A Dangerous Delay:The cost of late response to the

drought in the Horn of Africa

Benedict Dempsey, Save the Children

The Warnings

Aug: All seasonal forecasts indicate poor rains due to La Niña. FEWSNET

Nov: Pre-emptive action needed now to protect livelihoods and avoid later costly lifesaving emergency interventions FSNWG

Jan: Extreme food insecurity in the eastern Horn of Africa is likely FEWSNET

Mar: Below-average Mar-May rains forecast: crisis likely to worsen. Localized famine conditions possible Joint agency

Jun: Food security emergency: humanitarian response inadequate. Joint agency

20 July: UN declares famine. FSNAU

TimelineTimeline2010 20112010 2011Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct

The funding

More than 70% of funding, and almost 90% of mainstream US and UK media coverage came

after UN famine declaration in July 2011

Early warnings – inadequate response

Aug: Clear forecast of poor rains

Nov: A call for pre-emptive action now

Jan: Extreme food insecurity predicted

Mar: “Localized famine conditions possible”

July: UN declares famine

GAM rates in South Central Somalia

Early warnings – inadequate response

• Early warnings were correct, accessible and well disseminated • Humanitarian agencies relied on information from

intermediaries, like FEWSNET, not direct use of climate/weather information

• There was some response, but not at scale• The inevitable impact was increased suffering, loss of life and

livelihood, development gains reversed, and increased cost of response

The opportunity to avert a crisis was missed.

why was the response inadequate?

• Fear of getting it wrong? – both financial and reputational risk; an inability to act in uncertainty

• Fear of being too interventionist? – risk of undermining local communities

• Fatigue? – resignation to high levels of chronic malnutrition

• Critically, the warnings themselves were not considered the main problem – the problem lay in the response of the aid system

The international (humanitarian) system

NGOs

UN Agencies

Private Sector

?Military?

National Governments Communities

National Civil SocietyDonor Governments

Strengthening monitoring surveillance

systems

Transition to long term and recovery

programming

Long term development /

resilience building programming

Early response/interventions

Rapid assessment of the situation

Emergency response

Situation Returns to

normal

Shock

Slow Onset Food Crisis Response Framework

DRR

CCA

Preparedness

Capacity Building

Humanitarian Development

Resilience

Approaches to Aid

Social Protection

What is needed for improvement?

Humanitarian response must shift more into prevention and early action. This requires:1. Managing the risk – dealing with

uncertainty2. Developing triggers for earlier response3. Institutionalising ‘no regrets’ measures

Long term development work must be the first response. This requires:4. Embedding DRR into long term work5. Making programmes flexible and building

crisis response out of development work

Implications for weather and climate science

• Levels of risk and uncertainty need to be integrated into developing response frameworks

• Responders need to accept a level of uncertainty in their triggers for action

• Information needs to be meaningful and accessible to a diverse group of actors – particularly communities themselves

• Climate information must be combined with other indicators of oncoming crisis (e.g. food prices, nutrition)