a new pakistan

8/14/2019 A New Pakistan

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Mahboob MahmoodMarch 23, 2009Copyright 2009

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A New Beginning for Pakistan: Americas Strategy for Success

By

Mahboob Mahmood

March 23, 2009

President Barack Obama has been a strong supporter of the twin propositions that (a)a stable, peaceful and progressive Pakistan is crucial for success in the globalengagement that his predecessor had so trippingly mislabeled the war on terror and(b) the problem of Pakistan must be addressed at a military, political, diplomatic andeconomic level. While these propositions appear to make sense, the battle forPakistan is close to being lost. Only a strategy born at the ground zero of defeat will

be able to engender a new beginning for Pakistan.

The Future of Pakistan

The case for an intensive engagement with Pakistan is clear and compelling. Over thenext several years, there are three basic scenarios that could unfold in Pakistan. Thefirst scenario, the realization of which I rate at a probability of 50-60% (or 95% in theevent intensive US support is withdrawn), is the completion, at a minimum, of thefirst two stages of the transformation of Pakistan into the worlds first Sunni militantfascist state (lets call this state Jihadistan for the sake of convenience). The secondscenario involves the perpetuation of the division of power among the military, the

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the existing political parties and militant forces. Thethird scenario, the realization of which I rate at a probability of 5%, is that a small,effective and positive new force emerges which has the potential to unify the

progressive elements in the country and bring about a much-needed transformation inthe fortunes of the people of Pakistan.

The Rise of Jihadistan. Pakistan is rapidly transforming into the worlds first Sunnimilitant fascist state. Up to now, Sunni militant ideologies and institutions around theworld have operated as anti-government, oppositional forces in established states(such as the Islamic brotherhood movements in Saudi Arabia and Egypt) or asgoverning forces in small semi-states (such as Hamas in Gaza and the Taliban inAfghanistan prior to 9/11). Jihadistan, which could within a few years embrace all ormost of Pakistan and Afghanistan, will be the first substantial state ideologicallydedicated to the creation of a worldwide order based on a narrow and inflexibleinterpretation of Sunni Islam imposed through a dynamic of permanent militancytowards individuals within the state and towards other states.

Consistent with its ideology of permanent militancy, Jihadistan will come about instages. In between stages, Pakistan may splinter, only to be reunited by thecompelling forces of Jihadistan.

In the first stage, Jihadistan will straddle the mountainous divide between Afghanistanand Pakistan and proximate valleys and plains. The state will be largely coterminous


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with the territories dominated by the Pathans, who comprise 40% of Afghanistanspopulation of 32 million and 15% of Pakistans population of 165 million. During thisstage, predominantly Pathan groups such as the Taliban will form the political andmilitary front line of the state, with militant groups in Pakistan (such as Jamaat ul

Dawa) and more globally inclined Islamic groups (such as Al-Qaeda) playing acritical strategic and supportive role.

In the second stage, the mountain valleys of Northern Pakistan linking the NorthwestFrontier Province to Indian Kashmir will be occupied so that an easily defensiblecontiguous mountainous state is formed which controls the water resources of theremaining 140 million people in Pakistan (and is poised to control the water resourcesof 500 million people in India). During this stage, the Taliban and the fundamentalistKashmiri independence groups (such as the Harakat-al-Mujahideen) will initially joinhands and, inevitably, clash with each other as the ethnic composition of Jihadistan is

broadened. During this stage, the pan-Islamic militant groups will expand in

influence to create a more global and less ethnically and geographically tiedideological basis for governance.

In the third stage, Jihadistan will thrust outwards in all directions. In the West, thenew state will seek to bring under control the segments of Afghanistan that aredominated by non-Pathan ethnic groups (such as the Tajiks and Hazaras). In the

North, the support of Islamic militant groups in China and Kazakhstan will beintensified. In the East, the resolve of India to defend its segment of Kashmir and indampening down the highly corrosive radicalization of its own 160 million Muslimswill be severely tested. But the most immediate, easiest and biggest prize will lie inthe South control over the remaining portions of Pakistan.

The Potohar plateau of Northern Pakistan, a short distance from the mountains, willbe continuously attacked from within and from the Pathan areas in the West and theKashmiri areas in the North until Islamabad (the civilian capital), Rawalpindi (themilitary capital) and the considerable nuclear, missile and armament developmentcenters around these twin cities are brought firmly into control. Progressively, theforces of Jihadistan will thrust downwards into the provinces of Punjab, Sindh andBaluchistan. The fall of Pakistan (or, as some might see it, the fulfillment ofPakistans destiny to become an Islamic state) will be ably supported by the hundredsof thousands of militants already organized into well-armed groups that populateevery city and town of Pakistan and the thousands of fervent ideologues within thePakistan military and the ISI.


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Punjab province, where 60% of the population resides, and the Punjabi dominatedmilitary, will, for reasons explained below, relatively quickly submit to the control ofthe supporters of Jihadistan. The interior of Sindh, still awakening from its politicalslumbers of thousands of years, will succumb readily as well. Armed resistance toJihadistan will continue in pockets for many years, principally from the 25% Shia

population of Pakistan and a small Baluchi nationalist movement (both supported byIran) and the secular-minded muhajirs or migrants (led by the Muttahidda QaumiMovement (MQM)) who crossed into Karachi and Hyderabad during the partition ofIndia and Pakistan in 1947. However, this resistance will provide a welcome basis forthe state of Jihadistan to maintain a constant footing of armed struggle and unleash a

series of bloodlettings that will be deemed necessary for the state to achieve the


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requisite degree of purity and order.

By subsuming Pakistan, Jihadistan will gain control over one of the most populouscountries in the world, a reasonably well-developed talent pool and an agricultural

and industrial base that could be quickly rendered more productive. AlthoughJihadistan will not control substantial energy resources, it will control or threatenroutes critical to the transportation of energy from the Persian Gulf and Central Asia.In addition to its sizable revolutionary armies, Jihadistan will possess a million-manconventional military force, a nuclear missile arsenal, a nuclear weapons developmentcapability, a substantial conventional weapons production capability and the worldslargest informal weapons manufacturing industry.

Most immediately threatening to the rest of the world, Jihadistan will inherit thePakistani diaspora of over 5 million people who are integrated into almost everycountry in the West, who occupy almost every economic and professional strata in

these countries, who are indistinguishable from the even greater diaspora of Indiansand who by and large retain strong links with their home country. If the geographicalexpression that is presently called Pakistan will create the geo-political base for amajor Sunni militant state, the massive diaspora of overseas Pakistanis will providethe transmission mechanism for the export of the theory, knowledge and tools of masskillings into the heart of the West. Firmly entrenched, internationally minded terroristgroups will cultivate this rich source of recruits to yield a steady stream of culturallydexterous young militants thoroughly infused with the implacability and confidenceof the new Jihadistan.

Moderate Islam, which has been intellectually deadened for over 800 years by the

separation of faith from reason, is already intellectually and institutionally unable todefend itself against this onslaught. With Pakistan firmly under control, the leaders ofJihadistan will be able to fully institutionalize their five new pillars of faith: (1) theHoly Quran and the Prophet Mohammads life set out a plain meaning set of rulesfor ordering society in the image of 7th century Arabia; (2) the only legitimate state isa theocratic state committed to enforcing such rules; (3) women are legally inferior tomen in all substantial respects; (4) economic activity must conform to theologically-

prescribed guidelines; and (5) the greatest form of salvation derives from armedstruggle to the death to impose the system throughout the Muslim world and possibly

beyond. These new pillars of faith will be progressively integrated into the countryslaws, political system, bureaucratic institutions, economy, educational curriculum,military doctrine and foreign policy framework. The countrys demographics amedian age of under 22 years, a population growth rate of almost 2% and an illiteracyrate of over 50% - will prove a boon for ideological and institutional transformation.Within a decade, most of the population will know no other way of thinking or living.

Hundreds of internecine ideological and military battles will be fought as a leadershipcabal emerges to unify and harden the force of Sunni militancy into a fascistic systemthat is capable of controlling a large and complex state and acting as a substantialinterlocutor in world affairs. In this way, Jihadistan will serve as an engine for the

broader realization of state power by Sunni militancy. Unlike Iran, whose Shia

ideology has appeal only in parts of Iraq, Lebanon and Pakistan, a radicalized Sunnimilitant state in Pakistan will serve as an ideological and institutional magnet for


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Sunni militancy from Morocco in the West to the Philippines in the East. Much as theBolshevik revolution in Russia served to define the geo-political dynamics of the 20 thcentury, the occupation of Pakistan by the forces of Sunni militancy will constituteone of the defining geo-political events of the 21st century.

The cause of Jihadistan is now so well advanced and militarized that it can only reallybe grasped at a district-by-district level. The seven tribal agencies in the Northwestof Pakistan, nominally under the jurisdiction of the federal government, are alreadylargely controlled by Taliban and related forces. The Taliban have also established acritical stronghold in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan, and control the Northwesterndistricts of Baluchistan. Taliban forces are now spreading into the North-WestFrontier Province and Northern Areas using a two-pronged approach: (1) strategiccontrol over the more Northerly, mountainous districts; and (2) intermittent guerillaoperations in the more Southerly, plains districts.

Of the seven key Northern districts, two large districts (Dir and Swat), are alreadysubstantially controlled by the Taliban. From Swat, the Taliban are implementing aSoutherly expansion strategy, which involves occupation of four small districts andone large district (Buner, Shangla, Batagram, Swabi and Mansehra, all of whichalready have strong militant presences), and a Northerly expansion strategy whichwill take them through Kohistan district (the most mountainous and least populateddistrict, which is largely under the control of local militant and criminal groups) toMansehra district. Once Mansehra district falls, Jihadistan will border the thin sliverof valleys in Kashmir controlled by Pakistan: Pathan and Kashmiri militant forceswill be able to move freely across borders and will, thereafter, push the Pakistanmilitary out of Kashmir to complete stage two of Jihadistan. In the meantime, the

Taliban and related forces have stepped up attacks in the plains districts of the North-West Frontier province, particularly in Peshawar, Mardan and Kohat districts. Whilefuller control over these districts may have to wait until the Taliban have secured theirmountain state, targeted attacks to reduce foreign presence in these districts are wellunderway, most notably with the assassination of a USAID worker in Peshawar and aspate of attacks on NATO convoys. Even as stages one and two of Jihadistan are

being worked on, substantial groundwork is being laid towards the eventualoccupation of all of Pakistan.

The Taliban are not simply winning because of their ideological fervor and commandover an ethically homogenous, mountainous territory. The Taliban and related groupshave a robust and diversified economic base, which includes transportation,smuggling, drugs sales, weapons sales, foreign worker remittances and charitabledonations from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. The Taliban can also call upon thesupport of hundreds of well-armed militant groups embedded in every city and townof Pakistan. Already, militants from Punjab and boys from over 50,000 madrassahs(religious schools) across the country are being used as front line forces in the battlefor the Northern areas of Pakistan. Indeed, the Taliban are simply the most manifestexpression of a revolutionary overthrow by militant Islam of the existing order inPakistan.

The Perpetuation of the Status Quo. The two principal internal narratives forPakistans political morass are that the weakness and corruption of the civilian


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leadership and the security environment of the country has necessitated militaryintervention or, alternatively, that military voraciousness has not allowed civiliansupremacy and democracy to take hold. However, with the regular alternation ofmilitary and civilian governments over 62 years, we need to recognize that we are

dealing less with a fledgling states struggle towards democracy than with anestablished system of power with a built-in mechanism of instability. The roots of thissystemic instability derive from the collision of the new state of Pakistan against fortycenturies of settled practice.

The dynamics of Pakistans political situation are driven by deeply embeddedattitudes towards power and statehood. Pakistan was born a state of half-people: thePunjabis and Bengalis were divided between India and Pakistan and the Baluchis andPathans straddle Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Only the marginalized muhajirs(migrants), who moved across from their homes in India, fully subsumed theirregional affiliations to the national identity. Behind this division of loyalties lies a

more problematic calculus of sovereignty, particularly among the Punjabis.

For over 5,000 years, Punjab has been a settled territory, a breadbasket for the greatIndian subcontinent. Yet, remarkably, since the fall of the Indus Valley Civilizationaround 1700 BC, Punjab has almost continuously been ruled by non-Punjabis. TheAryans, Macedonians, Mauryas, Kushans, Huns, Afghans, Persians, Turks, Mughalsand English have all found it easy to conquer and hold the Punjab (Ranjit Singhs133-year Sikh kingdom of the 17th and mid-18th century represents one of the soleexpressions of Punjabi sovereignty prior to the creation of Pakistan). With eachconquering horde, Punjab has struck a grand bargain: in exchange for a subordinaterole in government, Punjab will accept the sovereignty of the conquerors and serve as

an agricultural and military recruitment heartland for the new empire.

The Punjabi bargain with Jinnah (the founder of Pakistan) was no different. Jinnah,although born in Karachi in Sindh province, was essentially a non-native to theterritories that came to form Pakistan, having lived most of his life in Bombay. Hismovement for the partition of India only acquired heft when Sikander Hayat, theleader of the Punjab, decided to accept junior partnership by bringing PunjabiMuslims behind the movement. However, since independence and after the earlydemise of Jinnah, Punjab has had power thrust upon it. And its response has beenclassical: it has sought a client from outside with whom sovereignty may be shared.

The Pakistan military has been a major proponent of this strategy. (Tellingly, theGhauri and Ghaznavi missiles of which the military is so proud, are named afterAfghan conquerors of the territories which are now Pakistan; this is the equivalent ofthe United States military naming one of its missiles George III). Ever since AyubKhan, the first military dictator, declared Pakistan to be the United States mostallied ally, the military has successfully fanned regional conflicts and traded this stateof tension for international patronage from the United States. To hedge its betsagainst American inconstancy, the military has also cultivated militant Islam groupsand the oil-rich Middle Eastern states as alternative clients.

Civilian rulers have similarly sought the patronage of outsiders to justify their ownbasis for power. In his lust for power, Zulfiqar Bhutto precipitated a crisis with the


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Bengali party that won the 1971 election: the result was the creation of Bangladeshout of the countrys eastern wing and a prime ministership for Mr. Bhutto. He theninitiated Pakistans nuclear weapons program and, as peddler of the first Islamic

bomb, assiduously courted the Middle East. Today, the military and civilian arms of

government are jockeying to position security and democracy, respectively, as thebasis for patronage from the United States.

The Pathans have had a fundamentally different attitude towards the waves ofconquerors of the subcontinent. In the past, Afghans (including Pathans) led bycharismatic and militant leaders, have conquered large parts of India, only torelinquish control within a matter of generations. And, by and large, the Pathans havefought fiercely for their independence and been antithetical to being fully absorbed ina larger state identity. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, they have been torn

between greater integration with Pakistan and the pull of a greater Pathan nationalism,fed prodigiously by the cross-border traffic of guerillas, militants, refugees and

fortune-seekers. The present Taliban movement represents one of the periodicexpansions of Pathan power which will, no doubt, exhaust itself either into the fold ofa larger militant state or, less probably, settle into a semi-antagonistic force within a

progressive and positive Pakistani state.

Notwithstanding the Pathan emphasis on autonomy, the accommodative Punjabiattitude towards foreign control has expanded into a national perspective, and fully

permeates political thinking and foreign policymaking. And, if the attitude of thecountrys elite towards sovereignty is robustly pragmatic, their attitude towards theirown people has been profoundly predatory.

Through much of their empire, the Mughals had perfected the Mansabdari systemunder which military commanders would be provided revenue rights over designatedtracts of agricultural land in exchange for the obligation to maintain military forcesfor the service of the empire. As the Mughal empire weakened, the commanders

became overlords of the land and its farmers, with no real responsibilities to the state.The British, with their Whig preoccupation to find holders of property in fee simple,settled these overlords as landowners in exchange for their pledge of loyalty to theRaj. Incredibly, the feudal system has carried through to modern-day democracy:traditional landowners have a disproportionate degree of control over Parliament andsecular political parties essentially serve as fiefdoms of prominent families. The

business sector in Pakistan (which in India has been a major driver towards itstransformation into a world power) has also adopted this feudal posture. It hasrelinquished the challenges of being internationally competitive in exchange for thecomfort of access to governmentally endowed licenses, funding and privileges. Andso, at least since the decline of the great Mughals, the dictum has held true that

proximity to power ensures wealth without responsibility.

The government of Pakistan does not exist for the people; it delivers to the peopleonly the barest shreds of identity, security, justice, education, health and welfare.While most Asian countries are surging forward in terms of human development,Pakistan ranks below Myanmar in the indices and only slightly above Mauritania.

Rural power lords tolerate the existence of over two million people who live inconditions of near slavery, and are traded with their debts of $300 when the lands they


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Unwilling to losing its privileges through realchange and fearful of being dragged into amedieval nightmare, the countrys leadershipis in a state of paralysis.

till are sold. Members of Parliament explain away the gang-rape of women asunchangeable tribal custom. Policemen extort car owners after stuffing car boots withthe dead bodies of miscreants killed in fake encounters. Major cities suffer power cutsfor 4-6 hours each day and stock market activity has almost ground to a halt. The

economy survives on handouts from wealthy donor countries and the IMF and, like ajunky donating blood, the country derives its most reliable foreign exchange earningsfrom the export of some of its most talented manpower. And everywhere,government-appointed tax collectors, judges, grain merchants, bankers, utilityengineers and airline executives work a massive machine for bleeding the people forthe personal advantage of its controllers. To live without power and wealth inPakistan is to live in the hell of feudal thralldom.

It is nearly impossible to bring about change fromwithin the current civilian-military dynamics in thecountry. Shrouded in secrecy, the military budget

soaks up a massive portion of national resourcesand, still, the military requires generouscontributions from the United States. Such amonstrous budget may only be justified bymaintaining a state of constant tension in SouthAsia and handouts from concerned powers. If thesecurity dynamics in the country were to change,the military would need to undergo a drasticrestructuring in terms of its size and orientation.And, of course, the institutional resistance tochange created by this dynamic is reinforced by

individual incentives to perpetuate a bloatedmilitary. Today, a lieutenant general in the Pakistan army is likely to retire, onaverage, with a net worth of around $5 million, derived from concessionary landgrants, positions in government-controlled companies and other wealth generationopportunities that come the way of power. As a senior military officer said to me: Itsdifficult to focus on killing your own people in some remote part of Waziristan whenyou are trying to make sure that a decent plot in the latest housing society in Lahore isallotted to you. What would you have me do? Risk my life for an American causeand, if I am not killed, come home to live on handouts from my son?

If corruption is a powerful lubricant for the military, it is the essential life source for afeudalistic civilian democracy. A parliamentary seat costs a politician at least $2million in campaign financing. And, unlike Barack Obama, a parliamentary candidatein Pakistan has access neither to party funds, nor to public finance, nor to popularcontributions (the religious parties are among the few parties that actually function onmore or less modern party lines and actually provide election funding). A politicalcandidate must come up with election funding from his or her own resources andneeds to take as a first priority a return on investment for his or her backers. And, ofcourse, a structurally corrupt political leadership can neither prevent wider corruptionnor focus on serving the people.

Systemically constrained from serving the public interest, the military and civiliansystems in Pakistan form symbiotic arms of a coherent system of governance in which


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each arm periodically replaces the other while whitewashing the others excesses. Themilitary has never been taken into account for its killings in Bangladesh andBaluchistan, just as fourteen years of civilian political criminality were washed clean

by General Musharraf through a National Reconciliation Ordinance. And so, while

life for the ordinary people of Pakistan grows ever more solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,and short, the military and civilian arms of government regularly replace each other tocreate the semblance of change as a mask for their structural impotence in bringingabout genuine change. Democracy and dictatorship are merely results of the operationof a more subterranean, feudal algorithm of power. As Zulfiqar Bhutto, the scion ofthe sequestration of democracy by feudalism, once put it:

Have you ever seen a bird sitting on its eggs in the nest? Well, a politicianmust have fairly light, fairly flexible fingers, to insinuate them under the birdand take away the eggs. One by one. Without the bird realizing it.1

From the perspective of the people of Pakistan, the true scourge of the country is notreligious fanaticism, nor military dictatorship, nor civilian corruption, but a deeplyingrained system in which political leadership is defined as the bartering of nationalsovereignty and public interest for personal power and wealth. If the system isincapable of bringing about a deeper form of political leadership then, perhaps, Sunnimilitancy, no matter how bloodthirsty, is a positive outcome. Sunni militancy is, afterall, despite its harkening to the past and its hatred of all that is different, a thoroughlymodern system which has a deep sense of sovereignty, a well developed ideology, acommitment to bringing out the best in humanity, a military agenda beyond self

perpetuation of an armed force, a wealth of political parties that are not mere clustersof personal alliances, a consummate capability to deliver public goods such as

education and an openness for talent to rise based on merit.

Anyone who wishes to seriously study the situation in Pakistan (and Egypt, SaudiArabia and much of the Muslim world) must study the dynamics of the Iranianrevolution. A revolutionary new order requires deprivation, ideas, commitment,organization, funding, guns, battles and victories for its realization. But, critically, arevolutionary new order also needs psychological acceptance by the people, arealization that the new order will come to pass, whether now or next month or a yearfrom now or five. The Iranian revolution occurred not in April 1978 but some weeks,months or years before that, when the people of Iran began to foresee a life withoutthe Shah.

The people of Pakistan are psychologically ready for a revolution. The military andISI officers who have been supporting the rise of Jihadistan, the politicians who haveexchanged their evenings of whiskeys and prostitutes for prayer sessions at tableeghi(proselytization) centers, the children at government schools who are learning in their6th gradescience classes the difference between Islamic halal(permitted) and haram(forbidden) foods, the villagers who have started treating their local mullahs (priests)no longer as functionaries over the rituals of marriage and death but as power brokerswho can deliver outcomes in this world and the next, the bazaar merchants who have

1 Interview with Oriana Fallaci, Interview with History, Houghton Mifflin Company,1976, page 209.


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taken to shutting their shops to attend daily prayers, and the society women who havestarted flocking to fundamentalist therapy sessions, are all preparing for the coming ofJihadistan. And so, within weeks, months or years, change will come. And, just as thePrussian military machine folded into the Wehrmacht under Nazi Germany, the

Pakistan military will in double time fall in formation behind the government ofJihadistan, grateful for a new client that will protect and expand its franchise.

Perhaps Sunni militancy is the only effective agent for change in Pakistan. Perhapsthe militants price of change must be accepted. Perhaps five generations of Pakistanismust be soaked in blood and repression. Perhaps a blood-dimmed tide of hatred andviolence must engulf the world. But change will surely come.

The 5% Solution. Pakistan is nothing if not schizophrenic. Regularly, amidst thecynicism and despair, one experiences glimpses of a different, radiant national

personality. The Punjab that staffs the countrys armed forces absorbed into its being

from the 14th

to the 17th

century the Bhakti movement, a mystical movement ofuniversal love which infused Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam alike. Today, even as thecountry is slipping into the grips of fundamentalist militancy, over 30 million of its

people implicitly follow the mystical paths of Islam which serve to lead man to Godthrough the heart. The country lives in near continuous tension with its Easternneighbor but its people thrill at the same stories, tragedies, recipes, competitions and athousand other points of connection with the people of India. The country is unable toteach its children to read but regularly produces individuals able to leave a worldwidemark in fields ranging from physics to rubber bridge. Tax evaders have helped createan unregulated black economy at least the size of the formal economy, yet peoplegive generously to charitable causes and flocked to support the victims of the 2005

earthquake. The country regularly subsides into martial law but enjoys an incrediblyvigorous free press and lawyers movement.

And, at every turn, one comes across remarkably committed people, such as thesenior politician who is building a block of legislators committed to corruption-free

politics, the army general who believes that Pakistan should achieve a lasting peaceby relinquishing its nuclear weapons and designs on Kashmir, the central banker whois committed to implementing high standards of governance, the technologist who hasrelocated from the United States to lead an innovation incubation fund, the founder ofa girls school in Swat, who is quietly struggling to reintroduce education for girls inhis verdant, Taliban-cursed valley, the local bodies councilor who is setting up secularcoeducational schools in his mountain district close to Swat, the senior lawyer who isleading a struggle to ensure the rule of law and the restoration of judicial integrity, theyoung activist who gave up a corporate career overseas to advance civil rights fordowntrodden minorities, the media magnate who pursues with equal zest his dualmission to expose political corruption and expand cultural appreciation, the serialsocial entrepreneur who is starting up her second bank for women micro-entrepreneurs, the poor farmer who is trying to organize a cooperative in his villagefor the processing and sale of walnuts and the trade union leader who has raised fundsfor a tanker to deliver clean water to hundreds of families in his neighborhood.

Yes, the people of Pakistan have the spirituality, the culture, the talent, the intellectualvitality and entrepreneurial drive to create a very different country, a country that can


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be a leading example of a modern Islamic nation. The essential contours of the newPakistan are as follows:

The Rule of the 20 Good People. The least politically developed countries inthe world (such as Afghanistan) have neither coherent political leadership noreffective governmental institutions. By this yardstick, Pakistan is merely half-cursed. Its political leadership is indeed deeply fractured and ineffective(consider that the President of the country cannot so much as push through aneffective investigation of the assassination of his wife). But, despite sufferingsixty years of depredation, Pakistan still has a reasonably functioning set ofgovernmental institutions, a civil service with a tattered capability to processdecisions, a more or less intact chain of command in the military, a much-abused but still functioning legislative process, a partially independent central

bank, a judicial system that could relatively easily be invigorated and a freepress. The countrys divided political landscape and reform-ready

governmental institutions present the ideal conditions for the emergence of asmall group of inspired, effective and honest leaders to lead a nationaltransformation. The conditions are ripe and the leaders exist, but these leadersneed: (1) sufficient personal wealth and political financial capital; (2) the

backing of strong international and national forces; (3) a common vision andexecution capability forged through the experience of coming together tosolve some of the countrys many problems; and (4) a scalable model for goodgovernance and economic development. With a concerted effort, all this can

be pulled together to initiate a deep reform based on the remaininginstitutional coherence in the country. But if this leadership team is not pulledtogether by the time of President Obamas next election, this institutional

coherence will have been absorbed by the militants or will have beenshattered. And, as Faiz Ahmad Faiz, the national poet, put it: There is nomessiah for shattered glass.

The New Governance Package. From the very beginning, the group of twentycould implement a new idiom of leadership based principles of responsibility,

justice, honesty, realism and the rule of law. This is what every man andwoman I have ever met in Pakistan seeks most ardently of their leaders: goodgovernance will lead to a flood of popular support from the people and will

pave they way for deeper constitutional reform. Since its adoption in 1973,Pakistans constitution has been amended 17 times (and modified by 31martial law orders) in slap-dashes attempts to address four key constitutionalrelationships: (1) the president and the parliament; (2) the civilian andmilitary arms of government; (3) the federal government and the provinces;and (4) Islam and the state. As the new leadership acquires political strength itcould, initially in practice and later in law, implement a thoroughly consideredgovernance package which involves a stronger Presidency, more formalinclusion of the military in governance, greater autonomy for the provincesand a more liberal interpretation of Islam. And a government based on the

principle of responsible realism will in its core orientation be inclusive, notexclusive, of the dazzling variety of opinions and interests that today bedevil

Pakistan and tomorrow could be its source of great strength.


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The Restoration of the Region. Pakistans hostile relationship with itsneighbors has its wellspring in the need both forlegitimacy and economic

sustenance. As the principle of responsible realism takes root in government,the legitimating role of foreign threats will begin to wither away and lasting

and positive relations with India, Afghanistan and Iran will become possible.But such a salubrious state of affairs will only become possible when theeconomic sustenance derived by Pakistan as front line state is replaced by anew and positive set of economic relationships with its neighbors. And thetwo most important aspects of this new reality are robust commercialrelationships with India (tilted favorably towards Pakistan until its economycan gather strength) and an Indian-Pakistani-Afghan-Iranian regional strategytowards energy, water and transportation. These eventualities will requiregreat statesmanship from outside Pakistan. India must be able to view itself asgreat power and rise above the fray to take medium term security risks andmake medium term concessions to embrace Pakistan commercially and

culturally in order to gain longer term benefits. And, most critically, theUnited States must overcome its deep neuroses about Iran and foster energyand trade interdependence between India, Pakistan and Iran. A new regionalreality is indeed possible but it will require new thinking from all participants.

The Sustainable Economy. Pakistan is an economic dwarf that is, relativelyspeaking, shrinking with every passing year. While military and civiliangovernments have alike failed to develop a sustainable model for economicdevelopment, if the track record of the militants is anything to go by,Jihadistan will only deepen the economic deprivation of the people. At no

point can the new Pakistan distinguish itself more effectively from Jihadistan

than by developing an engine for economic success which unleashes thecountrys entrepreneurial potential while ensuring economic well-being forevery household. The new Pakistan will systematically realize a vision, basedon a realistic appraisal of its challenges and prospects, which proliferates

prosperity through: (1) development of the countrys agricultural and agri-processing sector; (2) development of the countrys infrastructure base; (3)fulfillment of the countrys energy requirements on a cost-effective basis; (4)development of the countrys considerable human potential; (5) intensificationof regional trade and investment; and (6) curtailment of governmentalspending and waste.

The Islamic Renaissance. Pakistans two founding fathers, the lawyer Jinnahand the poet Iqbal, held contrasting views of the role of Islam in Pakistan.Jinnah argued for a secular homeland in which people of the Islamic and otherfaiths would be free to practice their respective faiths without persecution.Iqbal dreamed of a community which enabled individual believers to flourishat such a level of spiritual realization that, before making any decision, Godwould first seek the opinion of man. But both Jinnah and Iqbal converged on aview of Muslims that, in Iqbals words, were free to mold the future based ontheir interpretation of the past: The teaching of the Quran that life is a processof progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but

unhampered by the work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its


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own problems.2 Tragically, the militants are now creating a new version ofIslam by using images from the past that have transfixed liberal Muslims in a

paroxysm of intellectual helplessness. The people of Pakistan must breakthrough this death vice and reach deep into their mystical, poetical and

intellectual resources to fashion a new vision of Islam that celebratesindividual self-realization and denigrates communal repression and hatred.Ultimately, the defeat of Jihadistan must come about through a triumph of thespirit.

The Nature of Militant Islam

A defeatist new line of thinking on dealing with Pakistan and Afghanistan has beengaining momentum in Washington, a line of thinking that replaces the old confusionon the nature of the fight(the war on terror) with new confusion on the nature of theenemy (the war on Al-Qaeda). This line of thinking is based on ossifying the enemy

into Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, distinguishing between the two and furtherdistinguishing between the Taliban with whom one can deal and the Taliban withwhom one cannot deal. It is Al-Qaeda, the argument runs, who are internationalist intheir orientation and therefore only Al-Qaeda which needs to be defeated. While thatis being done (principally through redoubled military effort), the United States canopen a dialogue with and perhaps even provide soft support to the reasonable Talibanand ultimately make a graceful exit: Mission Accomplished!

This line of thinking prides itself as being grounded in a new realism: Americacannot be the worlds policeman anymore; it must preserve its resources and simply

protect its own. Unfortunately, this line of thinking will not accomplish its aims, just

as the neoconservative blitzkrieg on Islam failed to accomplish its aims. If everymember of Al-Qaeda is hunted down and killed, the United States will barely haveadvanced its aim of securing itself against Islamic militancy.

For Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are simply children of a broader revolution, arevolution that will devour these very children as it spreads and gathers strength.For the real enemy is the closing of the doors of reason by an extremely powerfulreligious tradition, the real enemy is the new ideology that has appropriated thesymbols of Islam while an intellectually supine mass of a billion people clutches at aritualistic dispensation, the real enemy is the colonial treatment of the Muslim people

by Britain, Israel and the United States, the real enemy is the uncaring leadership ofthe Muslim world, boastful of stealing eggs from nesting birds, the real enemy is theignorance and poverty nurtured by generation upon generation of feudal tyranny, thereal enemy is the packaging of all these realities into a highly replicable praxis of hateand violence, the real enemy is our own failure of leadership towards a brave newworld.

Indeed, by compromising the fight against the Taliban, the new line of thinking inWashington will only accelerate the fall of Pakistan and the rise of Jihadistan, and sohasten the coming of age of the 17-year old kid in a basement in New Jersey,

2 The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Sir Mohammad Iqbal, ShMuhammad Ashraf Publishers, 1988, page 168.


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scheming to bring down his hometown power grid as his contribution to theworldwidejihad. The so-called realism behind the new line of thinking simplyinvolves trading away the pain, to be suffered within the span of the Obamaadministration, of an achievable victory, for the terror, to be endured for decades, of a

confederacy of militant states feeding hatred around the world.

In trying to understand the nature of militant Islam, it is instructive to compare it withthe Soviet system, because, of the four principal characteristics of militant Islam, twoare shared with the Soviet system.

When one peers into the heart of Americas last great geopolitical victory, the defeatof the Soviet Union and the rollback of communism, one finds a missive on thecentrality of time. [W]e have seen, wrote George Kennan, in his famousLongTelegram, that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its

purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of

long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient.3

Kennan could have been writingof Al-Qaeda and other militant Islamic groups when he observed: The Kremlin hasno compunction about retreating in the face of superior forces. And being under thecompulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for suchretreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is

permitted to move, toward a given goal. 4 Even more so than the Soviet, and evenmore so than the Chinese, the militant Islamic mind is capable of thinking in terms ofgreatly extended time horizons. For, divine inspiration conflates all temporaldistinctions: through the militant conception ofjihad, a soldier of God can conjoin histawdry battle against a present enemy with the founding battles of the faith, andimagine himself shoulder to shoulder with the Companions of the Prophet, forming a

single temporally extended battlefront against the forces of infidelity. A battle lastingcentury upon century and consuming generation upon generation may be a necessary

price to pay for bringing about in this too, too solid earth, a divinely regulated society.

And, like the Soviet Union, militant Islam is predominantly absorbed with securingpower against its internal opponents. Over the past hundred years, a Muslim worldseeking to find itself in a modern, post-Caliphate age has unleashed a degree ofinternally-directed religious, ethnic and political savagery that entirely eclipses theviolence of its encounter with the West. The murderous suppression by the Turks ofthe Kurds, the ruthless consolidation of Baathist power in Iraq and Syria, thesystematic elimination of communists in Indonesia, the Pakistani massacres leading toBangladesh, the black September killings in Jordan, the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the violent power struggles in Algeria, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, thegang warfare in Somalia, the killings among Sunni and Shia groups in Pakistan, theand murderous power struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan, are all instances of violencewithin and internal to the Muslim world.

Within the context of societies for which violence is the principal dynamic of change,the principal aim of militant Islam, at least over this century, is to consolidate its holdover the Muslim world: the battle against the West is simply an essential front in the

3 George Kennan, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 1947, Part II.4 George Kennan, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 1947, Part II.


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struggle towards aPax Islam. As Kennan had reminded us, the threat of the externalworld becomes a means for justifying ruthless internal aggression. And, of course,treating the external world as an enemy has its own self-fulfilling logic: theaggression of the American response to 9/11 has dramatically accelerated the spread

of Islamic militancy around the world. It is only the solipsistic turn of Americanthinking that transmutes the aggression of militant Islam into, principally, aggressionagainst the United States. Regrettably, the quality of our solutions can be no greaterthan our understanding of our problems.

But militant Islam has substantially improved on the Soviet style of totalitarianism.The Soviet system was a highly centralized, command and control system: occupy thecentre and you control the whole; crack the centre and you fracture the whole.Militant Islam is ideologically totalitarian but organizationally decentralized. Like theInternet, militant Islam is capable of rapid expansion while being substantiallyimpervious to destruction by force. A militant Islamic package of strategy, ideology,

leadership, training, outreach, networking and finance has been brilliantly perfectedinto a meme, a coherent code that can be replicated with astonishing speed andefficiency. Consider, for example, the growth ofmadrassahs in Pakistan. During theroughly fifty years it has taken McDonalds to grow to 31,000 stores, the number ofmadrassahs in Pakistan has grown, with no centralized planning or financing, fromunder 250 to over 50,000. (And keep in mind that it takes considerably greaterintellectual resources to establish a madrassah than a burger franchise.)

If you were to visit today the town of Naran in the austerely beautiful Kaghan Valley,you will find a large, relatively new madrassah geared for success through a highlytrained and motivated leadership core, a large and impressive building in the centre of

town, a package of learning programs for boys and girls who walk up to two hours aday to attend class, a reliable stream of funding from a mix of local and foreignsources, and a growing network of connections with the local leadership. Under thesurface of scholastic and religious activity, yet anotherqaeda (base) for militancy is

being established; yet another node in the network is falling into place. In themeantime, the new talk in Washington, D.C. is of dismantling the infrastructure ofterrorism: an industrial age, civil engineering metaphor being press-ganged intocombating Internet era, social networking dynamics. How does one dismantle theinfrastructure of the Internet? How does one dismantle the infrastructure of a meme?

The collapse of the Soviet system was brought on by its own economic weakness inthe face of dynamic American capitalism imbued with military and political will. Nogreat intellectual struggle preceded this collapse: after all, Soviet ideology was afact-based ideology which posited that the internal contradictions of capitalism would leadto its demise. And, when, the facts turned out be transparently different: exeuntideology. Islamic militancy is, of course, afaith-based ideology, which posits a divineimperative for its proposed ordering of society: factual circumstances alone are aninsufficient basis for defeating such an ideology. Accordingly, Islamic militancy, andthe fundamentalism that acts as its intellectual and popular foundation, is able towithstand incredible defeats and yet retain its legitimacy and affective power.

And the ideological power of Islamic militancy is heightened by the position oftraditionalist faith: almost all Muslims accept at some level the validity of the militant


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and fundamentalist claim on their religion, for their faith provides them with no clearvision of a progressive, tolerant and modern Islam. In the traditionalist view, menwho grow beards and pray five times a day are obviously Muslims and, if, in thename of Islam, they burn down girls schools or kill fellow Muslims, so be it. In a

world denuded of critical thinking, form necessarily prevails over substance. TheMuslim world will only truly begin to roll back militancy and fundamentalist througha revolution in thought or, to put it more precisely, a revolution back to thought. TheMuslim world is long overdue its Martin Luther.

Core Principles of American Response

The West is in a dilemma, for, of the three root causes of Islamic militancy thestructurally deep failure of responsible leadership in the Muslim world, theintellectual death of Islam around the time of the Mongol invasions, and the failure ofthe West to generate positive outcomes for a longstanding colonial enterprise - two

are not of its making. And the four principal characteristics of militant Islam thelong term view of its mission, the aggregation of internal power through anengagement with the West, the perfection of a multi-nodal, self-generating form oforganization, and a non-falsifiable, faith-based millenarian ideology fuse medieval,modern and post-modern elements in a manner that will require a profoundreorientation of thinking to defeat. We will need to move beyond Sun Tzus maximthat, if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of ahundred battles5, and consider too, the wisdom of Al-Ghazzali, the great medievalIslamic philosopher: Honey does not become impure because it may happen to have

been placed in the [blood-stained] glass which the surgeon uses for cuppingpurposes.6 The United States will not only need to understand Islamic militancy but

adopt the intelligence and economy behind its success.

A tally of the imbalance of forces between militant Islam and the United Statesreveals no greater deficiency in the American inventory than that oftime. Indeed,Americas paucity of time is the central crisis of globalization: American consumers,in their rush to consume, have sucked in the worlds resources and stymied globaldevelopment; American bankers, in their rush for obscene bonuses, have presentvalued non-existent future earnings into bankrupting the worlds financial system;American companies, in their rush for quarterly earnings, have one too many timesresold creaking technologies which throttle the environment and Americas own

prodigious inventiveness; and American politicians, in their rush for solutions withintheir term of office, have grasped at militaristic fixes that have ratcheted up the levelof hate and violence in the world. Barack Obama can provide to the American peopleno greater bailout than helping them regain the capacity for the proper use of time.

The challenge of extending the temporal boundaries of the American mind is, ofcourse, neither new nor previously unsurmounted. After analyzing the sources ofSoviet conduct, Kennan had prescribed, In these circumstances it is clear that themain element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that oflong-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive

5 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Edited by James Clavell, Delta, 1983, page 186 Al-Ghazzali, The Confessions of Al-Ghazzali, Cosimo Classics, 2007, page 38


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tendencies.7 Forty-five years lapsed from the transmittal of Kennans telegram to theself-dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, but America found in itself the time and

patience to see it through. It is time once more to think and act long-term.

As a geographically isolated and militarily great power, the natural axis of Americangeopolitical thinking has been along geographical and militaristic lines. Kennansmetaphor of containment was translated in Washington into a geographical andmilitaristic doctrine that drained into the quagmire in Vietnam. But Kennans stresson patience was not lost and, ultimately, a different calculus of power defeated theSoviet system, a calculus which subsumed military considerations in a broaderengagement involving: (1) the assertion of irresistible economic power (both throughtrade and investment alliances and military build up); (2) the effective communicationof the message of globally achievable prosperity; and (3) the high-impact and low-cost support of military resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. And,although Bushs preemption doctrine represented a catastrophic retreat into

militarism, at its core it also represented a critical breakthrough in Americangeopolitical thinking into the temporal dimension, for preemption involves thinking intime, and changing the future before it arrives. Yes, honey may be contained even inthe neoconservative cup of blood.

The extension of the temporal perspective on the American engagement with Islamicmilitancy automatically foreshortens the core mission as presently conceived: if Al-Qaeda exists at the level of a meme capable of infinite replication, it makes littlesense to adopt as a core mission the killing of every member of Al-Qaeda. Over time,Islamic militancy and its expression in forms such as Al-Qaeda will only wither awayif the conditions of its perpetuation and growth are eliminated. Appropriately, then,

the core American mission should be the elimination over time of the conditions thatenable the perpetuation and growth of Islamic militancy, including through the

formation of a major Sunni militant state.

But, one cannot cross the Delaware only halfway: the expansion of the Americanmission to a scope and temporality that could engender a successful outcome mayalso doom the mission to failure for its very amorphousness. Indeed, the United Statescan only successfully engage with Islamic militancy on a broader and moretemporally extended front if at the same time it transforms its economy ofengagement. The three key principles of the new economy of engagement are:

Focus Only on Strategic Victories. In an extended engagement, the UnitedStates does not need to control every territory or engage in every potential

battle: it needs to concentrate its resources on controlling the territories andwinning the battles that have a critical impact on the long-term outcome . Inthe present context, the criterion for selection needs to be the extent to which,at any given point in time, control over any given territory or victory over any

potential battle, will either most substantially retard the formation ofJihadistan or most substantially advance the development of secular,

progressive forces in the region. Applying this criterion, perhaps Kandahar isunimportant and perhaps Kabul is important, perhaps defeating the Taliban in

7 George Kennan, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 1947, Part II.


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a given territory is more important that striking against Al-Qaeda in anotherterritory, perhaps both preemptive strikes and defensive battles make sense,

just as both military and non-military initiatives make sense: what is critical isto ensure that all strategically important battles are identified and won at the

lowest possible cost.

Create a Strong Defense. One may legitimately subscribe to the view thatkeeping Al-Qaeda on the run abroad is critical to Americas safety at homeand that a more selective and fluid policy of engagement may have the shortterm consequence of increasing the risk of a terrorist attack in the UnitedStates. Without needing to debate the plausibility of this perspective, in anyevent, the new economy of engagement would involve substantially greateremphasis on building highly intelligent and lower cost long-term lines ofdefense against terrorist attacks, including through building up networks ofalliances, investing in local intelligence-gathering, implementing national

identification systems, promoting international and inter-agency coordination,strengthening internal security systems in the United States, monitoringcontainer shipments and policing money laundering.

Prioritize the Political, Economic and IdeologicalJihad. To secure a long-term victory over Islamic militancy, the new administration must not simply

bolt political, economic and ideological initiatives on to an existing militarypolicy. Military engagement is highly expensive and least likely to providelonger term results unless such an engagement is integral to a political,economic and ideologicaljihad (struggle) within the Muslim world in whichthe United States serves as a catalyst but not a prime actor. The new economy

of engagement involves the United States promoting such ajihadby: (1)bringing the point of struggle to its proper locus as an inter-Muslim struggle ;(2) creating a new meme of good governance and economic development thatmay be replicated across the Muslim world; and (3)promoting fresh and

positive new thinking on what it means to be a Muslim in the modern age.

The engagement against Islamic militancy must, most critically, be won and lost bythe people living in the Muslim countries. No amount of American diplomacy,funding or military action can ultimately determine this outcome and, indeed, thefront line position of the United States in the region is doing as much harm as good.Each American soldier on the ground justifies a hundred new militants, each Predatorstrike galvanizes a village into bitter hatred and each misspent USAID Dollar createsever-greater suspicion of American motives. While the United States government wellunderstands the importance of reducing its footprint in the region, torn between the

paucity of effective local leadership and its own drive for control, the governmentcontinually equivocates on a robust implementation of this objective. However, anAmerican leadership that is committed to transferring ownership of the problem ofIslamic militancy to the Muslim countries (especially in the case of an institutionallydeveloped country such as Pakistan) and to creatively supporting new leaders who arecommitted to creating new realities in their countries can achieve much, much morethan more thousands of additional drones, humvees and grunts.


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A cohort of strong, responsive, progressive and clean leaders at the local level can beidentified and supported almost immediately in a country such as Pakistan, who canform the backbone of a new national leadership. While the strategy for devolvingmilitary power varies greatly from country to country, a combination of requiring

greater accountability in exchange for funding, the provision of counterinsurgencyequipment and training and a demonstrated willingness to use paramilitary forces, canyield substantial results in most countries. At the regional level, specific initiativesfor cooperation on energy, transportation and trade are likely to quickly create newcompulsions for dealing with terrorism. The opportunity for creativity is the greatestin the economic arena, where the United States could provide fulcrum capital tosubstantially leverage funding from the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries and the$500 billion in underutilized assets held by Islamic banks. And innovative linking intothe media industry proliferating throughout the Muslim world could generate

profound awareness of the possibilities and urgency for each country to overcome itschallenges with Islamic militancy.

As I traversed Pakistan last year, spending time with people from every walk of life, Irarely heard pleas for an Islamic state all over the land, people talked of the burningneed for jobs, financing, market access, stable prices, food, clean water, electricity,education, technical knowledge, hospitals, good policies, security, peace, justice andrepresentation. As of yet, while militant Islam has morphed into a meme that iscapable of rapid replication, it has not fully developed a model for what people inPakistan and every other Muslim country are truly, desperately seeking: goodgovernance and economic development. But the situation is changing fast. InPakistan, one increasingly hears the argument that militant justice might be better thanno justice at all. And Taliban redistributive efforts, already underway in Swat, are

adding a small measure of populist support to the militant movement.

Over time, no doubt, as militant control grows over the settled areas andgovernmental institutions in countries such as Pakistan and Egypt, fundamentalist

political parties will become increasingly radicalized, on the one hand, and will funnelthe energy of the movement into more sophisticated legislative and institutionaltransformations of the state, on the other hand. The dynamic of tribes from thehinterlands revitalizing morally decaying urban civilizations through their martialcapacity and ideological fervor was chronicled by Ibn Khaldun in the 14 th century; theanalysis still applies. Through the interplay of the forces of radicalization andabsorption, the presently crude militant forays into governance and economics will bereplaced by far more totalitarian solutions.

It is accordingly vital that, while militant Islam is still weak in these areas, the forcesof tolerance and progress actually bring about good governance and economicdevelopment in key states such as Pakistan. If the United States, using its considerableinfluence on government policy and leveraging regional and international support,could help implement a model for good governance and economic development, thespace for the growth of militant Islam will shrink dramatically.

To win this battle, the current approach to international assistance must radically

change. Todays initiatives are uncoordinated and unfocused, operate at the nationalor provincial level and are implemented through corrupt and ineffective foreign


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consultants and local government agencies. Filtering through layers of misconception,dispersion, bureaucracy, waste and corruption, precious little foreign aid gets throughto actually help the people or create new economic and social realities: the first $43million of the Bush Administrations $750 million planned assistance program for the

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan was earmarked for aWashington consultancy to develop a plan to spend the rest of the money on otherconsultants and build capacity at a provincial government development authority,which would no doubt direct into the pockets of corrupt administrators whatevercrumbs were dispersed locally by the international consultants.

The new paradigm must concentrate all bilateral, multilateral and private sectordevelopment activity through local leaders and social entrepreneurs to create a

comprehensive, sustainable and scalable model for good governance and economicdevelopment in a single district or set of districts in each country. The promotion oflocal leaders and social entrepreneurs (rather than foreign consultants or government

departments) will both generate relevant and cost-effective solutions and widen thebase of responsible social and political leadership. The focus on developing acomprehensive, sustainable and scalable model will both generate visible benefits forthe relevant communities and create a reference which will draw other communitiesinto the paradigm. And the concentration of resources and efforts on a smalladministrative and geographical area will force coordination and ensure success of themodel. Just as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are working to create Jihadistan district-by-district, a progressive new political order and economy may only be built district-by-district.

In his inaugural address, President Obama did well to remind the world that America

is populated by Muslims, as well as by Christians, Jews and non-believers. AmericasMuslim population, and the Muslim populations of other Western countries, caneither serve as the vanguard in the struggle against, or become the transmission mediafor, Islamic militancy. If this population is not allowed to become a vanguard againstmilitancy, it may well become a transmission media for militancy.

Martin Luther did not engender the Protestant reformation simply by posting at achurch in Wittenberg a set of theses as to mans relation to God and the Churchsrelation to man. He was part of a vigorous intellectual movement which includedmany other great thinkers such as Erasmus, Calvin and Zwingli. He studied for yearsat an Augustine monastery and drew extensively on the thousand-year old writings ofSt. Augustine. He engaged in intense debates with representatives of the CatholicChurch and other Christian sects. He and his companions were protected and funded

by the Elector of Saxony or by other German and North European principalitiesconfident in their growing economic and political power. His translation of the Bible

became a best seller through the invention of the printing press. And thousands ofpriests worked ceaselessly to popularize and institutionalize Lutheran doctrine andpractice. From its very dawning, an intellectual and religious revolution is a perilousact: its success requires debate, definition, ideology, institutions, political patronage,funding, technology, staffing, dissemination and popularization.

As a faith-based ideology, Islamic militancy will only be decisively defeated whenmembers of the faith begin to hold it as self-evident that militancy, violence,


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intolerance and hatred is categorically not part of their faith and that people whoespouse such messages cannot preach and pray in their midst. But, militancy feeds onextremism, which feeds on fundamentalism, which feeds on ritualistic traditionalism.To separate itself from militancy, Islam needs to undergo a deep reformation. And the

West needs to act as the Elector to this reformation, for it is only in the West thatthere is sufficient freedom of thought and speech to enable this reformation to gain

momentum. The West cannot ensure that the synaptic leap that occurs during a revolution will in fact occur across the Muslim world, but West can through its own

Muslim populations incubate the revolution and support it with funding, initiatives,institutions and media.

Today, most Western-originated thinking about Islam is either anti-Muslim ordeveloped with a view towards a Western audience. Much work needs to be done tounderstand, from an Islamic perspective, the role of knowledge and freedom in mansrelationship with God and the role of religion in the affairs of man; much work needs

to be done to bring into the centre of the religion the tolerance and love in the wordsof the Quran, in the actions of Mohammad and in the writings of great Muslimthinkers; much work needs to be done to comprehend the points of failure in thereligion which have enabled intolerance and hate to be so widely expressed in itsname; much work needs to be done to relate the spiritual message of Islam to thenature of humanity in an age of genetic engineering and artificial intelligence. Theseare all good thoughts to think and the space must be created for Muslims to thinkthese thoughts.

We return to Sun Tzu: Water shapes its course according to the nature of the groundover which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe he is

facing.8 Islamic militancy is a brilliantly modern form of social dynamics: it is fluidyet coherent, it is nodal yet networked, it is scalable yet cost-effective. We live in a

paradoxical age: a medieval world-view has acquired a protean post-modernity whilea progressive word-view is moribund in industrial-era inflexibility. American policytowards Islamic militancy needs to replenish itself from the wellsprings of modernity:success against militancy will come through the proliferation of strong nodes andvibrant networks that out-compete the militant web of hate and terror.

The New Strategy for Pakistan

How, then, should the United States work towards the elimination of the conditionswhich are transforming Pakistan into the worlds first major Sunni militant state?

It is not as if the United States has not been trying. The United States already has inplace a multi-faceted strategy which includes: (1) funding and support of the military;(2) Predator strikes against high value targets; (3) support of the economy through

bilateral and multilateral means; (4) promotion of democratic elections; and (5)encouragement of greater cooperation between India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Butnone of the prongs of this strategy seem to be working: the military is hedging its bets

between the United States and the militants, the Predator strikes are decimating thechances of rehabilitation of the Northern and Western areas without reducing the

8 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Edited by James Clavell, Delta, 1983, page 29


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strength of the militants, the economy is sucking in foreign funding instead ofdeveloping an engine for growth, USAID programs are almost invisible in theirimpact, the promotion of democratic elections has led to a vicious cat fight betweenestablished political groups and the regional diplomatic effort is foundering fast. The

essential problem with the current strategy is that it is geared towards strengtheningthe forces of the status quo against the forces of Jihadistan and, accordingly is, for thereasons previously discussed, doomed to failure.

The most recent additional strategy of appeasing the less virulent Taliban groups ismisguided in its aims: if the objective is to kill the present Al-Qaeda leadership andexit as quickly as possible, then this strategy might have some merit. If, however, theobjective is to address the conditions leading to militancy and avoiding its longer-term effects in the United States and around the world, then this strategy will notwork just as, it would not have worked, during the heat of the Russian Revolution, tohave supported the Mensheviks in the hopes of stemming the rise of the Bolsheviks.

The weaker children of a revolution are the first to be devoured.

With due regard to the importance of a well-managed policy reversal andimplementation of appropriate transitional measures, the United States needs toentirely reorient its policy towards Pakistan. If the United States does so, it will,within what I expect will be the two terms of Barack Obamas Presidency, with muchgreater economy of engagement, ensure the creation of a stable, peaceful and

progressive state and substantially advance the cause of liberal Islam throughout theworld. The seven key elements of the new policy are:

Concentrate Military Engagement on Strategically Critical Battles,Beginning with the New Paradigm Districts. In a long-term war, every battleneed not be fought and won. However, it is vital to win the battles that willeither most critically slow the advance of the militants or that will mostdecisively advance the cause of progressive leadership in the country. Intodays Pakistan, there is no more strategically important military objectivethat securing the front-line districts of Buner, Shangla, Batagram, Swabi andMansehra, as well as the districts of Abbottabad, Haripur and Attock (I willrefer to these Districts the New Paradigm Districts) from Taliban occupation.Accordingly, military efforts should be focused as a priority on fully securingthe New Paradigm Districts.

Refocus the Relationship with the Pakistan Military on Counter-Insurgencyand National Development Through the Promotion of Local Militias. ThePakistan military can play a vital role in rolling back Jihadistan and building anew Pakistan, but only if its focus radically shifts away from battling illusoryexternal threats from India to solving real problems within the countrys

borders. The most effective way of bringing about this transformation is thecreation of a cluster of localized dual-purpose militias, as a skunk-workswithin the Pakistan military, which are controlled by the military and arefocused on both counter-insurgency and development works. The first suchlocalized militia should be created for the New Paradigm Districts.


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Support a Small Group of Local and National Leaders Who Work toTransform, First, the New Paradigm Districts and, Next, the Country.

Instead of promoting democratic processes in the abstract, the United Statesneeds to identify and support a small group of local and national leaders who

are brought together to solve problems of good governance and economicdevelopment in the New Paradigm Districts. By leading the transformation ofthe New Paradigm Districts, these leaders will forge an effective workingalliance and create a demonstrable model for governance and development.Within a short span of time, these leaders will be in a position to lead thecountry to a bright, new future.

Advance the New Paradigm Districts Initiative as an Islamic NationsInitiative. Consistent with the larger objective of resituating the problem ofIslamic militancy as an inter-Muslim problem, the initiative for thetransformation of the New Paradigm Districts should be handled by a

consortium headed by countries such as Saudi Arabia and institutions such asthe Islamic Development Bank. With the United States playing a thoughtleadership role and providing fast-track mobilization capital, the Islamicmembers of the consortium will be important spokesmen, financing sources,investors and markets for the initiative and will also thereby also create atemplate for a broader, more effective form of engagement between theMuslim countries.

Concentrate Development Effort on Incubating a New Agribusiness Modelin the New Paradigm Districts. The economic transformation of Pakistan,like all economic transformations, will come about area-by-area and sector-

by-sector. Concentration of development work on reengineering agricultureand agribusiness in the New Paradigm Districts will lead to the economictransformation of the districts most at threat from the militants and will createa model of economic success that can then be replicated across the country.

Create a Strong Regional Tie-In Between Pakistan, India and Iran Throughthe Three-Nation Pipeline. There is nothing like a concrete, mutually

beneficial project to cement regional relationships. India needs gas, Pakistanneeds gas (as well as revenue from the transmission of gas) and Iran needs tosell gas. A pipeline from Iran to India through Pakistan makes eminent senseand is supported by all three participants. By reversing its position andsupporting the pipeline, the United States will help improve regional ties,create greater economic and political stability in Pakistan and start to bringIran in from the cold.

Drive for the Rapid Transformation of Education. If the Taliban are burningdown girls schools in Swat, why not promote virtual schools so girls canlearn from home? The Taliban can close down schools but they cannot closedown learning. If the madrassahs of Pakistan are churning out students withdeficient skills in coping constructively in this world, why not proliferateschools which equip students to have fulfilling, constructive lives in this

world? The militants can make all kinds of linkages between behavior in theworld and rewards in the next, but they are unable to meet the basic human


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yearning for engaging openly and fully with this world and our time. TheUnited States, bysupporting local social entrepreneurs and helping toincubate a local learning solutions industry committed to the advancement of

progressive education in Pakistan, can within a few years transform the state

of learning in the country.

Through these strategies, the United States will begin to create a series of nodes andnetworks that will overlap and compete with the nodes and networks created by the militants. Well-protected areas for the incubation of new models of governance anddevelopment, militias controlled by the Pakistan military which are focused oncounter-insurgency and nation building, teams of leaders who work together to solvereal problems in governance and development, consortia of leaders within the Muslinworld who begin to understand and help each solve others problems, socialentrepreneurs who optimize new supply chains in agribusiness, NGOs that create newmodels for building skills in selected districts, investors and buyers who leverage a

platform of risk management created by multilateral funding, regional alliances thatpromote stability by advancing national self interests and thought leaders and mediaexperts who collaborate to create a new educational reality these are the nodes andnetworks that the United States can help proliferate within a few years at much lowercost in money and lives than required by its present strategy and these are the nodesand networks that will turn back the tide of militancy.

The following districts are proposed to be included in the New Paradigm Districts:

The New Paradigm Districts and the Military

The day that the United States starting bombing Afghanistan, my father, who foughtthree wars for Pakistan and for a period commanded the Khyber Rifles when themilitia still had teeth, said to me: They are bringing down the hammer withouthaving created the anvil this will not go well for them. I dont know whetherAmerica militarily botched up Afghanistan because the United States military hasnever really had any experience with serious, sustained mountain warfare, or becauseRumsfeld bullied his commanders into adopting his own delusional view of armedconflict, or because the military felt that their technology had rendered irrelevant theexperience of the Russians and British in Afghanistan, but the military hasconsistently underestimated the importance of controlling high ground in the

mountainous regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. To borrow Wayne Gretzskys turn

District Province Area (Sq Km) Population Principal Language(s)

Shangla NWFP 1,586 434,563 Principally Pashto

Buner NWFP 1,865 506,048 Principally Pashto

Battagram NWFP 1,301 307,278 Principally Pashto

Mansehra NWFP 4,579 1,152,839 Pashto, Pahari, Hindko

Swabi NWFP 1,543 1,026,804 Principally Pashto

Abbottabad NWFP 1,969 881,000 Punjabi, Hindko, Pashto

Haripur NWFP 1,725 803,000 Punjabi, Hindko, Pashto

Attock Punjab 6,857 1,274,935 Principally Punjabi

TOTAL 21,425 6,386,467

New Paradigm Districts

Core Districts

Critical Districts


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of phrase, it is imperative to go to the high mountains and valleys where the militantswill be, not where they are.

Today, there is no more strategically important military objective in the Pakistan front

against militancy than maintaining firm control over the districts of Buner, Shangla,Batagram, Swabi and Mansehra. If these districts fall, the militants will: (1) have freerange to move men and supplies between Baluchistan, the North West FrontierProvince and Kashmir; (2) complete their control over all the non-Kashmiri rivers ofPakistan; (3) create a direct linkage with the militant groups in Pakistan-occupiedKashmir; (4) extend their campaign from Pathan-majority areas to Hazara and Punjabiareas; and (5) threaten the capital of Pakistan from a highly advantageous extendedmountainous front. It will only be a matter of time before the entire country will fall.

By retaining strong military control of these districts, and the neighboring districts ofAbbottabad, Haripur and Attock I have included in the New Paradigms Districts, the

Pakistani forces can create a classical forward triangle of defense East of the Indusriver, ensure Kashmir is kept separate from the insurgency in Swat, protect the capitaland, as I have proposed, create a zone for the implementation of a new model ofgovernance and development which will serve as a palpable, proximate reference casefor the eventual reoccupation of the Talibanized parts of the country. Asserting suchcontrol will not be an easy task. Militant groups are already powerfully entrenched inthese districts (the Mumbai attackers received weapons training in Mansehra district)and can only be broken through pitched battles in urban and semi-urban areas. Andthen there is the task of vigorously monitoring a territory that, at its Northernmostextremity, is blanketed with 20 feet of snow in the winter. But these tasks nonethelessremain easier than fighting and winning in the tribal areas or in Swat. These tasks, as

well as the task of cleaning up major urban centers such as Peshawar, will need to beleft until later.

Unfortunately, even leaving aside questions of motivation and discussions around itsTalibanization, the Pakistan military is not up to the challenge. To begin with, anyinstitutional military has an extraordinarily difficult time operating through formalcommand structures and established bases against a fluid enemy indistinguishablefrom the population at large. And, then, the Pakistan military has created conditionsthat exacerbate this structural level of ineffectiveness. When my father wascommandant at the Frontier Force Regiment Headquarters in Abbottabad District,military personnel and civilians alike would regularly walk into our house to ask forassistance on one matter or another. Today, that very house has an eight-foot walland an armed guard and is located a kilometer inside a military zone off-limits tocivilians. Everywhere, the Pakistan military has garrisoned itself away from thecivilian population, even as it has extended its reach into the body politic through theISI and political and economic encroachments. A military at a remove from its

people has an exceptionally difficult challenge in containing insurgency.

Pakistan needs to develop, as a skunk-works within the existing military, a new modelof a military force for the New Paradigm Districts and, in the future, other clusters ofdistricts. And the model being used by the American military in Iraq of outsourcing

work to local armed groups will not work (the Pakistan military will not accept it and,in any event, this crude colonial model of control will create severe long term


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problems even in Iraq). The new model involves recruiting and training a local militiawithin the New Paradigm Districts, highly conversant with local conditions andcapable of rebuilding the bridge to the local population that the military has beensteadily surrendering. The localized militia would have a military arm (which would

engage in counter insurgency operations, border patrol and intelligence gathering) anda development arm (which would engage in infrastructure development, emergencyrelief and medical assistance). Operating within the command and control of themilitary, the militia would also derive funding from and be subject to oversight from acivilian committee responsible for the rejuvenation of the New Paradigm Districts.

The tradition of using local militias controlled by a central force has been in effect forhundreds of years and the military has been using local militias in FATA since theinception of Pakistan. Accordingly, the extension of this strategy will be readilyaccepted by the military, the civilian government and the people. The redesign of themilitia as a dual-purpose force is, however, a critical objective that must be achieved.

Such a dual-purpose role for the militia is essential to ensuring greater localacceptance, instilling an ethic of responsible government, enabling cooperative civil-military relationships and optimizing utilization of limited resources.

Such a militia, of the people yet highly trained and well-disciplined, an armed forcebut also a helping hand, separate from the military yet reliant on its firepower andtechnical capabilities, controlled by the military yet answerable to civilian overseers,will empower the districts from which it is born with the capacity to turn backmilitancy. When the militants attack the militia, they will be attacking the local

population, when the militia rolls back the militants, its victory will constitute a localvictory, when a member of the militia implements a clean water solution for a village

or rescues a frost-bitten family from certain death, he will be treated as a local hero.Through such a militia, the choice of accepting or rejecting militancy will be driven towhere it rightly belongs: the communities most affected by this scourge.

Leadership and Alliances

a new pakistan

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