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    AKillIsaKillsymmetrically ttacking

    UnitedStates irpower

    MICHAEL A.O HALLORAN,MAJOR,USMCSchoolofAdvancedAirpowerStudies

    t Ul Sfcae4muifTft

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    AKillIsaKillsymmetrically ttackingUnitedStates irpowerMICHAELA .O'HALLORAN,MAJOR,USMCSchoolofAdvancedAirpowerStudies

    THESISPRESENTEDTOTHEFACULTYOFTHESCHOOLOFADVANCEDAIRPOWERSTUDIES,

    MAXWELLAIRFORCEBASE,A L A B A M A ,FORCOMPLETIONOFGRADUATIONREQUIREMENTS,ACADEMICYEAR1998-99.

    A irUniversityPressMaxwellA irForceBase,Alabama

    October2000

    DISTRIBUTIONSTATEMENTADistributionUnlimited

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    ThisSchoolofAdvancedAirpowerStudiesthesisisavailableelectronicallyatheirUniversityResearchwebitettp://research.maxwell.af.mil underResearchPapers thenSpecialCollections.

    Disclaimer

    Opinions,conclusions,andrecommendat ionsexpressed orimpliedwithinaresolelythoseofth e authoranddono tnecessar i lyrepresentth ev iewsofA irUniversity,th eUnitedStatesA irForce,th eDepar tmentofDefense,oranyotherUSgovernmentagency.Clearedfo rpublicrelease:dis-tr ibut ionunlimited.

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    ContentsChapter age

    DISCLAIMER ABSTRACT uA B O U TTHEA U T H O R iA C K N O W L E D G M E N T S ix

    NTRODUCTIONNotes 62S Y M M E T R I CRESPONSESA TTHEPOLITICALLEVEL9Notes3S Y M M E T R I CRESPONSESA TTHEOPERATIONALLEVEL 25Notes4S Y M M E T R I CRESPONSESA TTHETACTICALLEVELNotes5ONCLUSIONSNotes

    IllustrationsTable

    symmetricStrategies

    PhotographsUSSDwightD .EisenhowerandAmericaTransitSuezCanal

    iu

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    bstractA sthetwentiethcenturycloses,effortstowardsorganizing,training,andequip-pingUnitedStatesUS)airpowerassetsremainbasedontheassumptionofface-

    to-faceconventionalconfrontations.Thisisacomfortinghypothesis,asU Stech-nologicaluperiorityshouldkeepheoddstackedinourfavorfordecadesocome.A irstrategistsmaybeoverlookingthefact,however,hatthisverytech-nologicaluperioritymayorceadversariesocounterU Sairpowerwithotherthanconventionalmethods.Couplethiswiththestrongpossibilitythatthein-terestsof theUnitedStatesandouropponentswilllikelybefoundonoppositeendsofthepectrumofwar,andU Sairpowercouldbeinforsomeurprises.ThistudyanalyzestheasymmetricthreattoU Sairpoweracrossthepolitical,operational,andtacticallevelsofwarandexamineswhethertheUnitedStateshasadequatelyprepareditselftocounterasymmetricalmeasuresagainst itsair-powerassets.Theanswersarenotreassuring.U Sairpowerisnotlikelytoover-whelmtechnologicalcapabilitybyincreasing frictionlevelsandchangingourvi-sionsofurgicalwarfarentoanattritioneality.Theywillattemptonflictvirtualattrition aswellbychangingU Stargetingstrategiesandreducingoureffectivenesswhilebuyingthemselvestimetoattaintheirobjectives.nthisre-spect,U Sairpowercanbestrategicallydefeated.

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    bouttheuthorM ajMichaelA.O'HalloranisanativeofStateCollege,Pennsylvania,andwascommissioned throughtheUnitedStatesMarineCorps in1983.AfterattendingtheMarineCorpsBasicSchool,heproceededtoCampPendleton,California,and wasassignedtoMarineLightAttackHelicopterSquadron367whereheflew AH-1J,A H-1W ,andUH-1Nhelicoptersfrom1986throughJune1993.DuringthisperiodhecompletedanumberofoverseasdeploymentsoncludeerviceinOperationsDesertShieldandDesertStorm.A1994honorgraduateoftheJSMCAmphibi-ousWarfareSchool,heservedasaninstructoratMarineAviation WeaponsandTacticsSquadronOne,Yuma,Arizona,until1997whenhewasransferredtoMaxwellA irForceBase,Alabama,toattendA irCommandandStaffCollege.H ehasabachelor'sdegreeinaccountingfromPennsylvaniaStateUniversity.MajorO'Halloranisaweaponsandtacticsinstructor,aviationsafetyofficer,andflightleaderandhasloggedover2,900flighthours.InJune1999hewasassignedtotheMarineAir-GroundTaskForceStaffTrainingProgramatQuantico,Virginia.

    uu

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    cknowledgmentsIacknowledgeseveralpeoplefo rtheirsupportandhelp.IthankColB.C.Miller,thedentistattheMaxwellA irForceBasehospitalwhogavemetheideafo rthispaperashefilleda cavityalmosttw oyearsago.Fittingly,theresearchprocesswasinmanywaysverysimilartodentalwork.IthankDr.JamesS.Corumfo rhisguid-anceintheinitialorganizationofthisprojectandhisinsightandadvicethroughitsmanypermutations.Also,LtColWrayR.ohnson,UnitedStatesA irForce,aMarineatheart,continuously helpedmedigdeeperintomysubjectwhilepro-vidingsoundeditorialadvice.AlwaysinthebackgroundwasD r.DavidR.Mets,whohasforgottenmoreaboutairpowerthanmostmenhaveeverlearned,yethasetainedenoughojustifiablywarrantclassificationasanationalasset.thankmywife,Candice,orherloveandsupportandmyyoungsons,MichaelandTommy,ortheirconstantdistractionsandremindersofwhatisreallyim-portantinlife.

    IX

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    ChapterIntroduction

    Foroverathousandyears,Romanconquerorsreturning fromthewarsenjoyedthehonorofatriumph,atumultuousparade...Theconquerorrodein atriumphalchar-iot Aslavestoodbehindtheconquerorholdingagoldencrownandwhisperinginhisearawarningthat al lgloryis fleeting.

    G e nGeorgePattonInthespringof1991,followingagreatvictory,Americangeneralsledaparadeoftheirowninournation'scapitol.HeldostensiblytohonorthemenandwomenwhoparticipatedinOperationDesertStorm,theparadeclearlycelebratedtwoadditionalaccomplishments:irst,hattheAmeri-

    canmilitaryhadfinally riditselfoftheVietnamWar'sself-doubtingshack-les;andsecond,thatthecountrynowstoodaloneastheworld'sonlysu-perpower.TheUnitedStates(US)militaryhadonceagainarrivedatcenterstageandwasrevelinginthemoment.nthedinofcongratulationsandemotion,Rome'sslavewouldhaveneededabullhorntoissueanywarn-ings;andastheensuingdecadehasunfolded,U Sforceshavecontinuedtoprepareorwarn mannerhatargelyanticipatesDesertStormredux.Butiftherestoftheworldlearnedanythingfromthatconflict,twaspreciselythattheUnitedStatesshouldnotfightalongconventionallines.1A sa1992studydescribestheactionsoffutureenemies,H ewillnomoreseektoconfrontU.S.poweronU.S.ermshanDavidwouldhavegoneoutagainstGoliathwithaswordandhield. 2Althoughournextadver-sarymaynotbefamiliarwiththeO ldTestament,heU Smilitarycanig -norethecomparisonatitsownperil,asasymmetricoptionsmaybetheonlymethodavailabletoafo einconflictwiththeUnitedStates.Longago,theU SMarineCorps(USMC)rightfullyclaimedthetitlefirsttoight ;ndohisday,ewdoubthebilityoftheU SM Coprojectpoweratamoment'snotice.Increasingly,however,U Sairpowerassetsarethefirst(andsometimesonly)orcesthatseeactionwhendecisionmak-ersoptforamilitarysolution.nthewakeof thePersianGulfWar,hereisanalmostuniversalexpectationthatU Smilitaryactionwillbeginwithatrategicairampaign.3Withheombinationoftealthyaircraft,precision-guidedmunitions(PGM),globalreach,andstunningtechnolog-icalcapability,hefutureof airpowerwillcarrywithittheexpectationtodeliveronitseternalpromiserapid,low-casualty,anddecisivevictory.

    TheQuestionInthisstudy, examinehowwellthispromisewillbekeptif anenemyfightsinalessthanconventionalmanner.Specifically,Iexaminewhether

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    theU Smilitaryhasadequatelypreparedtselftocounterasymmetricalmeasuresagainstitsairpowerassets.BackgroundandSignificanceoftheProblem

    Nonconventionalorasymmetrictacticsarenotnewtothefair-fightingpractitionersofWesternwarfare,butheyhave lwaysbeenhated.TheancientGreeks,whopreferredheirightingace-to-face,iewedhosewhofoughtfromafarwithuniversaldisdainskirmishers,javelinthrow-ers,andaboveall,archers.4TheGreeksleftanindeliblestamponWesternsocietywiththeircontri-butionsoivics,aw ,andgovernment.Theirinfluenceonmodernwar-fareisequallystrikingandinsomeeyes,disturbing.InTheWesternWayofWar:InfantryBattlein AncientGreece,VictorDavisHansonexploresthisissuendetail.AlthoughtheGreekconventionoflimitingwarstrictlytocombatanthoplitesisnotrelevanttoday,hespiritofHellenicwarfareisaliveandwellinthemindsofWesternstrategists.5AccordingtoHanson,althoughheGreeksventuallyealizedhatpitchedbattlewasnot l-waysthemostefficientformofwar,uchfightingretaineditsusefulnessbyprovidingadecisiveandglorious)conclusion. TheGreek'starkwayofbattleleftuswithwhatisnowaburdensomelegacyintheWest:apresumptionthatbattleunderanyguiseotherthanano-nonsensehead-to-headconfrontationbetweensoberenemiesisorshouldbeunpalatable. 6TheClausewitzianquestfordecisivebattleandheprinciplesof wartaughtthroughouttheprofessionalmilitaryeducationystemaredirectdescendantsofGreekculture.A staughtbytheU Smilitary,theprinciplesofwarareessentiallyacookbookapproachtocorralanyenemyintoapo-sitionwhereAmericanfirepowercanbebroughttobearsowecandestroyhim,eturntothenormalstateofpeace,andgohome.Theseprinciplesssumehatbattlefieldvictoryselevantntself,makingfewallowancesforanenemywhopracticesa livetofightanotherday strategy,and,hroughsheerobstinacyandwill,urvives.FormanyintheU Smilitary,thedisturbinglegacyofthe VietnamWarisnotthatwefailedtorecognizethetruenon-Westernnatureoftheconflict,butratherthatpoliticiansprohibitedwarfightersfromfullyapplyingtheprinciplesofwartoourenemy.7Inmanyways,AmericanscontinueoviewlimitedwarasheBritishdidacenturyagowhentamingtheAfricancolonies.AsJohnElliswritesinTheSocialHistoryoftheMachineGun, Regularsoldierswhowentover-seas regardedtheAfricansasweirdeccentrics,hardlyevenhumanbe-ings,theywouldlookoncolonialwarfareasanamusing diversionwithlit-tleincommonwithrealwar. 8Technology(i ntheformoftheMaximgun)wasagodsendforthesegoodcitizensoftheworld:Inancienttimescivilizedcommunitiesouldhardlydefendhemselvesagainstpoorandbarbarousraces. nourdayitisthepoorandbarbaroustribeswhoareeverywhereatthemercyofthewealthyandcultivatednations. 9Certainly,theBritishtooktheirsenseoffairplaytoanywartheywaged,andthistoohasfirmrootsintheU Smilitary.WhilesuperintendentoftheU SMilitaryAcademyatWestPoint,GenDouglasMacArthurorderedthefollowingverseinscribedontheportaloftheschoolgymnasium:

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    Uponthefieldsoffriendlystrifearesowntheseedsthat,uponotherfields,onotherdayswillbearthefruitsofvictory.10Teamwork,camaraderie,andespritdecorpshaveadefiniteplaceinanyconflict;butalsoimplicitinthequatrainistheconceptofsportsmanship.OneoftheprimaryreasonsAmericansdisdainguerrillas,errorists,andirregularsisthattheydonotfightfair. Timeandagainthedirty ac-ticsofthesegroupsurpriseheAmericanmilitary,yetittlesearnedfromtheexperience.11Whenthenextconflictarises,AmericansassumethattheMarquisofQueensburyrulesarebackineffect.Withtheinertiaof2,500yearsofWesternculturebehindit,thereislit-tlewonderheU SmilitaryisrequentlyhockedwhenwardiffersromWesternexpectations.Whileairpoweradvocatesviewtheirtoolasrevolu-tionary,theyhaveactuallydonelittlemorethansecureanicheinthecon-ventionalWesternwayofwagingwar.ik eheGreeks,irtrategistsyearnfordecisiveness.Towardsthatend,heUnitedStateshasinvestedingenerationaftergenerationofthefinesttechnologyavailabletofind,fix,target,rack,nddestroyournemies.Butwhenonfrontedwithheskirmishers,javelinthrowers,andarchersofthewentiethcentury, ir-powerhasbeenfarlessthandecisive.Asthiscenturycloses,manypunditsspeculatethat withtheadventofnuclearweaponsandglobalinterdependence,Western-stylewarhasbe-comeextinct.ButasHansonwarns,'ThelegacyoftheGreeks'battlestylelingerson,anarcoticthatwecannotputaway. 12Thefutureof warfarecannotbeseeninthehulksof Iraqitanks;ratheritcanbefoundlurkinginHaitianslums,Albanianvillages,andIslamicpressurecookers.nthenextcentury, irtrategistswillcontinueoearchordecisiveesults;butheymayfindgreateruccessftheydependmoreontheadviceofpsychologists,ociologists,andlinguistsandlessontargeteersandtech-nologists.LimitationsofThisStudy

    Thesymmetricesponseo irpowerwillbeasvariedasheistofAmerica'spotentialadversaries.Findingtheanswer totheproblemwouldassumethatallasymmetricresponsescanbeidentified.Suchapremisewouldbefaulty,andIwillnotattempttoconstructacomprehensivelaun-drylistof likelyasymmetricmeasures.ndeed,omeoftheseresponses,suchastheuseofweaponsofmassdestructionfWMD),havereceivedsomuchattention intheliteratureonsecuritystudiesthatitwouldmakelit-tlesensetocoverthemhere.Whetheremployedagainstairfields,people,orports,theW M Dproblemisavexingone,anditappearsinvirtuallyalloftoday'swargames.PerhapshispointsoagreaterissueconcerninghowAmericansviewtheasymmetricthreat.W M Drepresentatechnologi-calhreathatcanultimatelybeounteredwithechnology.AlthoughAmericansareuncomfortablewithW M Duse,heyareathomegrapplingwithproblemsthatcanbeboundedbybudgetsandscience.13Inasimilarvein,heburgeoningtopicsofinformationandspacewar-farewillnotbediscussed.nChallengingtheUnitedStatesSymmetrically

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    andAsymmetrically:CanAmericabeDefeated?LloydJ.Matthewsassertsthat ourtechnologicalapparatushasfaroutstrippedourabilitytosecureit,whilegovernmentandpubliccomplacencyisendemic. 14Withthetu-multuoushangesanddual-usenatureofinformationandpaceys-tems,asymmetricthreatoptionsabound;but,asaU SMarinemorecom-fortablewithmarchinghanmegabytesandmoonhots,hepecificityandjargonofthesefieldsmakethemtoodauntingforthisauthortoenter.Whileiscussingomeechnologicallyasedsymmetrichreats,hefocusismainlyonideasthatmayappearinanenemy'sheadandnotsomuchinhislaboratories.Methodology

    ThistudyxaminesikelysymmetricesponsesoU S irpoweratthreeevels:politicalstrategic),operational,andactical.Eachofthesecategoriessexaminednurn,ultimatelyaddressingaangeofasym-metricthreatsexperiencedfromthepresidenttotheprivate.nthecon-clusion,hisauthorbringstheevidencetogetherandanalyzesitinordertoarriveatageneralanswertothequestion.Underlyingthestudyistheassumptionofalimitedconflict.Whilemanyoftheissuesdiscussedhavevalidtransfervaluetototalwar,manydonot;andsplittinghairsonthisissuewouldbecounterproductive.Whilehistudymayappearobeimplyaonglomerationofthreesmallerresearchprojectsaddressingparticularpheresofwar,tsm-portantthatthisworknotbeinterpretedassuch.Asymmetricstrategiescomplementoneanotherandwillmostlikelybeatworkimultaneouslyfromthepoliticalleveltotheactical.ndeed,asheevidencewillhow,lower symmetricacticsrequentlyranscendheircasteandenderpoliticaleffects.Sinceasymmetrichreatssaubjectareahatecentlyhaseceivedmoderateattention,heexpectationwasoencounteradearthofinfor-mation.However,hiswasnotthecase.AccountsfromtheVietnamWar,Afghanistan,andmorerecentconflictsprovidedawealthofinformation;and,urprisingly,OperationDesertStormdidaswell.Althoughavirtualdefinitionof Western-styleconventionalwar,he991onflictcontainedmanyexamplesofasymmetricmaneuvershatareikelytobeepeated.Likewise,nthepost-cold-warstruggletodiscernthefuture,professionaljournalshaveaddressedtwenty-firstcenturywarfareindepthandinvari-ablydiscusstheissuesinvestigatedherein.Newspapers,periodicals,andtheInternetyieldedagreatdealof timelyinformationaswell.Terminology

    Havingusedthewordasymmetricseveraltimesalready,itwouldbeap-propriateodefinetbeforeproceeding.ThissaaskeasieraidhandonetheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)dictionarydoesnotevenincludetheword.15Webster'sdictionaryisof littlehelpaswell,abelingasymme-tryasanunevendispositiononeachideofanimaginary)centrallineorpoint. 16Onethingiscertain,theconceptoffightingasymmetricallyisasoldaswar itself;anditisnotatechniqueusedsolelybytheunderdog.Forceshavealwaysattemptedtopitstrengthagainstanenemyweakness

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    whenable.17Forthepurposeofthiswork,hedefinitionisnarrowedooneorientedalongthelimitedwarscenariosinwhichAmericafindsitselfincreasinglyinvolved.Asymmetricwarfareisasetofoperationalpracticesaimedatnegatingadvan-tagesandexploitingvulnerabilitiesratherthan engaging intraditionalforce-on-forceengagements.Thencentiveongagensymmetricwarfaresusuallygreatestfortheweakestpartyindefenseagainstastronger(andoftenextra-regional)foe.Asymmetricconceptsandmovesseektousethephysicalenviron-mentandmilitarycapabilitiesinwaysthatareatypicalandpresumablyunan-ticipatedbymoreestablishedmilitaries,husatchinghem ffbalanceandunprepared.18

    ThetermairpowerpresentsdifficultiesaswellwiththeD O Ddictionary-absentadefinition.WilliamBilly Mitchellvaguelyemarkedhat ir-powerwastheabilitytodoomethinginorthroughthe ir. 19Unchar-acteristically,WinstonChurchillfoundhimselfatalossorwordswhenheavowedairpowerishemostdifficultofallformsofmilitaryforcetomeasure,oreventoexpressinpreciseterms. 20Lackingthechutzpah todefinewhatoneofthiscentury'sgreatmindscouldnot,hisauthorwillnotdescribewhatairpoweris ,butsimplylistwhatairpowerconsistsof:pacesystems,ncludingthemeansforplacingobjectsinspace.irystems,othmannedndunmannedixed-wingndotaryplatforms.issilesystemsoperatingfromabove,on,orinthecaseof under-waterplatformsbelowtheurfaceoftheearthagainstargetsnair,inspace,oronthesurface.heommand,ontrol,ommunications,omputers,ntelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissancesystemsthatenablelinkagetoalloftheabovesystems.21PreviewoftheArgument

    A shearmedervicesprepareorhewenty-firstcentury,ffortso-wardorganizing,raining,equipping,andemployingourairpowerassetsremainbasedontheassumptionofface-to-faceconventionalconfronta-tions.Thiss omfortinghypothesis,sU Sechnologicaluperiorityshouldkeeptheoddsstackedinour favorfordecadestocome.Americansoftenoverlookheact,owever,hatheres hinkingandeactingenemywhomaynotbewilling tolieprostrateasweapplyairpowertohim.Byvirtueoftheverytechnologicalsuperioritywearebankingon,wemayforcetheenemytofindnonconventionalmethodstoeventheodds.Inetrospecttheoldwarappearsaimpleime.TheWestmayhavebeenclosetoanuclearshowdownoccasionally,butatleastonecouldseethehandsnheoomsday lockandprepareoraighthatwouldclearlyputournationalurvivalatstake.Tomorrow'sightwilllikelybeverydifferent.WhileAmerica'snationalsurvivalmightnotbeinquestion,theadversary'smayverywellbe;ightingonoppositeendsofthepec-trumofwar,heUnitedStateswillbeinthewar,butnotofit. 22A sGuenterLewyobservesinDeceptionOperations:StudiesintheEast-WestContext,T hecapacityofpeopleinamoderndemocracytosupportalim-itedwarisprecariousatbest.Themixtureofpropaganda andcompulsion

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    thataotalitarianegimeanmusternorderoxactupportsnotavailableoeadersofdemocratictates.Hence,whenawarforlimitedobjectivesdragsonforalongtimeitisboundtolosethepopularbackingessentialforitssuccessfulpursuit. 23Airpowerencountersproblemsnlimitedwarshattechnologycannotreadilycounter.A sevidencedbytheCableN e wsNetwork's(CNN)PeterA r- nettnhe991ersianGulfWarandamall rmyofjournalistsnBaghdadduringOperationDesertFoxinDecember1998,eporterswilloftenbeonheceneobroadcastU Sairattacksasheyhappen.A irstrategistsodaymustanswer myriadofquestionswhenplanningstrike.First,theymustovercomethe traditionalproblemofputtingbombsontargets.Second,heymustweighhowtheirenemywillusethemediatoexploitthebombing.Third,heymustassesshowAmericansathomewillreceivethestrike.Fourth,coalitionimplicationsfromthisstrikemustbeanalyzed.Fifth,thepoliticalimplicationsoflostaircraftandairmenasprisonersofwarmustimilarlybeconsidered.Thesepoliticaldilemmasbecomeweaponsinthehandsofouradversaries.Operationally,uradversariesanakeadvantageoftheiramiliaritywitherrain,ulture,nd limateoakeheightwayromheevelplayingieldataltitudeandntovenueswhichuithembetter.Asym-metricoptionsalreadyseenatthisevelhavencludeddeceptionopera-tions,attacksonparkedaircraft,andurbanwarfare.Atthetacticallevelofwar,menwilldowhatisnecessarytosurvive.So-maliain1993witnessedrocket-propelledgrenadesbringingdownU Shel-icopterswithtrategiconsequences,ndvenhevauntedsraeliA irForcehastshandsiedwhenHizbullaforcesnouthernLebanonmixwithandwinver)heocalpopulation.TheasymmetricattacksonU S airpowerarelikelytorunseamlesslyacrossthespectrumofwarinanef-forttogrinddownourwilltocontinueaconflictinwhichAmerica'svitalinterestsarenotthreatened.Whileomewillbemoreeffectivethanoth-ers,all willbecomehistorylessonsforfutureadversariestodiscardorim-proveupon.U S irpowersnotikelyobedefeatedbyonventionalmeansal-thoughweerventlyequipandrain,wishingouradversarieswouldry.Rather,opponentswillcountertheoverwhelmingtechnologicalcapabilityofU Sairpowerwithomethingevenmorencrediblethehumanbrain.B yincreasingfrictionevelsandchangingourvisionofsurgicalwarfareintoanattritionrealityandcreatingvirtualattritionbychangingtarget-ingstrategies,enemiescangreatlyreduceoureffectivenesswhilebuyingtimeottainheirbjectives.nhisespect,Sirpowermightbestrategicallydefeated.

    Notes1.esAspin,NationalSecurityinthe1990's:DefiningaN ewBasisforU.S.MilitaryForces, paperpresentedtotheAtlanticCounciloftheUnitedStates,Washington,D.C.,6January1992.India'schief ofstaffwasquotedassayingthatthemainlessonoftheGulfWarisneverfighttheU.S.withoutnuclearweapons.2.BruceW.Bennettetal..TheaterAnalysisandModelinginan EraofUncertainty:ThePresentandFutureofWarfare(SantaMonica,Calif.:RAND,994),xvii.

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    3.atrickGarrity,ImplicationsofthePersianGulf WarorRegionalPowers, Wash-ingtonQuarterly,Summer1993,63.

    4.VictorDavisHanson,heWesternWayofWar:InfantryBattlenClassicalGreece(NewYork:AlfredA .Knopf,989),5.

    5.bid.,225.6.bid.,225,xv.7.WrayR.Johnson,War,Culture,andtheInterpretationofHistory:The VietnamWarReconsidered, SmallWarsandInsurgencies,Autumn1998,83-113.8.ohnEllis,TheSocialHistoryoftheMachineGun(NewYork:PantheonBooks,975),102.9.bid.,81.10.tephen.Ambrose,Duty,onor,ountry:AHistoryofWestPointBaltimore:

    JohnsHopkinsPress,966),275.11.RobertLeckie,heWarsofAmerica(NewYork:HarperCollins,992),69-74.The

    USArmybeganhewentiethenturywithguerrillawargainstmilioAguinaldo'sPhilippinensurrectos.Withover4,000Americanskillednahree-yearperiod,oldierswerestunnedbythebarbarictacticsoftheirenemyandbecamewhattheyfought, om-mittingatrocitiesoftheirown,anddistancingtheAmericanpublic'supportfortheon-flict.AKiplingesquepoemfromtheperiodspeaksvolumes:We'vetakenupthewhite man'sburden,ofebonyandbrown;Nowwillyoutellus,Rudyard,howwemayputitdown?12.Hanson,3.

    13.CharlesJ.DunlapJr.,AsymmetricalWarfareandtheWesternMindset, nChal-lengingtheUnitedStatesSymmetricallyandAsymmetrically:CanAmericaBeDefeated?ed.LloydJ.MatthewsCarlisleBarracks,Pa.:USArmyWarCollege,998),6.Dunlapques-tionswhetherWMDisanasymmetricthreatatall:Ininterstatewar,heU.S.hasadeci-siveadvantageinthisarena.naveryrealsense,usingWMDagainsttheU.S. wouldrepresentanill-consideredattempttomatchtheWestsymmetrically.14.bid.,111.

    15.DODDictionaryofMilitaryTerms, JointDoctrine,8March999,n.p.;on-line,Internet,22March1999,availablefromwww.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.16.heNewLexiconWebster'sDictionaryoftheEnglishLanguageNewYork:LexiconPublications,988),58.17.ohnCostello,ThePacificWar1941-1945(NewYork:Quill,982),369-72.Forex-ample,nfantryaremostvulnerablewhenbeingransported.On4November1942,sAdmRaizoTanaka'sdestroyersescorted1apaneseroopransportshroughheNew

    GeorgiaSound theSlot oftheSolomonIslandstheywereattackedbyUSdivebombers,torpedoplanes,B-17s,andurfaceorces.OnlyfouroftheransportsurvivedobeachthemselvesonGuadalcanal;andhesetoowereubsequentlydestroyed,eavingthesur-viving2,000roopswithoutupplies.Asaesultofthisaction,USMarinesonGuadal-canalweresparedthetaskoffightingthousandsofadditionalJapanesetroops.18.aul .Herman,AsymmetricWarfare:izingheThreat, LowIntensityConflictandLawEnforcement,Spring1997,76.19.WilliamMitchell,WingedDefense:TheDevelopment andPossibilitiesofModernAir-

    powerEconomicandMilitary(1925;eprint,NewYork:DoverPublications,981),81.20.RonaldR.Fogleman,Introduction, inAirandSpacePowerintheNew Millennium,DanielGoureandChristopherM .Szara,eds.Washington,D.C.:CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,997),xxvii.21.DanielGourendChristopherM .zara,TheComingofAgefAirandpace

    Power, nAirandSpacePowerintheNewMillennium,DanielGoureandChristopherM .Szara,eds.Washington,D.C.:CenterforStrategicandnternationalStudies,997),3.22.DonaldJ.Mrozek,AsymmetricResponsetoAmericanAirSupremacyinVietnam,inChallengingheUnitedStatesSymmetricallyandAsymmetrically:CanAmericaBeDe-feated? ed.LloydJ.MatthewsCarlisleBarracks,Pa.:USArmyWarCollege,998),80.23.GuenterLewy,DeceptionandRevolutionaryWarfareinVietnam, inDeceptionOp-erations:StudiesnheEast-WestContext,DavidA .ChartersandMauriceA .J.Tugwell,eds.London:Brassey's,989),71.

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    Chapter2AsymmetricResponsesatthe

    PoliticalLevelDiplomatsarejustasessentialtostartingawarasSoldiersareforfinishingit. YoutakeDiplomacyout ofwarandthethingwouldfallflatin aweek.

    WillRogersThedistinctionbetweentherolesofpoliticiansandgeneralsatthe high-estlevelsofwarhasalwaysbeengray,butiftheD O Ddefinitionisanyin-dicator,politiciansplaythemoredominantrole.

    StrategicLevelofWar.Thelevelofwaratwhichanation,oftenasamemberofagroupofnations,determinesnationalormultinational(allianceorcoalition)securityobjectivesandguidance,anddevelopsandusesnationalresourcestoaccomplishtheseobjectives.'

    Thisworkviewshepectrumofwaralongpolitical,operational,andtacticalines.Thewordpoliticalisusednsteadofthemoreraditionalstrategicforclarity.Theabovedefinitionsoundsmuchlikepolitics,awordmostpeoplecanintuitivelydigesteasierthanstrategic.Today,hewordsarepracticallyinterchangeableinanycase.Commandersinchief(CINC)nolongerhavetheautonomyofUlyssesS.Grant,DwightD.Eisenhower,orDouglasMacArthurtoboldlysetstrategiccoursesofaction.Politiciansareinvolvedinifnotdrivingmostcoursesofactioninlimitedwarsduetocoalitionconsiderations,mediaconcerns,orasimpledistrustoftheirmilitarysubordinates.Exacerbatingthistendencyistheincreasingeasewithwhichpoliticianscancommunicatewiththefront,providingtheil- lusionofhavingabetterunderstandingofthewarhanhoseonheground.2Whatevertheeason,tisairtocategorizemostthingsoccur-ringabovetheoperationallevelofwaraspolitical.3Thepoliticalleveliswheretheenemystandshebestchanceofstop-pingU S irpowerbeforeapilotvenwalksohis irplane.A sa994RANDstudyconcluded,althoughourenemywillattempttocounterU Scapabilitiesattheoperationallevel,hewillrealizethathismosteffectiveresponseswillbemadeatthestrategiclevel,bydeterringU Swilltoentertheonflict,byinducingtheU Sodiscontinuenterventionifitoccurs,andbywearingoutU Sresolveandinterest (emphasisinoriginal).4IfthisstrategywillkeepAmericansoutof awar,whatwillkeepAmeri-cansin?DonaldM.SnowandDennisM.DrewprovideonesetofanswersinFromLexingtontoDesertStorm:Warand PoliticsintheAmericanExpe-rience:

    bjectivesmustbeeasilyunderstood.heremustbeamoralappeal.esiredendsthatareimportanttonationalsecurity.erceivedimportancetomostindividualAmericans.5

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    CombiningRAND'strategywithSnowandDrew'sdomesticpoliticaltasksmayrovidehinkingnemywithointfepartureorstymieingheUnitedtateshopefullywhiletillnherehostilitiesmode.ThischapterexamineshowsusceptibleU Sairpoweristosuchanapproachndiscussespecificallyhownemypropaganda,oalitionbreaking,andinfluencesonU Stargetingstrategycanaffectvirtualattri-tiononU Sairpower.

    PropagandaIaskedTomifcountriesalwaysapologizedwhentheyhaddonewrong,andhesays:Yes,helittleonesdoes.

    MarkTwainTomSawyerAbroad

    Ifaskedhedenticaluestionoday,Tomawyerwouldeard-pressedtofieldtheameanswerbecauseinthetwentiethcentury,venLiechtensteinrarelyapologizes.Callitlying,propaganda,orspin,buteversinceyellowjournalistsndheThirdReichndovietUnionaisedmediamanipulationtoanartform,countrieshaveembracedtheideaofusingwordsojustifyandaugmenttheiruseofweaponsandodecryweaponsbeingusedagainstthem.Propagandaisaslipperysubject,andinordertoatleastbeginonaconcretefooting,hefollowingD O Ddefini-tionisprovided.

    Propaganda:A nyformofcommunicationinsupportofnationalobjectives e- signedtoinfluencetheopinions,motions,attitudes,orbehaviorofanygroupinordertobenefitthesponsor,eitherdirectlyorindirectly.6Theecentwork,DeceptionOperations:StudiesnheEast-WestCon-text,claimspropagandaastsown,tating,Propagandaisnotintrinsi-callydeceptive.tisloaded,'meaningthatttendsoelectheactstchoosesoexpose,andhenterpretationstplacesuponhem,oup-portpreconceivedbias. 7Thisstudyincludespropagandaasthefirstex -ampleofasymmetricmethodsbecauseoftspervasivenessnmodernwarfare.Whileheollowingpages itepecificexamplesofadedicatedpropagandacampaign,heuccessofmanyotherasymmetrictrategiesrequiresasolidpropagandaunderpinning.PropagandahasaprovenrackecordagainstU Sirpower;ccord-ingly,heUnitedtatessensitiveowherendwhenombsredropped.TheDecember998haltofOperationDesert oxairtrikesprioroheeginningfRamadansnlyhemostecentxample.PainfullyawarethatIraqwouldcapitalizeontheimageofWesternbombs

    fallingonMuslimsduringthisholymonth,GenAnthonyC.Zinni,U SM C ,CINC,U SCentralCommandU S C E N T C O M ) ,wasonatightcheduleohittargetsbeforeRamadanbegan.WithonlyfourdaysallottedtoseverelydegradeIraqicapability,U SC E N T C O Mwaspresentedwithanalmostim-possiblemission.Hadtheattackscontinued,heIraqiswouldhaveundoubtedlyomittedfromtheiroutragedpressreleasestheKoranicloophole whichpermitsRa-10

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    madantobeignoredinwar.8Indeed,the1973Arab-IsraeliWarinitiatedbytheArabsandknownintheWestastheY omKippurW a r i scalledtheRamadanWarintheMuslimworld.TheUnitedStates'ssensitivitytoanti-Americanpropagandacanresultinchangingviablestrategiesinordertopreemptivelydefuseenemypropagandaopportunities.U Sairpowercanbethebesttrained,organized,andequippedforceintheworld,withaflaw-lesswarplantomatch,andneverbeallowedtogetinthefightorhand-cuffedsoseverelythatairpowerisreducedineffectiveness.NorthVietnam'suseofthemediaduringtheVietnamWarisperhapsthequintessentialexampleof aneffectivepropagandacampaign.RAND'sstrategymatchespicelywithheNorth'spproachoheUnitedStates,whileSnowandDrew'sdomesticpoliticalprerequisitesprovideamenuofoptionsorhenemyoeverageagainsteachtrategicgoal.Lookingattheeftideoftable,NorthVietnam'strategicoptionsarelistedinorderofdescendingpriority.Clearly,heyfailedatstoppingtheUnitedStatesfromenteringtheconflict;andifthelengthofthewarisanyindicator,theirsuccessininducingtheUnitedStatestoquitwasnotverysuccessful,whichleftthemwithoption3wearingoutU Sresolveandin-terestnheonflict.Lookingoheightatdomesticpoliticalequire-mentsandthemannerinwhichtheNorthVietnameseorchestratedtheirpropagandaffort,heyuccessfullyattacked,hroughhemedia,everycategorythatSnowandDrewdeemessential.

    Tab leAsymmet r i cStrategies RA ND sSt ra tegySDomes t icPol i t ica lRequ i remen tsDete rU SWillto EnterCon f l i c tbject ivesEasilyUnders t ood InduceU Sto Discon t i nueIn tervent iono ra lA p p e a lWe a rO utU SReso l veandIn terestesi redEndsImpo r t an tto Nat i ona lSecur i ty Perceived Impo r t anceto Most Amer i cans AttacksonthemoralappealofthewartoAmericanspaidparticularlyhandsomedividends.TheDavidandGoliathstoryfitssowellinanycon-textwhereU Sairpowerispittedagainstaninferiorenemythatitbearsrepeating.NorthVietnamushedhismageelentlesslyoheointwhereittookonalifeofitsownanddirectlycontributedtoitseventualsuccess.TheRussellTribunalisoneexampleofwell-intentionedWesternersun-wittinglyfightingHanoi'sight.LeadbyNobellaureateBertrandRussellandalliedwiththelikesofJean-PaulSartreandStokelyCarmichael,theyunitedondependentlynvestigateheconductoftheUnitedStatesnVietnam.9InM ay967witnesseshargedhatAmericanlyersystematicallyandntentionallybombedNorthVietnamesemedicalfacilities.HospitalsareshownonthemapsoftargetsinthehandsofdownedU.S.pilots (em-phasisinoriginal).10Missingfromthetestimonywasthelogicalpossibil-itythathospitalsweremarkedonthemapspreciselytoensurethattheywerenothit.T opreventthisconstruct,hetestimonywasreportedinthefollowingmanner:Mapswithhospitalsmarkedastargetsonthemhave

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    beenfoundinthepossessionofU SpilotsshotdownoverNorthVietnam(emphasisnriginal).11Noturprisingly,heribunalconvicted heUnitedStatesofawarcrimeandlaterwentonwithother chargestocon-vict onthechargeofgenocideforattemptingtowipeoutawholepeopleandimposingthePaxAmericanaon Vietnam. 12LaterinthewarduringtheLinebackerbombings,heBachM aiHospi-talnHanoiwashitandeceivedgreatmediaattention.Someeportersmanagedtoprovidedetailsinthestoryandrevealedthat thehospitalwaslocated1,000yardsfromtheBachM aiairstripanditsmilitarybarracks,whichwereheavilybombed.13AsDeceptionOperationsnotes,Clearly,communistdeceptivepropagandainhisnstancewasnotacceptedun-

    critically. 14PerhapsnotbyAmericanmedia,buttherestoftheworldeceivedx- tensivecoverageofsuchstories.Accordingtoonecommentator,the iden-tificationofstrategicbombingwiththeUnitedStateshashelpedfuelcon-siderableanti-U.S.sentiment inthe world.AmongintellectualsandmediaofWesternEuropeandthethirdworld,astronganti-Americanbiashasbeenprevalent.TheresaargeandwellpreparedmarketortheworstpossiblestoriesaboutAmericanmilitaryaction. 15

    Ifthedomesticpoliticalrequirementsforawararenotmet,mainstreampoliti-ciansandjournalistswillhelpee dhismarketindditionoorganizationsliketheRussell Tribunal.A tthe1966FulbrightHearingsbeforetheU SSenateForeignRelationsCommittee,AmbassadorGeorgeKennancapturedtherecur-ringdilemmaofU Sairpowerinlimitedwars:venifAmericawoninVietnam,victorywouldbeoffsetbytheimageofAmericansinflicting ...grievousdam-ageonthelivesofapoorandhelplesspeople,particularlyonapeopleofdif-ferentraceandcolor Thisspectacleproducesreactionsamongmillionsofpeoplethroughouttheworldprofoundlydetrimentaltotheimagewewouldlikethemtoholdofthiscountry. 16Thecumulativeoll,whichdirectandndirectpropagandaactionsx-

    actedontheU SconductoftheVietnamWar,wasncreasinglydebilitat-ingtoairpower.By1972whentheChristmasbombings massiveB-52strikescenteredonargetsnandaroundHanoiwereorderedoorceNorthVietnambacktotheParispeacetalks,theU.S.governmentwassoconcernedaboutthepoliticalfalloutresultingfromevenmoderateciviliancasualtieshatomeofthemoreucrativemilitaryargetsoftheLine-backerIcampaignweredroppedromheargetistatherthannflictciviliancasualties. 17Althoughheheoryofstrategicbombingcanracetsootsomanycountries,heUnitedStateshasbecomevirtuallytheolepractitionerinthepost-WorldWarIIworld.Withtheemergenceofairpowerasanalmostuniquenstrumentfowereparaterommoreraditionalmilitarymeans,histendencywillundoubtedlyincrease.Thispecializationhasaprice,however.Dresden,Hiroshima,andheVietnamWarensitizedAmericansandhenternationalommunityothemoralimplicationsofstrategicbombing.Today,questionsaboutair-poweroverkillontheGulfWar'sHighwayofDeath, oreventheuproarovertheinclusionoftheEnolaGayintheSmithsonianInstitution,keeptheissuefreshandavailabletofutureadversaries.

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    CoalitionBustingTheproblemwithalliesistheyoftendevelopopinionsoftheirown.

    WinstonChurchillIntheearlystagesofacrisiswhenplanningcellspickupthecardstheyaredealt,ewaremoremportantandwildasheonesdealingwithcoalitions.Lessformalthananalliance,coalitionsareaforcecomposedofmilitaryelementsof nationsthathaveformedatemporaryallianceforsomespecificpurpose. 18Theoperativewordsareemporaryandspecificpurposetermshatdefydefinitionnunilateralampaigns,muchessthenternationalbazaarwerequentlyeessemblednpost-cold-warlimitedobjectiveoperations.Arecurringepiphanywhenstudyingwarisconfirmationofthebiblicalaphorismhatnothingsnewunderheun.19Coalitionwarfaresstrategyolderthanmost.TheTrojanWarsawbothTroyandGreecein-volvednoalitions.Napoleoncontendedwithaotalofsevendifferent

    coalitionsbalancedagainsthimnnineteenth-centuryEurope,ndheUnitedStateshasbeenacoalitionmemberinvirtuallyalloftheoverseaswarsw ehavefought.20 Thetypicalinternationalrelationstextsaysthathis-toricallycoalitionsandallianceshavebeencreatedfo rthreebasicreasons:rovidesufficientpowertoresistorcarryoutaggression.akeknownopotentialadversariesanalignmentofpowersasaformofdeterrence.ransformcommongoalstoformalcommitments. 21Whilethisisagoodretrospectivetemplate,currenteventswouldindi-catehatinternationalrelationsprofessorshaveomewritingtoo,be-causethesearenolongerthereasonsAmericaestablishescoalitions.Out-sideftandingllianceommitments,heSmilitaryeedsittleaugmentationtodeteranyconventionalthreatsortocarryoutoperationsshoulddeterrencefailindeed,thingswouldprobablygomuchsmootherwithoutacoalition.Whilethereasonslistedaboveplaywellinpublic,theyareeallywindowdressing.CoalitionsbringhreehingsoheUnitedStatestoday:egitimacy,access,andmoney.Althoughtherationalebehindcoalitionsmaybedifferent,thedegreeofdependenceemainsunchanged.EspeciallyfortheUnitedStates,egiti-macyisofparamountimportance.A sa1993articleintheU SArmy'sMil-itaryReviewhighlights,Thequestionoflegitimateuseofforceina worldconsciousofthenormsofinternationallaw,andmoreindependentandlayeredwithoverlappinginternationalorganizations,willdrivenationstoseekalliestohelpjustifytheiruseofforce. 22A sPresident RonaldReagan

    statedduringthe1983U SinterventioninGrenada,Iwas oldthatsixmembersoftheOrganizationofEasternCaribbeanStatesjoinedbyJamaicaandBarbadoshadsentanurgentrequestthatwejointheminamilitaryoperationtorestoreorderanddemocracytoGrenada. 23Althoughegitimacysofparamountmportanceograndtrategists,forairpoweraccessseverything.GlobalReachGlobalPowerisnotanemptyslogantotheU SA irForceUSAF):heabilitytotrikeanywhere,13

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    anytimebyU S A Fassetshouldnotbediscounted.24However,orae-gionalCINCwithawarplanhatmaydictatedailyortieatesnhethousands,DiegoGarciaandWhitemanA irForceBase,Missouri,willal-waysbeveryfaraway.25Theogistics,erialefueling,divert,andover-flight plansbehindthelaunchingofanintertheaterstrikecompriseanim-pressiveyetfragilearrangementthatcaneasilycollapse.Accessmeansairbases,ndairbasesmeanorties,empo,ndparallelwarfareevery-thingtheU S A Fisoptimizedfor.Modernwarfareisincrediblyexpensive.TheGulfWarcostanestimated$61illion.26While-117sndAbramsanksepresentnnduringimageoftheconflict,a lesspublicizedpictureistheoneofUncleSamwithhishatinhandaskingforcontributions.Nevertheless,ourfund-raisingeffortswereffective,withheUnitedStatesonly avingopickupsevenbilliondollarsworthof thetabJapanandGermanycontributedatotalof$16billion).27Whatifwehadonlybeenabletoraisehalfofthatamount,ornone?Wouldpoliticiansreallybewillingtofundsuchabillforawarwithverylimitedobjectives?Ifthewarturnsbloody,willAmericancitizensolerateheiroldiersdyingasmercenariesorwell-payingbutnonfightingpartnersnJapanandGermany?Coalitionscanometimesprovidethetransfusionof moneytheUnitedStatesneedstofightinlim-itedwars;ffornootherreason,heyarehigh-payofftargetsforourad-versaries.Sincecoalitionsarecentraltomakingmodernmilitarystrategieswork,whatcananenemydooakeoneapart?Unfortunately,anexamplesreadilyvailable.nhallenginghenitedtatesymmetricallyndAsymmetrically,tephenC.elletieredescribesventsnhewinterof1997-98whenraqeducedapowerfuloalitionntoheUnitedStatesactingasalargelyunilateralaggressor. 28ThetorybeginsnOctober1997whenSaddamHusseinbannedur-therUnitedNationsUN)weaponsinspections.AstheUnitedStatespre-paredoraonfrontation,addambackedwayromhebrinknD e- cember.VictoryfortheUnitedStates?OnlyasuperficialonebecausetheUnitedStatestoodatthebrinkwithoutacoalition.Russia,China,andFrancefellowUNSecurityCouncilmembersdisassociatedthemselves,whileonlyKuwaitjoinedtheUnitedStatesfromtheArabworld.29IraqisacountrythatcouldteachVietnamarefreshercourseinpropa-ganda.Inatextbookexampleofselectingthefactsitchosetoexpose,andplacingtsnterpretationsnhemoupportpreconceivedbias,raqloaded hemageoftheUnitedStatesntheeyesofthecoalitiononcearrayedagainstit.A stheworld'ssolesuperpower,heUnitedStatestakesprideinitsroleasabenevolentpillarofstabilityandchiefexecutiveofficeroftheworld'seconomy.Therestoftheworldisnotalwaysasenthusiastic.30Iraq'sviewoftheUnitedStatesisthatofabullying hegemon intentonmaintainingasphereofeconomicandpoliticalinfluenceintheMiddleEastattheex -penseoftherestoftheworld.WhowastheUnitedStatestosettermsoftradeoovereignnationsikeFrance,Russia,andChina?T oaddub-stancetothisimage,raqencouragedtradewithotherstatesandenteredintoucrativenternationalcontractsagainsthedayhembargowas

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    lifted.ThesenationsnowhadavestednterestineeingAmericaliftitsembargoandsawthemselvesbeinghurtbyU Spolicies.31Next,raqturnedtoitsArabneighborsandbegantoworkontheIs -raelidoublestandard. IfIsraelhasanestimated200atomicbombswhyisIraqbeingembargoedonthechanceswehaveone?WhyhastheUNallowedsraeltooccupysouthernLebanonsince1978?BecausetheU.S.defendsIsraelandbulliestheUNintodefendingitaswellwhilere-quiringtheUNtodealharshlywithIraq. 32AsPelletiereemphasizes,hedoubletandardhemeresonatesntheArabworld.Manyofthesecountriesrebarelyegitimateandal lareunderconstantassaultbycentrifugalforcesrangingfromethnicandre-ligiousensionsoslamicfundamentalismtoPan-Arabism. 33Thedou-blestandardthemecanalsoworkagainstthem.AcrosstheArabworld,asdemonstrationstartedgearingup,raqwasportrayedashecoura-geousparty,tandingupowesternmperialismandZionism;whilebyimplication,hemoderateArabeaderswereraitors. 34ModerateArabrulerseggedraqoiv en.AsAlanTonelsonwrotenheAtlanticMonthly,Iraq'sneighborscanhardlysupportinternationalpunishmentofIraq withouteventuallyexposingthemselvestojudgement. 35Un-believably,andalmostovernight,heUnitedStateshadvirtuallylostac-cesstothePersianGulf.TherewasnoovertactionbyIraq,butmoderateArabs,fearfulofapopularbacklash,efusedpermissionouseheirbasesorombatmissions,ndnomeasesveneniedverflightrights. 36H owwouldtheinevitableU SattackhavelookedhadIraqnotsteppeddown?December1998'sOperationDesertFoxprovidesananswer.Whiledetailsremainclassified,themannerinwhichthefour-daystrike wasor-chestratedseemsto verifyPelletiere'scoalition-bustinghypothesis.B-52s,whichtrulyhaveglobalreach,probablymadethemostofthiscapabilitytodelivertheirmunitions,whilecarrieraircraftandnavalshipsoperatedinnearby waters.Withthismixof assetsdeliveringthepreponderanceofstrikingpower,wherewereheestoftheplatformswhichperformedyeomanserviceduringOperationDesertStorm?Theywerenotabsentbydesignmostnationsn loseproximityoraqwereeluctantograntbasingrightsforoffensiveaction.Thislimitationonassetsandortiegenerationhelpsexplainthetime-clocknatureoftheoperationaswell.DesertStormwitnessedairpowerstrikingacrossheentirepectrumofIraqiargets,24hoursaday,orweeks.Y etanyonewatchingCNNcouldplainlyseethatDesertFoxactionwaslimitedtohoursof darknessonlyforfourdays.Themagnificentdis-playofnoespite,hornsofadilemma, parallelwarfarewitnessednDesertStormhadbeenreducedtoapredictableserialactionwhichprob-ablysaweveryoneinvolvedgaspingforcrewrestandPG Mreplenishmentafterfourdays.B ybreakingthecoalition,raqhadeffectedvirtualattri-tion onU Sairpower'scapabilitytostrike.A snoted,heUnitedStatesooksocoalitionsorthreehings:egiti-macy,ccess,andmoney.B yvirtueofSaddam'soalitioncastration,tseemshatDesertFoxwasunwithgreatlyeducedccess;ndheUnitedStatespaidmostofthecost.OnecansaythatatleasttheUnitedStatesetainedtsegitimacyorperhapsnot.A sPelletierenotes,H ow

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    couldWashingtonclaimtobeactinginthenterestsofthenternationalcommunity,whenpracticallythewholeofthecommunityhadabandonedit? 37Whetheroutofineptnessorcalculation,raq'sackofmilitaryre-sponseeemedtoplayonthelegitimacyangleaswell.B yallowingmas-sivemediaoverageromBaghdad,ndquiteimplyabsorbingU S t-tackswithessentiallynoesistance,everalaudiencesespeciallyArabonesfeltpangsofsympathyoryetanothercountrybeingmercilesslybombedbytheUnitedStates.Returningtotheaccessaspect ofcoalitions,navalenthusiastswillpointtoheaircraftcarrierasherumpcardordeniedbasingights.With90,000tonsofdiplomacy parkedininternationalwaters,thecarrierop-eratesnavenuereeof tatusofforcesgreementsandoreignun-ways.38Alas,thestrongestsuitofaircraftcarriersintheForward FromtheSearolesmorehehreatofforcehanorceapplication.39Carrierbattlegroups(CVBG)packa wallop,butsustainedcombatoperationsex -haustordnanceandcrewsapidly.Althoughhecarriermaybenuclearpowered,theirjetsburnJP-5instaggeringquantities.Additionally,asin-glearrierannotonductndefiniteround-the-clockperationsforthatcapabilitytheCINCneedswocarriers,andacautiousCINCwouldprobablywantthreeasacasualtyplan.Carriersdeploy withanentourageof othershipsaswell;uddenly,asignificantportionoftheU SNavymayfinditselftogetherinafar-flungcornerof theworld.Itistakenforgrantedthattheycangetthere;however,heU SNavyisalsovulnerableohewhimsofthenternationalcommunity.TheSuezCanalsacasenpoint.TotallyunderhejurisdictionoftheEgyptiangovernment U.S.ccess,whethercommercialormilitary,sdeter-minedbytheEgyptiangovernmentnottheL aw oftheSea. 40DuringOp-erationDesertStorm,accesswasnotanissue,althoughtherespecu-lationhatransiteesweregreatlyncreased.41EastCoast-basedS shipsboundorhePersianGulforRedSeadependonhegoodwillofEgypttogettherequicklylackingit,heymustsailaroundtheCapeofGoodHope.Shipsomingromotherpartsoftheworldouldunntoproblemsoftheirown.Forexample,ifpreventedfromtransitingthroughthendonesianarchipelagoandheStraitofMalacca, CVBGenroutefromYokusuka,apan,oBahrainwouldhaveoteamaroundAus-tralia, adding5daystothetransit.42Oncen-theater,heogisticalequirementsfheV B G s renor-mous.TheUSSAbrahamLincolnCVBG,deployinginJune1999withtheUSSEssexAmphibiousReadyGroup,willhaveintheneighborhoodof12 shipsandmorethan16,000sailorsandmarinesembarked.43Simplyget-tingthemailtothatmanypeopleisa logisticalchallengesupplyingthemwithfood,uel,parts,andordnancecomplicatesmattersbuttodoitallwithoutthebenefitofafriendlyportorairfieldsanightmare.LikeheUSAF,theU SNavyrequireslocalland-basedaccesstoefficientlyconductsustainedcombatoperations.Inshort,SaddamHusseinskillfullytoreapartacoalitionthatwasskill-fullyputogether lmost decadego.nooingheapitalizedngenericcoalitionweaknesses,whilehominginononesthatapplyspecifi-callytotheUnitedStates.Coalitionvulnerabilitiesarenotlimitedothe

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    confinesofthePersianGulf,however,andthetechniques werecentlywit-nessedarebynomeansall-encompassing.Inhepost-cold-warworld,heanticommunistgluehatheldU Sl-liancesandcoalitionstogetherhasweakened.44Theurgetogoitaloneamongindependentnationsismucheasiertoact upon.45Ofcourse,thereislwaysheuglyAmerican endencyoradversariesoeverage.A sStephen J.Blankwrites,ourinsistenceonunilateralleadershipandourethnocentricdisdainororeignnsights,nterests,apabilities,xperi-ences,andkills ufficetomakecoalitionformingaprocessrepletewithfrictionandfog. 46Andthisiswithnooneshootingatus.Oncehostilitiescommence,coalitionscan becomebrittle.HadIsraelre-spondedoraq'scudmissileaunchesorcefully,DesertStormmayhavetakenonacompletelydifferentcomplexion.Strategicsetbackswreakhavoconcoalitions.Readingthewritingonthewallduring WorldWarII,Italy,Finland,andRomaniaabandonedGermanytosidewiththeAllies.Withcoalitionstheoldadagethatyoucan choose yourfriends,butyoucan'tchooseyourfamily doesnotwork.Geographyplaysadecidingroleincoalitionomposition,andheUnitedStatesrequentlymustchoosebetweenthelesserof twoevilsinwooingcoalitionpartners.nourhastetofindafriendlyface,weoftenchoosepoorlyandultimatelygiveouren-emiesacoalitionwithseamsvulnerabletoattack.nSouthVietnamtheUnitedStatesbackedeveralcorruptandncompetentgovernments;nSomalia,Americachoseonewarlordoveranother.Our TurkishalliesarefightingtheKurdishcousinsoftheKurdsweareprotectinginnorthernIraq;andintheBalkanstoday,anygroupwesidewithisnotlikelytobeinnocent.ForU Sairpower,coalitionsaremuchliketheweather.W ehavetoworkwithwhatwearegivenand,whilerarelyaffordedachancetomakethingsbetter,wehavempleopportunityomakehemworse.Nevertheless,coalitionswillremainavitalrequirementinvirtuallyanyforeseeablecon-flict.fourenemiescandegradethelegitimacy,access,andmoneycoali-tionsprovide,airpower'sabilitytocontributewillbegreatlyreduced.

    En emyMeasurestoChangeU STargetingStrategyMercifully,hedecisionwillbequickinthiskindofwar,sincethedecisiveblowswillbedirectedatcivilians,thatelementofcountriesatwarleastabletosustainthem.Thesefuture warsmayyetprovetobemorehumanethanwarsinthepastinspiteofall,becausetheymayinthelongrunshedlessblood.

    GiulioDouhetTheCommandoftheAirGiulioDouhetwasaproductofhisenvironment.Althoughhiswritingsstrikeoneasruthlessnineteenth-centurysocialDarwinism,asaseminalairstrategisthewasmerelytryingtoavoidsomethingevenmorebrutalarepeatofthecarnageof WorldWarI.ThenextgreatwarawsomeofDouhet'sideasputtothetest,andtheyfailed.Today,hereiswidecon-sensusthatSirArthurBomber Harris'sareabombingofGermancitiesdidlittletohastenthewar'sendinEurope,whileGenCurtisLeMay'sin-

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    cendiaiyraidsonJapankilledarmorepeoplewitharlessdecisivee-sultsthanthosedeliveredbysingleB-29soverHiroshimaandNagasaki.Withaconsiderableamountofhistorybehindthemandanevenlargerbodyoflaw,onventions,andechnologytodrawupon,moderntrate-gistshaveabettergriponhowtoharnessairpowerthantheirpredeces-sors.ftheobjectofwarisindeedabetterstateofpeace,henstrategistsmustpaycarefulattentiontothemeansusedtodelivertheendresult.Themostangiblemanifestationsofhisphorismrenshrinednrulesof engagement(ROE),definedbyD O Dasdirectivesissuedbycom-petentmilitaryauthoritywhichdelineatehecircumstancesandimita-tionsunderwhichUnitedStatesforceswillinitiateand/orcontinuecom-batengagementwithotherforcesencountered. 47ntheogandrictionofwar,ROEprovidecombatantswithessentialguidancewhile lsoe-strainingthemromurningthewarintosomethingthatsalienotsnature. 48R O EdefinehowAmericansfight.However,tisnotsoimple.WhileR O Earealmostuniversallyviewedfromarestrictiveaspect,heyarealsoquitepermissive.Witnessthefol-lowingpassagefromL.C.Green'sTheContemporaryLawofArmedCon-flict:Attacksmayonlybedirectedagainstmilitaryobjectivesandmustnotbendiscriminate,ndoheextenthatseasible,naccordancewithheprinciplefproportionality. 49oar ,oood.Greenubse-quentlydefines militaryobjectives witha litanyofthecombatequipmentonewouldexpecttobefairgame,butmovesontolistbuildingsandob-jectsprovidingadministrativeandlogisticsupportformilitaryoperationsareasofland ofdirectusetoattackingordefendingforces,aswellaseconomicargetshatindirectlybuteffectivelyupportenemyopera-tions.Civilianvessels,aircraft,vehiclesandbuildingsarealsolegitimatetargetsiftheycontaincombatantpersonnelormilitaryequipmentorsup-pliesorareotherwiseassociatedwithcombatactivityincompatiblewiththeircivilianstatus. 50Thelawrecognizesthatthereisnosanctuaryformilitaryforcesortheactivitiesthatsustainthemwhileacountryisatwar.Acorollaryofthislawisthattheonusofprotectingcivilianslargelyfallsonthegovernmentbeingattacked.Therefore,anenemytankparkedintheplaygroundofanelementaryschoolisalegaltarget;ifchildrenarekilledbyanerrantMav-erickmissileaimedatthat tank,guiltdoesnotlieonthepilot'sshouldersbutratherontheenemy's.Viewedinthislight,targeteershaveconsiderableleewayunderinterna-tionallawinassigningmissions;andtargetarrayscanbedispensedofinshortorder.Butthetargetingprocessisnotsostraightforward.nalim-itedwar,heworldwideoutragehatwouldnvariablyaccompanyaby-the-law-bookbombingampaignwouldbeseafeningashebombsthemselves;andheseoarsofprotestwoulderveasffectiveweaponsagainsttheUnitedStates'swareffort.DespitethePG Mrevolutionandin-credibletechnologyavailabletotheU Smilitary,warisstillsubjecttofog,friction,andMurphy'sLawifanythingcangowrong,twill.Abombingcampaignconductedoheegalimitswillnevitablyexceedhem.ThefearofinternationalanddomesticcondemnationofourmilitaryactionsisanundeniableU Scenterofgravity.Stavingoffthiscondemnationiswhatbringspoliticiansintothetargetingbusiness.

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    Targetingsheexusetweenoliticsnderialombardment.WhetherourenemyhasreadSunTzuornot,they tendtoheedhisadvicetoknowtheenemyandknowyourself. ntheprecedingtankexample,clearlytheenemyabrogatedhisesponsibilitytoafeguardcivilians,yetintuitivelyoneknowsthatU Saircraftwillnotbepermitted tostrikeit.TheenemyaslacedsnWilliamTecumsehherman'sornsfdilemma.fweattackthetankandmiss,wekillschoolchildrenandtheenemystrikesapropagandablowthatworksagainstthemoralappealandquitepossiblytheconductofthewar.B ynottrikingheank,avaluableassetsurvivesandwecountenanceschoolyardsasmilitarysanc-tuaries.tisawin-winscenariofortheenemy.51Duringthecourseofhostilities,anyU Sactionthatevenappearstobeexcessiveunsheiskfurtherestrictingurwar-fightingfforts.Statedanotherway,anymeasuretheenemytakesthatforcesachangeintargetingstrategycreatesvirtualattritiononU Sairpower.FewexamplesillustratethispointbetterthanthestrikeonBaghdad'sAlFirdosbunkerduringOperationDesertStorm.AccordingoheGulfWarAirpowerSurveyGWAPS],theAlFirdosbunkerwasoneof tensecondaryleadershipbunkerslocatedinthesub-urbanareasofBaghdad andwasbelievedtobecapableof shelteringabout1,400-1,500people.UnknowntoCoalitionairplanners,heupperlevelofthebunkerwas,ccordingtoheraqis,beingusedatnightbyfamilies,andhedestructionhatresultedromheacilitybeinghitbytwoGBU-27s,bothaimedattheamepointonthebunker'sroofbydif-ferentF-117s,wasreportedthatmorningoverCNNtohavecausedhun-dredsofciviliancasualties. 52Iraqiourcesclaimedhat200-300ivil-ians,ncludingover100children,diedinthebunker. 53Untilhispointinthewar,plannershadenjoyed,withintheboundssetbytheaircampaign'spoliticalandmilitaryobjectives nearlycom-pleteleewayin heselectionoftargets. 54Thedemonstratedcapabil-ityoftheF-117wasoneoftheeasonswhy.AlthoughG W A P Sdoesnotsayitdirectly,tappearsthatthesecondGBU-27wenthroughtheholecreatedbythefirstbomb.TechnologywasworkinginDesertStorm.Buttheplannershadmirrorimaged theirsenseof strategyupontheIraqis.GiventhepriorityCoalitionairplannersattachedtotargetingleadershipfacilitieshroughouttheconflict twashighlyimprobable,fnotal-mostinconceivable,that civilianswouldbeknowinglyshelteredinanylo -cations associatedwithkeyelementsoftheraqiegime.55nchoosingtheAlFirdosbunkerohelter ivilians,wereraqieadersdeliberatelyplacingciviliansnharm'swaytoeizeapropagandavictory,orsimplypracticinga rankhasitsprivileges maneuverdesignedtosafeguardfam-ilymembersofhighIraqiciviliansinan impregnable shelter?Thatques-tionistillopen.Whatisundeniablesthepredictableraqireactiontothebombingandthestrike'simpactonsubsequentoperations.Inthewakeofdramatictelevisioncoverage,theU.S.mediasoonadvo-catedhaturtherCoalitionbombingoftargetsnraqicitieshouldbecurtailed...theNewYorkTimeseditorialized thatitwouldhenceforth'makeense'oimitCoalitionbombingopurelymilitaryargets,ikeenemytroops,tanksandartilleryduginonthe battlefieldinKuwait. 56Ofcourse,heseeventswerenotunfoldinginavacuum.A sthemediacon-

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    demnedtheattack,raqcontinuedondiscriminatelyfireScudmissilesatitieshroughoutouthwestAsia.evertheless,en.ormanSchwarzkopfgotthemessage.Fortherestofthewar,attacksagainstN a- tionalCommandAuthoritieswereharplylimited,andSchwarzkopfper-sonallyreviewedalltargetsselectedforattackindowntownBaghdad.57Thenextweek,anopportunityorairattacksoinallycutkeyom-munications nodesbetweenKuwaitandBaghdadevaporatedpartiallyduetotheimpactofAlFirdos.TheGWAPSfinalwordontheincidentstates,Itisimpossibletoruleoutcompletely hat constraintsimposedonairoperationsfollowingthebombingoftheAlFirdosbunkerprovidedthenarrow marginthatSaddamHusseinneededtoremaininpowerafterthewar. 58Theraqis laimhat ivilianswerenheAlFirdosbunkerolelyoseekhelter.Comingromegimewithsbysmalhumanightsrecordsraq's,hisssertionsprobablyuntrue.Unfortunately,heissueismoot.EvenifAlFirdoswasnothingmorethanagrislyreminderthatwarishell,heIraqiexploitationof themediafurorandtheensuingchangenargetingtrategywasapredictablechainofeventshatmayserveasatemplateforfutureadversariestofollow.

    ConclusionInhe990svirtuallyverynstanceofU Smilitarynvolvementhasbeenmetwithresistancelargelyatthepoliticallevel.Withequalconsis-tency,U Smilitaryinvolvementhasdependedonairpoweroftensolelyonairpowerformissionaccomplishment.Althoughairpowerisafavoredtoolamongpoliticaldecisionmakers,itsimageismixedalmost everywhereelse.Thelegitimacyofairpowerisques-tionedeven whenthingsgowellwhenthingsdonotgowell,itisa mediafieldday.Theallureof propagandaasaweaponagainstairpowercontin-uestogrow.Understandingtheloaded natureofpropaganda,andwithalargeaudiencepreconditionedtoantiairpowerviews,evenstrikesonter-roristsuchasUsamaBinLadenandthecountriesthatharborhimarefrequentlyastnnegativeight.59Whileropagandasnffectiveweaponnandofitself,tisalsoavitalngredientnotherasymmetricstrategies.MediacoveragefollowingtheAlFirdosbunkerstrikeattackedtheGulfWar'smoralappealandhelpedchangeU Stargetingstrategies.FortheUnitedStates,coalitionwarfarehasevolvedfromaneedtoaug-mentfightingpowertoanecessityforlegitimacy,access,andmoney.A llthreeofthesefactorsplaydecidingrolesinhowindeedifairpowercanbeemployed.WiththeenuousviewsonU Sairpoweraroundheworld,legitimacyisalwaysanavenueripeforasymmetricattack.Theabilityto

    denytheUnitedStatesbasingightsandaccesshroughpoliticalpres-sureoncoalitionsgivesenemiesthepotentialtotakesortiesawayfromaCINCndreatlyeduceirpower'sffectiveness.inally,whittlingcoalitiondownoaewmemberseducesheabilityoharecostsandmaymakealimitedwartooexpensiveforonecountrytofight.EffortsaimedatmakingtheUnitedStatesestricttargetingtrategieshaveprovidedhighpayoffsorournemies.TheLinebackerbombings

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    duringthelastdaysoftheU SinvolvementinVietnamwerenotas al loutastheycouldhavebeenpartlyduetothecumulativeeffectofNorthViet-nam'srelentlesspropagandacampaign.Morerecently,historycondenseditselfintheGulfWarwhentargetingstrategieschangedliterallyovernightinthewakeof theA lFirdosbombing.A sanasymmetricstrategyonlyinitsadolescence,urelythistacticwillbeseenagain.A theoliticalevel,asheUnitedtatesdequatelypreparedocounterasymmetricalmeasuresagainstitsairpowerassets?Theanswerhastobeno.ThelimitedwarsthatAmericafindsitselfinvolvedindonotlendthemselvestogalvanizingdomesticopinion,letalonethatoftherestof theworld.Nomatterhowskilledapoliticianmaybe,noU SpresidentcanwringheameppealutfhemeritsfbombingosovosFranklinD.RooseveltdidinavengingPearlHarbor.SnowandDrew'sdo-mesticpoliticalrequirementsarealmostimpossibletoevenarticulateinlimitedwars,etalonegainconsensusabout.Clausewitzaidwarsmerelyheontinuationfpolicybythermeans. Whenwarcommences,however,tcannotmerelypickupwherepolicyleftoff.nthetwenty-firstcentury,ffectiveactionandcounterac-tionatthepoliticallevelwillbeabsolutelyessentialfortheothermeanstoachieveanydegreeofsuccess.

    Notes1.DO DDictionaryofMilitaryTerms, JointDoctrine,18March1999,n.p.;on-line,Inter-net,22March 999,availablefromwww.duc.mil/doctrtae/jel/doddict/daWs/05794.html.2.ohnF.GuilmartinJr.,AVeryShortWar:TheMayaguezandthe BattleqfKoh Tang(CollegeStation,Tex.:TexasA& MUniversityPress,995),0 7.Evenin1975technologyhaddeliveredthecapabilityforpoliticianstomonitorandmakedecisionsconcerningon-goingmilitaryoperations.TheorderforcombatantstodisengagefromcombatonK oh TangIslandduringtheMayaguezcrisiswasissueddirectlyfromtheWhiteHousealmostim -mediatelyuponreceiptofnewsthatthecrewhadbeenrecovered.3.mallWarsManual1940;eprint,Washington,.C.:Departmentofheavy,1987),1-2-2.Thisisnotanewconcept.PriortoWorldWarII,ervicesclearlyrecognizedtheinfluenceofpoliticsonwar.Itisthedutyofourstatesmentodefineapolicyrelativetointernationalrelationshipsandprovidethemilitaryandnavalestablishmentswiththemeanstocarryitintoexecution.Withthisbasis,hemilitaryandnavalauthoritiesmayactintelligentlyinthepreparationofwarplansinclosecooperationwiththestatesman.Thereismutualdependenceandresponsibilitythatcallsforthehighestqualitiesofstates-manshipndmilitaryleadership.Thenitiativedevolvesuponhestatesmen"emphasisadded).4.Bruce W.Bennettetal.,TheaterAnalysisandModelinginanEraofUncertainty:ThePresentandFutureofWarfare(SantaMonica,Calif.:RAND,994),xvii.5.DonaldM.SnowandDennisM.Dre w,From LexingtontoDesertStorm,WarandPol-iticsintheAmerican Experience(Arm onk,N.Y.:M.E.Sharpe,994),332.6.D ODDictionaryofMilitaryTerms, JointD octrine,n.p.;on-line,Internet,22March1999,vailablefromwww.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/04812.html. 7.avidA.ChartersandMauriceTugwell,DeceptionOperations:StudiesintheEast-WestContext(NewYork:Brassey's,990), .8.heQur'an,rans.M..hakirElmhurst,N.Y.:TahrikeTarsileQur'an,988),24-26;ndPhillipK.Hitti,MakersofArabHistoryNe wYork:St.Martin'sPress,968),14.TheKoranmakesallowancesfordaysoftheRamadanfastthataremissedduetoill-ness,ravel,ordifficulty. Specifically,Surah11:194states,T heSacredmonth ndallsacredthingsare(underthelaw of)retaliation;whoeverthenactsaggressivelyagainstyou,nflictinjuryonhimccordingtohenjuryhehasnflictedonyou. TheProphet

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    Muhammadhimselfinitiatedanattack onadayofRamadan(mid-March624),duringtheholytruce againstmembersoftheUmayyahclan.9.ChartersandTugwell,78;andRussell,BertrandArthur andSartre,Jean-Paul,inMicrosoftBookshelfEncyclopedia98,CD-ROM,MicrosoftCorp.,997.10.hartersandTugwell,79.11.bid.12.bid.,80.13.bid.,81.14.bid.15.amesS.Corum,InflatedbyAir:CommonPerceptionsofCivilianCasualtiesromBombing, ResearchReportno.80/1998-04MaxwellAFB,Ala.:AirWarCollege,998),29-30.16.BarbaraW .Tuchman,TheMarchofFolly:FromTroyoVietnam(NewYork:AlfredA .Knopf,984),335.17.MarkClodfelter,heLimitsofAirpower:TheAmericanBombingofNorthVietnam

    (NewYork:FreePress,989),94-95.18 .DODDictionaryofMilitaryTerms, JointDoctrine,n.p.;on-line,nternet,22March1999,availablefromhttp://www.dtic.mi1/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/c/01184.html.19.ccles.:9.20.ThomasJ.Marshall,ProblemsandSolutionsinFutureCoalitionOperations(CarlisleBarracks,Pa.:StrategicStudiesnstitute,997),.21.WaldoD.Freemanetal.,TheChallengesofCombinedOperations, MilitaryReview,1993.Thetypical texttheyciteisHenryKissinger,TheTroubledPartnership:AReappraisal

    of theWesternAlliance(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,965),1.22.reeman,6.23.xcerptedfromAddressbyPresidentReaganonLebanonandGrenada, 27Octo-ber1983,inTheGrenadaWar:AnatomyofaLow-IntensityConflict,ed.VijayTiwathia(NewDelhi:LancerInternational,987),223.24.owardtheFuture:GlobalReachGlobalPower,USAtForceWhitePapers,1989-1992(Washington,D.C.:DepartmentoftheAirForce,993).25.liotA .Cohen,GuffWarAirpowerSurvey,vol.,AStatisticalCompendiumandChronologyWashington,D.C.:GovernmentrintingOffice,993),34.Anveragef2,697ortieswereflownbyUSandalliedaircraftperdayduringDesertStorm,withor-tiespeakingon24February1991at3,280.26.DepartmentofDefense,ConductofthePersianGulfWar:FinalReportoCongress(Washington,D.C.:DepartmentofDefense,991),P-2.

    27.bid.,P-3.28.tephenC .Pelletiere,RegionalStateCompetitors:TheCaseofIraq, nChalleng-ingheUnitedStatesSymmetricallyandAsymmetrically:anAmericaBeDefeated?ed.LloydJ.Matthewsetal.CarlisleBarracks,Pa.:StrategicStudiesnstitute,998),289.29.bid.,290.30.GenJohnJ.Sheehan,USMC,BuildingheRightMilitaryorhe21stCentury,StrategicReviewXXV,Summer1997,6.Sheehanwrites,Intheeyesofmostnon-Ameri-cans,lobalizationmeansmuchmorehanjustcross-bordereconomicctivity.Global-izationtohemconnotesheAmericanizationoftheworld Theyviewglobalizationasaseriousthreattotheirsocietiesandcultures.31.bid.,291.32.bid.,292.33.AlanTonelson,ThePersianGulf:StillMired, AtlanticMonthly,June1993,48-52.34.elletiere,292.35.Tonelson,48-52.

    36.elletiere,293.37.bid.38.MatthewKlam,ThePilot'sTale:AtSeawith90,000TonsofDiplomacy, Harper'sMagazine,February1999,33.39.orward FromheSeasheUSNavy'soperationalconceptorhewenty-firstcenturythatemphasizesForwardnavaloperationsbothtoensureunimpededuseoftheseasandtoprojectAmericaninfluenceandpowerintothelittoralareasoftheworld.Forward FromtheSea:TheNavyOperationalConcept,March997,n.p.;on-line,n-

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    ternet,April999,vailableromhttp://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/from-sea/ffseanoc.html.

    40.eoffreyKempandRobertE.Harkavy,StrategicGeographyandtheChangingMid-dleEast(Washington,D.C.:BrookingsInstitutionPress,997),260.

    41.bid.1993transitfeesforanaircraftcarrierandfiveescortswere$901,250.42.CaptGeorgeGaldorisi,U SNavy,'TheUnitedStatesandtheLaw oftheSea:Chang-ingInterestsandN ewImperatives, NavalWarCollegeReview,Autumn1996,33.43.ThetypicalCVBGiscomposedofnineships.TheEssexAmphibiousReadyGroup

    has threeships.ForinformationonLincolnCVBGseeWelcometo ThirdFleet,n.p.;on-line,Internet,0January1999,vailablefromhttp://www.comthirdflt.navy.mil.Compositionof typical CVBGfrom'TheCarrierBattleGroup, OfficialWebSiteoftheUnitedStatesNavy,n.p.;on-line,Internet,0January1999,availablefrom http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/allhands/ah0197/cvbg.html.EssexinformationfromU SSEssex,n.p.;on-line,Internet,0January1999,availablefromhttp://www.essex.navy.mil/.

    44.atrickGarriry,ImplicationsofthePersianGulfWarforRegionalPowers, Wash-ingtonQuarterly,Summer1993,33.

    45.venbeforehendoftheoldwar,U S lliesxhibitedhisendency;witnessFrance'srefusaltoallowoverflightrightsfortheElDoradoCanyonstrikeonLibyain1986.46.tephen .Blank,Ho wW eWillLoseheWarwithRussia, nChallenginghe

    UnitedStatesSymmetricallyandAsymmetrically:CanAmericaBeDefeated?ed .LloydJ.Matthewsetal .CarlisleBarracks, a. :StrategicStudiesInstitute,998),274.

    47.D OD Dictionary ofMilitaryTerms, JointDoctrine,n.p.;on-line,Internet,22March1999,vailablefromhttp://www.dtic.mi1/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/r/05235.html.

    48.arlvonClausewitz,nWar,d.ndrans.MichaelHowardndPeterParet(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,984),88.

    49..C.Green,TheContemporaryLawofArmedConflict(Manchester,U.K.:Manches-terUniversityPress,993),83 .

    50.bid.51.moreimportantdilemmatodayconcernsthedecisiontoattackW M Dinanurbanenvironment.Successfullystrikingthistargetsetcouldresultinthedeathsofthousandsofcivilians.Worldopinion wouldlikelyassigntheUnitedStatesalargeshareoftheblameforthesedeaths.

    52.ohen,282-83.53.ohencitesNeedlessDeathsintheGulfWar:CivilianCasualtiesDuringtheA ir

    CampaignandViolationsoftheLawsof War, MiddleEastWatchReport(NewYork:HumanRightsWatch,991),128-29.

    54.ohen,363.55.bid.,368.56 .bid.,284.57 .bid.58 .bid.,378-79.59.TimWerner,MissileStrikesagainstBinLaden W onHimEsteeminMuslimLands,

    U.S.OfficialsSay, NewYorkTimes,8February1999,foreign.ManyintheMuslimworldviewBinLadenasaheroforhisanti-UnitedStatesstance.

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    Chapter3AsymmetricResponsesatthe

    OperationalLevelInal lhonesty,wedidn'tachieveou rmainobjective,whichwastospuruprisingsthroughoutthesouth.Still,weinflictedheavycasualtiesontheAmericansandtheirpuppets,andthatwasabiggainforus.AsformakinganimpactintheUnited States,ithadnotbeen ou rintentionbutitturnedouttobeafortunateresult.

    TranD oAsdeputycommanderofCommunistforcesinSouthVietnam,TranD ooversoldtheoperationalsuccessof1968'sTetoffensivewhileundersellingthepolitical.1TetisgenerallyconsideredtohavebeenaCommunistbat-

    tlefielddisasterthat virtuallydestroyedtheVietcongasaseriousfightingforce.However,heimagesof chaos,confusion,andexecutionsonAmer-ican televisionturneditintoastrategicvictorybygalvanizingamostlyac-quiescentantiwarmovementinAmerica(andEurope)intoaction.TheVietnamWaristheequivalentof AsymmetricWarfare 0 1 forfu-tureadversariesoftheUnitedStates.WhatheCommuniststumbleduponin1968,oursubsequentenemieshaveshownacalculatedinclina-tiontoduplicate.The983bombingoftheMarine'sBeirutbarracksorBloodySunday inMogadishuadecadelaterwouldhaveseenscantcov-erageinWorldWarIIduetomediacensorship,accessibility,andlagtime.Today,heseeventsarebroadcastinrealtimeandhelpdrivepolicy.Inrecognitionofthetremendousimpactofadversemediaattentionandsubsequentpubliceaction,militaryplannersconsiderAmericanpublicopiniontobeadefactocenterof gravityandplanaccordingly.Thisistobeexpectedinademocracy,butwhentheprospectoftakinganycasual-tiesbecomeshowstoppernheoursefactionevelopment,heenemyhasalreadyscoredavictoryof sorts.Contrarytopopularbelief,Americansarenotnecessarilyaversetoca-sualtiesinwar.The AmericanCivil WarandtheworldwarsofthiscenturybeartestimonytothefactthatAmericancitizenswillcontinuetosupportmilitaryactionsthatresultinasteadystreamof U Sservicemenkilledinaction.AlthoughcasualtiesntheGulfWarwereanorderofmagnitudelowerthanexpected,Americansbracedfortheworstandseemedfatalis-ticabouttheprospectofthousandsof casualties.2However,mostlimitedwarsareadifferentspeciesfromtheoneslistedabove.ManyoftheseactionsarenotevensoldtotheAmericanpublicaswarstll ,utathersumanitarianreacekeepingperations.AmericanswerenotoutragedaboutLebanonandSomaliabecauseU Sservicemenwerekilled;heywereupsetbecausetheydidnotrealizetheUnitedStateswasnvolvednahootingwar.Theywererustratedbe-causetheyhadbeenmisledbytheirpoliticalandmilitaryleadersaboutthetruenatureofmilitaryinvolvement.Thiswastheunintentionalgenius

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    behindtheTetoffensive.UntilthispointintheVietnamWar,Americanshadbeenfe dasteadydietofgoodnewsandcompellingstatistics;and,al-thoughmanyhadmisgivings,manybelievedthatthewar'sendwasrightaroundheorner,omplimentsofsuperiorirepowerandechnology.3TetexposedthetruenatureofthewaranddestroyedthecredibilityofU Spoliticalandmilitaryleaders,whohadaidhingsweregoingverywell,andprovidedastrategicwindfallforNorthVietnam.4Evenif directenemyactionsfailtoyielddividendsatthepoliticallevel,operationalsymmetricattacksemainlluringespeciallygainstU Sairpower.Asa recentRA N Dstudynotes,Noother air forcetodayappearstofieldthecombinationofplatforms,weapons,andpersonneleitherinquantityorqualitythatwouldbeneededodefeatheU S A Fnose-to-noseat35,000feet. 5AstheD O Dcontinuestoinvestintate-of-the-arttechnologyforawarataltitude,ourenemiesarelikelytocountertheair-man'sperspectivewithanearthboundviewthatgoesnohigherthanthemaximumordinateof amortarround.Asymmetrictrategiesattheoperationalevelofwarofferadversariespayoffsontwolevels.First,witheffectslikethoseseenatTet,heycom-plimentandsometimestranscendstrategiesalreadyatworkatthepoliti-callevel.Second,andmorepragmatically,theyareoftentheonly waytheenemyhastotrikebackandcumulativelyworkagainstU Sresolveandinterestinheonflict.neitherevent,heyareombatmethodshataremuchmorelikelytooccurinthefuturethanaBattleofBritain-styledogfightat35,000feet.However,adversariesmustweighasymmetricstrategiescarefully.Suc-cessfullyopposingtheUnitedStatesinalimitedwarrequiresadegreeofthresholdawareness.faneventisoocataclysmicorstrikestooclosetohome,ourenemiesunheiskofawakeningaleepinggiant, asheJapanesedidwiththeirbombingofHawaiiin1941.AsymmetricwarfareattheoperationallevelofwarisaconstantgameofassessingwheretheUnitedStateshasdrawntheline.IntheGulfWar,Iraqunderstoodthisbyrefrainingfromusing W M D .Inthatlight,itisusefultoexamineseveraloperationalmethodsthatanenemymayusetofightU Sairpowerinlieuf,orinadditionto,antiair-craftguns,surface-to-air missiles(SAM),andMiGs.Specifically,Iwilldis-cussenemygroundattacksonU Shighvalueairborneassets(HVAA)andaircraftcarriers,deceptionoperations,andurbanwarfare.

    AttackingAirpowerontheRampInhiseminalworkTheCommandoftheAir,Douhetobserved,Itseasierandmoreeffectivetodestroytheenemy'saerialpowerbydestroy-

    inghisnestsandeggsonthegroundthantohunthisflyingbirdsintheair. 6WhileDouhet'scommentswereaimedatthecommandersof futurebattleplanes, heimplicationsofthisimpleobservationaremorefar-reaching.Aircraftontherampcanbedestroyedbygroundattackaswell.7Airplanesdonotbecomewar-fightingassetsuntilheyareafelyair-borne.Untilthatmoment,heyareliabilitiesvulnerabletoeventhemostprimitiveofweapons.Thisfollowsanincreasingtrend.Despitethegreat

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    leapsaviationechnologyhasmadeinceWorldWarI,parkedaircrafttodayarenoturdiernwithstandinghighexplosivesorhrapnelhanweretheirpredecessors50yearsago.ndeed,hecomplexityandsophis-ticationofmodernaircraftmaymakethemmorevulnerable. 8ArifleslughittingaP-51Mustangcouldeasilypassthroughtheaircraft'sfuselage.Theameoundtrikingnirbornewarningndontrolystem(AWACS)radomewouldprobablydisableitforanextendedperiod.9Attackingairfieldsisnotanewidea.Between1940and1992,groundattacksonair basesoccurredatleast645timesintenseparateconflicts,destroyingordamagingover2,000aircraft. 10AsDavidA.ShlapakandAlanVicknoteinCheckSixBeginsontheGround,herehavehistoricallybeen threereasonstoattackairfields:destroyHVAA,temporarilydecreasesortiegenerationatacriticalmoment,andcreateastrategicevent.11Lim-itedwarhasmeldedhisequationnaubtlebutmeaningfulway:de-stroyingHVAAdecreasessortiegenerationandeffectiveness,therebycre-atingastrategicevent.ThistatementisnotmeanttodiscountthefficacyofdestroyingU S fighterandattackaircraft.ThepoliticalpictureofF-16sburningontherampwouldcertainlybeacompellingone.Buttheoperationalimpactofdestroyingseveralfighterspalesincomparisontothedestructionofa spe-cializedaircraftsuchasaKC-10that willrefuelanentirestrikepackage.Two-thirdsofallombatmissionsnOperationDesertStormequiredaerialrefueling.12HVAAareheorcemultiplyingplatformshateparateU S irpowerfromtherestoftheworld'sairforcesthey winaircampaigns.TheU SA FdoctrineofGlobalReachGlobalPowerstayshomewithouttankers,whiletheoverallairpicture becomesamesswithoutAWACS.Ofcourse,mod-ernwarfareisa comeasyouare affair.TheU S A Fhas59KC-10tankersand33E-3Sentry(AWACS)aircraft.13Thenumbersaresimilarlysmallforbombers,STARS,RivetJoint,AC-130s,andC-5/141/17s.Forthedu-rationofanyoreseeableonflict,heseaircraftareverydifficultoe-place.TheGulfWarusedvirtuallytheentireU S A Finventoryofspecial-izedssetsevenminorattritionwouldhaveffectedairaskingorder(ATO)execution.Chillingly,aRANDforcestructureanalysisforatwomid-intensityegionalontingencycenariooncluded,TheU S A Fdoesnothaveenoughspecializedaircrafttofighttwosimultaneouscontingencies,evenwithnoattrition. 14TheU S A FswellawareofthemportanceandvulnerabilityofHVAAandgoestogreatlengthstosafeguardthem.Typicallytheyarebasedwellbeyondanenemy'sairradiusofaction,nottomentionthereachoftheirgroundforces.DuringtheVietnamWar,Guam,Okinawa,andthePhilip-pineslandswereecurebasesorHVAA(Thailandlightlylesso) .ThesamecanbesaidofDiegoGarciainMiddleEaststrategytoday.However,throughoutheGulfWar,mostHVAAwerebasedonoalitionArabairbases.naegionoftheworldwhereslamicconnectionscarrygreaterweightthananycartographer'sline,howsafewerethoseaircraft?TheywereomewhatvulnerableandvariantsofthebovequestioncanbeaskedconcerningAfricaandtheBalkans.Itdoesnottakeanarmytodamageanairfield.Thatmethodwouldbetoo conventional.talsowouldnotbeveryeffectiveaccordingtoRA N D,whichassessestheUSAF's

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    defensesagainstpenetratingthreatsasquitegood.15TheattentiveenemywhohasreadM aoandremembersVietnamwillplacehisguerrillafishamongstaseaofpeople enablingindirectstrikesagainstHVAA.16An81millimeter( m m )mortarhasamaximumeffectiverangeof5,700meters,orjustover3.5miles,whilea.50calibermachineguncanaccu-ratelyangeargetsat2,000meters.17Theseystems reportableandreadilyavailableontheworldmarket.Thethreatradiusoftheseweaponsmakeshemverydifficultopreemptivelydefendagainst.Assistedbyaforwardobserverforexample,viacellularphonemortarsareextremelyaccurateweapons;addtechnologytotheweaponintheformofupcomingprecision-guidedmortarrounds,andtheneedforadjustmentisgone.18InAfghanistan,heSovietsdealtwithheeaofpeopleproblemnapredictablemannerbydestroyingeveryvillagewithin0milesofKabul.19ThisisnotanoptionforU Sforces.AnynegativeU Sactionthat affectsthepopulationisliabletobeleveledagainsttheUnitedStatesforpropagandapurposes.nordertopartiallyalleviatesuchproblems,heU S A Fistran-sitioningoanxpeditionaryposture.Butausteritypresentsogisticalproblemssuchaslimitedshelters,crowdedparkingramps,above-groundfueltorage,ndheequirementostablishefenselanromscratch.20Mirroringindustry,heU Smilitaryhasembracedheconceptofjust-in-timelogisticstoreducetheneedforprocuringandstoringlargeinven-toriesofsparepartsandupplies.Whetherciviliancompaniesandper-sonnelwillbewillingtosubjectthemselvestodailydeliveriestoplaceslikeKabulremainstobeeen.ust-in-timelogisticscouldresultinjust-too-latecombateffectiveness.ThegreatestthreatstoHVAAassets,however,areontherampsofA irMobilityCommandAMC)basesinthecontinentalUnitedStatesCONUS).ShlapakandVickcomparemilitarybasesomallcities,ompletewithstores,chools,onstructionrews,nddeliveryrucks.21Theyarex-tremelyporous.Norisherontgateheonlymethodogainaccess.Asmallairplanecouldlandonataxiwayandimmediatelyplaceitscrewinapositiontowreakhavoc.AcoordinatedeffortatseveralAM Cairbasescouldtopaapiddeploymentntsracksandllowanenemyoc-complishhisobjectivesinafaitaccomplimanner.Evenifthephysicalre-sultsofsuchastrikewerenotsevere,heinevitableecuritycrackdownwouldhaveamolasses-likeeffectthroughoutA M C .ThehreatofattacksonC O N U Sbasessoftendiscounteddueoheextremepenaltynflictedonheapaneseorheir941ttackonheHawaiianslands,butpost-WorldWarIIeventshowanincreasingpro-clivitytotakethewardirectlytoWesternhomelands.France'sill-fatedaguerred'Algerieduringthe1950ssawmanyAlgerianNationalLiberationFrontmembersoperatinginFrance,whiletheIrishRepublicanArmyhasshownewqualmsaboutcarryingheirightohetreetsofLondon.22Traditionally,erroristshavettackedoftargets,withmilitarybasesbeingrelativelyimmune.However,nanopensocietysuchasours,herearenoguarantees.23BringingthefighttotheC O N U Scouldverywellbeastepacross America'sthresholdoftolerance.However,whilePearlHarbormaycontinuetoresonateamongmanyAmericans,tismerelyahistori-calfootnotetotherestof theworld.24

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    AircraftCarriersThebluewater-equippedU SNavyhasbigproblemsnheittorals.ConventionalhreatsuchasdieselubmarinesandSilkwormmissilescanperhapsbedealtwith,buttheNavy'santiminewarfarecapabilityiswhollynadequate.TheUSSPrincetonandripolibothufferedmajor

    minedamageduringtheGulf War.25Whileaircraft carrierscancomplicateaminelayer'ssolutionbystandingoffagreaterdistancefromshore,hisveryactionlimitstherangeofnavalaviation(andincreasestheirdepend-enceonin-flightrefueling,requentlybyU S A Ftankers).fanadversarymanagestodeployevenafe wdeep-seamines,heprudentcaptainof anaircraftcarrierwouldbecompelledtorecognizethisthreatandadjusthisoperationsaccordingly.AnunderappreciatedasymmetricthreattocarrieraviationistheSuezCanal.Extending21milesfromPortSaidontheMediterraneantoSuezontheRedSea,hecanalisasnarrowas525feetatitssouthernend.26Thesinkingofshipsin1967and1973closedthecanal,andasGeoffreyKempnotesinStrategicGeographyandtheChangingMiddleEast,ThereisapossibilityofdirectmilitaryactiontopreventU.S.transitevenifEgyptwereontheU.S.ideoftheconflict. 27Y ettheU SNavytreatsaSuezCanaltransitalmostascasuallyasapas-sageundertheGoldenGateBridge.Aircraftarenotflownoff,andhangarbaysonlyshielda smallpercentageoftheship'sairwing.SteelBeach daysarecommonlyheldeventswheretheship'screwgatherstopsidetorelax,barbecue,ndgenerallyakeadayofffromheigorsofflightopera-tions.28Theredundantpicturesshownonthefollowingpageillustratethepoint.Theywereboth takenintheSuezCanalwiththeirfullcomplementsofirplanes,ndheywereothakenuringperationesertShield/Storm.29Apictureofanaircraftcarrierpassing throughtheSuezCanalisa tro-physhot that willhangonthewallsof5,500sailors'homesfortherestoftheirlives.Thiseventisacruisehighlight,ariteofpassage.Evendur-

    Source:USNavyviaPeterB Mersky U S SDwightD Eisenhower and mericaTrans i tS u e zC a na l

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    ingperiodsofheightenedegionalensions,heNavy'spostureduringtransitisrelaxed.TheNavymakestheassumptionthatthewarwillstartwhenand wheretheNavyaystwilltart,whenhecarrierispositionednbluewater,withitscomplementofescortsfullyarrayed.Despitethepublicembraceof littoralwarfare,heNavy'sprogrammaticandproceduraldisregardforlittoralhreatsuchasdieselubmarines,mines,ndorceprotectionmeasuresbelieannstitutiontillbruisingoraightwithAdmSergeiGorshkov'sSovietNavy.Thisoutlookpresentsaipevulnerability.Operatorsofmortars,ma-chineguns,androcketsusedagainstairfieldswouldhaveasimplesolu-tioniringatalow-movingcarriernheSuezCanalandhundredsofsquaremilesofterritoryfromwhichtolaunchtheirattack.30Mortarim-pactsonthelightdeckwouldbeparticularlydisastrousgivenhehighdensityofparkedaircraft.TheNavysnotrangeroaircraftcarrierires.nOctober966heUSSOriskany,steamingoffNorthVietnamonYankeeStation, ufferedairewhich laimed44ivesandequiredheroeturnoheUnitedStatesforrefitting.31Ninemonthslater,heUSSForrestalunderwentthesamefatelosing134men,1aircraftdestroyed,and43damaged.She,too,eftYankeeStationforrepairsinC O N U S .32Inbothcases,heNorthVietnamesewerehandedno-costoperationalvictories.Aconflagrationofthismagnitudeodaywouldprovideanenemywithoperationalandpoliticalreturns.Amajorfireorworse,asinkingonanuclearpoweredaircraftcarrierwouldconstituteapropagandawindfallforannemynadditionopossibly losingheSuezCanal.Domesticconsensusinlimitedwarsisdifficulttoattain.Asuccessfulattackofthissortcouldsinkanoperationintheprehostilitiesphase.33Suezstandsoutasacriticalchokepoint,but thereareothers.Clearingthecanal,aPersianGulf-boundcarriermustalsonegotiateheBabElMandeb,andtheStraitofHormuz(thelatter,byallaccounts,beingapar-ticularlytenseandalertpassage).Aroundheworld,heNavyoutinelysteamshroughheMalaccaandLombokStraits,Gibraltar,ndothernarrowpassageswhileenroutetoportvisits.

    DeceptionAllwarisdeception.

    SunTzuDeceptionhasbeendefinedasapurposefulattemptbythedeceivertomanipulatetheperceptionsofthetarget'sdecisionmakersinordertogainaompetitivedvantage. 34naymen'serms,eceptionistortser-ceivedrealitybyprofessingthefalseinthefaceofthereal.Howeveritisdefined,deceptionhasbeenaddressedbyalmosteveryphilosopherandpo-liticalormilitarycommentatorinhistory. 35Thereasonissimpleitworks.Deceptionsoftenhoughtofinermsofanattacker'sechniqueoachieveurprise.36Asacountertoairpower,histudytakesadifferent

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    view.Attheoperationallevel,U Sadversariescanusedeceptiontodrainsortiesandmunitionsawayfromlegitimatetargetsets,preservingthemorprovidingthemarginofsurvivabilityneededtoaccomplishtheirobjectives.FormerSecretaryofDefenseRobertS.McNamaraiswidelycondemnedforntroducingquantitativeanalysismethodsomeasurecombatffec-tiveness.Y etMcNamarawasaproductofAmerica,andAmericansintheD O Dtodayremainquitecomfortablewithnumericalmeasuresofsuccess.GeneralSchwarzkopf,stillrecoilingfromthe VietnamWar,specificallyes-chewedenemybodycountsduringDesertStorm;butthenumberof sor-tiesflownlargely measuredthesuccessoftheaircampaign.Withthecon-tinuingemphasisonP G M s ,heemphasisonortiecountswillincreasesinceitiseasytomaketheeapoffaiththateverybombsffective.notherwords,ftheortieateishighwemustbewinningthewar.GenCharlesA.Horner,DesertStorm's jointforceaircomponentcommander(JFACC),onfirmedhisnotionnaG W A P Sinterview:Bytheimehegroundoffensivebegan,Schwarzkopfwasusingthenumberof airstrikesagainstatarget,notbombdamageassessment(BDA),ashisprimeindi-catorof enemycombateffectiveness emphasisinoriginal).37

    Evenintheageofnear-real-timeimageryofairstrikes,accurateBD A remainselusive.ThemainreasonSchwarzkopfreliedsoheavilyonsortiecountswasduetosheer frustrationwiththeBD Aprocess.38Therawdatageneratedbyhundredsof strikesortiesrepresentsanavalancheofinfor-mationrequiringrapidtransformationintointelligenceforplannersworkingonsubsequentATOs.InDesertStorm,theBD Aassessmentsystemfailedtomeettherequirementsplaceduponitbecauseofthepaceandscaleoftheaircampaign.Technicalsystemscouldnotkeeppacewithdemand. 39Ifsystemsandorganizationshavedifficultyfindingtargetsandaccu-ratelymeasuringBD Aandtheenemyhasatargetsetthatabsolutelyde-mandstriking,hengredientsareinplaceorthedeceptionofU Sair-power.W M Dmeetalloftheaboverequirements.Attheunclassifiedlevel,onecanonlyguessattheeffectivenessof the20August998 ruisemissiletrikeonheSudanesepharmaceuticalfactoryuspectedfmanufacturinghemicalweapons.TheNeworkTimesreportedhatwithindaysoftheattack,omeoftheadministra-tion'sexplanationsordestroyingtheactory provednaccurateSeniorofficialsnowsaytheircaseforattackingthefactoryreliedonin-ferenceaswellasvidence. 40Aotalof75one-million-dollarmissileswerefiredatthefactoryandothertargetsbasedpartiallyoninference.41Obviously,moneyisnoobjectinthefightagainst W M D .ThegreatScudmissilehuntof DesertStormrepresentsaforeshadow-ingoftheW M Dasbait strategy.ScudsweredoubletroublefortheGulfWarcoalition.Althoughmilitarilyinsignificant,theuseofaW M DwarheadwouldhavethrownthedirectionofthewardirectlyontoPresidentGeorgeBush'sdesk.Ontheotherhand,conventionalScudmissilesaimedatT el AvivthreatenedtobringIsraelintohewarwithcoalition-endingpoten-tial.raqiScudmissilesweretargetsthatabsolutelyhadtobedealtwith.Withmassesofstrikeaircraftin-theater,airplannershadtheluxuryofthrowingsortiesattheproblem.Duringthecourseofthewar,4,000mis-sionswereflownagainstScuds.42MuchwasknownaboutScudmissiles,andbysimply doing themath fromIsraeltoIraq,aScudlaunchboxwas

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    easytoconstruct.Additionally,theIraqiswerefiringScudsalmostexclu-sivelyatnight.Withalmost100sortiesperdaygoingtoaspecificbarrenareainanarrowedtimeperiod,heplannershadcauseforoptimism.Butmobilelaunchersprovedtobeadifficulttarget,andIraqwassur-prisinglyadeptatemployingScudmissiles.FromstudyingSovietmodels,analystshoughtrelaunchignatureswouldiv eatrollingircraftampleopportunity toattack.Inreality,theIraqishadsignificantlycutthetimerequiredtodeployandshoot.43Showingimpressiveforesight(andacalculateddeceptionplan),heyhadalsoinvestedinbothhigh-andlow-fidelityScuddecoystheformerbeingindistinguishablefromrealScudsfrommorehan25yards.44Flyingatnight,withnadequateprelaunchcueing,pilotsbecameentirelydependentupononboardsensorsinfraredandradar.Asgoodasthesesystemswere,heywerenotgoodenoughtodiscriminatemobilelaunchersfromdecoysorevenfueltrucks.Thedefaultplanwasnotmuchbetter.IfcoalitionaircraftcouldnotfindScudlaunchersbeforefiring,certainlythebrilliantnighttimelaunchsig-naturewouldenablethemtobeargetedpost-launch.Eventhismethodproveddifficult.Ofthe42timesstrikeaircraftwitnessedScudlaunches,onlyeightwereabletodeliverordnanceduetoonboardsensorlimitationsandIraqiproficiencyinshootandmovetactics.45GWAPSwrapsupScudhuntingonaombernote:TheresnondisputableproofthataingleScudmobilelauncherwasdestroyedbyafixed-wingaircraft.Y ethroughouthecudunt,nalystshoughtheampaignwasworking,withC E N T C O Mconsistentlyoverstatingtheresults.46A soneac-countnotes,Itwasnotaconsciousactof deception AmericanpilotswerereportingthattheyhadfoundanddestroyedScuds. opersuadetheWhiteHouseandthepublicthattheirScud-huntingcampaignwasasuccess,Schwarzkopfandhisairwarcommandersweretooquicktogivecredencetothe'kills'insteadofdiscountingthemasthesortofexcitedre-portpilotssometimesmakeintheheatofbattle. 47

    IndealingwithheScudhreat,irplannerswereorcedoadibahigh-visibility,complexplanintoanalreadyelaborateaircampaign.Evenifthecampaignwasuccessful,herictiontcausedheoalitionwaswellworthIraq'seffort.A ststands,Scudhuntingsucked4,000air-to-groundsortiesawayfromBaghdadandIraq'sfieldedforcesareaswhereairpowerwasespeciallyeffective.FutureadversariescanlearnfromIraq'sexample.W M DtargetsetsareirresistiblebaitforU Sairpowerandcanbeprofitablyusedtosiphonsortiesawayfromothertargets.48UrbanWarfare

    The futuresnothesonofDesertStorm,uthestepchildofSomaliaandChechnya. Ge nCharlesKrulak

    ThePentagon'sMilitaryOperationsonUrbanTerrainMOUT)nternethomepagehashundredsoflinkstosubjectsdealingwithurbanfighting.Virtuallynoneofthemaddressesairpower'srole.49FortheU SArmyand3

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    MarineCorps,urbanwarfareisatwenty-firstcenturystandingassump-tiontowardswhichtheyarepreparing.Y etattheA irWarCollegeandA irCommandandStaffCollege,hecurriculumisilentregardingthepro-foundproblemsurbanterrainpresentstothemosttechnologicallycapableairforceintheworld.However,airpowerhasprovenitselftobethemosteffectivetoolforlev-elingtheurbanplayingfieldintotalwar.Hamburg,Dresden,Hiroshima,andNagasakiprovidedvividestimonyinWorldWarIIohisact.nalimitedwar,however,withfriendlytroopsandciviliansincloseproximity,thesledgehammerapproachisimplynotanoption;andanenemythatchoosesoightromhe itypresentsU Sairpowerwithanntractabledilemmafromaphilosophicandphysicalstandpoint.Forairpower,urbanwarfaresnotaboutstrikingkeynodesofenemyinfrastructureorattainingstrategicparalysis.M O U Tmeanscloseair sup-port(CAS)inthecity,andCA Sisamissionthat theU S A Fseesitselfper-formingathexpenseofinterdictionandtrategicattack.nTheAirCampaign,JohnWardencapturesthisspiritinhisdefinitionofCAS:Let usdefine loseairupportasanyairoperationhatheoreticallycouldandwouldbedonebygroundforcesontheirown,fsufficienttroopsorartillerywereavailable. 50WardendoesnotviewC A Sasanintegralpartofagroundchemeofmaneuver.Rather,heviewsarequestforC A Sassomethinghathegroundorcecommandermustjustifyandperhapsbargainfor.51PartiallyasaesultofthisA irForcepredilection,heU SArmyhasequippedtselfwithattackhelicoptersandartilleryystemshatlargelynegatetheneedforfixed-wingCA Sontheconventionalbattlefield.Takingthiscapabilitytothestreetsisanothermatter,however.A sdemonstratedinreviousonflicts,rtillerynirect-firemodesevastatingweapon.Buttearingdownbuildingswith155-mmshellsisapooroptioninimitedwarswhereiviliansomminglewithombatants.Although

    Armyhelicoptershaveapoint-targetcapability,urvivalintheurbanen-vironmentischancy.n1993,Somalitechnicals inMogadishubroughtdownhelicopterswithocket-propelledrenades;nnemywithvenslightlyadvancedweaponrycouldinflictfarworsedamage.TheU SArmywillenteranurbanfightwithanorganicfirepowershort-fall;andif theU SA FhasrelegatedCAStothebottomoftheprioritylist,urbanCASsnotevenonhepage.52Nothatixed-wingaircraftareapanaceaorirepowerhortfallsfarromt.Buthisspreciselyheproblem.UrbanCA SiscompletelydifferentfromCA Sontheinearbat-tlefield.Urbanfightingisthree-dimensionalfromrooftopstosewers,mul-ticulturalfrommosquestomovietheaters,andalwaysclose tosomethingoromeonewhohouldbehieldedromheffectsofordnance.A Stechniqueslearnedontherakedrangesofthe western UnitedStateshavelittletransfervaluetotheworld'steemingcitiesandslums.NorwilltechnologysavetheU S A FfromitsphilosophicalindifferencetoMOUT.Whilelyingatnightenhancesurvivability,heurbanenviron-mentgreatlydegradesthesensorsthatallowapilottofight.NightvisiongogglesNVG)aredesignedtoamplifytheambientlightof themoonandstars.Culturallighting,headlights,andfireseasilyoverwhelmN V Gcapa-33

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    bilitiesandgreatlyincreasepilotworkloadwithacorrespondingdecreaseineffectiveness.Inadifferentspectrum,forwardlookinginfrared(FLIR)devicesarepre-sentedwithimilarhurdles.Builtodistinguishhottemsagainstoldbackgrounds,FLIRsbecomethermallysaturated