a different form of friendhsip

7/17/2019 A Different Form of Friendhsip

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CHAPTER SEVENA different form of friendship is that which is based on a superiority-for example, the friendship of a father for a son, and, in general, an olderman for a younger, a husband for a wife, and every ruler for one whois ruled. These friendships differ from one another as well: the friend-15 ship of parents for their children is not the same as that of rulers for the ruled. Yet the friendship of a father for a son is not even the same as thatof the son for the father, nor is that of a husband for a wife the same asthat of a wife for a husband. For in each case there is a different virtueand work involved, and different too are the reasons why they love eachother. Both the feelings of friendly affection and the friendships, then,are different.20 Each person, therefore, does not come to possess the same things fromthe other, nor ought each to seek the same things. But whenever childrenrender to their parents what they owe to those who have begotten them,and parents [to their sons]33what they owe to their children, the friend-ship of such people will be stable and equitable. And in all friendshipsbased on a superiority, the feelings of friendly affection too ought to be25 proportional-for example, the better person ought to be loved morethan he loves, and so also with the more beneficial person, and similarlywith each of the others. For whenever the friendly affection accords with

merit, at that point equality somehow arises, which of course is held tobelong to friendship.But what is equal in matters of justice does not appear to hold simi-30 larly in the case of friendship. For in matters of justice, what is equal is,first, what accords with merit, and, second, what accords with a certainquantity; in the case of friendship, however, what accords with a certainquantity is first, what accords with merit second. And this is clear when-ever a great difference arises between the friends in point of virtue, vice,resources, or some other thing; for not only are the parties involved no35 longer friends, but they do not even deem themselves worthy to be. Thisis most apparent in the case of the gods, for they exceed [human beings]in all good things to the greatest degree. But it is clear too in the case of

1159a kings. For those who are much inferior to kings do not deem themselvesworthy to be friends with them, and neither do those who are worthy ofnothing, with the best or the wisest.33 · A phrase that is omitted in the best MS. BOOK 8, CHAPTER 8 [ 175In these sorts of cases, then, there is no precise definition regardingthe point up to which friends remain friends. For although many thingsmay be taken away, the friendship still endures; but when someone is sep-arated from the other to a great degree, as is the god, then the friendship sno longer endures. This is also why the perplexity arises as to whetherfriends perhaps never wish for the greatest goods for their friends-forexample, for them to be gods-since then they will no longer be friendsto them, and neither will they therefore be goods, for friends are goods.So ifit has been nobly said that a friend wishes for the good things for the

friend for his friend's sake, the friend would need to remain as whatever 10sort he is. For the one friend will wish for the greatest goods for the otheras a human being-and perhaps not all such goods, since each wishes forthe good things for himself most of all.CHAPTER EIGHTBut the many seem, on account of their love of honor,34to wish to beloved more than to love. Hence the many are lovers of flattery. For the 15flatterer is a friend who is inferior, or at any rate he pretends to be infe-



rior and to love more than he is loved. Moreover, being loved seems to beclose to being honored, which is indeed what the many aim at. But theyseem to choose honor not on its own account but only incidentally. Forthe many delight in being honored by those in positions of authority, on 20account of the hope thus fostered (for they suppose that they will obtainwhat they need from them; they delight in honor, therefore, as a sign oftheir faring well).But those who long for honor from people who are decent and whoknow them aim at confirming their own opinion of themselves. They de-light in honor, therefore, since they trust that they are good as a result ofthe judgment of those who say so. But they delight in being loved in it- 25self Hence being loved would seem to be better than being honored, andfriendship would seem to be choiceworthy in itself But friendship seemsto consist more in loving than in being loved. And a sign of this is moth-ers who delight in loving their children: some mothers give away theirown children to be raised, and though they love them just because theyknow who they are, they do not seek to be loved in return if both are not 30possible. Rather, it seems to be enough for mothers if they see their chil-34 Philotimia, the term translated as "ambition" in 4·4· 1761 BOOK 8, CHAPTER 8dren doing well; and they love them even if their children, in ignoranceof who their mothers are, may render to them nothing of what is properto a mother.Since friendship consists more in loving than in being loved and35 those who love their friends are praised, loving seems to be a virtue of

friends. As a result, those in whom this arises in accord with merit are1159b stable friends, as is their friendship. It is in this way especially that eventhose who are unequal might be friends, since they could be renderedequal [by a difference in the love offered on each side]. Equality and like-ness constitute friendly affection, and especially the likeness of thosewho are alike in point of virtue: since they are stable in themselves, theyremain the same also in relation to each other, and they neither needbase things nor offer aid of this sort; rather, they even obstruct it, so tospeak, for it belongs to good people neither to err themselves nor to per-mit their friends to do so. Those who are corrupt are without steadi-ness, however, for they do not remain alike even to themselves; yet fora short time they do become friends, when they delight in each other's

10 corruption. But those who are useful and pleasant remain friends for alonger time, for however long they provide pleasures or benefits to eachother.It seems that friendship based on utility arises especially from oppo-sites-for example, the friendship of a poor person with a wealthy one,that of an ignorant person with a knower: because the one aims at what1s he happens to need, he gives something else in return for it. Someonemight bring in here both lover and beloved, or the beautiful and the ugly.Hence lovers in fact appear laughable sometimes, when they deem them-selves worthy to be loved as they themselves love.35Perhaps those who aresimilarly lovable ought to be deemed worthy of such reciprocal love, but

if they are nothing of the sort, it is laughable.Yet perhaps one opposite does not aim at the other opposite in itself,20 except incidentally. Rather, the longing involved is for the middle term,since this is good-for example, what is good for the dry is not to becomewet but to come to the middle condition, and similarly in the case of heatand the rest. Now, then, let us leave aside these considerations, for indeedthey are rather foreign to our purpose.3 5 Although Aristotle is speaking of the lover and the beloved in the erotic sense here,erastes and er6menos, the verbs he uses are the passive and active of philein. B



OOK 8, CHAPTER 9 [ 177CHAPTER NINEBut it seems, as was said in the beginning, that both friendship and the 25just are concerned with the same matters and are present among thesame persons. For in every community, something just seems to exist, andfriendship as well. At any rate, people address their shipmates and fel-low soldiers as friends, just as those in other communities do. And to the 30extent that people share in community, there is friendship, since to thisextent there is also what is just. The proverb "the things of friends are incommon" is correct, since friendship resides in community-for broth-ers and comrades, all things are in common, whereas for others, only cer-tain definite things are in common, to a greater or lesser degree. In thecase of friendships as well, there is greater and lesser community.The just things too differ, since these are not the same for parents in re- 35lation to children and for brothers in relation to one another, or for com- 1160arades and for citizens, and similarly in the other friendships. The unjustthings also differ in relation to each of them, and they increase the morethey concern friends-for example, it is more terrible to steal money 5from a comrade than from a fellow citizen, not to aid a brother than notto aid a stranger, and to strike a father than to strike anyone else. It is natu-raP6 for what is just to increase together with friendship, on the groundsthat justice and friendship are present among the same persons and are

coextensive.But all communities are like parts of the political community, forpeople come together for a certain advantage, namely, to provide some of 10the things conducive to life. And the political community seems to cometogether from the outset, and to continue to exist, for the sake of whatis advantageous; lawgivers aim at this and claim that the advantage heldin common is what is just. The other communities, then, aim at a partialadvantage-for example, sailors aim at the advantage of making money 15from sailing or some such thing; soldiers at the advantage bound up withwar, since they long for either money, victory, or a city; and similarly tooin the case of members of the same tribe or district.But some communities seem to arise on account of pleasure-likecommunities ofBacchic revelers and members of a dinner club, for these 20

exist for the sake of performing a sacrifice and of getting together with36 · One MS reads, "what is just appears to increase together with friendship ..:· 178] BOOK 8, CHAPTER 10others. But all these seem to fall under the political community; for thepolitical community aims not at the present advantage but at that per-taining to life as a whole, [since those engaged in political life] performsacrifices and host gatherings concerning them, thereby distributing hon-25 ors to the gods and providing a pleasant rest for themselves.37For the an-cient sacrifices and gatherings appear to take place after the harvest-forexample, the "first fruits" -because people used to have leisure especiallyin these seasons. All communities, therefore, appear to be parts of the po-

litical community, and the sorts of friendships will correspond with the30 different sorts of communities.

a different form of friendhsip

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