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A Fixed Tenure SystemLong Journey of Bureaucratic Reforms

Lavanya Suresh

Administrative reforms in India

have been a long-drawn-out

process, and recommendations on

having a fixed tenure system for

bureaucrats have been repeatedly

made since before Independence.

The legislature now needs to

take notice since the Supreme

Court has stepped in on this

issue. Its order of 31 October 2013

is a significant step on the long

journey to bring about

much-needed change in the

personnel management of the

Indian executive.

The Supreme Court order of 31

October 2013 directing the centre

and the states to set up civil serv-

ices boards for the management of

transfers, postings, inquiries, promo-

tions, rewards, and punishments of

administrative personnel, while ensur-

ing a fixed minimum tenure for them is

a laudable step (Venkatesan 2013). The

apex courts decision signals an im-

portant move towards much-needed

administrative reforms in India and is a

significant step in a long journey that

began decades ago. The idea of bringing

about stability in the tenure system of

bureaucrats has been the focal point of

a number of administrative reforms

initiatives, and despite the efforts of

multiple commissions and committees,

it has yet to be implemented in the

countrys non-political and permanent

executive structure.

Perspective

Stability of tenure has long been advo-

cated by organisation theorists as the

basis of effective and efficient manage-

ment. This basic tenet was emphasised

at the very inception of the discipline of

public administration by classical theo-

rists such as Henry Fayol. In his seminal

work General and Industrial Manage-

ment(1949 [1916]), Fayol states that one

of the principles of management is sta-

bility of tenure as it provides orderly

human resource staffing and establishes

provisions to ensure that an employee

possesses the requisite ability to per-

form his or her work efficiently. He

points out that it takes time to develop

the skills necessary to perform effec-

tively in a particular position (Wren

and Bedeian 2009). This logic holds

true even today and has been the basis

of many arguments in the favour of

fixed tenures in government services.In India, the system of staffing through

tenure was established by Viceroy George

Curzon (1899-1905). A number of com-

missions and committees supported the

system and also advocated stability of

tenure. They included the Llewellyn

Smith report (1919); the reports of the

Simon Commission (1930); Wheeler

Committee (1936); Maxwell Committee

(1937); Rowlands Committee (1944-45);and the Bengal Administration Enquiry

Committee (Avasthi and Avasthi 2004).

After Independence, the first Adminis-

trative Reforms Commission (ARC1967)

and the secondARC(2008) have dealt in

detail with the need for administrative

reforms and fixed tenures.

Current Situation

The second ARC has given a detailed

account of the current situation. One of

its reports points out that frequent transfer

of civil servants continues to be a prob-

lem in public administration in India,

and goes on to list its ill effects.

It affects governance because civil servants

are not allowed to stay in a position long

enough to acquire adequate knowledge and

experience of their job, and an understand-

ing of the milieu and culture in which they

have to function and the problems they

need to redress. They are unable to build

the required mutual confidence and under-

standing which takes time to develop andis necessary for administrative leadership.

It prevents civil servants from staying in a

position long enough to institute or sustain

reforms and it is both demoralising and

demotivating when civil servants are not

in a position long enough to see the fruits

of their efforts which could be a source of

enormous satisfaction to them. Frequent

transfers and posting lead to lack of ac-

countability and corruption. Short tenures

are not only characteristic of the adminis-

tration at the lower echelons, but also are a

regular feature in the higher civil services

(e g, the IAS[Indian Administrative Service],IPS[Indian Police Service] etc) (2008: 182).

The report also provides details of IAS

tenures from 1978 to 2006 for selected

years (Table 1, p 17).

Table 1 shows that only a very small

percentage of IAS officers spent more

than three years in the same position

between 1978 and 2006 the highest

being 10% in 1996 and the lowest 5%

in 1979. It also reveals that the majority

of officers spent less than a year in thesame position. The ARC report states

that the situation is much worse in

Lavanya Suresh (lavanya@isec.ac.in) is a PhD

scholar at the Institute for Social and Economic

Change, Bangalore.

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the states, with a large percentage of

officers lasting less than a year in any

one position.

The ARC report points out that the

trend of frequent transfers can be said to

have taken root in the country, especial-

ly in recent years. When a new govern-

ment is formed after an election, one of

the first actions the political executive

carries out is transferring civil servants.

These transfers are often made on the

basis of caste or community reasons or

for monetary considerations. This leads

to an erosion of morale in the bureauc-

racy and, more worryingly, reinforcescaste and communal divisions within it.

The transfers also lead to a lack of

accountability and are an important

cause of the spread of corruption.

Recommendations

We should note that the Supreme Courts

ruling to ensure fixed minimum tenures

comes against the backdrop of several

other commissions and committees having

made similar recommendations while

looking into administrative reforms.

The Fifth Pay Commission (1997) in

its massive report observed that provid-

ing continuity in administration and sta-

bility in governance required fixing a

minimum tenure for positions held by

civil servants. The minimum tenure sug-

gested for a bureaucratic post was three

to five years, except in cases where a

longer tenure was justified on functional

grounds, such as ensuring the continued

availability of certain specialised skills.As with the Supreme Court verdict now,

it favoured constituting high-powered

civil service boards at the levels of the

union and state governments to regulate

and look into cases of premature trans-

fers of civil servants.

The report of the committee of experts

on disciplinary and vigilance inquiries

headed by P C Hota (2004) also recom-

mended the establishment of civil serviceboards/establishment boards compris-

ing senior civil servants. It urged that a

Civil Services Act be enacted to make

these boards at the centre and states

statutory bodies. In its proposed set-up

at the centre, an appointments commit-

tee of the cabinet would be the final au-

thority on the transfer of administrative

personnel who came under the central

staffing scheme. The principle of a fixed

tenure would apply to senior officers

who are not under the central staffing

scheme, but are working under the

central government, and in their case,

the minister under which their depart-

ment fell would be the final authority

on transfers. Chief ministers would be

the final authority on the transfer of

all Group A officers of state services

and IASofficers serving in state services.

If a chief minister did not agree with

the recommendations of a civil services

board/establishment board, he wouldhave to record his reasons in writing.

An officer transferred before his tenure

is over could appeal before a three-

member ombudsman even if this move

was carried out on orders of the

chief minister.

The report also recommended that

the chairperson of the ombudsman be a

retired official of proven honesty and

integrity. The other two members could

be from among serving officers and

they could carry out their duties on a

part-time basis. In all cases of prema-

ture transfers, the ombudsman would

be liable to send a report to the gover-

nor of the state, who would lay it in an

annual report before the state legisla-

ture. The ombudsman could also decide

on damages to be paid to an officer

unfairly transferred to compensate him

for dislocation and the mental agony

caused by it.

The Hota Committee observed thatthe absence of a fixed tenure for officials

was one of the important reasons for

tardy implementation of government

policies, for a lack of accountability

among officers, for the waste of public

money due to inadequate supervision of

programmes, and, above all, for large-

scale corruption. It emphatically pointed

out that there was overwhelming evi-

dence that officials of state govern-ments, particularly those in the all-India

services serving in states, were demoral-

ised with frequent transfers at the

whims of local politicians and other

vested interests, who succeeded in pre-

vailing upon chief ministers or ministers

to order them. Chief ministers often had

to oblige powerful factions in their party

by transferring senior officers who were

honest, sincere, and steadfast in carry-

ing out government programmes but

were seen as inconvenient by local poli-

ticians whom they did not humour. The

reason behind this trend, the committee

pointed out, was faction-ridden party

politics in some states. What suffered

was the public interest with collectors/

district magistrates, senior superintend-

ents of police/superintendents of police/

deputyinspectors general of police and

divisional forest officers/conservators of

forests and other senior officials being

frequently displaced.The second ARC (2008) quoted from

the 2002 report of the National Commis-

sion to Review the Working of the Con-

stitution, which commented on the issue

of untimely transfers. It held all issues to

do with personnel policy, including

placements, promotions, transfers, and

fast-track advancements, be managed

by autonomous personnel boards, which

would functions on the lines of the

Union Public Service Commission (UPSC).

Table 1: IAS Tenures(1978-2006)

IAS as of Number Length of Time in Post (% of IAS)

1 January Less Than 1-2 Years 2-3 Years More Than

a Year 3 Years

1978 3,084 58 26 10 6

1979 3,236 55 30 10 5

1981 3,373 60 22 11 7

1982 3,539 52 31 9 8

1983 3,734 51 29 13 71984 3,797 56 26 12 7

1985 3,910 51 31 11 7

1986 3,970 58 25 12 6

1991 4,497 58 25 10 6

1992 3,951 56 27 11 6

1993 3,991 49 31 13 8

1996 4,621 48 28 13 11

2006 4,711 55 27 10 8

Source: Second ARC report (2008: 183).

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Such boards had to be constituted under

a parliamentary legislation under Article

309 of the Constitution. This would be a

major step towards neutralising the

well-known trend of playing politics

with official postings in public services

in general and the higher civil services

in particular.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court verdict is only the

tip of the iceberg. A number of reforms

commissions have pointed out short-

comings in personnel management of

the Indian executive and advised meas-

ures to introduce much-needed changes.

It has been time and again observed that

the frequent transfer of civil servants

has a negative effect on governance and

stands in the way of them delivering ef-

ficient and effective services to the peo-

ple. The fact of the matter is that no

commission or committee report has so

far contested the need for fixed mini-mum tenures, but the government con-

tinues to drag its feet. A democratic gov-

ernment ought to serve its own people

and not itself, something which our leg-

islatures need to be repeatedly remind-

ed of. With the apex court now stepping

in, we can only hope the powers that be

will finally get the message.

References

Avasthi, A and A P Avasthi (2004):Indian Adminis -tration,Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, Agra.

Second Administrative Reforms Commission(2008): Refurbishing of Personnel Adminis-tration Scaling New Heights, Government ofIndia, New Delhi.

Hota Committee (2004): Recommendations of theCommittee of Experts on Disciplinary and Vigi-

lance Inquiries,Department of Personnel andTraining, Ministry of Personnel, Public Griev-ances and Pensions, New Delhi.

Fayol, H (1949): General and Industrial Manage-ment, 1st edition 1916 (New York: Pitman).

Government of India (1997): Fifth Pay Commis-sion Report, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi.

Venkatesan, J (2013): In Major Reform, SC OrdersFixed Tenure for Bureaucrats, 1 November,The Hindu.

Wren, D A and A G Bedeian (2009): The Evolutionof Administrative Thought, 6th edition (New

York: Wiley).