a graphical representation for force-using oligopolists in noncooperative equilibria johnnie b. linn...
DESCRIPTION
Assumptions Two populations. Labor is mobile within populations but not between populations. No joint production technologies of output and force. Ratio rule. Firms fight over pooled output. Nash equilibrium. Firm employees share residuals.TRANSCRIPT
A GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION FOR FORCE-USING OLIGOPOLISTS IN NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA
Johnnie B. Linn IIIConcord University
This Paper
• extends previous work on the behavior of force-using competitive or monopolistically competitive firms to oligopolistic firms.
• A new geometric means of finding the equilibrium is introduced.
Assumptions
• Two populations.• Labor is mobile within populations but not between
populations.• No joint production technologies of output and force.• Ratio rule.• Firms fight over pooled output.• Nash equilibrium.• Firm employees share residuals.
Setting Up the Geometric Solution
• PPF’s of the two firms are placed origin to origin.• Y axes are horizontal and F axes are vertical.• A cursor partitions output according to ratio rule.• Additional firms can be included.
The Geometric Solution
Y1
Y2
F1
F2
O AB P
S1
S2
Return to Change in Force
W
F
Y2 Y1
F1
F2
1 1 2| ( / )( / )YW p F F D Y D
Return to Change in Input
1 2| ( ')(1 / )FW p Y Yp F D
W
Y
Y2 Y1
F1
F2
Marginal Rate of Transformation for Output and Force
1 1 2( / ){ /[ (1 )]} /Y D F Y
The Nash Equilibrium
ii
jj
FF
1 2( )i iW p Y Y
2 11
2 1 1
/( / )
FW pF
Y Y W p
Nash Equilibrium Illustrated
F1
F2
Y2
Y1P
W1
W2
B
AO
Characteristics of the Nash Equilibrium
• No output-only corner solutions.• Force-only corner solution is possible.• If there is not a force-only corner solution, there must be
at least one stable interior solution.• True for all technologies.
The Paradox of Power
• If a population has a sufficiently small endowment, it will employ a force-only corner solution against the other population (Hirschleifer, 1991).
Paradox of Power Illustrated
F1
F2
Y2
Y1B PW1
W2
Introducing Criminal Enterprises
• If smaller population is in a force-only corner solution, it would like to recruit more population, but can’t.
• Individuals in the larger population may go free-lance and set up a force-using firm of their own.
• Result is three entities, two in the larger population and one in the smaller.
Rise of a Criminal Enterprise
F1
F2
Y2
Y1BP1
W1
W2
P2
The Role of Outliers
• Outliers are force-using individuals who do not use force collectively on the margin.
• Outliers are not a firm, they are not regarded collectively as a player in the Nash equilibrium.
• Firms can hire outliers if outlier per-capita winnings are less than the per-capita earnings of firms.
• Outliers will be present only when combined winnings of firms do not exhaust output.
Test for the Presence of Outliers
*1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )p Y Y Y Y wL wG U U
1
1
0U pYU
One Firm in the Presence of Outliers
1 1 1 1[1 (1 ) (1 )] 0p Y
1 11
1
(1 ) 1
or
Two Firms in the Presence of Outliers
1 1 2 21 2
1 2
(1 ) 1 (1 )(1 ) 1
Two Firms in the Presence of Outliers, Identical Technologies
1 2
(1 ) 2 2
(1 ) 2a
or
Non-Cooperative Equilibria in Two Populations, Output-Producing Firms, Absence of Other Entities
2
1
1/(1-)0
DUOPOLY,OUTLIERS PRESENT
DUOPOLY, OUTLIERS ABSENT
Non-Cooperative Equilibria in Two Populations, General Case
2
1
1/(1-)0
DUOPOLY, OUTLIERS INBOTH POPULATIONS, ORTHREE ENTITIES, OUTLIERS PRESENT IN LARGER POPULATION
TWO ENTITIES, OUTLIERS PRESENT IN LARGER POPULATION, ORTHREE ENTITIES, OUTLIERS ABSENT
Equilibrium in Isolated Population
2
11/(1-)0
TWO ENTITIES, OUTLIERS ABSENT, OR MONOPOLY, OUTLIERS PRESENT
TWOENTITIES,OUTLIERS PRESENT
1.11
PURE COMPETITION, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, OUTLIERS PRESENT, OR DUOPOLY ORMONOPOLY AND CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE, OUTLIERS ABSENT