a note on bbc television news and the munich crisis, 1938
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A note on BBC television news and the Munich Crisis,1938K.R.M. Short aa University of HoustonPublished online: 15 Sep 2006.
To cite this article: K.R.M. Short (1989) A note on BBC television news and the Munich Crisis, 1938 , Historical Journal ofFilm, Radio and Television, 9:2, 165-179, DOI: 10.1080/01439688900260141
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Historical ffournal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1989 165
A Note on BBC Television News and the Munich Crisis, 1938
K. R. M. SHORT, University of Houston
Amongst the unforgettable newsreel images of the late 1930s are those recording British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's returning to London from Munich on 30 September 1938 waving what became known to the disillusioned as that 'scrap of paper'. This dramatic event came to forcefully symbolise the British and French sacrifice of Czechoslovakian territorial integrity in favour of appeasing Adolf Hitler's demands for Czechoslovakia's German minority's self-determination. Chamberlain's pyrrhic victory was celebrated by the British newsreels, including an uncritical special edition released by Gaumont British Newsreels in which he was heralded for having brought peace to the world through his inspired statesmanship [1]. The truth was to dawn painfully only later. The vast majority of the British people and their foreign counterparts had witnessed this triumphal return through the medium of the newsreel camera and had heard it via the microphones of the BBC's Outside Broadcasting radio unit. However there were Londoners who watched live coverage of Chamberlain's three returns to Heston Aerodrome (near Hounslow, Middlesex--west of London) on 16 September, 24 September and 30 September 1938 thanks to the marvel of BBC television. This was a significant but overlooked moment in the history of BBC television and the development of its news and current events programming.
BBC's Television Service had been launched officially on 2 November 1936 by the Postmaster General with the usual fanfare, laying claim to being the world's first regularly scheduled 'high definition' television service with its London Television Standard of 405 lines at 50 frames per second. This claim to be first in the race for scheduled high definition telecasting was somewhat ingenious for the British govern- ment had decreed that the BBC transmit programming for the competing systems of Marconi-EMI and the Baird Television Company, which required different receivers. This was done with an equal time allocation, alternating programming day-by-day. However BBC's high definition claims were based on Marconi-EMI's advanced electronic system, incorporating the technology of RCA's Vladimer Zworykin's icono- scope pick-up tube, and this represented only 50% of its transmissions. In contrast John Logie Baird's 240 line picture was produced by a less satisfactory electro- mechanical scanning system, incorporating patents of the American inventor Philo Farnsworth, using a scanning disk requiring vast amounts of light in the studio with virtually no mobility for the performers. Thus the new Television Service at Alexandra Palace, located high on the 300 foot escarpment overlooking north London, had two different studios (A for Marconi-EMI and B for Baird), control rooms and transmit- ters during this period which eventually ended on 13 February 1938 with the not unexpected rejection of the Baird system by the Television Advisory Committee.
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People who owned Baird receiving sets consigned them to the attic and those who had purchased EMI-compatible sets congratulated each other on their foresight [2].
The BBC's signal from Alexandra Palace, initially expected to stretch about 25 miles, was received reasonably within a 40-mile radius. Programming was provided for some 16 hours or 17 hours a week, based on two and one-half hours a day. An additional hour a day of broadcasting was provided for trade-demonstration purposes. The BBC's Handbook for 1938 enthusiastically proclaimed [3]:
The pictures are small ( 1 0 x 8 inches) but regular viewers know how satisfying such a picture can be when seen under home viewing conditions. It is nearly double the size of the full-page photographs published in the illustrated weeklies; the definition at a distance of four or five feet leaves nothing to be desired, and, perhaps the most important point of all, there is no flicker. Add to this the fact that, owing to the use of ultra-short waves for transmission, the sound reproduction, is, if anything, superior to that of ordinary broadcasting, and it will be realised that the owner of a television set is a person to be envied.
Outside broadcasting already was well established as one of the BBC's most important forms of radio programming and, despite the major financial outlay, experimentation on outside television broadcasting was included on Broadcasting House's agenda. Marconi-EMI was contracted to develop and build British television's first mobile outside broadcasting (OB) units, the first of which was delivered in 1937. This first OB unit comprised three vans, each of which was about two-thirds the size of a single-decker coach and naturally painted BBC green. Robert 'Woody' Wood, formerly BBC's Chief Engineer Outside Broadcasts, recalled the difficulties of siting the OB units for they were " . . . n o t the sort of thing you could place casually next to Wimbledon Centre Court without ruining things for the spectator" [4]. The scanning van contained the control room equipment with pulse generators, scanning gear, amplification and monitoring equipment; sound and vision was supplied by two EMI Emitron cameras. Within that van, the producer worked with the vision mixer and two monitors which afforded him a view of the live picture being broadcast of the picture he was transmitting to Alexandra Palace as well as the programme as received by television sets in the home. He also had a preview of the second Emitron camera. The transmitter van carried the ultra-short-wave transmitter which provided the vision signals. Vision transmission radio waves was limited to 20 miles from Alexandra Palace's receivers. The transmitter van was not needed within central London or the West End for vision signals were carried by specially designed (high definition vision signals could not be carried over telephone lines) General Post Office (GPO) cable to Broadcasting House and Alexandra Palace. Sound signals were carried by the GPO's telephone lines outside London, as well. The third van housed a petrol (gasoline) generator for powering the scanning and transmitter vans. Finally there was a 'fire- escape' ladder aerial which could be run up to a height of 100 feet in a few minutes. The second OB unit, with three Emitron cameras, was delivered to the BBC Television Service in August 1938 to meet the increased demand for outside broadcasts in the new service's programming [5].
The total number of television sets by the end of 1937 was estimated at no more than 1600, although the BBC's own Listener Research projected a figure as high as 2000. As demand grew the price of EMI and HMV television receivers fell in price from 95 to 60 guineas, still well out of the reach of the average Londoner. Viewers had
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The Munich Crisis 167
the advantage that their 10-shilling radio license covered their often difficult to tune television set as well. The 1938 Radiolympia exhibition at Olympia in West London was dominated by television equipment, while featuring specially produced BBC programmes broadcast direct from the exhibition. Both of the BBC's Outside Broadcast units were at work during Radiolympia with the first unit running 10 days of demonstration programmes from a studio built by the Radio Manufacturers' Associa- tion. It was constructed with glass panels on three sides so that visitors could have an unimpaired view of the sort of activities which took place at the London Television Station at Alexandra Palace. The second OB unit was set up at London Zoo in Regents' Park where it did a daily tour of the gardens. Amongst the 22 firms displaying receivers (there had been sixteen in 1937 and two in 1936), keen shoppers could find a table model with a 4x33/s inch screen for s and those for whom price no object could spend from s to s for cabinet sets with screens of about 22 • 18 inches (a good radio could be purchased for about s The Munich Crisis materialised just after the close of the exhibition. More television sets were sold in October and November of 1938 than in the whole of the previous period sets were available, something like 5000-6500 television sets. Estimates are that by August 1939 there were between 20,000 and 25,000 television sets in the south of England with a potential audience of more than 100,000 viewers [7].
Did the phenomenal growth in the number of television sets sold in the autumn of 1938 have anything to do with the rapidly deteriorating situation in Europe? It would be possible to posit some tenous connection based on an increasing interest in the 'news', but the expansion of an audience was more likely to be the result of the enormous publicity generated by the Radiolympia exhibition and the overall fall of receiver prices. The general pattern of broadcasting remained essentially the same. Outside television broadcasting had already made its impact on viewing with its exceptional coverage of the Coronation Procession, the 1937 Wimbledon Tennis Championships, the Oxford-Cambridge Boat Race of 1938, horse racing's classic Derby, and rugby football's Calcutta Cup match at Twickenham where the newest OB unit with its 100-foot antenna first went into service. Then came the McAvoy-Harvey championship fight, cricket Test Matches (Including L. Hutton making his record- breaking score at the Oval on 23 August), the Cenotaph ceremonies on Armistice Day (11 November) and the first play to be televised direct from a theatre was J. B. Priestley's When We Are Married from St Martin's Theatre (16 November 1938). This was followed on 10 December with ski-jumping televised in 'Winter Cavalcade' at Earl's Court Exhibition Hall. Events such as these, however, were considered by Listener critic Peter Purbeck as being 'stationary' news in quality lacking the dynamic qualities characteristic of news [7]. BBC television viewers saw their news primarily through newsreels, such as the current editions of British Movietone News and Gaumont British News. BBC Television also re-broadcast the 9.40 p.m. BBC radio's National Programme (there were also seven regional programmes, including one for London) news from 10.25 to 10.50 p.m. before closedown at 11 p.m. It was assumed that the television audience would have also listened to earlier radio news program- ming. The rapidly developing crisis in central Europe in late August and early September 1938 presented BBC with the greatest news challenge of its young history.
On 12 March 1938 Germany military forces invaded Austria wrapped in the Wilsonian cloak of self-determination, as well as that of more traditional pan- Germanism. Hitler had accomplished Germany's promised Anschluss--re-union with the German rump of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire, the land of his birth.
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Opinion leaders like news baron Lord Rothermere had stated in the Daily Mail that the Czechs were of no concern to the English and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had reflected general opinion when he later spoke of "a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing". Privately, he had no respect for Prague which ruled a nation of minorities. Hitler's speech at the Nazi's annual Nuremberg Party Rally on 12 September made it clear he was in no mood to drop his claims to 'protect' the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia. The speech led to a bloody uprising by Nazis in the Sudetenland, accompanied by high levels of military activity just across the Czech border in Germany itself. Facing conflicting and faulty assessments from his intelligence organisations, Chamberlain became convinced that Hitler would not wait beyond mid-September before invading the Sudetenland. On the 8th Chamberlain announced to his inner circle of advisors--Foreign Secretary Halifax, Sir Horace Wilson (Chief Industrial Advisor and Chamberlain's close advisor, on everything including foreign affairs), Sir John Simon (Chancellor of the Exchequer) and Sir Alexander Cadogan (Foreign Office permanent under secretary)--a secret 'Plan Z' for him to visit Hitler personally to end the crisis peacefully. Despite strong objections raised by Robert Vansittart (the previous permanent undersecretary, 'promoted' to chief diplomatic advisor by Chamberlain), who said that "it was Henry IV going to Canossa again", Chamberlain dispatched a message to Hitler on 13 September declaring his willingness to go anywhere immediately ("am ready to start to-morrow") by air for discussions with the Nazi leader. Hitler took Chamberlain at his word and proposed that they meet at the Berghof, his 'mountain house' retreat at Berchtesgaden in the Bavarian Alps near Munich. On the 15th of September Chamberlain, accom- panied by Sir Horace Wilson, left for Munich via a specially chartered British Airways flight; it was the first plane ride for the 69-year-old prime minister and the beginning of a 10-hour journey. At Munich's airport the British delegation was met by German Foreign minister Ribbentrop before proceeding by rail to Berchtesgaden. Ambassador Henderson, recalling that the meeting had been fixed up "literally at a few hours' notice", had come to Munich by rail from Berlin, joining Chamberlain for the final three-hour leg of the journey on Hitler's private train. Chamberlain arrived at the Berghof only to find Hitler unwilling to accept any solution other than the Sudetenland being turned over to Germany. Hitler said it was a matter of the simple justice of self- determination, a concept, he reminded Chamberlain, that he had not invented; this redemption of Germans was his last territorial claim. Chamberlain asked why Hitler had allowed him to waste his time by travelling that far when he was contemplating an immediate invasion of Czechoslovakia. Hitler demanded that Chamberlain give him an immediate assurance that the British Government was committed to the principle of self-determination in this instance and was willing to discuss ways and means of carrying it out. Unprepared to commit his government then and there, Chamberlain undertook to return to London to consult with the Cabinet in exchange for Hitler's promise not to take military measures [8].
BBC Television viewers probably had witnessed both Chamberlain's dramatic departure from Heston for Munich and his return, at their local cinema as it was the featured story in all of the British newsreels released on Monday 19 September, including Ganmont British News Issue No. 493 and British Movietone News Issue No. 485 (both newsreels contained, for the most part, the same stories). British Movietone News had an interesting symbiotic relationship with BBC Television in that the 'voice' or commentator/reporter of Movietone News was Leslie Mitchell, BBC television announcer. British Movietone's seven-minute issue contained: (1) News
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The Munich Crisis 169
pageant of Movietone--reported by Mitchell; (2) The Crisis/The Premier Flies to Germany; (3) The Sequel/The Premier reaches Munich and Berchtesgarten--Lord Runciman's return--the Premier's Home-coming; (4) Prince Arthur of Connaught's funeral--HM the King foUows his cousin's coffin; (5) Dokter Lew Lehr's inventions specially designed for the British public; and (6) John Cobb v. Captain Kyston in setting the world land speed record. This newsreel additionally could be seen that day broadcast at 3.31 p.m. on BBC Television but for television viewers, quite remarkably, the Prime Minister's homecoming was a 'repeat' for they had seen it live from Heston Aerodrome in West London on the previous Friday, the 16th of September [9].
The news of Chamberlain's precedent setting 'shuttle diplomacy' had galvanised BBC Television's leadership into preparing for a direct transmission from Heston of Chamberlain's return using an OB unit. Documentation in the BBC's Written Archives at Caversham provides little information about the broadcast's preparation, other than sorting out permission to televise the event with the airport authorities. The BBC was allowed to position cameras on the roof of the east end of the public balcony with another camera on a dolly operating in front of the traffic hall where Chamberlain would emerge from the aircraft. The OB Unit 2 (the new 3 camera unit) vans were allocated specific places well out of the way (see Fig. 1), and it was agreed that the Prime Minister would not be televised passing through customs. The final decision to broadcast was taken at 12.02 p.m. on the day of the arrival, Friday 16 September. Viewers, mostly it would seem, granting the time of day, London's middle class housewives, must have been amazed when a special sound and vision announcement went on the air at 2 p.m. They learned that Mr Chamberlain had left Munich by air at 12.50 p.m. and that he was likely to arrive at Heston between 4.15 and 5 p.m. and it was hoped to provide a live relay of the arrival. The television service would then be shut down until 3 p.m. when a short live relay from Heston would take place. Viewers were advised to keep in touch for more details, probably via the radio. The Heston programming began promptly at 3 p.m. with the live relay awaiting the arrival of Chamberlain. The commentator was Michael (M.F.C,) Standing of radio's National Programme, who interviewed Mr Wood, the assistant Operations Manager at Heston who described for the audience the airport (remembered by BBC's 'Woody' Woods as a "jumble of wooden huts with a control tower") and its operations while the television cameras panned across its expanse. The undoubted highpoint of this 13-minute programme was the arrival of a new American-built Lockheed 14-passenger aircraft in the livery of British Airways. Its pilot, Mr MacmiUan (chief instructor of British Airways Ltd) was then interviewed about the aircraft which was to be assigned to their London to Lisbon route in about six weeks' time. Standing explained that Chamberlain was not clue to land until approximately 5.15 p.m. and returned viewers to Alexandra Palace where they were treated to 'La Serva Padrona' repeated from two days previously. This was followed by the scheduled programme, including British Movie- tone News, No. 484A at 3.45 p.m. At 4.55 p.m. viewers could also see Ganmont British News, No. 492. After an 'interval caption', announcement and Gramophone Records at 5.12 p.m., live commentary went back to Heston (from National Service). The live relay of Chamberlain's arrival went out from 5.18 to 5.39 p.m.; the presenter was Philip H. Dort& Michael Standing's commentary backed up views of the airport and the assembled crowd which included the television and newsreel cameras. He also described the route that Chamberlain's British Airway's Lockeed was taking. Promi- nent amongst the welcoming party were Sir Horace Wilson, William Strang (Head of
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the Foreign Office's Central Department) , Foreign Minister Lord Halifax and the German chargg d'affaires Dr Theodor Kordt (see Fig. 2).
FIG. 1. Outside Broadcasting Unit No. 2 at Heston Aerodrome on 16 September 1938. The transmitter, scanning, and generator vans are parked behind the Heston control tower, with the fire engine 100 foot aerial prominent on the skyline from which the signals were beamed to Alexandra Palace. The public viewing balcony is immediately to the left of the antenna ladder on the lower level where one can just make out two
engineers and a camera in position. (Photograph courtesy of the BBC.)
At approximately 5.28 the plane was in sight. Viewers then saw the plane land and Mr Chamberlain alight from it. He was greeted and handed a letter which he opened. He was then asked to speak to the crowd, which he did.
The programme was an enormous success: Friday 16 September 1938 was a day to remember. Marconiphone wired the Director o f Television Gerald Cock: "Very hearty congratulations upon the magnificient work of the O.B. Squad at Heston this after- noon, and upon the brilliant thought that inspired the effort". A radio engineer named Mr Small telegraphed the BBC from Taunton: "Excellent television reception o f Prime Minister Arrival" while C. B. Lawrence o f Kenton sent "Heartiest Congratula- t i o n s - v e r y fine picture and an excellent scoop" [10]. Peter Purbeck, writing the
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The Munich Crisis 171
BBC's weekly magazine The Listener (22 September 1938), proclaimed that the live relay from Heston was a milestone in BBC Television.
Another milestone has been passed in the history of television. As soon as television ceased to be a dream and became a reality with the opening of the television service from Alexandra Palace in 1937, it was natural that we who were viewers should start dreaming new dreams of what the service was going to give. We dreamed. . , in particular of the television camera turning up at vital moments and at vital places to watch news being made. Month by month we have seen these dreams come true. This week came the latest and most striking development of television as a news service. Mr Chamberlain's speech was the news of the quick, sudden, mobile sort, the real news of the tape-machine, the singing telegraph wire, the special edition and the strident voice of the paper boy. Last Friday's broadcast from Heston [16 September 1938] gave us the first real taste of television as a news-gatherer.
BBC Television broke further new ground in the presentation of current events at 9.35 p.m. on Wednesday 21 September 1938 when it introduced the first of a series entitled 'News Maps (I)--Czechoslovakia'. Arranged by J. F. Horrabin (who did the maps) and Vernon Bartlett, it was presented by Mrs Mary Adams. According to BBC Television Programme Records 1937/38, it consisted of: "Five maps illustrating the geographical history of Czechoslovakia and the modern problems which have arisen from it shown by J. F. HORRABIN; Commentary read by STUART HIBBERD (in the absence of Vernon Bartlett); Film Excerpt". Bartlett, a well-known journalist and radio broadcaster, was in Central Europe covering the crisis; thus Hibberd read the commentary which had been written by Bartlett. There is no indication of what the film clips specifically illustrated, although they doubtless were drawn from various newsreels which covered significant points of Central European development since 1919. Purbeck (The Listener, 29 September 1938) reacted favourably to the pro- gramme pointing out that most news was going to take place beyond the range of the mobile camera thus necessitating programmes of this sort which could illuminate trends built of events. He was, however, disappointed by the feeling that the programme had been written four or five days before, which was quite likely considering the fact that as the crisis deepened Bartlett, like the newsman he was, had headed for Prague [ 11 ].
Initially Hitler had suggested that the second meeting with Chamberlain might take place in London but predicted that anti-German demonstrations would take place complicating the situation. Thus it was agreed that Chamberlain would fly to Cologne, with the meeting taking place across the Rhine River at nearby Godesberg. After discussions in Whitehall and meetings with representatives of the French government, Prime Minister Edouard Daladier and Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet, who flew to London on 18 September, Chamberlain was ready to return to negotiations and carry out what seemed to be a settled conclusion. Thus on the morning of 22 September, the Prime Minister's motorcade retraced its route from No. 10 Downing Street and out the Great West Road to Heston. Since BBC Television's programming did not begin until 10.30 a.m., the OB unit from television was not present, but the British people were able to share in the momentous event via BBC's live transmission via its Outside Broadcasting radio unit. Standing before the assembled microphones and newsreel cameras Chamberlain told the nation:
A peaceful solution of the Czechoslovakia problem is an essential preliminary to a better understanding between the British and German peoples; and that
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FIG. 2. The Arrival from Germany of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain at Heston Aerodrome on 16 September 1938. The smiling Chamberlain is in the centre of the photograph, with a newsreel camera with microphone boom immediately to his left front. The BBC OB Emitron camera is directly in front of the Prime Minister to the right in the picture. A second newsreel cameraman can be seen or; the left in the doorway of Chambertain's British Airways plane. The escort aircraft is parked to the rear. (Photograph
courtesy of the BBC.)
in turn is the indispensable foundation of European peace. European peace is what I have aimed at, and I hope this journey may be the way to get it.
And then he was on his way to Cologne and the meeting with Hitler at the Hotel Dressen across the Rhine at Godesberg, a hotel favoured by Hitler in the past; he had stayed there immediately prior to his purge o f Ernst R6hm and the SA on 30 June 1934. Chamberlain, despite the backing of the French government, found that a Sudeten plebisite and self-determination no longer suited Hitler, who scaled his demands up to the immediate occupation by 1 October o f all territory with more than 50% German-speaking population according to the census o f 1914, otherwise he would be ' forced' to invade Czechoslovakia to protect its German population. Chamberlain returned to London convinced that if Hitler's 'ul t imatum' was not acceeded to by the Prague government that the German army would overrun all o f the small nation in a matter of days. According to Philip M. Taylor "the principle o f self determination was no longer the issue, merely the timing of its application" [12].
BBC Television, along with the press, newsreels and radio, was waiting at Heston when Chamberlain returned late on 24 September. Although faced with poor light, it was judged that the transmission was "a great success". The complexity o f such an operation is hard to imagine in retrospect. The main problem that the OB engineers faced was the inadequate number o f telephone lines available to them for control
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purposes. Presenter/producer D. H. Munro noted that "it was quite a common thing for me to be telephoning urgent programme information to A.P. or B.H. while cross talk was going on re. wave form and modulation level" [13]. Chamberlain's flight over metropolitan London on route to Heston had made a singular impression upon him. He told the Cabinet that "he had asked himself what degree of protection we could afford to the thousands of homes he had seen stretched out below him, and he felt that we were in no position to justify waging a war today in order to prevent a war hereafter". He believed that the bomber, despite Britain's newly organised fighter aircraft defences, and in this instance Goering's Luftwaffe, would get through, a position taken in 1932 by the then Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin and seemingly borne out by the lessons of the bombing of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War. Hitler's Godesberg ultimatum seemed to leave little hope of peace, as he waited to put Operation 'Green' into effect, the invasion of Czechoslovakia on 1 October. The British and French governments found Hitler's Godesburg 'solution' unacceptable. On the 26th, the wheels were set in motion, with Chamberlain's approval, for a clandestine effort to broadcast in German directly to the German people. Thus over the next few days Radio Luxembourg carried the Anglo-French message to the German public using frequencies compatible with the Nazi's FoUesempfiinger--peoples' radio receivers --which were preset to receive only German stations. Broadcasts, suspended immedi- ately after the signing of the Munich Agreement were, according to Philip M. Taylor, begun again at the end of 1938 and into 1939. It was propaganda designed, as Nicholas Pronay and Philip M. Taylor succinctly put it, to "drive a wedge between Folk and Fuhrer". Despite the boldness of the effort, its effect was questionable, although it might have contributed to Chamberlain's significant popularity amongst the German people. Chamberlain later commented "I do not know what this did to the Germans, but by God it frightened me" [14].
Hitler, in a speech given at the Berlin Sportspalast on 26 September warned that if he did not have the Sudetenland by 1 October he would occupy it. Chamberlain decided to make a final effort. At 11.30 a.m. on 28 September 1938 Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax telegraphed Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson in Berlin (with repeats to Paris, Washington, Prague and Rome) that he should deliver a message to Hitler saying that Chamberlain was 'certain' that he could get "all essentials without war and without delay". The telegram effectively promised the transfer of the Sudetenland regardless of the wishes of the Prague government and guaranteed the arrangement jointly by the British and French governments. Chamberlain assured Hitler that the matter could be worked out within a week, offering to fly to Berlin to do so. Chamberlain concluded by saying that he could not believe Hitler would "take responsibility of starting a world war which may end civilisation for the sake of a few days' delay in settling this long standing problem". Hitler finally chose to accept Mussolini's plan for a four-power conference to be convened immediately in Munich. The Munich Conference would prove to be the high water mark of Anglo-French appeasement towards Europe's dictators.
Chamberlain was up until after 2 a.m. on the morning of 29 September preparing his departure speech, after having briefed the House of Commons in some detail on the current situation the previous afternoon. BBC radio and the media were making their own preparations, which did not include television because the Heston departure was set at half-past eight in the morning. Chamberlain, always one for consciously exploiting the opportunities offered by the media, told the nation that:
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When I was a boy I used to repeat, ' I f at first you don't succeed, try, try, try again'. That is what I am doing. When I come back, I hope I may be able to say, as Hotspur says in Henry IV: 'Out of this nettle danger we pluck this flower safely'.
Chamberlain's detractors in the Foreign Office and elsewhere recited the following cynical little ditty:
I f at first you can't concede Fly, fly, fly again.
On the morning of Friday 30 September, Czechoslovakia accepted her fate; the conditions agreed upon by Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain gave Hitler the Sudeteuland. Chamberlain the Statesman returned to London and the media, including BBC television was waiting. BBC Television Programme Records marked the event: "5:30--5:48. The Return of the Prime Minister from Munich". OB engineers had been hard at work and urgent messages concerning line difficulties were being relayed to Alexandra Palace two days before, warning that they required as much lead time as possible to go on the air for short notice transmissions from Heston. On 30 September, at 12 noon, at 3 p.m., between programmes and at the end of the afternoon transmission, viewers were alerted to the impending arrival of the Prime Minister at Heston. Alexandra Palace and the OB unit under the direction of Alick Hayes were ready. The commentators' camera (No. l moperator--Capon) was a 'long gun' with a 6-inch lens set on a tripod on the roof of the Public Hall. Camera 2 (operator--Cox) was also on the roof of the Public Hall and was known as a 'Super, iron man' with a 6- inch or 12-inch lens. Camera 3 (operator--White) was a 'long gun' with 6-inch lens mounted on a dolly and positioned with a view of the place where the plane would stop and the Prime Minister would address the crowd. There were two microphones, one by Camera 1, both boom and handheld, and a second microphone on a stand. At 4.55 p.m. transmission began with Telecine running the Tuning Note and Film Caption; five minutes later Jasmine Bligh, one of the two highly publicised lady announcers (described as "tall, statuesque, really beautiful in the dignified Edwardian manner") in the recently refitted Baird Studio B announced in sound only:
This is the BBC Television Station at Alexandra Palace. The latest informa- tion to hand from Heston is that the Prime Minister's plane will arrive there at approximately 5.44, and we shall be taking you over to Heston for a description of the scene there before the Prime Minister's plane arrives. Viewers might like to know that the number of the Prime Minister's plane is G-AFGN, and the number of the escort plane--G-AFGO. Also that it will take twenty minutes approximately from the time the plane reaches the coast at Sandwich until it arrives at Heston Airport. The route from Sandwich will be as follows: A few miles north of Canterbury, Sittingbourne, Rochester, south of Gravesend, Sidcup, Dulwich, approximtely two miles south of the House of Parliament, Barnes Bridge, Isleworth, Great West Road, Heston Air Port. We shall be making a further announcement at 5.15.
At 5.14 p.m. Telecine continued the Film Caption and one minute later Jasmine Bligh re-read the announcement with the modification that the plane was ahead of schedule, expected at 5.34 p.m. and the live relay from Heston would begin at 5.20 p.m. This proved premature and at 5.28 p.m. Miss Bligh, still only on sound, announced that "We shall be going over to Heston to televise the arrival of the Prime Minister's plane
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The Munich Crisis 175
at approximately 5.30". The tuning signal had radiated continuously from 5.14.45 seconds, until Bligh returned to the air at 5.30 p.m. with the sound announcement: "This is the BBC Television Station at Alexandra Palace. The Prime Minister's plane is due to arrive at approximately 5.41 and we are taking you over to Heston now for a description by F. H. Grisewood of the scene there before the Prime Minister's plane arrives--so over to Heston". From 5.30.22 until 5.48 p.m. GMT, just under 18 minutes, the transmission source was the 'Van OB'.
Joining Freddy Grisewood for the commentary was Richard Dimbleby from BBC radio's National Programme. Grisewood (on Camera 1) said: "Good afternoon every- body, this is the BBC Television Service. Ladies and Gentlemen, I am speaking to you from Heston Airport, where in some fifteen minutes' time the arrival is expected of our Prime Minister, Mr NeviUe Chamberlain". Grisewood opened the programme by describing the scene, whilst Camera 2 panned slowly left to right across the aerodrome, panned down on to the ubiquitous newsreel cameras, and then travelled to the left to the place where the plane would come to a halt. Grisewood went back on to Camera 1 where he introduced Commander Pelly (entered shot--camera right), who had flown Chamberlain to Munich for the first meeting with Hitler. Pelly used a map (brought in by H. Cox, operator of Camera 2) to describe the route by which the aircraft was returning from the Bavarian capital. Grisewood and Pelly also talked about the Prime Minister's reception by the German people. After Pelly exited to camera right, Grisewood introduced Richard Dimbleby (carrying a microphone), who was about to do the arrival commentary on BBC National radio. At approximately 5.39 p.m. Grisewood handed over the commentary and exited camera right. Since radio listeners were joining the event at that moment, Dimbleby apologised to television viewers for the duplication and proceeded to describe the scene for radio listeners. Cameras 2 and 3 followed Chamberlain's plane as it came into view and turned into land with their respective images mixed to provide continuous coverage. Followed closely by the three EMI Emitron cameras, the two British Airways Lockheed 14 aircraft came to a halt in front of the hall where Camera 3 prepared to cover Chamberlain and his expected comments. Prime Minister Chamberlain disembarked from the aircraft to find the world's assembled media, as well as a substantial crowd, which included Lord Halifax, the French Ambassador and the Rt Hon. Leslie Hore Belisha. Chamberlain received a letter from HM the King before moving forward to the waiting microphones (he had also made a similar statement before leaving Munich aerodrome).
There are only two things I want to say. First of all I received an immense number of letters during all these anxious days--and so has my wife--letters of support and approval and gratitude; and I cannot tell you what an encouragement that has been to me. I want to thank the British people for what they have done. Next I want to say that the settlement of the Czechoslovak problem which has now been achieved is, in my view, only a prelude to a larger settlement in which all Europe may find peace.
He continued:
This morning I had another talk with the German Chancellor, Herr Hitler, and here is a paper [which he dramatically waved aloft] which bears his name upon it as well as mine. Some of you perhaps have already heard what it contains, but I would just like to read it to you: 'We, the German Fiihrer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting to-day
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176 K. R. M. Short
and are agreed in recognising that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe. We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again. We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus contribute to assure the peace of Europe'. [15]
Viewers then watched the Prime Minister move to leave, with a vision mix from Camera 3 to Camera 2 which panned with Chamberlain as he entered his automobile and begin his triumphant trip back to London where he would be received by the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace that evening. Then came a vision mix to Camera 1 where Dimbleby concluded the National radio commentary and handed over to Grisewood for the concluding announcement and a return to the evenings's scheduled programmes. Dimbleby, upon hearing Chamberlain's promise of peace had grunted to a colleague: "Huh! I wish that were true" [16].
The Listener of 6 October 1938 featured a cover picture of the Prime Minister highlighting the BBC's 'Broadcasts of the Crisis'. Although BBC Television had done an incredible job of providing live relay coverage--a portent of great things to come--its overall coverage got lower marks. This was the ironic assessment of journalist Peter Purbeck.
WITH THE CRISIS SAFELY packed up and put away in the drawer for the time being, it is pleasant to recall that if I had been depending last week on my television set for information on the state of the world I should scarcely have known that there was anything amiss at all. There was the recorded news at the end of each evening's programmes and there were indications in Picture Page that all was not well in Europe. And of course there was the Prime Minister's arrival at Heston. But apart from that Alexandra Palace seems to have adopted 'business as usual' as its slogan.
This criticism failed to credit the BBC's basic philosophy which was that the news was still best carried by radio. For example, Broadcasting House had interrupted normal programming during Hitler's important speech at the Nuremberg Rally on 14 Septem- ber in order to give listeners a running summary of that speech. Regular news bulletins had been introduced at 10.30 a.m. and 1 p.m., in addition to the usual ones at 6, 7.30, 9.40 and 11.50 on weekdays, and a 4 p.m. bulletin was added to the 8.50 p.m. news on Sunday. Overseas news bulletins also were lengthened. Additionally, in early June talks on Czechoslovakia had been broadcast by Professor Seton-Watson of the University of London followed in July, August and September by a series of current event talks entitled 'The Past Week' delivered by Harold Nicolson. As Christmas neared there were relays of a West End first night--Under Your Hat--at the Palace Theatre, followed by a pantomime from Covent Garden and the circus from Olympia. Outside Broadcasting continued with an enthusiasm which reached something of a high point with the Boon-Danahar fight at Harringay in February 1939. The fight was shown at cinemas specially equipped with large screens, marking a partnership between the promoters, the BBC and the cinema owners. With the advent of war at the end of that summer, Outside Broadcasting and the rest of the Television Service were forced to take a broadcasting holiday for the Government closed down the service, lest the
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The Munich Crisis 177
Luftwaffe 'home in' on the television signals. On Friday 1 September 1939, in the midst o f a Mickey Mouse cartoon being transmitted at the Radiolympia exhibition, the order came to shut down at 10 a.m. The end came at noon just as a caricatured Greta Garbo said " A y tank ay go home". And then there was silence for seven years [17].
The BBC's management in those early days was justifiably committed to the primacy o f radio for providing the news, while the television service, with its severely limited schedule and tiny London audience, basically was limited to entertainment and running Movietone and Gaumont-British newsreels, as well as highly popular outside broadcasts o f sports, national ceremonial events, and West End shows. However, television's efforts o f the autumn o f 1938 to provide a serious adjunct to sound broadcasting's news and current events coverage should not be underestimated, or forgotten. The pioneering efforts o f Outside Broadcasting's Chamberlain coverage during the Munich Crisis and the J. F. Horrabin and Vernon Bartlett programme 'News Maps ' provided television's proponents with a vision o f television's extra- ordinary capacity to cover news and current events given the eventual development o f a national audience. Post-war television's news service would not be limited to showing weekly cinema newsreels thanks to the Newsreel Association o f Great Britain's refusal to make the cinema newsreels available to television. Begining on 5 January 1948, television viewer, who had dusted off their pre-war receivers, found themselves watching the BBC Television Newsreel [18]. Over the following 40 years, BBC Television was to develop that enormous potential for being, as Purbeck put it, "a news-gatherer" and became the primary source for news and current events in British society.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge the assistance o f the staff o f the BBC Written Archives, Caversham, as well as the critical comments relative to an earlier draft o f this article by Garth Jowett, Philip M. Taylor, David Culbert and Donald Browne. Needless to say, their responsibility ended there.
Correspondence: K. R. M. Short, School o f Communication, University o f Houston, Houston, Texas 77204-3786, USA.
N O T E S
[1] Three of the other outstanding images are the Hindenberg airship disaster, the bombed-out rubble of the Spanish town of Guernica, and Nazi troops re-occupying the Rhineland. For the newsreel treatment of the Munich settlement, including the application of Government censorship on less enthusiastic appraisals, see NICHOLAS PgONAY (1971/1972) British newsreels in the 1930s. I. Audi- ences and producers, History, 56 (1971) and II. Their policies and impact, History, 57 (1972). Two standard studies of Munich, neither of which are concerned with media coverage, are J. W. WHEELER- B~NNETT (1964) Munich: prologue to tragedy (New York) and "I~LFORD TAYLOR (1980) Munich: the price of peace (New York).
[2] Television in the United States, although equally 'high definition', was still in an experimental stage and NBC programmes over WNBT in New York City would not officially begin until 30 April 1939. The other major European competitor (excluding the Soviet Union about which little was known), Germany, had began its regular transmissions of its high definition television on 22 March 1935. The climax of the new television service was its outside broadcasting of the Olympic Games from Berlin in the summer of 1936, coverage which attracted an estimted 150,000 viewers in the forty or more public
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178 K . R . M . S h o n
television halls which, granting an estimated 200 private sets, was virtually the only way one could see television in Germany. British detractors had swiftly rejected German claim's to high definition television because its advanced mechanically-scanned system produced only a 180-line picture, even as in 1948 the BBC made the extraordinary claim: "London 1948. . . the first Olympic Games to be televised". The Germans clearly had started regular transmission in 1935 in order to be first in the world, preempting British hopes, but, although possessing the capability to increase their level of definition much earlier, did not adopt a 441 line standard until November 1938. German development is discussed in WILLIAM URICCHIO (1989) Rituals of reception, patterns of neglect: Nazi television and its postwar representation, Wide Angle, 11(1). On the question of which was the 'first' high definition system see Uricchio and BRIAN WINSTON (1986) The anniversary stakes, Sight and Sound, autunm. The BBC's claim to having been the first to televise the Olympic games is made in Eye of Britain: an illustrated survey of British television and of the Olympic Games, London, 1948 which were seen through its cameras (London, n.d.), pp. 26-32. The development of television in the United States is summarised in EI*,IK B.~Notrw's (1975) The Tube of Plen(y: the evolution of ,'lmerican television (New York) and his (1968) The Golden Web: a history of broadcasting in the United States, 1933-1953, Vol. 2 of 3 Vols (New York), passim.
[3] BBC's Handbook for 1938 (London, 1938), p. 43. Alexandra Palace or 'Ally Pally', as it was soon called (not with great affection, it seems), had been built as an Victorian pleasure resort and thus required substantial rebuilding and alteration to accommodate the studios and transmitters, along with the rebuilding of its east tower to support the erection of a 300 foot mast which carried an upper and a lower UHF antenna; the former transmitted vision on 6.7 metres and the latter sound on 7.23 metres. Alexandra Palace had been built to compete with the Crystal Palace from the 1851 Exhibition which had been moved from Hyde Park to south London. A fire destroyed Crystal Palace and much of the Baird Company's equipment on 30 November 1936.
[4] ROBERT WOOD (1979) .4 World In Your Ear: the broadcasting of an era, 1923-1964 (London), p. 119. [5] BBC Handbook 1939 (London, 1949) Broadcasting and the crisis, pp. 31ff. [6] BBC Handbook 1939, p. 28s Also see ASA BmC_,GS (1965) The Golden Age of Wireless: the history of
broadcasting in the United Kingdom, VoL 2 of 3 Vols (Oxford), Section V, The new world of television, pp. 517-622, especially, pp. 609-622. The guinea was a traditional English form of pricing products and equalled 21 shillings or s ls. It did not die out until decimalisation and the prewar exchange rate of about $5.40 to the s the guinea was worth about $5.70.
[7] The Listener, 22 September 1938, p. 627. [8] Details on the three trips are found in SIR Nm, ILI~ HI~N'DI~mSON (1940) Failure of a Mission. Berlin
1937-1939 (London), pp. 148-170; NmqLLE CI-IMC~RLMN (1939) The Struggle for Peace (London), pp. 286-303; K~rrn FEILr~H (1946) Life of Neville Chamberlain (London), pp. 364-384. For an assessment of the intelligence upon which Chamberlain had to make his decision see CHRISTOPHER ANDREW (1986) Secret Seruice. The Making of the British Intelligence CommunRy (London), pp. 556-559.
[9] BBC Written Archives, Caversham Files T14/541/TV OB/Heston. Ganmont-British News Issue No. 493 (19 September 1938) contained the items in the following order: (1) the funeral of Prince Arthur of Connaught at Windsor; (2) John Cobb and then Captain Kystou both break the world's land speed record; (3) Chamberlain leaves for interview with Hitler, including Cabinet Meeting and the King returns to London; (4) Chamberlain meets Hitler at Berchtesgaden; and (5) interview with Chamber- lain and Lord Runciman on their return to England.
[10] BBC Written Archives, ibid.; BBC Television Programme Records 1937/1938, p. 211. The programme had required three telephone lines from Hounslow, Middlesex exchange (nearest to Heston) to Broadcasting House and one line to Alexandra Palace. The preliminary estimates for the broadcast were s including a 10% contingency. A total of four telephone lines had been required for the first Hestou broadcast but only three were available thus OB sound used two lines, one for control and one for programme to Broadcasting House; a third line went to Alexandra Palace for vision required for programme, as well as engineering.
[11] BBC Written Archives, BBC Television Programme Records 1937-1938, p. 213. [12] Philip M. Taylor, correspondence with the author. [13] BBC Written Archives, T14/541/TV OB/Heston. [14] NICHOLAS PRONAY & PHILIP M. TAYLOR (1984) "An improper use of broadcasting.. . " the British
Government and clandestine radio propaganda operations against Germany during the Munich Crisis and after, Journal of Contemporary History, 19, pp. 357-384.
[15] Chamberlaln's public pronouncements are from his book The Struggle for Peace, pp. 263-303.
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The M u n i c h Crisis 179
[16] This is a reconstruction of the programme using the following four documents: (1) The brief report 'Televising the Return of the Prime Minister From Munich at Heston', Friday 30 September 1938, 5.30-5.48 p.m., dated 3 October 1938, 'Programme as Broadcast', initiated by presenter Alick Hayes; (2) Announcement routine and continuity for the return of Mr Neville Chamberlain to Heston Airport, dated 30.9.38; (3) Heston: the arrival of the Prime Minister from Germany, Friday 30 September 1938; (4) Heston: the arrival of the Prime Minister from Germany, Friday 30 September 1938 (Routine B). The third document contains the humorous detail of spelling Dimbleby 'Dumble- day'; it was later corrected in pen. Fame for the young announcer would come later. The second-hand source for Dimbleby's sceptical quote is JONATHAN DIMBLEBY (1975) Richard Dimbleby: a biography (London), p. 88.
[17] Briggs~ ibid.~ p. 622. When the Television Service re-opened after the war on 7 June 1946 (the license fee went up from 10 shillings to s that month as well), the British sense of the right-way-of-doing- things, dictated that they first finish the Mickey Mouse cartoon. OB broadcasting went back to work the next day to cover the Victory Procession in London and after a year's operation the total number of television licenses was 21,000. See MAtrRICE GORI-I~t (1952) Broadcasting and Television Since 1900 (London) for a great deal of useful detail and insight concerning this period.
[18] See HOW.~RD SMrrH (1988) The BBC Television Newsreel and the Korean War, HistoricalJournal of Film, Radio and Television, 8(3).
Kenneth Short is the founding editor of the 'Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Professor of Communication and Associate Director of the International Telecommunications Research Institute at the University of Houston. A specialist in international broadcasting and film~television history, he is currently preparing a book on Anglo-American cinema during the Second World War.
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