lthough the displaced popula-tions concerned may be in direneed of assistance and protec-

tion, and could benefit immeasurablyfrom outside support, few or no stepsare taken, or strategies developed, togain access to them. Whereas conflict isthe inhibiting factor in some cases, inothers, the governments concerned donot request aid and by and large rejectany that is offered. Only rarely does theUN Security Council deem such situa-tions to be threats to international peaceand security and demand entry.

Leading examples of governments thatsuccessfully bar international involve-ment with their displaced populationsare Turkey, Burma and Algeria. The situ-ations in the three countries are, ofcourse, quite different. In Turkey andBurma, governments have deliberatelyuprooted people in order to destroytheir possible links to insurgency move-ments. In Algeria, displacement is abyproduct of conflict, primarily betweenthe government and Islamist insurgentgroups.

In Turkey and Burma, the displaced pop-ulations are ethnic minority groups thathave long suffered policies of exclusionand marginalization by their govern-ments. In Turkey, the Kurdish minority,which comprises about 20 per cent ofthe population, has been subjected,since the founding of the state, to forcedassimilation. The Kurdish language maynot be taught; Kurdish language broad-casts are illegal; Kurdish publicationsand media are restricted; Kurdish politi-cal parties are banned or harassed. InBurma, the ethnic minorities, which con-stitute one third or more of thepopulation and include Karen, Mon,Chin, Shan, Rohingya, Kachin and

Karenni, suffer political and economicexclusion, restrictions in higher educa-tion, and ‘cultural Burmanization’. TheRohingya are even denied citizenship,while non-Buddhists suffer religious per-secution.

Although Turkey and Burma depict theinsurgencies in their countries as ‘terror-ist’ and respond to them with militaryaction, the problems at base are politi-cal, and require negotiations overautonomy or other forms of power-sharing. In Algeria too, the governmentexclusively blames terrorists for the vio-lence that causes displacement. It con-veniently overlooks the impact of itsown role in cancelling the 1992 electionthat the Islamic Salvation Front wasexpected to win. Moreover, its failure toprotect its own population from themassacres and violence that ensuedbecame a major cause of internal flight.

Outside efforts to influence the threegovernments are made difficult by theirfailure to request international assis-tance and by theirshielding themselvesbehind the ‘sanctity’of sovereignty. Burmadoes not want toacknowledge a prob-lem of internaldisplacement in its country while Turkeysignificantly minimizes its magnitudeand severity, insisting it can handle it byitself, despite evidence to the contrary.Both try to conceal the extent to whichtheir own policies or actions may havecontributed to the conflict and displace-ment. In the case of Algeria, outsideintervention would contradict the gov-ernment’s assertions that it isadequately caring for its population andthat the violence is under control.

At a conference organized in Washin gtonDC in January 1999 by the BrookingsInstitution Project on InternalDisplacement and the US Committee forRefugees (USCR), international expertsand NGOs examined the plight of inter-nally displaced persons (IDPs) in the threecountries and suggested possible strate-gies for dealing with these difficult cases.1

Turkey: regional leverage

Anywhere from half a million to two mil-lion Kurds have been forcibly displacedby Turkish counter-insurgency cam-paigns seeking to root out support forthe the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).To be sure, the PKK has also attackedand killed civilians and contributed totheir displacement but government oper-ations have been the preponderantcause. The Turkish military reportedlyhas emptied more than 3,000 villagesand hamlets in the southeast since 1992,burned homes and fields, and commit-ted other serious human rights abusesagainst Kurdish civilians. Hundreds ofthousands have crowded into shantytowns outside major cities withoutaccess to proper sanitation, health careor educational facilities, and withoutstable employment prospects.

Despite repeated promises, the govern-ment has taken few steps to facilitatethe return of forcibly displaced Kurds totheir homes, assist them to resettle, orcompensate them for the loss of theirproperty. Nor does it allow others tohelp. The only local humanitarian NGOallowed to operate in the southeast hasbeen shut down. No international NGOhas been permitted entry. Even ICRC hasbeen unable to operate in Turkey. Therequest of the Representative of the UN

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Hard cases: internal displacementin Turkey, Burma and Algeria

by Roberta Cohen

In some countries, the internally displaced arebeyond the reach of international humanitarianorganizations.

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Even ICRC has been unableto operate in Turkey

26 December 1999, 6 FORCED MIGRATION review

Secretary-General on Internally Dis-placed Persons, Francis Deng, to visit thecountry has received no response.

There are nonetheless some possibleavenues of action. In 1998, after repeat-edly denying entry to the rapporteurs ofthe UN Human Rights Commission, theTurkish government did permit theRapporteur on Torture and the WorkingGroup on Disappearances to visit. Someattributed this change in position toTurkey’s military victories over the PKKand its desire to be accepted into theEuropean Union (EU). Indeed, the EU’sleverage over Turkey is one possibleentry point for pressing for better poli-cies and practices toward the Kurds. In1997, citing human rights grounds inpart, the EU excluded Turkey from mem-bership and the European Parliamentblocked development aid. Given Turkey’sinterest in admission, the EU could insistupon certain steps being taken withregard to forced displacement. To gainentry in 1995 into the European CustomsUnion, Turkey undertook several reforms.

The Parliamentary Assembly of theCouncil of Europe, of which Turkey isalready a member, could also play a farmore stringent monitoring role withregard to forced displacement, compen-sation and returns. As a result of casesbrought before the European HumanRights Court and Human RightsCommission, Turkey has had to paysome $800,000 in compensation toTurkish victims of human rights abuse -most of whom were Kurds whose homesand villages were destroyed.

Turkey is also a member of theOrganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the regionalbody best suited to create a politicalframework in which a dialogue betweenthe Turkish government and Kurdishleaders could be introduced. OSCE canmediate disputes, dispatch missions toease local tensions, and deploy monitorson the ground. Although its decisions areby consensus, OSCE has special proce-dures for taking action when govern-ments fail to cooperate with it. Norwayand Austria, OSCE’s outgoing and incom-ing chairs, both have been prominent infocusing attention on internal displace-ment worldwide. Now as members of theexecutive ‘troika’, they could be encour-aged to introduce a more vigorous OSCErole with regard to forced displacementand Kurdish minority rights.

Although generally reluctant to exertpressure on Turkey bilaterally, theUnited States may be willing to supportmultilateral initiatives within OSCE. Fordecades, the US relied upon Turkey as astrategic and military partner, firstagainst the Soviet Union, more recentlyfor air operations over Iraq, and as abridge to central Asia. As instabilitywithin Turkey has become more appar-ent, however, members of Congress andthe foreign policy community havebegun to question the US approach.NGOs would do well to press the US towork within the OSCE framework to pro-mote a political solution for the Kurdsand support OSCE involvement in moni-toring and facilitating IDP returns.

The UN and Bretton Woods Institutionsshould also be encouraged to play astronger role. Specifically, the UNDevelopment Programme (UNDP), UNICEFand the World Bank could try to expanddevelopment programmes in the south-east (the least developed part of thecountry), set up projects for displacedKurds outside the major cities, and helpwith returns. The Emergency ReliefCoordinator (ERC), the UN’s ‘referencepoint’ for IDPs, could request the ResidentRepresentative/Coordinator to regularlyreport on conditions of displacement,and place the issue on the agen-da of UN inter-agency meetings.The UN system could also getbehind the request of theSecretary-General’sRepresentative on IDPs to visit Turkey.

Burma (Myanmar): focuson humanitarian aid

Forcible displacement is a deliberate policy of Burma’s military government. It has three main aims: to break uppotential areas of opposition to theregime; to destroy the links between theinsurgent movements of ethnic minori-ties and their local sympathizers; and tomake way for large-scale developmentprojects. Over the past decade, up to 1million people or more have beenforcibly uprooted.

The relocations themselves have beencarried out brutally, accompanied byrape, pillage, the burning of fields andconfiscations of land. The areas of reset-tlement have in the main been devoid ofinfrastructure and basic necessities.Many of the internally displaced have

been conscripted as forced labour onroad, railways and irrigation projects, oras ‘porters’ for the military. Thousandswho try to escape but do not reach theThai or other borders (where some200,000 have become refugees) haveended up hiding in mountains and jun-gles in dire need of food, shelter andmedical attention.

The government has denied entry to theInternational Labour Organization and,for the past four years, to the UN’sSpecial Rapporteur on Myanmar appoint-ed by the Commission on Human Rights.It has also prevented access by interna-tional humanitarian organizations andNGOs to conflict areas. It has gained foritself the reputation of a pariah becauseof its refusal to honour the 1990 elec-tions which brought the National Leaguefor Democracy (NLD) to power andbecause of its egregious human rightsrecord.

Isolation of the regime has been the pol-icy of choice of most Western govern-ments and human rights organizations.Nonetheless, some policymakers andexperts have proposed steps of limitedengagement to exert influence. Theypoint out that in recent years the gov-ernment has begun to open itself up to

foreign investment, tourism and devel-opment aid. Although its overall goal isto reinforce its own position, especiallythat of its military, it seeks acceptanceregionally and internationally and mustalso deal with a deteriorating economicsituation. This could offer some leverageto potential donors to link assistance topolitical reforms. In November 1998, theOffice of the UN Secretary-General,which has been pressing for reforms,2

introduced the possibility, both to thegovernment and opposition, of providingWorld Bank loans linked to politicalreform.

Caution, of course, is in order. An OpenSociety Institute report found that mostof the profits from international invest-

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OCHA should take the lead in pressing for an inter-agency needs assessment mission.

27FORCED MIGRATION review December 1999, 6

ment “go directly to the regime orthe small clique of soldiers and busi-nessmen close to the junta.”3 Anydevelopment aid would have to bepredicated on full access to those inneed, extend to the border areaswhere ethnic minorities reside and becarefully designed and implementedto include education, health, reforesta-tion and agricultural programmes.

It should be noted that the govern-ment has been promising, but notdelivering, development aid to ethnicminority groups that lay down theirarms. This could suggest an entrypoint for sponsors of internationalprogrammes to explore whether theycould introduce projects to the bene-fit of these groups.

Meanwhile, UN agencies in Burma,such as UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP andWHO, could make a more vigorouseffort, through the programmes theydo conduct, to find out about thehumanitarian relief needs of IDPs.Indeed, the Office for the Co- ordination of Humanitarian Affairs(OCHA) should take the lead in press-ing for an inter-agency needs assess-ment mission. Too little priority hasbeen given to date to providing foodand medicines to IDPs. Apart fromthe obstacle of access, there is thefear that aid will be diverted to themilitary and profit the government.There is also, however, the tunnelvision of donors, which focuses onlong-range democratization goals -the restoration of Aung San Suu Kyiand the NLD to power - but overlooksthe immediate humanitarian needs ofthe displaced.

In particular, strengthening cross-border programmes to reach dis-placed persons could help addresshumanitarian needs. The recordshows that indigenous organizationshave been able to bring food andhealth services cross-border to isolatedIDPs. Another promising development isthe government’s recent agreement toallow ICRC to maintain “a permanentpresence in various border states”. Thiscould offer an opportunity to collectinformation on IDPs and provide themwith assistance. Greater presence for UNagencies in border areas is somethingthe Secretary-General should advocate inhis talks with the regime and opposition.

Governments in the region, like Japan,could be pressed to raise humanitarianconcerns. In 1998 Japan provided quasi-development aid for the first time in tenyears but attached no explicit condi-tions. Lobbying the Japanese govern-ment should become a regular feature ofhuman rights and humanitarian strategy.Governments in the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whichapproved Burmese membership in 1997,should likewise be urged to raise hum-

anitarian issues. The ‘flexible engage-ment’ policy, proposed by Thailand andthe Philippines, calls for discussion ofhuman rights and democracy issues butshould extend to forced relocation prac-tices and the need for humanitarianaccess.

Some European and US corporations,such as Total and UNOCAL, continue tooperate in Burma. Forced relocations andforced labour are reportedly being used

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to construct facilities, such as oilpipelines, from which they directly bene-fit. The two companies in fact are beingsued in the US for alleged complicity insuch practices.4 Since their reputationsare on the line, the time may be right tourge them to review their policies andpractices and raise issues with the gov-ernment such as the need to avoiddisplacement, engage in fair labour prac-tices, and compensate those displaced.

Algeria: the information void

The scale of internal displacement inAlgeria and the conditions of the dis-placed are largely unknown becauseentry has generally been denied tohuman rights and refugee organizations,especially since 1997, and to many jour-nalists. Moreover, those who manage tomake site visits are limited by lack ofaccess and securityrisks and have nottended to collect infor-mation about thoseforcibly displaced as aresult of the violence.Some place the totalnumber in the thou-sands, others in thetens of thousands, orfar more. What is known is thatAlgerians since 1992 have been fleeingfrom villages to larger towns and citiesto avoid massacres by Islamist insurgentgroups as well as fighting between thesegroups and government security forcesand among the insurgents themselves.

The fact that the army and securityforces have frequently failed to inter-vene to stop the attacks on civilians (upto 100,000 have reportedly been killed)has led some to believe that members ofthe security forces are directly involvedwith the armed groups. Governmentland appropriation schemes, aboutwhich little is known, have also beencited as a cause of displacement.

International fear of an Islamic state inAlgeria led Western countries to givetacit support to the military governmentthat nullified the 1992 elections. Yet itssecurity forces have engaged in highlyabusive practices, such as arbitraryarrests, torture and disappearances.Meanwhile, Islamists have ruthlessly tar-geted for killing those perceived to be‘enemies’ of fundamentalist Islamic val-ues and those directly connected to thestate and have carried out indiscriminate

attacks and atrocities against villagers inrural areas.

Notwithstanding problems of access andsecurity, and the government’s discour-agement of outside fact-finding, entrypoints do exist to secure informationand monitor the conditions of thoseforced to flee. Local journalists andhuman rights groups remain active,despite harassment and restrictions, andsome NGOs like the Algerian League forthe Defence of Human Rights, theAlgerian League for Human Rights andthe Algerian Refugee Council have man-aged to collect some information aboutforced displacement. There are also UNagencies on the ground, in particularUNHCR and UNDP, which, while notdealing directly with the internally dis-placed, could be tasked with providinginformation.

Most important, a civilian governmentcame into office in April 1999, and ithas introduced an amnesty for Islamicinsurgents and pledged to reduce vio-lence. While its record is still unclear,there is reason to believe that it mayprove responsive to outside influence.Even in 1998, delegations from the EUand the UN gained entry, and the gov-ernment subsequently set up officesthroughout the country to process dis-appearance cases. The new governmentcould be encouraged by the UN and EUto establish offices to deal with arbitrarydisplacement and to invite theRepresentative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Personsto visit.

Development agencies could also play arole. They could explore the impact offlight from rural areas on Algeria’s pooragricultural output and on the housingshortage in the cities. Their programmescould help absorb at least some of theestimated 70 per cent of Algerian youngmen who are unemployed and more like-ly to be drawn into the insurgentactivities that produce displacement.

Conclusion

Even in the most difficult cases, thereare strategies available to alleviateforced displacement. Regional organiza-tions, donor governments, and the UNall have potential leverage. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has told theCommission on Human Rights and theGeneral Assembly that serious humanrights violations, in particular “the vio-lent repression of minorities,” have totake precedence over concerns of statesovereignty. This should encourageOCHA to turn its attention to the casesof Turkey, Burma and Algeria.

There are some of course who will arguethat limited international resources arebetter spent on countries more likely tocooperate. But would it not be uncon-scionable to ignore millions of IDPssimply because they are caught up in sit-uations deemed too difficult?

The UN is expected to focus on all IDPs.Although its modus operandi is to dealwith governments that request aid, itcertainly can use its discretionaryauthority to monitor situations and initi-ate actions on behalf of those whoclearly fall within vacuums of responsi-bility in member states. To do lesswould be to fail in its mandate.

Roberta Cohen is Co-Director of theBrookings Institution Project onInternal Displacement and co-authorwith Francis M Deng of Masses inFlight: The Global Crisis of InternalDisplacement (Brookings, 1998). Email: RCOHEN@brook.edu

1. The information before the meeting of 28 Jan 1999was provided by four USCR analysts: Bill Frelick, whovisited Turkey, Jana Mason and Hiram Ruiz who visit-ed Burma, and Steve Edminster who researched theAlgerian situation. See Bill Frelick The Wall of Denial:Internal Displacement in Turkey, USCR, November1999 (see page 45 of this FMR for details); Jana MasonNo Way Out, No Way In: The Crisis of InternalDisplacement in Burma, USCR, Jan 1999; and SteveEdminster Internal Displacement in Algeria: TheInformation Void, USCR, Jan 1999.

2. The Secretary-General has a mandate from theGeneral Assembly to use his good offices to talk to allparties in the conflict and encourage democratizationand national reconciliation.

3. Mason, quoting Open Society Institute, ‘Burma,Country in Crisis,’ 1988.

4. William Branigan, ‘Rights Victims in Burma Want aUS Company to Pay,’ Washington Post, 4-13-99.

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serious human rights violationshave to take precedence overconcerns of state sovereignty