a critique of susanne langer’s esthetics

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A Critique of Susanne Langers Esthetics

In the summer of 2000 I had the good fortune to attend a summer symposium hosted by the Societyfor the Advancement for American Philosophy. There, over the period of two days, I attended a

presentation by incent !olapietro in which we investigated the life and philosophy of Susanne"anger. #ear the end of the session, Prof. !olapietro voiced a concern he had with "anger$s

philosophy of art% he suggested that her notion of form left the artwor& something of a medium fortransmitting the idea of the artist, and that this picture of the artwor& was impoverished incomparison with a richer depiction li&e the one offered by 'ohn (ewey inArt as Experience. In hisessay )Susanne "anger on Sy* mbols and Analogy% A !ase of +isplaced !oncreteness)- Prof./andall Auier levels, successfully I believe, a sweeping criticism of the bul& of "anger$s

philosophy and, in the process, lays the groundwor& for a criticism of her esthetics which ta&es into

accountthe insight offered by !olapietro during the summer institute. Auier$s criticism of "anger$spro1ect focuses on her deliberate push to answer criticisms of her system of thought without resort tometaphysics. nce we have applied the general criticism offered by Auier to the specific case of"anger$s notion of esthetic form, I will show that only with the introduction of a rich description ofeperience itself, always lac&ing in "anger according to Auier, will "anger$s esthetics besalvageable.

I. Auxiers Criticis

In his essay, Auier accuses "anger of misplaced concreteness in her notion of form, and hefinds that this, at root, infects and calls into 3uestion her core philosophical positions. It is importantto reali4e from the beginning that "anger was a studentof 5hitehead and was influenced, especiallyin her early wor&, by his thought.2 Auier relates that in her first wor& The Practice of Philosophy"anger begins her long wor& on the notion of symbol by essentially borrowing ideas from hermentor. In particular, she holds that symbol and that which is symboli4ed are interchangeable. Thiswould seem to replicate the essential move ta&en by 5hitehead in Symbolism: Its Meaning and

Effectwhere he ma&es a similar move to ma&e the isomorphism the ground of the symbolic relation.As Auier points out, though, upon borrowing this notion, "anger 3uic&ly departs from theintentions of 5hitehead. 5hereas he too& the relation of symbol to symboli4ed as being one ofabstraction and contained within eperience itself, she too& the relation, which she calls here

6analogy$, to be an insight into the concrete* nature of things. Auier sums up the root of theproblem%

7or "anger, however, the symbolic relation is the &ey to getting the things in nature. . . and theperceiving mind8brain8body8consciousness together9in short, she uses her symbol theory as anepistemic bridge which, while being far more sophisticated that the )red here now) of the positivists,still betrays a set of philosophical concerns foreign to 5hitehead$s theory and a&in to attempts. . . tofind a principle of verification.:

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It is important to recognize that even in these early descriptions of the relation of sign tosignified, we have the essence of the problem which will later become more apparent. InPhilosophyin aNewKey, perhaps her most well known work, Langer redefines the symbol as a "logicalanalogy."[4] !hs, the symbol mst, by its very natre be something of an abstraction in that therelation between it and the signified is that of similarity. #$ier sggests that, with slight variation,this notion of symbolism is carried forward in her ne$t works incldingeeling and ormand

Problems of Art. !he problem that Langer faces, thogh, is that this notion of symbol seemsincongros with her assmptions abot the natre of the symbol to link the world and the mind.!hat is, it seems that Langer wants the symbol to be a concrete, mind independent portion of theworld while also being the reslt of the process of abstraction. %he describes the symbol as a createdthing, while seeming to need it as a &fond' portion of the world.

!hese divergent descriptions of the symbol might well be caght p together in a coherentpackage by some sort of metaphysical nderpinning, bt, as Langer's work progressed, she seemedless and less likely to offer sch a reconciliation. In fact, she is noted for her later trn to biology andanthropology despite the fact that it seems that sch a trn cold only e$acerbate the problem.#$ier cites a few lines from the opening chapter of what is argably her most matre workMind:

n Essay in !"man eeling(

!he main task entailed by the ndertaking of a new attack on the problem of mind in the conte$t ofnatra l history, withot resort to metaphysical assmptions of non)zoological factors for thee$planation of man's pecliar estate, is to keep the biological concept ade*ate to the greatness ofthe reality it is spposed to make comprehensible.[+]

It shold be clear, then, that by the end of her career, Langer had given herself over almostcompletely to positivism. %he has decided to bite the bllet and answer all the metaphysical*estions abot her earlier claims abot analogy by resorting to biological descriptions of theorganism, all the while eschewing any overt presence of metaphysics in her work.

#s #$ier points ot, we are able, in her final work, to discern the presence of the sameproblem which plaged her earlier thoght. y this point Langer has dropped the se of the word&analogy' to denote the relation which she has stdied and instead ses &pro-ection'(

"ro-ection" is really a word)of)all)work/ sometime it is sed to denote a principle, as I -st sed itabove in saying that a pro-ection is a principle of presentation. %ometime it is applied to the act ofmaking the presentation, i.e. setting p the symbol/ and finally, perhaps most often, we call thesymbol it self a pro-ection of what it symbolizes. In this sense art may be said to be a pro-ection ofthe artist's idea into some perceptible form.[0]

y pro-ection Langer clearly intends to indicate the relationship formerly identified by what she

called &analogy.' #s sch, we can still find the tension between abstraction, which is something of aprodct of the mind and the fact that Langer searches for the symbol as a fond portion of the world.!his tension is, in fact, even more prononced in her se of th e word &pro-ection' which seemschosen to indicate the active role the mind plays in its formation. 1hat remains a mystery is howLanger can resolve this depiction of the symbol as internal to the fnction of the mind whileadvocating material e$planations of the origin of the symbol.

It is here that #$ier's claim that Langer is gilty of misplaced concreteness is perhaps mostclear. Langer acknowledges and seems intitively drawn throghot her work to the notion, imparted

by her mentor 1hitehead, that the symbol is both analogos to the symbolized and that the processof drawing the analogy is one of abstraction which is necessarily mind)dependent. #t the same time,

thogh, Langer wants to, erroneosly, assign this abstracted form a material, concrete, mind)independent character. 1hen it becomes obvios in Langer's work that she oght to provide ametaphysical nderpinning for her notion of the genesis of the symbol, she instead trns to

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materialistic descriptions of the symbol in an attempt to fill the role which otherwise would havebeen done by metaphysics. In fact, though, the notions of both analogy and projection presupposea metaphysics in such a way as to leave Langers thought seriously flawed in the absence of one.

II. Langers Esthetics

Near the beginning ofProblems of ArtLanger clearly lays out her definition of art as being"an epressive form created for our perception through sense or imagination, and what it epresses ishuman feeling."!# Leaving aside the notion of the epression of human feeling, the majority of thewor$ in the sentence is being done by the notion of "epressive form." Later in the same chapter,Langer defines epressive form as being "any perceptible or imaginable whole that ehibitsrelationships of parts, or points, or even %ualities or aspects within the whole, so that it may be ta$ento re& present some other whole whose elements have analogous relations."!'# If we leave aside thecompleities Langer will later introduce into this model, we find that her notion of the artwor$ isclear at this point. (ust as she suggests that the globe represents the world to a child who will see it as"the world" and not simply something which "means the world" so too the artwor$ is not simplysomething which means or points to the idea or sentiment of its creator, but is instead an actualevocation of the idea or sentiment. )he epressive form, of which the artwor$ is a type, functions on

the relation of metaphor which is "the principle of saying one thing and meaning another, andepecting to be understood to mean the other."!*#

)his definition of the wor$ of art itself should ma$e clear the tendency in Langers thoughttoward an understanding that the artwor$ is a symbol assembled by the mind of the artistic creator. Itis in a later chapter dealing with the nature of artistic perception that we find the strain ofmaterialism which +uier finds infecting her general thought. he defines the apprehension of thewor$ of art as being "an act of understanding, mediated by a single symbol, which is the created. . .aesthetic impression-the apparition that results from the artists wor$." !*# Note that while artisticimpression is a process of the drawing of metaphor between symbol and symbolied, the process ofartistic appreciation is no such thing, but is instead a process of epistemic apprehension of the wor$.

/n the one hand we have the artist assigned the role of crafting the artwor$ to act as a metaphor forthe impression she wishes to convey, while on the other hand the observer is given the tas$ offorming from the impression of the symbol an understanding of the impression the artist sought toconvey. In a very real way, the artist and the observer represent the conflicting depictions Langerassigns the symbol. )he artist is the creator of the symbol which remains for her a metaphor for herimpression, while the observer is responsible for being able to generate an epistemic relation w& iththe artwor$ in which the impression of the artist can be drawn out.

+n overview of Langers notion of esthetic involvement, then, begins with the artist asactively creating the artwor$ for the specific purpose of functioning as a metaphor to convey achosen impression to the observer. )he observer is the receptor of the form of the artwor$, and it is

the observers tas$ to try to generate from the physicality of the artwor$ an understanding of theimpression the artist sought to convey. )his depiction of the artistic process rests, as I hope to haveshown, on both a systematic confusion of the abstract and concrete as well as the damaging lac$ ofan underlying metaphysical system. )hese underlying flaws further prevent Langers esthetics from

being able to account for what I see as seve& ral $ey portions of the esthetic eperience.

It is not clear, for instance, what Langer could ma$e of a situation in which the artisticobserver were presented with an artwor$ produced in a radically different cultural setting than herown. 0hile we, as educated patrons of the art museum, might be e%uipped to form an understandingof a 1onet or even a 2olloc$, a figurine from an aboriginal tribe in +ustralia would seem much more

problematic. /ur education would allow us to see in the 3uropean artists wor$, traces of concerns

which we may be well familiar with, while the radical different cultural setting in which the figurineis conceived may be so foreign that we are prevented from constructing the analytic understanding ofits meaning that Langer seems to call for. In fact, & Langers system seems to leave open the

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possibility that we can be simply mistaken about our esthetic impressions. Our understanding of theartwork, or what we think is the artwork, may simply be erroneous. For example, suppose we wereto find what we believe to be ancient cave paintings and we thought we formed the esthetic

perception of them by understanding how they portrayed the hunt, etc. Upon later discovering thatthe paintings were the result of non-human process or were doodles of the local neighborhoodchildren, it seems that, given Langers system, we would have to say that our esthetic perception wassimply mistaken! we thought we were experiencing the esthetic while, in fact, we were not.

"imilarly, though she discusses the possibility of appreciating t# he form of a piece of pottery,it is not clear that Langer would include various forms of craft as potential esthetic ob$ects. %t seemsthat the piece of pottery designed by an artist who sought to produce &a work of art& might be opento esthetic appreciation in her appraisal, but the meal produced by the careful, esthetically involved'in my estimation( chef would be difficult to understand under the description of the artwork Langeroffers. )hile this is problematic in a number of ways, perhaps the most clear criticism here is thatLangers esthetics seems to make no place for our common usage of the word *art to denoteexcellence in the performance of a certain task.+ Under Langers system, this use of the word *artis, at least apparently, illegitimate. he artistic process is not defined by mastery, or artisticinvolvement, but by the active formation of the artwork with the intention to convey an impression.

hese criticisms of Langers esthetics are actually specific ways of making the more generalcriticism that Langers esthetics does not link back into a more general description of humanexperience. +/0 %t is not at all clear when reading Langers esthetics, $ust how she means either the

process of artistic creation or perception to be understood in terms of more general experience. heesthetic for Langer is confined to the process of the transmission of an impression as she describes it.%t cannot, for instance, account for what we might well think of as esthetic moments which arenonetheless not tied to any particular esthetic ob$ect1or, as in the cases % provided, the ob$ect is nota traditional &art ob$ect.& %t makes sense, when offering this sort of criticism, to $uxtapose Langersthought with that of 2ohn 3eweys.+// %n stark contrast, 3eweys esthetics is arguably the mostcomplete statement of his general philosophy of experience with the esthetic moment being only a

special instance of general experience. 4ecause of this, the 3eweyan esthetic experience is notnecessarily tied to an artwork, or even to an ob$ect at all5 any experience is potentially an estheticone. his is not to say that Langer would have been better to have adopted a 3eweyan conception ofexperience, but only to suggest that Langer might well have avoided key criticisms of her esthetics ifshe would have provided a general theory of experience to ground her esthetic system. "he may verywell have been able to give a good account of why we are prevented from having esthetic perceptionof cultural artifacts or a well-made meal, but as it stands these are more or less excluded fromconsideration. his, in my estimation, seriously impoverishes her esthetic# s.

III. Conclusion

%s there a reason to attempt to provide the metaphysical underpinning to Langers thoughtwhich she herself neglected6 here are several places in Langers thought which suggest the answerto this 7uestion be &yes,& but perhaps t# he most compelling is the forth chapter of Problems of Artinwhich she discusses the notion of &living form.& hough % think she neglects the insight elesewhere,here she notes that the artwork cannot be simply an isolated entity, but must exist in a context. % willclose with an extended 7uote expressing Langers notion of living form. %t is this insight into thenature of the esthetic that % believe would be fruitful to pursue.

Living form, then, is in the first place dynamic form, that is, a form whose permanence is really apattern of changes. "econdly, it is organically constr# ucted5 its elements are not independent parts,but interrelated, interdependent centers of activity1that is, organs. hirdly, the whole system is held

together by rhythmic processes5 that is the characteristic unity of life. . .%f art is, as % believe it is, theexpression of human consciousness in a single metaphorical image, that image must somehowachieve the semblance of living form.+/8

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[1] InProcess St"dies. Vol. 26. Nos. 1-2. Spring-Summer 1997. PP 86-106

[2] Auxiers ess! ppers inProcess Tho"gh# ts one o" se#erl ess!s $%i&% explore '%e rel'ion(e'$een )ngers n* +%i'e%e*s '%oug%'s. I' is in'eres'ing 'o no'e '%' '%e ess! $%i&% "ollo$sAuxiers is &ommi''e* 'o s#ing )nger "rom ,us' '%e sor' o" rgumen' m*e (! Auxier.

[] Auxier 89.

[/] Susnne )nger.Philosophy in a New Key$ m(ri*ge r#r* 3n4 i#ersi'! Press 19/2. 19.

[5] )ngerMind: An Essay on !"man eeling Vol. 1 x#ii. i'e* (! Auxier 99.

[6] I(i*. 75. i'e* (! Auxier 100.

Susnne )nger.Problems of Art. Ne$ or S&ri(ners Sons. 1957. 15.

[8] I(i*. 20

I(i*. 61

[10] In "&' '%is usge o" '%e $or* is pro((l! gene'i&ll! prior 'o i' (eing use* 'o *eno'e &er'insor' o" pro*u&' o" &re'ion.

[11] An* '%is is o" &ourse reppli&'ion o" Auxiers &lim '%' )nger negle&'e* 'o pro#i*e me'p%!si&s $%en i' $s &ler '%' %er i*es nee*e* one.

pgin 5 #n 5A ri'iue o" Susnne )ngers s'%e'i&s

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a critique of susanne langer’s esthetics

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