a paradigm ina paradigm in crisis, israel's doctrine of military decision crisis,...

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A paradigm in crisis? Israel'sdoctrine of military decisionAvi Kober aa Lecturer in International Relations , HebrewUniversity , JerusalemPublished online: 11 Apr 2007.

To cite this article: Avi Kober (1995) A paradigm in crisis? Israel's doctrine ofmilitary decision, Israel Affairs, 2:1, 188-211, DOI: 10.1080/13537129508719370

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A Paradigm in Crisis? Israel'sDoctrine of Military Decision

AVI KOBER

The Middle East peace process and the emphasis on the securityarrangements attending the expected accords have somewhat divertedattention from both the changing nature of Israel's security problemsduring recent years and the dilemmas to which this change has givenrise.

One of the most evident dilemmas is the crisis threatening theIsraeli military-decision paradigm (to use Thomas Kuhn'sterminology).1 From a substantive point of view, it appears that abattlefield decision no longer provides an adequate solution to themain strategic challenges that Israel now faces; from the "sociological"standpoint it seems that the longstanding consensus among Israel'smilitary-strategic policy-makers regarding the merits of battlefielddecision has been recently eroded.

The aim of this article is to present the main elements of thetraditional Israeli military-decision doctrine within the framework ofits wider security concept, and to examine the challenges confrontingit now.

DEFINING A MILITARY/BATTLEFIELD DECISION

What then is the essence of a military, or battlefield decision? In theprofessional literature, decision is defined as denying one's enemy theability to continue fighting - in terms of both its will (the psychologicalaspect) and its capability (the material aspect);2 this can be considereda more objective definition than another concept - victory, generallyused to express a similar phenomenon. I have elsewhere distinguishedbetween the two concepts and recommended that victory be defined interms of the correlation between what each adversary aspires to,militarily or politically, before and during a war, and what it actuallysucceeds in achieving during that war;3 moreover, while victory sets itssights on a post-war horizon, decision focuses on the dimensions of thewar itself. By virtue of the subjective nature of victory, conflicts willoften produce more than one belligerent proclaiming itself the victor,but only a single party will have actually achieved a military decision.

Avi Kober is Lecturer in International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

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ISRAEL'S DOCTRINE OF MILITARY DECISION 189

THE DETERRENCE - EARLY WARNING - STRATEGIC DECISIONTRIANGLE

Israel's security doctrine has for many years been predicated on thedeterrence - early warning - military decision triangle, whosecomponents complement each other and mutually interact. The firstelement is aimed at preventing war from erupting in the first place; thesecond - at alerting policy-makers to the possibility that deterrence isin effect failing and that war might be in the offing; the third - atwinning a swift battlefield victory, should war break out. Theassumption is that since deterrence is bound to fail sooner or later,there will eventually be a need to recourse to military decision.4 Inturn, the ability to achieve a battlefield decision is supposed to helprehabilitate Israel's failed deterrence; to significantly prolong the lullsbetween wars; to underscore the enemy's inability to destroy Israel orto "reduce it to size"; and, over the long term, even to bring aboutpeace with the Arabs. From these points of view, military decision in asense demonstrates Israel's ability to stand firm: the Arabs will launchone war after the other, only to be defeated time and again until suchtime as they lose the taste for initiating further wars.5

THE EMPHASIS ON BATTLEFIELD DECISION IN ISRAELIMILITARY THINKING

There is fundamental asymmetry between Israel and the Arabs ineverything associated with the place of military decision in theirrespective security doctrines. Following the decisive battlefield decisionachieved by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War, military weakness drovethe Arabs to adopt a strategic doctrine based on the following mainelements: the attempt to achieve strategic decision would be postponedfor an indefinite period of time and replaced by efforts to reap politicalgains from the very launching of wars and/or from producing limitedmilitary achievements in that endeavour. The Arabs would thus engageIsrael in a series of limited wars whose gains would be essentiallypolitical in nature; these wars would exercise the effect of attrition andwould gradually weaken Israel by confronting it time and again with aforce having a greater staying power than itself; although none of theabove wars would be decisive, their cumulative impact wouldeventually be in the Arabs' favour.6

By contrast, Israel considers battlefield decision a centralcomponent of its security doctrine and does whatever it can toconstantly improve the ability of the IDF to achieve such a decision.Although military decision is a multi-dimensional and multi-variableconcept that exists at all levels of analysis, from grand strategy downto tactics, in Israel it has traditionally been perceived in the context ofthe battlefield - that is to say, as relating to the strategic, operational

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190 BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE

and tactical levels, and not to that of the grand strategy. Israel hasattached little thought in the past to employing its military poweragainst the enemy's society: its population, economic or industrialcentres. The main reason for this has been the general feeling that, ineverything related to war on the battlefield, Israel enjoys a markedadvantage over the Arab side. Other reasons have been the thoughtthat military decision may possibly contribute to strengthening Israelideterrent posture, and the belief that achieving such a decision can actto create conditions for easier negotiations following a war andthereafter. These notions have persisted despite the growing evidencethat Israel finds it far harder than the Arabs to establish a clear linkbetween military decision and deterrence, or directly to translatemilitary gains to political achievements.7

By contrast, there has always been a school of thought, though onethat has never gained preeminence in Israel, which does not accept asa given, at least not completely, the asymmetry in the balance ofachievements in war, realized respectively by Israel and the Arabs; inits view, there is a significant room for translating military successes topolitical achievements, notwithstanding Israel's geo-political and geo-strategic constraints, particularly the involvement of the world'ssuperpowers in the conflict.8 But even members of this school generallyrestrict themselves to circumstances of opportunities that are created atthe outbreak of a war or during its course, and in fact call more for theexploitation of opportunities than for the initiation of war for thepurpose of promoting political goals by way of a military decision.

The need to achieve a battlefield decision, in of itself, by virtue ofits centrality, is sometimes considered as a war objective, and asstanding at the very base of the country's strategic and operationalplanning. From Israel's standpoint, therefore, military decisionbecomes, at one and the same time, both an end and a means to thatend.

BASIC STRATEGIC CIRCUMSTANCES

Israel's military-decision doctrine has been crystallized in an informal,semi-explicit and incremental manner over the course of many years.It has been designed first and foremost to contend with two mainchallenges, traditionally perceived by those responsible for shapingIsrael's security doctrine as being extremely threatening: Israel'sinferiority in the quantitative balance of forces, and the superpowerinvolvement in Middle Eastern conflicts.'

Israel's Perennial Numerical InferiorityInferiority in the quantitative balance of forces has been perceived asIsrael's primary chronic problem.10 Although the military/populationratio in Israel is among the highest in the world, this is still insufficient

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to alter the fundamental circumstances: constant numerical inferiorityand a small regular army (about one quarter of the country's totalground forces) confronting large Arab armies, most of which - usuallymore than half of their total size - consist of regular forces. Over thecourse of time, a constant deterioration, from Israel's point of view, hasoccurred in the overall quantitative balance of forces with the Arabs."Furthermore, the Arab armies have been capable of switching quickly,within no more than a few hours, from a defensive to an offensivedeployment and take advantage of the small size of the Israeli armyfacing them, which requires 48 hours to mobilize its reserve forces.

Superpower Involvement in Arab-Israeli WarsAs Shimon Peres has said: "The shadow of superpower interventionhas hovered, directly or indirectly over all of Israel's wars, so as toprevent strategic decision".12 This superpower involvement wasnourished by the global competition between the United States and theSoviet Union until the end of the 1980s and simultaneously reflectedit. Both superpowers were constantly on guard lest their clients' localconflicts escalated to direct superpower confrontation; hence theysought to maintain a measure of control over the development ofMiddle Eastern wars.

Already upon the termination of the 1956 Sinai War Israelconcluded that the superpowers, which were heavily involved in theregion, would never allow either party to achieve absolute decision onthe battlefield, but would intervene at a certain stage and bring abouta ceasefire.13 Israeli decision-makers fashioned the view that, on theverge of any Arab military collapse, the superpowers would always takesteps to freeze the war and that superpower intervention was afunction, on the one hand, of Israel's gains on the battlefield (the moreextensive such gains the greater the chances of involvement) and, onthe other, of the time required for the superpowers to organizethemselves to react and act, discuss the matter amongst themselves,confer with the warring sides and reach decisions.

To examine the extent to which numerical inferiority andsuperpower involvement really constitute severe constraints, it is worthlooking into the impact they actually exerted on the decision process.Notwithstanding its overall numerical inferiority, Israel has not alwayssuffered from inferiority as far as the actual balance of forces on thebattlefield is concerned: in 1948 there was more or less equality; in1956 Israel enjoyed a slight superiority; in 1982 Israel had a clearsuperiority. Only in 1967 and 1973 did Israel suffer numericalinferiority on the battlefield, but this was significant mainly in 1973because in 1967 it was dealt with successfully by means of graduateddecision, which created a situation in which Israel did not suffer fromquantitative inferiority to any of its three adversaries.14 Similarly, thereis a gap between the real and the perceived constraints imposed by

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superpower intervention:15 an empirical examination of superpowerintervention in Arab-Israeli wars reveals that, despite Israel's earlyfears, such intervention has in most cases actually been an asset toIsrael. The Soviet military and political aid in the 1948-49 War provedvital to Israel's war effort, while the Western powers placed anembargo on the Arab states and the Anglo-American ultimatum inreaction to Israel's military gains in northeastern Sinai was, to a largeextent, stillborn.* In the 1956 War Israel collaborated with the twodeclining powers, France and Britain, though the fruits of thiscollaboration were denied by an angry US-Soviet response. In 1967Israel received a green light from the United States to launch an attackon the Arabs and benefitted from the American deterrence against theSoviet Union, which consequently remained passive.** In 1973,though Israel decided to refrain from a preemptive strike on accountof the likely American response to such a move, its decision derivedfirst and foremost from self-restraint, emanating from the view thateven at the last minute it might be possible to prevent the outbreak ofwar and that, in the circumstances that had arisen, the only option fora first blow would be a preemptive air strike against Syria, whoseeffectiveness was likely to be limited. Moreover, during that war it wasKissinger that granted Israel the required amount of time to envelopthe Egyptian Third Army, which led to the achievement of militarydecision over Egypt.*** Finally, in 1982 Israel launched the Peace for

* EDITOR'S NOTE: While there is little doubt that the (indirect) Soviet military aid wasindispensable for Israel in the 1948-49 War, for the simple reason that the latter began thewar in a state of marked material inferiority to the invading Arab forces, Britain was noinnocent bystander but rather helped the Arab war effort in several important respects,both prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 and in its aftermath. Thisincluded, inter alia, the illegal detention of some 9,000 "able-bodied Jews" inconcentration camps in Cyprus for nine months after the establishment of Israel to preventtheir participation in the ongoing war; the supply of weapons and military equipment tothe Jordanian and Egyptian armies; the participation of British officers deployed in theJordanian legion in the fighting; and the dispatch of forces to Transjordan to forestallfurther Israeli advances.** EDITOR'S NOTE: There is no evidence that Israel ever received an American "green

light" to start the Six Day War. Even William Quandt, by no stretch of imagination a friendof Israel, has failed to find such evidence and was grudgingly forced to conclude that "thered light turned yellow - but not quite green". See William Quandt, "Lyndon Johnson andthe June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?", Middle East Journal, Vol.46, No.2(Spring 1992), p.228.

Also, the Soviets did intervene on behalf of their Arab allies by way of a naval show offorce, and it was their threat to dispatch ground forces to the battle zone if Israel did nothalt its advance on the Golan Heights that enticed the Americans into applying heavypressure on Israel, thus leading to the end of hostilities without it achieving a decisivemilitary decision.*** EDITOR'S NOTE: Contrary to the author's claim, it was Kissinger who prevented

Israel from starving the Third Army into surrender, thus allowing Egypt to retain a firmfoothold on the Western bank of the Suez Canal and denying Israel the desired militarydecision. Moreover, while the Soviets supplied their Arab clients with large quantities ofweapons and war material from the very outbreak of the war, the Americans withheld armssupplies to Israel for over a week, despite its desperate position on the battlefield.

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Galilee War knowing that it had the tacit consent of the USAdministration (or, at least, of Secretary of State Alexander Haig), andits decision to end the war was less influenced by American pressuresthan by its assumption that it could achieve most of its war aims beforethe imminent ceasefire took hold.16

All this means that Israel's doctrine of military decision has alsobeen affected by two additional factors, which also reflect its basicstrategic circumstances: the territorial imperative and the cost of war.

The Territorial ImperativeLack of strategic depth:" Apart from the Egyptian front, Israel enjoysno strategic depth. This in turn makes the attainment of militarydecision rather problematic in the event of an Arab-initiated war. Insuch circumstances Israel has to mobilize its reserve forces and to movethem to the front before the enemy has made significant territorialgains, and then achieve a battlefield decision in enemy territory, thuscreating artificial strategic depth and distancing the war from its ownvital areas.

Geo-political vulnerability: Since its establishment in 1948, Israelhas been surrounded by enemies, actual or potential, on three sides.Indeed, the historical record indicates that the Arabs were inclined towage war on the Jewish State only when they succeeded in puttingtogether a coalition enabling them to obtain numerical superiority onthe battlefield and to create more than one centre of gravity, byexploiting the advantages of combat on external lines. As a result,Israel has had to accept that, in the worst case scenario, it may have to"confront every combination of forces (...) without the help of aforeign army";18 to think in terms of splitting its war effort betweenseveral simultaneous fronts without the ability to achieve decision in allof them at one and the same time requires clear priorities regarding theconcentration of effort on the different fronts.

The Cost of WarIf the cost of war is reckoned in terms of casualties, on the one hand,and injury to the economy resulting from prolonged mass conscription,on the other, then Israel's ability to withstand damage is clearly muchlower than that of its enemies. This of course gives the Arabs anadditional dimension of stamina and resilience for conducting a costlywar and, certainly, one that is prolonged.19 Former Egyptian President,Gamal Abdel Nasser, is attributed with the quip that a state whosenewspapers publish on their front pages the photograph and biographyof each of its fallen soldiers is unlikely to be able to cope with a war ofattrition.20

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THE MILITARY DECISION DOCTRINE

Israel's doctrine of military decision consists of the following components:

Rapid decisionThe need to achieve a swift battlefield decision is a corollary of Israel'sinability to sustain a prolonged war. This stems from the necessity toreturn as quickly as possible to routine; to minimize military andcivilian casualties; to diminish the likelihood of superpowerintervention; to weaken the possibility that Arab expeditionary forceswill be dispatched to fight alongside those armies already involved inhostilities; and, in the event of a war by choice, to ensure that thenational consensus is as widespread as possible with regard toeverything associated with the war's justification and publiclegitimation for the manner in which it is being conducted.21

Sensitivity to the necessity of a swift decision dates back to the Warof Independence, during whose latter stages Israel experienced the firstinstance of international intervention, though this did not deprive it ofthe military decision it had already achieved. Since then, "therecognition has mounted that, in war, we must take the time factorseriously and understand that we actually have very little time toachieve decision over the enemy. It is for this reason, perhaps, that thewars that have come thereafter... have been designated mainly in termsof time, such as: 'the 100 hours' war' or 'the Six Day war'".22

Destruction of Force and Occupation of TerritoryMilitary decision has traditionally been perceived in terms ofdestroying enemy forces, on the one hand, and occupying territory notpreviously in Israel's possession, on the other. But destruction of forceshas been regarded as having greater value for the purposes of achievingdecision.23 During recent years, Israel has begun to sober up from theillusion that it is possible, in modern war in general and in theArab-Israeli context in particular, to annihilate an army. The mannerin which the concept of annihilation is addressed has changed; and ifin the past it was linked first and foremost with the enemy's physicalstrength it has assumed a more qualitative connotation, referring moreto the enemy's ability to continue hostilities, both by virtue of thephysical harm occasioned on it and as a result of a collapse in its willand the structure and organization of its forces.24

This process of disillusionment has been reinforced by gradualawareness of the fact that not only did Israel fail to destroy the Arabarmies, but the Arab war losses were rapidly replaced following everywar and their order of battle significantly increased.

Decision via "Force Multipliers"

The hard core of Israel's military decision doctrine consists of itspatterns of action which, having the common denominator of creating

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"force multipliers", have enabled the Israel Defence Forces tocompensate for their overall quantitative inferiority and, whereverpossible, to convert it into superiority, at least on part of the battlefield.The traditional "force multipliers" are as follows:

Offence: Ever since the second truce in the War of Independence,offence has always been regarded as the only form of war by which itis possible to obtain decision, in general, and the only one which makessense in Israel's unique strategic circumstances in particular. Broadlyspeaking, it is arguable that at the strategic and operational levelsoffence affords a better compensation than defence for quantitativeinferiority, by allowing the weaker party to choose the most convenienttime and place for the military confrontation.25 Offence also grantsartificial strategic depth through shifting the war to enemy territory;may facilitate a rapid battlefield decision over more than one enemy,on more than one front, in a graduated fashion; its price is often lessexpensive than that of defence - if not necessarily in terms of casualtiesthen at least in more general national terms, because it makesprolonged battles of attrition less likely; it suits the ethos of the IDFand goes along with its high self-esteem and that of the Israeli society,as well as the IDF's image in the eyes of the enemy; and, by promotingthe objective of rapid military achievements, it at least opens uppossibilities for the realization of political gains."

The offensive approach in Israel has become so akin to a "secondnature" that it has taken on the essence of a nearly intrinsic value - sothat the country's generals have clung to it almost reflexively, in amanner redolent of the pre-First World War military powers in Europe.It was bluntly expressed during the Yom Kippur War, in which Israel'sgenerals found it difficult to digest a relatively prolonged defensiveposture, with no switch to offence in the immediate sight.

In recent years, the voices calling for the introduction of moredefensive elements into the Israeli security doctrine have increasedconsiderably. The point of departure of most adherents to thedefensive approach is the assumption that the future battlefield movestowards a dramatic growth in the range and accuracy of weapons. Insuch circumstances, the casualties ratio becomes no less significant thanthe balance of forces, and the task of breaking through the enemy'sstrongholds becomes far more difficult and expensive. Proponents ofthe defensive approach believe that Israel must exploit thesedevelopments to its advantage, even at the price of introducing changesinto its security model. This, in their view, will entail the adoption of adecision doctrine, predicated on the concentration of accuratefirepower on enemy forces that are attacking or moving to the front,and destroying these forces on a scale so large as to compel the enemyto terminate hostilities. In this thinking, the terms defence and offenceassume a new significance: attack does not necessarily requiremanoeuvre or physical contact with the enemy and no need for

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transferring the war to its territory. A model like this, they claim, is alsocheaper from an economic standpoint because it enables Israel to dowithout expensive weapons platforms and is less likely to arouseinternational disapproval.27

Advocates of the offensive approach can of course dismiss theassumption that the technological developments on the battlefieldrepresent a revolution. They can claim that what is at hand is anincremental change, which neither alters the fundamental strategiccircumstances within which the IDF operates, nor affects Israel's needand/or ability to maintain its offensive approach.

Shifting the war to enemy territory has always been seen in Israel interms of manoeuvre;28 but this pattern has never been seriouslyconsidered in terms of firepower, though this has been effected byother armies. NATO, for example, adopted the FOFA doctrine, whichwas founded on a combination of defence, counter-attack launchedfrom the territory being defended, and the shift of the war in terms offirepower (mainly through precision-guided munitions) to enemyterritory. At the centre of this doctrine is the idea of wearing down thesecond and third echelons of the attacker, with a view of blunting thepace of its advance and exact an unbearable cost for the continuationof hostilities.2'

Although ideas in this direction have been mooted in Israel, theyhave never been adopted.30 A prominent reason for this state of affair,which proponents of defence often bring up, is of course thetraditional psychological commitment to the manoeuvre and thedismissal, or underestimation, of the value of firepower. However,beyond intellectual conservatism, one of the more serious reasons forclinging to the notion of physically transferring the war to enemyterritory is the perceived vitality of occupying territory for theattainment of military decision.31

Basically, no change occurred in the Israeli offensive approach evenwhen Israel's territorial situation altered after 1967. Its new boundarieswere perceived as security borders that removed the need for a firststrike and, indeed, suddenly made it possible to absorb one,32 therebyopening up possibilities for a change in the country's strategic doctrine.The circumstances in which the 1973 Yom Kippur War began had theeffect of exposing, in all their severity, superpower constraints onIsraeli offensive initiative. On the other hand, the manner in which thatwar developed strengthened the feeling, among both political andmilitary leaders, that a defensive approach impaired the chances ofachieving a battlefield decision.33 Even after the Yom Kippur War,where Israel found it difficult to implement its traditional offensivedoctrine, its military leaders still failed to retreat from their adherenceto this approach,34 although they understood that Israel would have tostrengthen its defensive ability and even took steps in that direction.35

Israel's need for a swift victory over a coalition of enemies through

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an offensive approach has produced several conclusions. These, inturn, have been transformed into important additional complementaryprinciples, some of them natural and some of them problematic, as willbe specified below.

Concentration of force on the "principal effort" method: At least inthose wars where it found itself facing an Arab coalition, Israel wasforced to choose a priori (either prior to the outbreak of war or duringits course) where to make its main thrust; in other words - where toconcentrate its forces in order to gain a quantitative superiority, at leastlocally, and thus create the centre of gravity for the entire war and foreach theatre therein that would eventually allow the achievement of amilitary decision.36 This is a crippling constraint both on Israel'sfreedom of action and on its freedom of choice, hence an incentive foran offensive approach.

Concentration of the force, in Israeli military decision doctrine,contains yet another principle: a graduated decision in accordance withan order of priorities, namely, decision through an offensive on onefront while conducting "holding operations" on other front(s), only toshift the effort to them once decision has been reached on the firstfront.37

The disadvantages of the graduated decision approach are fairlyclear: it is likely to prolong the war and to result in the loss of theopportunity for a strategic decision in the event of either a failure toachieve decision on one of the fronts in the chain of graduation, or anadverse political constellation that "freezes" the situation on thebattlefield. This, in turn, raises the following dilemma: should thecentre of gravity be the weakest front (as advocated by Liddell-Hart)or the strongest one (as Clausewitz recommended)?38 The EasternFront is undoubtedly Israel's most vulnerable flank: it lacks strategicdepth; lies in close proximity to the country's main population centresand economic/industrial infrastructure ("counter value" targets);involves the danger of Israel being cut in half, and contains the seedsof a multilateral war coalition - Syria, Jordan and Iraq. However,despite these geo-political vulnerabilities, until the 1979 peace accordsit was Egypt that was considered the main military threat to Israel, dueto its leading position in the Arab World. Consequently, Israel hasopted for a battlefield decision against its strongest Arab adversary,namely, Egypt, before moving to secure its most vulnerable flank.

Since in the Yom Kippur War Israel was unable to achieve a militarydecision in one theatre that would enable it to shift its forces to thesecond front - both because enemy numerical superiority did not allowthis and because of the length of interior lines and the shortage of timewith which Israel had to contend in the war's early stages - it wassubsequently decided, during the tenure of Chief of the General StaffMordechai Gur (1974-78) to expand the size of the IDF. This growthwas intended to narrow the quantitative gap between the IDF and the

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Arab armies, so as to allow it to move from a strategy of a graduatedbattlefield decision to one of a simultaneous decision in two separatetheatres; this in turn would reduce the need for a quick transfer oflarge forces from one front to another in the event Israel were to becaught by a surprise attack again.3' Following the signing of peaceaccords between Israel and its Arab neighbours, a contraction in thesize of the army can be expected which, in turn, will restore the needfor a graduated decision.

The Strategy of an indirect approach: It has been a commonplace toview the indirect approach as an integral part of Israel's militarythinking,40 hence of its perception of a battlefield decision. ManyIsraeli generals have attributed their victories to their use of thisstrategy.41

Indeed, the indirect approach, both physical and psychological, atboth the strategic and operational levels, was first implemented by theIDF in the War of Independence and was since employed in almostevery subsequent war - specifically in the 1956 Sinai Campaign, the SixDay War, and the 1982 Lebanon War.42 It has become an"institutionalized" principle of the Israeli security doctrine, as ifformulated by Liddell-Hart himself, though its physical aspects hasreceived greater emphasis than its psychological dimensions.43

In the Yom Kippur war and thereafter, Israel has failed in itsattempts to physically implement the indirect approach at the strategiclevel. The crossing of the Suez Canal during the Yom Kippur War,exploiting a gap between the Second and the Third Egyptian Armies,was admittedly a brilliant gambit. However, not merely did itconstitute an operational success that was not translated to completevictory in the entire war, but it was executed against the mainconcentration of the Egyptian army, partly because the IDF did nothave at its disposal a force powerful enough to physically outflank theEgyptian formations. In 1982 the IDF failed in its attempt to envelopthe Syrian forces in Lebanon because of operational difficulties in themountainous terrain. It would seem that since the 1980s, the IDF hasbeen operating on the assumption that a battlefield decisionnecessitates a direct confrontation with the enemy, and has hoped thatsuch an encounter would not be too difficult.44

It is arguable of course, by way of challenging this approach, thatthe need for an indirect approach has not diminished; quite the reversein fact, it has even increased due to the far greater difficulties in thefuture battlefield in breaking through dense, fortified formations, rifewith forces equipped with advanced weaponry; in such circumstances,there is no alternative to building up the capacity for an indirectapproach, by air and by sea, including the development of a sizeable airand sea transportation capabilities, even at an exorbitant cost.

Fighting on interior lines: Surrounded by enemies of vast numericalsuperiority, Israel has naturally assumed that it would be likely to be

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required to fight on interior lines. This strategy enables surroundedstates to transfer forces from one front to another at a relatively rapidpace, and to do this through reliance on strategic mobility and a mobilelogistical system. It affords relative flexibility in moving andconcentrating forces and is supposed to facilitate a rapid strategicdecision even in circumstances where one is forced to rely on agraduated decision.45 Nevertheless, Israeli decision doctrine has neverruled out fighting on exterior lines, should conditions make thispossible. Moreover, an empirical examination would even reveal astrategic preference for war-fighting on exterior lines when thehostilities involve one enemy only (as was the case in the SinaiCampaign and the Lebanon War); this implies the tacit preference offighting on interior lines against a multi-front coalition and on exteriorlines against a single enemy. Even when Israel was forced to fight oninterior lines at the strategic level (in 1948, 1967 and 1973), itpreferred to fight on exterior lines at the operational level.

The concept of the first strike: The idea of a first strike has neverbeen developed as a permanent binding principle but rather as anoption whose implementation depends on the relevant politico-strategic circumstances. It is true that David Ben-Gurion, whorecognized the merits of strategic initiative, toyed with the idea of apreemptive air strike "which, upon the outbreak of war, will be able todestroy the enemy's air force";46 and that the IDF trained for such aneventuality.47 But the idea began to take full shape only in 1955, on theeve of the Sinai Campaign, at the inspiration of the then Chief of theGeneral Staff, Lieutenant General Moshe Dayan.48 Following that war,in which first strikes were dealt out to the enemy both on the groundand in the air (though the latter by Israel's allies), the concept of a firststrike as a means to throw enemy forces off balance, thereby allowingfor a battlefield decision, began to strike roots in Israeli militarythinking. It also came to be seen as a factor capable of considerablyshortening the war by creating the necessary conditions for a rapiddecision.4' Then came the astounding victory of 1967, with its brilliantair gambit, and elevated the concept of a first strike to a semi-principle.This in itself can be counterproductive in preparing an army for afuture war, for the IDF has since then been inclined to plan its next waron the assumption, which can never really be more than a hope, that itwill have the opportunity to initiate that war, and that its air force willbe able to destroy the enemy's air force while it is still on the ground.50

Moreover, this elevation of the first-strike concept has been, and stillis, at odds with an important principle of Israel's national securitydoctrine pursuant to which the military will allow the politicianswhatever room they require for deciding on the manner in which a warshould commence. What is at issue here are two types of first strike: apreventive war, designed to forestall a medium- or long-termdeterioration of the military situation, and a preemptive war, aimed at

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deflecting an imminent threat.51

The idea of a preventive war was implemented in the SinaiCampaign before being theoretically developed. Only after this war didit become an established article of faith of Israeli strategic thinking andcrystallized in people's minds as "a war whose motives are rooted inthe assumption that time operates in the Arabs' favour, namely, that theexpected balance of forces is likely to generate a future confrontationon conditions more favourable to the Arabs... at a time when thepresent balance of forces makes it possible to at least disrupt thegrowth in Arab power.... A preventive war [thus] is possible withoutthe existence of an immediate threat to the political or territorial statusquo".52

Before long the concept of a preventive war gave rise to the idea ofa preventive strike, namely, a military operation short of a fully-fledgedwar which aims to forestall a medium- or long-term threat: thedestruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981 being a prominentexample.

A related strategic concept, that of the preemptive war (or strike),which was most vividly demonstrated by the Six Day War, was definedby Yigal Allon as "an operational initiative... against concentrations ofenemy forces and the capture of vital strategic targets on enemyterritory, at a time that such enemy is preparing to attack you, beforehe has succeeded in actually launching such an attack". Such apreemptive strike seeks to disrupt the deployment and movement ofenemy forces from the rear to the front, and to inflict damage on itsfrontal and rear installations such as airports, air defence systems,surface-to-surface missile bases, and command and control centres; italso aims at seizing vital portions of enemy territory, both in order todisrupt its ability to wage war and to serve as bargaining chips in futurepolitical negotiations.53

Following the capture of vast territories in the 1967 War, Israelipolitical and military leaders began to question the necessity of a firststrike - at both the preemptive and preventive levels - and to entertainthe notion of absorbing an Arab first strike. Similarly, it wasincreasingly believed that a first strike would be less amenable to thegreat powers than before. After 1973, Prime Minister Rabin, ForeignMinister Allon and Defence Minister Peres publicly ruled out thepossibility that Israel would readopt a first-strike policy. This pledgewas an offspring of the general war wariness within the Israeli publicfollowing the Yom Kippur War; but no less did it reflect Israel's delicateinternational position: its growing dependence on the United Statesand its greater awareness of the weighty political constraints attendinga first strike, deriving from the difficulty of knowing with certainty, orof being able to prove to that the enemy was about to attack in theshort or long term.54 Such constraints will only become weightier in thewake of the present peace process and the anticipated peace accords.

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But there have always been further reasons for precluding thepossibility of first strikes, such as recognition of the need for priorcoordination of any initiated war with a friendly superpower (theUnited States) in order to secure a political umbrella and military aid.55

In actual fact, neither after 1967 nor after 1973 did Israel give up itspredilection for a first strike, as part of its offensive approach, thoughin practice it refrained from doing so in 1973.

The reasons that had originally produced the idea of a first strike -primarily the lack of strategic depth and numerical inferiority - werelater augmented by the growing constraints posed by the battlefield onmanoeuvre. Political and military leaders are likely to conclude that oneof the most effective ways to contend with the impasse created by a denseand heavily fortified battlefield in certain theatres is to launch a firststrike at the enemy's surface-to-air missile system and its air force, inorder to achieve air superiority over the battlefield and enemy territory,so as to enable one's own ground forces to achieve a military decision.Whether decision of this sort has much chance of being implemented onthe future battlefield is still subjected to a heated debate.

Striking force: Basing one's strategy on striking force is equallyperceived in Israel as the optimal expression and implementation of theoffensive approach. Assumptions regarding Israel's inability to conductlong and exhausting wars were reinforced following the War ofAttrition with Egypt (1969-70), and never since then has Israel beenprepared to revert to that kind of war.56 Israel's security and battlefielddecision doctrines have therefore come to accommodate the need tobuild up the IDF as a striking force, capable - in contrast with aresisting force - of producing significant achievements within a shorttime. These include assistance in the implementation of a rapiddecision before political constraints have had time to affect operationson the battlefield; exploitation of the advantages of strategic initiativeto effect the enemy's collapse; implementation of the indirectapproach; and the facilitation of strategic mobility between thetheatres of war should the need for a graduated decision arise.Additional perceived advantages of a striking force, deriving from theabove, are its relatively low cost in terms of manpower losses andeconomics, and the possibilities that it opens up for exploiting thequality of the Israeli soldier and the Israel Defence Forces as a whole.57

The striking force approach gained momentum prior to the SinaiCampaign, under the leadership of Chief of the General Staff MosheDayan.58 Since then, it has remained virtually unchanged, despite therecent criticism that exclusive reliance on striking forces has beeninappropriate because it has been based on unduly optimisticassumptions about the circumstances of war, and that it is alsoimportant to develop the capacity for resistance lest the war failed tounfold in accordance with Israeli planning.59

In line with this striking-force approach, the IDF was built as a

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mobile army, based on armour and capable of operating not onlyrapidly but also continuously. During the first half of the 1960s, alogistical setup was established to lend support to the striking forces byproviding them with fuel, ammunition and other supplies during theirrapid advance, thus ensuring the continuity of the war operations. It isbuilt on the "push" system (in contrast with that of "pull", in whichmaintenance is transferred to the front only following a specificrequest or need).60

It is worth noting in this context that the 1982 Lebanon Warrepresented in certain circumstances (for example, in actions againstirregular forces) a preference to rely on firepower at the expense ofstriking force - doing so mainly to reduce casualties; a similar approachwas already adopted four years earlier in the Litani Operation (1978),as well as a decade later in the Operation Accountability (1993).

The executors of battlefield decision - the tank and the fightingaircraft: In most countries, including Israel, the ground forces are thosethat provide the main impetus for a battlefield decision. This is so forthe following reasons: the main bulk of the belligerents' armies is madeup of ground forces, and their main military targets are territorial; andthe capture of territory, apart from its contribution to the achievementof a military decision, makes it considerably easier to hang on tobattlefield gains during the course of the war and, perhaps also,thereafter.

The weapon systems which, according to Israeli doctrine, bear themain brunt of the effort to achieve battlefield decision, are the tank andthe fighting aircraft. Their dominance derives from the fact that theycombine high mobility and firepower; and indeed, during the decadebetween the Sinai Campaign and the Six Day War a combined air/landdoctrine for achieving a military decision was crystallized within theIDF.61

The central position assigned to the tank in the IDF is due to itsseveral prominent advantages: it constitutes a multi-purpose andversatile weapons system, usable for breaching enemy formations andfortifications; it is usable for both defence and offence, for armourbattles, and for exploitation of success and pursuit; it possessesfirepower and considerable mobility capabilities and, relative to itsperformance, it requires only limited manpower; it provides adequateprotection to its team and thereby reduces the number of warcasualties; it is fast and thereby aids in achieving rapid decision andshortening the course of hostilities; it facilitates the shifting of war farfrom Israel's territory; and it has operational stamina that makes itpossible to effect continuous advances and strikes - largely by virtue ofits ability to traverse hundreds of kilometres (about 200) withoutrefuelling and with relatively high autarky as regards ammunition,water and food (for about 48 hours).62

By virtue of these qualities, the "all tank" concept, made

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fashionable by Fuller, was at one time dominant in the IDF, whichbased itself on armoured and/or mechanized divisions composedlargely of heavy tanks, largely at the expense of other elements of theground forces, such as the infantry, artillery and engineering corps. Inthe Yom Kippur War, the combat weaknesses of the tank and latentflaws of the tank-based force structure were exposed. Following thewar, a greater balance was introduced between the various componentsof the ground forces, and the structural and organizational lessons ofthis conflict found their expression in the establishment of the FieldForces Command.

As for the air arm, its missions diverge from the defence of thestate's skies, to strategic bombings deep in enemy territory. But it hasalso a key role in everything related to a battlefield decision. Since theearly 1950s, the air force has been built as an arm capable not only ofproviding close air support to the ground forces but also of creating theconditions for a battlefield decision. It is supposed to do this byestablishing air superiority that will grant the ground forces "cleanskies" from enemy aircraft, thus affording them relative freedom ofaction as they are being mobilized, moved to the front and deployedthere, and ensuring a free flow of war materiel from the rear to thefront.

The 1960s witnessed the evolution of the concept whereby theattainment of air superiority would not be effected through airconfrontations with attacking enemy aircraft but rather by destroyingthe enemy's air force on the ground, and/or destroying its anti-aircraftsystems immediately upon the outbreak of war, so as to prevent themfrom disrupting the freedom of action of the Israeli air force. From thepoint of view of the Israeli air force, a strike necessitates the use ofmost of its fighting aircraft, which are mainly versatile fighter bombers;this, in turn, relegates missions of close air support into a secondaryrole, at least during the initial stages of the war.

In the view of senior IDF officers, the freedom of action of armiesboth on the ground and in the air will become limited in the futurebattlefield. In September 1991, the commander of the IDF EngineeringCorps assessed that "if, until now, some 70-80 per cent of the battlehave been conducted in open spaces... the future battle is bound tochange so that about 80 per cent of the fighting will be conductedbetween obstacles".63 Similarly, the then commander of the Israeli AirForce pointed to the fairly clear trend of greater constraints on airmanoeuvrability, resulting from the increase in anti-aircraft weaponsand their growing sophistication.64 However, many senior IDF officersstill believe otherwise, whether out of intellectual conservatism or dueto typical organizational thinking.65 On the other hand, a growingnumber of experts are talking about the expected revolution on thebattlefield, augured by the appearance of the combat helicopter -which surpasses the tank in its operational and strategic

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manoeuvrability and firepower." With the appearance of airbornemulti-corps divisions in the future, the tank will continue to play a roleon the battlefield, but that role is likely to be reduced to missions of atactical and frontal nature.

THE BATTLEFIELD-DECISION DOCTRINE IN THE WAKE OFTHE 1991 GULF WAR

Up to the 1991 Gulf War, Israeli military thinking focused on decisionin the context of the direct battlefield. In other words, it did not thinkvery much in terms of denying the enemy the ability to continuefighting by striking at its society, morale, and strategic-industrialinfrastructure, or by targeting its high command so as to force it tocease hostilities. While there were occasional manifestations of thisstrategic thinking (for example, the shelling of the Suez Canal townsand the deep air raids during the War of Attrition), these were theexception that proved the rule. There was certainly a measure ofcomplacency or, perhaps, indifference, regarding the possibility thatthe Arabs might in the future attempt to develop the means of avoidinga battlefield confrontation and striking directly at Israel's society, letalone that they might use these means, if ever available. The responsesto these potential threats, adopted during the years preceding the GulfWar, were both inadequate and impractical. They were based on theassumption that, in the words of Yitzhak Rabin, it would be possible"without any fuss to move the entire population remaining in the largecities into shelters, until the achievement of military decision".67 Thefiring of Iraqi missiles at Israel's rear during the Gulf War did much todispel this complacency. It demonstrated, first of all, how widely theconcept of decision has expanded in the Middle Eastern context, fromthe tactical, operational and strategic spheres all the way up to thegrand-strategy level; and, secondly, it has precipitated renewedretrospection - more critical now, and extremely vital - of thetraditional Israeli doctrine of battlefield decision.

Granted, the firing of missiles does not constitute a full militaryconfrontation, and it is of course impossible to achieve a battlefielddecision through the use of missiles alone, or to place the continuedexistence of an enemy state in jeopardy. But the fact that the Arabspossess the ability to fire long-range missiles indicates that, in theMiddle East, there is no longer any sense in continuing to think interms of narrow and relatively insulated battlefields, and that there isno choice but to accept that the country's society - its population andeconomy - is now an integral part of the confrontation, and that theimportance of the link between the front and the rear has grown.Technological developments have not only expanded the scope of thebattlefield: they have created a real connection between the civilianrear and the military front, and have made the rear more exposed than

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ever before. Liddell Hart and Fuller, the military thinkers who morethan anyone else epitomize the strategic thinking of the twentiethcentury, emphasized the matter of avoiding direct militaryconfrontation. In their view, this could be achieved both at thebattlefield level - by striking at the enemy's command and control (the"brain) and maintenance (the "belly") centres - and at the nationallevel: by striking at its society - its industrial infrastructure and itsmorale.68

In his famous book The Command of the Air, written after the FirstWorld War (and inflating the value of air power as a factor capable,quite by itself, of achieving decision in war), Giulio Douhet looked farinto the future by positing strikes at the enemy rear as the means fordeciding a war. He described the demoralizing effects of air attacks ona country's rear, and urged that wars ought to be decided in thatmanner.69 The steadfastness and stamina of the rear have an impact ondevelopments at the front: on the ability to transfer human andmaterial resources to the front, on troops' morale, and on thecost/benefit calculations of the high command. Important Arabstrategists, such as Haitham al-Ayyubi, recommended as early as 1967,when Arab inability to defeat the IDF on the battlefield becameapparent, that the Arabs adopt a more sober strategy, based on aneffort to weaken the morale of Israel's society.70 The Gulf War hasproven that the Arabs, more than ever before, are making certainstrides towards that goal. It has shown that the next Arab-Israeli war,should it ever erupt, may possibly engulf the entire area between themilitary front and Israel's rear.

Indeed, the prevailing working assumption in the IDF in the wakeof the Gulf War is that while one need not exaggerate the significanceof the missile threat (for the real threat is still posed by the overall Arabattack forces),71 it is perfectly possible that, if the peace process werefor any reason impaired, the next confrontation with the Arabs willfeature two wars taking place simultaneously, in the rear and at thefront.72 It is even conceivable that in a future war, one or more Arabstates will operate against Israel on the ground while another, orothers, perhaps those that are more peripheral, will launch missiles atits territory - which will mean that Israel's response will become farmore complicated than in the past and will entail restrictive politicalconsiderations. It may well be the case that Israel will have noalternative, if it wishes to punish a remote state that strikes it withsurface-to-surface missiles, but to make do with an air strike and byway of doing this violate the sovereignty of states that border on Israel,are not involved in hostilities, and maintain correct relations with it -perhaps even peace - and thus possibly widen the confrontation andendanger that very peace; or, even worse, Israel may give up the notionof achieving a military decision over the state (s) launching the missiles.

Also, Israel cannot conceive of ever achieving a battlefield decision

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over a remote state like Iraq, similar to that achieved by the allies in 42days during the Gulf War; she lacks the military, operational, logistical,material and human infrastructure for such a task, and is unlikely tohave the necessary time frame to recruit for the required war effort.Irrespective of whether or not the achievement of military decisionremains a realistic war objective, Israel will have to ensure in any futurewar that it not only enjoys air superiority over its enemies, but also theability to destroy their fixed and mobile ballistic missile launchers, soas to liberate its rear from that threat and to limit hostilities to thenarrow, traditional battlefield. At the same time, there will be noescape from acquiring an effective capability for intercepting anddestroying incoming ballistic missiles in the event of failure to destroythem on their launchers; not least, there will be a need to improvemethods of passive protection from whichever Arab missiles thatmanage to evade the various measures taken against them.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Israel's battlefield-decision doctrine has been primarily influenced bytwo overriding assumptions: that Israel will be in a position of overallnumerical inferiority in future wars against a coalition of Arabadversaries, and that superpower intervention will continue topreclude the attainment of an Israeli battlefield decision. While theformer assumption represents a genuine reality, the latter reflects, inthe main, a perceived reality. Further assumptions that lie at the root ofIsrael's decision doctrine include: the lack of strategic depth on mostof the theatres of war; the plethora of different potential enemies andfronts; the difficulty, from the economic and the social standpoints, ofcoping with a prolonged war; and the existential significance entailedin any Israeli defeat in war.

A combination of "force multipliers" has been used to manipulatethis adverse balance of forces - a cardinal condition for achieving abattlefield decision. The traditional assumption was that an additionalvital condition for a military decision - the ratio between firepowerand manoeuvre on the battlefield — would tilt in favour of manoeuvre.However, after the 1967 Six Day War the element of firepower beganstrengthening on the Middle Eastern battlefields by way of reaction tothe crushing Arab defeat during that war. The more prominent the roleof firepower became, the more it disrupted the implementation of theforce multipliers and made a military decision still harder. Anexpansion in the size of forces and the intensity of firepower at thefront; natural and artificial obstacles that hamper mobility; growingconstraints on the operation of the dominant weapons systems on theground and in the air (the tank and the aircraft); hardshipsencountered by the logistical system in supporting the manoeuvreeffort - all these, or at least some of them, found their expression

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during the more recent Arab-Israeli wars - in 1973 and 1982 - andcontributed to the IDF's failures to achieve strategic decision; this wasin contrast to the earlier wars - in 1948, 1956 and 1967, in whichstrategic decision was attained.73

A number of factors clearly indicate that the Israeli battlefielddecision paradigm is undergoing a crisis. These include: the trend thathas recently been evinced in the development of battlefield decision inArab-Israeli wars; the fact that Israel is likely to find itself increasinglypreoccupied with security threats different from the traditional army-to-army battlefield confrontations (threats to its rear, on the one hand,and from low-intensity conflicts, on the other); and, last but not least,the controversies that have been raging among the most senior IDFofficers.

"Sociologically", the Gulf War exercised a very powerful impactindeed, for no other reason than that it introduced doubts into thehearts of the many who had insisted on cleaving to the paradigm in itsoutmoded form. The apparent fact, so vividly demonstrated by theGulf War, that enemy states, however remote from Israel, are now ableto threaten its security without ever having to try to invade it onlycompounds the dilemmas already posed by the newly discovereddifficulties on the battlefield of breaching fortified, dense and deepenemy dispositions. These two challenges make it imperative for theIDF to equip itself with the ability to wage effective strategic hostilitiesat longer ranges than those to which it has been previouslyaccustomed, and to overcome the constraints on manoeuvre by, interalia, making greater use than in the past of the second dimension - sea- and the third dimension - air. This will entail a considerable expense,which it is doubtful whether Israel can afford. On the other hand, ifIsrael were to decide to relate to the problem of restricted manoeuvreas given, but nevertheless try to retain the goal of a military decision,it could, for example, adopt a sort of an Israeli FOFA.

Notwithstanding the rhetoric that still clutches on to formulae ofthe past, it seems that the Arab-Israeli wars since the Yom Kippur War,as well as the Gulf War and the currently progressing peace process,have all reinforced the feeling in Israel that, in the future, it maybecome necessary to place a smaller emphasis on achieving a battlefielddecision and/or the war's other military and political objectives, andmore on finding ways and means to avoid war altogether. Indeed, itwould seem that Israel's war objectives are assuming a more "negative"character, aimed first and foremost at denying the enemy any militaryor political achievements.74 Should this be the case, there will probablybe a greater emphasis than before on defensive measures - of bothpassive and active nature. By virtue of budgetary constraints, thisemphasis is likely to come at the expense of developing andmodernizing the IDF's offensive capabilities and its ability to achieve abattlefield decision. It appears, in other words, that at the end of the

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day, because of the developments indicated above, Israel will adopt afar more balanced doctrine than hitherto possessed, and one that willcontain more defensive elements than in the past.75

NOTES

1. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, 1970.2. See, for example: Carl von Clausewitz On War, Princeton, 1976, p.90; B.H. Liddell

Hart, Strategy, New York, 1968, p.25; Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender, Stanford,1958, p.5.

3. Avi Kober, Military Decision in War: The Arab Israeli Wars 1948-1982, Tel-Aviv,Ma'arachot, forthcoming.

4. Yitzhak Rabin's lecture in memory of Yitzhak Sadeh, 21 September 1967; see also, EzerWeizman, Leha Shamaim Leha Aretz (On Eagle's Wings), Tel-Aviv, 1975, pp. 185-6.For an expansion on the subject of the link between deterrence and decision, see: YoavBen-Horin and Barry Posen, Israel's Strategic Doctrine, Santa Monica, September1981, pp.18-21.

5. Moshe Arens, "Ending Wars", Ma'arachot, 292-3 (March-April 1984), p.3; AvnerYaniv, "Deterrence and Defence in Israel's Strategy", Medinah, Mimshal Ve-yehasimBenle'umiyim, 24 (Summer 1985), pp.53^t; Zvi Lanir, "Political Objectives andMilitary Aims in the Wars of Israel", in Joseph Alpher (ed.) Milhemet Breira (War ByChoice), Tel-Aviv, 1985, p. 129.

6. Yehoshafat Harkaby, a lecture, 1978.7. For a keen early awareness of the asymmetry between Israel and the Arabs in the

sphere of military decision see: David Ben-Gurion, Yichud Ve-yeud (Uniqueness andDestiny), Tel-Aviv, 1971, p.219.

8. See, for example, Yigal Allon, Kelim Shluvim (Communicating Vessels: Essays), Tel-Aviv, 1980, p . l l l . Ezer Weizman, Ha-krav al Ha-shalom: Tazpit Ishit (The Battle forPeace: a Personal Perspective), Jerusalem, 1981, p.37.

9. See, for example: Chief of the General Staff (Reserves) Haim Barlev, as quoted inImmanuel Wald, Kilelat Ha-kelim Ha-shvurim (Curse of the Broken Vessels), Tel-Aviv,1987, p.198.

10. David Ben-Gurion, Be-hilahem Israel (When Israel Goes to War), Tel-Aviv, 1975,pp.301-2; Ben-Gurion, Yichud Ve-yeud, p.161; Yigal Allon, Masach Shel Hoi (ACurtain of Sand), Tel-Aviv, 1968, p.63; Israel Tal "Israel's Security Doctrine",Ma'arachot, 253 (December 1976), p.2.

11. If one examines, for example, the ratio of manpower between Israel, on the one hand,and Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq, on the other, it emerges that, whereas the ratio was2:1 in the Arabs' favour in the Six Day War, it declined to 3:1 in the Yom Kippur Warand deteriorated still further to 5:1 in 1989. Only at the beginning of the 1990s hasthis trend been checked and even improved somewhat. Avraham Adan, "Quality andQuantity in the Yom Kippur War", in Zvi Ofer and Avi Kober (eds.), Echut Ve-kamut(Quality and Quantity in Military Buildup), Tel-Aviv, p.275; Aharon Levran et al (eds.),The Middle East Military Balance 1978-1988, Tel-Aviv, 1988, pp.428, 429; TheInternational Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1993-1994, London,1993.

12. Shimon Peres, Mahar Ahshav (Tomorrow is Now), Jerusalem, 1978, p.249.13. Haim Barlev, "The War and its Aims", Ma'arachot, 266 (October-November) 1978,

p.2.14. See Kober, Military Decision in War.15. See, for example, Michael Brecher et ah, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy

Behaviour", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.13, No.l (March 1969).16. See, Kober, Military Decision in War.17. Strategic depth is defined as territory which, even if penetrated by the enemy, keeps

the state's vital interests and particularly its population and economic centres out of acritical danger. See, Aharon Yariv, "Strategic Depth: an Israeli View", Ma'arachot,270-1 (October 1979).

18. Yigal Allon, "Defensible Borders", Molad, October 1976; see also Yigal Allon, "Israel:

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The Case for Defensible Borders", Foreign Affairs, 55 (October 1976), pp.38-53.19. Amos Gilboa, Interview with Lieutenant-General Dan Shomron, Ma'ariv, 18 August

1989.20. Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army, London, 1975, pp.205-6.21. Ben-Gurion, Be-hilahem Israel, pp.14, 127, 132, 244, 289; Peres, Mahar Ahshav,

pp.249-50; Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security, New York, 1987, p.103; Israel Tal,"Offence and Defence in the Wars of Israel", Ma'arachot, 311 (March 1988), p.6;Moshe Bar-Kochba, "Changes and Trends in the IDF's Structure", Skirah Hodshit,1988, Nos.3-4, p.24.

22. Peled, "How Israel Failed to Prepare for War", p.24. For the considerable sensitivity ofthe policy-makers to this matter, see: Moshe Dayan, "Sinai: 10 Years After",Ma'arachot 306-7 (December 1986-January 1987), pp.27-28. In this matter, see also:Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life, Jerusalem, 1976, p.343,356 (Hebrew); Allon, MasachShel Hoi, pp.76-7; Tal, "Israel's Security Doctrine.", p.7.

23. Allon, Masach Shel Hoi, pp.66, 69, 173; Yitzhak Rabin, "The Test of Deterrence",Safra Ve-saifa, 4 (November 1981), p.29; Ben-Gurion, Be-hilahem Israel, p.189; Peres,Mahar Ahshav, p.249.

24. Israel Tal, a lecture, 1978. Aharon Yariv, "Strategic Depth", a lecture, 1979. The lasttwo Chiefs of the IDF General Staff have expressed themselves in this vein. See, forexample: Gilboa, interview with Dan Shomron, 1989.

25. On this matter see, for example, George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in theInternational System, New York, 1977, pp.3-4. For reference to Israel see, forexample, Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, Ithaca, 1984; Ben-Horinand Posen, Israel's Strategic Doctrine, pp.29-34.

26. Tal, "Israel's Security Doctrine"; Tal, "Offence and Defence"; Mordechai Gur, asquoted in Louis Williams (ed.), Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict, Tel-Aviv,1975, p.199; Dov Tamari, "Does the IDF Think in a Conservative Manner?",Ma'arachot 317 (October-November 1989); Yariv, "Strategic Depth", 1979; ArielLevite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine, Tel-Aviv, 1988, p.67. Littlewonder that Ben-Gurion saw offence as a "strategy that promises victory" (Ben-Gurion, Be-hilahem Israel, p.399).

27. For the view of Ariel Sharon on this matter see: Uri Dan, Rosh Gesher (Bridgehead),Tel-Aviv, 1975, p.13; for the approach of the then Chief of the General Staff DavidElazar see: Williams, Military Aspects, p.50.

28. Amnon Yogev, "Israel's Security in the 1990s and Beyond", Alpaim, 1 (June 1989).29. On NATO's strategy of Follow-ON Forces Attack, see for example: Boyd Sutton et al.,

"Strategic and Doctrinal Implications of the Deep Attack: Concepts for the Defense ofCentral Europe", in Keith A, Dunn and William O. Staudemaier (eds.), MilitaryStrategy in Transition: Defense and Deterrence in the 1980s, Boulder, 1984, pp.60-83.

30. See, for example, Dov Tamari, "Thoughts on Tactics", Ma'arachot, 273-4 (May-June1980), p.4.

31. See, for example, Haim Yaabetz, "Israel's Security Doctrine", a lecture in Yad Tabenkin,1984; Levite, Offense and Defense, p.66.

32. See the definition given by Abba Eban to security borders, quoted in: Dan Horowitz,"The Permanent and the Dynamic in Israel's Security Doctrine", in War by Choice,p.72.

33. Efraim Inbar, "Israel's Strategy since the Yom Kippur War", Ma'arachot, 289-90(October 1983); Dan Shomron, an interview with Davar, 11 September 1988.

34. See the words of Chief of the General Staff Mordechai Gur in Williams, The MilitaryAspects, p.199, and also his ideas and statements in Ma'ariv as quoted in Inbar, "Israel'sStrategy", p.17. See also: Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, Cambridge MA,1978, p.315; Steven Rosen and Martin Indyk, "The Temptation to Preempt in a FifthArab-Israeli War", Orbis, Vol.20, No.2 (Summer 1976).

35. Inbar, "Israel's Strategy", p.18. By contrast, the political echelon tried to reduce Israel'soffensive profile (Ibid.).

36. Allon, Masach Shel Hoi, p.66.37. Ibid., p.60.38. B.H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War, London, 1943, p.179; Clausewitz, On War,

p.248. Michael Handel attributes to Israel the preference for the strongest front.Michael I. Handel, Israel's Political Military Doctrine, Cambridge MA, OccasionalPapers in International Affairs, No.30 (July 1973), p.67.

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39. Inbar, "Israel's Strategy", p.19.40. See, for example, Handel, Israel's Political Military Doctrine, p.67.41. See, for example, Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study in his Military Thought, London,

1977, pp.238-73.42. Meir Pa'il, "The Indirect Approach is Preferable", Ma'arachot Shirion 28 (January

1973); Avraham Ayalon, "The War of Independence, the Sinai War, the Six Day War:Comparative Traits", Ma'arachot, 191-2 (June 1968).

43. Allon, Masach Shel Hoi, p.69.44. Tamari, "Does the IDF think in a Conservative Manner?", p.24; Menachem Eynan,

"The Importance of Quantity in Light of the Constraints on Quality", in Ofer &Kober, Echut Ve-kamut, p.481.

45. Allon, Masach Shel Hoi, p.159; see also, Israel Tal, "The Tank at Present and in theFuture", Ma'arachot, 281 (November 1981), p.3; Peled "How Israel Failed to Preparefor War", p.25.

46. Ben-Gurion, Be-hilahem Israel, p.87; and his Yichud Ve-yeud, p.141. See also: MichaelBar Zohar, Ben-Gurion, New York, pp.906-7.

47. Shabtai Teveth, Moshe Dayan, Tel-Aviv, p.355.48. Dayan, Story of My Life, pp.149, 176-8, 210; Horowitz, "The Permanent and the

Dynamic", p.69; Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security, pp.50-1; Handel, Israel's PoliticalMilitary Doctrine, pp.13, 19, 24-7, 35, 50-1.

49. Tal, "The Tank at Present", p.3.50. Dan Horowitz, "The Permanent and the Dynamic", p.69; Allon, Masach Shel Hoi,

p.68; Yitzhak Rabin, Pinkas Sherut (The Rabin Memoirs), Tel-Aviv, 1979, pp.165-6.51. Dan Horowitz, Tfisat Ha-bitakhon Ha-leumi shel Israel (Israel's National Security

Doctrine), Jerusalem, 1973, p.35.52. Ibid., p.35.53. Allon, Masach Shel Hoi, pp.68, 70, 73. See also Tal, "The Tank", p.5; Horowitz,

Israel's National Security Doctrine, p.35.54. Inbar, "Israel's Strategy".55. Yitzhak Rabin, "The Lessons of Sinai", Skirah Hodshit, 1968, Nos.10-11.56. On the War of Attrition as a red line from Israel's standpoint, see: Micha Bar, Kavim

Adumim Be-estrategiyat Ha-harta'a Ha-Israelit (Red Lines in Israel's DeterrenceStrategy), Te-Aviv, 1990, pp.108-9.

57. On the predilection for a striking force, including its perceived low costs, see, forexample: David Ben-Gurion, Zava U-vitahon (Army and Security), Tel-Aviv, 1955,pp.14, 244; Israel Tal, "Israel's Security Doctrine", p.3; Tal, "The Tank", p.3.

58. John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, Ithaca, 1983, pp.135-6. One of the mostprominent Israeli strategists to express this approach has been Israel Tal. See: Tal,"Offence and Defence in the Arab-Israeli Wars", p.6.

59. One of the early critics in this vein was Yigal Allon. See Masach Shel Hoi, p.79.60. See, Richard A Gabriel, "Lessons of War: The IDF in Lebanon", Military Review, Vol

LXiy No.8 (August 1984), p.62.61. See, for example, Haim Laskov, "The Lessons of Kadesh", Ma'arachot Shirion, 21

(October 1970); Haim Laskov and Meir Zorea, "Once You Wage War", Ma'ariv, 10October 1965.

62. See: Moshe Bar Kochba, Merkavot Ha-plada (Chariots of Steel), Tel-Aviv, 1989,pp.574-5; Hanoch Bar-Tov, Dado, Tel-Aviv, 1979, pp.83-105 (Hebrew); Tal, "TheTank", p.3; Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, pp.126-32; Handel, Israel'sPolitical Military Doctrine pp.24-8.

63. Ba-mahane, 19 September 1991.64. Ibid..65. For the opinions of the Head of the Operations Department at the IDF GHQ and the

Commander of the Armoured Corps in this respect see Ibid.66. Both Israel's "Mr. Armour", General (Res.) Tal and a former Air Force Commander

have estimated that the combat helicopter will supersede the tank on the futurebattlefield. Tal, "The Tank", pp.2-7; Ba-mahane, 19 September 1991.

67. Quoted by Reuven Pedatzur, Ha-aretz, 25 February 1991.68. Liddel Hart, Thoughts on War, p.54; John Mearsheimer, Liddel Hart and the Weight of

History, Ithaca, 1988, pp.88-9. For Fuller's attitude see his "Plan for 1919" Q.Y.C.Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, London, 1936.

69. Guilio Douhet, The Command of the Air, London, 1943, pp.252-3.

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70. Haitham al-Ayyubi, "Revolutionary Characteristics of the Fourth Arab-Israeli War",Ma'arachot, 234-5 (January-February 1974), pp.15-21.

71. This view was expressed by the then Chief of the General Staff Dan Shomron, Ha-aretz, 19 March, 1991.

72. Interview with Major General Ze'ev Livne, OC Home Front Command, Ba-mahane,15 January 1992; interview with Colonel Benny Michelson, Head of the IDF's HistoryDepartment, Ba-mahane, 19 September 1991.

73. See Kober, Military Decision in War.74. For Rabin's attitude in this vein see: Ha-aretz Supplement, 29 September 1989.75. On this matter, see, for example: Ariel Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military

Doctrine.

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a paradigm ina paradigm in crisis, israel's doctrine of military decision crisis,...

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