A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY PROBLEMS OF SOOTH ASIA

India and Pakistan had emerged as the joint

successors to British power on the sub-continent of South

Asia in August, 1947. The security concerns of these two

unfriendly and militarily important states, viz., the

problem of their defence against each other, had been

responsible for the instability and strife that

characterized the region's history in the post-colonial

period. Except for a brief spell after the Sino-Indian

war when the Chinese threat seemed awesome, the principal

threat to India's security, from independence on, had been

perceived to come from Pakistan. India knew very well

that Pakistan was not reconciled to Kashmir's accession

to India and she would use any means and any opportunity

to grab Kashmir by force. Pakistan's foreign policy

revolved round Kashmir. To a great extent, India's

relations with other countries, especially the great

powers, were also affected by the stand they took on the

Yashmir dispute. 1

1. Peter Lyon, "The Foreign Policy ~f India" in F. S. Northedge (ed.), The Foreiqn Policies of the Powers (London, 1968), pp. 260-261.

If a single most dominant characteristic of India-

Pakistan relations since the partition has to be

identified, we will find that mistrust and lack of

confidence between the leaderships of the two countries,

one extremely sensitive to their separateness and identity

and the other obstinately refusing to share that ideology,

even though compelled to recognize it as a - fait accompli.

At the time of partition, the Pakistanis thought that the

Indians were not reconciled with the division of the

sub-continent and looked forward to reintegration, if

necessary by force. The Pakistani suspicions were

strengthened by the statements of some Indian political

leaders. Jinnah lamente.3:

It is very unfortunate that vigorous propaganda has been going on . . . that Pakistan is . . . merely a tempora:ry madness and that Pakistan will have to come into the Union as a 'penitent, repentant, erring son'.[31

The Indians hoped, according to a Pakistani scholar, that

Pakistan would collapse by itself and it was their plan to

assist its collapse. He also blamed India for "virtually

2. Acharya J. B. Kripalani, a former President of the Indian National Congress, said that 'neither Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of a United India', while Sardar Vallabhbai Patel, the redoubtable former Home Minister asserted that "Sooner than later' we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country". Quoted by Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (London, 1967), pp. 115-:116.

3. --- The Statesman (New Delhi), 25 October 1947.

compelling the Indian Muslims to migrate to Pakistan, thus

creating psychological, financial, and administrative

problems of an unbearable character". 4

The truth, however, is that Pakistan misunderstood

the Indian leaders. Of course, they fondly saw reunion as

a distant possibility which they very much desired.

B L ~ they did not mean that it would be brought about by

fczce. Their statements emanated from their firm

ccnviction that Indians and Pakistanis constituted the

same people and reintegration was in the best interests of

toth Indians and Pakistanis. But they were not blind to

reality and they reconciled themselves to the partition.

It is worthwhile in this connection to quote from two of

the early speeches of the two great architects of

independent India's destiny, when they were closer to

reality. Patel said at Rajkot on 12 November 1947:

I bear Pakistan no ill-will. I wish them Godspeed: let them only leave us alone, to pursue our own salvation, and stop meddling with our affairs in places like far-off Tripura. We shall then settle down to our respective destiny. May be, after we have become prosperous, they themselves will awaken to the need for reunion in the interests of both. It is neither our business nor our interest to force a reunion. We only wish to be left alone. . . .[5]

4. K. Sarwar Hasan, "The Foreign Policy of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan", Pakistan Horizon, Vol. IV (Karachi, 1951), p. 193.

5. Sardar Patel, quoted by Sisir Gupta, "India's Policy Towards Pakistan" in M. S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (ed.), Sisir Gupta: India and the International System (New Delhi, 1981), p. 279.

Nehru declared at the Aligarh Muslim University on 24

January 1948:

Pakistan has come into being rather unnaturally, I think. Nevertheless, it represents the urges of a large number of persons. I believe that this development has been a throw-back, but we accepted it in good faith. I want you to understand clearly what our present view is. We have been charged with designing to strangle or crush Pakistan, and to force it into a reunion with India. That charge, as many others, is based on fear and complete misunderstanding of our attitude. I believe that for a variety of reasons it is inevitable that India and Pakistan should draw closer to each other or else they will come into conflict. There is no middle way, for we have known each other too long to be indifferent neighbours. I believe indeed that in the present context of the world India must develop a clc'ser union with many other neighbouring cocntries. But all this does not mean any desire to strangle or compel Pakistan. Compulsion there can never be, and an attempt to disrupt Pakisten will recoil to India's disadvantage. If we had wanted to break Pakistan why did we agree to the partition? It was easier to prevent it then than to try to do so now after all that has happend. There is no going back in history. As a matter of fact, it is to India's advantage that Pakistan should be a secure and prosperous state with which we can develop close and friendly relations. If today, by any chance, I were offered the reunion of India and Pakistan, I would decline rt for obvious reasons. I do not want to carry the burden of Pakistan's great problems. I have enough of my own. Any closer association must come out of a normal process and in a friendly way which does not end Pakistan as a state, but makes it an equal part of a larger tmic ln with which several countries might be associated.[61

6. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches September 1946-1949, edn. 2, (Delhi, 1958), p. 358.

The Mountbatten Plan had left many serious issues

unsettled. As India and :?akistan emerged as independent

states out of British India, the separation of Pakistan

from India to provide a h'smeland for the Indian Muslims

txought with it the potential for international conflict

tetween two sovereign states over issues that were

~reviously confined to the domestic level. The

pertitioning of the sub-continent also added new disputes

based on territorial claims, the sharing of river waters,

the treatment of the substantial religious minorities left

on both sides and the division of assets between the two

states. I

There were other factors which contributed to the

threats and counter-threats perceived by India and

Pakistan. External arms race became interlocked with the

India-Pakistan arms race. The politics of the cold war

and the attendant arms race between the United States and

the Soviet Union, as well. as the later concurrent Sino-

Soviet struggle for security, had produced efforts by the

Knited States, the Soviet Union, and China to draw India

7. However, foremost ariong post-independence areas of conflict and the most sensitive one, was the dispute over the former pr~ncely state of Kashmir, whose population was predominantly Muslim but ruled by a Hindu Maharajah. Two of the three India-Pakistan wars since independence were fought over Kashmir. See A. Appadorai and M. S. Rajan, India's Foreiqn Policy and Relations (New Delhi, 1985), p. 58.

and Pakistan into their security plans. his had resulted

in the infusion of arms from these states to South Asia

and the upgrading of Indian and Pakistani capabilities.

As a matter of fact, India was never favourably

ir-clined to view with tolerance super power interference

in South Asia. But Paki.stanls entry into Western military

alliances left India with little option. Nehru had always

regretted the consequent disability of India to pursue an

independent foreign policy. One of the objectives of

Indian policy had been to try to keep both super powers

out of the subcontinent to the extent possible. Nehru was

of the view that the United States committed a grave

mistake and did a great injustice to India by enlisting

Pakistan in military alliances and bringing the cold war

to India's door step. Nehru could not understand why the

United States could not recognize India's natural pre-

eminence in the subcontinent. In fact, Nehru said at one

stage that India saw no rhyme or reason for Pakistan's

identification with a military bloc. It was clear that

Pakistan had no stake in the anti-communist tirade led by

t t e United States. Ironically, Pakistan's relations with

oce of the communist powers, the People's Republic of

China, were excellent. And there was no reason to believe

that Pakistan would yo the whole hog, with the United

States, in any confrontation with the Soviet Union because

Pakistan knew, that would be suicidal, risking its own

existence. So India could only see ~akistan's military

alignment as an attempt tc intimidate India, attain parity

and to challenge India's natural pre-eminence in South

Asia. The result of the military pacts, according to an

analyst, was that "Pakistan has been able to acquire a

d i s p r ~ ~ ~ r t i ~ n a t e l y stronger power-position relative to

that of India and that it commanded from the US an

economic and military subsidy much larger than her size

would otherwise ~ a r r a n t " . ~ Pakistan's drive for security

was regarded by India as a dangerous pursuit aimed at

distorting the existing regional power balance.

This intense desire for parity with India produced an

effort in Pakistan to match or more than match Indian

military capabilities, which further aggravated the threat

perceived by India. Pakistan made an all-out effort to

procure high quality weapons from abroad, consequently

driving India on to a desperate search for power which

meant a greater Indian counter-action. The India-Pakistan

arms race in South Asia displayed a great security dilemma

of the classic pattern. It was a result of mutual fear,

hatred and suspicion. Fakistan, smaller in size, poorer

8. Selia S. Harrison, "Troubled India and Her ~eiggbour", Foreiqn ~ffairs (New York) , Vol. 43, 1964-65, p. 322.

in resources and sure of its inferiority vis-a-vis India

never disguised these feelings. The Pakistani mind was

trained to hate India. Indian efforts to improve

relations were suspected. Pakistani posture had all along

been dictated by a dominant psychological fixation of

hostility to Indi*,. 9

The irrepressible Foreign Minister 2. A. Bhutto was

expressing this theme of ,perennial suspicion when he said,

"We are fully aware of the treacherous nature of India and

we do not want to endanger the existence of Pakistan in

the name of co-operation". 10

Pakistan's attitude towards India can be summed up

only in pathological terms. Many Western writers,

intellectuals, and scholars who had the opportunity to

read the Pakistani mind from close quarters, had come

to such conclusions. A distinguished professor of McGill

University, Canada, wrote: "It would be quite wrong to

suggest that the feeling of Pakistanis towards India is

one of simple hatred. Their attitude is rather one of

intense rivalry to the pcint of bitter jealousy". 11

9. Ashok Kapur, "Emercing Problems in India's Foreign Relations in the Seventies", Foreiqn Affairs Reports (Delhi), Vol. XX, No. 7, July 1971, p. 150.

10. Times of India (New Delhi), 6 June 1966.

11. Keith Callard, -,tan: A Political Study (New York, 1957), p. 313.

According to an American professor, who had a four-

year academic stint in Dacca,

Many Pakistanis would like to see India weakened or even destroyetl by communist China. Indeed, the attitude of many Pakistanis towards India is almost pathological, for it involves persistent refusal to face political realities. Even if the Kashmir issue were settled in favour of Pakistan, it is likely thint the basic hostility towards India would remain. For what is involved is a clash of cultures, a hatred of the inferior for the superior, and a vindictiveness that makes a virtue of revenge.ll21

Another writer dexribed Pakistani reaction to

India's discomfiture in the Sino-Indian war in these

words :

It would be hypocrisy to deny the joy which almost all Pakistanis felt at the defeat of India. Some even went so far as to thank Allah for teaching our haughty and bullying neighbour the lesson of her life and at the same time bringing her down several steps from her claim of leadership of Asia.[l3]

The fear of domination by "Hindu India" continued to

be the most important single factor which influenced the

persons who formulated the Pakistani foreign policy. 14

The Pakistani leaders constantly created a war-

psychosis among the people which consequently dominated

12. John F. Owen, "Paki~tan's Ambiguous Politics", New Leader (New York), 2 March 1964, pp. 3-4.

13. M. A. H. Ispahani, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: 1947-64", Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XVIII (3rd Quarter, 1964). pp. 247-68.

14. For a detailed discussion, see K. Sarwar Hasan, n. 4.

the entire outlook and thinking of the people in

Pakistan. l5 Ever since the partition, the Pakistani

people were given to believe that Indian actions had

shattered their economy and created economic and

administrative problems for the country. Pakistan alleged

that India had refused to share cash balances with her and

declined to give railway carriages for transportation of

the military stores belonging to Pakistan. She complained

that India had stopped the supply of coal and other

essential goods to Pakistan. Pakistan believed that India

had been encouraging the Pakhtoonistan movement, had

invaded Junagadh and manel~vered Kashmir's accession to

India. It had stopped the canal waters as a result of

which large areas of Pakistan had been transformed into a

desert. Thus Pakistanis seemed to believe that India's

actions constituted a concerted move to destroy Pakistan.

They thought that India would not allow the existence of

Pakistan as a viable and independent nation. 1 I

15. G. W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India (DeJhi, 1971), p. 195.

16. However, the Canal Water dispute was satisfactorily resolved by a bilateral Indus Waters Treaty. A plan submitted by World Bank experts was formally accepted and signed by Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan on 19 September 1960. For details, see Nehru's statement at the time of signing the Treaty in Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreiqn Policy: Selected Speeches September 1946-April 1961 (Delhi, 1966), p. 482,

17. See Jinnah's statement to this effect in The Statesman, 25 October 1947.

In Pakistani view, Indian hostility had been a

greater danger than the pc~ssibility of Chinese expansion

or Soviet threats. Pakistani problem of defence was the

problem of defence against India. Pakistan not only

regarded Indian threat a permanent feature but also

believed that Indian endeavours were directed towards

making Pakistan's existence difficult. 18

In the opinion of Bhutto, India wanted to negate the

two-nation theory which formed the basis of partition.

That, to his mind, was the main reason why India had

dominated Jammu and Kaslimir by violating her pledge.

Commenting on the Indian threat, the Pakistani leader said

that to counter it, Pakistan had been compelled to buy

arms from different countries. 19

India, too, had no clear vision of a Pakistan policy

which would help solviilg the outstanding disputes.

Jawaharlal Nehru was under considerable stress and strain

to formulate a policy. Even in the teeth of opposition by

the hardliners, Nehru used his personal influence to adopt

a very moderate approach towards Pakistan. He sincerely

18. G. W. Choudhury, n. 15, p. 186.

19. Z. A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (Karachi, 19691, pp. 178-9.

hoped that his gesture of releasing the cash balances

would cut the ice and mellow Pakistan's confrontationist

posture. 20

In a statement from New Delhi on 15 January 1948,

Nehru clarified India's ;?osition:

The Government's decision in regard to the payment of the cash balances to Pakistan had been taken after the most careful thought and after consultations with Gandhiji. I should like to make it clear that this does not mean any change in our unanimous view about the strength and validity of the Government's position as set out in various statements made by distinguished colleagues of mine.[21]

Nehru endorsed the Gandhi line on the payment of cash

balances. But the escalation of communal violence in East

20. Regarding the distribution of assets of British India, the two countries agreed in December 1947 that Pakistan would receive its share of Rs 750 million from India out of which Rs 200 million had already been given by India. But the attack on Kashmir by raiders abetted by Pakistan in October 1947 compelled India to defer payment on moral grounds. Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbai Pate1 bluntly justified India's rethinking. He wanted Pakistan 'to behave'. However, Mahatma Gandhi did not approve what he considered as a breach of promise on India's part and what he ehought would be a blot on India's credibility. He undertook a fast to force the Government of India to pay the 550 million cash balance. Patel had no choice but to yield to Gandhi's wish.

For further details, see D. C. Jha, Indo- Pakistan Relations (Patna, 1972), p. 5.

21. Jawaharlal Nehru, n. 16, p. 449.

Bengal in February 1950 strengthened the hardliner's

position and there was at this time considerable pressure

on Nehru to be tough on Pakistan.

Nehru tried to steer clear of these two approaches

and explained this policy as a pragmatic one with an eye

on future friendly relations. Visionary as he was, he

liked to believe that confrontation was a passing phase

and ultimately better senses would prevail and India and

Pakistan would live as good neighbours.

In a speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs in

March 1949. Nehru said:

In regard to Pakistan the position has been very peculiar owing to the way Pakistan was formed and India was divided. And there have not only been all the upsets that you know but something much deeper, and that :LS a camplete emotional upset of all the people in India and Pakistan because of this. It is a very difficult thing to deal with, a psychological thing, which cannot be dealt with superficially. . . . There is no doubt at all in my mind that it is inevitable for India and pakistan to have close relations, very close relations, some cime or other in the future. I cannot state when this will take place, but situated as we aze, with all our past we cannot be just indifferent neighbours. We can be either rather hostile to each other or very friendly, whatever period of hostility may intervene in between because our interests are so closely interlinked.[22]

22. Jawaharlal Nehru, n. 5, pp. 252-53.

India's Offer of a No-War Pact to Pakistan

To reassure Pakistan of India's peaceful intentions,

a 'No-war Declaration' was offered to Pakistan by India in

1949. At that time, the threat to peace in the

sub-continent was not the Kashmir problem, but the

escalation of communal passions. The pitiable plight of

the minorities in East Pakistan compelled action on

Government of India's part. And there was much talk of

going to war against Pakistan over this matter.

Surprisingly Nehru ruled out that option. He declared in

his press conference on February 1950:

We have offered Pakistan a joint declaration for the avoidance of war. I am prepared to say that whether Pakistan agrees to that declaration or not, we will not have an aggressive war. We will not have war unless we are attacked, I agree to that declaratio:? on my part, whether Pakistan agreed to it or :not.[23]

The Pakistani leaAership, in characteristically

cynical way, interpreted Nehru's move as a political trap.

Liaquat Ali Khan was of the view that "peace between India

and Pakistan could be assured not by declaration but

by an actual settlement of outstanding disputes between

them. . . . It was not sufficient to declare in general

terms that the two governments should settle all their

disputes through negotiation, mediation or arbitration.

23. -Hindu (Madras), 7 February 1950.

They must be actually settled, and for that a definite and

binding procedure laid down". 24

The other 'No-War Pa~t' offers made by India a number

of times later also failed to evoke a positive response

from the Pakistani side. Pakistan felt that a 'No-War

Pact' leading to disengagement of forces with India "would

mean our accepting the status quo' in ~ashmir" and have

the effect only of lulling Pakistan into a false sense of

security.

Manifestation of the Poli.cy of Confrontation

1. Pakistan's Entry into Western Military Alliances

The India factor virtually had a blinding effect

on Pakistan's perceptions. It contemplated security

relationships with a singular objective in mind, viz., how

to deter the Indian threat. The desperate search for

power with a view to a.:tain parity, if not superiority

over India, finally landed Pakistan in the Western camp.

It so happened not because of any Pakistani preference for

the West. Pakistan had no quarrel with the Soviet Union.

But there was little scope for any tangible form of Soviet

assistance. Soviet Union at that time was preoccupied

24. Quoted by K. Sarwar Hasan, n. 4, pp. 195-196.

25. Z. A. Bhutto, g i q n Policy of Pakistan (Karachi, 1964), p. 3.

with European politics arid post-war reconstruction. It

was not in a position tc~ bestow much attention on the

newly independent Asian countries, least of all, Pakistan,

which, the Soviet Union cc~nsidered as a retrograde state.

China, in its foreign pcmlicy, was always ideologically

innocent, but at this time, Chinese capacity to help

other states was limited, almost non-existent. In the

circumstances, United States offer came in handy as that

country was feverishly looking for allies who would make

common cause with it in the fight against communism.

Initially, attempts were made to draw both India and

Pakistan into the security network the United States

perceived for the area. But India was firmly committed to

pursue an independent foreign policy and it did not share

United States security perceptions. The United States was

at a loss to understand India's world view which it

considered as unhelpful and negative. But Nehru stood his

ground and he thought nonalignment was in the best

interests of the country and the people. In his words,

"any attempt on our part, that is, the Government of the

day here, to go too far in one direction would create

difficulties in our own country. It would be resented and

we would produce conflicts in our own country which would

not be helpful to any other country". 26

26. Jawaharlal Nehru, n. 16, pp. 42-50.

In contrast, Pakistan fell an easy prey to the United

States bait of arms aid. Pakistani security doctrine was

purely based on arms aid and it succeeded in convincing

the United States policy-makers that the most effective

military defence of South Asia would require strong flanks

in Pakistan, with a geostrategic location at the

crossroads of Central, South and Southwest Asia.

Therefore, an early build-up of Pakistani forces was "of

primary importance", to be assisted by providing military

equipment to Pakistan. At this time Pakistan had only

"thirteen tanks with about forty to fifty hours of engine

life in them to face the Indian Army". 2 7

The United States noted that Pakistan was willing to

enter into a military partnership and was desperately in

need of arms. During Vice-President Richard Nixon's visit

to Karachi in December 1952, General Ayub Khan briefed him

that the Soviet Union would use India as a cat's paw for

establishing a major presence in South Asia. Immediately

upon his return Nixon recommended military aid for

Pakistan in his report to the President and National

Security Council. 28

27. Muhammad Ayub Khan, n. 2, P. 40.

28. For details, see News Week (Washington), 4 January 1954. Nixon recommended aid to Pakistan not only to defend herself against any possible communist attack but also, as a counterforce to confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru's India. See also Ralph Tolendor, Nixon (New York, 19561, p. 164.

It was a time when the policy of regional collective

security was pursued by the United States, on the line

advocated by John Foster Dulles, the standard-bearer of

the policy of containment. According to Dulles:

The cornerstone of security, for the free nations must be a collective system of defence. They cannot achieve security separately. No single nation can develop for itself defensive power of adequate scope and flexibility. In seeking to do so, each would become a garrison state and none would achieve security. This is true of the United States. Without the co-operation of allies, we would not even be in a position to retaliate massively against the war industries of an attacking nation. That requires international facilities.[29]

Ayub Khan was invited to Washington in October 1953

when the Eisenhower Administration became convinced that

it was to their mutual interests to provide military

assistance and link Pakistan both in bilateral and

collective security arrangements.

A US-Pakistan Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was

signed on 19 May 1954 in Karachi. Under the terms, the US

Government agreed to make available "such equipment,

material, services or other assistance'' as might be

authorised in accordance with "such terms and conditions

as may be agreed". 30

29. John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace", Foreiqn Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 3 , April 1954, pp. 355- 356.

30. M. S. Venkatramani and H. C. Arya, "America's Military ~lliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy partnership", International Studies (New Delhi), Val. 8, July-October 1956.

Pakistan signed the South East Asia Defence Treaty in

Manila on 8 September 1954 and thus became a member of a

full-fledged military alliance and formed with the United

States a regional defence pact (SEATO) for South East

Asia.

Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact on 23 September

1955, which was reconstituted as CENT0 in 1958. This

arrangement of the United States, Pakistan, Turkey, and

Iraq formed part of the "Northern Tier Plan". This was a

scheme for the 'defence' of Middle East. 31

The original aim of United States military aid to

Pakistan was officially mentioned as a defensive measure

to strengthen Pakistan on the periphery of Soviet Union

and China. United States gave the reason that it was in

the interest of Pakistan to defend itself "as it was also

in the interest of the Western objectives of filling the

power vacuum in West and South Asia against communism". 3 2

The United States thought that it could help in

"containing communism" :in the Southern sector if the

countries of the region grouped themselves for the purpose

31. For details, see Economist (London), 17 March 1956.

32. Robert Strans-Hupe l,ed.), American Asian Tensions (Washington 19561, p. 41. US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs said that the US must dominate Asia for an indefinite period and maintain a military counterpoise to China until the Communist regime crumbles from within.

in line with President Eisenhower's idea that if the free

peoples of Asia were attacked by those Asians who were

responsive to foreign communist countries, the former

ought to be in a position to defend themselves without

bringing Western troops into Asia. 3 3

Pakistan fitted into this strategy very well. The

United States also felt that Pakistan could play a

respectable role in the economic and political

stabilization of South Asia.

The United States military commitments to Pakistan

were qualified in two significant ways. Unlike its

obligation to its NATO partners, the United States did not

bind itself to regard a.ltomatically, any attack on

Pakistan as an attack on itself. A Pakistani request for

military help was to be considered only in accordance with

a due constitutional process. The United States, in fact,

rejected a Pakistani plea for a NATO-model alliance which

would have conferred the status and privileges of a full-

fledged military partner to Pakistan. Pakistan also

intensely lobbied in the SEATO meetings to get a United

States commitment to the defence of Pakistan against

all types of aggression, "irrespective of the label".

33. See Raghunath Ram, Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan (New Delhi, 1983), p. 54.

The United States was nct prepared to go so far and

Pakistani pleas were politely brushed aside. 34 An attempt

was also made to allay Irdja's fears on this account.

President Eisenhower wrote a personal letter to Nehru

assuring him that "this step does not in any way affect

the friendship we feel for India". He assured Nehru that

"if our aid to Pakistan is misused . . . I will undertake

action to thwart such aggression". 3 5

As a matter of fact, the United States and Pakistan

had divergent goals and interests in coming together in an

alliance. For Pakistan, the main consideration for

forging a relationship w:~th the United States was its

obsession with the perceived threat from India. Besides,

the United States was expected to exert pressure on India

to resolve the Kashmir question to its satisfaction.

The United States was guided by its global policy of

containment of communis~n. These divergent security

goals--the global perspective of the United States and the

Indo-centric goals of Pakistan led to tensions and

eventual Pakistani disillusionment with its alliance with

the United States.

34. For reports on Zafrullah Khan's efforts on this account at Manila meeting, see -- Dawn (Karachi), 6,7,8 September 1954.

35. Cited by Sreenivas C. Mudumbai, United States Foreiqn Policy Towards India (New Delhi, 1980), p. 134.

2. Kashmir Problem

India and Pakistan fought three wars on Kashmir. The

Kashmir problem arose out of the decision of the former

colonial power, Great Britain, to return to the former

princely states all the rights surrendered by the latter

to the paramount power. They were free to arrange by

negotiations with those parts of British India to which

they would like to accede or whatever measure of

association they considered to be suitable in the best

interests of their people.

Pakistan was vitally interested in Kashmir because it

considered India in Kashmir a potential threat to its

security. The Pakistanis claimed that the Kashmiris were

linked with them by ties of common religion, common

culture, and common habits of food and dress. They

further claimed that Kashmir's economy was tied-up with

that of Pakistan. 36 Zafrullah Khan argued as early as

1948, before the Security Council, that "the issues

involved are not merely 1-egal and constitutional or even

political. There is a vary large human background which

it will be very necessary for the Security Council to

appreciate before the menbers bring the'ir minds to bear

36. For details, see Zafl:ullah Khan, The Kashmir-Question (Karachi, 19501, p. 60.

upon the concrete questions that need to be resolved and

decided". 3 7 Again in 1.951, it was argued that "Indian

control over Kashmir would give India a complete

stranglehold over the economy of West Punjab". 38

Pakistan's strongest claim, however, was that Kashmir had

a predominantly Muslim population and so it should have

acceded to Pakistan rather than to Hindu-dominated India.

India never accept.ed the validity of this claim.

India was totally opposed to the belief that partition

took place on religious grounds. So, naturally, India

always scoffed at Pakistan's claim on Kashmir, solely

based on religion. V. K. Krishna Menon, the redoubtable

representative of India in the UN, in a statement before

the Security Council on 22 June 1962 declared: ''We are a

secular state, all of our organization is political and

has nothing to do with the religious aspect of a people.

We are not prepared to face a position where religious

fanaticism is to be or is protected". 3 9

Soon after attaining the status of an independent

state, Pakistan unleashed an invasion of Kashmir with a

view to prevent the integration of that state to the

37. Official Records of the Security Council (hereinafter cited as - SCOR), Mtg 229, January 1948, pp. 109-110.

38. See Arif Hussain, Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy (London, 1966), p. 75.

39. - SCOR, 7th Year, Mtg 1016, 22 June 1962, pp. 42-5.

Indian Union, on the basis of the same set of principles

made applicable to other native states. 40 Pakistan's

invasion on 22 October 1947 compelled the Maharaja to

accede to India and sign the Instrument of Accession. To

save the state from death and destruction, inflicted by

the Pakistani raiders, who included the tribal people like

the Afridis, Wazirs, Mahsuds, and soldiers of the

Pakistan army on 'leave', Lndian troops landed in Kashmir

to the dismay of Pakistan who alleged that Kashmir's

accession to India was based on fraud and violence. Lord

Mountbatten himself, was, however, of the view that

violence had been initiated by tribal invaders and he

clearly told Pakistan that it was impossible for Indian

troops to withdraw from Kashmir until the raiders had left

Kashmir soil. 41 It was ultimately on Governor General

Mountbatten's suggestion that India agreed to refer the

40. These principles were that the ruler should accede to one of the two dominions on the basis of geographical contiguity and will of the population. At a time when the state had not yet decided about its future connections with India and Pakistan, Pakistan resorted to economic and political pressure to annex Kashmir. In fact, since 15 August 1947, the history of Kashmir was a st.ory of pressures exerted by Pakistan and its supporters inside Kashmir to accede to that dominion, leading ultimately to armed invasion and open war.

See Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India- Pakistan Relations - (Delhi, 19661, pp. 117-119.

41. Government of India, white Paper on Indian States (Delhi, 19501, p. 61.

Kashmir issue to the United Nations. The correspondence

between Nehru and Mountbat.ten shows that Nehru accepted

the proposal with reluctarice, as he thought, the problem

had to be resolved through bilateral discussions. 4 2

Even after referring the issue to the United Nations,

some bilateral negotiations were conducted, mainly at

India's initiative. Nehru met the Pakistan Prime Minister

for informal talks in London on 5 June 1953. Later the

Indian Prime Minister went to Karachi on 25 July 1953 to

ensure peace. No solution seemed to be around 43 mainly

because Pakistan was busy with her quest for military

alliance with the Western bloc. Emboldened by the West's

support, Pakistan raided the Rann of Kutch in 1956 and

launched an anti-India campaign which shattered the

prospects of a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir problem.

In fact, a disastrous consequence of the military alliance

was the halting of the peace processes in Kashmir. The

scope for bilateral negotiations receded. Nehru expressed

his disappointment in no uncertain terms. He said that

"the whole psychological atmosphere between the two

42. For corres~ondence between Nehru and Mountbatten, see H. V. Godson, The Great Divide: ~ritain-~ndia- Pakistan (London, 19691, pp. 465-468.

43. Except the ceasefire agreement of 1 January 1949, no agreement was reached on the period o f demilitarization, withdrawal of troops, the quantum of forces to be left behind and the appointment of the plebiscite administration, at the UN Security Council. See Sisir G u p t - , n. 40, p. 241.

countries will change for the worse and every question

that is pending between us will be affected by it. He

also pointed out that United States military aid to

Pakistan would "imperil the freedom of Asian countries and

bring in the intervention of a foreign power in Asia". 4 4

In his letter to Pakistan Prime Minister Kohammed

Ali, Nehru contended that United States military aid to

Pakistan would "completely" change the aspect of Kashmir

problem and that the question had now become "one of

militarization and not demilitarization". 4 5

The acceptance of United States military aid by

Pakistan was certainly contrary to the tacit understanding

reached between India and Pakistan in their bilateral

negotiations. It did not help the peace process. In

frustration, Nehru gave up the idea of holding talks with

Pakistan. He said that the whole context in which "those

agreements on Kashmir were made, will change if military

aid from America, goes to Pakistan, so it is these

consequences that flow, one has to consider". 4 6

44. For details, see "Negotiations between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India regarding the Kashmir Dispute, June 1953 to September 1954", (Karachi, Government of Pakistan, 1955), pp. 55-74.

45. Government of India, White Paper on Kashmir (1953- 541, p. 48.

46. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. X, Nos. 16-30, December 1953, col. 2978.

India proceeded to consolidate its posicion in

Kashmir. The Kashmir Constituent Assembly's decision in

February 1954 to ratify the accession to India, was an

indication of the new touahness. The United States

press raised a hue and cry &bout. it. An American

newspaper characterized it as "bad news from Kashmir". It

stated: "Certainly this action in Kashmir does prejudice

such a settlement and will make it more difficult to carry

out the plebiscite. The United Nations, therefore, will

be amply justified if it calls upon India to repudiate'the

Kashmir action which is in obvious violation of the United

Nation's injunctionN. 4 7

Undaunted by Western criticism, Nehru stuck to his

guns and continued to emphasise that a resolution of the

Kashmir problem was rendered more difficult by the West,

especially the United Stares, by its aid to Pakistan. In

a letter to the United States President Nehru averred that

the United States had brought Kashmir in the vortex of

cold war politics, which complicated the issue. He added

that the problems between India and Pakistan "can only be

solved by the two countries themselves and not by the

intervention of others". 40

-

47. The New York Times, 8 February 1954.

48. Government of India, n. 45, pp. 74-78.

It was really United States military aid to Pakistan

that did the damage. India's line on plebiscite hardened

on this account. India wanted to show the world that

India could not be cowed by the US-Pakistan alliance. In

the opinion of a disting~ished observer of US-South Asian

relations, "whatever chance there might have been for a

Kashmir settlement in tt.is period appeared to have been

directly damaged by the United States military aid

programme to Pakistan". 4 51

Nehru was of the view that the acceptance of military

aid by Pakistan had given a new turn to the Kashmir

dispute and to events in Asia. In a statement to the Lok

Sabha, he expressed the apprehension that the military aid

would change the balance of things in India and Asia and

upset the balance in Sout:h Asia. 5 0

India, on its part, was never convinced that Kashmir

was the one and only hurdle in the path of relations with

Pakistan. Nehru was of the view that Kashmir problem was

a result of other confl:.cts between India and Pakistan,

and he was convinced that even if the Kashmir problem were

solved, the basic conflict will continue. India's and

49. Selig S. Harrison' "India, Pakistan, and United States, Cost of n Mistake", The New Republic (washington), Vol. i41, 24 August 1959, p. 25.

5 0 . Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 1, 1954, col. 973.

Pakistan's ideologies were diametrically opposed to each

other. Their outlooks differed fundamentally. The course

that Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies took after

freedom, the increasing dependence on and collaboration

with the West, the eagerness to befriend all India's

adversaries, the emphasis on religion in the state-

ideology of Pakistan, the gradual collapse of democracy in

Pakistan, the denial of equal rights to the minorities in

the Constitution, and the one-track devotion to the cause

of limiting and curbing India--all appeared to demonstrate

this irreconcilable conflict. 51

The 1965 war between India and Pakistan was a

manifestation of this conflicting posture. The war,

however, showed the limitations of the armed approach for

a resolution of India-Pakistan problems.

The China Factor in South Asian Security

China has never been considered as a South Asian

state. But China's South Asian connection has also never

been disputed. To India's north, Tibet, and China's

Sinkiang region share with India 3,000 kilometres of

common border, which has given China, a geographical

South Asian connection. Whenever China felt miiitarily

51. Sisir Gupta, "India's Policy Towards Pakistan", International Studies, July-October 1966, pp. 29-48.

strong, it made incursions into South Asia. "In tfre 7th

century A.D. Tibetan military expansion was rapid which

took them to the plains of India. They dominated Nepal

for a time and the whole Cis-Himalayan region". 52 In the

8th century, Chinese and TioetCZ troops moved into Gilgit

to help the Raja of Gilgit against the Turks and stayed

for five years. "Nepal since the earliest times had

served as the centrepot of trade between the Indo-Gangetic

Valley and Tibet and China". 53 The British Government in

this century treated Tibet and Sinkiang as security zones

of South Asia and maintained British consulates, trading

marts, listening posts, and soldiers in three Tibetan

towns, and in Kashgar in Sinkiang until 1947.

The emergence of India and Pakistan as independent

nations on the world scene and the establishment of the

People's Republic of China, almost coincided. Naturally

China became an important factor in the foreign policies

of the two major South Asian states. Of the two, only

India had pronounced a clear China policy. With an acute

sense of insecurity and a feeling of isolation in world

community, Pakistan's foreign policy, at this time, was

directionless.

52. Ravari Dhanalaxmi, British Attitude to Nepal's Relations with Tibet and China 1814-1914 (Chandigarh. 1981), p. 8.

53. Ibid.

On the other hand, Jawaharlal Nehru had great

fascination for China. He sincerely believed that India

and China could collectively refashion the events in Asia

and the world. India extended formal recognition to the

People's Republic on 30 December 1949. Nehru did this

with the full knowledge that the United States would take

exception to it. The United States expected Nehru to go

the whole hog with it in the Korean War. India's

neutrality was interpreted as an endorsement of 'Communist

Agression'. India's unequivocal refusal to co-operate with

the United States efforts to isolate the People's Republic

of China was regarded as "a blow to American-sponsored

efforts to tighten the Kctrean War". 54 Nehru was of the

view that China could have been sobered and chastened if

it was admitted into the United Nations. Speaking at

Mirzapur in Uttar Pradesh on 12 July 1954, Nehru

critically observed that the exclusion of Communist China

from the United Nations, was "the root cause of all

international troubles during the last four years". 5 5

There was no doubt that Nehru's China policy was one

of appeasement. But Nehru consciously pursued such a

policy with the noble objective of bringing new China into

54. The New York Times, 28 April 1961.

55. Quoted by Rober Strans-Hupe, n. 32. Nehru asserted in his speech that "The UN which presumed to be a universal organisation in this world has ceased to be that, because of the najor fact that a great country which is obviously s running country, obviously a stable and strong country, is not represented there".

the mainstream of world community, encouraging contacts,

lessening hostilities and suspicions, so that a normal

relationship with China could be established. This, Nehru

hoped, would help Asian and world peace. Above all, Nehru

hoped that friendship with China best guaranteed the

security of India.

Nehru, however, did not lack political understanding

of the potential problems involved in the relationship

with China. A shrewd student of history, Nehru was well

aware of the historical Chinese tendency of expansionism.

He had noted in a communication to the Indian Ambassador

in Peking, Sardar K. M. Panikker, himself a distinguished

student of ~ s i a n history, that whenever China had a strong

central government, it had tended to expand across its

frontiers.

Nehru was right. In China's days of turmoil and

struggle for nationhood, Tibet was a semi-independent

buffer territory, over which China excercised suzerainty,

but little control. 56 When the communists under Mao Tse-

Tung came to stay in mainland China, Tibet became a

priority in Chinese policy. The 'liberation' of Tibet was

only a question of time. The Government of India was

naturally called upon to take a decision on whether it

would acquiesce in the imminent Chinese action or it would

56. Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia (Delhi, 1988), p. 98.

resist Chinese inroads cbn the basis of special interests

it had inherited there from the ~ritish. It was not easy

to take a decision because Chinese friendship, which Nehru

valued much, was at stake. At the same time, Himalayas,

India's vital line of defence.could not be written off.

A confrontation between India and China on Tibet was very

much on the cards.

Nehru, however, did not wish to get involved in a

territorial conflict with China, but he was equally

opposed to any demonstration of Indian weakness. 57 AS a

notice to China, of India's determination to stay in the

Himalayas, Nehru signed new treaties with Bhutan and

Sikkim, legitimising India's special relationship. But

India found another Himalayan state, Nepal, a hard nut to

crack. It had other plans. It did not want to estrange

China. India's proposal to continue to handle Nepal's

foreign policy did not: find favour. Nepal, in fact,

wanted to keep its options open. India had no

alternative, but to conceding full sovereignty to Nepal. 5 8

Unmindful of possible Indian resistance, China took

armed action in Tibet in 1950. For the first time,

India's national and strategic interests clashed with

those of China. India expressed its annoynace and gave

notes of protest. Chinese notes in reply treated Tibet

57. Ibid., p. 100.

purely as an internal affair and the Tibetan mission in

India was accused of taking a defiant posture under the

influence of "foreign powers". A study of these notes

offers an interesting cl.le to the minds of Nehru and Mao

in tackling the first big South Asian power contest.

Nehru, in spite of considerable pressure from his

colleagues in party and government, was not for a

confrontation with China. 5 9

Nehru revised his earlier assessment of China and

visualised the threat to peace due to the expansionist

ambitions of China. He wrote thus to the Chief Ministers

of India:

We do not desire to dominate any country, and we are content to live peacefully with other countries provided they do not interfere with us or commit aggression. China, on the other hand, clearly did nok like this idea of such peaceful co-existence and wants to have a dominating position in Asia. We do not want communism to come here and yet: the essential conflict is more political and geographical than that of communism, although communism is an important factor in the background. Communism too is fundamentally developing two facets, one represented by the Soviet Union and the other by China. It is possible to live with the Soviet Union but it is not possible to do with China. Hence the essential conflict.[60]

- 59. The Government's Tihet policy was strongly attacked

in Parliament, and deputy Prime Minister Pate1 wrote him a lonq critical letter in November 1950. It is published as an appendix in Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder (Bombay, 1969).

60. Quoted by Ajit Singh Sarhedi, India's Security in Resurgent Asia (New Laelhi, 1979), p. 190.

Nehru saw that sympathy for the people of ~ibet might

conflict with India's desire to maintain friendly

relations with China. He said in his speech in the Lok

Sabha, on 30 March 1959, that while "we want to have

friendly relations with the people of Tibet, at the same

time, it is important for us to have friendly relations

with the great country, China. That does not mean that I

or the Government or this Parliament or anyone else should

submit to any kind of dictation from any country, however

great it may be. It does not mean, however, that in a

difficult situation, we should exercise a certain measure

of restraint and wisdom, and not do anything in excitement

which might lead our country into difficulties". Nehru

deliberately played down the Tibetan issue and pursued the

main goal of building bridges with China. For some time

there was considerable unity of purpose between Indian and

Chinese policies in the region, with China making vigorous

efforts to break the American encirclement and making

common cause with as many Asian-African countries as

possible for this purpose, and with India opposing United

States policy of military alliances in Asia and advocating

the peace-area approach. India befriended China at the

risk of United States displeasure, which even led to some

sharp comments on Nehru in the United States press. - - - - - -

61. Jawaharlal Nehru, n. 16, p. 305.

One newspaper condemned Nehru as "the lost leader" who

along with his country went "into a limbo". 62 ~ntense

United States hostility was the price Nehru had to pay for

the Chinese hand of friendship which, except for a brief

spell, remained elusive.

The Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai visited India

in June 1954 amidst great fanfare. It seemed that the

Chinese leader and Indian Prime Minister Jawharlal Nehru

had developed a great personal rapport and their

pronouncements indicated the desire on both sides to live

as friendly neighbours and to strive in unison for Asian

and world peace". 63 As a gesture of goodwill, India also

recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet, much of a

climb-down on India's part. India practically abandoned

all facilities and special rights in Tibet and Sinkiang,

which the Government of India enjoyed as the successor of

the British Raj. Nehru shared the Chinese perception of

these extraterritorial rights as a remnant of imperialism,

in opposing which, Nehru was prepared to work hand in

62. The New York Times, 28 August 1951.

63. Nehru and Chou En-lai accepted the doctrine of Panchsheel or the five principles of peaceful co-existence as the guiding principles in the conduct of foreign relations. These are: (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, ( 2 ) Mutual non-aggression, !3! Non- interference in each other's internal affairs, ( 4 ) Equality and mutual benefit, and (5) Peaceful co-existence. See speech in Lok Sabha, 17 September 1955, in Jawaharlal Nehru, n. 16, pp. 99-101.

glove with the Chinese. Defending these concessions,

Nehru told Parliament in 1954. "The British empire in the

days of Lord Curzon about 50 years ago had expanded into,

and made several types of arrangements in Tibet. Now it

is impossible and improper for us to continue any such

arrangements as the British empire had established". 64

In 1955, India participated in the Bandzn; Conference

of Afro-Asian nations, along with China. Chou En-lai

again visited India in 1956 and showered lavish praises on

India for its efforts towards the resolution of the Korean

and Indo-China disputes., aut it became apparent by this

time that all was not well in Sino-Indian relations.

In spite of India's recognition of China's sovereignty

over Tibet, China felt that India was meddling in Tibetan

affairs. The Tibetan rebellion that finally broke out in

1959 actually began to fester in 1956. China suspected

India's hand in it. It was observed: "Recently certain

friction has developed in the relations between China and

India". 65 The flight of the ~ibetan spiritual leader

Dalai Lama, the asylum granted to him in India in 1959,

and the large-scale exodus of Tibetan refugees to India,

embittered Sino-Indian relations.

64. See statement in Parliament, 27 April 1959, in Jawaharlal Nehru, n. 16, pp. 319-326.

65. G. F. Hudson, "India, China, and Japan: Emerging Balance in Asia", != (Winter, 1958).

Meanwhile, India received reports of Chinese road

construction acd military build-up in Tibet close to the

Indian border. In 1958, China published maps which showed

a large chunk of Indian territory as belonging to China.

Nehru still had not lost heart. He continued to hope that

better senses would prevail in Peking. He wrote a long

letter to Prime Minister Chou En-lai on 14 December 1958,

wherein he raised the issue of the border and China was

requested to enter into negotiations for a peaceful

settlement. 66 Chou En-lai 's reply, though chilly, did not

close the peace options. He continued to maintain that

China never had the intention of straining the border

situation and the relations between the two countries and

proposed that he and Nehru should meet to discuss the

boundary question and Sino-Indian relations generally. 67

Nehru, however, ruled out such discussions because

concession to China on the bcrder was sure to invite

popular wrath. Nehru was really helpless. 6 8

The Chinese stance also hardened mainly because of

India's sympathetic reaction to the Tibetan uprising.

66. Government of India, White Paper 1954-1959, p. 48.

67. See Neville Maxwell, India's China War (London, 19701, p. 135.

68. See Nehru's reply to debate in Parliament on 10 September 1959, in Jawaharlal Nehru, n. 16, pp. 346- 353.

According to a distinguished Indian scholar, the show of

Soviet support for India was another factor which changed

the whole Chinese attitude.69 Furthermore, China wanted

to cut India to size and show the world that China was the

'big power' of Asia. It wanted to nip in the bud Indian

aspirations for Asian leadership. Territorial cliams, for

China, were only a camoufl-age.

A last attempt to find a solution to the territorial

disputes was made during Chou En-lai's visit to Delhi in

April 1960. Nothing tangible came out of the talks. The

talks failed mainly because both sides were not prepared

to discuss and make adjustments on specific issues. 7 0 The

absence of political will., on both sides, to arrive at a

solution, complicated the! issue. The only small results

of the Nehru-Chou summit were the agreements to avoid

armed clashes along the frontier and to refer the border

dispute to a joint team of officials for further study.

69. Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 56, p. 129.

70. "In India, it had been recognised from the end of 1959", writes Neville Maxwell that China proposed to exchange recognition of the Mc Mahon alignment for India's waiver of her Aksai Chin claim and this was seen as China's attempt to "barter" what she held illegally against what she claimed unreasonably. See Neville Maxwell, n. 67, p. 161.

Nehru told the Parliament on 26 April that the Chinese had been prepared to accept the Indian position so far as the eastern sector was concerned, but added that they had "equated it to the western sector". See Jawaharlal Nehru, n. 16, p. 387.

Where the politicians failed to agree, it was naive to

expect that the officials woulS meet eye to eye. When

these teams met in June and September, it was found that

the Chinese position on the border issue was political and

the Indian stand legal. China knew very well that a

strictly juridical approach would help only India. So

what she wanted was a reopening of the whole boundary

question and a political settlement of it. The Chinese

argument was that the India-China border had not been

formally delimited and, therefore, had to be negotiated

between the two governments, and, if necessary, settled

through joint surveys; and the boundary which India

considered legitimate was a legacy of British

imperialism. I 1

The Chinese and Indian positions gradually hardened.

A Chinese note on 4 May 1961, said that Peking will

"absolutely not retreat an inch from its stand" as long as

India refuses to negotiat~e and tries to impose its views

on others". 7 2

It seems that the border conflict could have been

avoided if both sides were less rigid and more ready to

accommodate each other's; interests and points of view.

71. See A. Appadorai and M. S. Rajan, n. 7, p. 135.

72. A rally of dip1omat:ic notes were exchanged during this period. For details, see Neville Idaxwell, n. 67, pp. 233-234.

After a series of mutual accusations of intrusions and

border violations, everits rapidly moved towards a war.

Large-scale Chinese troop movements began in July 1962 7 3

followed by a massive invasion on 20 October 1962, in both

the western and eastern sectors, overwhelming the Indian

posts. 74 India suffered a series of military reverses

on the border. On October 24, Premier Chou En-lai

uniliterally proposed 8 formula for ceasefire and

disengagement, consisting of three points:

(1) Pending a peaceful settlement, both parties must

respect the line of actual control between the two

sides along the entire Sino-Indian border and the

armed forces of each side must withdraw 20 kilcmetres

from this line and disengage;

(2) If the Indian Government agreed to the above

proposal, the Chinese Government was willing to

withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector to

the north of the line of actual control: both China

and India should undertake not to cross the line of

actual control in the middle and western sector; and

73. On the Indian side, after the failure of the Nehru- Chou talks in April 1960, a large number of forward posts were set-up on the Mc Mahon Line. See Ibid., p. 295.

74. See A. Appadorai and M. S. Rajan, n. 7, p. 138

( 3 ) Talks should te held between the Prime Ministers of

India and China at Pekino or Delhi. 75

The Chinese proposal was not acceptable to India.

On the other hand, India made a counter-proposal which

called for the restoration of the status quo as on

8 September 1962, followed by discussions between the two

countries. The Chinese answered by further massive

attacks deeper into Indian territory.

India's Search for Military Aid-- The United States Response

It became suddenly clear that India could not defend

itself from an advancing Chinese army without effective

military aid from the Western powers, particularly the

United States. On 26 October 1962 the Government of India

made an urgent appeal to Washington and London for armed

assistance. "Indeed", it has been pointed out, "the

first consignment of United States arms arrived on 3

November, even though tne formal pact between the two

countries was signed on 14 November. On 19 November, New

Delhi made an urgent and specific request to the United

States for American fighting air suppcrt. 7 6 Perhaps, with

75. Notes, Memoranda, and Letters Exchanqed and Aqreements Signed Between the Governments of India - and China 1954 to 1968 (NMLC VIII) (New Delhi, 19681, p- 1.

76. D. R. Mankekar, - The Guilty Men of 199 (Bombay, 1968), p. 64.

a view to keeping up a semblance of non-alignment between

the Soviet Union and the United States, Nehru directed his

appeal for military assistance generally, and at the same

time emphasised that the Soviet Union had been approached

as well as the United States. 77 The United States claim

that India made a special request to that country 78 wa s

refuted by no less a person than the then Defence

Minister, and Jawaharlal Nehru's close confident

V. K. Krishna Menon. 79

However, there is no denying the fact that the

Kennedy Administration responded sympathetically to

India's predicament. President Kennedy personally wrote

to Nehru expressing sympathy and support. Nehru ' s

forbearance and patience, in dealing with the Chinese,

came in for his special praise. All help was offered to

India. Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith was instrumental

in swinging American policy in favour of India. He

informed the Indian Government that the United States

recognized the Mc Mahon Line as the international border

'sanctioned by modern usage'. This was the first time

77. John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (London, 1969),

78. See A. Appadorai and .Y. S. Rajan, n. 7, p. 139.

79. See Michael Brecher, India and World - Politics: Krishna - %enon's View of the World (London, 1968), pp. 172-173.

that a United States official came out with a clear-cut

statement on the international border. Even now Galbraith

had to overcome the reluctance of the State Department

before he was authorized to endorse the Mc Mahon Line. 80

India accepted the United States military aid. 81

Naturally, this was a set-back for India's policy of non-

alignment. Confrontmed by China's formidable military

power. India had n'o option but to look for external

assistance. Nehru re,alized that idealism had no place in

international relati'ons and it was power that mattered.

India's security interests dictated a reassessment of non-

alignment. Nehru was convinced of the need of following a

more realistic foreign policy. This realization, of

course, dawned on him cnly after the discovery of the

threat from China. Nehru had always explained his earlier

resistance to acceptance of foreign military aid by

pointing out that to incur such dependence upon other

governments would inevitably entail a reduction of India's

independence. But now he was forced to compromise on that

principled stand. This, Nehru did, with great reluctance,

as evidenced by his einbarrassment to do business with the

military mission sent to India by the State Department in - - --

80. For details, see J. K. Galbraith, n. 77, pp. 440-488.

81. See, Department of State statement on 17 November 1962, "US Extends Military Aid to India". Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXLVII, No. 1223, December 3, 1962, pp. 837-838.

November 19 6 2. 82 The mission, however, prepared the

groundwork for substantial military assistance to India

over the next three years, under an agreement reached soon

between Kennedy and British Prime Minister, Macmillan, at

Nassau.

The United States diplomat Chester Bowles regarded

the emergence of a dy:namic and expansionist China as the

most significant post-war development. He was of the view

that if China advanced towards Southeast Asia, it would

come into direct cocflict with the United States.

Therefore, he advocated the creation of a counter-balance.

This could be achieved if India and Pakistan reached an

understanding on Kashmir. The defence against Communist

China would be "a lot easier if those twc countries would

pull together". 83 But this United States strategy did not

work and Pakistan turned to be bitterly critical of United

States military aid to India. Pakistan took it as a

direct threat to its own security.

82. Roger Hilsman, a member of the high-level mission headed by Averell Harriman, despatched to India, by President Kennedy to assess India's military needs, observed that "Nehru's letters to Kennedy asking for help had painted a desperate picture, but face to face Nehru seemed to want to avoid talking about it at all". He added: "it must have been difficult for Nehru to areet Americans over the ruins of his lona < -. 2

pursued policy of neutralism". See Roger Hilsman, No More a Nation: The Politics of Foreiqn Policy in - the Administration of John F . Kennedy (New ~ o r r - - 19691, p. 331.

83. The Hindu, 2 May 1963.

End of Border Fighting

On 21 November 1962, the Chinese announced a

unilateral ceasefire. This decision might have been

influenced by the support openly extended by the United

States to India and the ambivalent stand of the Soviet

Union. It was c1ea.r that the Soviet Union would not

endorse Chinese action and the Soviets desired peace. 84

For the Afro-Asian nations, the Sino-Indian conflict

was a bolt from the blue. To their dismay, they found

that the cause of Afro-Asian unity suffered a rude jolt.

The damage had already been done. Still they did not lose

hope and made a serious effort to bring about a peaceful

resolution of the comfli.ct. A conference of six Afro-

Asian non-aligned countries--Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon (now

Sri Lanka), Egypt, Ghana, and Indonesia--met in Colombc

from 10 to 12 December 1962 and agreed upon certain

principles for the settlement of the disputed issues. 85

The Colomto proposals, however, did not make much headway.

During the period following fighting in the border and

84. Cn 6 November 1'362, First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR, A. N. Ixosygin, made his first comments on the Sino-Indian border war. He regretted the incidents and advised ceasefire and oeaceful negotiations to resolve the dispute. cited by S. P. Yadav, India-China Relations--Soviet -- Reactior. - (New Delhi, 198v, p. 5.

85. For further details, see A . ~ppadorai and M. S. Rajan, n. 7, p. 139.

Nehru's death (1962-1964), no appreciable improvement was

registered in Sino-Indian relations. The general trend of

relations during this period remained unfriendly. There

was no substantial improvement in each other's stand on

the disputed border. And no serious effort was made by

either side to settle the border question peacefully and

normalize bilateral relations.

China in South Asia-Pakistan's Attitude and Policy

By the end of the fifties, the Chinese People's

Republic was able to project a formidable presence in

South Asia. 86 Her relations with India were far from

being cordial. She was well-entrenched in Tibet and the

world appeared to acquiesce in the consolidation of

Chinese authority in Tibet. Pakistan's reaction was very

cautious and typical of early Pakistani attitude towards

China. Pakistan also declared that it would be neutral in

this matter, and it abstained from participating in the

United Nations discussions on the Tibetan appeal against

Chinese forcible occupation of Tibet. 8 7

In fact, Pakistan had no definite China policy in the

early 1950s. Pakistan had been quick in granting

86. Bhabani Sen Gupta, n , 56, P - 1 3 4 .

87. P. L. Bhola, Pakistan-China Relations (Jaipur, 1986), p. 64.

diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China

and Pakistani press had been critical of United States

non-recognition. Even while publicly advocating China's

admission to the United Nations, Pakistan showed its

double face by voting in the Steering Committee of the

General Assembly in favour of a United States resolution

to exclude the question from the United Nations agenda. 88

To begin with, Chinese attitude was also not

favourable. Mao Tse-tung treated the first Ambassador

from Pakistan as a nominee of the British King. 89

It seemed that the Chinese communist leadership regarded

Pakistan as a protege of imperialism. During 1952-55,

they had doubts about Pakistan's intentions in entering

into military alliances. While replying to Mohammed Ali

Bogra's congratulatio~ns on the successful conclusion of

the Geneva Conference, Chou En-lai expressed the hope that

Pakistan would not join any United States-sponsored

attempt to create spLit and antagonism among the Asian

nations. On 14 August 1954 responding to the wish

expressed by the Pakistan Government in developing "happy

and harmonious" relations with China, Chou En-lai -- -

88. Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale - (London, 19741, p. 10. For Pakistani advocacy of People's China's case, see the Pakistani delegl;te ~ohammed Zafarullah Khan's statement in the UN General Assembly, September 15, 1950, as reported in Dawn, 26 September 1950.

89. Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 56, P. 112.

suggested that Pakistan and China should not only enhance

their economic and cultural relations but they should also

develop "relations of peaceful co-operation' in the

political field by striving towards "the building up of

collective peace in Asia and the further relaxation of

international tensions". 90

It was at Bandunqgl that the Chinese and Pakistani

Governments mooted significant steps to improve bilateral

relations. China assured Pakistan of its enduring

friendship here and stated firmly that China apprehended

conflict of interests with India very soon. 92 Chinese

friendship was a shot in the arm for Pakistan, which, in

an ebullient mood went t.o the extent of lambasting the

Soviet Union for its 'expansionist' policy in Asia and

Africa. Mohammed Ali Bogra observed that "Soviet Union

was an imperialistic nation with statellites which had

90. News Bulletin of the Chinese Embassy (New Delhi), 23 August 1954, pp. 4-5.

91. The Bandung Conference in April 1955 sponsored by India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) was attended by a number of Asian countries. The conference formulated the urgent tasks of uniting .Afro-Asian countries and solving the major issues of international development. The conference reaffirmed the Asian countries' determination to fol.10~ the principles of peaceful co-existence, struggle against colonialism, strong Afro-Asian solidarity on anti-imperialist basis and promote the strengthening of peace.

92. Sangat Singh, Pakistan's Foreiqn Policy (Delhi, 1970), p. 107.

brought many people under its heel". But in case of

China, he continued, "We have the friendliest relations

with China; China is not certainly imperialistic, she

has not brought any other country under her heel. 93 It

appeared that Pakistan drew a distinction between China

and the Soviet Union and considered China as a peace-

loving nation. The c~~mpl.iment from a newly independent

Asian country naturally helped to enhance Chinese standing

in the fro-~sian community.

Thus a new chapter of Sino-Pakistani friendship was

opened at Bandung. However, there was some anxiety in

Chinese circles about t:he course of Pakistani policies on

account of some anti-communist and extremely pro-West

stances taken by General Ayub Khan, at the head of a

Martial Law Administration since October 1958. Perhaps,

to impress the United States, Ayub Khan displayed rabid

anti-communism in his domestic and foreign policies.

Communist leaders of Pakistan were imprisoned. Severe

curbs were imposed on the communist Party activities. The

Chinese committee for Afro-Asian solidarity sent a cable

to Ayub Khan protesting against the arrest of Pakistani

leftists and "resolutely demanding their release". 9 4

93. Quoted by George M. Kahin, Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung, 19561, p. 20.

94. Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong), 4 March 1959, p. 39.

The Pakistani actions aimed at demonstrating that

country's willingness to join the United States

wholeheartedly in the anti-communist tirade. In June 1960

in a SEAT0 council meeting Pakistan agreed with the

assessment of other members that the communist challenge

posed "a potential threat to the independence of countries

in the area". 9 5

China obviously wanted to teach Pakistan a lesson.

Adepts, as they were, in using border disputes for

intimidating neighbours and obtaining political advantage,

the Chinese used the card against Pakistan also. A

cartographical claim was made to that part of the

territory regarded by Pakistan as its own in the

undemarcated border area of Gilgit and Sinkiang. 9 6 The

Chinese trick worked and Pakistan was alerted to the

threat lying ahead. President Ayub Khan expressed a

desire for bilateral negotiations for a peaceful

settlement of the northern border and its physical

demarcation. Pakistan might have also hoped for Chinese

support for its claim on Kashmir. China, however, did not

make any commitment. Still the signals from Peking were

encouraging. During the official-level talks between --

95. 9, 3 June 1960.

96. Ibid., 10 October 1959.

China and India held in New Delhi from August to October

1960, the Chinese officials refused to discuss "the

question pertaining to the boundary of the Kashmir state

of India, west of the Karakoram pass on the ground that

these boundaries did not fall within the scope of these

discussions". 97 This was a clear climb-down from the

earlier Chinese stand that the people of Kashmir had

already expressed their will in favour of India. Chou

En-lai had clearly stated this position in 1956. 98 1t is

this flexible Chinese position with regard to Kashmir that

enabled China in the sixties to exploit this volatile

issue not merely to advance its own influence in Pakistan

but also to keep Pakistan wide apart from India. 9 9

As the Sino-Indian border conflagration was brewing,

Pakistan expressed a desire to discuss its own border with

China, probably with the hope that China would not like

confrontation on two fronts. The Chinese responded

positively in December 1960, and asked for a formal

proposal. 100

97. The Indian Official Report (Delhi, 1961), p. 269.

98. See L. P. Singh, India's Foreiqn Policy--The Shastri Period (New Delhi, 19801, p. 10.

99. Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 56, p. 134.

100. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 1 April 1960.

The Chinese wil-lingness for negotiations assumed

significance as the situation in the Sino-Indian border

deteriorated. The frequent clashes on the border

indicated that a collision was in the offing. Pakistan

also noted with concern that the Kennedy Administration's

policy was swinging in India's favour. It feared that

India-United States co-operation for countering the

Chinese threat would ultimately work to the detriment of

Pakistan's place in the United States schemes. Ayub Khan

felt that "friends" and "non-friends" were considered on

the same level by the United States. Secondly, India's

liberation of Goa in 1961 caused great disquiet to

Pakistan; the failure of NATO to come to Portugal's help

brought home the point that membership in military

alliances was no guarantee of support. The Pakistani

press came out with a severe criticism of Western inaction

and urged Pakistan to pull out of SEAT0 and CENT0 and seek

closer ties with China. Ayub Khan told United States

correspondents in July 1961, on the eve of his state visit

that the small countries of Asia might turn to China for

protection if it became overwhelmingly strong. lo* This

was followed by a review of the China policy of Pakistan.

101. See Russel Brines, The 1ndo-Pakistani Conflict (London, 19681, p. 1 5 5 7

102. Girilal Jain's despatch from Karachi, Times of India, 12 July 1961.

Unmindful of United States displeasure, Pakistan voted for

China's admission into the United Nations in December

1961. This gesture prompted China to reply to a Pakistani

note in which a request was made to start a dialogue to

define the boundary bet:ween Pak-occupied Kashmir and

Sinkiang. China formally conveyed its willingness for

border negotiations in February 1962. 103

The climate for a shift of foreign policy in favour

of a close understanding with China was building-up in

Pakistan. A Dawn editorial on 14 May 1962 even talked

of scrapping the capitalist pattern, "imported along with

American dollars", t:o seek "different alignments". A

leading Pakistani intel-lectual, after a visit to China in

1960, wrote a series of articles in - Dawn reminding

Pakistan that China was not only an important neighbour

but a potential world power. 104

Sino-Pakistani border negotiations were conducted in

a very cordial atmosphere for the joint communique to

state that there was the :need to "locate and align their

common border in the Sinkiang-POK section". lo5 President

Ayub Khan was very much impressed by the accommodation

shown by the Chinese side in the negotiations. He said he

104. M. A. H. Ispahani's articles, cited by B. N. Goswami, Pakistan and China (Bombay, 1971), p. 77.

105. Dawn, 5 May 1962.

would even be willing to consider a friendship treaty with

People's China. 106

The Sino-Indian border clash, which elicited

sympathetic support from the United States and the public

neutrality of the Soviets, fundamentally realigned

relations in South Asia, which in turn accelerated a

border agreement that was signed on 2 March 1963, in which

Pakistan "ceded to China 10,000 km of Indian territory in

Pak-occupied Kashmir". 107

It was significant that China itself did not concede

Pakistan's right to sign the border agreement as final:

and Pakistan concurred with it since it had no option.

Article I of the Sino-Pak border agreement affirmed only

that the defence of the area contiguous to Sinkiang was

under the control of Pakistan. Article 6 of this

agreement, concluded by %. A. Bhutto, stated:

The two parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the Government of the PRC in the boundary . . . .

The agreement was to hold in its present form only in the

event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan. 108

106. The Pakistan T i r ~ (Lahore), 2 July 1962.

107. See Sino-Pak "Aqreemenc, 2 March 1963, Some Facts (Government of India, New Delhi, 1963).

108. Jasjit Singh, "Siachen Glacier: Fact and Fiction," Strateqic Analysis, October 1989, p. 707.

The rapid development of political relations between

Pakistan and China, which was greatly accelerated by the

successful conclusion of the border agreement made

Pakistani leaders confident about their security

environment. On 17 July 1963 while defending the

country's foreign policy in the National Assembly, Bhutto

declared:

An attack from India on Pakistan is no longer confined to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistar~. An attack by India on Pakistan involved the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in Asia, and therefore this new element and this new factor brought in the situation a very important factor. I would not at this stage like to elucidate any further on this matter, but suffice to say that the national interest of another state itself is involved in an attack on Pakistan.[l09]

Bhutto's statement pointed to a security understanding

between Pakistan and China. There were also speculations

that China and Pakistan had entered into a security

alliance against India. Bhutto, in his subsequent

statements, denied that Pakistan had concluded a security

pact with China. But all the same, he continued to assert

that the two countries had come closer to each other

on account of "impel-ling considerations of national

security". Again, in October 1963, in the United

109. Pakistan, National Assembly Debates, 11 (17 July, 1963), p. 1666.

110. x, 13 September 1963

States, at a press rzzferance, on being asked whether

China had promised to help Paicistarl in case it is attacked

by India, he said:

There is no assurance, there is no agreement between China and Pakistan on this matter . . . but there is a strong assumption. He added that in case of c!onflict the area's geopolitics might come into play, z it was not possible to predict exactly how the situation would develop. [ 111 J

The Chinese position was still more intriguing, In

its anxiety to befriend Pakistan, China was willing to

excuse that country's membership in the anti-communist

alliances. In July 1963 when a Pakistani delegation was

in China, Chou En-lai told it that China would defend

Pakistan throughout the world as Pakistan defended China

in the CENT0 and SEATO. Again, during his visit to

Pakistan in February 1.964 Chou En-lai expressed his

solidarity with Pakistan and expressed the hope that the

Kashmir question would be solved in accordance with the

wishes of the people of Kashmir, as pledged to them by

India and Pakistan. Ayub Khan agreed with Chou En-lai

that the United 1Wations could not be considered

representative of mankind without China. In this context,

Pakistan extended support. to China on Taiwan. 113

- 111. Morninq News - (~arachi), 9 October 1963. 112. London Observer, 21 July 1963.

113. P. L. Bhola, n. 87, pp. 115-i16.

The 1965 India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir put

China-Pakistan relations to an acid test. Pakistan

naturally expected China to prove its worth as a reliable

friend in its hour of ne&. It actually expected a direct

Chinese interve~tion in the war. But as events finally

turned out, Pakistan found to its dismay that Chinese

policies remained as enigmatic as ever.

The Aftermath of the Border War

The military reverses of October-November 1962 dealt

a severe blow to India's international standing. India's

non-alignment was put to an acid test and found want ing in

ensuring the nation's security. The war also came as a

shot in the arm for Pakistan to cultivate a security

relationship with China. The Sino-Soviet relations

suffered a jolt as China felt that the Soviet Union did

not extend to it the moral and political support due to a

communist 'brother'. 114

The timing of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war,

however, caused Soviet Union a great deal of

114. The Peoples' Daily came out with the famous editorial entitled "The Origin and Development of the Differences Betwssen the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves", on September 6, 1963. It said: "Even after large-scale armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border began in the autumn of 1962, the leadership of the CPSU has continued to extend military aid to the Indian reactionaries", (Peking, 1963).

embarrassment. It came at the height of the Cuban missile

crisis and the Soviet Union, at that time, was not in a

position to risk a major feud with China. Soviet Union

was very cautious in its public pronouncements. Tt gave

approval to the PRC position and ceasefire proposals.

Khrushchev regarded the unilateral Chinese ceasefire and

withdrawal as "reasonable" and. added, "we are most happy

about this and welcome such actions by our Chinese

comrades". But this welcome was tempered with strong

criticism of the Chinese action. Khrushchev said in a

speech at Bucharest "The Soviet Union, too, had her own

frontier problems, but she approached them in a reasonable

way". The reference was to the Soviet-Iranian boundary

dispute, but reading between the lines, it was clear that

Khrushchev pointed his accusing finger at what he

considered as an irresponsible Chinese action.

In short, the Indian sub-continent, after the border

war, presented a very different scenario. China became a

major factor in the security considerations of this area.

It remained a major threat to India's security. India

continued to perceive China as an ambitious, arrogant, and

militarily powerful neighbour with whom India might

eventually have to have a day of reckoning. Pakistan, -

115. Quoted by Neville Maxwell, n. 67, p. 281.

India's most immediate security concern, became China's

most reliable friend and ally. Pakistan was expected, as

India anticipated, to act in concert with China so as to

divide Indian military forces by presenting New Delhi with

the possibility of tension on two fronts. This threat was

very real in the 1965 India-Pakistall War. As for the

United States, it continued to be satisfied with only a

peripheral role in South Asia. It also did not take

serious exception to Pakistan's friendship with China.

President Ayub Khan visited the United States in December

1965 and explained to President Johnson "the geopolitical

compulsions" which obliged him to cultivate China's

friendship. Johnson evidently accepted this plea, as Dawn

reported from Washington at the time. 116

Changes in Soviet policy towards South Asia were

subtle but crucial. It seriously noted Pakistan's

disenchantment with the United States. At the same time

growing China-Pakistan friendship was a matter of concern

for her. A major foreign policy task was to curtail

Chinese influence in the South Asian region, by weaning

away Pakistan from the Chinese orbit. Soviet Union's

relations with India were already very cordial. Nehru

himself believed that though the Soviet Union had taken a

116. See Dilip Mukerjee, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, Quest for Power (Delhi, 19721, p. 53.

neutral stand on the border conflict, her neutralism had a

slant in favour of India. 11' He noted the worsening of

the Sino-Soviet rift and thought that a shift in policy,

effected after the commencement of armed conflict, was

temporary and a resultant of expediency. The 1965

conflict between India and Pakistan, gave the Soviet Union

the next opportunity to spell out its foreign policy

preferences in the South Asian region. It acquitted itself

very well in the direction of that policy.

117. Nehru, however, was in for a shock, on receipt of a letter from Khrushchev, warning against taking up arms to settle the boundary dispute. A Pravda editorial on the conflict was also quite disappointing for India. See Neville Maxwell, n. 67, pp. 365-366.

118. For Nehru's assessment of Soviet Policy, see The Hindu, 1 November 1962. -