrey, England: Schiffer Publishing, 2003), 213.


a critique of pure success: inchon revisited, revised, and

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