Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 20, 2014 vol xlix no 38 31

review article

A Cuckoo Strategy on China

Atul Bhardwaj

Deep Currents and Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security edited by John Garofano and Andrew J Dew (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press), 2013; pp xvii + 331, $32.95.

Asymmetrical Threat Perception in India-China Relations by Tien-sze Fang (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), 2014; pp xv + 247, Rs 795.

Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific by C Raja Mohan (Washington DC: Carnegie Foundation), 2012; pp xii + 360, $19.95.

Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm by George J Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham (New York: Cambridge University Press), 2012; pp xxx + 376, 22.99.

In a vintage warship, the crows nest is the topmost spot on the ships mast from where a lookout scans the seas for incoming danger. In a modern warship this vantage point has been replaced by the radar. However, for students of strategy, the story of the cuckoo surreptitiously laying eggs in the crows nest continues to be relevant. The wise crow is lured out of his nest into a chase when provoked by the continu-ously jarring sounds produced by the male cuckoo. While the crow is busy in hot pursuit, the female cuckoo quietly moves into the crows nest, throws out some of the crows eggs, thereby making place to lay her eggs. Unknowingly, the crow warms all the eggs and nurtures the babies when the eggs hatch.

The crow is a perfect example of a strategic sucker. In the secular world too, there are nations who are suckered to provide their military manpower to fi ght someone elses war. The fi rst ques-tion to ask vis--vis China is whether the 1962 confl ict was Indias own war? The lack of dispassionate analysis of the period has led Indian strategic thought to shy away from identifying and nam-ing the cuckoo that clandestinely came and laid its egg in the Indian nest.

Foreign Strategy of India

According to K M Panikkar, America and Apa Pant were the twin factors responsible for a sudden deterioration in Sino-Indian relations in the mid-1950s (Gupta 1982: 14). A powerful American lobby having deep links with all political parties in India, barring the Communist Party of India, pushed the Indian estab-lishment on an escalatory path vis--vis China that eventually resulted in a border war. Apa Pant, Indias political offi cer in Sikkim (1955-61), was instrumental in building a Tibet lobby within India. He convinced many senior Indian political leaders like Jai Prakash Narain, G B Pant

and the ex-president Rajendra Prasad to take up the Tibetan cause as their own (Gupta 1982: 15). Purshottam Das Trika mdas, an old associate of Apa Pant, inspired the international commission of jurists to publish two reports on Tibet in 1959 and 1960 with an aim to establish that Tibet enjoyed de facto sovereignty between 1912 and 1951.

In 1959, India entered the game of brinkmanship vis--vis China and kept climbing up the escalation ladder. India was gullible enough to follow western instructions both on Tibet and its bound-ary with China and ended up fi ghting a frivolous war. By allowing asylum to D alai Lama, India acted like a foolish crow that hatched American strategic eggs. The United States (US) actions in Tibet provoked the Sino-Indian war that ful-fi lled the American goal of preventing any possibility of Soviet Union, China and India forming a progressive joint front against western imperialism. The 1962 war was used to widen the wedge in the communist bloc and inch closer towards making Mao Zedong, a Chi-nese Tito, who could speak openly against the Soviets (Xiang 1992: 319). The confl ict shook Jawaharlal Nehrus belief in non-alignment, teaching him an unforgettable lesson on the relevance of empires in the postcolonial world.

Some argue that recent scientifi c stud-ies have revealed that not all varieties of cuckoos are cunning. In some cases, the pungent juices secreted by the newly-hatched baby cuckoos protect the nest from being attacked by predators, there-by ensuring that the left-behind baby crows are also nurtured in a protected environment. According to this logic, America was not a cunning cuckoo since the war proved benefi cial for some in India too. The US, by instigating India to take on China, helped the capitalist-driven Indian state to stem the growth of the left movement in India. The venom spewed against the communists during and in the wake of the 1962 war was enough to cause a three-way divide in the Communist Party of India and push the leftist forces on the defensive for times to come. An editorial in The Indian Express of 6 November 1962 sug-gested that people should

keep our country consolidated by weeding out the indigenous communist vermin from such organisations and bodies into which, behind the facade of fellow travellers, they have infi ltrated. There can be no place for these faceless traitors in any war committee or council. Despite their belated protesta-tions of patriotism they cannot be trusted and must be put effectively beyond the pale.

Masked in realpolitik, the national chauvinist evangelism surged in the wake of the 1962 war. It has continued to serve the Indian elites ideological interests that perceive the Chinese threat to the American empire as their national concern.

Twin American Contributions

In the initial years after Independence, the twin American contributions that laid the intellectual groundwork for an Indian foreign policy aimed at acquiring regional primacy were the Monroe doctrine and Alfred Thayer Mahans concepts of sea power and overseas naval bases. In March 1953, at the end of

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his fi rst stint as the US ambassador to India, Chester Bowles apprised Nehru of the Monroe doctrine and its applicability in the Indian context. He advised Nehru that in order to preempt potential Com-munist advancements, he should take charge of Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim, Burma and Tibet and drive out all external infl uences (primarily China) from its vicinity. This, according to Bowles, was the best way for India to maintain its neutrality (Iscoe 2010: 8).

A scenario where Japan, China, India and Russia may combine to end centuries-long western dominance of the Indo-Pacifi c maritime space is never allowed to be considered as a viable strategic o ption. History is, however, replete with examples of efforts to forge a pan Asian solidarity. In 1913, Katsura Taro, Japans acting Prime Minister, a soldier-politician, proposed to Sun Yat-Sen, the Chinese nationalist leader, the launch of a joint Sino-Japanese effort to liberate India. Taro felt that booting out the British from India would relieve Japan of the necessity to worry about land for coloni-sation and commerce and liberate it from pursuing the crude policy of conquest (Altman and Schiffrin 1972: 387-88).

The general paranoia related to the rise of China and unfl inching faith in the myth of unipolar peacefulness is perplexing.

The fi rst two decades of the unipolar era have been anything but peacefulIn all the US has been at war for 13 of the 22 years since the end of the Cold War The fi rst two decades of unipolarity, which make up less than 10% of US history, account for more than 25% of the nations total time at war (Monteiro 2012: 11).

Out of the 30 days that the India-China war lasted, for 18 days the Indian Parliament and press were engaged in driving out Krishna Menon from the Ministry of Defence (Ghose 1993: 292). The remaining 12 days were spent in preparing a shopping list of arms to be presented to the Americans.

One of the biggest fallout of the 1962 war was the growth of arms lobbies in India. On 26 November 1962, one week after the Sino-Indian war ended, T T Krishnamachari (popularly known as TTK), a minister without portfolio in Nehrus cabinet, wrote a personal and

confi dential letter to the cabinet secre-tary, S S Khera, lobbying for the imme-diate procurement of M-14 guns from Harrington and Richardson Arms Com-pany of Massachusetts. Intriguingly, along with TTK, Partap Singh Kairon, the then Chief Minister of Punjab, was also invol-ved in meeting the arms agents.1

This North-South bonhomie in the arms business offers a perfect example of the ad hocism and political interfer-ence that has plagued Indian defence purchases since Independence. However, this crucial cultural malaise is rarely considered as a factor in analysing Indias national strategy. Paradoxically, those who profess greater indigenisation are also the biggest advocates for hastening the process of importing arms and ammunition from abroad.

The modernisation of the forces with indigenised equipment is a long-drawn out process that requires protracted peace. However, the Indian defence and foreign affairs establishment, married to theories of security dilemma, inter -national anarchy and balance of power, can hardly appreciate the need for delib-erately lowering the threat levels to achieve national objectives. Should India impose a moratorium on its desire to a ppear masculine? Why should India not explore the possibility of an isolationist foreign policy? It is sacrilegious to pose such questions, because it is tantamount to disrespecting Kautilya and the west-ern realpolitik scholars ranging from Machiavelli to Mearsheimer.

Take for example, the recent raising of a mountain strike corps in the eastern sector, consisting of 40,000 troops and costing Rs 60,000 crore. This mobilisa-tion of men and money is justifi ed by digging out the ghost of the 1962 war and echoing the weather-beaten Ameri-can theories of Chinese threat and irre-dentism. The predominance of security matters in the India-China matrix has needlessly rocked the boat and made the two neighbours sit on a powder keg. The net result is that the precious Rs 60,000 crore that should have gone to beef up indigenisation plans has been spent on creating a military asset that will con-tinue to draw its feed from the foreign military industry.

It is hard to discount the fact that much of the anti-China rhetoric in India emanates from the international arms and currency bazaars, especially when New Delhi is the largest importer of arms in the world and Chinas growing economic might is seen as a direct threat to the supremacy of the dollar.

Familiar Chant of Bazaars

The four recent books discussed here echo the familiar chant of bazaars that well-nigh pray for strained Sino-Indian ties. Some authors simply reiterate the India-China dis agreements over Tibet and unsettled borders, others who fi nd the two contentious issues inadequate to keep the Asian giants apart for long insist on extending the rivalry into oceans and the nuclear realm. The common thread running through these analyses is the underlying assumption that the US is a benign balancer in the region and India should not contest American hegemony. The auth ors believe that America has a central role in mitigating the China-India conundrum. A trilateral dialogue be-t ween India, China and America is pre-scribed to calm the maritime commons.

In Chinese and Indian Strategic Beha-vior: Growing Power and Alarm, Gilboy and Heginbotham talk of India and Chinas strategic culture and how those historical and social moorings could be best uti-lised by America. Raja Mohans Sam udra Manthan sees the surging economies of the Asian giants and their expansionist urges as a cause of Mahanian resurgence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). He almost treats India and China as the East India Company and Dutch East India Company respectively who will entangle themselves in a war for reso urces and profi ts. Such western and much of the Indian analyses imagine the Indian and Chinese armada competing on the high seas to establish their naval bases in Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles in the IOR. It is also imagined that the Indian navy in order to maintain its per-ceived hold over the Indian Ocean would interdict the China-bound oil tankers and choke their growth. Tien-sze Fang in Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India-China Relations uses constructivist studies to understand the perception of

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a threat in India-China dyna mics, but arrives at the realists conclusion that sees security dilemma as the raison dtre that prevents India-China ties from resting on an even keel. Tien-sze Fangs nuanced theoretical understand-ing of Indias misperceptions with r egard to Chinese intentions is helpful in drawing a correct picture of the prob-lems in current Sino-Indian relations.

Samudra Manthan that talks about churning of the Indian Ocean misses the point that the mythological magic potion of immortality is no longer concentrated in the oceans, it has proliferated to the global fi nancial markets, where d aily trade amounts to trillions of dol-lars. The ratio of global fi nancial assets to global gross domestic product (GDP) is now above 450 in developed countries (Sassen 2008: 187).

The fi nancial deepening of advanced as well as emerging economies is one of the major reasons for the western worlds bold alteration of course away from the seas. Holmes and Yoshiharas chapter, In Red lines for Sino Indian Rivalry, in Deep Currents and Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security, high-lights the opposing approaches to sea power in Europe and Asia. On the one hand, the West seems to have

transcended Mahan, entering a post m o dern, post-Mahanian age in which high seas combat appears almost unthinkableAsians by contrast inhabit a modern, neo- Mahanian in which naval war becomes a r eality (pp 187-88).

Just as in the 20th century, America used maritime strategy as a subset of a grand strategy to deal with the balance of power, it is once again trying to do the same by poking its nose in the South and East China Sea disputes between sover-eign nations. One sees a great deal of commonality between the current Sino-US maritime competition (in which I ndia is being used as a pawn) and the Anglo-American maritime rivalry during the interwar years. It was a period when the naval problem ranked with repara-tion as the most serious international problem. Much of the mari time prob-lems in the 1920s resulted from Anglo-French fears related to emer ging compe-tition to their colonial holdings. The

1922 Naval Treaty arrived at the Wash-ington conference was successful only for a couple of years, mainly because it did not account for the fast declining combat capacities of the warships in the era of naval aviation and submarine warfare. This resulted in the need for further review of international navies and restricting their tonnage or type. The Three-Power Naval Conference in 1927 between the US, Great Britain and Japan failed to arrive at a common de-nominator to measure the navies. The US did not approve of the greater expan-sion in the cruiser strength of the United Kingdoms naval power and any limita-tions on the type of vessels that America wanted to invest in (Dulles 1929).

The naval negotiations of the interwar years, between the rising and the declin-ing international powers, were primarily focused on putting restrictions on the naval vessels and their armament. A nother element in the American strategy was to apply moral pressure on the Anglo-French to retain their colonial status. Throughout the 1930s, Anglo-American tussle continued on the maritime high table. It is only in the ABC Conference of 29 January-29 March 1941 that the Americans fi nally convinced the British to accept their Atlantic First strategy which, according to General George Marshall, meant, If we lose in the Atlantic we lose every-where (Offner 1978: 832).

Ongoing Power Game

With Asia now emerging on the global economic stage, America is focused on an Asia First strategy. The strategy is to deepen the schism within the Asian community and project the rise of China as morally repugnant and militarily thre atening. America (primarily due to money constraints) is seeking help from India, Japan and the Philippines to make China divert its resources to spending more money and energy in managing the maritime issues in South and East China Sea.

It is under these circumstances that one sees the Chinese proposal of a Mari-time Silk Road, as a counter-strategy, a conciliatory strategic gesture, or proba-bly a Chinese version of the Monroe

doctrine. As Robert Kaplan says in his latest book, Asias Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End to a Stable Pacifi c, China is seeking an Asian version of the Monroe doctrine, an approach that helped America take over from European nations as the supreme power in the western hemisphere. Kaplan is of the opinion that the US must encourage a rising Chinese navy to assume its right-ful position, as the representative of the regions largest indigenous power.

What Kaplan is saying is that China, the sleeping partner of the US in the cold war, must now play an active role on behalf of Washington in the ensuing US-Russian rivalry. America wanted Chiange-Kai-shek to be the US policeman in Asia-Pacifi c region and subsequently expected Mao to perform that role.

The 21st century power game is not ideological nor is it between players with huge asymmetries in terms of wealth and technology. In the 1950s, China only had nationalism and a bit of ideology to defend itself. Now, in addition, it is also rich. However, the role of China in shap-ing the contours of future regional and global politics remains as important now as it was in the past in shaping the fi nal outcome of the cold war.

In this ongoing power game, should India be in the playing 11 or decide to be the 12th man? Should India remain i ndifferent to Chinas geopolitical rise or help America maintain the status quo and retain its supremacy? Working in aid of the US entails India to partake in US mili tary adventures. Gilboy and Hegin-botham attempt to extrapolate from a ncient Chinese and Indian texts their respective propensity to use force and willingness to sacrifi ce their military manpower to achieve US goals. The Indian and Chinese texts (Kautilyas Arthashastra and Sun Tzus Art of War) on strategy are more or less similar in terms of how to fi ght wars through de-ception, deceit and trea chery. The major difference between the two is that Kauti-lya openly suggests that continuous con-quest is indicative of good leadership while Sun Tzus use of force is cloaked under the rubric of self-defence.

One tends to disagree with Gilboy and Heginbotham that strategic culture can

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be used to distinguish a nations military behaviour from another. The entire human civilisation is entrapped in a vicious c ycle of fear and violence that has made their military behaviour almost similar. There is a universal culture of violence that transcends all boundaries. However, one cannot ignore the modern history of a nation to understand its propensity to use force under different circumstances.

For example, modern history can pro-vide an answer to the question of whether China or India is culturally more incli-ned to use force to fi ght other peoples wars. The Indian military tradition does not consider it repugnant to send armies on expeditionary missions launched by imperial powers. Indian armed forces celebrate their regimental achievements in the fi rst and second world wars that fought under the Union Jack. The Chinese military tradition, on the other hand, is more intertwined with their nationalism. Historically, the Chinese have never left their country to fi ght others wars. Dur-ing the second world war, the Chinese soldiers did come to India to be trained by American and British forces, but that was only to fi ght the Japanese within China. Furthermore, most of the wars that China has fought after 1950 have been related to their territory. India, on the other hand, has fought wars in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka for reasons other than territory.

Looking further back into history one fi nds an excellent example of how the British imperial navy used an Indian prince to attack Tibet at a time when the British were launching their fi rst opium war against China in 1840. Those who argue that it was the British naval might that forced China to sign the unequal treaty in 1842 must also give due credit to Gulab Singh who unknowingly fell into the British trap to hatch their eggs in Ladakh and Tibet.

Ladakh, Tibet and Nanking Treaty

In the second half of the 19th century, in order to prevent English ships and s ailors from being regularly checked and regulated by the Chinese authorities in Canton (Lamb 1958: 35), the British iden-tifi ed Tibet as the soft spot that could be exploited to pressurise and provoke the Chinese. Massive economic and fi nancial

stakes in mainland China prevented L on don from direct military action ag-ainst Peking. The British preferred covert means to draw the Chinese military into a noose.

Gulab Singh, Raja of Jammu, was used to attack Tibet. He was ensnared by the lucrative pashmina shawl wool trade to invade Ladakh in 1834. Ladakh was the transit point for the wool coming from western Tibet for its onward journey to Kashmir. However, the moment Ladakh was invaded by Gulab Singh, the Tibet-ans diverted their export consignments along the Sutlej route to Rampur- Bushahr, a British territory. Gulab Singh got Ladakh but not the profi ts. His fi rst war ended up fi lling British coffers since the selling price of shawl wool in Rampur skyrocketed by 200% (Lamb 1958: 40).

Then in 1841, the prospect of earning huge profi ts bewitched Gulab Singh to conquer western Tibet, the source of pas hmina wool. He attacked, but only to face the combined wrath of the Chinese-Tibetan military might. He lost Leh to the Chinese and was forced to toe their line.

Analogy of Crows Nest

The story of gullible Gulab Singh bri ngs us back to the analogy of the crows nest. Singhs fi rst invasion in 1834 led him to invest in the administration of Ladakh, while the British made all the gains from shawl imports. Gulab Singhs second war in 1841 against western Tibet brought him only defeat and humiliation, but again huge strategic and commercial gains for the British. In 1841, the British were launching the fi rst opium war against China and forcing them to grant trade and territorial rights within China. Gulab Singh unknowingly helped the British navy secure victory against the Chinese and forced them to sign the treaty of Nanking. Incidentally, the Bri-tish involvement in instigating Gulab Singh to go on expeditionary missions is borne out by the fact that the British raj infl uenced and instigated Gulab Singh through their ally, the Sikh kingdom of Lahore to indulge in the futile use of force.

Tibet, for the British imperialists of the 19th century, was not worth a candle. They were least interested in

wasting their resources on a land that did not promise to fetch adequate profi ts for their businessmen. The British could not match the Chinese might in terms of land warfare. All they could do was to divert Chinese military manpower towards distant Tibet and tie them up in a noose that could be pulled and tight-ened at will.

It is important to understand the noose strategy because this is exactly what Mao used when he bombed Jinmen and Mazu in 1958. He did not launch an amphibious attack to land on Jinmen. He made sure that the shells from main-land China avoided hitting the American naval ships and inhabited areas. Mao did not escalate the crisis; his intention was to control the American movements by drawing them into an area where they were unwilling to commit their forces. China wanted America to maintain the sanctity of its territorial waters by remaining outside the 12-mile limit. Be-sides bombing, Mao was also having ambassadorial-level talks with America in Warsaw (Xiaobing et al 2009).

It can be safely concluded that the propensity to use force is not a function of cultural moorings. Use of military is a matter of time and space. The best re-sults ensue when passion is combined with politics. Gulab Singh, a Sikh, belon-ging to a martial race, failed because he played a pure military game. He let the British accumulate the political gains that accrued from his military actions. Mao, on the other hand, played a politi-cal game with military tools. At one stage during the bombing campaign, in order to avoid pushing the envelope too far, Mao ordered the shelling to be con-ducted only on odd numbered days. This unprecedented military joke displayed Maos judicious understanding of the limits of limited war and the futility of pushing it beyond a certain limit.

Conclusions

Military power is generally considered to be the ultima ratio of power because it is perceived as a decisive arbiter of disputes when it is used and shapes outcomes among states even when it is not (Beckley 2012: 57). However, more than the military, it is the strength of the

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trea sury that determines majority of the international outcomes. Viewing strategy purely as a military option or use of force is a skewed approach. Strategy must extend beyond the narrow confi nes of use of force to include options that sug-gest ways and means to avoid getting sucked into wars. Middle powers that get suckered into wars designed to sus-tain empires and anarchy in the inter-national order only increase their debt and dependency.

Indias aspirations to be a global power are justifi ed and legitimate. However, what is questionable is the timing and its level of preparedness to jump into the great power game. Has India accumu-lated the requisite capital to be a mean-ingful actor in the global game? America, despite being a pre-eminent economic power from 1900 to the 1940s, did not display its true intentions to be a global hegemon. It began appearing militarily on the global stage only after the Anglo-French Asian empire had been bank-rupted and delegitimised by the second world war.

The Chinese too are patiently waiting for their time to come. It is only in 1987 that China started considering an air-craft carrier for the PLA Navy that was eventually commissioned in 2012, when their foreign reserves stood at $3 tril-lion. India, on the other hand, bought an old aircraft carrier in 1957 and 1980. On both occasions, India was suffering from acute foreign exchange crisis and going to the World Bank with a begging bowl. Today China holds about a third of the worlds international reserve assets ex-clu ding gold and has foreign exchange reserves of $4 trillion. It can afford to be more assertive in the South China Sea by placing 80 ships to protect its newly established deep-sea oil rig in Paracel Island. But how can India think of play-ing big maritime games in the Pacifi c, when its foreign reserves stand at a meagre $300 billion plus? Despite such glaring asymmetries between the two, Raja Mohan still sees India in competi-tion with China. He sees China having diplomatic ties with Bangladesh also as a problem and a potential fl ashpoint. Tien-sze Fang is more objective in his assessment that China is not moving

ahead to thwart the Indian advance. In fact, New Delhi does not fi gure in the Beijings immediate adversary list.

The anti-China, pro-Tibet advocacy groups in India who were active during the 1962 war are once again reviving old rivalries with state-capitalist China. The only novelty is that the stage for enact-ing the Machiavellian drama, with Alfred Thayer Mahan and Monroe as the lead actors, is being shifted from the Himalayas to the high seas. The drama, scripted in American think tanks has gained popularity among Indian real-ists. The resulting nautical neurosis is making India draw imaginary redlines in the Indian Ocean, challenging China to cross them at their own peril. Mahan the fi n de sicle American sea cap-tain, is being invoked to kindle the Indian elites colonial instincts, urging them to take on China.

Perhaps, it is the Chinese Jin-class sub-marines, with JL-2 ballistic missiles, that the Indian strategists fi nd menacing. However, the fact is that currently China has no proper command and control mechanism in place to operatio nalise a sea-based deterrent. Moreover, China has no experience of operating SSBNs (sub-marine-launched ballistic mis siles) at sea with nuclear warheads mated to missiles (Lewis 2013: 12). Furthermore, China has enough land-based missiles that cover the entire Indian subcontinent. There is no reason for China to come and meet India from the Indian Ocean.

Why should India be perturbed by Chinas rise? If India can manage to live with America, a global hegemon of mon-strous proportions, with around 700 military bases around the world, then dealing with a powerful China, in a multi polar world should hardly be a cause for concern. If Japan, despite be-ing nuked, positively engages with the US, there is no reason to imagine that India cannot jettison the historical bag-gage of a low-level Sino-Indian war of fi ve decades vintage. The China-India territorial dispute is not insurmountable nor is it diffi cult to have a dialogue with China on the Tibet issue.

India suffered immensely during the 1940s, losing her men to famine and im-perial wars. India must revisit 1962 and its

relations with China as a catharsis rather than repeating the process of churning at the behest of another empire.

Atul Bhardwaj (atul.beret@gmail.com) is an ICSSR senior fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi.

Note

1 National Archive of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, File No 110/62/E,CS/1962.

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