a “measure” on oregon’s future: the passing of judicial balance to mandate extremism

8/6/2019 A “Measure” on Oregon’s Future: The passing of Judicial Balance to Mandate Extremism

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Michael SmiraGeorge ColePS 203May 29, 2011

A “Measure” on Oregon’s Future: The passing of Judicial Balance to Mandate ExtremismThe Formal Review of Measure 11

Background and Issue This analysis will focus solely on the proven impact M11 has had on Oregonin relation to criminal trends, Prison populations, budget allocations and ratioof people served.In 1994, Oregonians approved a “tough-on-crime” initiative known as“Measure 11” (M11), which mandated minimum sentences for severalserious and violent crimes ranging from 70 to 300 months for persons as

young as 15 years old, with no previous offenses. Measure 57 (M57) requiredmandatory minimum sentences for property and drug crimes, and Measure73 (M73) imposed more mandatory minimums for certain sexual crimes anddrunk driving. Below are the authors of M11, who championed its cause,(Fora complete overview of M11 please refers to Appendix A).

Committee Members:Appointed by:

Representative KevinMannix

Chief Petitioners

Robert J. Prinslow Chief Petitioners

Lee Coleman Secretary of State

Jim Francesconi Secretary of State

Cory StreisingerMembers of theCommittee

Before M11 was approved by voters, prison sentences could be decided on acase-by-case basis at a judge’s discretion. However, M11 and othermandated sentencing made a “cookie cutter approach to sentencing,” saysPatty Katz from Partnership for Safety and Justice (PSJ), whose mission isprison reform. It essentially eliminated the discretion we have entrusted toour elected and appointed judicial servants who know and understandcriminal acts. Although crime has fallen in the past years since the passing of this measure, it is consistent with similar trends throughout the country, andit does come at a staggering cost. Our entire state government has beenstripped to a skeleton operation as our budget has been depleted, causing



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the forced cuts to hundreds of programs as a direct result of a sufferingeconomy and legal mandates.

(Graph courtesy of the Criminal Justice Commission of the State of Oregon)Criminal Trends

Based on information obtained from Partnership for Safety and Justice, Oregon hasincreased its prisonpopulation by morethan 41% since thepassing of M11.

Though, Oregonhas enjoyed thesteady decline of violent andproperty crimes inthe last twodecades, the

decline in criminalactivity cannot behailed as solelybeing attributed toM11. According to

FBI and Oregon statistical data, violent and property crime in Oregon has beendecreasing since the late 1990s. In 2008, Oregon ranked 40th for violent crime and23rd for property crime; the lowest state rankings for Oregon since 1960.

National and statewide FBI UCR data is available going back to 1960. The graphbelow shows the national and Oregon violent crime rate from 1960 to 2008. Oregonfollows a similar trend as the rest of the nation, and has historically had a lower

violent crime rate than America as a whole. Craig Prins of the Criminal JusticeCommission (CJC) eluded that the long-term violent crime rate trend “showscontinuing increases through the ‘60s,‘70s, and ‘80s and decreases starting in theearly to mid-90s and continuing through 2008. Violent crime in Oregon fell by 11percent from 2007 to 2008 and by 14 percent from 2004 to 2008,” says Prins, boththe largest percentage drops of any state.Incarceration Rates

Since theimplementation of mandates such asM11 the Oregonprison system hasbecome bloated withlong-term prisonersserving no less thanwhat is prescribed bylaw to be 70 monthsand creating theneed to increase the

http://www.oregontransformation.com/images/safety/doc-overviegraph2.gif



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building program. The increases in the number of inmates due to M11 werenot so much due to the growth in the number of offenders entering thesystem but to the length of time M11 offenders spend in prison. SB 1145also affected the prison system by transferring the responsibility for thosesentenced to 12 months or less to counties. This bill made a one-time

reduction in the growth of the prison population after a short adjustmentperiod when counties used the state prisons for incarceration until new jailcapacity was completed. Other factors contributing to the prison populationgrowth include changes by the 1999–and later—Legislative sessions thatincreased the sentences for repeat property offenders. Finally, M57 passedin November 2008 changed the sentencing of certain property and drug-related crimes. The Legislature altered the implementation dates for M57,but long-term it should have had a similar impact the way it was passed bythe voters. It is estimated that approximately 600 inmates will be added tothe prison population by July 2011 as a result of M57 growing to a totaladditional population of over 1,500 by 2015 (Transform).

To the left is themost currentconvictionrecord of M11by crimeprovided fromCrime VictimsUnited (CVU), aM11 advocacygroup. Thegraph clearly

demonstratesthe relationshipbetween prisonovercrowdingand the overallconvictionsassociated withM11. With themandateminimumsentence being

70 months,most of thepeople still

remain incarcerated and can account for more than a third of the total prisonpopulation.

Cost of Incarceration



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In the past few decades The Department of Corrections budget has balloonedfrom $377 million to $1.4 billion dollars. Additionally, the Department of Corrections absorbs over 55% of the public safety budget, leaving roughly$900 million left for all other safety needs. Our tax dollars would be betterspent on education and social programs that work to better the antecedents

to crime such as poverty and lack of education, rather than locking youthsand adults away for 70 to 300 months. We must stop siphoning funds frompublic programs, like education, to support measure 11. This graph shows the estimated cost for M11 and the actual cost. Column 3displays the cost for a single year and column 4 displays the bi-annual costto house only property of the state prisoners in Oregon institutions. Currentlythere are approximately 6,959 offenders in DOC custody costing the public$103per day for each inmate, which amounts to an overall cost of $37,595. Today, there are over 14,400 persons in DOC custody, racking up a bi-annualbill well over a billion dollars.Max Williams, the former Republican legislator now in charge of the Corrections

Department, stated in an interview that, “We are on an unsustainabletrajectory,”when asked about the future of the prison population. Although theDOC’s budget is massive, it is still strapped for funding."I have very little flexibilityfinancially." Williams further acknowledges that "Oregon's prison system does leanto one of the higher cost systems in the country, but most of that is driven by laborcosts."

“The National Institute of Corrections, part of the U.S. JusticeDepartment, lists Oregon's annual cost per inmate in 2008 as $36,060,compared with the national average of $24,052. A corrections reportby the Pew Center on the States, using 2007 data, showed Oregonconsuming 10.9 percent of its general fund for corrections. Althoughthe Pew report emphasizes that identical state-to-state comparisonsare impossible because of multiple variables, it's still clear Oregon hasone of the most expensive corrections systems based on the share of state money spent on its inmate population” (Partnership).

Such a cut — the Department of Corrections’ proportional share of the $563 millionacross-the-board reduction ordered recently by Kulongoski — simply can’t be made,director Williams said.

“As much as I’d like to say we can do it all, I’m pretty convinced thatwe can’t,” he said. “You really have to start closing institutions andreleasing inmates and we really don’t have the authority to do that.

Those are decisions that policymakers in the Legislature have to make”

(Partnership).

Oregon cannot sustain the cost of housing drug addicts and criminals whowould best be rehabilitated through programs and treatment to keep themfrom re-offending. This cost is a result of longer prison sentences and fewerpeople being released, as a direct result of minimum sentences. TheExecutive Director for Partnership for Safety and Justice, David Rogers statedin his article “MONEY, PRISONS, AND POLITICS: AN OREGON BUDGET



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PRIMER,Rogers explains that due to the swelling in DOC population it’sbudget is the siphon of Oregon’s public safety dollars. Their budget hasexploded and expanded by 400% in the last fifteen years, from $377 milliondollars to $1.4 billion dollars. He calls it “dramatic growth” and “the fastestgrowing state agency budget.” Today we spend more on incarceration than

we do on education.A Measurable Service Ratio The DOC spends a billion dollars per biennium to house 14,400 inmates,which is $37,595 each. The Department of Education has 562,142 studentsin K-12 public schools (Education) and allocates $5,769 for each student. The graph to the left indicates the funding from Oregon in blue and Federalfunding with Oregon funding in Red. Section 1 gives the amount of students,Section 2 is the amount for each student in K-12, Section 3 is the yearly costfor all students per year, and Section 4 is the bi-annual cost of justattendance.Oregon spends almost seven times the amount to incarcerate one person

than to educate one person. Based on an interview with Jenni Deaton fromthe Oregon Department of Education (DOE) Superintendent’s Office, shestates that “for 2009-11, the state school fund amount is $5.76 billion and$500 million less than in 2008-09. For each student, the state school fundallocation is $5,769. The per-student number including local and federalfunding is approximately $9,600.” That is less than the year before. We havereduced our dropout rate in the last 19 years, but only by 1836 students. Wehave over 6,000 dropout students each year. According to the OregonDepartment of Education, in the 1994-1995 school years there was a drop-out rate of 7.4 percent or 11,152 students. This also happens to be the sameyear measure 11 was implemented. Some have said that Oregon has made a

poisonous investment in the future of our state by taking public educationdollars and redirecting them to the DOC.Oregon ranks 32 in the country on per student spending and number 1 forincarceration spending (PSJ). We have become a prison state (U.S.).Additionally, the Pew Charitable Trust report one in a 100: Behind bars in America 2008, states that we have 1% of America's entire population behindbars and nationally, educational spending has increased only 21% since1987, when prison spending increased over 127% nationally.Our education system is only one of the many agencies that have beenaffected by the bloated corrections budget. The Department of HumanServices, for example, has been cutting programs for years; they help the

persons living with disabilities and persons suffering from the disease of addiction. These people represent roughly 85% of our prison population andabsorb the largest amount of additional funds for the much-needed Alcoholand Drug Treatment, championed as being the reason that Oregon has sucha low recidivism rate at 22.8% (PEW). Additionally, with M11 came a new all-time high cost of healthcare due in part to the shift in the incarceration agedemographic. The state now must pay for any and all healthcare costs for all



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inmates which were the case for one person who has a quadruple bypassheart surgery at the expense of DOC (Partnership).

When we look at the Department of Human Services who services onaverage of a millionpeople each year and

has an economicimpact of $2.5million per $1 millionspent has seen itsbudget sliced anddiced many times inthe past decade(DHS).In recent bi-annualbudget cycles theDepartment of

Human services hasseen its budgetdepleted by billions. Today, the federalgovernment providesmore than 60% of DHS funding as shown in the graph from DHS.

Of the $13.53 billion in funding, more than $8 billion is dedicated toMedicaid, Foster Care and adoption assistance, Women with infants, Temporary assistance to needy families (TANF), and food stamps. These areprograms that are solely funded by the Federal government and cannot be

re-disbursed. That means the needed funding for Drug Treatment programsacross the board are on the chopping block to close to $3.5 billion dollarshortfall for the 2011-2013 Bi-annual budget cycles. The once hailed andchampioned addictions treatment programs of which Oregon has served as amodel for many states in the nation could be a thing of the past. We areturning into a strapped-for-cash, skeleton government, which would rathercut programs than advocate for prison reform because of re-electionconcerns.

There is however one state agency has been sanctioned to delve into M11and the almost poisonous effect it has had Oregon. The Criminal JusticeCommission is that internal government agency.

The Government Review of M11

The Criminal Justice Commission is a state run entity whose mission is:

The Criminal Justice Commission's (CJC) purpose is to improve the

efficiency and effectiveness of state and local criminal justice systems

by providing a centralized and impartial forum for statewide policy

development and planning. The commission is charged with



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developing a long-range public safety plan for Oregon, which includes

making recommendations on the capacity and use of state prisons and

local jails, implementation of community corrections programs and

methods to reduce future criminal conduct. In addition, the

Commission has a role in funding and evaluating Oregon's drug courts.

The commission also conducts research, develops impact estimates of crime-related legislation, acts as a statistical and data clearinghouse,

administers Oregon's felony sentencing guidelines and provides staff to

the advisory committees regarding asset forfeiture and racial profiling.

Commission members are appointed to four-year terms by the

governor and confirmed by the senate (Wasson).

What led to the creation of the CJC has a bit of history. The CJC before its conception

was known as the Criminal Justice Council, which was formed under House Bill 2093.

They were charged with providing “a permanent forum ...for communication,

coordination and overall planning"(Wasson) with-in the corrections community and

assisting in finding a solution of prison overcrowding.

The Council would develop a punishment/risk management model that could be

tested and validated in Oregon. The goal was to have a system that was capable of

matching sanctions according to both the offense (punishment) and the offender

(risk) (Wasson) .The council’s relatively brief existence began in 1985 and ended in

1995. The 1995 legislative session allowed the Criminal Justice Council to sunset

and created the Criminal Justice Commission. The earlier planning bodies had been

composed of representatives from all elements of the criminal justice system,

typically including law enforcement, local government, the judiciary, the Legislature,

the Parole Board, the State Corrections Division/Department of Corrections, and

prosecuting and defense attorneys. The new Commission was composed of but

seven members, appointed with consideration to the different geographic regions of

the state and with no more than four being from the same political party. Although

the commission was limited in number, the chairman was given the authority to

create additional committees (Wasson).

Prison Overcrowding

Capps v. Atiyeh: Oregon´s Prisons Unconstitutional. In 1980 the federal court

ruled in Capps v. Atiyeh that the Oregon prisons presented unconstitutional

conditions and ordered the state to reduce the institutional populations. On appeal,

the U.S. Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the order to the U.S. District Court.

In December of 1982, the U.S. District court said that Oregon´s prisons did not

violate Constitution standards, but were, nonetheless, so seriously overcrowded that

future court intervention could be likely if remedial steps were not taken (Wasson).

The Prison Overcrowding Project: Oregon was not alone in its prison

overcrowding situation. The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation and the National



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Institute of Corrections funded a national Prison Overcrowding Project. The Project

provided grants and technical assistance to four states: Colorado, Michigan, Oregon,

and South Carolina in 1983. The Project sought to examine the factors contributing

to prison overcrowding and develop strategies to control the size of prison

populations (Wasson).The Oregon Prison Overcrowding Project collected offender-

based data on inmates, offenders released from jail, and probationers. The OregonProject concluded that the Oregon correctional system was expertly managed, given

the offenders sent to it. They also did an inventory of the sanctions (punishments)

and services available at the local level on a county by county basis (Commission).

Oregon had a Jail Overcrowding Project from 1984 through 1988 that was related to

the Prison Overcrowding Project. Their final 1988 report noted that twenty-two of

the thirty-two counties operating jails had been sued for unconstitutional conditions

of confinement. Jail population limits were either ordered (fourteen counties), or

voluntarily set to avoid costly litigation. The Project made findings and

recommendations to the 1987 legislature. The Sentencing Guidelines Proposal:

Along with the Criminal Justice Council, established in 1985, the Jail OvercrowdingProject recommended the Council develop sentencing guidelines. The guidelines

were to be based on the severity of the offense and the seriousness of the offender

´s criminal history. The guidelines would synchronize the demand and supply of

correctional resources, including jails. The proposal was to be presented to the 1989

legislature (Commission).

The Jail Overcrowding Project also found that unnecessary delays were contributing

to the overcrowding of jails. Time limits were adopted for: 1) offenders being

detained in jails awaiting determination of whether they had violated conditions of

their probation, 2) delays between conviction and sentencing, and 3) delays in the

transmittal of the judgment orders to the sheriff for defendants in custody. The 1987

legislature also passed a law declaring it state policy that the state, not the

counties, was responsible for the incarceration of sentenced felons (Commission).

Mandates

With the passage of M11, the commission was faced with the daunting task of the

evaluation and impact of this measure. In March 2011 the CJC released its much

anticipated review of M11 and its findings are as follows:

The Promises of M11

All information used in the section is cited under “Commission.”

The chief petitioner fleshed out his utilitarian argument for M11 in the1994 voter’s pamphlet as follows:

“Requiring solid, minimum prison time for violent crimes will result in:



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• Incapacitation. The criminal cannot commit other crimes while inprison. This will reduce actual crime in society.

• Deterrence. Career criminals will learn that crime does not pay inOregon. Some of them will leave, or change their ways.

• Predictability of Sentences. Right now, the range of sentences isso broad, and the reasons for increasing or reducing sentences sobroad, that it is hard to predict what actual sentence will be imposed.With these mandatory minimums, everyone will know the exactminimum sentence which must be served for the crime.

• Comparable Sentences. All judges in Oregon, no matter how soft,must impose the minimum sentence for a violent crime when a juryhas found the criminal guilty. Sentences can be higher if thecircumstances call for it, but they cannot be lower.

The Fulfillment of the M11 Promise


Whether mandatory minimum sentences have provided the fouroutcomes promised by the chief petitioner will be considered in depthin this report. How it has fulfilled these promises is the bulk of thisreport, but can be summarized as follows:

• Incapacitation. Measure 11 did increase the use of incarceration toincapacitate offenders by requiring Oregon to grow its prison system tohold offenders for longer terms of prison. The increased need for prisonbeds was mitigated by the way the prosecution has applied themeasure and mandatory minimum sentencing in general.

• Deterrence. The effectiveness of the measure as a crime deterrentis indeterminate, but it is clear that many of those indicted andconvicted for these offenses were not “career criminals” in that theyhad little or no prior felony record.

• Predictability of Sentences. The measure did providepredictability for the minority of cases where the state sought aconviction for crimes that carried the sentence proscribed by the chief petitioner. It created this predictability by eliminating judicial discretionif the prosecution obtained a conviction for that crime. This reportfocuses on the application of mandatory sentencing in Oregon in

thousands of cases over more than a decade, and makes clear thepredictable sentence is only arrived at in the minority of cases where aprosecutor, not a judge, decided it was appropriate and necessary. Thisreport delves into the factors that increase the likelihood a prosecutorwill seek a conviction that calls for a mandatory minimum sentenceand examines the broad disparity in sentences for the 70 percent of cases where the prosecutor uses the “leverage” of the mandatorysentence to obtain a plea bargain to a lesser charge.



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• Comparable Sentences. The chief petitioner focused on requiring“soft” judges to impose the minimum sentence if a jury found theoffender guilty. This report shows that juries only hear about 15percent of the cases involving mandatory minimum sentences, and inthe other 85 percent of the cases there is broad disparity in thesentences arrived at by the plea negotiation process in Oregon’s 36

counties. DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS

Information Used by CJC


The Oregon Judicial Information Network (OJIN) contains information onall charges in Oregon, the dispositions and sentences on thosecharges, as well as demographic information of offenders. Use of OJINdata allows analysts to identify the initial charges in the formalaccusatory instrument, charges returned as indicted by the grand jury,how often individual offenders are convicted of those charges and the

sentences imposed based on those convictions.

For this analysis we rely on the language of ORS 132.390, concerningthe grand jury, to provide the best information about what crimeactually occurred and what the state would seek to prove at trial if anoffender asserts the right to a jury trial. Our analysis then consideredthe movement from indictment to conviction as the point in the systemwhere application of prosecutorial discretion impacts the actualsentence for the crime. Using this methodology, we were able to trackchanges in convictions before and after M11’s passage. We also usedwell accepted statistical models to examine factors that influence if anoffender is convicted of a M11 offense or if an offender is sentenced to

prison.The Outcome of the M11 Review


FINDINGS

• The typical M11 offender is white (74 percent), male (91 percent),and adult (89 percent) and has no adult felony convictions. Only 30percent have been previously convicted of a felony, 15 percent havebeen convicted of a person felony and 15 percent have beenpreviously incarcerated at an Oregon prison.

• In 2009, offenders who were charged by a grand jury with at leastone M11 crime, and were convicted of that crime or a lesser felonymade up 34 percent of prison intakes, and 64 percent of all prisonmonths imposed.

• Statewide, 29 percent of offenders charged by a grand jury withcommitting at least one M11 offense were convicted of the most



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serious crime in the grand jury indictment. Sixty-two percent of offenders indicted for at least one M11 crime were sentenced to prison.

• M11 is applied differently across counties. In the five most populouscounties, Multnomah County convicts the lowest percentage of M11indicted offenders for a M11 crime at 36 percent, while Marion County

convicts 63 percent. Counties apply M11 differently, and thosedifferences are statistically significant even after controlling for otherfactors such as age, gender, race, and criminal history. Offendersindicted for a M11 in one of the five most populous counties are 79percent more likely to be convicted of a M11 and twice as likely toreceive a prison sentence as offenders in the other 31 counties. (This iscounter to the prevailing myth that officials in counties in EasternOregon, away from Oregon’s four largest cities, would be more likely toconvict of the most serious offense carrying the longest sentence.)

• M11 is applied differently across demographics. Juveniles andfemales indicted for a M11 are both less likely to receive a M11

conviction. These differences are statistically significant with juvenilesand females both being about 20 percent less likely to be convicted of a M11. M11 conviction rates also differ by ethnicity. Blacks who areindicted for a M11 are about 15 percent less likely to be sentenced toprison than whites, and Hispanics are about 40 percent more likely tobe sentenced to prison than whites.

• M11 indicted offenders who go to trial are nearly four times morelikely to be convicted of a M11.

• M11 indicted offenders who have a private attorney are about 25percent less likely to be convicted of a M11.

• A M11 indicted offender’s criminal history is important in determiningwhether they are convicted of a M11. A M11 indicted offender withthree or more prior person felonies is nearly twice as likely to beconvicted of a M11.

• Upon the passage of M11, fewer M11 indicted offenders wereconvicted of their most serious offense. During the 1990s, offenderswho were subject to M11 were 34 percent less likely to be convicted of their most serious offense than those who committed crimes beforethe passage of M11.

• Upon the passage of M11, M11 indicted offenders were much more

likely to go to prison and more likely to receive a longer prisonsentence. Offenders who were subject to M11 were 36 percent morelikely to go to prison and their median length of stay in prison was 81percent longer.

• If Oregon voters had not passed M11, Oregon would require anestimated 2,900 fewer prison beds, about one third of the initial officialestimate.



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• Senate Bill 1049 (1997), which allowed guidelines sentences forsome M11 offenses, had little or no impact on the prison population.

The prison months imposed for indicted offenders changed very littleafter passage of the law.

Report Conclusion


In conclusion, M11 did not eliminate the tough choices about what theappropriate sentence is in a specific case. It did change who makesthat decision from the judge to the prosecutor. It did eliminate thestructure the guidelines gave for guiding these tough decisions incases involving a M11 charge. The result has been an increase inseverity of sentence, and an increase in incarceration in Oregon,though not nearly as great an increase as there would have been if prosecutors had sought conviction for the charge carrying themandatory minimum as they had before the measure’s passage.

In the United States, the separation of powers between the executive,legislative, and judicial branches has developed into well-defined rolesfor each branch. In states and sentencing systems with sentencingguidelines, the legislature approves the sentencing laws; the executivebranch prosecutes the laws and carries out the sentences imposedwithin its corrections system. The role of the judicial branch is to applythe law at the individual case level by evaluating the facts of thecriminal case before it: the impact of the harm to the victim, theculpability of the offender, the public safety threat posed by theoffender, and the societal impact of the crime. The judge then imposesa sentence that holds the offender accountable for his or her criminal

action and promotes public safety. The judicial branch is usually seenas the neutral party in our adversarial criminal justice system that isbest structurally situated to bring all the facts together, taking intoaccount the most persuasive arguments of both adversarial sides, andto make an impartial informed decision. The prosecutor’s role in such asystem is to bring the facts, from the State’s perspective, to bear inthe case. The prosecutor, due to familiarity with the case, is bestsituated to understand and explain the case from the perspective of the victim and law enforcement. The defense can provide informationabout the defendant that would be unknown to law enforcement andseek to mitigate the punishment that may be thought to be necessary.

Usually, the executive branch discretion is controlled by adherence toobjective criteria that are the basis of discretion. The judicial branch isnormally given broader discretion. M11 flipped this dynamic forsentencing on Oregon’s most serious offenses. M11 did not take awaythe difficult decisions, it simply moved the decision making power fromthe judge to the prosecutor.



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These findings have sparked many discussions involving the complete reform of Oregon’s sentencing laws. Special hearings are taking place to figure out ways totrim the DOC’s budget and all options are on the table.

Possible Solutions

A subcommittee of the Governor's Reset Cabinet recommended the state suspendfully imposing sentences required under Measure 57 for repeat property offenders.

That alone could save $40 million the next two years. Kulongoski's advisers reached

the same conclusion, dryly noting that prison costs are "too often ignored when

sentencing policies are established."

The advisers also recommended the state do what many others have done to rein inrocketing prison costs: shift more attention to less expensive ways of gettingcriminals to behave. The group suggested the state better treat the drug, alcoholand mental problems that afflict more than 70 percent of Oregon’s prisoners. Theysuggested more use of home detention and tighter community supervision, steps

successful in other states (Justice).

Governor Kitzhaber recognizes the need to reduce the DOC budget and increasefunding for education, however since his solution for the DOC conglomerate is to cutall drug and alcohol treatments, parenting programs, and cognitive courses, thiswould also include the continued suspensionof Measure 57 and a newly suspendedMeasure 73 to bring down spending. Although the governor has brought up the ideaof prison reform, that reform is only financial.

Senator Chip Shields and his colleagues are advocates for prison reform and believein the treatment programs that have proven to be successful. Shields, D-Portland,who has worked on public safety measures, has said, "The public safety system isout of balance. There's too much money going to prisons." A complete advocate forprison reform, Shields has further said in an interview that "Kevin Mannix never putsa price tag on any of his measures. He's OK with us taking money from K-12 to payfor them” (Justice). In fact, Shields is a member of the Ways and Means committeereviewing the Public Safety budget which held public hearings to gain further insightas to what the public view is on prison funding. Many spoke including this author. Ispoke to the panel about my experience in DOC and the treatment I received sayinghow “grateful I am to have a new life, I get to be a part of my community and giveback, I get to be a brother and a son today”, and there were more stories of howtreatment programs helped those incarcerated. I was touched that The Ways andMeans subcommittee hung on my testimony, eager to hear more, which gave mehope for the future.For a complete copy of my testimony, refer to Appendix B.

An option that has not been discussed is to temporarily suspend Measure 11 and allother mandatory minimum sentences laws, require all mandates to have funding inplace, and give earned time for those who are currently incarcerated under Measure11 crimes.

Until the mid-80s the DOC was part of the Department of Human Services (DHS).Why not reverse that action and allow for DHS to absorb the DOC and take over theoperations to reduce costs in medical and treatment services for those who sufferfrom illnesses and drug addiction? DHS already has the facilities to deal with most



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of the services provided by DOC at a less expensive cost, thus saving Oregon timeand money that could be better spent on education.

Lastly, Oregon can keep M11 in the books, but modify the way it is implemented.Utilize M11 in cases of repeat offender cases that warrant a harsher touch on crimeapproach.

Power Players

The grid below demonstrates the amount each person or agency has toinfluence a change in M11 reform. Each is given a rating of 1-10, 10 beingthe most influence and 1 the least.

Governor Kitzhaber: Has a high position of power and influence in the legislature.Also has Veto power.

Senator Chip Shields: Has influence among his colleagues and constituents andchairs the most powerful financial committee in the legislature.

Max Williams: As Director of DOC he has admitted that with the current structureof sentencing law the DOC cannot sustain the exponential growth any longer.Having this view puts him as an advocate with moderate influence among thelegislature. His position gives him influence among legislators.

Kevin Mannix: Since he is no longer in office, no longer has the financial backingfrom his supporters and is currently under investigation; his influence in low. He isalso the Measure’s author and has no interest in changing the Measure for the goodof Oregonians.

Crime Victims United:A well-meaning group of “tough-on-crime” advocates thatenvelope all crimes as violent whether they be committed by non-violent offenders

or not. Not a group interested in appealing Measure 11.Partnership for Safety and Justice: A smart on crime, pro-prison reform groupwho has many influential legislators as supporters of their causes.

Though there are those cited that appear to have no or little influence, clearly if they pooled their political influence they could make some changes that Oregon’spublic safety budget desperately needs.

Political PlayersFor/Agai

nstSalience ormotivation

ActualPower

TotalPower

Governor Kitzhaber 6 5 10 300

Senator Chip Shilds 8 8 5 320Max Williams 6 -5 6 -180

Partnership for Safety and Justice 10 10 2 200

Kevin Mannix -10 -10 3 -300

Crime Victims United -10 -10 3 -300

Community Leaders 10 10 2 200



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240

Based on myPolitical Power Chart I can predict that there is just simply not enough motivationand political will touch M11. The recognition for reform is apparent, however, toadvocate for such a reform would most certainly be political Russian roulette. Thepublic is too easily swayed by scare tactics and deceitful ads that a cry for change isnil. It will not be until utter catastrophe that my fellow Oregonians will rise to the

occasion and demand our legislator to change our incarceration practices. My fear isthat if that happens we will go for extreme changes rather than functional changes.We will have to wait and see.

Summary:

I have included these visuals and information about measures 11, 58, and 73 whichgives a view of how Oregon is funding its schools, human services programs andprisons. The heartbreaking part is that too many voters with influence get theirinformation from a 30-second soundbite and thus, hearing a poignant but brief victim of a violent crime victim’ story (not related to the intent of the measure),they base their votes on this information. Oregon has been a leader in offenderrehabilitation, effectively reducing its recidivism rates. To cut these programs would

do harm to society and go against the programs set forth in the 2004 legislativesession. The potential impact these measures were unseen until recently, and theeffect they have on other services like education funding, offender reform, andcritical public services. These Oregonians would want to preserve to keep a healthybudget. Oregonians want healthy funding for education and treatments for offenderrehabilitation instead of pouring money into a system that does no justice for thosewho can lead, want to lead, and are capable of leading a better and rebuilt life. Casein point, the DOC/M11 provides funding for 14,400 people, having a direct impactagainst those who serve millions. The siphoning of funds from much-neededprograms to DOC has shown that Oregon is willing to invest more in incarcerationthan its general population. It has been proven that treating what broughtindividuals to crime, i.e. drug addiction, has reduced recidivism and allowed these

people to become productive people in society. Hence the power structure I haveincluded here: These are people with the influence to change this backwardspractice and, thus far, we have seen no changes from any one of them. Until we asa community and an electorate hold these people and groups accountable, wecannot expect anything different. It is time for change and it is time for all of us tomake and see that change happen. We have the power to do so. I’m in.

Chart NumberDefinition Column1

High positive Will change

Medium PositivePossibleChange

Low positive Could ChangeHigh - MediumNegative

Will notChange

Low NegativeUnlikely to

Change



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Conclusion:

The math is wrong, bothersome, and the logic behind it is disturbing.It simplydoes not add up to have Oregon’s funds forits educational systemcome fromour incarceration rate. Oregon has a high recidivism rate and we havecreated a revolving door in our criminal justice system, and it takes longer to

cycle through. Handing out mandatory minimum sentences like measure 11can makes our situation worse. It would be wiser to increase educationalspending to promote an educated population, rather than a population of criminals, and prisons. With this reckless allocation of tax dollars could we besealing our fate as a prison state? Can we stop the revolving door of incarceration? Will our government finally stop the temporary bandaging of our social issues and practice social and fiscal responsibility? Well, theanswer lies with you. Writing a letter to your elected official or your DistrictAttorney’s office, or volunteering to help in some way, such as publictestimony, can and will make an impact. Do your part and make Oregon abetter place for the future.

Work Cited

Commission, Criminal Justice. "Longitudinal Study of the Application of Measure 11

and." Http://media.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest news/other/Measure

http://media.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest

http://media.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest



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%2011%20Analysis%20030911.pdf . Oregon Live, 11 Mar. 2011. Web. 28 May

2011.

Deaton, Jenni. “Re: Oregon Department of Education: Budget numbers.” Message to

the author.9 Aug. 2010. E-mail.

"Measure 11 Report Released | PSJ." PSJ | Partnership for Safety and Justice.Web. 30

May 2011. <http://www.safetyandjustice.org/news/2249>.

"Oregon Violent Crime and Measure 11."Crime Victims United. Web. 07 May 2011.

<http://www.crimevictimsunited.org/measure11/presentation/>.

Partnership for Safety and Justice.Web. 9 Aug. 2010.

Pew Charitable Trust. “one in a 100: Behind bars in America 2008.” 28 Feb. 2008.

Web. 9 Aug. 2010.

Prins, Craig. Crime in Oregon Report . Issue brief. Vol. June 2010.Salem, 2010. Print.

Rogers, David. “Money, Prisons, and Politics: An Oregon Budget Primer .”20 June.

2009. Web. 9 Aug. 2010.

State of Oregon Department of Corrections.Web. 9 Aug. 2010.

"Transform Oregon's Budget: Department: Corrections, Dept of." Transform Oregon's

Budget: Jive SBS: Transform Oregon's Budget . Web. 07 May 2011.

<http://community.allenalley.com/community/budget1113/ps/dc>.

US Census Bureau.Web. 9 Aug. 2010.

U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2010).

Digest of

Education Statistics, 2009 (NCES 2010-013) Table 180 and Chapter 2 .

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_180.asp?referrer=list

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/ch_2.asp

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_180.asp?referrer=list

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/ch_2.asp



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Wasson, Billy F. "Criminal Justice Commission The Development of Oregon's."

Oregon.gov Home Page.Web. 30 May 2011.

<http://www.oregon.gov/CJC/overview.shtml>.

a “measure” on oregon’s future: the passing of judicial balance to mandate extremism

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