1

THE UNIVERSITY OF WINCHESTER

‘The Natural Relationship’ provides the story of Anglo-American relations at a significant

moment in history, whilst Britain was on the verge of joining Europe, America was negotiating

detente with the Soviet Union and also opening up China. This period for Anglo-American

relations has been portrayed as a low point for the alliance – and even regarded by some

historians such as John Dickie and David Reynolds as the end of the special relationship.

Commentators and historians in the past have blamed Prime Minister Edward Heath for

purposely downgrading relations with Washington in order to achieve his primary objective,

which was entry into the European Community. However, using recently released government

material from both sides of the Atlantic, this thesis challenges that argument, to actually

highlight that relations between the two governments/administration and particularly the

leaders was the strongest it had been for quite some time.

‘A Natural Relationship’: Anglo-American relations and Britain’s

application to the European Community, 1970-1972

Thomas James Collins

MA in History

Faculty of History

September 2015

2

List of Contents

Abstract 1

Declaration and Copyright 3

Acknowledgements 4

Abbreviations 5

Introduction 6

Chapter One - Britain’s move to Europe 13

Chapter Two – Natural Relationship 24

Chapter Three – Getting in 34

Chapter Four - Sponsors to Sceptics 43

Conclusion 54

Bibliography – Primary Sources 58

Bibliography – Secondary Sources 63

Word Count: 19566

3

Declaration and Copyright Statement

Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in the Independent Study has been submitted in support of

an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other

institute of learning

Copyright

Copyright in text of this Independent Study rests with the author. Copies (by any process) either

in full, or of extracts, may be made only in accordance with instructions given by the author.

Details may be obtained from the appropriate Faculty Office. This page must form part of any

such copies made. Further copies (of any process) of copies made in accordance with such

instructions may not be made without the permission (in writing) of the author.

4

Abbreviations

Archival Sources

CAB Cabinet Files (TNA)

FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office Papers (TNA)

FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States

HAK Henry A. Kissinger Files (NPMP)

Memcon Memoranda of Conversation

NA National Archives, US

NSA National Security Archive

NPMP Nixon Presidential Materials Project

NSDM National Security Decision Memoranda

NSSM National Security Study Memoranda

POF President’s Office Files (NA)

PPPUS Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States

PREM Prime Minister’s Files (TNA)

Telcon Telephone Conversation

TNA The National Archives, UK

WHCF White House Central Files (NA)

WHSF White House Special Files (NA)

5

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisors Mark Allen and Neil Curtin for their guidance and continuous help

throughout the process of writing this dissertation and also for their support prior to the MA History

Conference. I am sincerely grateful to them for sharing their truthful and illuminating views on a number

of issues related to the project. I would also like to thank both the History and Politics staff as a whole

for the last four years at the University of Winchester.

I would also like to thank my partner, Rebecca Davis, for all the love and support throughout that was

provided whilst studying the MA and also the research and writing of my dissertation.

I would like to acknowledge both John Wade and Sylvia Fones for the grammar support they gave me

throughout the lengthy proof reading process.

Lastly I would like to thank all my family and friends who have supported me both throughout my

degree, but most important the completion of this research.

6

Introduction

The Heath-Nixon years, extended from Edward Heath’s election in June 1970 to his defeat in February

1974, have been widely portrayed as a low point for Anglo-American relations. Political commentators

and historians alike have characterised the early 1970s as ‘the lean years of almost forgotten friendship’,

highlighting how, in numerous policy areas, longstanding cooperation and dialogue gave way to

disagreement and acrimony.1 Personal relations between the two leaders were said to become

increasingly constrained and distant as expressed by historians such as David Reynolds and Alan

Dobson2 which is rather surprising, considering their positive first meeting at the White House in

October 1970.3 It can be clearly contended that the Heath-Nixon years marked a turning point in that

the ‘special relationship’ was abruptly over, albeit a short term crisis.

However, in many ways, the fact that the Heath-Nixon premiership was characterised as a difficult time

for the alliance is rather surprising. Nixon had been privately cheering for the Conservatives in the June

1970 General Election, and Nixon was said to be ‘ecstatic’ about Heath’s surprise victory, calling his

National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, repeatedly to express his delight.4 After what had been a

difficult time for Nixon under Heath’s predecessor, Harold Wilson, Heath’s victory suggested an

opportunity for the Anglo-American relationship to be rectified. Harold Wilson had badly damaged the

alliance in Washington’s eyes for three reasons: firstly its refusal to send a token force in Vietnam, the

announcement of its intention to withdraw troops from the East of Suez and finally its devaluation of

the pound. As a result, Nixon regarded the Conservative government as a natural match for his

administration and had the highest regard for Heath. Internationally, Heath was one of a few leaders to

stand by US policy in Vietnam, Heath was an instinctive Cold War warrior who believed it was essential

to protect the global balance of power against the Soviets and finally showed his discontent with the

East of Suez decision in withdrawing British forces. Here it would seem that Nixon could finally find a

Prime Minister that would share his foreign policy motives.

Having said that, what would very much seem to be at the heart of the decline in Anglo-American

relations is Britain’s application and entry into the European Economic Community (EEC). Britain was

1 John Dickie, ‘Special’ No More – Anglo American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London: 1994) p.133; see also for

example, David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart (London: 1998) pp.261-266, Alan Dobson, Anglo-American Relationship in the Twentieth Century (New York: 1995) p.124 and Andrew Scott, Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship (Basingstoke: 2011) p.1 2 Ibid.

3 Record of Meeting: Heath, Nixon, et al., 3 October 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA.

4 Haldeman Diaries: 19 June 1970, Box 41, Haldeman Papers, WHSF, NPMP.

7

twice barred from the European Community (EC) by the domineering French President Charles De

Gaulle, whose reasons were that Britain was too close to America to be able to fully commit to Europe.5

Heath was determined to prove otherwise. In order for Heath to prove Britain were good Europeans,

the argument is, as put forward by President Nixon’s former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, ‘he

deliberately and decisively downgraded relations with Washington.’6 Britain’s transformation from

having a focused foreign relationship to Europe, or arguably France, would very much seem to be the

sole reason for the decline in Anglo-American relations according to Henry Kissinger. Furthermore, the

other reason that would seem to have contributed to decline in Anglo-American relations, was Edward

Heath. Henry Kissinger felt that Heath’s political ambition and determination to get Britain into Europe

pushed aside what was more pragmatic, such as retaining foreign relations with America. To this day,

according to Kissinger, Heath was single minded and was prepared to sacrifice all else, which is why

Kissinger felt that the alliance was doomed from the very start.7

It would seem that Kissinger’s account of Heath and the Anglo-American relations during the early 1970s

has come to dominate scholarship, even though his account is something of a Heath-centric orthodoxy.

Kissinger’s three volumes and nearly 4000 pages of memoirs offers the most detailed and personal

account of Anglo-American relations during the period. Somewhat surprisingly, given his reputation as

an arch-realist, Kissinger emerges as a convinced supporter of the theory of a ‘special relationship’,

which reflects his political bias against Edward Heath following Britain’s entry and application to the

EEC:

The special relationship with Britain was peculiarly impervious to abstract theories. It did not

depend on formal arrangements; it derived in part from the memory of Britain’s heroic wartime

effort; it reflected the common language and culture of two sister peoples.8

It has become universally accepted amongst historians that relations with Washingston had been

undermined by Heath’s ambitions of going into Europe, as argued by Kissinger. Ritchie Ovendale wrote

for example ‘Nixon’s overtures of friendship were met with a deliberate and sustained aloofness by the

Europe-obsessed Heath’.9 Furthermore, biographers of Heath and Kissinger, Alistair Horne and Phillip

Ziegler, have reinforced this view that ‘never has the “special relationship” been in worse shape with

5 Charles De Gaulle’s press statement, 14 January 1963, official French translation, p.7, NSF 73 (Kennedy Library)

6 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (London: 1999) p.603

7 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: 1982) p.141

8 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: 1979) p.90

9 Ritchie Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke:1998) pp.136-137

8

Heath at the helm in London’.10 It would seem therefore that Heath is the odd man out, whilst looking

down the line of British Prime Ministers; he is the first and only British leader to have chosen a place in

Europe over and at the expense of relations with America.

The aim of this thesis, using recently released government documents on both sides of the Atlantic, is to

examine if and why this was the case. Was Heath to blame for the decline in Anglo-American relations, a

view that is widely accepted amongst scholars? Unlike Ritchie Ovendale, Philip Ziegler and Alistair

Horne, having the official sources recently released from Washington and London it has become

possible to re-examine Kissinger’s claims. The greatest example of this is the US ambassador to the EC,

Robert Schaetzel, explaining to the FCO and Number 10 in October 1970 that he believed Kissinger and

Nixon were split on European affairs, Kissinger opposing expansion of the EC, Nixon supporting it.11 This

highlights the clear problems with using memoirs as a major historical source when making an

argument. Memoirs are understandably self-serving, however when they present a detailed and

determined version of events they can have a huge impact on our understanding of history – especially

when they represent the first draft and are written by a central participant. That is not to say that

Kissinger is wrong in arguing the Anglo-American alliance had its difficulties, it clearly did, particularly on

Europe, but in arguing that the blame should be primarily put onto Heath is another matter.

The central argument of this dissertation is that the Heath-centric view drafted by Kissinger and adopted

by various historians as already mentioned goes too far. The dissertation challenges the notion that one

man such, being Edward Heath, single-handedly affected the outcome of the ‘special relationship’,

demonstrating that it is not only exaggerated but largely misleading. As will be shown in chapter one,

Britain’s turn to Europe reflected a gradual evolution rather than a sudden change in policy. America’s

global supremacy and Britain’s decline on the global stage was very clear, with the examples of the Suez

crisis, the nuclear dependence on America and Britain’s lack of funds to support America in Vietnam.

The chapter also explains the difficulties the Anglo-American alliance had, prior to the Heath-Nixon

years, highlighting that the strained relationship between Heath and Nixon was not a anomaly.

Chapter one largely explains why Britain turned to Europe, somewhat following on from the previous

chapter. By the time Heath came to power, arguments were mounting in favour of entry to the point

10

Alistair Horne, Kissinger’s Year: 1973 (London: 2009) p.111, Phillip Ziegler, Edward Heath: The Authorised Biography (London: 2010) p.384 11

Letter to the Permanent Under-Secretary from Sir Con O’Neill, 30 October 1970, PREM 15/1540, TNA – Probably seen by Heath also as it is underlined

9

where it was widely regarded as both essential and inevitable that Britain was going to join Europe,

Heath’s role was to sail Britain towards it destiny, rather than steer his own course. For Heath, like his

predecessors, most notably Harold Macmillan and Harold Wilson, joining Europe was first and foremost

about renewing Britain’s status and role as a world power, and helping America to defeat the spread of

communism.

The second chapter addresses the ‘natural relationship’ a phrase used by Heath whilst being interviewed

by American journalists following his first meeting with Nixon and Kissinger at the White House in

October 1970. This was seen by Kissinger as a departure from an Anglo-American alliance by refusing to

use the phrase ‘special relationship’. Adding to that, the chapter examines the ‘personal friendliness’12

between Heath, Nixon and Kissinger following their first meeting and analyses why there is a

contradiction between the primary sources and the account given by Kissinger in his memoirs.

The third chapter analyses how Britain following two vetoes from French President Charles De Gaulle to

enter Europe, finally got the approval by the European Community to become a member. Here is where

Kissinger accuses Heath and the British government of moving itself away from the ‘special relationship’.

In reality however, it is revealed that Britain was continuously in consultation with President Nixon

whilst it was negotiating membership, such as the Common Agricultural Policy, which Nixon and

Kissinger were most fearful of, if there was to be an expansion and further integration of the EC.

The final chapter explores the American perspective to Britain’s application and entry into Europe. Since

the Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower America was preparing and sponsoring Britain’s entry into the

EC13, however the Nixon administration had a sudden change of course. Whilst Nixon had more

significant issues to contend with such as focusing on domestic turmoil being the Watergate scandal and

also foreign relations with China and nuclear détente with the Soviet Union, Kissinger took the reins on

Britain’s application to Europe, which seemed an odd decision considering Kissinger’s euroscepticism

and arch believer in the ‘special relationship.

It is also necessary to examine research to argue how and if so why Anglo-American relations changed as

a consequence of Britain’s entry into the EC. In order to achieve a broad overview of the issue, the

primary sources that are utilised include recently released government documents from both sides of

the Atlantic. These government documents include records of meeting between Heath, Nixon and

12

Edward Heath, The Course of my Life: My Autobiography (London: 1998) p.473 13

“The Grand Design” (Co-operation with Western Europe), 5 January 1957, CAB 129/84, TNA

10

Kissinger, but also meetings between foreign secretaries and between ambassadors from across the

Atlantic. Government documents are hugely beneficial to this thesis because they truly highlight the

language used between the two leaders, which show the confrontational, or positive relationship they

had. Furthermore, as already mentioned, unlike previous historical and political texts on Nixon and

Heath’s relationship such as An Ocean Apart by Andrew Scott and Special No More by John Dickie, these

government documents prove what really took place during the Heath/Nixon years, rather than having

to rely on other secondary sources, as noted Kissinger’s memoirs, to give evidence.

Having said that, of course there are issues with government documents, particularly political bias,

certain parts of the meetings may not have been recorded to benefit Nixon or Heath’s leadership or

respect amongst the public. Adding to that, the recordings of meetings focus on the political side of

events; it would have been beneficial to see the personal relationship between the leaders, rather than

just the political. What is also interesting from some of these government documents is the date is not

provided14, by knowing the specific date, further research could have been made to understand the

global and domestic events Nixon in this case, had to deal with. Further issues have been faced from

encounters with sources such as with an anonymous note to Edward Heath, potential research from

knowing the senders identity could have revealed more about possible political sympathies towards

Anglo-American relations, or Britain’s application to the EC.15 Finally, it is difficult to understand what

sort of tone was used whilst Heath, Nixon, Kissinger or various other character when speaking. There is

no emotion expressed in the recordings, therefore it is difficult to understand the atmosphere in which

these meetings took place.

Other primary sources include documentaries and TV interviews. The documentary in this dissertation

which has been the greatest contribution to this is between Edward Heath and Henry Kissinger which

took place in 1990 and was hosted by Peter Hennessy and Caroline Anstey. Unfortunately, Nixon’s

health made him unavailable to take part in the documentary, but the fiery language between the two

such as Kissinger describing Heath as being an ‘unusual leader’16, which indicated the fierce relationship

the two had for quite some time. However the problem with this documentary, and many other

documentaries on the ‘special relationship’ was the focus on when the relationship was at its best, with

14

Memos for the President beginning December 1971, POF, Box 87, NSC, NPMP, NA 15

A note ‘President Nixon’s Visit to Chequers’, 3 October, FCO 7/1812, TNA 16

Peter Hennessy and Caroline Anstey, Moneybags and Brains: The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ Since 1945, Strathclyde Analysis Paper, No.1 (Strathclyde: 1990) pp.16-18

11

the example of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan or Harold Macmillan and John F. Kennedy,

highlighting the problems with popular history.

The main form of secondary sources used in this thesis includes biographies and autobiographies, in

particular Heath’s, Nixon’s and Kissinger’s. These are a clear benefit to the dissertation as they present a

point of view that is first hand and that is a unique position given their proximity and direct engagement

with events. This in itself is a clear disadvantage, as mentioned earlier; they are self-serving, particularly

when they are former politicians and defending their position that was taken on Britain’s application

and entry into the EC. Kissinger in particular, who has a changed perspective of Heath-Nixon years,

which may have been down to the Thatcher-Reagan years when the relationship was strongly bound

together on foreign policy, most notably the Soviet Union and euroscepticism.

Other secondary sources such as journals and books that discuss Anglo-American relations only have a

relatively small focus on the Heath-Nixon years, but at the same time, these texts are still instructive. An

Ocean Apart by David Dimbleby and David Reynolds for example has only 5 pages out of 33417 focused

on the Heath-Nixon years, the main interest of the book being Thatcher and Reagan. Historians such as

John Dickie, Alan Dobson, John Dumbrell, Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon all seem to take Kissinger at

his word that Heath purposely damaged relations with America. 18 Having these secondary sources

challenged the government documents that this dissertation has, suggesting to some extent that these

sources are historically inaccurate.

The greatest contribution to this dissertation is the historical text Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the

Anglo-American relationship written by Andrew Scott for his PHD at Cambridge University. The focus on

Europe is rather small, but greater to that of other historians and political commentators mentioned.

The main focus is on the opening of China, negotiating Détente and also the Middle East Crisis.19 But the

largest contribution it brings to this thesis is the development of the personal relationship between

Nixon and Heath, other historical texts such as those mentioned analyse the political aspect of the

relationship, whereas Scott also looks at the personal relationship, which gives a different aspect of the

‘special relationship’ between Nixon, Kissinger and Heath.

17

Dimbleby and Reynolds, An Ocean Apart (London: 1988) p.266 18

See, John Dickie, ‘Special’ No More – Anglo American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London: 1994) p.133, Alan Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (New York: 1995) p.124, John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After (London: 2001) p.73, Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon, The Heath Government: A Reappraisal (London: 1996) p.305. 19

Andrew Scott, Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship (Basingstoke: 2011) pp. 50-80, 108-140 and 166-196.

12

Before this dissertation addresses the decline of the ‘special relationship’ between Heath and Nixon

from June 1970 to when Britain gained entry into the EEC on the 1st January 1973, it is important to

receive a conceptual backdrop into why Britain felt the need to apply to join Europe in the first place. It

will also be interesting to analyse the problems the Anglo-American alliance faced prior to the Heath-

Nixon years and whether therefore such an unhealthy relationship between the two leaders was

inescapable.

13

Chapter One – Britain’s move to Europe

When addressing the origins of the phrase ‘special relationship’ it was inevitable that relations between

the US and Britain during the Heath-Nixon years faced a difficult spell. Leading up to the early 1970s,

there was a clear sign from the very beginning when Churchill announced the phrase of a ‘special

relationship’ between Britain and America, was more of a myth than reality. The biggest problem facing

the ‘special relationship’ which will be clear from this chapter is the complete paradox of the two

nations involved in it. On the one hand you have America being the global superpower following the

Second World War; on the other you have a declining Britain, which following the Second World War

had lost a quarter of its national wealth, was struggling to hold onto the remains of its Empire and

relying on America for economic assistance and a security of guarantee. Whether the issue was of the

Marshall Plan in 1947 or the Suez Crisis in 1956 there was a clear indication that Britain would have to

change its course and look for its ally elsewhere, in this instance, it would be membership of the

European Community in 1973.

When Winston Churchill first popularised the notion of the ‘special relationship’ during his ‘Iron Curtain’

speech on 5th March 1946, he depicted it as a central partnership between Britain and America in the

struggle against tyranny, the clear opposition being the Soviet Union.1 Before Churchill announced his

speech in public, President Truman had read the speech on the train, describing it as ‘admirable, it

would do nothing but good’.2 Churchill had called for a ‘special relationship between the United States

and the British Commonwealth’, which would have meant combined military staffs, shared bases,

resources and weapons, and eventually perhaps common citizenship. This fraternal association of the

English speaking people’ was, he insisted, the only hope for a ‘haggard’ world in which all countries,

except America and the British Commonwealth, were now confronted by the peril of communism.3

Although the reaction from President Truman was positive, reaction from the public was far less

enthusiastic. At first it seemed that Churchill would have received popular support for his speech, a poll

on the 6th March 1946 indicated that seventy percent of Americans disapproved of Soviet foreign policy,

‘a fraternal association’ with Britain however had very few supporters. Americans had only recently

been converted to the idea of a United Nations Organisation (UN) to gain world peace and many feared

that a wailing nation such as Britain, being in a formal alliance with America would undermine the UNO’s

1 Stephen R. Rock, Appeasement in International Politics (Kentucky: 2000) p.79

2 Fraser Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: 1986) p.180

3 Robert Rhodes James, ed., Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, vol.VII (New York: 1974) pp.7285-7293

14

foundations. For example, protesters in New York chanted ‘Winnie, Winnie, go away, UNO is here to

stay.4 The Wall Street Journal commented that the ‘country’s reaction to Mr Churchill’s Fulton speech

must be convincing proof that the United States wants no alliance or anything that resembles an alliance

with another nation’.5 The fact that the American public were very anti-‘special relationship’ must have

brought suspicion to the British government.

Following the protests from the American people, the tune had changed within Truman’s

administration. President Truman for example declined in commenting to US journalists on his feelings

of the speech, Secretary of State Dean Acheson pointedly excused himself from a dinner for Churchill in

New York. Whilst at the same time, Henry Wallace, US Secretary for Commerce attacked the idea of

‘getting rough with Russia’ and warned against letting ‘British balance-of-power manipulations

determine whether and when America gets into war’.6 Shortly thereafter there was to be a dramatic

shift of American policy with the launch of the Marshall Plan. The consequence of the Marshall Plan was

that the US eventually deployed its forces so thoroughly as to make the spread of American hegemony

the mainspring of US policy and that included replacing British power with American power, which was

not at all the intention Churchill had from the ‘special relationship’.7

Although one could certainly argue that the Marshall Plan was an indication that Britain was receiving

special treatment from America as it was receiving the largest share of the $13 billion that had been

subsidised to the eighteen European countries.8 However, these investment were not made in the

interests of the suffering European countries, it was for America in order of protecting Europe from

Communism, which was the entity of the Truman Doctrine of 1947. Adding to that, after US Under-

Secretary of State Will Clayton had toured Europe in May 1947 he announced to Truman’s

administration that ‘millions of people in cities are slowly starving’ and in order for Europe to not face

‘political disintegration’ he emphasised that ‘America must run this show’.9 The word ‘run’ being the key

phrase in highlighting America’s hegemony above the other European countries, and their

determination to stop a spread of communism across Western Europe by any means necessary.

4 John L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: 1972) p.309

5 Wall Street Journal, 19 March 1946, in Robin Edmonds, Setting the Mould: The United States and Britain, 1945-

1950 (Oxford: 1986) p.6 6 Simon Heffer, Like the Roman (London:1998) p.187

7 Guy Arnold, America and Britain: Was there ever a Special Relationship? (London: 2014) p.207

8 Spectator, 5 November 2005, p.61 in Andrew Roberts, A History of the English Speaking Peoples since 1900

(London: 2006) p.395 9 Clayton, memo, 27 May 1947, in US Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol.III

(Washington: 1972) pp.230-2

15

The Suez crisis of 1956 saw possibly the worst rift in the twentieth century between Britain and America.

It had clearly reflected their contrasting attitudes to communism and colonialism, the different stake

each had in the Middle East, and the growing disparity of power between the two countries. But it was

also a tragedy of personalities, which demonstrated how common language and even personal

friendship between leaders could not prevent complete misunderstanding. The invasion of Egypt by

Israeli and eventually Britain and France was an attempt to overthrow the Egyptian President Gamal

Abdel Nasser from power and to regain Western control of the Suez Canal. Since its construction by the

British and French in 1869, the Suez Canal had been the main artery of the British Empire, which had

connected Britain with India and the Pacific.10 After India had become independent however in 1947,

the function of the Canal became less important.11 This was before supertankers and it was still the

route by which two-thirds of the oil produced in the Persian Gulf was shipped to the West, and

therefore a sea route of extensive strategic importance. The Canal Zone was also the centre of Britain’s

military presence in the Mediterranean. This was a vast area of garrisons, airfields, supply depots and

training grounds stretching from the Canal to Cairo. For the Egyptians however, the Canal Zone was a

visible reminder of the hatred of British occupation.

The Suez Canal therefore was an incredibly important strategic point for the British, and was willing to

regain Western control of it by force. However, President Eisenhower believed that the British ‘were out

of date thinking of this as a mode of action’.12 Eisenhower was not indifferent to the British to what had

happened, many of Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff in the meeting supported military action, the growing

alarm of Nasser’s ambitions, and the Suez nationalisation had disturbing implications for America’s

control of the Panama Canal. But Suez was not a vital interest for America, as it was for Britain and

Eisenhower believed that the best way to react was through diplomacy. A large reason for Eisenhower

supporting diplomacy was the Presidential election coming up on the 6th November and his reputation

as a President depended on his ability to handle the world’s diplomatic and military crises. This was a

rather self serving reaction to make and largely a complete paradox to Churchill’s design of the ‘special

relationship’. However, salvation came from across the channel, France like Britain, agreed that military

intervention was the right method to safeguard their property. As a result of this intervention by France

10

Peter G. Boyle, The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955-1957 (London: 2005) p.71, Dennis Mcshane, The 20 British Prime Ministers of the 20

th Century: Heath (London: 2006) p.34

11 David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart (London: 1988) p.209

12 Eisenhower, meeting of 31 July 1956, in Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: 1984) p.331

16

to ally Britain, Eden became convinced that America would either go along with the operation or at least

offer no serious opposition, even though on principle being unhappy on military intervention.13

However, Eisenhower’s reaction was anger by telephoning Downing Street and asking the Prime

Minister if he had ‘lost his mind’.14 The Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had also told the National

Security Council that if America wished to condemn ‘Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe’ it would

therefore have to break with ‘Anglo-French colonialism’. If not, he expressed that America would

otherwise ‘be looked upon as forever tied to British and French colonialist policies’.15 A ceasefire was

therefore called by the United Nations, which America supported, and by doing so received significant

support amongst leaders from Asian and African countries. As a result of this, the US Treasury Secretary

George Humphrey met with the British Ambassador, Sir Harold Caccia, and confirmed that ‘for the

United States to offer financial aid to the United Kingdom and France in the light of their actions in the

last ten days would be totally unacceptable politically for some considerable time’.16 Such a removal of

aid would have had a huge impact on Britain’s economy, the sterling crisis continued and during

November Britain had lost $280 million, fifteen percent of her reserves. On the 28th November,

Chancellor, Harold Macmillan pressured the cabinet in that to avoid financial disaster ‘the good will of

the US government was necessary and it was evident this good will could not be obtained without an

immediate and unconditional undertaking to withdraw the Anglo-French force’.17 By Christmas, British

troops were out of Port Said.

Following this catastrophe and humiliation for Britain which highlighted its declining Empire, the cabinet

discussed Britain’s relations with America and Europe. It was France, not America, who allied itself with

Britain during the Suez crisis, which led to a realisation that Europe was Britain’s future. In a cabinet

meeting Eden declared:

The Suez crisis had made it plain that there must be some change in the basis of Anglo-American

relations. It was doubtful whether the United States would now be willing to accord us alone the

special position which we held as their principal ally during the war. We might therefore be

13

Sir Leslie Rowan, note on ‘Economic and financial measures in the event of war with Egypt, 11 September 1956, Treasury Records, TR 236/4168, TNA 14

Eisenhower to Eden, 3 September 1956, PREM 11/1177, TNA 15

Dulles at National Security Council, 1 November 1956, in William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds, The Special Relationship: Anglo American Relations since 1945 (Oxford: 1986) p.277 16

Sir Harold Caccia to Foreign Office, 27th

November 1956, CAB 236/4190, TNA 17

Cabinet Meeting, 28th

November 1956, CAB 236/4190, TNA

17

better able to influence them (America) if we were part of an association of powers which had

greater political economic and military strength than we alone could command.18

For almost a decade Britain had decided to keep its distance from Europe, believing that the ‘special

relationship’ was a reality rather than a myth. However, Suez seemed to have shattered that dream, but

what the Suez crisis had achieved was a change for Britain’s destiny and her realisation that her it was in

Europe.

Following this meeting, which took place on the 8th January 1957, Anthony Eden announced his

resignation as Prime Minister, on the grounds of ill health. Harold Macmillan, formerly Chancellor of the

Exchequer became Prime Minister. His primary ambition in regards to foreign policy, bring Britain into a

closer European partnership whilst at the same time, restoring relations with the United States. Of all

the possible leaders of the Conservative Party, Macmillan was the best suited to heal the transatlantic

breach. Very much similar to Churchill, he was the offspring of the Anglo-American marriages at the turn

of the century and felt close ties with his mother’s homeland.19 He had established a good relationship

with Eisenhower during the War as British Minister Resident in Eisenhower’s Mediterranean Allied Force

Headquarters between 1943 and 1944. Eisenhower was also inspired by Macmillan’s negotiations with

the allies on political complexities: ‘skill, his insight, his intelligent, his ability to handle complex issues

and advise on them in a way in which Eisenhower had great confidence’.20

But, the significant story here, in regards to Harold Macmillan’s premiership as Prime Minister, was the

relationship he had with President John F. Kennedy. The relationship between the two leaders was

always expected to end well, Kennedy had admired Macmillan’s political style, the supposed ‘Victorian

languor’ which had concealed a shrewd and subtle politician.21 The two also had political similarities, the

commitment to nuclear arms control and also social justice. Macmillan was also flattered by Kennedy’s

charm, and impressed by his history. Personality wise, they both shared a rather sharp, ironic sense of

humour. After the two had early disagreements over Kennedy’s confrontation reaction to Khrushchev

and the Soviets stubbornness on Berlin, according to Kennedy’s aide and historian Arthur Schlesinger,

Macmillan was ‘Kennedy’s closest personal relationship with a foreign leader’.22

18

Cabinet Meeting, 8th

January 1957, CAB 128/30, TNA 19

David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart (London: 1988) p.221 20

Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: 1970) p.21 21

David Bruce to State Department, telegram 2295, 12 December 1961, NSF 170/12 (Kennedy Library) 22

Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (New York: 1971) p.350

18

The new friendship was reinforced by Macmillan’s choice of British Ambassador to succeed Sir Harold

Caccia, one of Kennedy’s oldest British friends in fact, David Ormsby Gore, who was previously the

Minister of State at the Foreign Office. Kennedy let Macmillan know that he was ‘emphatic’ about the

appointment of Gore. Gore came from the same generation and operated on the President’s

wavelength of being dynamic to change. Soon, he practically became an insider at the White House,

mixing easily with the administration.23 By 1961 therefore, Britain had a Prime Minister and an

ambassador that got on exceptionally well with President Kennedy. Macmillan therefore hoped that

these personal relationships could help advance the goals of British foreign policy. There were two key

elements to his foreign policy. The first of which being Britain should maintain a ‘special relationship’

with the United States and also and most significantly in the context of this dissertation, that Britain

should start to play a full part in the affairs of Europe, by joining the European Economic Community.24

Although these ambitions seemed rather compatible, in reality it would result into conflict, and each in

its own different way would be blighted in the few months between the autumn of 1962 and the spring

of 1963.

On the topic of Europe however, in January 1958 France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands

and Luxembourg had formed themselves into the European Community. Britain had largely believed

that economically, they were better off in the Commonwealth, as were the other countries of the

sterling area and regarded the integration of Western Europe mainly as a way of reconciliation. By 1960

however, Germany was producing nearly a fifth of the world’s manufacturing output and her economic

miracle was transforming not just Germany’s society, but also her neighbours, as wealth began to grow

following the reduced tariff barriers. The British were therefore wrong; they believed that post-war

prosperity would depend on rising prices for the world’s raw materials, many of which were still

controlled.25 The German leader, Konrad Adenaur, joked about Britain in 1958 by saying it was ‘like a

rich man who has lost all his property but does not realise it’,26 in regards to the decline of its Empire

and the growth of America.

However, Macmillan knew exactly what was going on. Macmillan, similar to his predecessors, Anthony

Eden and Winston Churchill did not consider himself as being wholly European, and believed that Britain

was right to maintain their special links with the Commonwealth and the United States. However, he

23

Harold Macmillan, Pointing the way, 1959-1961 (California: 1972) p.339 24

David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart (London: 1988) p.231 25

Guy Arnold, America and Britain: Was there ever a Special Relationship? (London: 2014) p.62 26

Richard J. Barnet, Allies: America, Europe and Japan since the War (London: 1983) p.181

19

turned into a convinced Europeanist, by 1960 he recognised the economic benefits for Britain’s

membership of the EEC, even though members of his party, the Conservative Party, and Labour were

fearful of a political objective being a united Europe. A defining moment, in the context of this

dissertation and also the ‘special relationship’ itself, Macmillan had received assurance from Kennedy

and his administration that ‘relations between the United States and the United Kingdom would be

strengthened, not weakened, if the UK moved toward membership’.27

As a result of this assurance Britain applied for membership, which did not go at all well with the French

President Charles De Gaulle. This was largely because of his antipathy towards the Anglo-American

alliance dating back to World War Two. Whilst he was leader of the French Free Forces he had been

consistently snubbed by Roosevelt, who had no time for France and her imperial pretensions.28

Roosevelt consistently blocked the Free French claim and to share in the occupation of Germany.29 As

for the British government’s engagement with the issue, Eden notably did intercede where they could

for France, whereas Churchill had generally sided with the Americans. De Gaulle was largely fearful of

British membership, following Churchill’s outburst to De Gaulle declaring:

This is something you ought to know: each time we have to choose between Europe and the

open sea, we shall always choose the open sea. Each time I have to choose between you and

Roosevelt, I shall always choose Roosevelt.30

As largely expected, on the 14th January 1963, De Gaulle had vetoed the British application for

membership. He dismissed Britain as being a true European: her economy and trading links were very

different from those of the Six. But most significantly, he expected that Britain would be a Trojan horse

in the EEC, acting on behalf of America, by saying that Britain’s membership would probably be ‘a

colossal Atlantic Community under American dependence and leadership’.31 As a result of this,

Macmillan’s foreign policy was a failure, and he was in total despair, writing in his diary ‘all our policies

at home and abroad are in ruins’.32

27

Assurance to Macmillan recorded in McGeorge Bundy, memo for the President, 7 April 1961, NSF 170/2 (Kennedy Library) 28

David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart (1988: London) p.242 29

Ibid. p.242 30

Charles De Gaulle, War Memoirs: Unity, 1942-1944 (London: 1956) p.227 31

De Gaulle’s press statement, 14 January 1963, official French translation, p.7, NSF 73 (Kennedy Library) 32

Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 1961-63 (London: 1973) p.367

20

Harold Wilson’s turn to Europe, in comparison to that of Harold Macmillan, can be seen as a reaction to

Britain’s global decline, rather than trying to regenerate the ‘special relationship’. For Wilson and the

Labour government, the decisive moment came in 1967 with the decision to withdraw British forces

from East of Suez, which to a large extent, signalled an end to Britain’s assertion that it was a world

power.33 Not only did this decision have a negative impact on relations with President Johnson – coming

at a time when Johnson was looking for support in Vietnam – more significantly in the long term it

highlighted Britain’s redundancy as a truly global partner to America. Reflecting on this, following Harold

Wilson’s visit to White House, Johnson had told one of his aides that ‘spending two days with the British

Prime Minister was overdoing it because Britain was not that important anymore.’34

As a result of this supposedly hostile relationship with President Johnson, it would seem that Wilson’s

bid to join Europe was seen less as a means to saving the ‘special relationship’ and more of an

alternative to it. As historian Ben Pimlott concludes, against the background of global retreat, the British

government became conscious as never before that the Anglo-American relationship was actually a

client one.35 In September 1966, member of Wilson’s cabinet, Richard Crossman complained that ‘I

haven’t found the twenty months we have spent outside of Europe and close to America very attractive,

particularly in view of the new subordinate relationship to President Johnson’.36 For Wilson, the defining

issue was Vietnam. With Johnson so infuriated by Britain’s refusal to commit troops to Vietnam, Wilson

came to realise that the only way to restore relations with Washington would be to follow the US into

South Asia, a policy which his party would refuse to support. As the world had become increasingly

polarised around two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the US, Wilson recognised it was an imperative

not to just join Europe but to help build within it as the key to resisting pressure from the two

superpowers. Speaking to parliament on the 10th May 1967, newly appointed Foreign Secretary George

Brown, issued a rallying call that it was only an integrated Europe that could ‘stand up to both the

Russians and the American’s’37, indicating a clear change in direction away from an Anglo-American

alliance.

Whilst as leader of the opposition, Heath wanted to discredit Wilson, supporting his application whilst

mocking his apparent conversion, in reality however his own views were not so different. As

33

Andrew Scott, Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship (Basingstoke: 2011) p.28 34

Henry Brandon, Special Relationships: A Foreign Correspondents Memoirs from Roosevelt to Reagan (London: 1989) p.210 35

Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London: 1993) p.384 36

Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Volume II (London: 1976) p.31 37

George Brown, In My Way (London: 1971) p.207

21

negotiations were reopening in Brussels, Heath had travelled to America to deliver a series of lectures at

Harvard based on his vision for Europe and Britain’s place in it. ‘People in Europe today are feeling more

European’ Heath argued, from economic union he predicted that a political union would necessarily

grow.38 However, behind Heath’s public appeals to notions of Europeaness and enthusiasm for a

political union lay far more realist and pragmatic instincts.39 Heath, taking Kennedy’s twin-pillar

formulation of the Atlantic Alliance as his aspiration, the main theme of Heath’s lectures was the need

for the old world – Europe – to balance the new world of the United States. His most distinctive

suggestion which supports this argument of a new world, was the idea of a European nuclear force

based on existing British and French forces, but held in trusteeship for Europe as a whole.40 Ironically

enough, at the very same time, Presidential candidate Richard Nixon devoted considerable time to

Europe when discussing foreign affairs both in public and in private. Nixon argued that a whole new

framework for Atlantic cooperation was necessary:

Today Western Europe is strong economically and economic independence has inevitably led to

more political independence. The winds of detente have blown so strongly from East to West

that except for Germany most Europeans no longer fear the threat from the West’.41

Quoting the former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan he warned that ‘Alliances are kept together

by fear, not by love’.42 To Nixon the original Cold War conditions that had created and shaped the post-

war special relationship were altering. Nixon may have included Britain amongst the European powers

that were complacent about the East-West detente but as his quote indicated he had some sentiment

for the closest ally of the US.

Although, Heath was careful to relate his vision for Europe to Kennedy’s design for the Atlantic Alliance,

it is clear that Heath’s Europeanism, similar to Wilson’s, was spurred by the rise of the superpowers,

which after the scare of the Cuban missile crisis were moving towards direct and exclusive talks. Heath

argued ‘It is not healthy that the Americans and Russians, as natural result of their nuclear pre-eminence

should discuss private matters such as a non-proliferation which intimately affect the security of

38

Edward Heath, Old World, New Horizons: Britain, the Common Market and the Atlantic Alliance (London: 1970) p.35 39

Edward Heath, ‘Realism in Foreign Affairs’, in Foreign Affairs (October, 1969) p.42 40

Edward Heath, Old World, New Horizons: Britain, Europe and the Atlantic Alliance (Cambridge: 1970) p.73 41

FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Foundations of Foreign Policy 1969-1972, Vol. 1 (Washington: United States Government, 2003), address by Richard Nixon to the Bohemian Club. 42

Ibid.

22

Europe’.43 For Heath, European unity would depend ultimately on the ‘habit of working together’ rather

than any innate sense of community or vague transnational concept.44

Therefore, both the Labour and the Conservative Party, their leaders and the foreign office had agreed

that for Britain to sustain political strength and influence it had to have access to the EEC’s large and

sophisticated market.45 Adding to that, against the nature of relations with the United States, advice was

mounting on both sides of the Atlantic that Britain should try again to join Europe. At the beginning and

the end of 1969, papers to this effect were produced by the Foreign Office and the planning staff at the

British embassy in Washington. Officials in London judged that, on present form, British influence on the

US had become a ‘dwindling asset’, while the impression on the other side of the ocean that ‘we have

become less and less of an equal and in an objective sense more and more an instrument of American

purpose’.46 The advice from the embassy was clear: ‘Our influence will increasingly depend on our

representing a joint European view... If we fail to become part of a more united Europe’ - it predicted,

‘we shall become increasingly peripheral to US concerns.’47 Amongst the Atlantic community, then, it

had become generally accepted that whether Britain tried to retain special status within or achieve

interdependence from Washington, it would have to join the EC.

But, with de Gaulle in office still, entry into Europe looked forever blocked. However, in 1969, events

took a propitious turn. Charles De Gaulle was eventually forced out of office two months later, after

being more focused on foreign affairs and less on domestic problems and the economy.48 De Gaulle’s

successor Georges Pompidou, was considered as being far more pragmatic on foreign policy and the

expansion of Europe,49 and was free to consider British entry without necessarily betraying his loyalties

to his predecessor. Pompidou was far less doctrinaire about Europe than de Gaulle, seeing the EC as

more of a means to an expansive common market which could compete on the global stage with

America, rather than using it as a French instrument.50 Most significantly, he did not share de Gaulle’s

hostility towards the Anglo-Saxon world, believing that Britain could act as a potential counterweight to

43

Ibid., pp, 74-5 44

Heath, ‘Realism in British Foreign Policy’, p.42 45

‘The Consequences of UK Exclusion from the EEC’, 21 December 1967, quoted in Helen Parr, Britain’s Policy towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 1964-1967 (Oxon: 2006) p.178 46

FCO Planning Committee paper from P Craddock, 14 November, 1969, FCO 7/1427, TNA; Draft Paper: ‘Anglo-US Relations’ prepared by US embassy and planning staff in Washington, 17 January 1969, FCO 32/376, TNA. 47

Draft paper on ‘Anglo-US Relations’ prepared by embassy and planning staff in Washington, 17 January 1969, FCO 32/376, TNA. 48

Guy Arnold, Britain and America (London: 2014) p.95 49

Andrew Scott, p.41 50

Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain joined the Common Market (London: 1973) p.69

23

the growing economic power of West Germany. British ambassador Christopher Soames had argued

that France’s ‘perennial mistrust of Germany’ was the most significant factor realigning French opinion

in favour of British membership.51 All of which would compel Pompidou’s first press conference as

president to renounced any principled objection to British accession.52

Before completely opening the door to Britain, Pompidou was determined to set the Community in a

way which was consistent with French interests. As Uwe Kitzinger, Andrew Scott and other have

argued53, the main precondition for British entry was that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) be

accepted by London. When the leaders of the Six had met at The Hague in December 1969, the French

were largely succeeding in achieving their interests, obtaining preferential treatment for their

agricultural products. For Britain though, the crucial point about the Hague Summit was the leaders had

unanimously agreed to work towards political unification within the context of European enlargement,

thus finally endorsing the principle of British membership.

Most significantly, President Nixon had fully endorsed Britain’s entry into Europe. Following a meeting in

January 1970 Nixon restated his support for British entry and promised continued US support for the

development of the European Community.54 Nixon also revived the use of the ‘special relationship’

when visiting London in 1969, unlike Harold Wilson, who from his foreign policy such as refusing to

support Vietnam was less willing to revive the special relationship.55 The very fact that President Nixon

and Edward Heath shared so many political similarities, particularly on foreign policy, it seemed that the

two were the perfect match to revive Anglo-American relations.

By the time Heath had came to power, membership of the EEC was widely regarded, in this instance Roy

Hattersley, as both essential and inevitable. Against the demise of empire and continued decline of

British manufacturing, combined with the growing predominance of America and the Soviet Union, and

the ever changing relationship with the US, the leadership of the political class in Labour and the

Conservatives were in agreement that entry was vital to British interests, regardless of how the White

House felt about it.56 However, as shown within this chapter, President Nixon was previously supportive

of EC expansion and as the following chapter will show, he unlike his National Security Advisor, Henry

51

Telegram: Soames to Home, 9 June 1971, PREM 15/372 TNA. 52

Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion, How Britain joined the Common Market (London: 1971) p.69 53

See Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion p.71, Scott, p.31, Rossbach p.14 54

Memcon Nixon – Prime Minister Wilson. Conversation between President Nixon and Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Sir Burke Trend and Henry A. Kissinger, 27 January 1970. NSC/Box 1023 55

The Financial Times, 26 January 1970, p.4 (No author provided) 56

Roy Hattersley speech to Parliament, 29 October 1971, Hansard.

24

Kissinger, would continue his support to both bring global balance and rejuvenate the ‘special

relationship’.

25

Chapter Two – Natural Relationship

Following the General Election victory for the Conservative Party and Edward Heath in June 1970, there

seemed to be better prospects for the Anglo-American alliance, particularly from President Nixon and

his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s perspective.1 Going away from politics, the two leaders

were kindred spirits, both having risen to the top from humble origins – Nixon the son of a small town

grocer and Heath the son of a carpenter. While these two notorious loners had little time or talent for

small talk or socialising, they were largely at home together when exchanging thoughts on international

relations. Ultimately however, these were two serious politicians driven by a profound sense of personal

and above all political ambition; Heath getting Britain into Europe and for Nixon defeating the Soviet

Union in the Cold War. Although their relationship might have lacked the public appeal or outward

intimacy of previous or later president-prime minister connections, with the examples of Kennedy and

Macmillan or Reagan and Thatcher, there is large amount of evidence that the personal and political

relationship of these two leaders was strong. Prior to their first meeting, it was expected that their

shared personal shortcomings would enable them to shed their social insecurities and get down to

business together. Following Heath’s election victory, the two leaders professed their desire to rebuild

relations and, in particular, establish a close personal connection.2

By all accounts the personal and political relationship between the three key members in this story,

Edward Heath, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, got off to a good start.3 When Nixon first met Heath

as Prime Minister at his country residence, Chequers, on the 3rd October 1970, the two leaders engaged

on wide-ranging discussion on international affairs, very much demonstrating a broad harmony of views

on foreign policy, which was expected, in respect to their similar politics. On Vietnam, unlike Harold

Wilson, Heath fully endorsed Nixon’s emphasis on the need for the US to be seen to withdraw in ‘good

order’. If America was to lose in South East Asia, Heath reasoned in a logic shared by the President that

the Soviet attitude would therefore harden elsewhere, particularly in Europe. Turning to the Middle

East, Heath was equally shrewd, warning that the Soviets stood ready to extend their influence towards

the Gulf and across the entire region without necessarily moving to confrontation – an analysis which

Kissinger described as the most ‘original and cogent’ he had heard from any world leader.4 The Prime

Minister was also keen on the significance of the Five-Power Defence Pact (UK, Australia, New Zealand,

1 Haldeman Diaries: 19 June 1970, Box 41, Haldeman Papers, WHSF, NPMP.

2 Ian McChirney to Peter Moon, 25 September 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA.

3 Letter from the British Ambassador, John Freeman to Robert Armstrong, 8 October 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA.

4 Record of Meeting: Heath, Nixon, et al., 3 October 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA.

26

Malaysia and Singapore), which had just been finalised and had committed 4500 British troops in South

Asia, proclaiming that it would play a significant role in America’s determination in maintaining the

security in that area. Given the large amount of issues which confronted Nixon and Heath on foreign

policy, and domestically there were considerably more with mass protests against the Vietnam bombing

and trade union strikes, Nixon stressed that the need for close contacts between their governments was

‘greater than it had ever been’. Nixon and Kissinger, referring explicitly and continuously to the ‘special

relationship’, they had underlined its purpose and value as a free and confidential exchange of ideas and

opinions before formal policies were adopted. Britain, Nixon pledged, would not be kept in the dark

over America’s intentions,5 a pledge which would later be broken by an essential figure in this

dissertation, Henry Kissinger.

Following their first meeting together and Nixon’s return home to Washington, he had written a warm

message to Heath where he emphasised the ‘special advantages of speaking with old friends.6 It is

revealed by Nixon on the 17th December 1970, following Heath’s first visit to the White House, that the

two leaders had been close friends and political allies for ‘almost twenty years’7, highlighting why Nixon

was so ecstatic after hearing the Conservative Party’s election victory in June 1970. Nixon had also

addressed the Prime Minister as ‘Ted’ highlighting their personal connection after having just one

meeting. Kissinger followed by enthusiastically affirming that the first visit had demonstrated that ‘there

was indeed a special relationship and that it continued to flow strong’.8

The relationship would continue in its rosy vein when Heath had visited Washington the following

December. Once again, the two leaders had a relaxed and productive discussion, with Nixon even

commenting that, unlike Wilson, ‘Heath was a great guy’.9 A photo of the two leaders playing a piano

duet seemed to capture the spirit of the new special relationship, with the media widely reflecting on

the ‘unusual degree of personal cordiality’ that had developed at the top; the New York Daily News even

suggested that it was ‘the first time since the Eisenhower Administration that genuine personal

friendliness has been enjoyed by the leaders of the two nations’10, which is rather contradictory of the

relationship President Eisenhower and Eden actually had. Speaking more broadly about Heath’s hopes

for the alliance during an appearance on the American television show Meet the Nation, Heath was

5 Ibid.

6 Letter: Nixon to Heath, 7 October 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA.

7 Record of meeting: Toasts of the President and Prime Minister Heath of Great Britain, December 17 1970, TAPP

8 Letter: Kissinger to Heath, 10 October 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA.

9 Record of Meeting: 17 October 1970, quoted in Edward Heath, The Course of My Life (London: 1998) p.472

10 Ibid. P.473

27

effusive, stressing that he had come to power eager to recreate the ‘automatic process’11 of

consultation with Washington which he had felt had been lost in recent years. After difficult times

therefore, the beginning of the Heath-Nixon years had heralded something of a new beginning for the

Anglo-American alliance – even the rebirth of the ‘special relationship’.

Looking aside from personal relations, Heath’s meeting with Nixon from the 17th to the 18th December in

Washington was a huge opportunity for him to ensure US support for EC negotiations. The first meeting

in Chequers had touched on every conceivable topic, both on domestic and foreign policy, apart from

the EC, which of course was Heath’s political and personal ambition. The very fact that the EC was not

touched upon during Nixon and Heath’s first meeting showed that Nixon’s priorities were elsewhere,

such as nuclear detente with the Soviet Union and forming some kind of an alliance with China. Heath’s

ambition was to achieve three things, firstly, bolster Nixon’s willingness to quash critics of her the British

government’s EC policy in Nixon’s administration, those members included Henry Kissinger, Secretary of

State William Rogers and Vice-President Spiro Agnew. Secondly, to urge Nixon that he should not cave in

to protectionist tendencies in the US; which Heath saw as having the potential in provoking an EC-US

Trade War.12 Thirdly, Britain also needed the US understanding for whatever course of resolution taken

on the issue of the sterling. The British had assumed that Nixon’s administration would support Britain

because it had a vested interest in a stable and economically Europe. So the British felt that Nixon

should be told that once inside Europe, Britain would work towards stability and prosperity in Europe

through integration ‘in the economic, political and defence field.’ The aim which to tempt the Americans

was that eventually the expansion of the EC would ensure that the Europeans would shoulder a greater

burden in the defence of the ‘free world’.13 The bait was to appeal to Nixon and Kissinger’s security

orientated world view.

During the meeting Heath outlined his plan for EC entry and treated Nixon and Kissinger to a ‘highly

technical analysis of outstanding economic issues’.14 Heath said that there were to be no allowances

made on behalf of the US before accession into the EC, mainly because he did not want Britain to appear

11

Interview given by Heath to CBS Television, ‘Meet the Nation’, Washington, 20 December 1970, in Duncan Watt and John Mayall (eds), Current British Foreign Policy: Documents, Statements and Speeches 1970 (London: 1971) p.762 12

Brief for the ‘Visit of the Prime Minister in Washington steering brief 17 – 18 December, 11 December 1970, FCO 7/8140, TNA 13

Ibid. 14

NARA/59 State Department box 2657 Subject Numerical 70-73, Secret, White House, Memcon, subject: Meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath, 17 December 1970, NA

28

as a ‘Trojan Horse’,15 which previous French leaders, particularly Charles De Gaulle, had been fearful of.

This applied to all fields, in regards to EC policies, but most notably, Heath added:

We can best defend your interests inside the Common Market and should not pay a price to you

before we get in. The best reason though for our entering the Common Market is “political”,

and this is why you were for it to begin with.16

Nixon acknowledged that ‘the British have the political and diplomatic skills to make Europe into an

entity’. Nixon went further to explain that ‘there are some in this country who don’t want you to go in

because they are afraid of Europe, but Europe is essential for the balance of power’17 – Kissinger is said

to have had his head down, whilst Nixon explained this to Heath, indicating that Nixon was to have the

final say on the US’ position of EC expansion. Nixon was convinced that the British government, with the

leadership of his close friend and political ally Edward Heath, would work for a cohesive Europe that

would ease American burdens.18

Nevertheless, Nixon reiterated that EC protectionism was a very sensitive issue and took agriculture as a

prime example of an issue that stirred up protectionist feelings in the US.19 Heath claimed that the

British had to raise the price level for the benefit of British farmers when entry came about and that it

should not be seen by the Americans as being protectionist.20 It was just an adaption to price levels in

the EC. Heath had reassured Nixon that the chances of the Community going completely protectionist

‘were probably nil’ and that the EC would not damage the trend of greater liberalisation of international

trade.21 Heath liked a matter of fact approach and this seemed to resonate with Nixon. Nixon was

satisfied with Heath’s understanding of the situation and suggested that ‘the problem was what price

Britain was going to have to pay to get in’. Heath agreed that this was an essential point, but explained

that the price was ‘very hard to quantify’.22 The British were successful; they promised to work for

liberalisation of world trade and increased burden sharing. Nixon had stuck to his original policy of

muted support for British EC entry. However, there was a small condition, the US would support

15

Ibid. 16

NARA/NSC/ box 1024 Secret, Memorandum of conversation, Meeting between Nixon, Heath, Trend and Kissinger, 17 December 1970, the President’s Office 17

Ibid. 18

Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p.137 19

Ibid. 20

NARA/59 State Department box 2657 Subject Numerical 70-73, Secret, White House, Memcon, subject: meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath, 17 December 1970, The President’s Office 21

Ibid 22

Ibid.

29

enlargement despite some ‘but not excessive’ economic costs, only time and events could show if and

what ‘excessive’23 really meant.

Another issue which majorly concerned Nixon was defence, particularly nuclear deterrent, which was

also discussed in the December 1970 meeting. Both Nixon and Heath shared a desire to reform the

alliance by cutting both costs and modernising their nuclear weapons. Heath believed that the alliance

would benefit more from an independent Western European element. The US however wanted its allies

to shoulder more of the costs.24 Heath had suggested an Anglo-French collaboration25 when it came to

nuclear weapons, at the same time he was careful not to suggest that this would damage the ‘special

relationship’ in the security field. Following France’s withdrawal of its Mediterranean Fleet from NATO

command and later banning the stationing of foreign nuclear weapons on French soil, this seemed a

risky idea. However, it can be Nixon saw this as a great opportunity to bring the French closer to NATO

and a fantastic advantage for the US as it would bring about a more cohesive Europe which would offer

a far better threat to the Soviet Union.

Prior to the meeting, Heath and Nixon had agreed privately to extend the traditional agreement that the

US would consult with the British government before using US nuclear weapons in Britain for anti-

submarine warfare nuclear weapons and to ensure that the same applied to certain storages of nuclear

weapons.26 Heath and Nixon had therefore signed up to a smooth continuation of a very active Anglo-

American nuclear special relationship; it seemed therefore that there had been a rebirth of the special

relationship.

Despite this smooth continuation, from Kissinger’s point of view the meeting in December was a

disaster. Following Heath’s first visit of the White House in December 1970, he pointedly refused to

reciprocate Nixon’s repeated public references to the ‘special relationship’. Instead, to the president’s

evident embarrassment, he announced the preferred the less exclusive term, ‘natural relationship’27, to

describe the transatlantic connection. Behind the shift in rhetoric, the prime minister seemingly spurned

Nixon and Kissinger’s offers of special treatment, preferring to build relations with his new partners in

23

NARA/NSDM 68 in box H-217, 3 July 1970, NSDM 68, US Policy Toward the European Community, NA 24

Letter from A. R. M. Jaffray, MOD, W. S. Ryrie, PS Chancellor of the Exchequer, 4 November 1970, PREM 15/35, TNA 25

‘Anglo-French collaboration’, 15 February 1971, PREM 15/788, TNA – meeting took place on 17 December 1970, but meeting was mentioned in the Prime Minister’s Papers. 26

NARA/HAK/box 63, Message Department of State, 15 December 1970. US-British consultations on the use of nuclear weapons. 27

Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p.603

30

the EC. Following this introduction of the term ‘natural relationship’, the American press was intrigued

to what this meant exactly, and whilst Heath was on the CBS television program ‘Meet the Nation’ he

was questioned by presenter George Herman.

Herman: What do you mean (by the reference ‘natural relationship’)?

Heath: I don’t use the term special relationship because I think when the British use it, we’re

asking for special privileges. This is not the case when an American President uses it, because

everybody knows that he’s not asking for any privileges. And so, from the British point of view, I

prefer to use the expression a natural relationship. And a natural relationship is based on all

things we have in common, in our history, in our language, in our-basis of our law and the fact

that we fought in two major world wars together, all of our family relationships which still exist,

the professional background which so many people have.28

From this point of view therefore it would seem that for Heath, the phrase ‘natural relationship’ was not

an attempt to downgrade relations with America, but an opportunity to rejuvenate them, an

opportunity for a new beginning in a new age with Britain likely to seal entry into the European

Community. On Europe also, as many of those in American journalism and politics was questioning

following the introduction of this phrase, Heath was questioned by George Herman ‘What do you think

will happen to the relationship when Britain enters and becomes a part of Europe’, Heath with pure

conviction responded with ‘I don’t see that that will in any way change it’29. Therefore, highlighting how

Heath, as shown from his meetings with Nixon and Kissinger in October 1970 was determined to fix and

maintain Anglo-American relations following the difficult periods in previous years.

The change in terminology may have also been a reference to the two leaders, Heath and Nixon, who

were expected to naturally have a positive relationship, seeing as the two were both European

enthusiasts. Nixon’s speech to the US Congress explaining his Nixon Doctrine in February 1970 showed

identical European beliefs to that of Heath. His suggestion was a foreign policy that aided and supported

allies, without undertaking to take over their security obligations.30 It was an advocacy for the greater

self-reliance of allies. He claimed that he wanted to talk with the European allies instead of talking at

28

Interview given by Heath to CBS Television, ‘Meet the Nation’, Washington, 20 December 1970, in Duncan Watt and John Mayall (eds), Current British Foreign Policy: Documents, Statements and Speeches 1970 (London: 1971) p.762 29

Ibid. p.273 30

Nixon to the US Congress, February 1970, FCO 7/1808, TNA.

31

them, a modernisation of Anglo-American relations, in comparison to that of Eisenhower and Eden and

also Johnson and Wilson. Similar to the modernisation of relationships between the two leaders, the

phrase ‘natural relationship’ is therefore relevant here.

Although, as provided, there is evidence to defend Heath for his new term the ‘natural relationship’,

Kissinger on the other hand saw this as an absolute outrage. Although Nixon had deep respect for the

new Prime Minister, Kissinger recalls how Heath was particularly difficult to get along with, variously

describing him as prickly, stubborn and prone to bouts of ‘aloofness’31 – a paradox to his comments of

Heath being ‘original and cogent’ on foreign policy. All of which suggests that it would have been

impossible for Nixon, despite promising beginnings to establish anything like the kind of personal

relationships previous presidents and prime ministers had in the past. Moreover, Kissinger argues that

Heath lacked the instinctive pro-Americanism of his predecessors and even felt indifferent to Americans

individually.32 All things considered therefore, the new Prime Minister, Kissinger bemoans, dealt with

the United States ‘not on sentimental attachments but on cool calculations of self interest’.33

However, the biggest problem for Kissinger with Heath was not his personal predisposition or prejudice

but his political ambition. Above all, Heath is remembered for his determination to lead Britain into

Europe, which he finally managed in January 1973 with the signing of the Treaty of Accession. To

Kissinger, whereas Churchill gave birth to the notion of the ‘special relationship’, Heath was said to have

been the father of a European Britain.34 To this end therefore, Kissinger has argued that Heath was

single minded – even blinkered – and prepared to sacrifice all else. Anglo-American relations following

the introduction of Edward Heath as Prime Minister were described by Kissinger as being ‘doomed from

the start’.35

As mentioned above, the main reason for Kissinger’s criticism of Heath during the Heath-Nixon years

was entering Europe in 1973. But the following argument will explain Kissinger’s position, highlighting

both his euroscepticism and also his strict support of the ‘special relationship’. Initially, the British

believed that the Secretary of State William Rogers had considerable weight with the White House

because of the office that he held and also, most importantly, he was a close friend with President

31

Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p.603 32

Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p.141 33

Ibid. 34

Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: 1998) p.216 35

Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p.141

32

Nixon.36 The Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) knew, however, that he was excluded from discussion

on Vietnam, and that ‘Dr Kissinger emerged as the President’s principal adviser on foreign and defence

policy’.37 William Rogers had no real foreign policy expertise or experience and approached foreign

policy as a lawyer, case by case, with no real philosophy attached to his approach. Kissinger on the other

hand, had been a passionate researcher of diplomacy. His PhD thesis was about the peace settlement

during the Napoleonic wars and was burdened with assertive Hegelian-style judgements. His basic ideas

were based on elements lifted from his analysis: it was necessary to establish order by mutual consent

of the great powers, by creating a legitimate but not necessarily just order capable of starving off

revolutionaries in the international system.38 Initially however in October 1970, it did not seem to the

FCO that Rogers and Kissinger held differing opinions in regard to Europe. But soon there was to be

worrying signs about the unity of support for British entry in Washington.

Later on during October 1970 the FCO and Number 10 learnt that the US Ambassador to the EC, the pro-

European Robert Schaetzel, believed that there was a difference between Kissinger and Nixon over

European affairs, previously mentioned in the introduction.39 He stated in his biography that he believed

Kissinger did not favour the idea of the US assisting in the emergence of a new global actor in Europe,

and that he was quite content with the US holding sway over a number of states in Europe.40 Schaetzel

had informed the FCO that it was President Nixon alone who had favoured European integration and

supported Britain’s European policy, others in Nixon’s administration such as Vice President Spiro

Agnew was sceptical of European expansion. The British had also learnt that the decision-making

machinery in Washington was unusual in its concentration to the White House.41 Given Nixon’s support

for EC membership this would therefore be assumed as being a good thing. However, because of the

normal foreign relations with the US in flux due to Nixon allowing Kissinger to expand the National

Security Council, Heath would have to work extremely hard with Nixon for his administration to fully

support European integration and Britain’s European policy.

36

Niklas Rossbach, Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship: Britain, the US and the EC, 1969-74 (Basingstoke: 2009) p.41 37

A note ‘President Nixon’s Visit to Chequers’, 3 October, FCO 7/1812, TNA 38

Niklas Rossbach, Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship: Britain, the US and the EC, 1969-74 (Basingstoke: 2009) p.35 39

Letter to the Permanent Under-Secretary from Sir Con O’Neill, 30 October 1970, PREM 15/1540, TNA – Probably seen by Heath also as it is underlined 40

Jon Robert Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance: America and the European Community (New York: 1975) pp.48-52 41

Letter to the Permanent Under-Secretary from Sir Con O’Neill, 30 October 1970, PREM 15/1540, TNA.

33

As previously noted, the power struggle as argued previously by historians such as Alan Dobson and

Andrew Scott42 is that President Nixon and Heath had a poor relationship, however here it is shown the

difficult relationship is clearly between Kissinger and Heath. Kissinger never fully grasped the ardour of

Heath’s Europeanism, and at the same time Heath could never quite understand why Kissinger regarded

Europe to a different light to himself.43 Nor did Kissinger understand the degree to which the FCO and

Heath worked in tandem. He thought that the FCO led by Sir Alec Douglas-Home followed a different

course to Heath’s.44 This probably says a lot more about the power struggles and contradictory points of

view within the Nixon administration. Heath’s views were always consistent with his Harvard lectures.

His views were also similar with the FCO’s view that the US supported British EC membership because it

would lead to a united and integrated Europe as a partner to the US.

The only real difference between the FCO and Heath, which is important in the context of this research,

is that the FCO was more moored to the traditional interpretation of the special relationship than Heath,

thus defending the argument made by Kissinger in different points of view. It believed that the British

were the first the Americans looked to when it felt isolated in foreign affairs. And after all the FCO

believed that the Anglo-American partnership was still valuable to Britain since ‘on balance, we still get

more than we give, in some fields a great deal more’.45 However, at the same time, and in defence of

Heath, the FCO believed that the Anglo-American relationship was severely run down as a result of

previous years. This is a result of Britain’s ‘relative economic decline’ and competition for a special

standing from other allies; President Johnson’s personality and his conduct of the Vietnam War; the

British decision to withdraw from the East of Suez; a ‘marked loss of national self-confidence in the

United States and most importantly, a disorderly state of international affairs in general.46 This is why

the FCO and Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home recognised the importance of going into to Europe

and rejuvenating its international reputation and superiority.

However, Kissinger missed what Heath was all about. First, Heath did not put more distance between

Britain and the US than necessary. His aim was for Britain to be a good European but not at the expense

42

John Dickie, ‘Special’ No More – Anglo American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London: 1994) p.133; see also for example, David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart (London: 1998) pp.261-266, Alan Dobson, Anglo-American Relationship in the Twentieth Century (New York: 1995) p.124 and Andrew Scott, Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship (Basingstoke: 2011) p.1 43

Heath, The Course of My Life, pp.492-493 44

Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p.143 45

Anglo/United States Relations, by the FCO, 23 September 1970, FCO 7/1839, TNA 46

Ibid.

34

of relations with the US. His vision included a future European partnership with the US. Second, Heath

was not a Gaullist, but he also was not a pure-supranationalist either. He did not want to give executive

powers to the EC Commission. Not because he passionately guarded the prerogatives of the nation-

state, but because he saw himself and the other leaders of Europe working together as the most

convenient way of constructing a European Union.

Heath was following concrete aims, even if his vision of Europe and Anglo-American relations was

somewhat shrouded in generalities. Kissinger’s approach was the opposite of Heath’s. Heath was a

pragmatic as he tried to achieve his specific goals; Kissinger was a realist whose objective was to

safeguard what he saw as the national interest of the US. Rather than following a certain goal and

adapting policies to that aim of Kissinger’s instinct was to adhere to a conceptual approach of how

everything hung together when dealing with the challenges to the US and managing Nixon’s aims.

Although this approach by Kissinger was instrumental in achieving many of the challenges that faced the

US in the late sixties and early seventies, specifically China and nuclear detente with the Soviet Union,

Kissinger’s realism made him see constancy of purpose in new phenomena. This enabled him to claim

that Heath was a new De Gaulle, instead of seeing him as an entirely new factor. This would have

mattered little if Watergate had not happened. Because it did, the besieged Nixon left the handling of

foreign policy more and more to Kissinger.

It is quite clear from this chapter that the political and personal relationship between Heath and Nixon

was strong, a different picture to what has been documented in the past. Although the term “natural

relationship” would have been an embarrassment for the White House, at the same time it showed a

modernised approach to Anglo-American relations in an ever changing world with global difficulties, and

Nixon fully respected this. The key member of Nixon’s administration that detested Heath, was

Kissinger, not just politically on Europe, but also personally and the penultimate chapter will show the

clear difference between Nixon and Kissinger in regards to their relationship with Heath and their views

with Britain going into Europe. The following chapter will emphasise and challenge the argument made

by Kissinger that Heath moved away from any kind of “relationship” in order to get into Europe and that

Heath shared identical views of Britain going into Europe to that of President Nixon and also the

Secretary of State William Rogers.

35

Chapter Three – Getting into Europe

This chapter investigates British negotiations from the expansion of the Soviet navy in 1970 to the

signing of the European Communities Act in 1972. By doing so, we will see the interaction ambassadors

from both sides of the Atlantic had, and at the very same time, this chapter will make it clear the

contrasting views in America of Britain’s application, with the likes of President Nixon endorsing it,

whereas those in the NSC becoming more sceptical of British entry and of Europe as a whole. This

chapter at the same time will challenge the argument made by Kissinger in that Britain purposely moved

itself away from America in its attempt to get into Europe. Instead we will see that the attitudes towards

Britain from the White House to global events had a major impact on Britain’s importance to be a

member of Europe.

By the time Heath had actually took charge of Number 10 his views had been supported by recent global

events. When he came to write the forward for the publication of his Godkin lectures in September 1969

he observed how during the two-and-a-half years since he had delivered them ‘events of the highest

importance to Europe made it clear that the underlying need for European unity was becoming more

pressing’.1 Having already doubled the size of the Soviet Naval infantry during the 1960s, in 1970

Brezhnev had ordered a series of large scale manoeuvres in both the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans.

For Britain in particular, Soviet naval power spreading across the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean was

hugely alarming as it infringed on many sea routes that connected its remaining outposts. Alec Douglas-

Home had warned that the rapidly expanding range and size of the Soviet navy could have serious

consequences for the balance of power across the oceans.2 The foreign secretary told the cabinet in

September 1970 that ‘what was required was a counterbalancing western presence as evidence of

western concern and in order not to leave a free hand for the Soviets’.3

A British delegation was sent to Washington to seek advice in mid December of 1970. However, when

the head of that delegation, John Thomson, met with the Senior Review Group in Washington, the

threat was played down by the Americans,4 most notably, Henry Kissinger who as seen from the

previous chapter was becoming suspicious of Heath at this time. Alec Douglas Home saw this as an

underlining moment in history for greater need for European cooperation, as Britain could no longer

1 Heath, Old World, New Horizons, p.3

2 Speech by Home to Parliament, 6 July 1970, Hansard

3 Record of Cabinet meeting, 30 September 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA

4 Memo: Kissinger to Nixon, 15 December 1970, VIP visits, Box 942, NSC, NPMP, NA

36

count on American security. As a result of Britain’s concerns, the FCO had come to the conclusion that it

was ‘vitally important that US troops in Europe remain at substantially present levels’.5 Rather ironically,

it was at this time that the White House was facing mounting pressure to withdraw them. Between 1964

and 1972, the US pulled out 65,000 troops from Europe, most of which were sent to Vietnam, leaving a

total of just over 250,000.6 This was once again an indication of where America’s priorities laid.

When Heath had his landmark meeting with Georges Pompidou in May 1971, at the same time Senator

Mike Stansfield was putting a resolution to the American President calling for US troops in Europe to be

halved, thus putting further pressure on Europe to expand and integrate. Following this meeting, the

two leaders came to agreement that the only response to mounting pressures in the US was the

‘development of Europe for the long term future’.7 Following this meeting, Heath made a speech to

parliament regarding the meeting and the changing dimension of the Atlantic alliance.

There have been growing, even since our last debate, pressures for changes in the American

forces in Europe. These pressures are growing space, and with them, the renewed demand for

Europe to do more in the cause of its own defence. We would maintain that an Atlantic alliance

is still vital for the defence of Western Europe, but there can be no doubt of the growing

pressures for Europe to consolidate its own defence position.8

This speech was a clear shift in rhetoric to the ones he had previously made from his Godkin lectures,

when Heath had endorsed Kennedy’s twin pillar concept. Here, Kissinger argued that this speech made

by Heath was a clear distinction of moving away from America,9 and in regards to moving away from the

twin pillar concept, it was. However, the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO), whom as mentioned in

the previous chapter was more sympathetic of a ‘special relationship’ realised that following recent

events concluded that ‘Europe will have to do more to look after itself’.10 Even Alec Douglas Home, who

is regarded as being an Atlanticist, alongside the likes of Winston Churchill, who saw himself as a Foreign

Secretary that would balance out Heath’s clear Europeanism, had come to realise that it was not only

vital to join the EC, but to also build from within it.11 At the Conservative Party Conference in October

5 FCO Brief on NATO and Burden Sharing, 2 October 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA

6 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945, From ‘Empire by Invitation to Transatlantic

Drift, 2nd

ed. (Oxford: 2003) p.46 7 Record of Meeting: Heath and Pompidou, 20 May 1971, PREM 15/372, TNA

8 Heath, 28 October 1971, Hansard

9 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p.603

10 FCO Report on ‘Future Relations with the United States’, 5 November 1971, PREM 15/714, TNA

11 Andrew Scott, Allies Apart, p.37

37

1971 he underlined the point that ‘with the Soviet Union constantly expanding her conventional military

strength while the US tends to pull her horns, the spotlight falls again on Europe’.12 This speech from

Heath was highly pragmatic as he had realised with the problems America was facing regarding Vietnam,

China, Nuclear Detente and most importantly for Nixon, an upcoming Presidential election for Nixon,

Britain needed to start fighting its own ground, and Europe was the clear answer.

Heath had now adopted the view that against the post-war shift in power the ‘special relationship’ had

become an anachronism.13 As he would explain in the Jubilee Conference in June 1971, which discussed

international relations for the last twenty five years, Heath explained that because of the lack of

development within the Commonwealth compared to what was expected following the Second World

War, ‘there was never any question of the special relationship developing between balanced partners’.14

In a world which of superpowers, Heath assured Pompidou that ‘there could be no satisfactory

partnership, even if Britain wanted it, between two powers which was barely a quarter the size of the

other’.15 Adding to that, with America’s main concern being relations with its oppositional superpower,

the Soviet Union, and upcoming global threat, such as China, the FCO went further by concluding that

the unbalanced partnership in the ‘special relationship’ meant that ‘there is no good alternative policy’

other than being outside the EC.16

The importance therefore of being a member of the EC for Britain to retain her future as a world power

was more important than ever before. Heath states in his biography that he was told by his foreign

policy advisers that a rejection a third time would prove final, as public opinion would become more anti

Anglo-French than ever before, and with France electing a more dynamic President compared to De

Gaulle, ‘non’ would more than likely mean a definitive ‘non.17 Even with de Gaulle out of office and a

successor who was more open to the possibility of British membership, anxiety of previous rejections

still existed in London.18 This was a respectable position for the British government to have, when you

consider the fact that many of De Gaulle’s foreign policy advisers were now advisers in Pompidou’s

government, many of whom were majorly responsible for rejecting British membership in the first place.

12

Home, 14 October 1971, Conservative Party Conference, HAK Office Files, Rodman, Box 41, NPMP, NA. 13

Heath, Old World, New Horizons, p.67 14

Speech by Heath, Wilton Park, Sussex, 21 June 1971, in Duncan Watt and John Mayall, Current British Foreign Policy: Documents, Statements and Speeches 1971 (London: 1973) p.483 15

Record of meeting: Heath and Pompidou, 21 May 1971, PREM 15/714, TNA 16

FCO Study: John Freeman to Peter Moon, 8 March, 1971, PREM 15/62, TNA 17

Heath, Old World, New Horizons, p.6 18

Minute: Unnamed and undated, ‘The EEC Negotiations – Strategic Review’, c20 July 1971, PREM 15/62, TNA

38

19 As a result of this, British Ambassador to France, Christopher Soames, informed the British cabinet

that Pompidou, under the advice of his foreign policy advisers, supposedly, was ‘not wholly convinced

that we (Britain) are yet free of our intuitive and deep-seated attachments’ and must therefore ‘have to

make it clear that the UK is in no sense a Trojan horse for the US’.20 The reference of a ‘Trojan horse’

was the statement de Gaulle had made for his rejection of British membership back in 1963 as earlier.21

In this instance therefore, it was a understandable and pragmatic decision made by Heath following the

previous rejections by the French and from the advice of his advisers both in the government and

ambassadors to try his better to subtly dispel itself from the idea that Britain only had a ‘special

relationship’ with one country. Heath announced that this task was specifically to ‘reassure France’, but

not to make America think that it was moving itself away from an Anglo-American alliance.22 This was an

ambition previously made by Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Deputy Leader George Brown whom

after meeting ‘the six’ in January 1967.23 In their attempt they referred to the special relationship with

America as a ‘close relationship’, ironically for the six, and in particular de Gaulle, a ‘close relationship’

with America was still to be too close. Thus, Heath’s so called rejection of the ‘special relationship’ by

describing as a ‘natural’ one was nothing new and revolutionary, if anything it was calculated as it was

the only way for Britain to reinvigorate itself on the global stage by being a member of the EC.

One must consider that even though Heath considered the ‘special relationship’ as something of an

illusion, none of this was made to provoke a rift in Washington. Heath had come to power sharing the

view in Whitehall that the only way for Britain to revive Anglo-American relations was by joining the EC

as his view once was as mentioned in his Godkin lectures.24 One of his constituents in Bexley had

questioned whether him joining Europe was in spite of America his response was adamant.

I have always believed part of the point of developing the unity of Europe is that a united

Europe will be able to better cooperate with the USA for the benefit of the free world25

Even the most radical idea of Heath’s, which was the creation of an Anglo French nuclear force, can be

interpreted as the above quotation. Previously mentioned in chapter two, Kissinger was highly sceptical 19

Alan Campbell, ‘Anglo-French Relations a Decade ago: A New Reassessment’, International Affairs, 58, 2, (1982) p.425 20

Letter: Soames to Greenhill, 21 April 1971, PREM 15/62, TNA 21

Gaulle’s press statement, 14 January 1963, official French translation, p.7, NSF 73 (Kennedy Library) 22

Edward Heath, The Course of My Life, p.364 23

John Young, The Labour Governments, 1964-79, volume 2: International Policy (Manchester: 2003) p.21 24

Heath, Old World, New Horizons, pp.67068 25

Ziegler, Edward Heath, p.374

39

of this, but Heath’s efforts to create a European deterrent were not an attempt to be independent from

America, but to actually bring France back into the Atlantic alliance.26 Both Heath and his Foreign

Secretary Alec Douglas-Home had promised Nixon that they would try to make France more outward

looking, and historian Niklas Rossbach argues that the only way this was achievable for Britain was with

nuclear collaboration, something which Kissinger should have been more respectable of British foreign

policy. 27

Although Anglo-Americans were likely to become less exclusive, the British government made a

determined effort to reassure Washington that Britain’s negotiations for entry with Europe were not an

abandonment of the US. By doing this, Heath had chose his close friend and former governor of the

Bank of England, Lord Cromer, to succeed John Freeman as Ambassador in Washington at the beginning

of 1971. Cromer was both favourably willing to the US and someone who Heath had complete trust in;

Cromer was therefore the ideal candidate to keep positive links with the Nixon administration. Douglas-

Home had written to the new ambassador arguing that Britain’s determination for European

enlargement was ‘not a case, vis-a-vis America, of off with the old and on with the new’.28 With the

British government sensing some unease from Kissinger’s National Security Council, head of Foreign

Office’s North American department, Hugh Overton, drafted a letter to EC sympathiser Secretary of

State William Rogers that by working with the EC, the EC would become more ‘outward looking’, in

reference to France and their negative perspective of the Atlantic alliance.29 This was clear indication

that the British government was trying to modernise the ‘relationship’ with America by being more

outward looking, as Heath believed this was a positive step forward in helping balance the power

against the Soviets.

This chapter will now investigate is the talks Britain had with America, whilst negotiations with France

were taking place. The fact of the matter is the White House did not get the chance to hear about

Heath’s idea for a US-EC special relationship during the summer of 1971. The strains over the opening of

China had led to Heath cancelling a visit to the so-called Western White House in San Clemente in

California, where he had wanted to talk about the future of the Community.30 Other issues had an

26

‘Anglo-French collaboration’, 15 February 1971, PREM 15/788, TNA – meeting took place on 17 December 1970, but meeting was mentioned in the Prime Minister’s Papers. 27

Rossbach, Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship, p.84 28

Home to Cromer, 5 November 1971, PREM 15/712, TNA 29

Minute: Overton, 21 July 1971, FCO 82/61, TNA 30

Speech by the Prime Minister to the Assembly of the American Bar Association, Grosvenor House, London, 19 July 1971, PREM 15/717, TNA

40

impact on discussions between Britain and America, most notably the tensions between India and

Pakistan which would eventually lead to war in December 1971.

It would not be until the Bermuda Summit in 1971, that Heath could meet formally with Nixon and

reassure him that Britain did not intend to choose between Europe and the US, by pursuing a “pro-

European policy”, at the expense of America. He argued and he had continuously implored to do so in

the past, and that America needed a strong Europe; this was the kind of security thinking that Nixon

appreciated. Heath explained that the Europeans would have to go beyond bilateral dealings to create a

political union of a kind that made the EC a far more effective partner to deal with. Nixon fully

understood this, and added that the West would remain united, despite increased economic

competition. Kissinger however, strongly disapproved of this and is likely to have been annoyed at Nixon

that he voiced no protest against this.31 Kissinger argued that it lacked regard for the parts of the special

relationship, and how European integration eventually developing a common foreign policy and defence

was actually a step away from Kennedy’s grand design.32 However, without a unified joint approach to

defence and foreign policy there would not be a defensive force anywhere near as equal to that of

America’s, even with a common defence policy it would not have been on par to that of Americas.

Despite the fact that the NSC and Nixon’s administration urged the Europeans to share the burden of

defence and even though Heath was informed about the US tentative support for Anglo-French

collaboration on nuclear weapons, he was still portrayed as a non-malignant de Gaulle-like figure.33

However, what Heath truly wanted were good relations between two equal pillars in the Western camp,

a position which hardly amounted to Gaullism.

Despite the lack of concrete agreements between Nixon and Kissinger, overall both the British and the

Americans were pleased with the Bermuda Summit at the end of 1971. The relationship according to the

FCO was to become closer between the two nations with ‘close and continual consultation’ to be

established whilst discussing foreign policy matters.34 This was partly a result of the meeting, and also

foreign policy and domestic issues that had distracted both leaders from consulting each other. On the

one hand, Nixon had Vietnam, India and Pakistan on his shoulders, whereas Heath had his continuous

struggles with the trade unions. Naturally, the FCO wanted to re-establish the communication which had

been experienced and enjoyed over recent decades.

31

Rossbach, p.131 32

Kissinger, White House Years, pp.934-935 33

Ibid. 964-965 34

Letter from H. T. A. Overton, 7 January 1971, FCO 82/183, TNA

41

The White House was rather naïve in thinking that the myth of the special relationship was

predominantly a relationship between the leading government individuals. They did not understand that

when they by-passed the State Department they also undercut other Anglo-American ties.35 As a result

they had agreed with the British in recreating the informal consultation basis of the Anglo-American

relationship. The White House was fully aware that the restoration of relations could be complication by

EC enlargement, but during 1972 Nixon was fully concentrated on his re-election and Heath of course

was focused on Britain’s inevitable EC membership.

On the 22nd January 1972, Britain had signed the Treaty of Accession, which would become effective on

the 1st January 1973. Following the signing, Heath had spoken of a future that required a ‘strong effort

of imagination’ that would inspire ‘new measures’ beyond the scope of the Treaty of Rome. To him the

signing a beginning of another stage in the construction of a new and greater united Europe’.36 Although

Britain would become a member less than a year later, the EC was getting ready for further European

enlargement. Pompidou had hoped that the next EC Summit would take place in Paris in 1972, to which

Britain had been invited, as it would confirm his role as a European statesman and show the drive

France had for European enlargement.37 As well as this, Pompidou’s ambition was also for there to be a

creation of a political secretariat. This was supposed to deal with international and defence matters,

which were areas outside the EC treaty. It would avoid linking of matters in the economic, monetary and

trade, to defence and foreign affair fields as the Europeans believed the US desired.38

Pompidou’s conception of the agenda for the EC summit appealed to Heath. The only problem for Heath

was that Pompidou had wanted this secretariat to be based in Paris. If a European secretariat for

political consultations in foreign affairs was to take place Heath did not want it to conflict with either

‘NATO or with the Americans’. Heath argued that potential conflicts between France and America, or

even the EC and America would be avoided if the secretariat was based in Brussels.39 This was a far

more pragmatic idea as it would make it easier to tangle the EC in NATO affairs, which was

35

Rossbach, p.133 36

Prime Minister’s Speech on the Signature of the Treaty of Accession, 22 January 1972, PREM 15/880, TNA 37

Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union (London: 2004) pp.141-142 38

Meeting of heads of Mission from Community posts, 3 May 1972, PREM 15/898, TNA 39

Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and the President of the French Republic at Chequers, 18 March 1972, PREM 15/904, TNA

42

unfortunately not to the liking of the French. That said, the British admired the idea of a secretariat

because it would bring continuity to the Council of Minister and emphasise the importance of its role.40

In May 1972, Heath had reassured the US Secretary of State William Rogers that all EC members except

France wanted the secretariat in Brussels, but he said that he did not expect Pompidou to force the

matter.41 The proposal made by Pompidou was eventually abandoned altogether with other various

French proposals at the Paris Summit. Pompidou was becoming more and more frustrated by the rather

lukewarm support that was given to European integration and indirectly at him, with the French

referendum on enlargement in April 1972, with a 60.2% turnout and a 68.3% approval of European

enlargement.42 The British cabinet saw the result of the French referendum as an equaliser, and

believed that the French leadership would realise that they were on the same level as their European

partners.43 The British therefore assumed that this could make it easier for Britain to assume a

significant leadership role in the EC, but at the same time, they had not counted on the possibility that

the referendum could eventually stop the French drive for further integration.

The following meeting in October 1972 in Paris was a rather difficult affair for the British government,

on the one hand it reaffirmed to deepen integration and to forge a European Union before the 1980s,

the crucial political French enthusiasm had come back.44 But either way, Britain had now become an

influential member on the European table. Nixon had recognised this, and in the spring of 1972

following the Treaty of Accession and continuous consultation between the two leaders on a regular

basis, Nixon had been thoroughly pleased to see that Heath and Pompidou were we in general

agreement. Nixon had written to Heath saying that the Anglo-French relationship was the key to

building ‘an enlarged and strengthened Europe’ a project that had his ‘wholehearted support’.45 This

was the key difference between Nixon and Kissinger, whereas Kissinger was sceptical of the contact

Britain had with France, Nixon realised for the best of Britain, but most importantly America, Britain had

to appeal to France to gain EC membership, which would help Britain become a far more equal partner

with America.

40

Memorandum undated, Spring 1972. PREM 15/869, TNA 41

Record of Conversation held in No. 10 Downing Street between the Prime Minister and the US Secretary of State Mr William P. Rogers, 4 May 1972, PREM 15/898, TNA 42

Dinan, Europe Recast, p.141 43

A note to Heath, 11 May 1972, PREM 15/898, TNA 44

Dinan, Europe Recast, pp.142-143, 337 45

Letter from Nixon to Heath, 29 March 1972, PREM 15/904

43

Thus, to see Heath’s turn to Europe as marking a determined detachment from the United States is not

only distorting but also misses the wider arguments that were being made at the time, both across

Whitehall and Number 10. Certainly for Heath, the ‘special relationship’, seen in Churchillian terms of a

partnership of equals was over – the East of Suez decision had finally seen to that. However, in joining

Europe Heath – initially at least – held out the hope of a wider Atlantic partnership with the Anglo-

American relationship at its heart.

44

Chapter Four – Nixon’s administration

The American policy towards European enlargement during Nixon’s Presidency has always been very

difficult to understand.1 This chapter will explain clearly, how the Nixon administration’s dealings with

Britain’s application to the EC were largely inconsistent. The previous two chapters have shown a rather

positive reaction to European enlargement from President Nixon and his Secretary of State William

Rogers, as they had shared the same ideals as the British Prime Minister. On coming to power, Nixon

publically affirmed this position. An enhanced Europe with Britain at the heart of it, remained integral to

the White House’s global strategy.

However, as this chapter will highlight, lurking behind Nixon’s enthusiastic pronouncements, were clear

doubts which had reflected both long-held thinking within the whole of America, most notably the

American press, and also concerns with the Nixon administration itself, particularly those who were

closest to Henry Kissinger. When Britain publically entered negotiations with France over EC entry,

Nixon in private, began to despise EC enlargement, and publically even began to become

confrontational. In private, he and Kissinger became scornful of the whole project, dismissing the

decision of themselves and previous American presidents, such as President Kennedy, as a ‘horrible

mistake’.2 The changing of Nixon’s administration from being sponsors to sceptics of an enlarged Europe

was ultimately the result of Henry Kissinger; whom would later become Nixon’s Secretary of State in

1972. This chapter demonstrates the importance of security thinking over the other approaches in the

White House and it analyses the Anglo-American efforts to agree on a transatlantic initiative.

As stated initially in the introduction, Nixon confirmed and deepened Washington’s support for

European integration. After reflecting the broad conclusions of a review of America’s foreign policy

towards Western Europe, Nixon publically renewed US passion in his First Annual Foreign Policy Report

to Congress in February 1970 (prior to Heath’s general election victory):

Our support for strengthening and broadening of the European Community has not

diminished…We consider that the possible price of a truly unified Europe is outweighed by the

gain in the political vitality of the West as a whole.3

1 Dumbrell, Special Relationship, p.184

2 Telcon: Kissinger and Nixon, 9 August 1973, HAK Telcons, Box 21, NPMP, NA, found in Andrew Scott, Allies Apart,

p.42 3 Nixon’s ‘First Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy, February 1970, PPPUS

45

Adding to that, the British ambassador at that time, John Freeman, observed that Nixon’s statement had

not only highlighted the enthusiasm for a united Europe, but also made mention of Nixon’s

administration being prepared to ‘make sacrifices in the common interest’ as a necessary consequence

of European unity.4 Nixon’s public enthusiasm for European integration can be interpreted against both

conventional wisdom and new foreign policy calculations. From the Marshall Plan to Kennedy’s Grand

Design, the US had been the leading voice and principal sponsor of a united Europe, urging Britain to

join all along. Although, one could call this act by the US as high minded, and putting British interests

first, it would largely seem as argued earlier in the introduction to this thesis, the Washington view was

that the expansion of the EC was a containment of both East Germany and of course, the Soviet Union.

As ambassador John Freeman explained, Nixon had started from the same basic principle that ‘it would

be contrary to the US fundamental interests for Europe to be dominated by the Soviet Union.5

However, going beyond Cold War calculations made by previous US presidents such as Kennedy and

Johnson, Nixon’s support for an integrated Europe can also be understood as part of his overall design

for a new world system based on a multipolar balance of power. The White House, particularly, Henry

Kissinger, was also keen to end the condition of bipolarity governments in Europe. In a meeting in

February 1970 between Nixon and Georges Pompidou, Nixon told Pompidou that ‘it was not healthy to

have just two superpowers’6 and then a year later that ‘political multipolarity while difficult to get used

to, is the precondition of a new period of creativity’.7 To be more specific, Nixon believed in a

pentagonal balance of power with the United Western Europe forming one of the five apexes, against its

economics, political and military competitors, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. It was on this basis

that Nixon had therefore looked to his European allies to create a solid block, with the UK a part of it, for

his new and more fluid world order against America’s prime competitors. This theory was also

recognised and sympathised by Henry Kissinger by explaining in his memoirs that ‘a strong healthy and

independent Europe is good for the balance of the world.’8

A quaint essential factor for Nixon, concerning his enthusiasm for European enlargement, was the

growing doubts over America’s decline on the global stage. When Nixon had entered the White House in

1968, the US was suffering an increasing balance of payments deficit and deepening domestic divisions

4 John Freeman to Michael Stewart, 26 June 1969, FCO 7/1427, TNA

5 Ibid.

6 Memcon: Nixon and Pompidou, 24

th/26

th February 1970, Pres/Hak Memcons, Box 1024, NSC, NPMP, NA

7 Memos for the President beginning December 1971, POF, Box 87, NSC, NPMP, NA

8 Kissinger, White House Years, p.418

46

in the country, the result of over 250,000 US troops embroiled in Vietnam and an even higher figure

committed to the defence of Western Europe. The situation according to his National Security Advisor,

Kissinger, was unsustainable: ‘if the US remains the trustee of every non-Communist area it will exhaust

its psychological resources. No country can act wisely simultaneously in every part of the global at every

moment in time’.9 As a result of this conclusion made by Kissinger, both he and Nixon looked

increasingly to their allies to take a greater role in global security. In a landmark speech at Guam in July

1969, Nixon outlined his intention to devolve power to its regional allies – something that would later be

known as the Nixon Doctrine. Although the President was referring explicitly to South Asia to challenge

China and Japan, his design was also being applied to Europe, with Nixon referring frequently and

stressing that a ‘highly cohesive Western Europe would relieve the US of many burdens’.10 Furthermore,

a state department paper made the case for European enlargement along similar lines:

The US interest lies in the development of an effective decision making entity in Europe in both

the political as well as economic field. In the defense field, a substantially increased West

European contribution is unlikely except in the context of greater European political unity.11

According to Kissinger, there was ‘no alternative’ to European unity either for the United States or even

for Europe.12 In summarising the administrations thinking, Kissinger had concluded that only a ‘Federal

Europe could end Europe’s wars, provide an effective counterweight to the USSR and share with us the

burdens and obligations of world leadership’13. Rather ironically, a very similar argument as provided by

Heath as explained in the previous chapter. This highlights once again that Heath shared common

ground with Nixon and Kissinger of the importance of European enlargement.

In this context therefore, Nixon and Kissinger had quite a similar thinking, as did the White House, in

that it was up to Britain to play a leading role on the global stage. In this instance, British membership

was seen as an essential part of the development of the EC, signifying according to Kissinger and Nixon

the so called ‘final creation’14, whereby only then would Europe become the regional power centre that

9 Henry Kissinger, ‘Central Issues of American Foreign Policy’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-76,

Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: 2003), Document 4 10

Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire’ by Integration, The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford: 1998) p.20 11

State Department Study Paper, undated (c. December 1969), mentioned in Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 143-148 and White House Years, p.81 12

Henry Kissinger, ‘Central Issues of American Foreign Policy’, Document 4 13

Kissinger, White House Years, p.81 14

State Department Study Paper, undated (c. December 1969)

47

Nixon and Kissinger had desired. Specifically however, US policy makers had identified two key defining

features of the British outlook which they had hoped would guide the Community in a way that would

be in America’s interests. Firstly, as Nixon had explained to Heath, Britain was seen as being the sole

country in Europe, coinciding with Britain and America’s ideological similarities, as ‘being capable of

taking a world view of events’.15 And secondly, if not more importantly, Britain was regarded as a

liberalising force, strengthened by Heath’s free market economic ideology, and that ideology would

supposedly challenge the so called direction the EC was heading into according to Kissinger and Nixon.

American foreign policy strategists, led by Kissinger, hoped that British traditions would guarantee that

the EC developed a ‘democratic, liberal and outward looking character’.16

From Washington’s perspective therefore, Britain had a special role to play in Europe as the protector of

US interests, a situation that France had feared for many years, hence why they vetoed Britain’s EC

applications in 1963 and 1967. It was on these two grounds, that when Nixon met Heath he had

repeatedly stressed his desire for Britain to be an integrated member in Europe, and more specifically to

lead it towards a democratic, liberal and outward looking character. When Britain had finally secured

successful member to join the EC in 1973, Nixon was the first to convey his personal congratulations and

satisfaction to the Prime Minister, very much highlighting his support and desire for Britain to integrate

and lead the EC, for his and America’s interests.17

Although it would seem from the first section of this chapter, and from the previous two chapters,

Nixon’s administration had been fairly supportive of Britain’s negotiations with Europe, and it would

also seem that the relationship had its rebirth, by the time Britain had successfully negotiated its terms

of entry in the summer of 1971, US opinion had begun to change. Nixon’s Second Annual Foreign Policy

Report to Congress on 25th February 1971, even before the strong and successful talks held between him

and Heath in December 1971, he had reflected the shift in US opinion. Rather than as would have been

expected, such as Nixon embracing the expansion of Europe, the central theme to his message on

Europe was the ‘Challenge of European Unity’ and Nixon had warned that in the future ‘European unity

would pose problems for American policy, which would be idle to ignore’.18 Adding to that, in private,

Kissinger revealed to the British Ambassador Rowland Baring in October 1971 that ‘if history were to be

rewritten, it would have been far better for the US if the UK had not been compelled by events to join

15

Record of Meeting: Nixon and Heath, Bermuda, 20 December 1971, Box 87, NPMP, NA 16

‘Enlargement of the EC: Implications for the US and Policy Options’, October 13 1969, Box H-164, NSSM 79, NA 17

Letter: Nixon to Heath, 6 July 1973, NSC Subject Files, Box 322, NPMP, NA 18

President Nixon’s ‘Second Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy’, 25 February 1971, PPPUS

48

the EEC’19 – a quite dramatic shift in view that was previously taken by Kissinger almost a year ago.

Within a year therefore, America had gone from being the leading voice and support of Britain’s

membership of the EC, it being its largest critic – in this case, what exactly changed America’s position?

The White House had consistently, during Nixon’s administration, spoken in favour of an expanding

Europe. Behind the public rhetoric however, American opinion was deeply divided and increasingly so,

as European enlargement had moved from being an idea towards reality. Although the US had

advocated European political unity as part of a strengthened West to politically and economically

confront the East, economically, European political unity and the EC’s custom union became a threat to

the US. There became fear within Nixon’s administration that the EC’s custom union would become

economically protectionist and ultimately a competitive institution to the US. Even President Kennedy

who had been a strong advocate of integration, if not the most enthusiastic to date, was privately

persuaded by his economic adviser, John Galbraith, that the effect of a high tariff-bloc such as the EEC

could be ‘extremely serious’.20 Of course, Galbraith was wrong to say that, the EC’s economic ideology

was free market economics, not protectionism.

Adding to these clear concerns within the Nixon administration was how the EC’s trading system

extended well beyond its borders, offering special and exclusive arrangement to nation stations outside

of Europe, particularly its Mediterranean members and former colonies. Potentially therefore, the

Community stood at the centre of a trading bloc of 58 states stretching from the Arctic Circle all the way

to the northern border of South Africa.21 As what had been expected, the EC’s expansion had

established itself across the Atlantic through a growing disparity in global exports; between 1950 and

1970 America’s share had dropped from 16.7% to 13.7%, whilst the EC’s on the other hand, had almost

doubled from 15.2% to 28.8%.22 As a result of this, Nixon’s first year in office had become economically

and politically frustrating, particularly now the EC had established its highly controversial Common

Agricultural Policy (CAP) and continued to extend its preferential trade arrangements. Looking further

ahead, the National Security Council in America had reported that an ‘expanded Europe’ could account

for half of world trade compared to America’s 15%, suggesting a clear relative decline for America. To

make matters even worse for Nixon, particularly with the President election of 1972 ever looming, the

19

Letter: Cromer to Tickell, 21 October 1971, PREM 15/361, TNA 20

Lundestad, ‘Empire’, p.91 21

Claudia Hiepel, ‘The Hague Summit of the European Community, Britain’s Entry, and the New Atlantic Partnership, 1969-1970’, in Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz (eds), The Strained Alliance (Cambridge: 2009) p.121 22

David Reynolds, One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945 (New York: 2000) p.405

49

United States had experienced it first balance of payments and had entered into a recession, a political

disaster for Nixon, whose 1968 Presidential campaign was to make American the global power

economically.23

Following the 1970 EC Hague Summit American fears about the effects of an expanded community

became more vocal especially amongst its trade agencies – the Treasury, and Departments of

Commerce and Agriculture.24 The Summit set members off the path towards economic and monetary

union – clear threat towards the American Dollar, which following America’s recession and budget

deficit, was becoming less and less competitive. Furthermore, with anxieties among American producers

beginning to boil, there became growing talk of a trade war. At an interagency meeting on the 13th May

1970, the representatives of each government agency argued that the opening move should be a

‘reinterpretation’ of the Presidents First Foreign Policy Report.25 After summarising their position to

Nixon, Kissinger argued that the representatives ‘see Europe as too strong a competitor already for us to

pay any economic price for further movement towards European unity’.26 As a result of mounting

pressure from agricultural and industrial officials, Nixon’s own attitude began to turn sour: ‘it seems to

me what we “protest” and continue to get the short end of the stick in our dealings with the

community’.27 As a result to this, the Nixon administration began to hope that Britain would use its

negotiations to steer the EC in a more outward looking direction – or to put it simply, in the interests of

America and the Nixon administration. In particular, the Department of Agriculture looked to British

negotiators in defending US commercial interests by insisting on reductions in CAP prices on key feed

grains.28

The end of 1970 seemed to be the pivotal year in which the United States had shown its rejection of the

prospect of British membership of the EC. For Britain to prove it could be an integrated member of the

EC the British government announced in October its intention to unilaterally introduce an interim levy

system to prepare the way for entrance into CAP. This policy, as highlighted in this chapter and previous

ones, was one which Nixon’s administration and the American people had been highly sceptical of and

23

Kissinger, White House Years, p.426 24

Scott, Allies Apart, p.45 25

Ibid 26

Memo: Kissinger to Nixon, 30 June 1970, RE: Guidelines for US policy towards the expansion of the EC, NSDM 68, US Policy towards Euro, H-217, NPMP, NA 27

Nixon’s annotation on Memo: Kissinger to Nixon, 13 November 1970, NSC Subject Files, European Common Market, Box 322, NPMP, NA 28

Memo: Bergsten to Kissinger, 8 October 1970, H-217, NPMP, NA

50

continues to be so. Heath had originally promised to attempt to ratify the CAP, as did the FCO,29 so for

Heath to abide to all the rules and regulations of it, must have looked humiliating to President Nixon and

Kissinger. Unsurprisingly, the move made by Heath and the FCO had instantly created an anti-Europe

feeling amongst American farmers. Fred Bergsten, who was Kissinger’s adviser on international

economics had warned that the ‘flames have just been fanned’.30 It was not until March 1971 that

British representatives met with Washington to discuss their application following its controversial on

CAP. The Americans stressed the problems that Britain had created, particularly for the Nixon

administration, with the election looming ever closer. Peter Peterson, who was the President’s assistant

for international affairs, still hoped to convince the British to relieve the situation.31 But Geoffrey

Rippon, the Minister in charge of Britain’s negotiations stood firm and confirmed to Peterson that the

British had to accept to rules and regulations of the CAP: ‘There was no possibility of renegotiations

behind our negotiations’.32 Talks had therefore ended in disappointment for the Americans. Looking

back at the meeting Kissinger writes that he ‘hoped that the British government realised what a difficult

domestic problem they had created for President Nixon’. Adding to that, he concluded by saying that

although the idea of British membership did not cause tensions between Britain and America, it had

brought them head to head: ‘With Britain’s entry into the Common Market imminent we were brought

face to face for the first time with the full implications of what we had wrought’.33

While the prospect of European enlargement had created doubts in the United States, the shift in

rhetoric had also reflected the particular priorities and prejudices of the Nixon White House, and a

growing split with the State Department. For Nixon, his frustrations were with the EC were largely a

result of electoral concerns. With the 1972 Presidential election up and coming, it was the very group

that protested most fiercely about the effects of an enlarged Europe – the farmers. The farmers

traditionally had and have been the main basis of political support of the Republican Party. Nixon’s very

own constituency for example being California, largely a farming industry, such as citrus growers,

therefore Nixon prior to the introduction of CAP saw them as clear voter, now he did not.34 As Peterson

had explained to Rippon, with an election approaching the question of whether or not the farming

29

NARA/59 State Department box 2657 Subject Numerical 70-73, Secret, White House, Memcon, subject: meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath, 17 December 1970, The President’s Office 30

Memo: Bergsten to Kissinger, 8 October, H-217, NPMP, NA 31

Record of conversation: Rippon, Peterson, et al. 8 March 1971, PREM 15/62, TNA 32

Ibid. 33

Kissinger, White House Years, p.425 34

Nigel Hamilton, American Caesars: Lives of the US Presidents – From Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush (London: 2010) p.230

51

electorate would support the Republican campaign was instrumental in the President’s mind.35 For his

own political survival therefore, rather than the interests of the special relationship, Nixon saw the EC as

a threat to his voting constituents, although in the long term Nixon had been highly supportive of the

EC’s enlargement, in the short term however, he was sceptic of it.

Under pressure from his own constituents, voters, administration, trade agencies and most notably

Henry Kissinger, Nixon prepared for combat over the EC’s economic policies. Whilst Nixon was publically

supporting a unified Europe, in reality, he was sceptical of bilateral relations and had deep misgivings

over the member states’ move towards enhanced cooperation and collective decision-making. Robert

Schaetzel, whom as mentioned earlier, was the US ambassador to the EC between 1966 and 1972,

described Nixon’s policy towards the Community as one of ‘studied neglect’.36 Furthermore, he added

how Nixon’s obsession with national diplomacy undermined the development of the EC by making it

excessively difficult for the governments of Europe to break away from bilateral habits which were at

odds with their expressed Community commitments.37 In backing up this argument, Nixon was adamant

that American should be working with ‘the heads of government in the various country and not that

jackass in the European Commission in Brussels’.38

While the prospect of European enlargement stirred Nixon’s own weaknesses, his very own foreign

policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, had a long record of doubting the whole project from the very beginning.

One of the defining themes of Kissinger’s instrumental academic career had been his scepticism over

European integration and its effect on Atlantic relations, a view also shared by a future Conservative

Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. Kissinger had argued that Kennedy’s ‘Grand Design’ that a united

Europe would emerge simply into partnership with the US was overly sentimental and failed to

recognise the fundamental tension between European autonomy and the bigger goal of Atlantic unity.

He had concluded in his 1965 paper, The Troubled Partnership, that ‘a separate identity has usually been

established in opposition to dominant power’ – Europe he predicted was highly unlikely to be all that

different.39 Furthermore, as a foreign policy theorist, Kissinger warned that the assumption that the

British could solve the central dilemma of Anglo-American relations had always been ‘overoptimistic’.40

35

Record of conversation: Rippon, Peterson, et al. 36

Robert Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliace: American and the European Community (New York: 1975) p.53 37

Ibid. 38

Matthias Schulz and Thomas Schwartz (eds), The Strained Alliance: US-European Relations from Nixon to Carter (Cambridge: 2009) p.362 39

Henry Kissinger, A Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: 1965) p.39 40

Ibid. p.78

52

After entering the White House, Kissinger who had been the Presidents Chief Strategist on foreign

policy, expressed his concerns very early on gradually steering the policy of EC enlargement from

previously established views – as seen very much so from this thesis. As the State Department prepared

papers publically stating the US’ support for federal Europe, he was calling for a ‘more neutral

posture’.41 Six years later, in October 1971, he would make his scepticism for public to President Nixon

by announcing that ‘the big mistake’ was ‘made by Kennedy in pushing them [the British] so hard on the

Common Market’.42

In September 1972 saw the rise of Henry Kissinger, and how with Nixon’s focus elsewhere, such as his

Presidential Election, this allowed Kissinger to publically change America’s perspective of Britain’s entry

into the EC. Kissinger had made a public comment in London to the effect that if Nixon’s administration

remained in office after the November Presidential election, it was likely that America would make a

‘striking new initiative towards Europe’.43 The White House meant to develop a programme for an

Atlantic partnership in close cooperation with their European friends. Historian Seyom Brown also

argues that the ‘initiative’ or ‘Year of Europe’ was an attempt for Europe to play a significant role in

dealing with the Soviet Union, as the US was the main voice against them.44 According to the FCO

however, this actually went beyond what Kissinger and Nixon had told Heath during the same visit.

Furthermore, the FCO believed it would not be until November that the phrase ‘Year of Europe’,

Kissinger’s infamous speech, would widely be used in the White House.45

By the time the political scandal famously known as ‘Watergate’ began to unravel in the autumn of

1972, eventually incriminating the White House, the British knew that they would be a European

initiative. Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, welcomed Kissinger’s reference however to a ‘Year of

Europe’, but would later change his perspective when hearing the speech in 1973.46 However, the British

had very little reason to believe that Kissinger would play a central role in any European initiative, and

that Nixon would have lead the way, as he had done with the talks he held with European minister

Georges Pompidou. In the same month of September 1972, Nixon had told Home that the initiative

would be planned during the first months of his second administration, and he would lead the way, until

41

Memo: Kissinger to Under-Secretary of State, 7 October 1969, NSSM 79, NPMP, NA 42

Telcon: Kissinger and Nixon, 12 October 1971, HAK Telcons, NPMP, NA, found in Andrew Scott, Allies Apart, p.48 43

Rossbach, p.137 44

Seyom Brown, The Crises of Power (New York: 1979) pp.117-118 45

FCO Analysis ‘The Year of Europe, III Record of Events’, October 1973, PREM 15/2089, TNA 46

Ibid.

53

future events such as Watergate would revert the priority over to Kissinger.47 A widespread impression

amongst the FCO was that Nixon had fully supported Britain’s entry into the EC, even following the

debacle with British diplomats over the CAP. It continued to seem that Nixon was far more supportive of

Heath than Kissinger, even during the first stages of problems the White House was facing as a result of

‘Watergate’.48 Kissinger’s connection with the initiative ‘Year of Europe’ tended to reinforce this idea

that this was his idea all along, and it seemed that both Nixon and the rest of administration refused to

endorse this ‘European initiative’ that Kissinger desired.

Furthermore, the 1972 analysis of US economic foreign policy towards the EC which had been requested

by Nixon, and put together by the State Department, had assumed that the Europeans intended to

pursue the aims of the Paris Summit and aim for a ‘European Union’ by 1980. Although the White House

had expected to be ‘punctuated by crises’ it also expected the EC to make headway on the global stage.

The development towards a union meant for the Nixon administration that Europe would take on more

global responsibilities whilst at the same time, continue a ‘close partnership in the US’.49 However, there

was some scepticism in the Nixon administration, most notably Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defence

Melvin Laird and Attorney General John N. Mitchell. They argued that the EC would fail to become a

political union, when it could not even deal with very minor difficulties such as agreeing to recognise

Bangladesh.

Having said that, all (but Kissinger) in Nixon’s administration seemed to be in agreement that a

‘European Union’ would be a favourable outcome for the US. Nixon’s administration argued that

deepened integration was a more likely to create a full and economic monetary union, with a flexible

exchange rate, which would prove far better for the US. Nixon had hoped that a united Europe would

help burden the sharing on the global stage, such as the problem of continuous defence spending that

was being made by the US.50 Consequently, on the eve of EC enlargement, Nixon had reaffirmed his

administration’s commitment to European integration.51 After diplomatic success made by Nixon such as

the opening of China and Salt I agreement with the Soviet Union, it may seem therefore that the ‘Year of

Europe’ or a ‘European initiative’ neatly filled an empty slot for Nixon. However, as demonstrated from

47

Ibid 48

John Elliott, ‘Trade looms large in Heath-Nixon talks’, The Financial Times, 23 December 1972, p.1 49

Annex – US-EC Relations, NARA/WHCF/Whitman box folder EC-CIEP 2 of 2, found in Rossbach, Rebirth of the Special Relationship, p.139 50

Richard Nixon, ‘US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace’, Report to Congress (Washington: 1972) 51

Henry Brandon, ‘Heath-Nixon talk on US fears about Europe’, The Sunday Times, 3 December 1972, p.2

54

the previous chapters, European enlargement had always been on the agenda for Nixon. To Nixon and

the majority of those in his administration, except Kissinger, felt that EC enlargement with the inclusion

of Britain was an absolute imperative.

Quite clearly, as seen with every chapter in this dissertation, the success of Britain’s entry following the

signing of the Treaty of Accession in 1972 should have been a crowning moment for Washington, as it

was for Downing Street and the FCO. From the very beginning, British membership had been a

professed US objective. When the principle of European enlargement came into reality however, in the

short term it had problems for the Nixon administration, with the introduction of CAP and the electoral

problems it had for Nixon’s Presidential election campaign. In the long term however, as this

dissertation has fully demonstrated, European enlargement was one of Nixon’s primary foreign policy

objectives. Although some in Nixon’s administration, such as those in the National Security Council were

sceptical of EC enlargement, with Henry Kissinger believing that that European integration would

undermine both bilateral relations and the whole of the Atlantic.

55

Conclusion

The contemporary judgement amongst historians and foreign policy analysts alike are in agreement that

the Anglo-American relationship between 1970 and 1972, during Britain’s negotiations for entry into the

EC, had nearly been extinguished during the Nixon-Heath years.1 However, this dissertation, with a large

access of primary sources, has been able to challenge the view of the usual literature on the Nixon-

Heath years, to give a far more positive portrayal of the relationship the two leaders had. The conclusion

will summarise the research made in three different sections, firstly the view that is given by Henry

Kissinger, as to why he believed Edward Heath was a traitor for taking Britain into Europe. The following

section demonstrates Heath’s ideas for Britain and European integration and the strong understanding

Heath and Nixon had on European enlargement. The final section of this conclusion discusses the

problem with being dependant on one particular view, in this instance, Henry Kissinger’s.

Despite previous setbacks before the Heath government and Nixon administration, such as the debacle

of the Suez Canal Crises, the concept of the ‘special relationship’ never died or went away during the

Heath-Nixon years. Although Heath’s terminology had changed by replacing the word ‘special’ with

‘natural’, the emphasis of keeping strong Anglo-American relations very much remained intact.

Relations between the two leaders were good when Heath first became Prime Minister and quickly

became even better after their first meeting in 1970. Their views on foreign policy were identical and

Nixon was won over by Heath’s vision of European enlargement.2 Heath’s ambition was to make a

seamless adaption of the Anglo-American special relationship to an American-European special

relationship. Nixon’s administration ambition was also to improve transatlantic relations. In contrast,

the Nixon administration had wanted to continue the traditional American support for European

integration and sought to strengthen the NATO alliance by getting the French more inclusive in NATO.

Very much similar to the Heath government in Britain, Nixon’s administration wanted to prevent

American power from decreasing but also wanted to ensure that there would be no Western decline.

However, according to Henry Kissinger Heath was the problem all along. It was Heath who had come to

office indifferent to the American connection and determined to take Britain into Europe. It was Heath

who had been prepared to downgrade relations with Washington and to break old ties. And it was

1 John Dickie, ‘Special’ No More – Anglo American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London: 1994) p.133; see also for

example, David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart (London: 1998) pp.261-266, Alan Dobson, Anglo-American Relationship in the Twentieth Century (New York: 1995) and Andrew Scott, Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship (Basingstoke: 2011) p.1 2 Record of Meeting: Heath, Nixon, et al., 3 October 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA

56

Heath who had been anxious to avoid separating from the French.3 This was Kissinger’s story, and as

argued in this thesis, Kissinger had clearly taken a Heath-centric view which has come to dominate

literature on this period. However, as shown with the primary sources utilised in this dissertation his

accounts are both exaggerated and very much misleading. As shown from this dissertation, Heath’s

views were not ideological; rather pragmatic, and ones which had evolved over time and events. They

reflected his pragmatic calculations on how best to promote British interests. In this case, he was

consistent with his predecessors, not different from them. In making their case for membership of the

EC, Macmillan, Wilson and Heath all argued that entry was the way to renewed greatness and a world

role for Britain. It was the very same logic that had inspired appeals to the ‘special relationship’. As

highlighted emphatically in this dissertation, when Britain could no longer claim special status or

influence in Washington, Europe was presented as the alternative. Heath, as seen with the Godkin

lectures, had for some time been convinced that this was the way forward.4 Far from dictating a split

with the United States, it was seen as the key to the revival of relations across the Atlantic.

Like Heath, Nixon believed that the world was becoming one of regions, that is to say multipolar. As a

realist when it comes to foreign policy, Nixon did not believe he could prevent this evolution only make

certain that it was beneficial to the US. Nixon had also realised that Britain adrift outside any major

customs would contribute to the lessening of Britain’s power and increase the risk of Britain becoming a

problem for its allies, and specifically America itself. Nixon believed that an enlarged EC, with Britain as a

member, would be more open to agreements which were satisfying to the US, such as those on trade

and monetary affairs and particularly more responsible on matters on global security. Nixon believed

that EC enlargement with Britain within it was likely to increase the Europeans willingness to accept

more of the costs for their own defence and pave the way for NATO reform.

This explains the American support for British entry but not for Heath’s ideas. Nixon had always

supported European integration. Heath’s references to an Atlantic partnership between equals

resonated with Nixon. Nixon accepted the implications of Heath’s vision of stabilising Anglo-American

relations by being a member of the EC because it fitted the requirements of the Nixon doctrine. And as

long as Britain remained reliable, and kept its views on market liberalisation and the need to remain

involved overseas, Heath’s version of the future of the EC was preferable to potential alternatives less

attuned to the needs for agreement within the West. Although there were short term difficulties over

3 Scott, Allies Apart, p.199

4 Heath, ‘Realism in British Foreign Policy’, p.46

57

EC enlargement, as demonstrated in the final chapter, which were mainly a result of Presidential

election concerns, ultimately Nixon had profoundly given both Heath and the French President

Pompidou his ‘wholehearted support’ for EC expansion.5

On a historiographical note, this analysis of the Heath-Nixon years points to the limitations of relying on

histories written by those involved at the time. Whilst revealing, members are clearly and understanding

close-minded and self serving, however, when they are incredibly detailed and determined version of

events and are written by a formidable analyst on this subject, they can have a huge impact on our

understanding of history – especially when they represent the first draft and are written by a central

participant in this story. In this respect, one individual, above all, has left a massive imprint on history of

America’s foreign policy during the 1970s, Henry Kissinger. In terms of Anglo-American relations, despite

crafting his reputation as an arch-realist, Kissinger emerges from his memoirs as a convinced believer in

the ‘special relationship’ as a uniquely intimate bond and pattern of consultation. But above all, as seen

with this thesis utilising primary sources, his judgement of Anglo-American relations during the early

1970s is both exaggerated and hugely misleading.

And finally, what this analysis has revealed from the Heath-Nixon years, is that for all the attention on

those who were in charge of the White House and Number 10, the research here demonstrates that the

shape and course of relations between London and Washington were determined by the widespread

patterns of power, both nationally and globally. In short, with Britain coming out of the Second World

War in decline, whereas America coming out as the global superpower, it became inevitable that the

transatlantic alliance would have to change. With the Heath government moving towards Europe and

Nixon’s administration focusing and trying to prevent the spread of communism, the relationship

seemed to become ‘natural’ rather than ‘special’ after all.

5 Letter from Nixon to Heath, 29 March 1972, PREM 15/904

58

Bibliography

Primary Sources

National Archives, US

Memo: Henry Kissinger to Under-Secretary of State, 7 October 1969, NSSM 79, NPMP, NA

‘Enlargement of the EC: Implications for the US and Policy Options’, October 13 1969, Box H-164, NSSM

79, NA

Memcon: President Nixon and President Pompidou, 24th/26th February 1970, Pres/Hak Memcons, Box

1024, NSC, NPMP, NA

Memo: Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 30 June 1970, RE: Guidelines for US policy towards the

expansion of the EC, NSDM 68, US Policy towards Euro, H-217, NPMP, NA

NARA/NSDM 68 in box H-217, 3 July 1970, NSDM 68, US Policy Toward the European Community, NA

Memo: Fred Bergsten to Henry Kissinger, 8 October 1970, H-217, NPMP, NA

Nixon’s annotation on Memo: Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 13 November 1970, NSC Subject Files,

European Common Market, Box 322, NPMP, NA

Memo: Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 15 December 1970, VIP visits, Box 942, NSC, NPMP, NA

NARA/HAK/box 63, Message Department of State, 15 December 1970. US-British consultations on the

use of nuclear weapons, NA

NARA/59 State Department box 2657 Subject Numerical 70-73, Secret, White House, Memcon, subject:

Meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath, 17 December 1970, NA

Alec Douglas-Home, 14 October 1971, Conservative Party Conference, HAK Office Files, Rodman, Box 41,

NPMP, NA

Memos for the President beginning December 1971, POF, Box 87, NSC, NPMP, NA

Record of Meeting: President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath, Bermuda, 20 December 1971, Box 87,

NPMP, NA

Letter: President Nixon to Prime Minister Heath, 6 July 1973, NSC Subject Files, Box 322, NPMP, NA

Foreign Relations of the United States

FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Foundations of Foreign Policy 1969-1972, Vol. 1 (Washington:

United States Government, 2003), address by Richard Nixon to the Bohemian Club

Kennedy Library

59

Assurance to Prime Minister Macmillan recorded in McGeorge Bundy, memo for the President, 7 April

1961, NSF 170/2 (Kennedy Library)

David Bruce to State Department, telegram 2295, 12 December 1961, NSF 170/12 (Kennedy Library)

Charles De Gaulle’s press statement, 14 January 1963, official French translation, p.7, NSF 73 (Kennedy

Library)

Nixon Presidential Material Projects

Memcon: President Nixon – Prime Minister Wilson. Conversation between President Nixon and Prime

Minister Harold Wilson, Sir Burke Trend and Henry A. Kissinger, 27 January 1970. NSC/Box 1023

Haldeman Diaries: 19 June 1970, Box 41, Haldeman Papers, WHSF, NPMP.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States

Nixon’s ‘First Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy, February 1970, PPPUS

President Nixon’s ‘Second Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy’, 25 February

1971, PPPUS

Congress Reports

Henry Kissinger, ‘Central Issues of American Foreign Policy’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-76, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: 2003), Document 4 Richard Nixon, ‘US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace’, Report to Congress (Washington: 1972) The American Presidency Project

Record of meeting: Toasts of the President and Prime Minister Heath of Great Britain, December 17

1970, TAPP

The National Archives, UK

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, 3 September 1956, PREM 11/1177, TNA

Sir Leslie Rowan, note on ‘Economic and financial measures in the event of war with Egypt, 11

September 1956, Treasury Records, TR 236/4168, TNA

Sir Harold Caccia to Foreign Office, 27th November 1956, CAB 236/4190, TNA

Cabinet Meeting, 28th November 1956, CAB 236/4190, TNA

“The Grand Design” (Co-operation with Western Europe), 5 January 1957, CAB 129/84, TNA

60

Cabinet Meeting, 8th January 1957, CAB 128/30, TNA

Draft Paper: ‘Anglo-US Relations’ prepared by US embassy and planning staff in Washington, 17 January

1969, FCO 32/376, TNA

John Freeman to Michael Stewart, 26 June 1969, FCO 7/1427, TNA

FCO Planning Committee paper from P Craddock, 14 November, 1969, FCO 7/1427, TNA

President Nixon to the US Congress 1970, FCO 7/1808, TNA

Anglo/United States Relations, by the FCO, 23 September 1970, FCO 7/1839, TNA

Ian McChirney to Peter Moon, 25 September 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA

Record of Cabinet meeting, 30 September 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA

FCO Brief on NATO and Burden Sharing, 2 October 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA

A note ‘President Nixon’s Visit to Chequers’, 3 October, FCO 7/1812, TNA

Record of Meeting: Prime Minister Heath, President Nixon, et al., 3 October 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA

Letter: President Nixon to Prime Minister Heath, 7 October 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA

Letter from the British Ambassador, John Freeman to Robert Armstrong, 8 October 1970, PREM 15/714,

TNA

Letter: Henry Kissinger to Prime Minister Heath, 10 October 1970, PREM 15/714, TNA

Letter to the Permanent Under-Secretary from Sir Con O’Neill, 30 October 1970, PREM 15/1540, TNA

Letter from A. R. M. Jaffray, MOD, W. S. Ryrie, PS Chancellor of the Exchequer, 4 November 1970, PREM

15/35, TNA

Brief for the ‘Visit of the Prime Minister in Washington steering brief 17 – 18 December, 11 December

1970, FCO 7/8140, TNA

Letter from H. T. A. Overton, 7 January 1971, FCO 82/183, TNA

‘Anglo-French collaboration’, 15 February 1971, PREM 15/788, TNA

Record of conversation: Geoffrey Rippon, Robert Peterson, et al. 8 March 1971, PREM 15/62, TNA

FCO Study: John Freeman to Peter Moon, 8 March, 1971, PREM 15/62, TNA

Letter: Christopher Soames to Denis Greenhill, 21 April 1971, PREM 15/62, TNA

Record of Meeting: Prime Minister Heath and President Pompidou, 20 May 1971, PREM 15/372, TNA

61

Record of meeting: Edward Heath and Georges Pompidou, 21 May 1971, PREM 15/714, TNA

Telegram: Christopher Soames to Alec Douglas-Home, 9 June 1971, PREM 15/372 TNA

Speech by the Prime Minister to the Assembly of the American Bar Association, Grosvenor House,

London, 19 July 1971, PREM 15/717, TNA

Minute: Unnamed and undated, ‘The EEC Negotiations – Strategic Review’, c20 July 1971, PREM 15/62,

TNA

Minute: H. T. A. Overton, 21 July 1971, FCO 82/61, TNA

Letter: Lord Cromer to C. C. C. Tickell, 21 October 1971, PREM 15/361, TNA

FCO Report on ‘Future Relations with the United States’, 5 November 1971, PREM 15/714, TNA

Alec Douglas-Home to Lord Cromer, 5 November 1971, PREM 15/712, TNA

Prime Minister’s Speech on the Signature of the Treaty of Accession, 22 January 1972, PREM 15/880,

TNA

Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and the President of the French Republic at

Chequers, 18 March 1972, PREM 15/904, TNA

Letter from President Nixon to Prime Minister Heath, 29 March 1972, PREM 15/904

Meeting of heads of Mission from Community posts, 3 May 1972, PREM 15/898, TNA

Record of Conversation held in No. 10 Downing Street between the Prime Minister and the US Secretary

of State Mr William P. Rogers, 4 May 1972, PREM 15/898, TNA

A note to Prime Minister Heath, 11 May 1972, PREM 15/898, TNA

Memorandum undated, Spring 1972. PREM 15/869, TNA

FCO Analysis ‘The Year of Europe, III Record of Events’, October 1973, PREM 15/2089, TNA

Newspapers

The Financial Times, 26 January 1970, p.4 (No author provided)

Henry Brandon, ‘Heath-Nixon talk on US fears about Europe’, The Sunday Times, 3 December 1972, p.2

John Elliott, ‘Trade looms large in Heath-Nixon talks’, The Financial Times, 23 December 1972, p.1

Hansard

62

Speech by Alec Douglas-Home to Parliament, 6 July 1970, Hansard

Prime Minister Heath, 28 October 1971, Hansard

Roy Hattersley speech to Parliament, 29 October 1971, Hansard

63

Bibliography

Secondary Sources

Memoirs and Diaries

Brown, G., In My Way (London: 1971)

Gaulle, C, D., War Memoirs: Unity, 1942-1944 (London: 1956)

Heath, E., Old World, New Horizons: Britain, Europe and the Atlantic Alliance (Cambridge: 1970)

Heath, E., The Course of my Life: My Autobiography (London: 1998)

Kissinger, H., A Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: 1965)

Kissinger, H., White House Years (Boston: 1979)

Kissinger, H., Years of Renewal (London: 1999)

Kissinger, H., Years of Upheaval (London: 1982)

Kitzinger, U., Diplomacy and Persuasion, How Britain joined the Common Market (London: 1971)

Macmillan, H., At the End of the Day, 1961-63 (London: 1973)

Macmillan, H., Pointing the way, 1959-1961 (California: 1972)

Schaetzel, J, R., The Unhinged Alliance: America and the European Community (New York: 1975)

Books

Ambrose, S., Eisenhower: The President (New York: 1984)

Arnold, S., America and Britain: Was there ever a Special Relationship? (London: 2014)

Ball, S and Seldon, A., The Heath Government: A Reappraisal (London: 1996)

Barnet, R, J., Allies: America, Europe and Japan since the War (London: 1983)

Brandon, H., Special Relationships: A Foreign Correspondents Memoirs from Roosevelt to Reagan

(London: 1989)

Brown, S., The Crises of Power (New York: 1979)

Crossman, R., The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Volume II (London: 1976)

Dallek, R., Partners in Power – Nixon and Kissinger (New York: 2007)

Dickie, J., ‘Special’ No More – Anglo American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London: 1994)

64

Dimbleby, D and Reynolds, D., An Ocean Apart (London: 1998)

Dinan, D., Europe Recast: A History of European Union (London: 2004)

Dobson, A., Anglo-American Relationship in the Twentieth Century (New York: 1995)

Dockrill, S., Britain’s Retreat from the East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World

(Basingstoke: 2002)

Dumbrell, J., A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After (London: 2001)

Edmonds, R., Setting the Mould: The United States and Britain, 1945-1950 (Oxford: 1986)

Gaddis, J, L., The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: 1972)

Hamilton, N., American Caesars: Lives of the US Presidents – From Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W.

Bush (London: 2010)

Harbutt, F., The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: 1986)

Hennessy, P., The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders since 1945 (London: 2000)

Heffer, S., Like the Roman (London:1998)

Horne, A., Kissinger’s Year: 1973 (London: 2009)

Lundestad, G., The United States and Western Europe since 1945, From ‘Empire by Invitation to

Transatlantic Drift, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 2003)

Mcshane, D., The 20 British Prime Ministers of the 20th Century: Heath (London: 2006)

Neustadt, R., Alliance Politics (New York: 1970)

Parr, H., Britain’s Policy towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role,

1964-1967 (Oxon: 2006)

Pimlott, B., Harold Wilson (London: 1993)

Louis, W, R and Bull, H., eds, The Special Relationship: Anglo American Relations since 1945 (Oxford:

1986)

James, R, R., ed., Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, vol.VII (New York: 1974)

Ovendale, R., Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: 1998)

Reynolds, D., One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945 (New York: 2000)

Rock, S, R., Appeasement in International Politics (Kentucky: 2000)

65

Rossbach, N., Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship: Britain, the US and the EC, 1969-

74 (Basingstoke: 2009)

Schlesinger, A., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (New York: 1971)

Schulz, M and Schwartz, A, T., (eds), The Strained Alliance (Cambridge: 2009)

Scott, A., Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship (Basingstoke: 2011)

Watt, D and Mayall, J., (eds), Current British Foreign Policy: Documents, Statements and Speeches 1970

(London: 1971)

Watt, D and Mayall, J., Current British Foreign Policy: Documents, Statements and Speeches 1971

(London: 1973)

Young, H., This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: 1998)

Young, J., The Labour Governments, 1964-79, volume 2: International Policy (Manchester: 2003)

Ziegler, P., Edward Heath: The Authorised Biography (London: 2010)

Journals/Articles

Campbell, A., ‘Anglo-French Relations a Decade ago: A New Reassessment’, International Affairs, 58, 2,

(1982) 237-253

Ellison, J., ‘Separated by the Atlantic: The British and De Gaulle, 1958-1967’, Review of International

Studies, 16, (1990), 239-258

Heath, E., ‘Realism in Foreign Affairs’, Foreign Affairs (October, 1969) 39-50

Hennessy, P and Anstey, C., Moneybags and Brains: The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ Since

1945, Strathclyde Analysis Paper, No.1 (Strathclyde: 1990)

Hiepel, C., ‘The Hague Summit of the European Community, Britain’s Entry, and the New Atlantic

Partnership, 1969-1970’, in Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz (eds), The Strained Alliance

(Cambridge: 2009) 105-124

Parr, H., ‘Saving the Community: The French Response to Britain’s Second EEC Application in 1967’, Cold

War History, 6, 4, (November 2006) 425-455

Reynolds, D., ‘Rethinking Anglo-American Relations’, International Affairs, 65, 1, (Winter 1985-86), 89-

111