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National Development and Security, Vol. X, No 3, Spring 2002 19

A Historical Review of Elitism in the Federal Bureaucracy of Pakistan and a Critical

Analysis of Pakistan's Higher Public Administ ration

Historical Origin a ~ i d Ma~lifestatio~l of "Elitism" in Pakistani Bureaucracy

The System of Public Adnzinistration in British India

P akistan's higher bureaucracy has its structural origin in the system of public administration which evolved

in the Indian subcontinent under British rule since the latter half of the eighteenth century. The basic objectives of the British Indian system of public administration, which incorporated some important features of the Mughal administrative system1, and which remained unchanged until the partitioning of India and creation of Pakistan in 1947, lay in the maintenance of law and order, revenue collection, dispensation of justice and the provision of basic services. With the passage of time, the system was revised several times in accordance with the expanding gamut of functions and responsibilities stemming from the consolidation of British hegemony in India, and to satisfy Indian demands for a greater participatory role in the system of public administration

* Aurangzeb Z. Khan holds a Diploma in Bitsiness Administration from the University of Trier, Germany, and a Master's Degree in Public Administration from the Gerinan Post-Graduate School of Ad~ninistrative Sciences Speyer, Germany.

without relinquishing British supremacy over it. Important evolutionary milestones were:

the growing influence of the British East India Company, which was set up as a mercantile organisation in India during Mughal rule early in the seventeenth century. In 1765, the company acquired the right to collect and administer revenue in Bengal. This was followed shortly thereafter by the company' assumption of the administration of the civil and criminal justice system. After 1786, the company's administrative strucure was organised into four main branches: commercial, judicial, public or general and revenue. The East India Company Act 1793 stipulated that covenanted semants, that is, (higher) employees who signed agreements (covenants) describing the terms and conditions of their service with the company's directors, were entitled to exclusively fill important positions based on certain considerations such as seniority, though in practice, because of the company's rapid functional expansion and shortage of covenanted servants, ~r~zcove~rarrterl semants, that is, those employees who did not sign agreements with the company, also staffed important or covenanted positions.

- the creation of the Statutory Civil Service in 1879 as a response to increasing Indian pressure for more representation in the British-dominated covenanted civil service. Dissolved in 1887 on the grounds that it had failed to live up to its expectations, the service provided for the reservation of one-sixth of posts in the covenanted civil service for Indians nominated by the Governor-General, Secretary of State and lbcal governments.

2 0 A Historical Review of Elitism in the Federal Bureaucracy of Pakistan and a Critical Analysis of Pakistan's Higher Public Administration

National Development and Security, Vol. X, No 3, Spring 2 0 0 2 2 7

- the implementation of the recommendations of the

Aitchison Commission, which was formed in 1886 to look into the question of administrative reforms in India. Consequently, the covenanted and uncovenanted civil services were abolished and an Imperial Civil Service (which subsequently came to be'known as the Indian Civil Service) was created at the apex of a new service structure which also comprised a Provincial Civil Service and, for lower administrative posts, a Subordinate Civil Service. Recruitment to the prestigious imperial civil service was open to British and Indian nationals on the basis of a competitive examination held exclusively in England, its members were entitled to a higher salary and served in key positions of administrative authority and responsibility throughout India. However, for various reasons, notably the quest to consolidate British hegemony over India and safeguard its imperial interests, the service was staffed predon~inately by British officers and remained under the control of the powerful British Secretary-of-State until partition. The provincial and subordinate civil services were intended to increase Indian administrative representation. There was a provision for inter-service mobility: one-sixth of the imperial civil service posts were reserved for members of the provincial civil service, who remained in their own cadre, while members of the subordinate civil service were, on merit, eligible for promotion to the lower tiers of the provincial civil service. Another consequence of the reforms introduced in the wake of the commission's report was the creation of imperial and provincial branches in the forest and public works departments.

- the reforms introduced on the recommendations of the Islington Commission, which was formed in 1912. The Commission endorsed the division of departments into imperial and provincial branches, albeit on a more restricted scale, the respective domination of imperial and provincial branches by British and Indian officials, and the deputation of imperial civil servants to key positions in other departments. The quota of officers from the provincial civil service in the imperial civil service was raised to 25'%1. Two classes, initially confined to the education department, survey of India and the geological survey department, were introduced to distinguish civil servants at the administrative/executive level (Class I) from those at the operational level (Class 11).

- the reforms introduced in 1924 in the wake of the Lee Commission's report were the last major administrative reorganisation effort prior to partition. Consequently, the service structure was divided into three categories: (1) All-India Services comprising, inter alia, the Imperial Civil Service and Indian Police Service, whose members, their recruitment and terms and conditions of service were under the direct control of the Secretary-of-State (2) All-India Services in the "transferred" field, namely, those departments placed under provincial control' and (3) Central Departments, some of which were controlled by the Secretary-of-State, while others were either under joint imperiavprovincial government control or solely provincial government control.

The Civil Service of Pakistan: The Corps drElite of the Bureaucracy

On 14 August 1947, almost two centuries of British hegemony in India came to an end. The concurrent'

24 A Historical Review of Elitism in the Federal Bureaucracy of Pakistan and a Critical Analysis of Pakistan's Higher Public Administration


adopted this system with modifications. Consequently, access to the CSP (and the other services) depended primarily on a competitive examination whose selection criteria were based, apart from the mandatory requirement of a university education, on the candidates' examination performance and a provincial/regional quota system. In this context, the CSP1s elitism was highly evident because:

(1) a substantial proportion of university graduates applied for the examination, reflecting the prestige and glamour of government service (especially the CSP) at the time,

(2) the number of vacancies in the CSP was extremely low in relation to the number of candidates aspiring to join the higher bureaucracy, and

(3) since 1948 the CSP was the first choice of service for most candidates: in 1961 and 1962,78'%) and 80"h of candidates appearing in the competitive examination opted for the CSP; only 14'%1(1961) and 15'%, (1962) opted for the foreign service and approximately 3'%, in each year for the third preferred category, the police serviceb.

Table 1: Recruitment Statistics of the Civil Service of Pakistan 1950 - 1964

Suul-zc: Ralph Braibanti, Tlrr Hislrcr Rirrrarrcracy of Pakistnrr, in: Jalneelur Rehrnan Khan (ed.): E71olrrtiorr of Pakistarr's Adrrrirristrnti7~~ Systerrl. The Collected Papers of Ralph Braibanti, Pakistan Public Administration Research Centre, O&M Division, Government of Pakistan, lslarnabad, 1987, p. 224.

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

TOTAL >

YEAR

1950

1951

1952

1953

Training: The training imparted to CSP recruits highlighted the cadre's privileged status perhaps even more so than the recruitment process. At the center of the training programme was the legendary Civil Service Academy, which catered exclusively for the training of the housing of all CSP probationers, and in whose imposing imperial architectural structure the recruits were housed and trained over a period of several months.

University Degrees Granted

2,287

2,867

3,158

3,405

Number of Applicants

722

532

645

555

8,991

10,297

15,455

17,944

22,995

119,605

Successful Applicants

125

68

84

63

571

894

1,135

1,639

1,708

13,817

Inducted into CSP

11

17

13

25

327

118

303

266

253

2,560

23

27

28

39

NA

31 5



The Academy's unique programme and its imperial ambience intended to convey the message to probationers that the CSP constituted the corps d'elite of Pakistan's system of public administration. According to Professor Braibanti: "The CSP has been able to maintain its elitist quality probably more as a result of training at the Civil Service Academy than as a consequence of any other single factor or group of factors"'. Mandatory courses included horse-riding because, inter alia, it symbolised an "expensive luxury and it certainly connoted identification with feudal aristocracy and the leisured land-owning classes ... developed command presence and poiseUR. The Academy's programme included activities which have been described as being "more conducive to the development of attributes of the English gentleman than to the train-ing of technically- competent decision makers"'? probationers automatically acquired membership of the Lahore Gymkhana (an elite club whose membership during the British Raj was restricted to British officers) and were required to participate in weekly mess nights at the Academy in which the wearing of formal attire was compulsory and invited guests, confined to CSP members and high- ranking government and military officials, were permitted only with the consent of the Academy's director. The training programme was, moreover, very rigorous and disciplined in its outlook and structured in a manner which gave probationers little time to venture beyond the Academy's confines or mentally preoccupy themselves with political and social issues10. On completion of the training programme, but prior to formal induction in the CSP, probationers were sent overseas for a one-year non-degree training programme. The first batch (1949) of probationers received training in

Australia, subsequent batches (until 1960) were sent to the elite British universities Oxford or Cambridgel1.

Salaries: Another very visible manifestation of the CSP's priviliged status was the comparatively higher salary its members were entitled to. Professor Braibanti noted that a CSP probationer with a bachelor's degree received a monthly emolument of 350 Rupees while an agriculturalist with a bachelor's degree received only 200 Rupeesl2. Moreover, CSP members had superior promotional prospects. The salary and promotional disparity proved a highly vexatious issue which fostered immense resentment towards the CSP from other services and, in particular, by officials serving in technical fields. Moreover, it signalled the traditional preference accorded to the (CSP) generalists in the British-Indian system of public administration viz-a-viz the specialists with technical backgrounds, which was based on the dubious premise that generalists make more efficient administrators and coordinators than technocrats.

Postings: The most coveted privilege accorded to the CSP cadre was, in keeping with the example set by the Indian Civil Service, the reservation of higher administrative posts at the federal and provincial level for its incumbents. The Corrzposition and Cadre Rules 2954, stipulated that two-thirds of the federal and provincial posts of Joint- Secretary and above were reserved for CSP members, in effect, virtually monopolising administrative power and control by the CSP. As it turned out, practically all the posts of Secretary - the bureaucracy's highest - came to be occupied by the CSP, especially by former Indian Civil Service (ICS) members:


Table 2: Secretary ships in the Central and Proviilcial Governments in 1964

2A: The Central Goverilnlent

National Development and Security, Vol. X , No 3, Spring 2002 2 9

2B: West Pakistan Province

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

President's Secretariat Secretary to the President Cabinet Division Establishnie~it Division Eco~ioniic Affairs Division Planning Division Scientific and Technological Research Divisio~i States and Frontier Regions Division Ministries Agriculture and Works

Food and Agriculture Division Rehabilitation and Works Division

Coninierce Coniniunicatio~is Defence Education Finance Foreign Affairs Health, Labour, Social Welfare

Health Division Labour and Social Welfare Division

Honie and Kashniir Affairs Home Affairs Division Kashmir Affairs Division

Industries and Natural Resources Industries Division

Natural Resources Division lnforniatio~i and Broadcasting Law and Parliamentary Affairs

Law Division Parliamentary Affairs Division

ICS-CSP ICS-CSP ICS-CSP ICS-CSP CSP

CSP

ICS-CSP ICS-CSP CSP ICS-CSP ICS-CSP ICS-CSP ICS-CSP ICS-CSP ICS-CSP ICS-CSP

ICS-CSP CSP CSP ICS-CSP CSP

ICS-CSP

WEST PAKISTAN

Governor's Secretariat

Personal Secretary

Chief Secretary

Additional Chief Secretary

Planning and Development

Services and General Administration

Departnients

Agriculture

Auqaf

Basic Democracies - Local Government

Communications - Works

Cooperatives, Labour, Welfare

Education

Finance

Food

Health

Home Affairs

Inforiliation

Industries, Commerce

Irrigation, Power

L.aw

Revenue, Rehabilitation

'rranspol-t

ICS-CSP ICS-CSP ICS-CSP

CSP

ICS-CSP

CSP

CSP

CSP

CSP

CSP

CSP CSP CSP CSP

CSP

CSP

3 0 A Historical Review of Elitism in the Federal Bureaucracy of Pakistan and a Critical Analysis of Pakistan's Higher Public Adn~inistration

National Developnlent and Security, Vol. X . No 3 , Spring 2002 3 1

2C: East Pakistan Province

SOLI~CC: ICalph Braibanti, l h l lliglri~r. Brrr.i,tjrri-rac!l qf Prtliistirrl, in: Jameelur Rehman Khan (ed.): I'lrcl Fz~i~lrrtiorr qf Pi1liisti11l's Arfrrrirristratrz~c~ .C;!/sti~rrr. l'he Collected Payers of Ralph Braibanti, Pakistan Public Administratioil Research Centre, OCLM Division, Government of Pakistan, lslamabad, 1987. pp. 217-218.

EAST PAKISTAN

Governor's Secretariat

Personal Secretary Chief Secretary Additional Chief Secretary Planning Services and General Administration

Departments

Agriculture

Basic Democracies - Local Government Education

Communications and Transport *

Finance Food Health, Labour, Social Welfare Home Affairs Information Law

Revenue Works, Power, Irrigation

The CSP's domination of higher federal and provincial administration was impressive and its awesome power and influence was not confined solely to administrative matters. In the context of the Secretary- Minister working relationship, it was often the Secretary not the Minister, who called the shots and influenced policy-making processes. This paradoxical situation was the consequence of Pakistan's chronic political volatility, which resulted in a constaiitlv changing cycle of cabinets and ministers who did not stay in their job long enough to fully exercise their authority, and moreover, lacked the requisite expertise because political expediency was the decisive factor in their appointment17 Information was also a crucial variable in the power equation given that the Secretaries "possessed considerable administrative experience, were connected through service affiliations to a wide network of admiilistrators aiid institutions, and conlnianded a high degree of institutional loyalty from subordinates ... more in~portantly, Secretaries controlled access to ilifornlation ... quite literally, they controlled the extent and quality of iiifornlation available to Ministers"l4. During General M o h a i ~ i l ~ ~ a d Ayub Khan's dictatorship (1958-69), which was considered the CSP's heyday, and which included a 44-month period of martial law in which there were no provincial ministers and only a few ministers in the central government, secretaries de facto headed most niinistriesls.

CS P ICS-CSI-' ICS-CSP ICS-CSP CS P

CSP CSP CSP CS P

CS P

The CSP's immense influence in the ininistries were reinforced by its control over district administration. This too was a legacy inherited froni the Indian Civil Service and was the initial posting for most recruits inducted into the CSP after their training. After gaining experience aiid with time, CSP members becailie Deputy Commissioners (administrative heads of districts), and

34 A Historical Review of Elitism in the Federal Bureaucracy of Pakistan and a Critical Analysis of Pakistan k Higher Public Administration

Weeks after the East Pakistan debacle which culminated in Pakistan's disnienibernient in 1971, the socialist-oriented Pakistan IJeoples Party (IJPIJ), led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was voted into power. Bhutto appointed an administrative reforni committee to propose reforms to the discredited bureaucracy and, in his televised address to the nation on 20 August 1973, he announced a package of sweeping administrative refornis. The salient features of Rhutto's reforms, iniplemented in stages over a period of several ~nontlis, were:

+ abolition of the <'SIJ and reorganisation of the encadred services into fifteen ~iewly-constituted occirpmtionnl grorrps span~iing two categories:

All- Pakistan Unified Grade:

* District Management Former CSP officials were assigned to these three * Secretariat occupational groups * Tribal Affairs which a large nunlber on non - CSP recruits were also inducted

Federal U ~ ~ i f i e d Grade:

* Accounts ;k Commerce alid 'I'rade :b Customs and Ikcise :I: Economists and Planners * Foreign Affairs * Income Tax

* Inforniatio~i :k Military Lands and Calitolllllellt :k Office Managenieii t :I: Police

National Development and Security Vol. X . No 3. Spring 2002 35

:r Postal * Railways

+ adoption of a unified salary system consisting of 23 grades (BPS 1-23)'7 in place of the complex system of approxiniately hO0 pay levels spanning the ministries, divisions and their departments

+ resciiidi~ient of the practice of reserving high administrative posts, inter alia, for the CSIJ

+ initiation of a lateral recruitiiicnt programn~e'~ to give q~lalificd and experienced individuals froni the public- as well as private sector the opyort~~ii i ty 10

serve in the higher civil ser\rice

+ increased horizontal (between ministries, their divisions or affiliated organisations) iliobility and vertical (within ministries, their divisions or affiliated organisations) mobility, inter alia, to enable civil servants with a tecliiiical background to serve in high adniinistrative posts

+ enactment of new civil service legislation (Civil Servants Act 1973, Civil Servants (Appointment, Proniotion and Transfer) Rules 1973, Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1973, Service Tribunal Act 1973) and abolition of job safeguards for senior civil servants

+ d i s p e ~ i s a t i o ~ ~ of the I a e r a l Public Service ( 'o~n~iiission's consultative function in matters collccrning promotion, transfer and discipliiie of civil servants.

+ introductioll of a common training programme each year for recruits to all newly-constituted occupational groups

36 A Historical Review of Elitism in the Federal Buteaucracy of Pakistan and a Critical Analysis of Pakistan's Higher Public Administration

National Development and Security, Vol X. No 3. Sprfng 2002 37

+ abolition of the use of service labels by civil servants

Subsequently, the reform prograniliie was criticised, inter alia, because":

6 the groups in the All-Pakistan Uiiified Grade had coniparatively more opportunities for horizolital n~obil i tv as well as mobility between tlie federal and provincial governments than the groups in tlie IJederal Unified Grade

6 increased resort to horizontal niobilitv coiiflicted with tlie objective of proiiioting specialist expertise aiid capabilities in the civil service, thus benefitilig gtxieralists iiiore than technocrats who were its intended prime beneficiaries

6 no occupational groups were formed for the benefit of civil servants with specialist backgrounds, for example in engineering, medicine and teaching

6 a number of appointments under the lateral recruitment programme were made o n tlie basis of political patronage and PPP party affiliation, oftcll resulting in the induction of inadequately qualified or inept individuals in the higher bureaucracy and in public-sector enterprises

6 the abolitioii of job safeguards for senior bureaucrats seriously undern~ined morale and efficiency.

Ucspite its shortcomings, Bhutto's refor111 prograliinie sylliboliscd a courageous effort to render an anachronistic federal bureaucracy more receptive to the circui~~stances and expectations prevaililig at the time. I t elimiiiated tlie elite status enjoyed by a sniall group of bureaucrats for a quarter of a celitury, b ~ l t did 110t

c l~a l le~ige the existence of elitism in the bureaucracy per se nor did it alter the basic system of public administra-

tion I'akistan inherited from Great Britain. After Bhutto's reforms, elitism, in this author's opinion, simpl) acquired a new and broaaer scope and subsequently epitoniised all "officer-level" (BPS 17 - 23) posts3" which, viewed collectively, exhibit several common group characteristics in terms of concentration of adniinistrative power and control, recruitment, training aiid prestige, which set them apart from the rest of Pakistan's ~ ~ ~ a ~ i ~ n ~ o t h bureaucratic system.

Problein Areas of the Higher Bur-'eaucracv in Pakistan

Politicisation

The inter-relationship between bureaucracy and political elites in developing states has for years been the focus of considerable research interest. In the Pakistani context, some scliolars argue that Pakistan's assertative bureaucracy has significantly iiiipeded the nation's political development^. The relationship between Pakistan's higher bureaucracy aiid its political elites over the past 54 years has witnessed considerable alterations and can be analysed in five distinct phases:

1947 - 72: The political dimelision of Pakistan's CSP dominated higher bureaucracy after independence was discussed earlier. The bureaucracy's political clout reached its zenith under President Ayub Khan, but after his abrupt exit from the political arena following widespread and violent civil unrest in 1969, its influence eroded perceptibly as Ayub Khan's successor, General Mohanii~iad Yahya Khan (1969-72), apparently seemed less inclined towards sharing his niili'ary regime's political power with civilian bureaucrats, notably tlie CSP".

1972 - 77: Bhutto's rise to power in January 1972 marlced the beginning of a new era for Pakistan's higher


bureaucraci. His civil service reforin progranlme (1973) shattered the bureaucracy's illusion of untouchability, giving the political elites for the first time in Pakistan'.i history a clear edge in their long-running tussle of strength with the bureaucracy. Fearful of jeopardisiilg their career prospects following the withdrawal of job safeguards and the introduction of Bhutto's lateral recruitment programme, higher bureaucrats tended to adopt a low-profile "wait and see" approach. One notable "gain" for the higher bureaucracy was Bhutto's nationalisation programme which created new opportunities for senior civil servants to exercise and consolidate their influence and power in the economic sphere.

1977 - 88: In July 1977, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was ousted by General Mohalnmad Zia-ul-Haq in a military coup. Under Zia-ul-Haq's dictatorship, the higher bureaucracy, which was shaken to its roots by the administrative reforms of 1973, experienced a renaissance of sorts. On assuming power, Zia-ul-Haq did not emulate his predecessors' practice of screening and purging the bureaucracy and accorded senior civil servants relatively long tenures in office, as, for the first time in Pakistan's history, the secretaries of such key ministries as defence, establishment, finance, information and the interior, served each for minimum five years without change". He reportedly had a better relationship with the senior bureaucracy and granted senior bureaucrats frequent service extensions. Zia-ul-Haq made the bureaucracy a "junior ruling partner of the army"34 and initiated measures to partially revoke Bhutto's civil service reforms, more notable manifestations of which were the retirement and transfer of some lateral recruits". However, Zia-ul-Haq's rosy relationship with the higher bureaucracy soured after democracy was restored in

National Development and Security, Vol. X No 3, Spring 2002 39

Pakistan, albeit under Zia-ul-Haqls guiding hand, under Mohammad Khan Junejo (1985-88). Zia-ul-Haq was irritated that senior bureaucrats were ignoring him and closely aligning theniselves with Juilejo and consequently, when Zia-ul-I-iaq disn~issed Junejo's goverilnlent in May 1988, his behaviour towards the senior bureaucracy in his last renlaining months in office was less than cordial".

1988 - 1999: General Zia-ul-Haqfs death in a plane crash in August 1988 ushered in a new era of civilian rule in Pakistan. This era was characterised, Liter alia, by a marked deterioration in the country's political culture and the erosion of its institutional structures which in turn had adverse repercussions for all strata of the bureaucracy. At no point in tinle since independence was the disparity between the interests and the actions of Pakistan's political elites on the one hand, and the interests and expcctatiol~s of the electorate from which they derived thcir inalldatc to govern the country on the other, so cvidcilt. 12asically, Pakistan's post-1988 "dei~~ocratisation proccss" proved to bc a masquerade by its deeply-cntrrnchcd, powcrful and ubiquitous feudal elites scekiog, in their que5t for self-preservation and self-enrichment, to institutionalist and consolidate their influence through the deil~ocratic instrument of the ballot, frequently by applying tlicir immense econonlic leverage and/or a plethora of socio-cultural factors such as allciellt loyalties, personal charisma, established custon~s and traditions, and on occasions, the threat or applicatioll of physical coercioll to counter dissent'7. The feudal orientation of Paltistan's political elites, which are reportedly donlinated by around 300 influential fal~lilies7" obstructed (and to this day continue to obstruct) the process of national ecol~o~llic l l~~>d~rn i sa t io l l , social transforn~atioll and the creation of

42 A Historical Review of Elitism ~n the Federal Bureaucracy of Pakistan and a Critical Analysis of Pakistan's Higher Public Administration

National Development and Security. Vol. X; No 3, Sprtng 2002 43

hardly have come at a worse time for the higher bureaucracy.

+ sharply conflicted with the principles of accountability and good governance because bureaucrats, in their endeavour to safeguard their positions were practically compelled to follow the illicit biddings of their corrupt political mentors accustomed to misusing their political influence for self-enrichnlent and for giving and receiving ~~nwar ran ted favours and privileges. Moreover, political patronage tempted bureaucrats to misuse their positions for their own personal gain too as they perceived themselves 'protected" from scrutiny and accountability. The volatility of Paltistani politics served as a further incentive for bureaucrats to indulge in illicit wealth accumulation because a change in government may have heralded their removal from their positions and with it the advantages and privileges they derived therefrom".

Since 1999: General Pervez Musharraf's assumption of power in October 1999, and his regime's efforts to promote accountability and tackle corruptio~l and maladmil~istration through the newly-created National Accoulltability Bureau, ushered ill a new era in the bureaucracy/yolitical elites nexus. Some con~illendable remedial ineasurcs to correct past shortcon~i~lgs have since been implemented in this regard, for instance, the initiation of hundreds of investigations into the misconduct of higher bureaucrats and the adoption of a ilunlber of disciplinary measures. Nevertheless, bureaucratic maladnlinistratiol~ still prevails though the politicisation dinlension has. at least for the time being lost the relevance i t had in the higher bureaucracy prior to 1999.

'The scourge of corruptions4 is an acute and pervasive problem in Pakistan's higher bureaucracy, and has been observed and commented upoll since independence. The first large-scale opportunity for bureaucratic corruption in Pakistan became evident in the early post- independence years when the properties of Hindu and Sikh evacuees were distributed anlongst Muslin1 refugees streaming in from India55. From the late 1 9 5 0 ~ ~ President Ayub Khan's e~ltrustnient to the bureaucracy of the task of spearheading the nation's economic growth and developn~ent through extensive planning, regulation and public-sector involven~ent, created unprecedented opportunities for large-scale corruption and nepotisms6. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's nationalisation of heavy industries (food processing, manufacturing, energy, mineral resources) and the banking and insurance sector in 1973, and the entrustment of their management to senior bureaucrats, proved yet another opportunity for corrupt civil servants. The economic liberalisation and deregu- lation programmes being implemented since 1990 (particularly the disinvestment and privatisation of state- owned enterprises and efforts to attract foreign investment to Pakistan) and the social action prograinnles presently being inlplemented in Pakistan at the behest of its major il~ternational creditors (Asian Development Bank, Tnterllatiollal Monetary Fund, World Bank) and donor states gave bureaucrats yet another golden opportunity for illicit self-enrichment.

Among the myriad corruption-facilitating factors in Pakistan's higher bureaucracy, four considerations merit special attention:

+ rising inflation. The increase in the cost of living index has been especially evident in the 1990s and is

$4 A ffistorical Review of Elitism in the Federal Burea~icracy of Pakistan and a Critical Analys is of Pakistan's Higller Ptiblic Admmistration

National Development art(/ Sectirity V o l X . No 3. Spr~ny 2002 45

attributable pri~llarily to the blunderous eco~lo~llic policies of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, which brought Pakistan near to the brink of an econo~nic collapse. Because of the erosion of real income which inevitably accompanies it, inflation is an open invitation to bureaucrats to indulge in corruption, and coinpels those who normally would resist the temptation of co r rup t io~~ to think twice. I'hough the federal governnlent periodically revises the salary scales upwards to "con~pensate" for increases in the cost of living, this increase usually constitutes a fraction of the cunlulative rise in the inflation rate. Moreover, in Paltistan the official inflation rate usually tends to underestimate the actual inflatio~i rate which may be substantially higher5'. Given the failure of successive governments to evolve a monetary incentive system adequate to encourage conscientious bureaucrats to "stay clean", it is understandable though certainly reprehensible that buriaucrats facing rising food prices, utility bills, school fees for their children, and so forth, venture into the dark zone of corruption.

failure by successive governments and the judiciary to vigorously pursue anti-corruption measures. l'aradoxically, an elaborate anti-corruption legal and institutional f ran~ework exist in Pal<istan. For installcc, the Co-c~crrrrrrerrt S~~r-z~icc?,s (E/ / ic i~~rrc~y rlriri I~isciplirrr) Rrrlrs 1973 empowers the government, inter alia, to demote, retire or dismiss corrupt b u r e a ~ c r a t s ~ ~ , the Prrz)rrltiorl of Corrlrlttiorr Ac t 1947 allows for fines and imprisonment terms ranging from three to seven years for corrupt public servants5' and the Paliistrzrr Peril11 Corlc 18h0 also

contains several anti-corruption clauses6". 'J'he Federal Investigation Agency, Pakistan's apex law enforcement body, has extensive powers to investigate corruption in the federal bureaucracy, and federal as well as provi~~cial anti-corruption con~n~i t tees are operative. Furthermore, the institution of Federal Ombudsman was created in 1983 to investigate and deal wit11 complaints of adnlinistrative maladministration6'. l-lowet~er, tliescl legal and institutional instruments have yet to be applied to the maxii-num extent, in letter and spirit, impartially, speedily and across-the board, to an extent where they could effectively counter the u b i q ~ ~ i t o u s menace in the Pakistani bureaucracy. Periodic anti-corruption measures adopted in the past, such as the introduction of "scree~~ing committees"(~~ by Ayub I<han (1959-60), "p~rges"6~ by Yahya Khan (1969) and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972). the airing of a list of 89 corrupt federal and provi~lcial officials on national television(" by the Sllarif governn~cnt (1997) and, more recently, the investigations of 490 bureaucrats by the National Accou~ltability Bureau (1999-2001) were, by and large, selective and synlbolic steps which are no substitute for a systematic and sustained policy aillled at eradicating cor1.u p t i o ~ ~ and punisllillg thc corrupt in Pakistan's higher bureaucracy.

the public's ignorance of their rights and nlcans of grievance redl-essal, c o ~ ~ p l c d wit11 L I S L I ~ ~ ~ Y C O I I I ~ ~ ~ X

intra-drpartmental investigative procedures, delays in filing and processing cascs as well as widespread judicial corruption, especially at the lower lcvcls of the courts, and the difficulty in proving allegations of adlllinistrative improbity.

48 A H~stoncal Review of Elitism in the Federal Burea~lcracy of Pakistan and a Critical Analysls of Pakistan's Higher Public Administration

nionuiiiental challenges and problems of economic u~iderdevelopnle~it and social deprivation have bcconie paraniount national priorities; at tlie sanie time, growing probleni complexities, rapid tecliiiological advaiicetiients as well as chronic and increasi~igly acute resource constraints liave rendered the efficient pursuit of these tasks imperative. In developing states, the higher bureaucracy has an instr~~mental role to play in facilitating national dcvcloprnent processes. l'akistan's unsatisf.ictory progress in the develop~iiental field - cpitoniised, for instance, by its near-bottom position in the United Nations cou~itry table of human developn~ent indices - shows that its higher bureaucracy is incapable of facing these n~ultifarious developmental challenges. A perfcr~na~ice-oriented reform of tlie higher bureaucracy is needed but modifications iiitroduced in the adnlinistrative frameworlc with tlie passage of time to bring i t in line with national priorities liave been largely incon.;cquentia1":.

Mcrrfal i ty: Attitudiiial sliortcomings are a serious weak~iess in Pakistan's systeiii of public adniinistr a t' ion. 'l'eam spirit and team work, prerequisites for effectively tackling adniinistrative tasks, especially those tasks of a highly coniplex nature which entail a broad divisioii of responsibilities, and coordiiiatio~i both within aiid betwec~i ministries, divisions, departillelits aiid non- public-sector organisations, is the exception rather than the rule in Pakistan's higher bureaucracy where the gctieral working environment is, in large measure, cliaracterised by a lack of interest for quality work, apathy, avoidance of initiative atid risk-talting and an o\,erall laid-back atti tude. ( 'onscq~~en tly, prograninics and projects tend to be planned and irnplemcntcd sloppily and belatedly, u s ~ ~ a l l y with enornlous cost o\erru~is. l ~ ~ ~ r t l i e r ~ i ~ o r e , Pakistani society traditionally

National Development and Security, Vol. X, No 3, Spring 2 0 0 2 49

espouses unquestioning submissiveness to figures of authority a manifestation of the iniquitous feudal social order and a trait profoundly ingrained on the native psyche. This socio-psychological mind set in turn fosters a culture of sycophancy in which, viewed in the bureaucratic context, subordinates strive to safeguard their positions by refraining from taking the initiative or by criticising or contradicting their superiors' strategies and tactics. Consequently, rationality is surrendered to personality, centering on the bureaucratic bosses, who are flattered by their subordinates into a false sense of infallibility ("Sir-you-know-it-better"), and the flow of information up the hierarchical rungs is impeded, thus compromising the quality of administrative management and decision-making.

Eilricutiorz Starzdards: The inexorable deterioration in Pakistan's education system poses potentially serious long-term consequences for the higher bureaucracy, most of whose recruits are drawn froni Pakistani colleges and universities. The Federal Public Service Commission lameiited that: "The standard of school's education, beside higher education, has been deteriorating so rapidly that our serious assertation now is that we just cannot find enough suitable candidates for some government jobs ... candidates with first class Master's Degree in different disciplines lacked even the basic knowledge in their own discipline"6s. The civil service subject examiners also 'bemoan the candidates' poor standards of English, superficial knowledge, lacking originality of thought and the tendency to avoid critical reasoning and indepth study of the subject matter69. The Comniission's observations thereby coincide with those of virtually all experts monitoring Pakistan's education system. Burdened with a literacy rate of approximately 40'%1 low even by the standard of the developing world

50 A Historical Review of Elitism in the Federal Bureaucrat of Pakistan and a Critical Analysis of Pakistan's Higher Public Administration

the Pakistani state's failure to provide universal quality education to its citizens symbolises one of its biggest shortcomings to date. Pakistan's school system is characterised by high drop out rates, inadequate facilities and poor quality teaching relying on antiquated learning methods which emphasise parrot-style cramming of students' minds with mostly irrelevant subject matter while ignoring or discouraging analytical, critical and innovative thought processes. The college and university level - the final stage prior to recruitment to the civil service - is plagued by myriad problems such as student militancy, plagiarism, examination fraud, purchasing or "leaking" of examination papers and answers, the falsification of degree certificates and an apathy towards learning in general - which are frequently the rule rather than the exception. The prospects for an enhancement in the quality of (most) recruits aspiring to join the ranks of Pakistan's higher bureaucracy in the short and most likely medium-term hence appear rather bleak70.

Recruitment Process: The civil service examination itself is characterised by serious inherent flaws. By sustaining a system which overemphasises acquisition of factual, largely trivial knowledge at the expense of critical, analytical and cross-disciplinary thinking, the examination is not fulfilling its crucial roie as a filter of academic talent for the higher bureaucracy.

Many corrupt recruits enter the higher bureaucracy, notably in the district management, custon~s and excise, and police group which offer comparatively more opportunities for illicit wealth accumulation7~. Consequently, the usefulness of the "psychological assessment1' and "viva voce" (components of the civil service examination), and the subsequent common and specialised training programmes for civil service recruits,

National Development and Security, Vol. X , No 3, Spring 2002 51

is questionable given their failure to identify and dis- qualify candidates whose intention of joining the higher bureaucracy is not to serve the public but to nurture corruption and nepotism.

The civil service quota system has undoubtedly facilitated a more proportionate level of representation in the higher bureaucracy for the smaller, economically and educationally disadvantaged provinces and regions than would otherwise have been the case. At the same time, it has some significant drawbacks72. For instance, it inducts candidates with (comparatively) low merit scores who in the absence of the quota would not be recruited to the higher bureaucracy. For example, a candidate from Province P whose overall merit score is 595 may be ineligible for service because that province's quota has been filled by higher-scoring candidates but a candidate from Province B whose overall merit score is 575 would be eligible if the number of vacancies under the quota system exceeds the number of higher-scoring candidates from that province. Obviously such a system is not conducive to enhancing efficiency in the higher bureaucracy. The quota system also discourages prospective candidates from sitting in the examination given the high opportunity costs (time spent and expense incurred on preparing for it instead of searching for, or working in, a more lucrative career job) and the perceived risks involved, namely, the heightened uncertainty over the level of competition stemming from the quota system's application. It promotes a sense of inferiority amongst candidates recruited in preference over better qualified candidates and, concurrently, fosters a feeling of victimisation and resentment amongst rejected candidates. This is inconsistent with the goal of promoting inter-provincial harmony in a country which is being increasingly subjected to


fissiparous tendencies. Furthermore, it unequivocally contravenes the anti-discrimination clauses contained in Articles 25/27 of Pakistan's Constitution (1973)73. The constitution stipulated the quota system's abolition by 1983; in 1985 this deadline was extended by ten years. Since 1993, the system is being applied without legal basis and this was confirmed in March 1997 in a Supreme Court ruling74.

Cortzpetition for Recruits: Since the British Raj era, the popular assumption is that the civil service attracts society's "best and brightest" young minds. This premise may have held true in British India, but not so in contemporary Pakistan. Though it retains much of its traditional prestige, Pakistan's higher bureaucracy now faces stiff competition in its quest to attract the nation's "best and brightest" young minds, attributable in large measure to the diversification of career opportunities for talented graduates. This stems from the quantitative and qualitative growth and structural transformation of the Pakistani economy since 1947 when few manufacturing and service-oriented enterpises existed. Talented graduates can now opt for comparatively better-paying career jobs in thousands of industrial and service- oriented enterprises operative in a large number of fields, including jobs in hundreds of transnational corporations and foreign-managed joint ventures. Since the 1980s there has been a phenomenal increase in the number of non-governmental and international organisations operative in Pakistan, and their salary levels usually considerably exceed those offered by the public-sector. Moreover, there are good opportunities for self-employment in a large number of professional fields such as medicine, engineering and consulting, as well as opportunities for emigration. Initially, emigration from Pakistan was confined primarily to

National Development and Security, Vol. X, No 3 , Spring 2 0 0 2 5 3

unskilled/semi-skilled workers who settled mainly in the United Kingdom and some affluent Middle Eastern states, but recent years have witnessed a substantial increase in the number of emigrating Pakistani professionals75. A large number of Pakistani students enrolled in American and European colleges and universities - an excellent potential source of talent for Pakistan's higher bureaucracy opt to live and work in their guest country on completion of their study programmes.

Concluding Remarks

In concluding, several observations can be made about Pakistan's higher bureaucracy, in its manifestation as the Civil Service of Pakistan prior to the administrative reform programme of 1973, and thereafter as the higher bureaucracy. On a positive note, it was one of the few well-established institutions Pakistan inherited from British India at the time of its independence. It maintained its standards of pro- fessionalism and its traditions for many years after independence and helped steer Pakistan away from anarchy and resisted the emergence of a theocratic Islamic state. On a negative note, it has obstructed the political development process in Pakistan through its interference in the political process and collusion with the country's restive military, served the interests of Pakistan's feudal elite by resisting popular demand for land and social reforms, collaborated with business and industrial elites and caused the concentration of economic power in a few hands, and helped alienate the people of East Pakistan which consequently led to Pakistan's dismemberment. After the restoration of democracy in Pakistan in 1988, it became excessively susceptible to political interference and is an

54 A Historical Review of Elitism in the Federal Bureaucrat y of Pakistan and a Critical Analysis of Pakistan's Higher Public,Administration

increasingly corrupt and inefficient institution, ill- equipped to confront the complex and daunting economic and social challenges facing the country.

It is hard to state what the future holds for Pakistan's higher bureaucracy. President Musharraf's intent to reform Pakistan's administrative system is a laudable initial step which may alleviate the prevailing bureaucratic malaise to some extent. At the same time, it would be unrealistic to expect any dramatic changes in the foreseeable future. What is needed now is a comprehensive and critical rethinking of the whole concept of public administration in Pakistan. In particular, innovation, initiative and performance in the higher bureaucracy must be emphasised and appropriately rewarded, and, at the same time, apathy, sloppiness, incompetence and rigidity should be stiffly sanctioned. Many of the traditional, in our modern time anachronistic administrative regulations, recruitment, promotion and work procedures, salary levels, and so forth must be drastically revised and an all-out effort made to recruit highly talented and well-educated Pakistani graduates, especially those with an international exposure, into the ranks of the higher bureaucracy..

National Development and Security, Vol. X , No 3, Spring 2002 55

Notes and References

1. N.H. Jaffry, Fcdcralisrrz, Political Parties and Derrlocrac!y, in: Shabir Ahnied (ed.): Pakistarz's Political artd Aiirrlirristrative Strlrcturc, Foundation for Research on International Environment, National Development and Security (FRIENDS), Rawalpindi, 1995, pp. 20-21.

2. The lists of transferred services was expanded in 1934 by tlle Ioirlt Corrlrrlittce 011 lndiafl C o r ~ s t i t ~ r t i u ~ ~ a l Reforrrls.

3. Charles H.Kennedy, Blrreatrcrizc~y ir l Pakistarz, Oxford Uiiiversity Press, Karachi, 1987, pp. 31 ff. Professor Kennedy's book contains an excellent and thorough analysis (and extensive bibliographical references) on various aspects of Pakistan's higher bureaucracy, notably the administrative reforms of 1973.

4. The elaboration below is based primarily on the work of Professor Ralph Braibanti who undertook extensive research on Pakistan's higher bureaucracy. His work, published in a series of essays which appeared in the 1950s and 1960s, today still constitutes probably the best available academic material on the subject.

5. Ralph Braibanti, Plrblic B~rrcalrcrac!y and J~rdiciayy iirl

lJukistarz, in: Jameelur Rehniaii Khan (ed.), Ezlulutiott of 1~akis tur~'s Ailrrrirlistrutizic S!ysterrz. Tllc Collected Papers of I<alp/1 Braibarlti, Pakistali Public Administration Research Centre, O&M Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1987, pp. 83 ff. Also see Ralph Braibanti, Tllc Higher H~rrc~zlrcri~c!~ of Pakistarl, in: Jameelur Rehman Khan (ed.), Ez~ollrtiorl of Pakistan's Adrrrirlistratizie S!ystcrrl. Tllc Collccteil Papers of Ralpll Bruiburlti, Pakistan Public Administration Research Centre, O&M Division, Govern~ne~i t of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1987, pp. 206 ff .

6. Ralph Braibanti, Tlzr Hi'y1rr.r Brrrcizrrcrucly qf Pizkistrr~r, (footnote 5), p. 251. Braiba~iti points out that the candidates chosen for the CSP were, with the exception of some who were selected because of the quota system, those who topped the nierit list.


7. Ralph Braibanti, The Hiyller Br~rcurrcrucll of P L I ~ ~ S ~ L ~ I I , (footnote 5), p. 260.

8. Ibid, p. 254. It may be noted though that horse-riding was an important pre-requisite for CSP recruits to carry out their field duties, especially in times of natural calamity such as flooding when, in their capacity as comnlissioners or deputy commissioners, they had to move around to assess physical damage and crop destruction.

9. Charles H. Kennedy, (footnote 3), p. 8.

10. Ralph Braibanti, The Higher Burea~icr~~c!y of Pi~kist i~rr, (footnote 5), p. 253. Braibanti explains this as the result of the Academy to shield probationers from the temptation of improbity and guarantee their effectiveness.

11. Ralph Braibanti, Tlze Higher Brrreaucracy of Pnkis tnrl, (footnote 5), p. 216. By 1965, 68'%~70'70 of the CSP's 457 members were trained in England and a number of them had acquired British degrees.

12. Ralph Braibanti, Tlze Cizjil Scrvice of I-'ukistarr: A T11eoretical Ailalysis, in: Janieelur Rehman Khan (ed.), Evolrrtion of Pakistai1's Adiaiiristratiz~e S!lstcrrr. Tlzc Collected Papers of Ralpll Braibailti, Pakistan Public Administration Research Centre, O&M Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1987, p. 32.

13. Charles H. Kennedy, (footnote 3), p. 12. Also see Ralph Braibanti, The Higher Blrrealrcracy of Pakistail, (footnote 5), pp. 297 ff. Braibanti asserts that "Secretaries to ministries traditionally had a status rivalling if not exceeding that of ministers to whom they were nominally subordinate. This was a consequence of the fact that in imperial days Secretaries were British ICS officers and Ministers were Indian politicians. This relationship has not con~pletely changed, although the ethnic and imperial differentials have been supplanted by other factors".

14. Charles H. Kennedy, (footnote 3), pp. 12-13. 15. Ralph Braibanti, Tlfc Higher Brrrcrrricrac!l of l-'nklstlrrr,

(footnote 5), pp. 300 ff.

16. For a detailed review of district administration in Pakistan see S.K. Mahmud, Ijistrict Adrniiristri~tioa, in: Jameelr~r Rehman Khan (ed.), Goz~crrrrrrcrrt crrrd


.4drr1irristrntiorr i r r I'akistnn, Pakistan Public Adniinistration Research Centre, OLLM Division, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Pakistail, Islamabad, 1987, pp. 201-251.

17. The convergence of administrative and judiciary power at the level of the Assistant Con~niissioner and Deputy Commissioner is (rightly) a highly controversial issue in Pakistan and has been debated for decades. In recent years a broad conselisus that administration and judiciary should be completely separated has emerged and in January 1996 the Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled in January 1996 that the executive and judiciary must be separated. Consequently, the powers of assistant commissioners and deputy comn~issioners were curbed.

18. Ralph Braibanti, Tlrc Hiylrcr Brrrci~rrcracy of Pakistarr, (footnote 5), p. 264.


20. Jayanta Kuniar Ray, I'olitici~l L)i~zli~loprrrcrrt iir Pnliistarr, 1947-71: Rolc of B ~ ~ r e ~ r r c r r ~ c , in: Verinder Grover/Ranyana Arora (eds.): l ' o t i c S!lstcrir 1 1 1

l'nkisturr. Rolc of Militirr~l l)ictr~torslrip iri Pnkistuii I'olitirs (Vol. 5), Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1995, p p 307-335.

21. Charles H. Kennedy, (footnote 3), pp. 75 - 78.

22. Ralph Braibanti, Tlrc Higlrcr Brrrcrzrrcrac!l of Pakistnir, (footnote 5), p. 290.

23. Charles H. Kennedy, (footnote 3), pp. 62 - 63.

24. For a co~icise review see Agha Iftikhar Hussain, Goz~crrrrrrcrrt llrrd Adrrrirrisfrrztiorr i l l Pnkistur~, in.: Amara Kaksasataya/Heinricli Siedentopf (eds.): Asinrr Ciz~il Scrz~iccs. Dcz~cloprncrrts nrrd Trcrrris, Asian Pacific Developniellt and Adniinistration Centre, Kuala Lun~pur, and Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, Germany, Sillgapore National Printers (Pvt.) Ltd, 1980, pp. 338-344.

25. Mohalllnlad Waseeni, politics rIrr[l tlrc Stntc i l l I'al,is:nrr, Progressive Publishers, Lahore -1989, p. 179 fl'. l":dsee~il states that olily those reforni proposa!~ e ~ l l a ~ a t i n g fro111 within the bureaucracy were seriouslv co~:sidered. The



most important and widely-discussed reform measure was the introduction of the Section Officers scheme in 1959 which was basically intended to enhance administrative efficiency. The Section Officers replaced the posts of Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretaries.


27. BPS 1 - 16 are "non-officer" posts and comprise a very large, diversified group of public servants from Gardeners, Peons, Sweepers and Watchmen at the lowest hierarchical rung (BPS 1) to Superintendents (BPS 16). The posts correspond to the pre-1973 Classes 11, 111 and IV. The higher "officer" administrative posts (the pre- 1973 Class I) are: Section Officer (BPS 17, 18), Deputy Secretary (BPS 19), Joint Secretary (BPS 20), Additional Secretary (BPS 21) and Secretary (BPS 22). BPS 23 is reserved for the single, but long vacant post of Secretary General. Officials serving in various technical posts (e.g. researchers, computer progranlmers and system analysts, engineers, lecturers, medical and psychological specialists, technicians) are also allocated higher grades (BPS 16 and above, usually to BPS 20, but rarely higher).

28. For a detailed analysis see I<ennedy, (footnote 3), pp. 129- 152.

29. Syed Karim Arshad, Mo(ierrrisirrg Brrreaucrac!/ i s Pakisturr: Its Role in Polic!~ Irrrplerrrerztatioa, in: Pakistan Journal of Public Administration, Volume XXIII, Number. 2, 1996, pp. 44 ff.; N.H. Jaffry, Rcflectiorls or1 Adrrrirtistratiz~e Refortrrs irr Pakistarl, in: Pakistan Journal of Public Administration, Volume XVIl, Nunibers 1 & 2, December 1978, pp. 10 ff. Also see S.J. Burki, Pakistas rrrrder Blzrrtto, St. Martin's Press, New York 1980 and Wlrite Paper on tire Perforlrrartce of tlre Bllrrtto Regzrize (4 Volunles), Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1979.

30. This refers, above all, to the higher officials serving in the federal ministeries, divisions and departments, the majority of whoni are based in Islamabad, as well senior federal officials deputed to serve the provincial governments.

31. For a brief review of some important research undertaken in thisregard see Syed Karim Arshad, (footnote 29), p. 28 f f .

32. Charles H. Kennedy, (footnote 3), p. 19. Also see Syed Karim Arshad, ibid, p. 49. Arshad states: "Yahya Khan, though inviting a few CSP's to advise him as close associates, looked into the point that his governnient might not be influenced more by the civil bureaucracy than the military. Moreover, during his regime, the CSP's were not considered the only civilian bureaucrats as it now included the men of other services as well. The senior positions of government were not only filled by CSP's but also by the nien from finance, military accounts, taxation, coninierce and industry, which further undermined the supreme status of the CSP".

33. Mushahid Hussain/Aknlal Hussain, Pakistan. Problerrls of Goverizance, Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd, New Delhi, 1993, p. 82.

34. Ibid, p. 82.

35. Charles H. Kennedy, (footnote 3), pp. 97 ff . In 1978, General Zia-ul-Haq appointed the Civil Serz~ice Reforrri Corrrririssioiz to review Bhutto's administrative reforms. The Commission made a number of proposals, mostly conflicting with Bhutto's refornis but, with the notable exception of the lateral recruitment progranlme which Zia-ul-Haq abolished, no significant alterations were made. Zia-ul-Haq did, however, initiate a programme under which a number of military officers were inducted annually into the higher bureaucracy.

36. Mushahid Hussain/Akmal Hussain, (footnote 33), pp. 81- 83. The authors have eloquently summed up the attitude of Pakistan's higher bureaucracy with regard to the prevailing political power constellation: "for the civil bureaucracy, "power" is operationally defined as the ability to grant them promotions, transfers and extensions. In other words, "power" emanates from the source where the file eventually ends up".

37. For a brief but insightful analysis of feudalism's role and influence in Pakistan see Iftikhar M. Malik,. State aird


Civil Society in Pakistarz. Politics of Arltlrority, Ideolog~l and Ethnicity, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1997, pp. 81- 93.

38. N.H. Jaffry, (footnote I), p. 19.

39. One of the greatest shortconlings of Pakistan's deniocratisation process is, without doubt, its failure to include in the power-sharing process traditionally politically disenfranchised but increasingly assertive segments of society, notably the comparatively well- educated, progressive and urbanised middle class, intelligentsia and the rural peasantry which constitute the bulk of Pakistan's 135-million people. There is growing support amongst Pakistan's intelligentsia for increased middle-class participation in the political process. See M.R. Khan, Pakistarr's Political arid Administrutiz~c Strircture, in: Shabir Ahmed (ed.), (footnote I), p. 8.

40. Benazir Bhutto is the daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who, after his ouster from power in July 1977, was imprisoned, tried and convicted in a murder case which many believe was fabricated against him. Despite international appeals for clemency, General Zia-ul-Haq declined to commute Bhutto's death sentence and he was hanged in April 1979.

41. The legendary corrupt exploits of Benazir Bhutto and Asif Ali Zardari were the subject of a BBC television docunientary aired in 1997, as well as the lead story in an edition of TIME magazine.

42. Gul Muhammad Shan, Its Raizuirrd Agaiir, in: The Friday Tinies (Lahore), July 31 - August 6,1998, p.3.

43. Slrarifs Tax Defazrlt Stayed by Corrrt, in: The Friday Times (Lahore), June 19-25, 1998, p.7; Amer Meer, State Bairk Report Reveals Miszrse of Pozuer by Sharifs, in: The Friday Times (Lahore), October 2-8,1998, p. 2.

44. Rclrrrrarr Malik Acczrses Sharifs, in: The Friday Tinies (Lahore), October 2-8,1998, pp. 3 - 6.

45. Gul Muhammad Shan, Shalzbaz Sharif Iiizplicatcrl irr Harlifa's Murder, in: The Friday Times (Lahore), September 25 - October 1,1998, p.5.

National Development and Security, Vol. X , No 3, Spring 2 0 0 2 67

These are evident froni Sharif's crude attempts to usurp power presently vested in the President, other executive organs and the judiciary. See Gul Muhammad Shan, Fascisiir or Dcirrocrac~y, in: The Friday Times (Lahore), 6-12 February 1998, p. 7.

M.S. Jilani, Politicisatiorr of H~~rcnr~cruc~y, in: The News (Islaniabad/Rawalpindi), October 15, 1998. Jilani, himself a retired senior civil servant, has cloquently stated: "the nuiiiber of promotions, transfers ... have no parallel in our history. They are indicative of soniething very serious. They apparently signal a collusio~i between tlie politicians and the bureaucrats; the former have tlie influence and status while tlie latter have power to execute. This is a perfect conibination for scratching each others back - the masses and their welfare can go to hell!"

This "distinction" is reserved for those senior officials froni which the party in power particularly seeks to distance itself. OSD's are assigned 110 administrative responsibilities, but continue to receive their salaries and sonie other benefits.

Mushahid Hussaiil/Aknial Hussain, (footnote 33), p. 85.

M.S.Jilani, (footnote 47).

For instance, bureaucrats have resorted to breaches of confidentiality in order to discredit Benazir Bhutto's governAient as the enibarrassiiig relevations of several "leaked" official conini~inications reveal. See Mushaliid Hussai~l/Aknial Hussain, (footuote 33), p. 83.

This also tends to discourage bureaucrats froni acquiring important specialist kiiowledge and expertise as (1) they may not stay in their positions lolig enough to benefit there froni or (2) are prevented froni doing so by an abrupt transfer order. Furtlierniore, in addition to the expenditures and social uprooting they cause to families, frequent transfers mean that in-coliiing and out-going officials must first faniiliarise theniselves with their new office environnient and form new working relationships. Often, these can prove to be quite tedious affairs.

M.S.Jilani, (footnote 47). Jilani states: "... the governnielit servant niust amass wealth which would sustain him



during bad times. This leads to corruption of the worst kind: you need a house of the standard you have gotten used to, the flow of funds and services beyond your legitimate means to sustain your children studying abroad and afford an annual family trip abroad, have transport worth your status as the "off season" postings may take away your fleet of cars available at "good postings".

54. Corruption in Pakistan has numerous manifestations. In its softer form it symbolises a co~iscious neglect of official duties and responsibilities, such as tardiness, entertainment of private guests in office hours, misuse of official transport for personal use and misuse of fringe benefits such as office telephone, petrol. The harder (and more serious) forms include the placing of friends and relatives in official jobs to the detriment of better qualified persons, acceptance of kick-backs and "comniission" froni businessmeli and industrialists for government contracts, misappropriation and embezzlenient of state funds and illicit accumulation of wealth in exchange for favours to politicians.

55. Inaniul Haq, Brlreazlcrutic Corrllptiorr: I t s Caiises and Remedies, in: Pakistan Administrative Staff College Journal, Volunie XV, Number. 1, January 1978, pp. 11-26. Haq's article provides an excellent analysis of the causes and nianifestations of corruption in the Pakistani bureaucracy and proposes a number of practical remedial measures. Also see Ralph Braibanti, Reflectiorls orr Urlri~rzrlcrr~tic Corrll}?tiorl, in: Janieelur Rehnian Khan (ed.), Ez~olllt iorr of l 'akistr~rl 's Arfrrlirristrutivc Systcrrl. T l lc Collcctcd Papers of Rulplr Bruiburrti, Pakistan Public Adniinistration Research Centre, O&M Division, Governnie~it of Pakistan, lslaniabad, 1987, py. 51-72. Braibanti provides twelve "partial explanations" for corruption and proposes ten "positive measures" to cot~~iter the problem.

56. Jayanta Kuniar Ray, (footnote 20), pp. 325 ff.

57. This is done for political reasons, that is, because the ruling party wants to avoid bad publicity.

58. Atta-ur-Rehman, Marrrlul of C i v i l Services Lrrzcl artd Practice in Przkisturr. Cerrtral rzrld Proz)irrcial. A~rrer~drrrcrrts rzrld Case Lazus Up-To- l la tc, Punjab Law House, Lahore 1998, pp. 257-399. 83 and 84 are especially relevant. They stipulate that the governnie~it can impose one or more penalties (niinor: censure, withholding, promotion, recovery of damage caused through deduction of salary, maior: demotion, cunipulsory retirement, dismissal with or without tile possibility of reemployment in government service) on a civil servant if he, inter alia, is deemed inefficient, has ceased to be efficient, is guilty of niisconduct, is corrupt or call be co~isidered corrupt, for instance, by being in possession of i~naccountabie resources or property disproportio~iate to k ~ i o w ~ i sources of illcome or living beyond his nieans. Also see the Goz~crrlrrrcrlt Scrzjr~rrts (Corrrfrlct) Rlrles 7964, ibid, pp. 562- 577.

59. M.A. Zafar, Mrzrlllul of Arrti-Corrrrptiorr Lazus. Arrrcrldcd Up-To-Dr~tc Wit11 ,411 Exlrarlstioc Corrrrrrcrrtar~y, Punjab Law House, Lahore 1998, pp. 10-110.

60. Ibid, yy. 119 ff. The sections in qrrcstiorr rlrc: 167-165, 217- 278, 403-409,417-420, 365-468,371, 477.4

61. l'r11ii~t1111 1993: ,411 Of f i r i r~ l Hr~rrrfbook, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1996, yp. 38-41. I11 10-year period froni its formation in August 1983 to December 1993, the federal ombudsnian's officc had processed 401,897 complaints, of which 119,684 were thoroughly investigated and 71'%1 found genuine. Excluded from the onibudsnian's jurisdictio~i are ~iiatters co~icerni~ig provincial agencies, foreigu policy, the defence of Pakistan, niilitary law, cases under court yroceedings, and personal grievances and service uiatters of public officials. The ombudsnian's powers are basically reconiniendary, but failure to coniply call lead to the matter's referral to tlic I'resident of Pakistan who can act accordingly. The onibudsnia~i is also enipowercd to award conipensation to victinis of nialadniinistratio~i.

62. C.P. Bhaniblirl/M.B. Nair, Corrrl}?tiorr i l l l'r~kistrzrr Cizlil Scrz~icc: A I I Arrrz l !y t i~r~l Surzjc!/., in: Veri~ider Grover/Ranyana Arora (eds.): ~ 'o l i t i c r7 l S!ystcrrr irr


National Deve/opment and Security, Vol. X , No 3, Spring 2002 65

Paki~tarz. Role of military Dictatorship irr P~kistarr Politics (Vol. 5), Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 286 - 296. A total of 3,549 central and provincial government officials were screened which entailed one of eight consequences ranging from "displeasure" to "dismissal".

63. Charles H. Kennedy, (footnote 3), pp. 77 ff. In December 1969, under the Removal from Services (Special Provision) Regulation (known as Martial Law No. 58) 303 Class I officials were dismissed from service. These included 38 CSP members. Subsequently, under the Removal from Service (Special Provisions) Regulatio~i 1972 (known as Martial Law No. 14 and identical to the above regulation), Bhutto retired 1,303 government officials including 13 CSP melnbers. This came in the wake of the CSP's loss of 188 of its members who had opted for Bangladesh.

64. Hasan Mujtaba, Corrrrptocracy, in: Newsline (Karachi), May 1997, pp. 54-56. Mujtaba's article brings shocking relevations to light about both the extent and interwoveness of politics and bureacratic corruption in Pakistan.

65. Muhammad Akram, Er~orccrrrcrrt o j Law Problrrrrs, in: Pakistan Adniinistration, Volume 33, Number 2, 1996, p. 124.

66. No analyses scientifically exanlining the probleni of inefficiency in ~ a k i s t a n ' s ~ higher bureaucracy were available to this author. However, it is worth noting that a nunlber of articles and coninle~its on this theme appear frequently in the print media.

67. This reluctance to change is criticised by nialiy scholars of tlie subject of public administration in Pakistan. See, for example, Raisuddin K. Sherani, I'roblcrr~s of Gcrrcrlrl Arirrrirristr~~t~or~ ill I'rrliistcrrr, in: Pakistan Journal of Public Adniinistration, Volulile XXII, Number 1, January-June 1987, pp. 58 ff.

68. Federal Public Service Conimission, Annual Report 1996, p. (iv).

69. Ibid, pp. 50 - 56. Interestingly, in its reports dating back to the early 1950's, the Conimission was highly critical of the civil service candidates' intellectual abilities. No plausible explanation has been offered to explain the deterioration in standards. Probably, this can be attri- buted to the decline in the intensity of conipetition subsequent to independence when conipetition was restricted more or less to graduates from Pakistani universities. This would have reduced the number of high quality candidates because Pakistan's system of higher education was considerably snialler than India's.

70. I11 all fairness, it may be added that there are (still) sonie educational institutions of international repute in Pakistan, for exaniple, the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in Lahore and the Institute of Business Adniinistration (IBA) in Karachi. Paucity of f l ~ n d s aside, there are seve'tal niajor obsticles in the way of a speedy, visible improvenient in Pakistan's education system, including a lack of political commitnient and bureaucratic apathy. For a thorough analysis of problems and reniedial strategies in ~ak i s tan ' s education field see Khadija ul Haq/Mahbub ul Haq, H~rrrrnrl Dcz~cloprrrcrrt in Sorrtlr Asia 1998. The Erirrc~rtioir Clrallcrryc, Oxford University Press, Karachi 1998. In the early 1990s, the Covernnient opened the education field to the private sector and conseque~ltly a nuniber of prinlary and seco~idary schools, nlostly in urban areas, were founded. Though they usually offer a higher quality of tuition, their fees are correspondingly higher, and hen'ce affordable priniarily by the affluent, upper middle class. Consequently, this has enhanced tlie relative disparity in educational standards (that is, viz-a-viz the less affluent or majority segnients of society) while conconlitantly not iticreasi~ig the overall standards of education.

71. interview with retired Anibassador Ross Masood Hussai~i at his residence in Isla~nabad 011 13 October 1998.

72. Charles H. Kennedy, (footnote 3), pp. 202-204. 73. Article 25: Equality of Citizens: "All citizens are equal

before law and are entitled to equal protectio~l of law ... "; Article 27 Safeguard against Discri~ii i~iatio~i in Services:


"No citizen otherwise qualified for appointment in the service of Pakistan shall be discriminated against in respect of any such appointment 011 the ground only of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth ... provided that, for a period not exceeding twenty years from the coniniencing day, posts may be reserved for persons belonging to any class or area to secure their adequate representation in the service of Pakistan". See Muhammad Younas, Corrstitrrtiorr uf Islarrric Rrprrblic I , / Pakistan, National Law Tinies Publications, Lahore 1998, pp. 66 - 72.

74. Gu l Muhammad Shan, Will t11r CSS Exairrs be Postpoircri Again?, in: The Friday Tinies (Lahore), April 10-26, 1998, p.6.

75. Khadija ul H a q m a h b u b ul Haq, ibid, p. 43. The authors note that in the past three decades at least 36,000 Pakistani professionals eniigrated although the actual ~ iun ibe r could be far higher. Presently, Canada in particular is proving to be a very attractive destination for Pakistani professionals and thousaiids have eniigrated there over the past few years.

Not by Military Strategies Alone.. .

S eptember 11 gave rise to a global coalition against terrorism, led by the United States of America.

However, so far the US strategy has been overwhelmingly dependent on military power for the eradication of terrorism.' This seems to focus on rooting out "terrorists" rather than "terrorism". It may put a lid on some problem spots; it may put pressure on pockets of terrorists and prevent certain incidents, yet it cannot be the long-term solution to terrorism.

India endeavors to emulate the United States in its fight against terrorism. The current military deployment along the border with Pakistan is not only an 'ultin~atum', but also an attempt to eradicate terrorism via military power. This is unlikely to succeed on both counts, as this is not the solution to India-Pakistan problems. Even if it were assumed that the world now consists of terrorists and non-terrorists, there has to be communication between the two sides in order to peacefully co-exist in this world. Neither side is going to win this war if violence/military muscle is the tool chosen to solve the problem.

It is often rightly argued that communication with the 'terrorists' could be misconstrued as a sign of weakness. Yet total blockage of communication does not succeed in the long term either. There are two major reasons for this. Firstly, this is a war in a different medium. Military

The paper is based on the writer's views expressed at the 4th Asian Security Conference hosted by Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, 18-19 March, New Delhi.

.A

Defense Analyst

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