Ruanda

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Helmut Strizek

Linda Melvern is right, but...Short Analysis ofA People BetrayedThe role of the West in Rwanda’sgenocide By Linda Melvern (2001)1

Summary

Melvern points out that in 1994 the interna-tional community failed in its obligation to interveneagainst a genocide that could have been prevented.

The international community acted againstthe clear advice of General Dallaire, the Com manderof the UN Peacekeeping Forcein Rwanda (UNAMIR)who had repeatedly stated that the ongoing genocidecould be stopped if he had appropriate orders andsupport. Both were refused.

On the basis of irrefutable documents, Mel-vern describes that these denials were the result ofdeliberate policies forced on the UN Secu rity Councilmainly by the Clinton Administration and Great Bri-tain - under the influence of Lady Chalker2 - withthe agreement of Belgium.

Melvern proves that the argument put for-ward later that these countries were not aware ofthe genocidal character of the mass killings againstthe Tutsi population is not justified.

Countries such as Nigeria and the CzechRepublichadclearlywarnedagainsttheconsequen-ces of the UN Security Council decision of Apri121,1994, to reduce the peacekeeping force to a symbolicnumber of 270 soldiers. This decision allowed theongoing genocide to spread

It is, however, difficult to understand whyLinda Melvern doesn’t try to contrast her findings tothe usual explanation of what had occurred in theGreat Lakes Region. She adopts most of the argu-ments made by the Rwandan Patriotic Front tojustify its political action to re-conquer power in Ki-gali, Iost by their predecessors as a result ot ademocratic referendum on September 25, 1961.

The main RPF arguments are

- The RPF is a "liberation movement" to overcomethe ’Iotalitarian" Habyarimana regime.

- Anybody- namely France-who opposed the RPFtaking power in Kigali is blamed for anti-Tutsi racism.- Opposition to the Arusha Agreements of August 4,1993, is characterized as support for the planning ofgenocide.

Despite the fact that he was murdered, Habyari-mana is regarded as the spiritual father of the Tutsigenocide.- "Hutu extremists" had killed Habyarimana becausefinally he was not ready to execute his own plans.- The military offensive immediately after the crash ofthe Presidential airplane on April 6,1994, was launchedto stop the genocide.

The genocidejustified the RPF in not apply-ing the provisions of the Arusha Agreements, inclaiming the absolute political leadership in Kigaliand in postponing democratic elections ad calendasgraecas.

In the light of Melvern’s findings, this argu-ment adopted in line with most of the western inqui-ries, is in danger of being considered partisan.

Especially the theory of the genocide plann-ing by Habyarimana turns out to serve as an alibi toveil the fact that the international community by thede facto retreat of the blue helmets unleashed ’lhehu man beasr’. Its existence and danger was knownto everybody and an nounced by Dallaire and respon-sible human rights organizations.

An analysis of the "evidence" put forward toprove the existence of "genocide organizations" byMelvern and others suggests- having been mostlycommunicated anonymously - the need to be verycautious. It cannot be ruled out that "traps" were setin anticipation of the later necessity to apportionblame.

Ail information available nowadays contra-dicts the "Hutu extremisr’ theory also used by Mel-vern concerning the air crash on April 6, 1994.

But even if Melvern should have been morecautious in accepting the usual explanations, hermain message is well documented: The Rwandan

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people has been betrayed; the Tutsi by not havingbeen protected and the Rwandan nation as a wholeby the fact that a preventable genocide could beexecuted, tarnishing the Rwandan future.

- Ail further research needed to shed light onthe Central African tragedy with its millions of deadin Rwanda, Burundi and Congo should start fromthat point.

Introduction

A remarkable book...

Linda Melvern3 published in 2000 a remarkablebook: A people betrayed. The role of the West inRwanda’s genocide.(Melvern 2000) It is remarkablebecause it adds valuable details to the knowledgeso far published on wh at was discussed and decidedon Rwanda in the secret sessions of the UnitedNation’s Security Council during the summer of1994. Linda Melvern doesn’t reveal how she got this"hot" information.4 Melvern confirms many aspectsof the memoirs of Boutros Boutros-Ghali publishedin 1999. (Boutros-Ghali 1999) She points out clearlythat the members of the Security Council were verywell informed-at leasP about the ongoing genocideperpetrated against the Tutsi population withinRwanda. But the West - against the recommen-dations of Nigeria for example - was not ready tostop it although it would have been possible to do so.General Roméo Dallaire, the commander of theblue helmets in Kigali, had from the very beginninge,.pi,i~~izud ii~i~i pu~~ibiiiiy.

In 2000 the Organization of African Unity (OAU)also came to the same conclusion. On July 10,2000, it published its voluminous report elaboratedby a seven-member International Panel of EminentPersons (IPEP) under the direction of Sir KetumileMasire (former President of Botswana)6 with thetitle: Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. What theWorld could have done. (Masire 2000) Melvern pointsout in rich detail her main hypothesis:The RwandanTutsi were betrayed. The facts are indisputable.There was no lack of information and the genocidewas preventable. Those who could have preventedit invented a whole series of prelexts not do so.The book gives the best description published so farof how the Canadian General Dallaire wasdiscouraged from laking action in favor of thethreatened populations. He had to suffer ail sorts ofhumiliations in the mosl horrible situations.

Linda Melvern also deserves thanks for having paidhomage to Philippe Gaillard, the representative ofthe Red Cross, who relentlessly tried to save peopleeven in the most hopeless circumstances.

but...

Despite ail the positive elements of Linda Melvern’spublication it should be stressed that she couldhave scrutinized more closety the background toher findings. When she blames the British Ambas-sador for what he was saying in the secret meetingsof the U N Security Council she rarely undertakes anin-depth analysis of his declarations. She seemsreluctant to wonder if political objectives may haveguided the governments that insisted on refusingeven the most reasonable and modest demands ofGeneral Dallaire.

Her findings call for further examination of the usualexplanations for the Rwandan catastrophe startingon October 1,1990, Linda Melvern could have triedto answer four main questions:

- Did the situation of the Tutsi emigrantsmainly in Uganda justify a military attack against asovereign state with ail its consequences?- Is there any evidence that Hutu extremistscould have killed two Presidents and a major part ofthe Rwandan army’s leadership?

- Doesn’t the "planning theory" of genocideserve as a pretext for non-intervention and behaving- to use the word of Samantha Power- li ke "bystan-ders"? (POWER 2001)- Why did the Anglophone world favor theRPF victory?

The present paper analyses Linda Melvern’s argu-ments relating to the Rwandan tragedy and confrontsthem with the available facts and findings on a "hid-den agenda" concerning the Central African cri-sis,triggered by the crash of the presidential aircraft inKigali on April 6, 1994 at 8.30 p.m.

Was the RPF invasion of Rwandajustifled?

On October 1, 1990, a group of soldiers comingfrom Uganda attacked Rwanda. They were part ofthe Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the armed wingof the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Insidersknew that the descendants of the Tutsi oligarchythat had left Rwanda between1959 and 1964

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controlled the RPF¯ Most of their ancestors fled toUganda and Burundi. In 1963 they tried, after aseries of failed attempts, to regain power by force¯They failed again and mass killings took place inRwanda against the Tutsi population¯ A mass exodusof Tutsi from Rwanda followed in the beginning of1964.

The term genocide was used - for instance b~Bertrand Russell - for the first time in the Region.Before that political murder was common but thenumber of victims limited. A long lasting conflicttook roots.

The differences between the population groups ofTutsi and Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi dated frombefore the colonial era but became virulent duringthe decolonization process when the question cameup of whether the pre-colonial monarchies in bothcountries should be reestablished as independentstates.

Whereas the pre-colonial Tutsi-dominated ordercould be maintained in Burundi, in Rwanda the inde-pendent state came under the control of the Hutuparty PARMEHUTU following the abolition of themonarchy in September 25, 1961 by a referendummonitored by the United Nations¯

The influx of Rwandan refugees after the establish-ment of the Hutu-dominated Republic in Rwandaaggravated the up-to-then less virulent Hutu-Tutsiproblem in Burundi¯ In 1966 the Burundian army ledbv anti-Hutu Tulsi extremists took power in a coupd’état and in 1972 the first ethnocide was organizedby the Burundian slate against the Hutu elite in Bu-rundi. In summer 1972 between 100,000 and300,000 Hutu were executed¯ The internationalcommunity had ail the necessary information butdid not intervene to protect lhe threatened popu-lations, avoiding the conflict with one western powerprotecting its"cronies". The Burundian Tutsi-conlroll-ed army is still in power! A precedent full of conse-quences was set. Since 1972 the Hutu-Tutsi conflictbecame the main political rationale in the region ofthe Great Lakes in Central Africa.

In 1973, with the consent of the international com-munity, General Habyarimana took power in Rwandaand repressed the already ongoing "revenge forBurundi" by Rwandan Hutu against the Tutsi popu-lation. The cyclical killings came to a stop in bolhcountries untilthe end of the eighties. Bulthe regio-nal refugee problem could not be solved. The des-

cendants of the Tutsi aristocracy in Uganda became- first in opposition to Obote, then as allies of IdiAmin and later on of Yoweri Museveni - part of theinternal problems of that country.

The economic crisis in the whole region in the lateeighties aggravated the regional tensions¯ The Tutsiproblem in Uganda became acute again. YoweriMuseveni, their protector in this historical phase,became interested in helping his allies during hisarmed conquest of Uganda in 1986 - organized inthe above-mentioned Rwandan Patriotic Front-to"go home" and take power in Kigali. Melvern is rightwhen writing: "While the Rwandan officer corps wasan asset for Museveni, the Rwandans themselveswere a problem. There were increasing complaintsamong Ugandan officers that they were discrimi-nated against in favor of Rwandans in the army¯"(p¯28)

The RPF had succeeded in presenting itself to therest of the world as a non-eth nic liberation movement.After the death of Fred Rwigyema, the first presidentof the RPF and a Iongtime Ugandan deputy ministerof Defense under Museveni, during the first days of

¯ ¯ 8the nvas on the Hutu AlexJs Kanyarengwe becamethe new RPF-President. He was a former Colonelunder Habyarimana and went into exile after a failedputsch in 1980¯ His nomination was a very clevermove by the new RPF military leader Paul Kagamé,who was actually the leading figure of the RPF.

The RPF Iobby - very much supported by RogerWinter, at that lime Direclor of the US Committeefor Refugees and since 2002 Deputy Administratorof USAID-succeeded in presenting it to the outsideworld as an non-ethnic liberation movement. EvenSeth Sendashonga, a Hutu opposed to Habyarimanaand living in exile in Kenya joined the RPF, convincedthat the non-ethnic and democratic rhetoric of theRPF was honest.9

Linda Melvern reasons along this line. She doesn’treally ask if the RPF was right to mount a militaryattack on the regime oi General Habyarimana. Forher - and this can be considered as the most im-portant weakness of her book - the historical rightof the RPFto overthrowthe"dictatorship"of Habya-rimana by ail means is undisputed. "Among non-communisl countries Rwanda was probably themost controlled state in the world." (p. 25)

Before lhe beginning of the civil war in October 1990this characterization of the situation is al least

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exaggerated. Someone who lived in the countryfrom 1980 to 1983 and who dealt with the co-ope-ration projects of the FRG in Rwanda and Burundibetween 1987 and 1989 - as the author did - cantestify that before October 1990 the situation inRwanda did not correspond to that description. U ntilthe beginning of the civil war Habyarimana can beaccused of human rights abuses against his Hutupolitical opponents but not against Tutsi.

If Melvern wants to justify the military overthrow ofthe established order in Rwanda she cannot butcharacterize the Habyarimana regime in the mosthorrific colors. For this reason she doesn’t even dis-cuss the question of whether it was justified to supp-ly weapons to the RPF. Therefore she doesn’t exa-mine where these weapons came from. Conse-quently those who helped the Rwandan state tofight against a military invasion are considered to beon the wrong side of history from the very begin ning.

France, following the declared "La Baule policy" ofJune 1990, helped Rwanda against the invasionand is nowadays generally blamed for that involve-ment. However, in 1990 France acted in full accor-dance with the United States and the whole westernworld - except Great Britain.

Herman Cohen, at that rime Deputy Secretary ofState for Africa, had conceived for Secretary ofState James Baker, in close contact with France,the policy of "smooth democratization" to replacethe "cronies" of the cold war. Habyarimana, afterhavina evoked to Mitterrand the danaers of thatv

policy, finally complied. So did Mobutu after a visit ofJames Baker to Kinshasa in Apri11990. France andthe USA guaranteed to some extent a peacefultransformation to democracy and promised helpagainst movements which could be tempted to takepower by force. This applied to Rwanda and to Zaireas well. In both countries the democratization startedin autumn 1990 with full French-American support.Only in 1993/1994 did the Clinton Administrationchange that policy unilaterally and without informingor discussing it with France.

Objectively, the attack of October 1,1990, by the RPFwas an aggression. The MASIRE-Report discussedthe question and accepted the very questionableargumentation of the OUA. "The situation, however,was immediately complicated by two facts. First,despite clear guidelines set down in the1969 OAUConvention Governing the Specitic Aspects ofRefugee Problems in Africa, the OAU had done

nothing in the years prior to the invasion to helpresolve the festering problem of Rwanda’s refugees;it had been of marginal concern until it assumed civilwar proportions. As a result, ~he OAU felt it lackedthe moral authority to condemn the RPF invasion,although at the same time it quite appreciated theoutrage that the invasion caused the Habyarimanagovernment."(Masire-Report 11.16)Thetruth behindthat unconvincing argument is rather simple. Atthetime of the RPF invasion Yoweri Museveni was theacting President of OAU and could therefore preventthe condemnation of his RPF-friends for aggression.

Another tact should never be forgotten. At the timeof the invasion negotiations concerning the possibilityof emigrants returning to Rwanda were under way.During his visit to Rwanda late in the summer of1990 the Pope had also urged Habyarimana to finda solution to that question. So, an aggression in or-der to solve the refugee problem can by no meanshave been justified at that moment.

The question whether the war was justified is veryimportant since it was obvious to everybody that aninvasion must bring back the "ethnic devir’ to theregion. The RPF played "with tire" and was quiteaware of the inherent risks. Actually, only days afterthe invasion on October 1,1990, the first ethnic cla-shes took place. During the war lasting from October1990 to the Arusha Agreements of August 4, 1993,the anti-Tutsi propaganda became part of daily lireand the number of political murders and politicallymotivated massacres increased, but the phenome-non of mass killings was limited during Habyarima-na’s lifetime.

Mass murder started with the downing of theRwandan presidential aircraft on April 6, 1994, kill-ing not only Habyarimana and his Burundian collea-gue Cyprien Ntaryamira but at the same time themost important leaders of the Rwandan Army.

The Rwandan state organization was almost annihi-lated. A political vacuum was created making pos-sible the massacres turning eventually -not beingprevented but even encouraged by the SecurityCouncil decision of April 21, 1994 - into genocideagainst the Tutsi population.

Who shot down the airplane?

Nowadays there is broad agreement that the geno-cide would not have taken place

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- if the Presidential airplane had not been shotdown,

- if the RPF had not resumed military action onlyhours later and

- if the international community would have acted inan appropriate manner to protect the threatenedTutsi population.

Melvern’s book offers much evidence on how insecret sessions the UN Security Council managedto prevent any help to the threatened Tutsi. It con-firms in a very detailed manner the findings of theMasire-Report, which was first to ascertain that thegenocide could have been prevented. In September2001 Samantha Power added several details abouthow the decision for inactivity was taken within theClinton Administration. (Power 2001 ) The former UN-Secretary General Boutros Boutros-G hali des-cribesin detail the differences with the Clinton Administra-tion and especially with the new US-Ambassador tothe UN, Madeleine Albright, on the Rwandan case,which contributed to the early end of her UN career.

The danger for the Tutsi population was increasedby the military campaign of the RPF and its refusalto reach a cease-fire with the Rwandan Army inorder to protect the threatened population.

The facts on these two conditions allowing the ge-nocide to happen are known. What really happenedon April 6, 1994 is not yet revealed. Ail parties invol-ved keep their knowledge secret. Nevertheless someindividuals have testified. But those who are in aposition to confirm these testimonies still refuse todo so. Written in 1999/2000 Melvern’s formulationapplies also to the situation in 2002: "At this pointevents conspired to remove him [Habyarimana] fromthe scene and to this day there is still no adequateexplanation for what happened next." (p.114)

The politlcal contexfMadeleine Albright came fo her new job in New Yorkin spring 1993. The negotiations aiming at a power-sharing agreement between the Rwandan Stateand the RPF were under way and came to a conclu-sion on August 4, 1993. The Rwandan PresidentHabyarimana and the RPF President Kanyarengwesigned the Arusha Agreements. Both men were notthe real players of the game. A multi-party govern-ment headed at that moment by Agathe Uwilingiyi-mana limited Habyarimana’s power. She had beennominated after a crisis within the coalition partyMDR only on July 17, 1993. Within the country an

important opposition had grown up against theagreements with the RPF. So Habyarimana was ina very uncomfortable situation when he came toArusha to sign the agreements that would reducehis-already reduced-presidential prerogatives ina very far-reaching manner. On the other side theRPF President was considered by most of theRwandans as the frontman for the military leaderPaul Kagamé. There was widespread mistrust ofhis objectives. Was he really ready to accept power-sharing? Would he really accept the results of de-mocratic elections foreseen in the Agreements af-ter a transitional period? There were considerabledoubts.

On the other hand the RPF and most of the humanrights NGOs who had strongly criticized Habyarima-na’s maneuvers during the democratization between1991 and 1994 and after the conclusion of a cease-tire with the RPF in March 1993 wondered if Habyari-mana and his entourage would really be ready toaccept the provisions of the agreements. They feltthat the President, still considered to be in fullcontrol of Rwandan politics, must be behind ail theanti-Tutsi propaganda stemming from Radio-Televi-sion des Mille Collines, created just before the sig-ning of the Arusha Agreements.

Unfortunately Madeleine Albright had to negotiatethe mandate for the United Nations Assistance Mis-sion for Rwanda (UNAMIR), foreseen in the ArushaAgreements, al a moment when the United Stateswas firmly opposed to new involvements fo UN-ledpeace-keeping missions after having seen on theirtelevision screens the dead 18 American soldiers inSomalia on October 3, 1993. The decision to estab-lish UNAMIR two days later, on October 3,1993,was taken at an unfortunate moment. The ClintonAdministration that in March 1993 had almost enthu-siastically accepted the transfe r of the American ledoperation in Somalia to a multinational force underdirect UN command was deeply disappointed andchanged its policy. Consequently the U.S. tried toreduce the UNAMIR mandate from the beginning.When the blue helmets arrived in Kigali in December1993 the political situation had profoundly deterio-rated. On October 21,1993, the Tutsi-dominated ar-my had killed the recently elected Burundian Presi-dent Melchior Ndadaye. From now on there wasstrong opposition in large parts of the Hutu po-pula-tion to the application of the Arusha Agreements.Fierce anti-Tutsi feelings were cultivated amongstthe Burundian Hutu refugees fleeing the civil warthat broke out in Burundi after the Ndadaye murder.

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And also in a second refugee community living inmiserable conditions around Kigali hatred of "theTutsi" was common: About one million Hutu hadfled to the south when the RPF had conquered alarge part of the northern regions in Rwanda inFebruary 1993. The RPF-Radio Muhabura startedin 1991 to diffuse anti-Habyarimana propagandaand broadcast even the death sentences imposed

¯ . 10by the RPF agamst Hutu°politiclans . In an unavoi-dable dialectic Muhabura provoked the creation ofthe anti-RPF Radio-Tél~vision des Mille Collines(RTLM) in summer 1993.

It must be stressed again and again that theseevents had created an anti-Tutsi mood in largeparts of the population. Ethnic hatred did not haveto be organized. It was present everywhere. Every-body knew that. Even a CIA desk-level analysis for

11the State Department which was mentioned indifferent publications and not denied by the agencypointed out in January 1994 that when the war re-sumed in Rwanda mass killings would happen andhalf a million lives could be Iost.

It must also be stressed; at that moment the Frenchtroops who had twice saved the Habyarimana regimein October 1990 and in February 1993 had left Rwandain December 1993 for good. The new cohabitationgovernment in France was about to impose on Pre-sident Mitterrand a reduction of France’s militarycommit ment in Africa. So even the Ndadaye assassi-nation in October 1993 could not postpone the reso-lution to withdraw from the Rwandan theater. Habya-rirn~na was alone. He had after a long period ofhesitationtogiveinto pressuresto applytheArushaAgreements against the tierce opposition in hiscountry. Being aware that it would be risky to go toDar-es-Salaam and accept the full application of theagreements he had asked his friend Mobutu tocome with him in the presidential plane. Mobutuaccepted but did not show up after having receivedsome hints from the CIA via Brussels hOt to do so.12His life was saved, the other passengers on theflight from Dar-es-Salaam to Kigali perished.

What do we know?

The downing of the Rwandan presidential aircraft isnormally described as a "mystery". The related inci-dent is in fact mysterious. But in political terms the

13biggest mystery is the fact that up fo now nobodyhas been interested in examining this mystery moreclosely. Ail the work that has been done to explainthe genocide happening during the summer 1994must be considered as preliminary as long as the

truth about the event is not revealed. ApproachingKigali airport, two rockets were launched at thePresidential Falcon Mystère on April 6, 1994 at20.30 local time. The airplane came down in thecompound of President Habyarimana’s privateresidence.

Ail passengers aboard died:

- President Habyarimana of Rwanda- President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi

- The Burundian Ministers Bernard Ciza and Cyri-aque Simbizi- Major General Déogratias Nsabimana, Army Chiefof Staff

Juvénal Renzaho, Habyarimana’s Political Counse-Ior, former Rwandan Ambassador to Germany

- Colonel Elie Sagatwa, Personal Counselor of Ha-byarimana and his brother in law- Major Thadée Bagaragaza, Commander of theRwandan Presidential Guard- Dr. Emmanuel Akingeneye, Habyarimana’s Perso-nal Physician- Three French crew members (Héraud, Minaberryand Perinne)

A glance at the passenger list gives rise to strongdoubts about the hypothesis of the responsibility of"extremist Hutu". Even il Habyarimana’s Hutu ene-mies had had an interest in getting rid of him afterhaving agreed to implement the Arusha Agreementswhy should they kill the newly elected BurundianPresident Ntaryamira, who could have been a valu-able ally in fighting against the RPF? Why shouldthey have killed one of the critics of the ArushaAgreements like the Chie! of Staff Nsabimana?Why should they have killed Colonel Elie Sagatwa(a brother of Habyarimana’s wife Agathe), who normally considered as one of the inner-family op-ponents to Habyarimana with considerable pres-tige within the Army? Why should they have killedMajor Bagaragaza, the commander of the Presi-dential Guard that should play a crucial role infighting the RPF?

In !act ail of them were strongly opposed to the RPFtaking power in Kigali.

And furthermore, a political and military vacuumcould have been in the interest of extremist groups.But is it conceivable that they did not show up aftertheir success? Nobody asked to take powerimmediately after the creation of that power vacuum;

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nobody went directly to the radio station to declarethat a coup d’état had taken place. Many publicationshave since been written trying to prove the extremisttheory. However it did not work. After eight years noserious evidence has been brought up in favor of it.That theory can be excluded from further conside-ration. Even Colonel Théoneste Bagosora - oftenconsidered as the head of the Hutu extremists -who is indicted at the International Criminal Tribu nalfor Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha for having participatedin the organization of mass killings after the assassi-nation of the two Presidents has not been accusedof being involved in the downing of the Presidentialplane.

On the contrary, most convincing indicators areavailable to underline the theory making the RPFand their allies accountable for the assassinationsof April 6, 1994. It does not seem tobe pure chancethat the RPF launched its well-prepared assault totake power in Rwanda immediately after the an-nouncement of the death of the passengers in thePresidential plane.1~ The accusation of the RPF’sinvolvement in the assassination of Habyarimana issummarized in a most comprehensive way in abook recently published in France by Charles Onanawith the collaboration of Déogratias Musha-yidï.(Onana and Mushayidi 2001)

They explain whythe RPFdid nothing to prevent themass killings starting after the plane crash and hadno objections when it turned into genocide twoweeks later by neutralizing the blue helmets undertheir Commander Dallaire through the UN SecurityCouncil decision on Apri121,1994. The most sensa-tional testimony fo confirm the assumption that theRPF was not interested in stopping the killings of theTutsi living in Rwanda was given by Deus Kagiranezaon March 1, 2002 at a hearing organized by theBelgium Senate. He said: "lt was a political calcula-tion that led to the sacrifice - history may judge theCentral Committee of the RPF whose member Iwas - of 800.000 persons.’’6

These and some other testimonies of former RPF-¯ . 17 .

members (Chnstophe Haklzabera , Jean-Pierre18 . . 19 . .

Mugabe , Michael Houngan reporhng of infor-mants to the ICTR in Arusha) indicate that in-depthinvestigations must be undertaken to obtain an"adequate explanation" of what happened on April6, 1994 and afterwards.

The most complicated question is a possible USinvolvement in organizing the downing of the plane.

Since the documentation established by FilipReyntjens (Reyntjens 1995) in 1995 there is com monknowledge of an international background. The com-plex consequences of that crash which

- caused the breakdown of the Rwandan stateorganization,

- deprived the Rwandan army of its leadership and

- neutralized Burundi as an opponent to the RPFsuggest the existence of an internationally guided"invisible hand".

The fact that Mobutu was eventually warned not toboard the Rwandan plane especially underlinesthat supposition. Such complicated organizationcan rarely been handled by a liberation movementalone.

Moreover these speculations are nourished by therefusal to include this starting point of the genocidein the inquiries of the International Arusha Court. Itcannot be maintained that a Court whose expensesamount in the meantime to more than US-$ 600million2° has no right to inquire into this crucialelement.21

And there is another astonishing fact related for thefirst time by Linda Melvern: "In a strange coincidenceof timing, an American military officer, ColonelCharles,Chuck’ Vuckovic, was already in Kigali andhad an evacuation plan. Vuckovic had turned up atthe rive-star H6tel des Mille Collines some six hoursbefore the presidential plane was shot down." (p.140) Actually the Americans alreadv began Ioevacuate their nationals on the morning of April 7,1994.

When will the US investigate?

During his short visit to Kigali on March 25, 1998,President Clinton asked how il could happen, that"there were people like me sitting in offices, dayafter day after day, who did not fully appreciate thedepth and the speed with which you were beingengulfed by this unimaginable terror. "He nevergave an answer to that question and his admini-stration did ail il could to prevenl an investigationwhich was already suggested by Alan Kuperman inThe Washington Post of December 29, 1998. "lheU.S. Congress should follow the lead of its Belgiancounterparts by launching a full-scale investigation,starting with ail relevant classified documents."

Ail available information indicates that this will be a., 22

painful proceeding. So one cntlque of Melvern’s

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book in the U.S. stressed: "Melvern’s implicit equa-tion of the French and U.S. roles, for instance, isn’tso much u nfair as unhelpful. The French govemme ntwas actively complicit in the violence; the ClintonAdministration, after Somalia and already underpressure from isolationist Republicans in Congress,was simply unwilling to waste political capital onfurther African misadventures." Despite the know-ledge of the later American commitment in the Con-go war and the support to the RPF to get rid of therefugees in Eastern Zaire nobody seems to beready to believe that an American part could havebeen played in the plane crash on April 6, 1994.

The process of taking a closer look at the involvementof the Clinton Administration was launched by theBush Administration when Samantha Power coulduse declassified documents to write her alreadymentioned article "Bystanders to genocide". ButSeptember 11,2001 interrupted this process in theinterest of national solidarity.

Nevertheless, sooner or later the US Administrationmust share its knowledge of what happened onApril 6, 1994 and why the evacuation of its nationalscould start immediately after the plane crash andwhy the US Embassy was already closed on April 7,1994.

Planned genocide?

The responsibility for the mass killings that dege-nerated into genocide after the spectacular decisionof the UN Security Council of Apri121, 1994 to with-draw the UN peacekeeping force and not to interveneto help the threatened population rests with thosethousands of killers who executed the massacres.Compared to other precedents we are confrontedby a genocide sui generis. It was executed withoutreal weapons in a state vacuum by masses drivenby hatred. Objectively they did what the RPF expec-ted them to do. The Hutu elite who could have ex-plainedthisdialectictothe Hutupopulationasawholeand convince them to stop these actions didn’t existanymore. The"human beast" was unleashed and no-body made efforts to contain it. The "interim go-vernment" didn’t try. It was in tact more of a phantomthan a government. The Army had been decapitatedby the plane crash and the headless "GardePrésidentielle" became part of that "human beast".The International Community succeeded in pre-venting fights against the "lnterahamwe" militias.The blue helmets did not tire a single shot at them.

But the RPF also refused any appropriate action tohelp the threatened Tutsi. Why did Kagamé threatento consider the Belgian soldiers as enemies, if theydid not withdraw after the evacuation of Belgiannationals in mid-Apri11994?23 Apparently the RPFdid not try to neutralize Robert Kajuga who acted asleader of these militias. The RPF succeeded in as-sassinating several of his enemies. Shouldn’t it

¯ 24have been possible to eliminate hJm? If the RPFand his allies can be held responsible for the planecrash, its co-responsibility for the genocide wouldbe evident.

Since the responsibility of the RPF for the downingof the presidential aircraft can not yet fully be provenand many contest the theory of a spontaneousoutbreak of hatred after the assassination of the twoPresidents, the theory of a centrally planned geno-cide that is also adopted by Melvem, must be con-sidered. Two versions exist: one group maintainsthat Habyarimana himself was at the center of ge-nocidal planning; others presume that "Hutu ex-tremists" overruled Habyarimana and killed him soas to be in a position to exterminate the Tutsi.

The Habyarimana version

Alison Des Forges (Des Forges 1999) and othershave described the genocide perpetrated against theTutsi population in a comprehensive way. Incon-testable facts are unfortunately mixed up with con-testable conjectures about the historical backgrou nd.Melvem adopts these speculations. She believes thatHabyarimana was personally involved in genocidalplanning. Is there any evidence or at least likelihood?

Nobody has been able to produce evidence that hewas involved in the planning of genocide. Ail "evi-dence" put forward up to now is doubtful. The aile-garions against him personally are based on con-jecture and hearsay. The Masire-Report is verycautious but unfortunately gives in to the temptationto speculate."So far as is known, there is no document,no minutes of a meeting, nor any other evidence thatpinpoints a precise moment when certain individualsdecided on a master plan to wipe out the Tutsi. Aswehave already seen, both physical and rhetoricalviolence against the Tutsi as a people indeed beganimmediately after October 1, 1990, and continued toescalate until the genocide aclually started in April1994. Withoutquestion thiscampaign was organizedand promoted, and at some stage in this period theseanti-Tutsi activities turned into a strategy for genocide.But that exact point has never been established.(Masire-Report, 7.2.)

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An astonishing contradiction regarding the perso-nality of Habyarimana has to be mentioned. Most ofthose who were writing about the Rwandan genocidedescribe Habyarimana as a more or less diabolicalperson. Even Alison Des Forges quotes without fur-ther explanation pure speculations that Habyarima-na, although he had been warned the RPF attackcould take place, did nothing to prevent it, because"he wanted the invasion" in order to launch an anti-Tutsi campaign. (Des Forges, 1999, p. 49) On theother hand the authors of the Masire-Report blamehim for not having acted in a wise manner withrespect to the invaders. "The October 1990 RPFinvasion of Rwanda and the Government’s responseconstituted a giant step on the road to genocide.Habyarimana at that moment had a choice. Contraryto RPF expectations, few Rwandans of anybackground welcomed these unknown "Ugandan"soldiers. A united front among ail Rwandans againstoutside invaders would have been possible, but anopportunistic and threatened Habyarimanagovernment chose the opposite course. With greatdeliberation, it awakened the sleeping dogs of eth nicdivision. The Tutsi were portrayed as alien invaders.Any question of class or regional divisions betweenHutu was tobe submerged in a common frontagainst the intruders. Ail Tutsi were denounced asfifth columnists, secret supporters of the RPF. Anti-Tutsi propaganda, largely muted for the previous 17years, was unleashed anew." (Masire-Report,Executive Summary, 17)

This appreciation is very theoretical. Even if theRwandan President had wanted to behave in therecom mended way, his prevailing political weaknessairer an agitated summer tollowing the La Baulespeech of French President Mitterrand in June1990 would not have allowed him to do so.

In any case, the RPF considered Habyarimana asthe incarnation of evil and could nol have expectedthat the Rwandan regime would not awaken the"sleeping dog". But during Habyarimana’s lifetimethe "dog" could only bark and was prevented frombecoming a beast of prey. Would Habyarimanaalready have implored Boutros-Ghali in January1994 not to withdraw the blue helmets in anycircumstances? If he had planned genocide hewould have had, on the contrary, an interest in theirdeparture.

Those who planned the air crash knew that airer thedeparture of French troops in late 1993 theelimination of Habyarimana could lead fo the military

victory of the RPF. France was no longer in aposition to prevent it. But they knew also that masskillings of the Tutsi population would be theconsequence. In this respect it is u nderstandable totry to attribute the responsibility to a person whocannot deny it anymore. Since it was not Iogical toassume that Habyarimana would make plans basedon his own death an auxiliary version has beeninvented.

The "Hutu extremist version"

According to this theory Habyarimana was killed by"Hutu extremists" because in the end he was notready to execute his own plans.

The "Hutu extremist theory" assumes that Habyari-mana himself was no longer in control of his country.Was that the case? We don’t know exactly. It is,however, strange that ail those who adhere to theplanning theory maintain that Habyarimana and hisfamily where in full control of Rwandan policy.

Supposed that Habyarimana was unaware of theplanned genocide is there any evidence that aconspiracy by Hutu extremists against Habyarimanawas under way? No "hard evidence" has beenfound until now. The passenger list and the mostconvincing findings of Onana and Mushayidi (Onanaand Mushayidi 2001 ) suggest the contrary.

When resuming the war on April 7, 1994, the RPFknew as well as anybody else that an enormouspotential for aggression- as already detailed above- existed. The soeculation mav be allowed: Those¯ 25within the CIA who in a report of January 1994 pre-dicted half a million victims if the civil war shouldresume were not those who were in favor of a policytotakethat risk. Whydidtheyannouncethedanger?Was somebody playing with that risk?

The information by Mobutu’s last security cou nsellor(N’Gbanda 1999) may be repeated: Mobutu waswamed by a secret agent in a phone call comingfrom Brussels not to board the Rwandan airplane.(Habyarimana had expressed some fear for hispersonal security and asked him during a visit toGbadolite some days before the Dar-es-Salaammeeting to do so being convinced that the presenceof this American ally would give him some security).

In the days after the RPF seized power in Kigali thewhole Tutsi community followed the theory that theHabyarimana regime had planned the genocide.This more or less official version was laid down in a

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book edited in London in 1994 by Rakiya Omaar,Director of African Rights26. (Omaar 1994) Onlysome months later, in 1995, Gérard Prunier who isa sort of a French "dissident" to Mitterrand was ableto publish his book in English transmitting the samemessage. (Prunier 1995)¯

Nowadays the Tutsi opposition to Kagamé, livingpartly in Brussels and partly in the U.S., seems tobeconvinced, as Deus Kagiraneza has testified March1,2002, at the Belgium Senate that the Tutsi popu-lation which had not left the country with the nobilityin the period form 1959 to 1964 was "sacrificed" bythe RPF in the interest of its military victory and theestablishment of its undisputed rule in Rwanda.

Melvern - taki ng from already known sou rces- pre-sents three pieces of evidence for both versions ofthe planning theory

- the anonymous AMASUSU-letter of January 1993;- the letter written by anonymous officers to Dallaireon December 3, 1993;- the "Jean-Pierre-information" transmitted to NewYork by General Dallaire on January 11,1994¯

It is worthwhile to have a closer look on thesedocuments.

The anonymous AMASUSU-letterAlison Des Forges writes: ’oEhe congruence of inte-rest between hard-line soldiers and anti-Tutsi mili-tants reappeared in January 1993 just after the thirdof the Arusha protocols was signed. On January 20,a group of soldiers calling themselves Amasususent an aggressive open letter to Habyarimana. (...)

¯ 27’Commandant M=ke was a pseudonym, of course,but it seems likely that he is either Col. ThéonesteBagosora or someone working closely with him".(Des Forges, 1999, p. 104/5) "Commandant Mike"warns ,"the RPF had better clear out of the countrybefore it is too late." He asks Habyarimana:"How doyou expect to stop us from delivering an exemplarylesson to traitors inside the country? After ail, wehave already identified the most virulent of themand will strike them like lighting."

Des Forges dares to make the risky equationAmasusu = Bagosora. Is she in a position to produceany "hard" evidence"? It is unlikely. Linda Melvern

28goes even further:"Bagosora, Nsengiyumwa andothers set about creating a secret Hutu Powersociety within the army called Amasusu" (p.63.)She gives no evidence to prove that the well-known

critics29of the Arusha Protocols were taking part ina conspiracy. If they wanted to deliver a message toHabyarimana they had other possibilities to letHabyarimana know their position than anonymousletters.

Alison Des Forges considers the letter authenticbecause its content is similar to the famous phraseof Léon Mugesera "He who wishes for peace pre-pares for war." Her appreciation could be right, butit may not be. The RPF knew the position of Mugeseraand could easily have used it for its propagandapurposes. The RPF was in any case interested inaccusing the opponents to the Arusha Protocols toprovoke ethnic hatred.

The anonymous letter of December 3, 1993

"In eady December 1993, peacekeepers receivedan anonymous letter from Rwandan army moderateswaming that President Juvenal Habyarimana hadconceived a’Machiavellian Plan’ for political assas-sinations and ethnic massacres across the coun-try. "3° The letter is confirmed by many sources sincecopies had been sent to the diplomatic missions.Nobody can prove that it was written by the "mode-rates" referred to. Normally the army is presentedas the stronghold of the "Hutu extremists». Is it likelythat ail of a sudden dovish officers got the upperhand who accuse Habyarimana to be a hawk?

It seems more likely that the authors could be foundin RPF circles than in the Rwandan Army.

The "Jean-Pierre Informations" of Jan. 10, 1994

Melvern’s description of how "Jean-Pierre" passedhis information to UNAMIR is worth quoting inextenso:"In January Dallaire was told the Interahamwe wasreceiving military training. Then on 10 January some-one else came forward, this time from the heart ofthe Hutu Power network, who agreed to meet Mar-chai31 only at night, and alone. Marchal met the manby candlelight. They both laid their pistols on thetable. The man’s codename was Jean-Pierre andhe had been introduced to the intelligence networkby a senior politician 32. Jean-Pierre had a mostextraordinary story to tell. He was a former memberof the president’s security guard, who had workedas a chauffeur, and was now a senior trainer in theInterahamwe. His salary came from the ruling partyMRNDD. He told Marchal that 1,700 Interahamwehad been trained in Rwandan army camps andthese men were now scattered in groups of fortythroughout the city. (...) Up until now Jean-Pierre

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had supposed that the Interahamwe had beencreated in order to protect Kigali form the RPF. Buthe said that since October he had been ordered toregister Tutsi in Kigali. He was certain that it was fortheir extermination, for the Interahamwe was nowbeing trained to kill up to 1,000 people every twentyminutes."(p. 92)

General Dallaire sent a confidential cable to hisheadquarters in New York on January 14, 199433.This cable is normally taken as irrefutable evidenceof the planning theory, although Dallaire has written:"Force commander does have certain reservationson the suddenness of change of heart of the infor-mant to come clean with this information. Recce ofarms cache and detailed planning of raid to go onlate to morrow. Possibility of a trap not fully excluded,as this may be a set-up against the very importantpolitical person."

Regarding the circumstances of this testimonvDallaire’s warning that Jean-Pierre Turatsinzewas asked to play the role of an agent provocateurshould be taken into serious consideration. Thosewho may have planned that trap knew that themandate of UNAMIR excluded the seizure of armscaches indicated by "Jean-Pierre’’35 ¯ And in fact,New York ordered no action to be taken and Jean-Pierre Turatsinze not to be brought out of thecountry. (He later on "disappeared" without leavingany trace!)

In January 1994 the planning of the assassination ofHabyarimana must have been under way. Theplanners were aware that it could be useful foforward documents after that event "proving" thatHabyarimana was the "Machiavellian" spirit whoseexistence was already established in the"Amasusu"letter.

The "Jean-Pierre" story was in any case very suc-cessful since honest people like Alison Des Forges,the former Swedish Prime Minister CarlssonJ°(Carlsson 1999) and others still consider the cableto be the most convincing "evidence" of the plannedgenocide. However it can hardly be assessed assuch. Following Dallaire’s warning historians shouldbe cautious.

Killing Iists

Some publications refer to "killing lists" to prove theplanning of the genocide. Such lists existed andcontained on the Hutu as well as on the Tutsi sidenames of political opponents to be killed. Political

murder was unfortunately common. In the first daysafter the death of Habyarimana, people on the listswere killed by the Presidential Guard and the RPF.37

These lists cannot nonetheless be taken as evidencefor genocidal planning. The genocide after the retreatof the blue helmets an Apri121,1994 was executedmost otten by illiterate young people without lists.

Who wanted the Rwandan Patriotic Frontto win the war in Rwanda and take poweralso in the Congo?

Samantha Power asks in her article: "Who were thepeople in [the Clinton Administration] who ruade thelife-and-death decisions that dictated U.S. policy?Why did they decide (or decide not to decide) they did? Were any voices inside or outside the U.S.government demanding that the United States domore?" Convincing answers still don’t exist.

Analyzing the events in Central Africa since 1990 amajor political change can be observed when theClinton Administration took office in January 1993.The former Undersecretary of State for AfricanAffairs Herman Cohen stated in Paris before theInformation Commission of the French NationalAssembly that the US had no interest in supportingthe RPF while he was in office. When the ClintonAdministration came in things changed slightly. Inthe beginning George Moose, the successor ofHerman Cohen, followed his Iow-profile policytowards Central Africa. But his role diminished in anobvious way and Madeleine Albright came graduallyto the forefront.

But even in 1990, when Herman Cohen believesthat the U.S. government had no interest in thevictory of the RPF, this organization already hadsome important friends in the United States. The1988 Washington Conference on the problem ofRwandan Refugees in Uganda can be identified asthe starting point of the pro-RPF policy. Somemonths later the present President of Rwanda, PaulKagamé, came to Forth Leawenworth (Kansas) forfurther military train ing. After the invasion of Rwandahe was ordered back and started his ultimatelysuccessful campaign fo take power in Rwanda. Hisfriend Roger Winter, the director of the USCommittee for Refugees, was during ail that timeone of his American "guardian angels". Winter canbe considered as a part of a "non-official" US foreignpolicy team. The Prayer Breakfast movement was

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another part of this "shadow-foreign-policy" estab-lishment. Rudolf Decker, the unofficial represen-tative of the Prayer Breakfast in Germany, has re-vealed in a booklet how the later US Ambassador toKigali, David Rawson, managed together with himto be an integral part of the Arusha negotiations in1992/1993.From that moment on, the US involve-ment in Rwandan affairs became unofficially official.Rawson pushed Habyarimana strongly to go to Dar-es-Salaam and was the first to evacuate Americannationals from Rwanda and left the country afterHabyarimana’s death. Did he knowthatthe Americanpolicy had opted for a RPF victory?

After April 6, 1994, it became obvious that the Clin-ton Administration endorsed that option. Had theClinton Administration a strategy in this respect? Toanswer this question we should know, once again,if the most sophisticated attack on the airplane wasorganized with the help of agencies - or at teastparts of them - with connections to the West.

The unconditional support for the new military regimein Kigali and the US support for its invasion of Congotogether with other"new African leaders" make clearthe pro-RPF option. This political option is not justan expression of the "guilt complex" for not havingprevented the genocide.

A Sudan Syndrome ?

It is nota pure coincidence that in 1993/1994 whenthe Rwandan cdsis became more acute the regimein Sudan came openly under rhetorical fire. Sudanwas classified as a "rogue state". Following the de-cision not to send American soldiers to Africa afterSomalia, the British ally Museveni was going to getmore important. He was threatened by Khartoumand cooperated with the south-Sudan rebels underJohn Garang. As a military leader Museveniwas notvery interested in the democratization policy launch-ed by Mitterrand and James Baker in 1990. Heoffered to serve as an ally against Khartoum andsuggested that he be freed from the"democratizationpressure". At the same rime- as already mentioned- he asked for support to "relieve" him of his Tutsifriends and help them to return fo Rwanda.

The new anti-Khartoum policy and its consequenceswere not compatible with Mitterrand’s pro-Arabpolicy. The dialogue with Mitterrand’s Franceconcerning Central Africa was phased out.

Especially after Madeleine AIbright becameSecretary of State in 1997 she tried hard fo establish

an anti-Khartoum coalition formed by the so-called"new generation of African leaders" from Asmara,via Addis Ababa, Kampala, Kigali, Buju mbura finallyto Kinshasa.

Observers -Warren Christopher among them withhis pro-democracy speech in Addis Ababa on Octo-ber 10, 1996,-wondered very soon if the new allieswho defied ail democratic options would be suitable.The most astonishing of these western allies wasLaurent Kabila who, despite his long anti-Americanpast, came to be considered as one of these "newleaders" and was flown to Kinshasa in May 1997 byAmerican pilots38.

In December 1997 Madeleine Albright in conformitywith the extreme conservative wing of the Americanforeign policy establishment represented by JesseHelms, publicly asked in Kampala the South Sudanleader John Garang to attack Khartoum. ProbablyMadeleine Albright was not very interested in estab-lishing an independent Christian South-Sudan State,as were the Breakfast Prayer Movement and SenatorJesse Helms. She was more driven by the Khartoumquestion.

During his trip to Africa in March 1998 Clinton gavehis blessing to that strategy but expressed somedoubts when meeting Kabila. One day earlier in Ki-gali he had made a very astonishing declaration. Heacknowledged that in 1994 people"sitting around inoffices did not fully appreciate the depth and thespeed" of the Rwandan tragedy. Only some weekslater the coalition of the "new African leaders" implo-ded. War broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopiaand on August 2, 1998 Laurent Kabila refused toplay the role he was supposed to play. In August1998- during the most threatened point of his poli-tical career after having confessed his affair withMonica Lewinsky - he nevertheless ordered thebombardment of Khartoum. This event, with its de-vastating effect on the Arab world, marked the com-plete failure of the attempt to bring down the Khar-toum regime by force. The record was horrible. "Af-rica’s First World War", as Madeleine Albrightdescribed it in a session of the UN Security Councilon January 24, 2000, came into being. The democra-tic movement that also sprang up in Central Africaafter the fall of the Berlin wall was destroyed.Warren Christopher’s warning against militaryregimes has proved to be correct.

Many facts indicate that the Bush jr. Administrationafter taking office on January 20, 2001 was ready to

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take up a new stance in Central African affairs.When Kagamé and Kabilajr. were-only some daysafter Laurent Kabila’s death -"ordered" to take partin the National Prayer Breakfast in the USAthe newSecretary of State Colin Powetl told them that theU S did not favor any more the ongoing secession ofthe Congo Kivu Provinces and that Rwandan troopsmust pull out of the Congo in exchange for securityguarantees against invasion by former RwandanArmy units. September 11,2001, slowed down Ame-rican pressure. But finally both had to sign such anagreement in Pretoria on July 30, 2002, brokered bythe South African government with US support. Ifthese agreements were applied, peace could corneback to Central Africa.

Building up new democratic structures will be adifficult task. Reaching that goal is also in the USinterest to contribute to the truthful analysis of whathappened between 1990 and 1998 in the GreatLake’s Region in Central Africa.

The role of FranceAs it was pointed out before, France was in completeharmony with the US government regarding thedemocratization policy to be applied in Africa afterthe end of the cold war. And despite minor rivalriesover the growing American influence in the traditional"francophone" countries the U.S. agreed with theFrench commitment in favor of Habyarimana follo-wing the invasion of October 1, 1990. The formerGerman colonies Ruanda and Urundi (later govemedby Belgium under the mandate of the League ofNations and UN-trusteeship) only came underFrench influence in the early seventies. Francesupported the Tutsi dominated army in Burundi andlived on good terms with the Hutu-regime in Rwanda.In 1990 both partners were told by the United Statesthat their regimes had to seek more legitimacyamong the population. In the beginning Francewondered if it should follow such a policy. Only aftera period of hesitation was Mitterrand ready to goalong with the Americans to say good-bye to the"cronies" of the Cold War. Habyarimana maintainedsome objections and complied after he receivedmilitary guarantees against groups that could try toovercome the established order by force.

In Burundi the democratization succeeded in thesummer of 1993with democratic presidential elec-tions, but France continued its cooperation with theTutsi-dominated army. An often asserted Frenchaltinity for "the Hutu" never existed. And whenFrench troops hadto save the Habyarimana regime

in February 1993 for the second time and thegovernment in Paris became aware that the interna-tional mood was rather anti-French because of ot-her much criticized military involvement in Africa,France was- again in accordance with the Americanpolicy rather keen to leave the Rwandan theaterwhen a quickly negotiated power-sharing agreementwas reached in Arusha. France actually withdrew,but was rather astonished when the US opted in fa-vor of the RPF after the foreseeable implementationproblems of the Arusha Agreement. When Mitter-rand was about to prevent such a victory and wan-ted to opt for an intervention to stop the genocide,his Prime Minister Balladur strongly opposed sucha course. France started her now almost completedmilitary retreat from Sub-Saharan Africa.

Butfor a very complicated set of reasons internationalpublic opinion - the above mentioned book by Gé-rard Prunier andthewritings of Jean-Pierre Chrétien- still holdsFrance to be mostly responsible for theRwandan genocide. Some also maintain that theCatholic Church, in alliance with France, was a res-ponsible force behind the genocide. Non-partisanresearch will come to the conclusion that neitherdeserves to be considered as the "main culprit" inthe Central African catastrophe. Responsibility mustbe shared by many.

Conclusion

The Great Lake’s Region in Africa was in a space of30 years the theater of four genocides or genocidalmass-killings.

Burundi 1972In 1972 in Burundi the Hutu Intelligentsia was killedmainly by the Burundian Army. The killings wereorganized by the State and no official investigationhas been undertaken so far. René Lemarchandspoke recently of the "conspiracy of silence" con-cerning this genocide". (Lemarchand 2002) Francehas ever since supported the Tutsi-dominated Bu-rundian Army which was responsible. The historianJean-Pierre Chrétien, who made most of his pro-fessional career in Bujumbura, contributed much tothe "democracy-sceptical" position of lhe Frenchleft which was never interested in scrutinizing peoplebeing held responsible for the events that occurredin Burundi in 1972 and still being in power.

Rwanda 1994 in areas held by the Intedm GovernrnentThe massacres of the Tutsi population in 1994 are

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officially recognized as genocide. Most knowledgeis available on this crime since it happened publicly.Ail serious researchers agree that it could havebeen prevented, but two members ofthe UN SecurityCouncil blocked any action. There is disagreementwithin the research communitywhether the genocidewas centrally planned before and during itsexecution. Some maintain that it was planned byorgans of the Rwandan State long before theassassination of the Presidents of Rwanda andBurundi on April 6, 1994. Others are convinced thatit was a genocide sui generis that happened in avacuum of State power after that event. Thishypothesis takes it that the Interim Governmentestablished on April 9, 1994, that had to flee threetimes before arriving finally in exile mid-July 1994,was not in a position to organize anything. It wasmass-killings by the masses with rudimentaryarmaments. In this characterization it was genocidebeyond State-p!anning. It was a crime againsthumanity nonetheless and can hardly be excusedas "normal war proceedings".

Rwanda 1994 in RPF-controlled are, asThe killings of Hutu in the Byumba Province didn’toccur officially. The Rwandan RPF-State deniesthat mass-killings were undertaken by the RPFwhile conquering the country. None of the westernsecret services has declassified its knowledge. Thezone was declared secret during the civil war. TheGersony Report gave detailed hints, but wasclassified by the UN.39 However experts like FilipReyntjens have asked on several occasions toundertake investigations.

Former Zalre 1996/1997The killings of the Rwandan refugees in Eastern Ex-Zaire organized by AFDL and the RPF Army betweenNovember 1994 and April 1995 are not yet officiallyrecognized as genocide. Only semi-officialinvestigations have been undertaken so far. Butsince ail necessary information is available, an in-depth assessment would be easy.

A full assessment of that period of African history isnot yet possible. On the one hand too many of thepeople involved are still in power and on the otherhand in some countries it is still considered tobe inthe "national interest" not fo reveal what has beendone in the name of those nations.

We are still in a phase of asking questions andreflecting on some hypotheses. In the case of thedowning of the Presidential airplane on April 6,

1994, the available facts already allow a type ofprocess based on "circumstantial evidence". Onthat basis it can be ruled out that "Hutu extremists"shot down the plane. A lot of credible testimonypoints in another direction. But the full truth of howthe crash was organized cannot yet be established.Historians and other researchers have a lot of workto do. Especially American researchers shouldencourage the US Government and/or Congress toundertake serious investigations. It cou Id be painful,but it is necessary in the interest of the moralleadership role that the United States has to play inPost-Cold-War world politics. Strizek@t-online.de

BibliographyBoutros-Ghali, B. (1999). Unvanquished: a U.S.-U.N. saga.New York, Random House.Carlsson, I. (1999). Report of the Independent Inquiry intothe Actions of the United Nations during the 1994Genocide in Rwanda. New York, United NationsOrganization.Des Forges, A. (1999). Leave None to Tell the Sto-ry.Genocide in Rwanda. New York et al., Human RightsWatch.Halberstam, D. (2002). War in a rime of peace. Bush,Clinton and the Generals. London, Bloomsbury Pub-lishing.(As valuable background information for the Clintonera.)Lemarchand, R. (2002). Le génocide de 1972 au Burundi:Les silences de l’Histoire." DIALOGUE, BruxeUes 34(N°228): 3-24.Masire, K., Ed. (2000). Rwanda: the preventable genocide.Report by the International Panel of E mi- nent Personalitieste !m:est!g~_te !he !99A Gen~i_rl~_ in Rwan_rla ~n~ thpSurrounding Events. Addis Ababa, Organization of AfricanUnity/IPEP.Melvern, L. (2000). A people betrayed. The role of theWest in Rwanda’s genocide. London New York, ZedBooks (Distributed in the USA exclusively by St. Martin’sPress). ISBN: 1- 85649-830-1. 272 p.N’Gbanda, H.N.K.A. (1999). Ainsi sonne le glasl Lesderniers jours du Maréchal Mobutu. Paris, Edi-tionsGideppe (58, rue de Lisbonne, 75008 Paris).Omaar, R., Ed. (1994). Rwanda. Death, Despair andDefiance. London, African Rights.Onana, C. and D. Mushayidi (2001). Les Secrets Gënocide Rwandais. Enquètes sur les myslères d’unprésident. Paris, Editions MINSI.Power, S. (2001). Bystanders 1o genocide. Why the UnitedStates Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen. Atlantic Monthly288(2/2001 (September)): 84-108.Prunier, G. (1995). The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994. Historyof a Genocide. London, Hurst and Company.Reyntjens, F. (1995). Rwanda: trois jours qui ont faitbasculer l’histoire. Paris, L’Harmattan.

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Anmerkungen1 Melvern, Linda, A poople betrayed. The role of the West

in Rwanda’s genocide. London/New York, Zed Books,2000. 272 p. (ISBN: 1-85649-830-1 (cased); 1-85649-831x limp; in South Africa 0 620 26654 6 limp2 Baroness Linda Chalker was at that t/me Britain’s minister

for overseas development. She is the most importantpersonality among those who, in the late 80s, after hismilitary victory in Uganda’s civil war"integrated" the formerMarxist Yoweri Museveni into the "western community".

3 Biographical Note: "Trained on local newspapers beforearriving in Fleet Street where she worked on the EveningNews and the Evening Standard. She then moved to theSunday T/mes working first in the newsroom and then inthe Insight Team. Her first book, Techno-Bandits, (co-authored), was published in 1984 by Houghton M/filin,Boston. In 1986 she published The End of the Street, anaccount of Rupert Murdoch’s secret plan to move his titlesto a non-union plant. In 1995 she published a secret historyof the United Nations, The Uit/mate Crime. Who Betrayedthe UN and Why, Ail/son and Busby. Her account of tnegenocide in Rwanda, A People Betrayed, the Role of theWest in Rwanda’s Genocide was published in September2000 by Zed Books. She is an Honorary Fellow of theUniversity of Wales, Aberystwyth, in the Department ofInternational Politics."(From:http://www.reportin.q the world.or.q/clients/rtwhome.nsf/LKco ntpcts/Linda+Melvern?opendocument)4 "In January 1997 in New York an extraordinary document

was handed to journal/st Linda Melvern. A contemporaryaccount of secret and informal meetings held by theSecurity Council of the United Nations. It was 155 pageslong. This was an unprecedented leak of information. Forthe first t/me in UN history it was possible to know what wassaid in secret Council meetings, and in this case during thefirst crucial weeks of the genocide in Rwanda. Thedocument detailed ail of the secret meetings of the Councilin April and May 1994." (Information of the Univers/iv ofWales, Aberystwyth, via www.~ber.ac.uklaberonline/uwo10401.html)s Melvern’s book confirms that no information was given

about the massacres that had taken place at the same t/mein areas under the control of the Rwandan Patriotic front.This chapter of the Rwandan disaster can hOt yet bewritten, since ail secrel services have withheld the availableinformation up fo now. But we know, for example, that nota single priest in the Byumba Prefecture has survived.

« Vice President was Amadou Toumani Tour~, who becamein June 2002 President of Mal/.7 Melvern doesn’t, however, qualify the killings of 1963/

1964 as genocide. (p. 19)a After the RPF-victory Kanyarengwe was completely

deprived of his power.9 After his break with Kagame and his second exile fo

Kenya he explained that he was assured by the change ofthe RPF statures on his demand in a less Tutsi biasedwording. When he became aware of the fact that Kagamewanted fo eslablish a military dictatorship based only onTutsi emigrants he left the country in 1995 and was killedin Nairobi on May 16, 1998.

lo Ref. to the article "Jalons vers la tragédie totale" in:

L’AGORA, July 1995.

" For example, refer to Des Forges, 1999, p. 159 and Mel-vern, 2000, p. 91. According fo Melvern the paper waspassed to UNAMIR but "not until the genocide was over."1= These facts have been confirmed by Mobutu.

13 Not even France who Iost 3 nationals, the crew being

French.14 The fact is confirmed by those RPF members present in

the evening of April 6, 1994 at the RPF-headquarters inMulindi, especially by Jean-Pierre Mugabe who gave histestimony in exile published by The International StrategicStudies Association, April 24, 2000, Alexandria, Virginia,USA.l s Charles Onana is ajournalist from Cameroon, Déogratias

Mushayidi is a Rwandan Tutsi in exile.1« More complete quotation in French: "11 est vrai, tout

d’abord, que le génocide est un crime innommable. Il estvrai, ensuite, que la communauté internationale n’a pas puintervenir en temps utile pour y mettre fin; il est vrai aussique nous avons - j’étais moi-même membre du bureaupolitique - interdit à celle-ci d’intervenir parce que nousvenions de perdre toute la matière utile, sur le plan poli-tique en moins de dix jours. En moins de dix jours, on a vules rues se joncher de cadavres; le nombre de personnestuées dans ce laps de temps est évalué à 200.000. Cechiffre ahurissant montre que le génocide était consommé.(...) Du coup, toute la matière utile, sur les plans politiqueet économique a été éliminée en moins de dix jours. C’estdonc un calcul politicien qui a donné lieu au sacrifice -l’histoire jugera, plus tard, le bureau politique, dont j’ai taitpartie - de 800.000 personnes pour, finalement ne riengagner. (...) Si après dix jours, l’ONU avait envoyé surplace un déluge de forces armées, comme au Kosovo, onaurait pu sauver ne serait-ce que 500.000 personnes, cequi est loin d’ètre négligeable." (Compte rendu de l’auditionde M. Deus Kagiraneza devant la Commission d’enquêteparlementaire <Grands Lacs> du Sénat de Belgique levendredi 1er mars 2002).17 L’ONU dans l’etau des Iobbies du Front Patriotique

Rwandais (FPR), Cotonou, Augsut 10, 1999.ls Testimony: The Shooting Down Of The Aircraff Carrying

Rwandan President, The International Strategic StudiesAssociation, Alexandria, Virginia (USA), April 24, 2000.ig Michael Hourigan, Interview with Austral/an Broadcasting

1/03/1999 and Report by Steven Edwards, National Post(Canada), Match 27,2000=o Figure given by André Guichaoua in his article .Tribunal

pour le Rwanda: de la crise à l’échec?", Le Monde, Sep-tember 4, 20022, The status of the inquiry conducted by the French Judge

Bruguière and supposed fo be finished end of 2002 is st/Ilunclear. Cf. Stephen Smith, Le Monde; September 4, 2002.22 Confessore, Nicholas, Washington month/y, Book Re-

view, 12/20002~ Information given by the former Foreign Minister Claes

at the Inquiry Commission of the Belgian Senate.24 Robert Jerry Kaluga was the son of a well-known Tutsi

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IAF4/2002/Ruanda H.Stritzek, Linda Melvern

family in Kigali. Probably he played the role of an enemy ofhis people to be compensated later. Nevertheless it stillremains a mystery how he could do his horrible"job" until theend, not having been disturbed by UNAMIR or the RPF.25 Melvern characterizes if as a "desk-level analysis given

to the State Department" that was passed to UNAMIR "notuntil the genocide was over". (p.91)2« African Rights can be characterized as a Iobby group for

the RPF.2~ The letter was signed "Commandant Mike Tango."

2a Lieutenant-Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumwa was the chief

of army intelligence (G2).z~ Melvern refers to secret reports sent to the President

with warnings against powersharing. (p.62)zo Kuperman, Alan J. (Institute for the Study of World

Politics), December 29,1998, The Washington Post.31 Colonel Luc Marchal was the head of the Belgian

contingent of UNAMIR.

»= The person was Faustin Twagiramungu, the interimPrime Minister mentioned in the Arusha Agreements ofAugust 4, 1993. When contacted by "Jean-Pierre" Twa-giramungu sent him to UNAMIR.3» Filip Reyntjens got hold of it and published it first in 1995.

Reyntjens, F. (1995). Rwanda: trois jours qui ont fait bas-

culer l’histoire. Paris, L’Harmattan.»4 The full name was passed on by Filip Reyntjens.

»s On the following day Luc Marchal sent a Senegalese

peacekeeper to a building indicated by the informantbelonging to the state party MRNDD on the Kimihurura billnear the Center of Kigali. Accordung to Melvern 137 Ka-lashnikovs were found (p.95).(Other sources give smallerfigures).To find some rifles in a State owned building isactually nota convincing evidence in a country full of armstorn by civil war. Melvern indicates for instance that theRPF at the same time "secretely reinforced the battalion inKigali with arms and ammunition, smuggled in from thenorthern headquarters." (p. 101)3« The Carlsson Report uses the,,Jean-Pierre-informations"

as the main source to accuse UN Secretary General KofiAnnan fo be somewhat responsible for the RwandanTutsi-genocide.»7 Cf. to Reyntjens, 1995, p.62.

3a In a TV report realized by the Munich based catholic

organization MISSIO, one of these pilots testifies that tact.39 For instance Nkiko Nsengimana, the Coordinator of

Congres Democratique Africain (CDA), mentioned thJsreport in a letter to Kofi Annan dated December 21,2000,and urged him fo declassify this report.

)

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