a national party in a regional party system: the psc-psoe in catalonia

This article was downloaded by: [University of Guelph]On: 30 June 2012, At: 02:19Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

Regional & Federal StudiesPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/frfs20

A National Party in a RegionalParty System: The PSC-PSOEin CataloniaElisa Roller a & Pieter Van Houten ba University of Manchesterb University of Cambridge

Version of record first published: 25 Mar 2008

To cite this article: Elisa Roller & Pieter Van Houten (2003): A National Party ina Regional Party System: The PSC-PSOE in Catalonia, Regional & Federal Studies,13:3, 1-22

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13597560308559432

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make anyrepresentation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up todate. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses shouldbe independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/frfs20

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13597560308559432

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs ordamages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly inconnection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012

A National Party in a Regional Party System: The PSC-PSOE in Catalonia

ELISA ROLLER and PIETER VAN HOUTEN

After relatively good showings in the 1977 and 1979 general Spanish elections, the Catalan socialists had good reason to be optimistic about their chances in the first autonomous election in Catalonia in 1980. Indeed, 'the socialists were widely expected to win the election' (McRoberts, 2001: 60). These expectations were not fulfilled, however, as the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), a Catalan party connected to the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) through a federal association, came only second in the election (see Table 1). A nationalist government was formed, and its leading party coalition (the Converg2ncia i Unid, CiU) has been in power since then. The PSC-PSOE has continued to perform well in Spanish elections in the region, but only in the 1999 regional election did it challenge again for party dominance in Catalan politics. It won the most votes in this election, but not the most seats. This election may, however, have been a turning point in Catalan politics, and the socialists are seen by many as the possible winner of the regional election to be held in late 2003.

What can explain the discrepancy in the election results of the PSC- PSOE in national and regional elections? And why was this pattern disrupted in 1999? Instead of answering these questions through a detailed analysis of Catalan electoral behaviour, which has already been attempted by other authors (e.g., Pallarks, 1999), we focus in this article on one feature of this party, which conditions and influences many aspects of its behaviour and electoral performance. In particular, we argue that the PSC-PSOE's dual nature as a regional party and an affiliate of a national party can explain many of the strategic and electoral dilemmas it has experienced. Only in the latter half of the 1990s were the conditions such that these dilemmas did not severely constrain a successful performance in regional elections.

More generally, this case study provides interesting insights in the behaviour of national parties in subnational party systems.' While processes of decentralization in many West European countries have spurred academic interest in political developments at the subnational level, the role of national parties at this level has received little attention so far.2 This is surprising, as national parties are important actors in regional political

Elisa Roller, University of Manchester; Pieter van Houten, University of Cambridge

Regional and Federal Studies, Vo1.13, No.3, Autumn 2003, pp.1-22 PUBLISHED B Y F R A N K CASS, L O N D O N

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012

2 REGIONAL and FEDERAL STUDIES

TABLE 1

ELECTION RESULTS I N CATALONIA, 1977-2000

PSC-PSOE CiU ERC APIPP PSUCIIC-V

Regional Electiorzs (%)

Regiorzal Elections (seats)

National Elections (%)

Sources: Coordinaci6 Electoral, Departament de Governaci6, Generalitat de Catalunya; www. eleweb.net.

systems. While this is self-evident in regional political systems consisting entirely of national parties or characterized by long-term dominance of one national party (such as the 'red belt' regions in Italy), national parties are also crucial actors in regions featuring regional parties. National parties control the regional government in several such regions (e.g., in Scotland, Wales or Galicia), or are important in influencing the policies and degree of success of a regional government dominated by regional parties (e.g., in Catalonia, Basque Country or Bavaria). Furthermore, the political consequences of processes of devolution and the actual decentralization 'experience' very much depend on the attitudes of national parties towards the territorial reorganization of their own party structures and the regionalization or localization of political competition at the subnational level.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012

A NATIONAL PARTY IN A REGIONAL PARTY SYSTEM 3

The choices faced by national parties in subnational party systems are by no means trivial, and there is considerable cross-national and cross-regional variation in their strategies. For example, as the experiences of the PSOE and British Labour party demonstrate, even when they control and manage the decentralization processes as governing parties, national parties will be faced with - often unwanted - dilemmas on the territorial reorganization of their own party structures. National parties are often unwilling or unable to respond to the political consequences of these processes of regional devolution. All this raises interesting questions. Exactly what dilemmas and trade-offs do national parties face in a regional party system? How do national parties respond to these challenges, and what accounts for differences between parties in attitudes and behaviour? The existing literature on parties and regional politics is not of much help in answering these questions. Most standard works on parties and party systems focus neither on territorial decentralization within parties, nor on subnational diversification of and variation in party behaviour (e.g., Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1976; Mair, 1990; Katz and Mair, 1994; Ware, 1996). Admittedly, some works recognize aspects of a 'territorial dimension' in party organization and behaviour (e.g., Duverger, 1964; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Panebianco, 1988), but these still fall far short of providing an analytical framework to study the subnational strategies of national parties.

This article suggests a framework to study the behaviour of national parties in regional party systems, and provides a first test of the hypotheses derived from this framework through a case study of the PSC-PSOE. The starting point of our analysis is the observation that national parties potentially face complicated organizational and political choices in devising their subnational strategies, especially under conditions of electoral competition from regional parties. Organizationally, they have to decide on how much power and autonomy to delegate to their regional branches. Politically, they have to take positions on the territorial organization of the state (whether to favour further decentralization or federalization), and on the balance between national and regional issues in their programmes. We hypothesize that national party behaviour, while significantly shaped by party history, is crucially influenced by several contextual and internal factors. These factors include the constitutional structure and number of subnational units in a state, the presence of dual identities among the regional population, the strategies of other national parties, and leadership in the party.

These hypotheses shed light on various aspects of the policy position choices and electoral results of the PSC-PSOE in the Catalan party system, and help to explain why this party has struggled to play a dominant role in Catalan politics. The PSC has a large degree of autonomy from the PSOE,

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


but it has still faced difficulties in establishing itself as a credible representative of regional interests. The gradual process of decentralization in Spain has led the party to focus more on regional issues. It has continued to try to appeal to both (Catalan) nationalist and non-nationalist constituencies, and now better exploits the existence of dual identities among parts of the regional population. The good results in the 1999 regional election show that this has allowed the party to come to terms better with the challenges of simultaneously being a 'national' and 'regional' party in a strongly regionalized political system.

STRATEGIES O F NATIONAL PARTIES IN SUBNATIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS

Almost all party systems at the subnational level of government in Western Europe contain national parties, and the strategies and electoral performance of these parties exhibit enormous variation across cases and over time. How can we analyze this variation? Which factors have an impact on the strategies and electoral results of subnational branches of national parties? This section presents a framework to study these questions, and suggests some possible answer^.^ The case study of the PSC-PSOE in the next section will provide a preliminary test of several of these hypotheses.

The seemingly trivial observation that regional branches of national parties have both national and regional characteristics and orientations provides a good starting point for the development of an analytical framework. This observation implies a fundamental tension or trade-off faced by these parties (referred to here as the 'regiona1,national dilemma'), as this dual nature provides both potential benefits and costs to various groups and actors within the party (cf. Keating, 1998: 101 ; Schmid, 1990: 21). Political actors in a regional party branch can benefit from the opportunity to use resources and channels of influence provided by the national party organization. This can include campaign funds, administrative support, access to the national government in case the party governs at the national level (Keating, 1998: 125-6), and the use of the reputation and image of the party built at the national level or in other regions. Moreover, it may provide opportunities for regional politicians to pursue political careers at the national level. For the national headquarters of the party, it provides the opportunity to adapt strategies to regional circumstances in order to maximize its electoral success and influence in the region, the means to target its grassroots activities more effectively, and opportunities for the recruitment and training of political personnel. Furthermore, strong regional branches may allow parties to continue to

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


govern when it is forced into an oppositional role at the national level. The regional level can then serve as a basis for contesting future national elections (Downs, 1998). German parties have benefited from this on several occasions.

The organizational link between national party headquarters and regional branches can, however, also constrain party actors. Regional party leaders will not be able to deviate too much from the national party line, and may be limited in their ability to respond to regionally specific situations and to claim that they represent distinctly regional interests. Moreover, negative developments for the party at the national level are likely to trickle down to lower levels (Geser, 1999). National party leaders, on the other hand, face the possibility that regional branches will try to deviate from the general party line, potentially undermining the interests of the national party leadership and the credibility of the party as a whole. Moreover, an organizational structure that provides significant autonomy for regional branches can give rise to internal power struggles about policy positions or party offices.

The significance and impact of this regionalhational dilemma will, of course, vary. If the preferences of regional and national leaders about party strategies at the subnational level converge, its significance is limited. This will be the case if the regional level has little salience in the political system or if the regional population cares much more about national than regional issues. However, several factors can lead to divergence of preferences between regional and national politicians, thus increasing the significance and impact of the regionalhational dilemma.4

First, in federal or strongly regionalized systems the regional level plays, by definition, a larger political role, and will feature more prominently in party considerations and strategies. Such systems will not necessarily give rise to more decentralized party structures or more diversified policy choices (see below), but they force parties to deliberate more consciously about these issues.

Second, the presence or absence of distinct cultural, social or economic characteristics in a region influences the strategic environment of national parties. If present, such characteristics will be reflected in the strength of regional identities among the population, and increase the likelihood that regional and national political preferences differ (Fearon and Van Houten, 2002). Regional party branches, then, need to consider the extent to which they should appeal to regional identities and diverge from the national party line. One possible response is to try to depoliticize regional issues by ignoring them. In some situations, however, this may not be possible. Thus, a third factor amplifying the regionalhational dilemma is the presence of regionalist or secessionist parties, which significantly heightens the salience

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


of regionally specific concerns, and forces national parties to respond (Keating, 1998: 96).

In sum, the strategic considerations for national parties are most complicated in regions with a well-developed regional identity, in which they face significant competition from regional parties. This certainly applies to the Socialist party in Catalonia, a region where national and regional identities are both forceful and in political competition. Interestingly, the underlying conditions for this competition of identities are both the presence of different population groups in the region and the existence of multiple identities among individuals.

These strategic considerations for national parties will be focused on several aspects of party structures and positions. The first aspect is organizational, and concerns decisions regarding the territorial structure of the party. It refers to the powers that are delegated to the regional branches, and the autonomy that these branches enjoy. For example, the party needs to establish which level has the authority to appoint regional party leaders, to formulate and approve electoral programmes of regional branches, and to dispose financial resources (Deschouwer, 2003). Historical patterns in a party will play an important role in this (Hopkin, 2003), but parties have often made changes and adjusted strategies in a relatively short period of time, especially when challenged by regionalist parties. It is possible to indicate four (ideal-typical) strategies. First, and most extremely, the party can decide to abandon the national organization, and split up into regional parties. The Belgian mainstream parties did this between 1968 and 1978. Second, parties can decide to decentralize their organizational structures, and grant more autonomy to regional branches. For example, the Spanish Socialist party granted significant autonomy to the Catalan branch in their 1978 agreement (see below). Third, parties can simply maintain their existing territorial structure in the face of competition from regional parties. Finally, although perhaps paradoxically, a party can centralize its structures to better coordinate its response to regional challengers (Meguid, 2001).

Furthermore, in the face of the regionallnational dilemma, national parties have to make choices on at least two aspects concerning their policy positions. One policy choice concerns the party position on the territorial issue par excellence, namely, the territorial structure of the state. Laver and Hunt (1992) document considerable variation among parties on this issue in the 1980s. In the 1990s, parties such as the Labour Party in the UK, the Socialist party in Catalonia, and some of the Italian parties have supported decentralization of the state, while the Conservative Party in the UK and the PP in Spain opposed such measures.

The other policy-related choice concerns the regional diversification of party positions. Does the regional branch focus much attention on

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012

A NATIONAL PARTY I N A REGIONAL PARTY S Y S T E M 7

regionally specific issues? Does it deviate from the national party line to account for regional views? One needs to compare national and regional electoral programmes of parties, or national and regional government agreements and declarations to answer these questions. For example, the Labour Party in Scotland has focused significant attention on regional issues. On the other hand, the Conservative Party in Scotland and the SPD in Bavaria have exhibited less regional diversification. Parties can also vary their emphasis depending on the type of elections (regional or national) being contested, as the PSC-PSOE in Catalonia now does.

Several factors can be hypothesized to influence the strategies of national parties and, consequently, to impact on the electoral results of these parties in particular region^.^ An obvious factor is the historical origin and evolution of a party (Duverger, 1964; Panebianco, 1988; Hopkin, 2003). To give one example, the split of the Christian-democratic party in Belgium in the late-1960s and the reluctance of the Belgian Socialist party to follow a similar strategy in the next decade cannot be properly understood without attention to the historical influence of the Flemish nationalist movement on the former party, and the traditional emphasis on national unity in the ideology of the latter party. However, history will not necessarily determine the responses of parties to changing situations and challenges. Parties have room for choice, as the wide empirical variation in strategies seems to indicate, and other factors will be equally important determinants of party strategies.

One such factor is the presence of distinct regional characteristics. Other things being equal, such characteristics make national parties more likely to decentralize its organizational structure and to focus on regional issues. Not doing so will hurt the electoral performance of the party in the region, especially in regional elections. Interesting and often highly relevant regional characteristics are the presence of population groups with different cultural identities, or the presence of dual (regional and national) identities among individuals. These factors are very relevant in the case of Catalonia. The expected effect of these factors is less clear. If there are different population groups or strong dual identities, party strategies are likely to be ambiguous, and vary depending on the type of issue (following the general party line on some issues, and taking a distinct regional position on others) and the type of election being contested.

Second, the constitutional structure of the state will influence party strategies. In principle, one may expect that federal and regionalized systems increase the likelihood of decentralization of party structures and an emphasis on regional issues. However, the effect of federal and regionalized structures will depend on the exact nature of a federal system (Deschouwer, 2003). If regional elections have no direct consequences for

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


the national political system, then decentralization and regional diversification are likely. On the other hand, if regional elections have a direct impact on the national political level - as is the case in Germany (through the role of regional governments in the Bundesrat) - parties will have an incentive to keep more control of regional party branches and to focus campaigns more on national issues."

Third, the number of subnational units in the political system will influence the organizational strategy of parties. A small number of subnational units makes organizational decentralization or break-up more feasible, as the Belgian case suggests.

Fourth, the position of a party in the national party system matters in several ways. Mainstream parties in the opposition are often more supportive of state decentralization than governing parties (Hopkin, 2003). Examples are the Socialist party in France in the early-1980s, and the British Labour Party in the 1990s. These parties were partly motivated by the hope to increase their regional support in order to be more successful at the national level. Moreover, if a party is not in government at the national level, there is less pressure for regional branches of the party to follow the national party line. Thus, regional diversification is more likely for oppositional parties. When facing competition from regional parties, we can expect national parties to have more electoral success in regional elections under such circumstances.

Parties on the fringes of the national party system may also focus considerable attention on the regional level in an attempt to enter the 'mainstream' of the political system. Successful examples of this strategy are the Austrian FPO in Carinthia, and the German Green party in local and regional elections. The effect of this factor on organizational strategies seems less relevant, however, as the organizational structure of fringe parties seems more driven by ideology (for example, the emphasis on participation in Green parties) or leadership (especially in extreme right and populist parties).

Finally, regional leadership can be important. The presence of a powerful leader with a strong regional profile has an important impact on the strategic considerations of a party. It allows a party to more credibly focus on regional issues without decentralizing its structure further. Other things being equal, it will enhance the electoral prospects of the party, especially in regional elections. Of course, strong regional leadership may also increase the likelihood of internal power struggles between the national and regional level, which can lead to decentralization or centralization within the party (depending on who wins this power struggle). By contrast, weak regional leadership reduces the credibility of regional appeals, and will reduce the attractiveness of the party for the regional electorate. Both

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


weak regional leadership and strong national leadership will lead to the centralization of a party.

This section has formulated a framework and hypotheses to guide more comprehensive and systematic empirical research on the behaviour of national parties in regional party systems than has been conducted so far. While such systematic research will have to await future work, the remainder of this article provides a suggestive test of several of these hypotheses through a case study of the Socialist party in Catalonia.

T H E PSC-PSOE I N T H E CATALAN PARTY SYSTEM

Background

National and regional party systems in Spain coexist in a complex and interdependent relationship sometimes termed the 'electoral Spains' (Valles, 199 1). Consequently, Spain provides great opportunities to explore the role of national parties in regional party systems, as there is significant interaction between the national and regional party systems, which themselves have undergone significant change over time (Linz and Montero, 1999). Catalonia is a specifically interesting case to study this interaction.

The party system in Catalonia7 is interesting because, unlike many other regional party systems, it does not reproduce the general electoral and party support patterns found in the national party system (Linz and Montero, 1999). The end of the period of consensual elite-led politics and the emergence of centre-periphery conflicts in the immediate post-Franco era led to a new era within the Catalan party system in which both national and regional parties began to consolidate themselves on both the political scene and the electoral front. These national and regional parties are in strong competition with each other (Baras and Matas, 1998; Caminal, 1998). As Table 1 shows, the two main parties are the regional CiU, a centre-right nationalist coalition, and the PSC, which is affiliated with the PSOE and can be considered a regional branch of a national party. The Catalan party system is characterized by both a traditional left-right bipolarity and a nationalist-centrist struggle, with parties increasingly having to shape their policies around issues of autonomy and Catalonia's role within the Spanish state rather than traditional left-right political issues (Roller, 2000). The CiU has governed the Generalitat, the Catalan government, since 1980 under the leadership of Jordi Pujol owing, to a great extent, to the absence of a coherent nationalist leftist force in Catalonia. Thus, in terms of alternation in government the Catalan party system has experienced very little change over the last decades. As one disgruntled columnist summed up the situation, 'Over the last twenty years there have been changes in the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


entire world except for in Catalonia and in the Vati~an. '~ However, there are signs this may be changing.

The PSC was founded in July 1978, through a merger of the Congress and Regrouping branches of the PSC (until then independent Catalan socialist parties) and the Catalan Federation of the PSOE. It is not officially part of the PSOE organization, but cooperates with them through a 'federal' agreement, and is generally referred to as PSC-PSOE. Historically, the PSOE has been unable to embed socialist ideals and principles into the Catalan political debate. Faced with a strong anarchist movement which dominated the working class support in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and a growing nationalist movement, during the Second Republic (193 1-36) the PSOE was reluctant to grant much autonomy to Catalonia (Gillespie, 1989). This strategy backfired and the PSOE's support in Catalonia remained marginal during the Second Republic. It hoped to prevent a similar situation through the formation of PSC-PSOE.

However, due to internal dissent, the PSOE's image in Catalonia through the PSC suffered throughout much of the 1980s and early 1990s. Like Spain's other main state-wide party, the Partido Popular (PP), the PSOE has been 'less capable of reflecting 'territorial' images, those directly related to the autonomous level, than other general images' (Pallares et al., 1997: 161). This handicap relegated the PSC-PSOE to a position of 'vote collector' for the PSOE (El Pais, 4 July 1998). It has done this much more successfully in national than in regional elections. In fact, Table 1 shows that PSC-PSOE has been the most successful party in Catalonia in Spanish general elections. Furthermore, the PSC-PSOE was able to play a semi- direct role in politics in Madrid with a significant but gradually less effective 'Catalan lobby' within the PSOE cabinets (1982-1996).9 Thus, the party has certainly not been a failure. However, its inability to win regional elections has limited its influence, and 'Catalan nationalism . . . has maintained a clear dominance over Catalan politics and has guided Catalonia's relations with the rest of Spain' (McRoberts, 2001: 64).

The October 1999 Catalan election appears, however, to have reversed the fortunes of the PSC-PSOE. As already indicated above, although CiU won more seats, the Catalan socialists won a greater share of the popular vote (see Table 1). As a result, the traditional nationalist-centrist polarity and the stability of the Catalan party system appear to have been weakened (Roller, 2000). Considering that the Catalan economy was doing well at the time of the election and that public opinion was generally positive about the incumbent government (Pallards, 1999: 241), this favourable election result for the PSC-PSOE requires explanation. We argue that a main reason for this improvement in the party's regional credentials is that it now manages

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012

A NATIONAL PARTY IN A REGIONAL PARTY SYSTEM

its regionahational dilemma better.

The RegionalLVational Dilemma

As in other assertive regions, state-wide parties in Catalonia have to juggle with two roles. On the one hand, as Catalan branches of national parties, the expectation is that they defend Catalan interests in both national parliamentary and internal party politics by extracting policy concessions. On the other hand, they represent the views of Spanish parties in Catalonia. As a result, tensions exist between their Catalan and national branches, and the parties have struggled to portray a coherent image towards the Catalan electorate. These parties, and specifically the PSC-PSOE, have suffered from considerable internal divisions and factions, and are often referred to as regional 'franchises' (Newman, 1997)" or 'ambassadors' (Linz and Montero, 1999) of mainstream Spanish parties. In comparison to these parties, some of the regional parties in Spain have enjoyed an advantage. These parties have been able to both govern in their own regional party system and, on occasions, provide external support to a national party in the central government, thereby extracting important policy concessions (Linz and Montero, 1999).

The PSC-PSOE has struggled with this regionalhational dilemma throughout its existence. As Keating (2001a: 152-3) states, the Catalan socialists 'have been torn between their attachment to their colleagues in Madrid and the need to compete within Catalonia', which has resulted in 'support for a moderate measure of Catalan nationalism within PSC, while criticizing Pujol for attempting to monopolize nationalist virtue and suffering taunts from the nationalist parties that it is a mere branch office of Madrid'.

The force of the dilemma has been amplified by several circumstances and has varied over time. The distinctive nature of Catalan politics in combination with the ongoing decentralization of the Spanish state - in which Catalan demands have played a large role - have made it a much more complicated issue than for party branches in most other Spanish regions. The formation of a distinct Catalan party system characterized, among other things, by a nationalist-centrist divide has proved to be particularly difficult for Spanish political parties represented in Catalonia. These parties have been forced to adopt more explicit positions on the degree to which Catalan autonomy should be pursued within the confines of the Spanish state. Indeed, the territorial organization of the state and Catalonia's place in the constitutional settlement have been key issues causing internal dissent in the PSC-PSOE. Even the PSC's predecessor during the Second Republic, the Federaci6 Socialista de Catalunya (FSC- PSOE), had disagreed with the PSOE over the issue of self-determination to

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


the point where in 1936 it broke away from the PSOE to join the Partit Socalista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), the Catalan communist party. By 1978, however, the PSOE supported the demands for Catalan autonomy and, in the spirit of compromise of the times, reluctantly agreed to give up its goal of a federal Spain (Gillespie, 1989). This strategy allowed the PSOE to join Spain's other political forces in reaching a historic settlement on the territorial organization of the Spanish state. However, it also caused regionalist tensions and growing divisions within the party particularly amongst the Basque and Catalan party faithful. The resulting 'nationalist ambivalence' has proved to be a historic handicap for the Catalan Socialists in their quest for the Catalan vote (Giordano and Roller, 2002), aided by the PSC7s inability to mobilize support for regional elections (Colomi, 1996).

In line with one of our arguments in the previous section, developments at the national level have further complicated the strategic calculations of PSC-PSOE and have constrained their ability to adapt to regional circumstances. The PSOE's 14-year reign in Spanish politics (1982-96) meant that the PSC-PSOE was forced to play a double role as the central government's political representative in the Catalan parliament and as the party in opposition with the Generalitat. In its latter role, it faced considerable pressure from its mother party to oppose nationalist demands for greater decentralization (McRoberts, 2001: 88). This, of course, undermined attempts to portray itself as an autonomous Catalan Socialist party. In fact, with disappointing electoral results in the Catalan elections for much of the 1980s, it seemed as if the Catalan branch of the PSOE would no longer be dominated by a nationalist undercurrent. Its position in the Catalan party system became even more complicated following the 1993 Spanish general election, when the PSOE was forced to solicit external support from CiU to stay in power. This undermined PSC-PSOE's role as the main opposition party in the Catalan parliament for the next three years (Matas, 2000).

Moreover, the predominance of Felipe Gonzilez as party leader and Spanish prime minister, and internal dissent within PSC reduced the influence of the Catalan branch in the PSOE. This has changed after the end of the GonzAlez era. Initially, the election in early 1998 of the charismatic populist and former Minister for Public Works, the Catalan Josep Borrell," as PSOE7s candidate for prime minister, reinforced the image of the PSC- PSOE as a franchise party. In his open opposition to the 1997 Catalan linguistic law, Borrell clearly broke away from the PSC-PSOE7s position, which had supported the linguistic legislation and had agreed to support CiU on this issue. However, with the arrival of former Barcelona mayor Pasqual Maragall as Catalan party leader and the weakening of the PSOE due to financial scandals, the PSC was able to challenge the PSOE

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


leadership again. This has loosened some of the constraints the party faces in choosing its strategies.

Party Organization and Positions

Which choices by the PSC-PSOE have emerged over time from these dilemmas? We lack the space here to provide a detailed analysis, but the main patterns in the three areas identified in the theoretical section are as follows. Organizationally, the situation has been relatively stable, albeit complex, since the formation of PSC-PSOE in 1978. Unlike other socialist parties which were integrated into the PSOE, the PSC entered into a federation with the PSOE which in theory renders them as equal partners (Colomk, 1996). This agreement leaves their relationship in a unique position, both as separate parties and as federal partners. Thus, the 'relationship of the PSC with the PSOE has to be placed at the level of a party with autonomy with respect to the other' (Colomk 1996: 9). The agreement stipulating the arrangements of the PSC-PSOE federation is highly ambiguous. According to this agreement, the PSC 'will have full sovereignty in those areas of competency which Catalan Socialists defend for the political organization of their country in accordance with the constitutional framework approved in their programme by the Socialist Party'.12 From the very start, the debate between the national and regional party level has been on whether PSC-PSOE is a federation of parties or a federal party (Molas, 2000). In practice, however, the national level has mostly controlled the party organization, especially in the Gonziilez era (see above). For instance, despite the federal structure, it reduced the autonomy of PSC-PSOE by abolishing its separate parliamentary group in the Spanish Cortes. Only recently has the regional branch become stronger again and begun to operate as a relatively equal partner to the national level.

As already indicated, its position on the territorial organization of the Spanish state has been one of the most difficult issues for PSOE and its Catalan branch. PSC7s position has long been in favour of a federal Spanish state, a position it formally adopted on its fifth Congress in 1987. It sees the federal alternative as a means to consolidate Catalonia7s position within the Spanish state and its high level of self-government (Keating, 2001a; McRoberts, 2001). However, it has regularly been forced to compromise or been undermined in this objective by the national PSOE. And these compromises aside, its support for a federal model of the Spanish state has not necessarily increased PSC-PSOE7s regionalist credentials. Rather, it has left them open to the criticism that it advocates a cafe'para todos ('coffee for everyone,' that is, the same arrangements for everyone) solution, which does not address the CataIan nationaIist demands for recognition of

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


Catalonia's hecho diferencial or distincti~eness.'~ The PSOE has played a significant role in the decentralization of the

Spanish state, first through its support for the formation of the Spanish 'State of Autonomies' in the late-1970s, and then through various initiatives in government after 1982. However, this has not helped PSC-PSOE's credibility as a Catalanist party. First, some of PSOE's initiatives, such as the LOAPA law proposed in 1982 - which was meant to provide the framework for Spanish intergovernmental relations, and would actually have reduced Catalan autonomy - were received with much hostility in Catalonia. Second, over time it effectively institutionalized the bilateral nature of Spanish intergovernmental relations, in which regional governments bargain directly with the national government for competencies and financial resources. This has enormously helped the standing of the governing CiU, PSC-PSOE's main rival (Balcells, 1996: 183). Not surprisingly, the CiU continues to support this bilateral model.

Thus, PSC-PSOE's attempt to juggle different roles and to appeal to different population groups has meant that it has taken different positions on the desired degree of self-government for Catalonia and the future model of statehood for Spain than the nationalist Catalan parties. One example is PSC-PSOE's refusal to support the 1989 declaration of the Catalan parliament for recognition of Catalonia's right of self-determination (Balcells, 1996: 193). Recently, the PSC-PSOE has taken a more pro- Catalan position in its federal proposals, in a deliberate attempt to shed its image as a 'franchise party'. In its party programme, it proposed the introduction of a Carta Autondmica [Autonomous Community Charter], which would broaden the existing Statutes of Autonomy of Spain's autonomous communities. Nevertheless, not wanting to strain relations with the PSOE, the PSC remained ambiguous as to whether the 1978 Constitution should be reformed so as to achieve the proposed objective (El Pais, 9 September 1998).14 Maragall's new form of 'federal Catalanism' has met some success in countering past accusations that the PSC-PSOE is 'too Spanish' and not Catalanist enough (Roller, 2000). In particular, the party appears to have become much more effective in pursuing a 'dual strategy', in which it emphasizes Catalanist issues more strongly in regional than in national elections.

Regional diversification in PSC positions has been relatively limited until recently. Its image as a party concerned with regional issues was damaged by its refusal after the first Catalan elections in 1980 to accept CiU's offer to enter the Catalan government as a coalition partner. For many voters this refusal at a time when important decisions were to be made about Catalonia's political future and on issues such as the consolidation of Catalan institutions and self-government disqualified the PSC as a party

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


seriously concerned with Catalonia's political future (Matas, 2000; Font et al., 1998). As already mentioned, throughout the Gonziilez period the PSC mostly followed the national party line, although its emphasis on a federal Spanish state regularly led to tensions.

In recent years, the PSC has adopted more pro-Catalanist policies, which have aggravated relations with the PSOE. In the March 2000 Spanish election, the PSC-PSOE campaigned with its own electoral programme, and it has taken distinct positions on several issues. The PP government's plans for an overhaul of the regional financing system, largely supported by the PSOE, were criticized by the PSC leadership, leading to accusations that the PSC was trying to dictate PSOE policy in Madrid (El Pais, 9 November 2001). Another recent area of contention between the PSC and PSOE, largely brought on by ongoing political debate in Catalonia, has been the representation of Spain's autonomous communities in the European Union's Council of Ministers. While the PSC supports some form of direct representation for Spain's 'historic communities', in line with many of CiU's proposals, the PSOE has mostly advocated a more uniform approach to representation. Generally, as one of our hypotheses predicts, PSOE's two consecutive losses in the 1996 and 2000 general elections and PSC's rise in electoral fortunes in Catalonia - the result of some weariness with the CiU government and PSC's own transformation - appear to have led to a boost of PSC-PSOE's more autonomous political strategy.

Relevant Factors

Several of the factors mentioned in the theoretical section have influenced these party strategies: the organizational and ideological past of the party, the presence of different population groups and dual identities, the evolving structure of the state, the position of the mother party at the national level, and leadership. We will discuss these now to indicate the plausibility of some of our hypotheses.

First, past decisions and developments conditioned several of PSC- PSOE's strategies and problems since 1978. For example, the decision not to enter the Catalan government in 1980 was partly the result of internal divisions that remained from the merger of three parties into the PSC-PSOE in 1978 (Balcells, 1996: 178). Similarly, the decisions by the party and its forerunners to mainly target the regional 'immigrant' population (people born outside Catalonia) in the first democratic elections in 1977 and to downplay nationalist themes in the first regional elections in 1980 had long- term consequences for the regional image of the party (McRoberts, 2001). Furthermore, ideological differences between PSC and PSOE about the interpretation of socialist principles have a long history. The PSC's tradition, a conglomeration of its different constituent parties and

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


movements, brought together Catalanism, social democracy and demands for self-government, as well as representing a backlash against the centralizing tendencies of the Spanish state. The PSOE's tradition, on the other hand, represented a more working class and statist approach to the interpretation of socialist principles. These conflicting interpretations of socialist ideals often clashed throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

Second, distinctive regional characteristics such as Catalania's demographic profile and identity patterns have left their mark on party strategies. An obstacle for the PSC-PSOE has been how to balance different demands from potentially conflicting groups of voters. Traditionally, the PSC-PSOE's image has been one of promoting the interests of migrants to Catalonia from other parts of Spain, who are less likely to speak the Catalan language and identify as Catalan. This has constrained the party's ability to capitalize on Catalan nationalist themes. For example, the PSC-PSOE has been unable to mobilize a sense of regional deprivation as the Catalan nationalists have done. As one of Spain's wealthiest autonomous communities, Catalonia has contributed substantially to the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund [Fondo de Compensacidn Interterritorial]. This fund is designed to eliminate regional socio-economic inequalities, but has generated feelings of relative deprivation or resentment among the Catalan electorate. Moreover, the PSOE's traditional strongholds have been in poor southern autonomous communities like Extremadura and Andalucia, reinforcing the perception of the PSOE - and by extension the PSC - as a non-Catalan party. However, in order to win regional elections the PSC also needs to appeal to the indigenous Catalan population, especially since the turnout among the 'immigrant' population in regional elections is relatively low. This has heightened its dilemmas, and has contributed to the dual political strategy mentioned above.

It should be noted that the dominant pattern of voter support has been breaking down in recent years. Some authors have argued that the PSC- PSOE, like other Catalan parties, has been forced to adopt a more 'catch-all' attitude, designed around the particular demands of the Catalan electorate (Molas and Bartomeus, 1999). In recent Catalan elections both the PSC- PSOE and CiU have attempted to attract moderate centrist Catalan voters with varying degrees of nationalist support (Roller, 2000). Combined with the PSOE's move to the centre on economic and social issues during the 1980s and early 1990s, this has led to considerable convergence in the positions of the PSC-PSOE and CiU. The only real difference remains the desired degree of Catalan autonomy and the future model of the Spanish state.

The dual strategy of the PSC has also been influenced by dual identities and dual voting patterns. A significant, and growing, part of the Catalan population identifies with both Catalonia and Spain (Keating, 2001b: 74),

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


making them susceptible to different messages in different elections. Although voting patterns have stabilized somewhat in recent elections in Catalonia (Roller, 2001), some Catalan voters continue to choose different parties at different levels of government, a move which has been termed a 'dual vote' strategy (Roller, 2000; Pkrez-Nievas and Fraile, 2000; Moreno, 2001; Pallarks et al., 2001). The general trend has been that in elections to the Catalan parliament, some voters vote for parties that they perceive as being more Catalan, while in national elections they elect party representatives perceived to be capable of influencing the central government. This is one of the reasons the PSC-PSOE has done better in national than in regional elections.15 However, with the aforementioned convergence in positions and growing weariness with the CiU government, this pattern may be breaking down.

Third, the evolution of Spain's State of Autonomies has influenced the development of PSC-PSOE strategies in various ways. Most directly, it has increased the relevance of the subnational political level and helped to induce a distinctive regional party system. This has forced the PSC-PSOE to take positions on the desired structure of the Spanish state, and has increased pressures for regional diversification. The separate timing of the Catalan and general elections means that results of the former do not generally affect turnout or voting behaviour in the latter, giving the PSOE fewer structural incentives to exert control on the PSC and allowing it to focus more on Catalan issues. The fact that, unlike in Germany, regional governments do not directly participate at the national level reinforces this.I6 On the other hand, the already high level of decentralization may paradoxically decrease the salience of the territorial issue in years to come. In particular, it may make nationalist demands for further decentralization less convincing, especially since the CiU has always been reluctant to indicate what it sees as the end state of the decentralization process (McRoberts, 200 1 ; Keating, 200 1 a).

Fourth, we have already shown that the position of the mother party at the national level has influenced the strategies of the PSC-PSOE in the Catalan party system. When the PSOE was in government, it was in a position to dictate the positions of its Catalan branch. Its current weak position situation as an oppositional party after poor election results in 1996 and 2000, on the other hand, reduces its capacity to impose a general party line, and has induced incentives to allow the PSC-PSOE to improve its electoral chances by regionalizing its programme.

Finally, regional leadership has undoubtedly influenced the strategies and fortunes of the PSC-PSOE. The creation of the State of Autonomies has meant that the autonomous communities have emerged as power bases, and regional politicians have become influential figures in national politics. For

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


example, the PSOE's so-called regional barones [barons] were instrumental in the election of the current PSOE leader, the relatively unknown Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. PSC-PSOE's current leader is the charismatic former mayor of Barcelona, Pasqual Maragall, with his own distinct vision of Catalanism. PSC's political strength in Catalonia is very much based on its strong presence at the local level. This has been described as municipalitzacid (Molas, 2000) or 'localization,' whereby party elites are increasingly being recruited from local levels of government. Thus, party leaders such as Maragall and Joaquim Nadal with backgrounds in local government have been able to move political debates within the party away from a focus wholly on Catalonia's position within the Spanish state to issues of local autonomy and governance, socio-economic development and urban regeneration. This has allowed the PSC to consolidate its traditional support in urban areas and to begin to appeal to voters who either feel that the process of decentralization has gone far enough or are tired of CiU's long-serving leader Jordi Pujol. Overall, with this new strong leadership, the PSC-PSOE has been able to increase its credibility as a Catalan party. Maragall already proved a formidable rival to Pujol and CiU while mayor of Barcelona by establishing a political and administrative network to counter the Generalitat. Maragall ran a highly 'personalized' campaign for the 1999 regional election (Pallarks, 1999: 242), and is widely credited for the electoral success of the PSC-PSOE in this election.

CONCLUSION

The ongoing process of decentralization has had important ramifications on national political parties in Spain's autonomous communities. In other words, the cultural and political changes unfolding in Spain have led to significant party changes (Torcal and Montero, 1997). It is clear that the territorial cleavage continues to matter in Spanish regional party systems, thereby posing significant challenges for national parties. It is crucial to take into account this territorial cleavage 'as a second dimension of competition that structures both the existence of regional party systems in some autonomous communities and their complex interaction with the party system at the statewide level' (Linz and Montero, 1999: 44). Because of the salience of this cleavage, national parties in regions such as Catalonia - like the PSC-PSOE - have been faced with a variety of challenges, and have been forced to adapt to changing realities. In fact, some observers have concluded that 'given the weakness of their image as defenders of the interests of the autonomous community, the role of the large parties as instruments of political integration in a complex state with autonomic elections and institutions is ... affected' (Pallarks et al., 1997: 167).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


Although our case study of the PSC-PSOE has illustrated this point, it has also shown that the role and success of national parties can vary over time and is conditional on a party's organizational and strategic decisions.

Faced with the long-term one-party rule in the region and the continuing debate over Catalonia's role within the Spanish state, the PSC-PSOE has had difficulties coping with demands from its traditional electorate as well as appealing to new groups of voters. It continues to fulfil its long-standing role as the main opposition party in Catalan politics and although it has had success at the local and national levels, it has yet to hold office at the regional level. Over time, however, the PSC-PSOE has increasingly adopted a dual strategy. On the one hand, it portrays itself as more 'national' in general elections, in which it can derive various benefits from its association with a large, state-wide party. This, of course, also constrains it in the positions and profile it can adopt, but these constraints have been loosened by the absence of the PSOE in national government since 1996 and as a result of popular regional leadership. On the other hand, in Catalan elections the party tries to portray itself as more 'regional', appealing and responding to regional and local conditions, a strategy which has only recently met with success. One reason this ambiguous strategy may work is that the increasingly pronounced dual identities of parts of the Catalan population are equally ambiguous. The October 1999 election may have marked a turning point for the PSC-PSOE in terms of its new credentials and popular mandate, although it remains to be seen whether the 2003 regional election will confirm this.

More generally, this case study of the PSC-PSOE suggests that to improve our knowledge of subnational political dynamics, a better understanding of the role of national parties at the regional level is indispensable. This article has tried to do this by starting with the straightforward observation that regional party branches face conflicting 'regional' and 'national' pressures, especially in regions featuring regionalist parties. It then broke down the choices and dilemmas of national parties into several aspects, and focused on factors that will influence these choices. The case study makes it abundantly clear that the dual 'regional' and 'national' characteristics of regional party branches give rise to dilemmas and trade-offs between possible strategies, and indicates the importance of several hypotheses regarding factors influencing these strategies. This provides an exciting agenda for further research on the subnational role and behaviour of state-wide parties, a topic neglected for too long by scholars of regional politics and political parties alike.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012

' 20 REGIONAL and FEDERAL STUDIES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Earlier versions of this paper were presented in a workshop at the Third Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, March 2002, and at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 2002. We thank David Samuels, Michael Keating, the Florence workshop participants, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.

NOTES

1. Throughout this article, national party refers to a party which operates state-wide, while a regional party operates only in one region or a limited subset of all regions.

2. It has received much less attention than the fate of regional parties (e.g., De Winter and Hiirsan, 1998; Newman, 1996). Recent and tentative attempts to more systematically study the subnational role of national parties are Hopkin (2003) and Deschouwer (2003).

3. For a more extensive discussion, see Van Houten (2003). 4. As discussed below, some of these factors can also induce particular responses to this

dilemma. The point at this stage of the discussion is simply that these factors amplify the regionalhational dilemma, and make it a prominent issue for state-wide parties.

5. This distinction between exogenous factors and outcomes is potentially problematic. For example, the territorial structure of the state - one of the suggested independent variables - is itself partly the result of previous choices by national parties (see, for example, the decision by the British Labour Party to devolve powers to Scotland and Wales). The distinction, however, helps to draw out the role of certain factors on party choices at a particular point in time, which is necessary to facilitate more systematic empirical research than is currently available. In specific case studies, it is then possible to pay closer attention to the interaction of these factors over time.

6. This contingent effect of federal and regionalized structures may explain why Harmel (1981) found only weak support for the influence of devolution of state powers on party decentralization.

7. In this article, we refer to the Catalan party system in terms of both state-wide and nationalist parties which operate both in Catalan and national elections.

8. Josep Ramoneda, 'El cansancio y el cambio', El Pais, 18 October 1999. 9. For example, Narcis Serra, the then PSC leader, was Deputy Prime Minister of Spain for

many years. 10. Nationalist parties condescendingly refer to them as partidos sucursalistas [branch parties]. 11. Borrell subsequently resigned in May 1999 after a financial scandal involving his estranged

wife and lack of support from the PSOE's Executive Committee. 12. Unity Protocol PSC-PSOE, Section 4, authors' translation. 13. The hecho diferencial represents the characteristics (real or perceived) distinguishing one

community from another. In political and constitutional terms, the concept has been interpreted as applicable to any autonomous community which enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in the form of fueros or otherwise, or possessed institutions of self-government prior to the Spanish Second Republic. The concept has frequently been employed in Catalan nationalist discourse as a justification for certain policy initiatives (e.g., the Catalan linguistic law passed in 1997, Senate reform and autonomous community financing) and to ensure the differentiation between the 'historic' nationalities/communities and all other autonomous communities within the Spanish state. Its closest English translation would be the notion of 'distinct society' as employed in Qu6b6cois nationalist discourse.

14. Interestingly, Maragall's ideas about a future federal Spain have now been adopted by PSOE at the national level ('El PSOE baja 10s humos federales a Maragall', Cambiol63 December 2001, pp.16-18).

15. It is conventional wisdom in the study of Catalan politics that lower turnouts in regional elections and dual voting behaviour among part of the electorate have both contributed to the discrepancy between PSC-PSOE's national and regional election results. The relative importance of these factors is, however, far from clear, as establishing this faces significant

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


methodological problems. For example, most research has been based on election surveys, but survey responses to questions about election turnout are notoriously unreliable. Further statistical research in this area would be fruitful in order to better understand the electorate's behaviour that conditions the strategies of the political parties in the region.

16. There are actually ongoing debates in Spain about the reform of the Senate along the lines of the German Bundesrat. Incidentally, the PSC favours such a development, while the CiU opposes it as another cafe' para todos measure.

REFERENCES

Balcells, Albert (1996), Catalan Nationalism. London: Macmillan. Baras, Montserrat and Jordi Matas (1998), 'Els partis politics i el sistema de partits', in Miquel

Caminal and Jordi Matas (eds.), El sistema politic de Catalunya. Barcelona: Tecnos. Caminal, Miquel (1998), Nacionalisme i partits nacionals a Catalunya. Barcelona: Emp6ries. ColomC, Gabriel (1996), 'The Left Parties in Catalonia: The Case of the PSC and the PSUC',

Working Paper No.88, Instituto Juan March, Madrid. Deschouwer, Kris (2003), 'Parties in Multi-Layered Systems', European Urban and Regional

Studies, Vol. 10, No.3, pp.213-26. De Winter, Lieven and Huri Tiirsan (eds.) (1998), Regionalist Parties in Western Europe.

London: Routledge. Downs, Anthony (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row. Downs, William M. (1998), Coalition Government, Subnational Style: Multiparty Politics in

Europe's Regional Parliaments. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Duverger, Maurice (1964), Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modem

State. London: Methuen. Fearon, James D. and Pieter van Houten (2002), 'The Politicization of Cultural and Economic

Difference: A Return to the Theory of Regional Autonomy Movements', paper presented at the fifth meeting of the Laboratory in Comparative Ethnic Processes (LiCEP), Stanford University.

Font, Joan, Jes6s Contreras and Guillem Rico (1998), L'abstencid en les eleccions a1 Parlament de Catalunya. Barcelona: Mediterrhnia.

Geser, Hans (1999), 'The Local Party as an Object of Interdisciplinary Comparative Study: Some Steps Toward Theoretical Integration', in Martin Saiz and Hans Geser (eds.), Local Parties in Political and Organizational Perspective. Oxford: Westview Press.

Gillespie, Richard (1989), The Spanish Socialist Party: A History of Factionalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Giordano, Benito and Elisa Roller (2002), 'Catalonia and the "Idea of Europe": Competing Strategies and Discourses within Catalan Party Politics', European Urban and Regional Studies, Vo1.9, No.2, pp.99-113.

Harmel, Robert (1981), 'Environment and Party Decentralization: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Political Studies, Vo1.14, No. 1, pp.75-99.

Hopkin, Jonathan (2003), 'Political Decentralisation, Electoral Change and Party Organisational Adaptation: A Framework for Analysis', Fourth European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol.10, No.3, pp.227-37.

Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair (eds.) (1994), How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies. London: Sage.

Keating, Michael (1998), The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Keating, Michael (2001a), Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland (2nd edn.). London: Palgrave.

Keating, Michael (2001b), Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Laver, Michael and W. Ben Hunt (1992), Policy and Party Competition. London: Routledge. Linz, Juan J. and JosC R. Montero (1999), 'The Party Systems of Spain: Old Cleavages and New

Challenges', Working Paper No.138, Instituto Juan March, Madrid.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012


Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan (1967), 'Cleavages Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press.

McRoberts, Kenneth (2001), Catalonia: Nation Building Without a State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mair, Peter (ed) (1990), The West European Party System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Matas, Jordi (2000), 'Los gobiernos de coalicibn en Catalufia', in Jordi Matas (ed.), Coaliciones

politicas y gobernabilidad. Barcelona: ICPS. Meguid, Bonnie M. (2001), 'The Sub-National Effects of National-Level Strategies: The Case of

Devolution in the United Kingdom', paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco.

Molas, Isidre and Oriol Bartomeus (1999), 'Els espais de frontera entre els electorats: Estructura de la compethcia politica a Catalunya', Working Paper No.165, ICPS, Barcelona.

Molas, Isidre (ed.) (2000), Diccionari dels partits politics de Catalunya segle XX. Barcelona: ICPS.

Moreno, Luis (2001), The Federalization of Spain. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass. Newman, Saul (1996), Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies: Mostly Ballots, Rarely Bullets.

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Newman, Saul (1997), 'Ideological Trends Among Ethnoregional Parties in Post-Industrial

Democracies', Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vo1.3, No.1, pp.28-60. Pallarks, Francesc (ed.) (1999), Eleccions i compartament electoral a Catalunya 1989-1999

(Estudis Electoral 11). Barcelona: Mediterrhnia. Pallarks, Francesc, JosC Ramon Montero and Francisco JosC Llera (1997), 'Non State-wide

Parties in Spain: An Attitudinal Study on Nationalism and Regionalism', Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vo1.27, No.4, pp. 135-69.

Pallarks, Francesc, Joan Serra and Jes6s Garcia (2001), 'Els ciutadans i la campanya: Aspectes generals i electors duals', in Josep Gifreu and Francesc Pallar6s (eds.), La campanya mks disputada: Mitjans, partits i ciutadans a les elecciones catalanes de2 2999. Barcelona: Pbrtic.

Panebianco, Angelo (1988), Political Parties: Organization and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pkrez-Nievas, Santiago and Marta Fraile (2000), 'Is the Nationalist Vote Really Nationalist?: Dual Voting in Catalonia 1980-1999', Working Paper No. 147, Instituto Juan March, Madrid.

Roller, Elisa (2000), 'The October 1999 Elections in Catalonia: End of Nationalist Dominance in Catalan Politics?', International Journal of Iberian Studies, Vo1.13, No.2, pp.109-21.

Roller, Elisa (2001), 'The March 2000 General Election in Spain', Government and Opposition, Vo1.36, No.2, pp.209-29.

Sartori, Giovanni (1976), Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schmid, Josef (1990), Die CDU: Organizationsstrukturen, Politiken und Funktionsweisen einer Partei im Foderalismus. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.

Torcal, Mariano and JosC R. Montero (1997), 'Party Change and Cleavage Formation: The Effects of Value Change on the Spanish Party System', Working Paper No.132, ICPS, Barcelona.

VallCs, Josep M. (1991), 'Entre la regularidad y la indeterminacibn: Balance sobre el comportamiento electoral en Espafia (1977-1989)', in Jost Vidal Beneyto (ed.), Espaiia a debate: La politica. Madrid: Tecnos.

Van Houten, Pieter (2003), 'Territorial Aspects of West European Party Politics: National Parties in Regional Party Systems', unpublished manuscript, University of Cambridge.

Ware, Alan (1996), Political Parties and Party Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 02:

19 3

0 Ju

ne 2

012

a national party in a regional party system: the psc-psoe in catalonia

Documents