a paradigm theory of existence · ask willard quine what existence is, and you will hear that...

A PARADIGM THEORY OF EXISTENCE

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES

VOLUME 89

Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer

Editor

Keith Lehrer, University of Arizona, Tucson

Associate Editor

Stewart Cohen, Arizona State University, Tempe

Board of Consulting Editors

Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Radu Bogdan, Tulane University, New Orleans

Marian David, University of Notre Dame

Allan Gibbard, University of Michigan

Denise Meyerson, University of Cape Town

Fran<;ois Recanati, Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS, Paris

Stuart Silvers, Clemson University

Barry Smith, State University of New York at Buffalo

Nicholas D. Smith, Michigan State University

The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.

A PARADIGM THEORY OF EXISTENCE

Onto-Theology Vindicated

by

WILLIAM F. VALLI CELLA

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

A c.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 978-90-481-6128-7 ISBN 978-94-017-0588-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-0588-2

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All Rights Reserved © 2002 Springer Scicnce+Business Media Dordrccht

Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2002

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For Mary

Lumen soli mutuum das

The absolute things, the last things, the overlapping things, are the truly philosophic concerns; all superior minds feel seriously about them, and the mind with the shortest views is simply the mind of the more shallow man.

William James

CONTENTS

PREFACE

I THE IDEA OF A PARADIGM THEORY OF EXISTENCE 1. Between Existential Neutrality and Circularity 2. Existence Cannot Be a Concept 3. Are There Modes of Existence?

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1 2 8

15 4. Contingency and Necessity as Modes of Existence 22 5. Need for a Unified Answer to the Nature and Ground Questions 24 6. Possibility of a Unified Positive Answer to the Two Questions 29 7. A Spectrum of Theories 30

II IS EXISTENCE A FIRST-LEVEL PROPERTY? 37 1. There Are No Nonexistent Objects 38 2. Argument One: Vicious Circularity of the Property View 42 3. Argument Two: ExtemaVIntemal 48 4. Argument Three: Property-instances and Tropes 49 5. Argument Four: Essential/Accidental 49 6. Argument Five: Existence Too Basic to Be a Property 51 7. Argument Six: the Holism of Existence 53 8. Existence, Actuality, and Contingency 55 9. Existence and the 'Existential' Quantifier 57 10. The Etiology of Existence-blindness. Analytic Existentials? 62

ill THE 'NO DIFFERENCE' THEORY 67 1. Eliminativism Versus Identitarianism 68 2. Refutation of the Identitarian Reading of the Theory 71 3. Brentano as an Eliminativist 72 4. Brentano's Argument 76 5. Brentano's Eliminativism Eliminated 80 6. The Eliminativism of Donald C. Williams Eliminated 81 7. Nonconstituent Ontology and Eliminativism 88 8. The Minor Existential Difference Vindicated 89

IV IS EXISTENCE A PROPERTY OF PROPERTIES? 93 1. Preliminaries 95 2. Three Grades of Strength of the Instantiation Theory 96 3. Existence, Satisfaction, and Instantiation 96 4. Existence and Exemplification: Identitarianism 97 5. Existence and Exemplification: Eliminativism 104 6. Frege's Theory of Existence 108

V111

7. Untangling Plato's Beard 112 8. Nonexistence and Negative Existentials 114 9. IdentitarianlEliminativist Ambiguity in Quine 116 10. Conclusion 122

V MONDIAL ATTRIBUTE THEORIES 127 1. Sommers on Existence: Exposition 127 2. Sommers on Existence: Critique 132 3. Diagnosis of How Sommers Goes Wrong 149 4. Hartmann on Essence and Existence 151

VI THE ONTOLOGY OF THE CONTINGENT EXISTENT 159 1. A Solution via a Constituent Theory of Individuals 160 2. Facts versus Bundles 163 3. The Need for Truth-Makers 163 4. Truth-Makers as Concrete Facts 165 5. The Ostrich Realist's Rejection of Truth-Making Rejected 168 6. Rejection of N onconstituent Realism 170 7. The Thin and the Thick Particular 176 8. Are There Uninstantiated Constituent Universals? 178 9. Are There Fact-Independent Thin Particulars? 181 10. Summary and Transition 186 11. Thin Particulars versus Aristotelian Substances 187 12. Two Objections to Constituent Ontology 189 13. Conclusion: Advantages ofthis Approach 191

VII THE GROUND OF THE CONTINGENT EXISTENT 195 1. Three Conceptions of Facts 196 2. Bradley's Problem 199 3. Is a Relation a Tertium Quid? 201 4. Is Exemplification a Nonrelational Tie? 203 5. Is Exemplification a Nonrelational Nontie? 205 6. Does the Exemplification Relation Spawn a Regress? 206 7. Is the Exemplification Regress Benign? Armstrong 207 8. Is the Exemplification Regress Benign? McTaggart 209 9. Are Unifying Constituents Universals? 211 10. Does Relatedness Require Unifiers? 213 11. Are Properties Universals? 216 12. Are the Existence and Actuality of a Fact the Same? 223 13. Is the Unity of a Complex Contingent? 225 14. Summary and Transition 226 15. Are Facts Irreducible Entities? Hochberg 227

16. Are Facts Irreducible Entities? Olson 17. Are Facts Irreducible Entities? Annstrong 18. Dependentism Vindicated 19. The Argument Summarized

VIII THE PARADIGM EXISTENT 1. One or Many? 2. Does the External Unifier Avoid Bradley's Regress? 3. The Unifier not a Castanedan Ontological Operator 4. The External Unifier as Mind 5. The External Unifier as Transcendental Mind? 6. The External Unifier as Necessarily Existent Mind 7. The Unifier as Self-Existent Existence 8. What is the Alternative?

REFERENCES

INDEX

IX

234 234 238 239

249 249 250 254 255 256 267 269 269

273

279

Preface

The heart of philosophy is metaphysics, and at the heart of the heart lie two questions about existence. What is it for any contingent thing to exist? Why does any contingent thing exist? Call these the nature question and the ground question, respectively. The first concerns the nature of the existence of the contingent existent; the second concerns the ground of the contingent existent. Both questions are ancient, and yet perennial in their appeal; both have presided over the burial of so many of their would-be undertakers that it is a good induction that they will continue to do so.

For some time now, the preferred style in addressing such questions has been deflationary when it has not been eliminativist. Ask Willard Quine what existence is, and you will hear that "Existence is what existential quantification expresses."! Ask Bertrand Russell what it is for an individual to exist, and he will tell you that an individual can no more exist than it can be numerous: there just is no such thing as the existence of individuals.2 And of course Russell's eliminativist answer implies that one cannot even ask, on pain of succumbing to the fallacy of complex question, why any contingent individual exists: if no individual exists, there can be no question why any individual exists. Not to mention Russell's modal corollary: 'contingent' and 'necessary' can only be said de dicto (of propositions) and not de re (of things). At the source of the Russellian-Quinean stream stands the imposing figure of Frege, perhaps the greatest of logicians, and certainly the greatest since Aristotle. But logic is not metaphysics, and we shall see that existence cannot come into focus through the lenses of logic alone. It is, as Santayana once said, "odious to the logician.,,3 This is part of its charm, as the resolute reader will no doubt come to appreciate.

The critical task of this book is to put paid to deflationary and eliminativist accounts, thereby restoring existence to its rightful place as one of the deep topics in philosophy, if not the deepest. The constructive task is to defend the thesis that the nature and ground questions admit of a unified answer, and that this answer takes the form of what I call a paradigm theory of existence. The central idea of the paradigm theory is that existence itself is nothing abstract (hence not a property or a concept or a quantifier or anything merely logical or linguistic or representational) but is instead a paradigmatically existent concrete individual. The idea is not merely that existence itself exists -- which would be true if one said that existence is a property and one held a realist theory of properties -- but that existence exists in a plenary concrete sense that it cannot be the business of a preface to explain. But the idea may be limned as follows. Existence itself exists of absolute metaphysical necessity and the contingent existent exists in virtue of its dependence on self-existent existence. I submit that this robust theory of existence can be as rigorously defended as any deflationary theory.

xi

xii PREFACE

I thank the publishers of Nous, Dialectica, International Journalfor the Philosophy of Religion, History of Philosophy Quarterly, and International Philosophical Quarterly for permission to reprint some previously published material. The anonymous referees of these journals should not go unacknowledged for the probity and precision of their unsung service. The same holds for the anonymous Kluwer referee whose detailed comments on an earlier draft were of considerable help. Comments from Quentin Gibson, Horace Jeffery Hodges, D. W. Mertz, Philipp Keller, and Barry Miller have also proven to be very useful. Barry Miller, I should add, is a fellow worker in the vineyards of existence whose works must be studied by those dissatisfied with deflationary approaches.4 An Auseinandersetzung with his views, which was originally to be included in this volume, will appear in due course as a separate work. I am grateful to Ingrid Krabbenbos, my Kluwer contact, for her prompt attention to my numerous e-mail queries.

Above all, I am indebted to my wife Mary whose loving support made it possible for me to leave the ranks of those who live from philosophy, but rarely for it, and to strike out on an independent path. I should also mention fellow maverick Quentin Smith with whom I have enjoyed many a conversation and on whom I have inflicted many a half-baked draft. The largesse of the National Endowment for the Humanities of the USA contributed its part to my postdoctoral education. Among teachers and NEH seminar directors, I recall with pleasure Roderick Chisholm, Hector-Neri Castaneda, and J. N. Findlay, all of whom, sadly enough, have ascended into the philosophical pantheon. I have tried to combine Chisholm's sobriety, Castaneda's systematic vision and Findlay'S speculative depth -- with what success, or lack thereof, the reader is left to decide.

June, 2002

NOTES

William F. Vallicella Gold Canyon, Arizona, USA

[email protected]

1 W. V. Quine, "Existence and Quantification" in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 97.

2 Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' in Logic and Knowledge, ed. R. C. Marsh (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), pp. 232 ff.

3 George Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955), p. 48.

4 Barry Miller, The Fullness of Being (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002). See also his From Existence to God (London: Routledge, 1992).

Chapter One

The Idea of a Paradigm Theory of Existence

Our question about the nature of existence is actually two questions. First, what is it for a contingent individual to exist? Second, what is existence itself? But the questions are closely intertwined, and so may be posed indifferently in the form, what is existence? Our treatment divides into two halves, one critical, the other constructive. The critical chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this book tread the via negativa: they attempt to show what existence is not. They issue in the following aporetic tetrad:

a. Existence is not a property or property-instance of individuals. b. Existence is not identical to individuals. c. Existence is not a property of properties or cognate items. d. Existence is not a property of worlds or domains.

The limbs of this tetrad are plausible even without argument; the detailed arguments of chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 should make them well-nigh irresistible. Taken together, (a)-(d) present us with the two main problems of this book. The first is to explain how existence can belong to existing individuals (as the third and fourth limbs imply) without being identical to individuals (as per the second limb), but also without being a property or property-instance of them (as per the first limb).

To simplify the question, how can an individual have existence if this having is not the instantiating of a property? Chapter 6 answers this question with the doctrine that the existence of a contingent individual is the contingent unity or togetherness of its ontological constituents. We will see that this togetherness cannot be understood as a property of an individual or as a relation among its constituents. It is a unique sort of unity the nature of which logically requires a unifier as its ontological ground, a unifier that is external in that it is distinct from the individual and each of its constituents.

The second main problem is to determine what existence itself is. As the reflexive pronoun suggests, existence itself is existence considered in its difference from existing individuals. There is clearly a prima facie distinction between existence itself and the existence of an individual. Thus someone who thinks that existence is a universal property of individuals would have to distinguish between the property of existence itself -- which is a universal-- and the particular existing of a, which is a's instantiating of existence, the particular existing of b, which is b' s instantiating of existence, and so on. Now we shall see in Chapter 2 that existence itself cannot be a property, and thus that the existing of an individual cannot be its instantiating of this putative property. But

1

2 CHAPfERONE

although this illustration of the primo. facie distinction collapses, the distinction does not. Given (from Chapter 6) that the existence of an individual is the unity of its ontological constituents, we will argue (Chapter 7) that unity logically demands an external unifier, and thus that existence itself - existence in its difference from individual existents - is the external unifier of each particular unity of ontological constituents.

Our approach implies not only that existence itself exists, but also that it exists in a paradigmatic way, as that by relation to which contingent objects exist. Hence the name, 'paradigm theory of existence.' To deny that existence itself exists is to embrace difficulties whose exfoliation will commence in section 2 below. To deny that existence paradigmatically exists is to make an adequate account of existence impossible, as section 1 below begins to argue. The gist of the paradigm theory may be put as follows:

(PT) Necessarily, for any contingent individual x, x exists if and only if (i) there is a necessary y such that y is the paradigm existent, and (ii) y, as the external unifier of x's ontological constituents, directly produces the unity/existence of x.

(PT) comes highly recommended by the fact that it allows for the reconciliation of two desiderata that cannot otherwise be reconciled. One desideratum is that a theory of existence account for the actual existence of existing individuals. The other is that it avoid circularity. These desiderata and their reconciliation will be explained in detail in the following section.

Another point in favor of (PT) is that, in accounting for what it is for a contingent individual to exist, it at the same time accounts for why any contingent individual exists. No doubt some will take this to be a liability of (PT). But it is a peculiarity of existence that no adequate account of it can be given which is not a unified account both of what it is for a contingent individual to exist, and of why any contingent individual exists. We will return to this in detail in sections 5 and 6 below.

1. BETWEEN EXISTENTIAL NEUTRALITY AND CIRCULARITY

The very question, 'What is existence?' embodies a tension. The word 'what' suggests that the goal of the inquiry is the nature, essence, or intelligible structure of the existence of individuals. But the word 'existence,' if it means anything, refers to the that and the whether of things. The existence of a thing is its sheer ontological presence, a presence that makes possible, and thus is not to be confused with, its phenomenological presence, pace some phenomenologists. The existence of a thing is its being as opposed to its (possible) nonbeing, its being 'outside the mind.' The existence of a thing is

THE IDEA OF A PARADIGM THEORY 3

something it has quite apart from us and our conceptual and linguistic activities. This 'datanic' point must be kept in view. Although we take this to be a datum, section 2 argues for it by arguing that existence cannot be a concept that we impose on things, but must be a determination they possess independently of us.

Now if the existence of a thing is its sheer ontological presence, its thatness, then to ask what it is for an individual to exist, is to ask, seemingly paradoxically, about the whatness (nature) of this thatness. This is not empty word-play. If the sheer existence of things is not to be an unintelligible surd like Jean-Paul Sartre's en soi, the appropriate response to which would be Roquentin's nausea, then the existence of things must have an intelligible structure. The thatness must have a whatness. But what sort of intelligible content or structure could existence have? Is not existence just a bare facticity opposite to all intelligibility? If ontology is fundamentally about existence, and not fundamentally about what exists, how is ontology so much as possible? This is a problem we must solve if we are to proceed.

The problem assumes the form of a dilemma. If a theory of the existence of individuals is to be possible, then existence must have an intelligible structure that can be explicated or conceptualized. But any non circular explication which presupposes that existence is a property of existents will fail to capture actual existence. Thus even if it is true that, necessarily, for any x, x exists if and only if x is causally active/passive, this explication fails to capture actual existence. This is clear from the fact that the truth of the biconditional is consistent with the nonexistence of individuals. Even if no individual exists, it could still be true that, for any x, x exists just in case x is causally active/passive. To specify a property that all and only existing individuals have, such as the property of being causally active/passive, or the property of being spatiotemporal, or the property of being self-identical, or the property of being the value of a bound variable, etc., is not to express what it is for an individual to exist.

Let us say that any theory of existence which attempts to specify a property that all and only existing individuals have is an existentially neutral theory of existence. It is clear that any such theory is not a theory of existence at all, but at best a theory of what exists. Thus the first example in the foregoing paragraph tells us that what exists are causally active/passive entities and nothing besides. It does not tell us what it is for an entity to exist. Thus our first desideratum for a viable theory of existence is that it avoid existential neutrality. To avoid existential neutrality, however, a theory of existence must somehow invoke or presuppose that something actually exists. For only if the theory invokes or presupposes something that actually exists will it be able to account for the actual existence of anything. But then how can the theory avoid vicious circularity? How can a viable theory satisfy the first desideratum, which

4 CHAPTER ONE

forbids existential neutrality, without violating the second, which forbids circularity? Before we can find a way around or between the horns of this dilemma, we must appreciate its prima facie force. Let us consider the horns in more detail, and see what sort of case can be made for each of them.

Horn One. Consider the following theory: (T1) Necessarily, x exists if and only if x has properties. This appears to specify what it is for an individual to exist: for an individual to exist is for it to have properties. But it is clear that (Tl) could be true even ifno individual exists. This should give us pause. If a theory of existence could be true even if no individual exists, then it is obviously not a theory of what the actual existence of an individual consists in. For in that case we have not conceptualized the actual existence of the individual in question; at best we have conceptualized a property which the individual must have given that it exists.

The actual existence of an individual contrasts with its possible nonexistence. The actual existence of an individual is that in virtue of which it is rather than is not. It is this difference between existence and nonexistence that must be explained if we are to have an explanation of what it is for an individual to exist. What does this difference consist in?

Some will claim that this is a logically primitive difference not susceptible of explication in more basic terms. Chapter 7 will argue that this difference cannot be logically primitive. Indeed, it will be argued that to assume that it is logically primitive leads to a contradiction. But for the moment, we are assuming, naturally enough, that an account of it can be given. It would be unphilosophical to begin by assuming that what one wants an account of is unaccountable. The present point is that the question concerning the difference between existence and nonexistence cannot be answered by specifying a property that all and only existing individuals have. But this is all that (Tl) does: it specifies a property (the property of having properties) that all and only existing individuals have - if there are any. At best, (T1) is extensionally correct. Compare (DI): Necessarily, x is triangular if and only if x is trilateral. This is extensionally correct: all and only triangular items are trilateral items. But it does not tell what it is for something to be triangular. It leaves us in the dark as to the nature of triangularity. Similarly, (Tl) leaves us in the dark as to the nature of existence, i.e., the nature of an individual's existing. (D1) says in effect, given that there are triangular items, then they are trilateral, and vice versa. (Tl) says in effect, given that there are existing individuals, then they have properties, and vice versa. But it is precisely the structure of the existing of these given individuals that wants accounting, and this is something that cannot be provided by any theory of the form of (Tl).

The truth of (Tl) is not in dispute. That we accept (T1) while Meinongians reject it is not the point. The point is rather that (Tl) does not


qualify as a theory of what it is for an individual to exist. It qualifies only as a theory about what exists. Existence must be distinguished from what exists: existence is that in virtue of which what exists exists. Plotinus said that "It is by the One that all beings are beings." (Enneads VI, 9) We say: it is by existence that what exists exists. No doubt these are hard and dark sayings. But we have a whole book ahead of us to make them easy and light.

That (Tl) does not qualify as a theory of what it is for an individual to exist may also be seen from the fact that (Tl) is consistent with each of the following three theories which are inconsistent with each other: (A) the theory that contingent individuals are caused to exist ex nihilo by God; (B) the theory that contingent individuals are caused to exist by other (earlier) contingent individuals; (C) the theory that contingent individuals exist on their own wholly without cause, as a matter of 'brute fact.' To simplify the discussion, consider just (A) and (C). These are logical contraries and so cannot both be true. But each is consistent with (Tl). And each is a theory of what it is for an individual to exist. (A) says that the existence of an individual is its being created by God; (C) says that the existence of an individual is its causeless ontological presence. Since (A) and (C) are both genuine theories of existence, we must conclude that (Tl) is not a theory of the genuine article, actual existence. What is it then? The most (Tl) can legitimately be is a theory about what exists: everything that exists has properties, and vice versa. But if one insists on taking (Tl) as a theory of existence, then all it can be is a theory of pseudo-existence, existence masquerading as an essence or nature or category or structure.

What is true of (Tl) is true of every theory of the same form. Thus no instance of the theory-schema, 'Necessarily x exists if and only if x_,' where a candidate gap-filler is a monadic or non-relational predicate, can amount to an adequate theory of existence. Plug 'is spatiotemporal' into the gap. The result is arguably false since there are presumably items (e.g., sets) that exist without being spatiotemporal. But suppose the result, call it (T2), is true. Still, (T2) cannot amount to a theory of the genuine article, actual existence. For again, (T2) could be true even if no individual exists. All (T2) could legitimately be is a theory about what exists.

We may also note that a spatiotemporal item like my writing table is possibly nonexistent; but it is surely not possibly non-spatiotemporal. So for this reason as well, existence cannot consist in spatiotemporality. The same holds for any monadic predicate that expresses a quality or categorial feature. Nothing surprising here: surely the existence of an item cannot be reduced to any of its qualities or categorial features.

Horn Two. An adequate theory of existence cannot, therefore, remain neutral on the question whether individuals actually exist. Existence is not a structure or categorial feature that mayor may not be instantiated; existence is

6 CHAPTER ONE

the sheer thatness of things, their presence, their being rather than nonbeing. An adequate theory must explain the actual existing of individuals. Otherwise, there would be no way to capture the facticity or thatness of existence. But if so, we risk being skewered by the second prong of our dilemma, according to which any theory of existence that presupposes that individuals exist cannot avoid vicious circularity.

Thus Quine's proposal that a exists if and only if (~x)(x == a), l although doubtlessly true, provides no insight into what it is for a to exist. (Here we treat Quine's proposal somewhat cavalierly; a much more nuanced treatment is provided in section 9 of Chapter 4.) That it provides no insight is clear from the manifest circularity of Quine's suggestion. For what it comes to is that a named individual exists just in case it is identical to something that exists. Of course, it does not quite say this. What it says is that a named individual exists just in case it is identical to something. But 'identical to something' is elliptical for 'identical to something that exists.' It is clear that Quine's definition would be false if the first phrase were elliptical for 'identical to something that does not exist,' or elliptical for 'identical to something that neither exists nor does not exist.' So if Quine's definition is true, then it is circular. And if it is noncircular, then it is false. (This last sentence is just a restatement of Horn One.) Quine's biconditional is not quite useless, since it shows how a singular existential like 'a exists' can be expressed as an existentially general sentence. Although Quine's biconditional is not useless given his purposes, it is useless given ours. But it is not only useless, but pernicious in that it appears to provide insight into what existence is, when it can do no such thing.

One cannot take this dilemma to show that 'exist(s)' is not an admissible predicate of individuals. For there are excellent reasons, detailed in Chapter 4, for rejecting this eliminativist line of Frege and Russell.

Nor can one take the dilemma to show that existence is not an intrinsic determination of individuals, but is a concept we impose on individuals, for reasons given in the following section and in Chapter 8.

A third response to the dilemma is to take it as demonstrating that a theory of existence such as the one here envisaged is impossible, and that the question as to what it is for an individual to exist cannot be answered. We will be told: "If in your account of what it is for an individual to exist, you invoke something that exists, such as a paradigm existent, then you move in a circle of embarrassingly short diameter; but if you attempt an account that remains neutral on the question whether any individuals actually exist, then you miss existence entirely. Ontology as you understand it, as a theory of existence itself as opposed to a theory about what exists, is simply impossible." But the dilemma can be circumvented.

Between the Horns. Safe passage between the prongs is possible if we


reject an assumption on which the dilemma is based. The assumption is that there is only one way (mode) of existing. Suppose there are two ways. On this supposition, instances of the following schema will not be circular. (S) Necessarily, x exists (in mode 1) if and only if there is ay (which exists in mode 2) such that y stands in R to x. A theory of this form will avoid the dilemma. It avoids the first hom by not being neutral on the question whether any individuals exist. It does not attempt the absurdity of giving an existentially neutral account of existence. For the explicans asserts the existence of an individual y by relation to which all else exists. The theory of existence is thereby anchored in an actual existent. But because y exists in a different way than the individuals mentioned in the explicandum, there is no circularity, and the second hom is avoided. (S) is but an abstract theory-schema. We get a theory only by assigning values to 'y,' 'R' 'mode l' and 'mode 2.' Thus we get (PT) above by assigning the paradigm existent U to 'y,' unifies to 'R,' and by construing the two modes of existence as contingency and necessity, respectively. Of course, we will have to defend the notion that contingency and necessity are modes of existence.

The main point is that here is no circularity in saying that what existscontingently exists-contingently in virtue of a relation to something that existsparadigmatically. For although it is true that Socrates and the Paradigm both exist, the truth-maker of this truth is not the fact that they share the attribute of existence. This is because there is no shared attribute of existence. If there were, we would be embroiled in Plato's Third Man regress. What makes it true that Socrates and the Paradigm both exist are two facts with no common constituent. The one is that the Paradigm is itself. Its existence is its selfidentity. The other is that Socrates ontologically depends on the Paradigm. Socrates' existence is obviously not his self-identity. Thus in reality there is no existence that they share. This should come as no surprise given that the Paradigm is existence itself. This is not to deny that the word 'exists' can be applied to both; nor is it to deny that the sense of 'exists' is the same in 'Socrates exists' and 'The Paradigm exists.' The point is that the referent of 'exists' in the two cases is different, contingent-existence in the first case, paradigmatic-existence in the second. The hyphens underscore the fact that there is no common existence.

It is perhaps not unnecessary to point out that we are not presupposing that the Paradigm exists. That is an ambitious thesis for which this entire book is the argument. The point is merely that, if we can establish the existence of the Paradigm, then we will have a theory that will satisfy our two desiderata by avoiding both existential neutrality and circularity. Note also that from the fact that the existence of the Paradigm is (identically) its self-identity, there is no quick ontological argument to the existence of the Paradigm. If the Paradigm

8 CHAPTER ONE

exists, then it necessarily exists (where its necessity is grounded in its selfidentity); but that it exists cannot be shown by showing how it exists if it exists.

We now want to answer in preliminary fashion a question raised near the beginning of this section. If ontology is fundamentally about existence, and not fundamentally about what exists, how is ontology so much as possible? The answer is that ontology is possible only if existence itself exists as a paradigm existent. To employ some Heideggerian terminology to make an antiHeideggerian point, ontology is possible only as onto-theology. That is to say, ontology, the science of Being, is possible only if Being itself occurs as a paradigmatic being. Heidegger is therefore wrong to maintain that ontology is possible only as phenomenology.2

2. EXISTENCE CANNOT BE A CONCEPT

The thesis of the last section was that an account of the existence of concrete contingent individuals is possible if (and only if) two conditions are met. The first is that the theory of existence be anchored in an actual existent so that the theory of existence is at the same time both a theory of existence and a theory of an actual existent. The second condition is that the theory be noncircular. Both conditions are met if we are allowed to invoke an entity, the paradigm, whose way of existing is distinct from the way of existing of contingent individuals. The crucial idea, then, is that existence itself exists as a paradigm existent whose mode of existence implies that it exists a se and not ab alio. This idea has weighty consequences.

For one thing, it follows that existence cannot be a concept as various philosophers have maintained. Heidegger, for example, ties Being (Sein) to the understanding (of) Being (Seinsverstaendnis).3 Butchvarov, following at a distance, treats existence as a transcendental concept.4 (For a detailed critique ofButchvarov, see Chapter 8.) We maintain, however, that existence is the exact opposite of a concept, being that in virtue of which there is anything at all for the mind to conceptualize. This is not to deny that there are various concepts of existence or indeed that there is a true concept of existence. We are after all in quest of a true concept of existence. But 'concept of existence' is ambiguous due to the ambiguity of 'of.' It will pay to invest a bit of ink in disambiguation. After the linguistic underbrush has been cleared away, some arguments against the conceptual status of existence will be advanced. This will further support the paradigm approach. For it is a necessary though not sufficient condition of the paradigm theory's being true that existence not be a mere concept.

There is the 'of of apposition, as in 'the city of Boston.' The city of Boston is the city, Boston. Curiously enough, the 'of' of apposition functions as a punctuation mark, a comma. Then there is the genitive 'of which further


divides into the genitivus objectivus and the genitivus subjectivus. Consider 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.' 'Fear of the Lord' illustrates the objective genitive; 'beginning of wisdom' illustrates the subjective genitive or possessive. Clearly, fear of the Lord is not the Lord's fear, but our fear. The Lord is the object of fear, not its subject. The beginning of wisdom, by contrast, is wisdom's beginning. 'Concept of existence' is therefore exposed to a threefold ambiguity. The phrase could mean 'the concept, existence.' This would imply that existence is a concept. Or it could mean 'the concept about existence,' which does not imply that existence is a concept. Finally, and third in order of plausibility, it could mean, 'existence's concept.'

Bearing these distinctions in mind, we are not likely to be bamboozled by the three-fold ambiguity of 'concept of existence' into supposing that existence is a concept. This is a good start, but we need arguments why existence cannot be a concept. This section will provide some, and in so doing provide indirect support for the conclusion of the preceding section according to which existence itself exists.

A concept is a mental entity, whether occurrent or dispositional. It is either an occurrent episode of conceiving as when I identify a percept as something ( as a rabbit, as a modem ... ), or it is an unexercised ability to identify a percept as something. We can also think of a concept, or else the content of a concept, in abstraction from occurrent acts of conceiving and existing dispositions to conceive. But when we engage in such an abstraction, we must not forget that concepts are found in reality only where minds are found. In a world with no minds, then, there are no concepts. We may put this by saying that concepts exist only in minds, where 'in' does not have a spatial sense, but means that concepts are either accusatives of awareness, or else a mind's classificatory abilities.

Now if concepts exist only in minds, and some concepts exist, then at least one mind must exist to be that in which concepts exist. So if existence is a concept, then a mind must exist to be that in which the concept, existence, exists. But this is clearly absurd. For it implies, first, that mind M exists, but that, second, M's existence consists in its instantiating a concept C the very existence of which presupposes the existence of M. In a nutshell, the absurdity is that the existence of M ontologically depends on the existence of C, while the existence of C ontologically depends on the existence of M. The existence of my mind cannot depend ontologically on the instantiation of a concept in my mind. Ontological dependence (o-dependence) is obviously asymmetrical: if x is o-dependent on y, then y is not o-dependent on x. Given that the accident, Socrates' whiteness, is o-dependent on the substance Socrates, Socrates cannot be o-dependent on his whiteness. Given that the truth of what I say is 0-

10 CHAPTER ONE

dependent on the way the world is, the way the world is cannot be o-dependent on the truth of what I say.

Similar arguments are easily generated. If a thing's existence consists in its instantiation of the concept, existence, then at times at which there are no minds, nothing exists, and at possible worlds in which no minds exist, nothing exists. These are obviously unacceptable consequences, and amount to a reductio ad absurdum of the view we are examining.

Therefore, if existence is the existence of individuals, where the italicization signifies that the genitive construction, 'existence of individuals' is to be taken as a subject genitive, then existence cannot be a concept. This conclusion is inescapable if we understand what a concept is, and if existence is the existence of individuals, an intrinsic determination in virtue of which individuals are rather than are not. Now it seems to us that this is what we must mean by existence if we are serious about the genuine article. When I say that yonder mountain exists, what I mean is that it exists whether or not anyone perceives it or thinks about it, indeed, whether or not any mind like ours exists. But then it is clear that existence itself cannot be a concept. No doubt there is a concept of existence, but the concept of existence is not the concept of a concept, but the concept of something that is extraconceptual by its very nature.

Our interim conclusion is this: If existence is the existence of individuals, then existence cannot be a concept, where 'concept' is defined as above.

Charitably interpreted, then, someone who holds that existence is a concept must be denying that existence is the existence of individuals. What then could he be holding? Most likely what he is holding is that existence is the existence of individuals, the genitive construction now being construed as a genitivus objectivus. Thus the existence of a is not a's existence, the existence intrinsic to a and belonging to it; the existence of a is now merely a's being the obj ecti ve correlate (accusative) of a concept, where a concept is either an actual conceiving, or a form of a possible conceiving by some actual mind. On this latter scheme, existence is wholly extrinsic to a. It is not a's existence, but something imposed on a from without. Butchvarov, for example, speaks of existence as a concept we impose on objects.5 Existence is not that which makes a exist, it is rather that relative to which a is conceived as existent. This extrinsicness is conveyed by talk of an individual 'falling under' or 'being subsumed by' a concept.

Existence is thereby removed from things and relocated in the mind. The existing of a becomes a matter of a' s being conceived as existent, a matter of a' s being subsumed under the concept, existence. When existence is demoted to the status of a concept, a concept, moreover, that does not correspond to any determination in things, existence becomes a transcendental concept, and ceases


to be an ontological concept, a concept of something in things in virtue of which they exist outside the mind. We are using 'transcendental' here in the Kantian rather than the scholastic sense.6 Unlike ordinary concepts, transcendental concepts do not stand for determinations in the things to which they apply. Transcendental concepts are non-representational. We could call them impositional inasmuch as they involve a conceptual imposition upon their objects. The Kantian categories furnish examples of transcendental concepts. If Kant is right, there is nothing in an object or a sequence of objects that the concept cause represents; yet the concept applies to some object-sequences, but not to others, and imposes causality upon the sequences to which it does apply. Cause, if a transcendental concept, is a classificatory one; whether existence is a transcendental classificatory concept depends on further considerations which will surface in a moment.

When existence is demoted to the status of a concept, therefore, existence becomes a transcendental concept. It cannot be an ordinary concept, because an ordinary concept is one which stands for empirical features in the things to which it applies. The existence of an individual, however, is clearly not an empirical feature of it. Philosophers as diverse as Hume and Heidegger have emphasized this point, although they have drawn wildly different conclusions from it. Absorbency, heaviness, hardness, redness, etc. are all empirically detectable via the senses and their instrumental extensions. But existence is nothing like this: it is not a descriptive or quidditative feature, and so cannot be conceptualized in the same way these features can be conceptualized. So existence, if a concept, cannot be an ordinary concept. If it is a concept, it is a transcendental concept.

As against this view of existence as a transcendental concept, our view is that the concept of existence is an ontological concept, which is to say, a concept of something extraconceptual, namely, the existence of individuals. Moreover, existence is something which, in being conceived, does not forfeit its extraconceptual status. So although there is a concept of existence, existence itself is not a concept. It cannot be since it is precisely that which establishes things as extramentally and extraconceptually existent. Our theory may therefore be described as a realist, as opposed to a transcendentally idealist, theory of existence. Thus we are realists not only about the things that exist, but also about the existence of the things that exist.

The point, then, is that if we start with the notion that existence is a concept, we are soon dialectically forced into the view that it is a transcendental concept. But absurdity results from the conjunction of (i) existence is an intrinsic determination of existing individuals, and (ii) existence is a concept, in the presence of (iii) concepts are mind-dependent. If absurdity is to be avoided, (i) must be abandoned. But then the existence of individuals can be a mere

12 CHAPTER ONE

concept only if existence is divorced from existing individuals. This implies that existing individuals are existing only relative to the concept, existence, which is imposed on them by the mind from without. This further implies that individuals in themselves, i.e., considered apart from the concept of existence under which they fall, neither exist nor do not exist. This eliminativism about the existence of individuals, to give it a name, is deeply counterintuitive if not incoherent. How could a contingent individual neither exist nor not exist? If x is contingent, then x is possibly nonexistent: it exists, but might not have existed. Its nature does not entail its existence, but is consistent with its nonexistence. If 'contingency' is a predicate that can be applied to individuals, then existence must belong to individuals themselves. Contingency is contingency in respect of existence: hence an individual cannot be contingent unless existence is an intrinsic determination of it.

To avoid the consequence that existence is an intrinsic determination of individuals, the conceptualist - one who maintains that existence is a concept - must make one or another further move to account for the contingency of individuals. One move leads to the reduction of existence to instantiation. The other leads to the postulation of nonexistent objects. We examine the first move first, the second second, and reject both in the end.

First Move: The reduction of existence to instantiation as a way of accounting for the contingency of individuals without taking them to have existence intrinsically. If existence is reduced to instantiation, then existence is not only a transcendental concept, one to which nothing in things corresponds, but it is a second-order transcendental concept. An example of a first-order transcendental concept would be the concept of cause as it functions in Kant's system. Cause is transcendental in that it is imposed by the mind; it is first-order in that it is imposed on objects or events. A second-order concept is a concept of a concept. Thus the concept, instantiation, is second-order. It is also transcendental in that there is nothing in things to which it corresponds. Concepts are either instantiated or not, but no individual can be instantiated. Now if existence is the concept of instantiation, then perhaps we can do justice to the contrast between existence and nonexistence by saying that the existence of Fs is the instantiation of the concept F, and the possible nonexistence of Fs is the possible uninstantiation of the concept F. In this way the contingency of individual Fs may seem to be accounted for without an ascription of existence to them. What we do is 'kick contingency upstairs': we take the line that the contingency of a cat, say, is the contingency of the instantiation of the concept cat.

But this is only the appearance of a solution. For it is not the contingency of individual Fs, individual cats for example, that is being accounted for when we speak of a concept's being possibly uninstantiated, but


the contingency of the truth of the proposition expressed by 'Cats exist.' The contingency of an individual cat is ontological contingency; the contingency of a proposition is alethic contingency. The latter is grounded in the former. To account for alethic contingency is not to account for ontological contingency. An individual cannot be onto logically contingent without being contingent in its very existence, which presupposes that existence is an intrinsic determination of it.

Furthermore, according to the 'truth-maker intuition' which this book presupposes as self-evident, and elaborates in Chapter 6, a contingently true proposition requires a worldly truth-maker, an ontological ground of its truth. 'I am sitting now' cannot just be true; it is true because a certain fact obtains, namely, the fact of my now being seated. And so 'Cats exist,' which is obviously contingently true, cannot just be true; it requires a truth-maker. What could this be? It cannot be the fact of the existence of cats, for on the theory under examination, existence has been removed from the world and relocated in the mind. Hence, although there are cats in the world, there is no such thing in the world as the fact of the existence of cats. But neither can the truth-maker be cats themselves. For if an individual cat can make true the proposition expressed by 'Cats exist,' then an individual cat can make true the negation of this proposition, namely the one expressed by 'Cats do not exist.' For, on the theory under examination, a cat is the only thing in the world having any relevance to the truth of either sentence: if existence is a concept, it is not in the world. If a cat in the world neither exists nor does not exist, then it can equally well serve as a truth-maker for 'Cats exist' or its negation. But this amounts to saying that no plain individual, which is structureless, can serve as a truthmaker. A truth-maker cannot be a 'blob,' it must be a 'layer-cake,' to borrow some scholarly terminology from David Armstrong. Only a fact can be a truthmaker. For only a fact has a structure that can mirror the structure of a proposition.

Lacking an ontological ground of its truth, 'Cats exist' will either have no truth-ground, in violation of the truth-maker principle, or its truth-ground will be in the mind, which amounts to idealism. Thus some may be tempted to say that 'Cats exist' is true because we accept cats, and that 'Unicorns do not exist' is true because we reject unicorns. (There will be more to say about this acceptance and rejection when we discuss Brentano in Chapter 3.) Since neither consequence is particularly palatable, the instantiation theory is reasonably rejected. We will have much more to say about instantiation theories in general later on.

Second Move: Positing nonexistent objects as a way of accounting for the contingency of individuals without taking them to have existence intrinsically. The other move the conceptualist could make is to treat

14 CHAPTER ONE

individuals in themselves, i.e., individuals considered apart from the concept of existence, as nonexistent objects in something like Meinong's sense. A nonexistent object, a pure object, is a pure Sosein, a pure whatness which, as such, neither exists nor does not exist. These objects, moreover, are incomplete: it is not the case that for every property P, either object 0 has P or 0 has the complement of P. A mountain in the distance, qua perceived, is say purplish; but it is not qua perceived colored, even though in reality everything purple is colored. Incomplete objects are not 'closed under entailment.' Again, the mountain in reality is either predominantly basaltic or not predominantly basaltic; but my perceptual noema, to use a piece of Husserlian jargon, is neither. The mountain qua perceived is therefore incomplete: it violates the property analog of the Law of Excluded Middle.

Given such incomplete and therefore nonexistent objects, one might view the concept of existence as a classificatory concept, one that applies to some objects but not to others. To say that an object 0 exists would then be to say that 0 is contingently the same as (the membership of) a certain set of other objects. Existence is contingent sameness. For Butchvarov, this contingent sameness is indefinite identifiability;7 for Hector-Neri Castaneda, it is the equivalence relation he calls 'consubstantiation.'8 Whatever it is, it allows us to understand '0 might not have existed' in terms of '0 might not have been contingently the same as (the membership of) a certain set of other objects.' In this way the contingency of individuals may seem to be accounted for without the ascription of existence to them as an intrinsic determination.

But this too is only the appearance of a solution. For the datum to be explained is the contingent existence of a complete individual, not the contingent sameness of an incomplete object with other incomplete objects. It is the contingent existence of Superstition Mountain itself in reality, fully determinate, wholly complete, intractably resistant both to my mind and my boots, that needs explaining. There is also the problem that there are no nonexistent objects, a thesis to be argued in the following chapter.

To sum up. The concept of existence is the concept of that which, outside the mind, intrinsically determines individuals as existent, as actual, as real. The concept of existence is therefore an ontological concept. As such, it is a concept of something extraconceptual. It follows that existence itself cannot be a concept. Philosophers who treat existence as a concept, in effect remove existence from individuals in the world and relocate it in the mind. But this removal and relocation cannot sever the connection between existence and existing things. It does, however, force its reinterpretation. The existence of individuals (subjective genitive) gets read as the existence of individuals (objective genitive). A transcendental tum occurs whereby the emphasis shifts from things in the world to the conceiving and judging mind. Worldly


indi viduals get reinterpreted as correlates of mind. The problem of accounting for the difference between actual existence and possible nonexistence, however, remains. But we have just suggested that neither the instantiation theory, nor the theory that invokes nonexistent objects, can solve this problem. We will substantiate these points in greater detail in later chapters.

For the moment, the main point is that there are weighty reasons for rejecting the view that existence is a concept. But if existence is not a concept that minds impose on things, then existence is an intrinsic determination of things themselves, and one obstacle in the path of the paradigm theory has been removed. Another obstacle is the view that existence is a property of individuals. This second obstacle will be removed in Chapter 2.

3. ARE THERE MODES OF EXISTENCE?

We have seen that the paradigm theory avoids circularity by maintaining that the Paradigm and contingent beings exist in two different modes. The very idea of there being ways or modes or kinds of existence, however, is controversial. A sustained assault on this idea is to be found in Quentin Gibson's recent book, The Existence Principle. 9 If Gibson is right, our project is doomed. So it is incumbent on us to respond in some detail to the position Gibson represents.

Gibson maintains that existence is an "absolutely elementary concept"l0 that cannot be explicated in other terms without circularity. The circularity arises from the fact that anything in terms of which one attempts to explicate existence must itself exist. For example, to say that x exists if and only if x is spatiotemporal is to say that x exists if and only if x exists in space and time. The circularity is blatant. Gibson concludes that a biconditional like this one cannot be taken to give us any information about what it is to exist; at best, it can inform as to what exists. Such definitions can do nothing to illuminate the concept of existence itself. "If ontology is an enquiry which is supposed to do this, then there is no such thing as ontology."ll

Now Gibson is certainly right about one thing, namely, that existence cannot be explicated in nonexistential terms. We ourselves emphasized this point above. A theory of existence cannot be existentially neutral on pain of failing to be a theory of actual existence; it cannot treat existence as if it were an essence or form or categorial feature or structure or 'template' that mayor may not apply to something. But it does not follow that every explication of existence must be circular. For it was shown above how circularity can be avoided if an appeal to the doctrine of modes of existence is allowed. If the existence of contingent individuals is explicated in terms of a relation to a paradigmatically, and thus necessarily existent individual, then circularity is circumvented.

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By Gibson's lights, however, the doctrine of modes of existence is ruled out by what he calls "the existence principle." This is the claim that existence is an elementary and thus irreducible concept the intelligible use of which is governed by six "requirements." Anyone who uses 'exists' in its elementary sense is bound by these requirements. To violate one or more of them is to demonstrate a failure to grasp the concept of existence. The requirements are as follows.

(1) Either something exists or it does not. (2) There are no degrees of existence. (3) There are no kinds of existence. (4) Existence is not a relative concept. (5) Existence is not a property. (6) We cannot classify objects into existent and non-existent.12

From Gibson's point of view, anyone who maintains, as we do, that contingent beings have a different kind of existence than the necessary paradigm being violates requirement (3) and has simply failed to grasp the concept of existence. Before we respond to Gibson as regards requirement (3), let us sound an irenic note by saying that we endorse (4), (5), and (6) and are sympathetic to (1) and (2). Consider (4). Someone who says that God, say, may exist for one person (group, conceptual framework, etc.) but not for another, simply has not grasped the concept of existence. Existence, like truth, is absolute. To say that God exists for Kierkegaard but not for Feuerbach is either nonsense, or just a confused and confusing way of saying that Kierkegaard believes that God exists, while Feuerbach does not.

Now one problem with Gibson's view is that it implies that existence is a concept, a view we have just finished refuting. Thus when Gibson writes that existence is "an absolutely elementary concept,"13 and that "Existence is not a relative concept,,,14 he implies that existence is a concept. But perhaps he is just being sloppy, and really wants to say that the concept of existence is the concept of something absolutely elementary, and not the concept of something that is relative. So we leave this line of critique to one side.

Another way to respond to Gibson is by demanding that he prove the existence principle with its six requirements. This he will not be able to do in a non-question-begging way. It is obvious that the principle is not open to empirical justification. But it is also not logically true. Each of the requirements can be denied without logical contradiction. Gibson is well aware of this as he is also aware that an appeal to the supposedly unacceptable consequences of denying his principle will not deter a resolute violator of one or more its requirements. Thus we deny requirement (3) while accepting the consequences of this denial with equanimity. How can Gibson compel us to accept (3)? If he cannot, the result will be a stand-off.


But it may be possible to take a more ambitious tack in response to Gibson. It may be possible to dislodge him. According to requirement (3), the concept of existence is the concept of something that does not admit of modes or kinds. To think otherwise is to make "a conceptual mistake." But why is this a conceptual mistake? We need an argument here. Unfortunately, Gibson does not give us one. So we will provide the best argument we can think of, and then show how one can still maintain the doctrine of modes of existence.

Gibson says things that suggest that the concept, existence, is the concept, instantiation. As he points out, existence adds nothing to the description of a thing; "the only information it gives us is that some given description has instances.,,15 This implies that the concept, existence, is the concept (of) a description's having instances. Now there are no kinds of instantiation. This premise, though not quite obvious, needs no argument since Gibson will certainly not contest it. So if existence were instantiation, we could conclude that Gibson is right as regards requirement (3), to wit, "There are no kinds of existence." So here we have a clear argument for (3): existence is instantiation; there are no kinds of instantiation; hence, there are no kinds of existence.

We reject this argument by rejecting its first premise. Although there is a necessary connection between existence and instantiation, the two cannot be identified. The reason for the necessary connection is that if first-level property P is instantiated, then P is instantiated by an individual x that exists. Gibson should agree to this since his requirement (6) rules out nonexistent objects. Thus no property is (actually) instantiated by a nonexistent individual. We cannot, however, say that the existence of x consists in, or is identical with, the instantiation of P, since that would violate Gibson's principle that existence is "absolutely elementary" and thus irreducible to anything more basic. If the existence of an individual were to consist in the instantiation of some property or properties, then the concept of existence would be reducible to the concepts of property and instantiation. Since a property, if instantiated, is instantiated by an existent, it follows that the existence of an individual involves something more than its instantiation of a concept or property. Intuitively, the existence of an individual is an ontologically prior condition of its instantiation of any property. This intuition is made precise and argued for in Chapter 2. (In a moment I will consider the eliminativist option according to which there just is no such thing as the existence of x as something intrinsic to x.)

Existence and instantiation, then, cannot be identified; the first cannot be reduced to the second. That there are no kinds of instantiation, therefore, has no tendency to show that there are no kinds of existence. Let P be the property of being identical to Socrates, and let Q be the property of being identical to God. Then the following four propositions are mutually consistent. (i) P is

18 CHAPTER ONE

instantiated by an individual that exists in the mode of contingency. (ii) Q is instantiated by an individual that exists in the mode of necessity. (iii) There are no modes (kinds) of instantiation. (iv) There are two modes (kinds) of existence. There is no conceptual mistake here.

What we are arguing, in effect, is that Gibson is partially right and partially wrong. He is partially right in that instantiation is a (proper) part of the concept of something existing, and in that instantiation does not admit of modes. He is partially wrong in that instantiation is not the whole of the concept of something existing: the concept of something existing is the concept of some property's being instantiated by an individual that exists, and whose existence is irreducible to any property's being instantiated. Thus one part of the concept of something existing is grasped when we grasp the concept of instantiation; the other part is grasped when we grasp that the concept of instantiation, being relational, is the concept of a property's being instantiated by some individual that exists, and whose existence is irreducible to any property's being instantiated. Thus it is not clear on what grounds Gibson could exclude the possibility that the existence of individuals, the existence intrinsic to them, admits of two modes. There does not seem to be any obvious "conceptual mistake" here.

One way Gibson might try to exclude this possibility is by maintaining that existence just is instantiation, and that it is nonsense to speak as we do of the existence of individuals as an intrinsic determination of them. He might say that the existence of an individual is just its relational property of instantiating a property or falling under a concept. This is the eliminativist option mentioned above. On this option, existence cannot be predicated of individuals as an intrinsic determination of them. Gibson, however, does not endorse this option; instead he says things that seem inconsistent with it. He says, for example, "That everything exists is a necessary truth.,,16 This implies that individuals exist. If individuals exist, and existence is "absolutely elementary," then existence cannot consist in a relation to anything, and so must be an intrinsic determination. He also says that the existence principle does not commit us one way or another on the question "whether it is legitimate to predicate existence of anything at the first level." 17

It seems, then, that there is a serious tension within Gibson's position. Is existence reducible to instantiation or not? If it is, then we will grant him that there cannot be kinds of existence. But it cannot be Gibson's view that existence is reducible to instantiation, for the central point of the existence principle is that existence is irreducible, "absolutely elementary." If existence is irreducible, then it cannot be reduced to instantiation. On the other hand, if it is Gibson's view that there just is no such thing as existence, that it is a bogus


concept, something to be dispensed with rather than theorized about, something to replaced (by the concept of instantiation, perhaps) as opposed to analyzed, then he should come out and say this. But he does not say this; indeed, he implies, or at least suggests, the opposite. Thus to say that existence is "absolutely elementary" strongly suggests that there is such a thing as the existence of individuals; it is just that we cannot say anything noncircular about it. Of course, he also says, in his requirement (5), that existence is not a property. But all he means by this is that existence is not classificatory. Thus his argument is that (i) properties are classificatory in the sense that whenever we attribute a property to a thing we can always at least envisage some other thing to which the property cannot be attributed; (ii) existence, which is attributable to everything, is not classificatory; ergo, (iii) existence is not a property. That existence is not a property in this sense is, however, consistent with existence's being an intrinsic determination of individuals. A central task of this book is to explain how existence can be an intrinsic determination of individuals without being a property of them.

At the root of the tension in Gibson's position, perhaps, is the conflation of existence with the concept of existence, a conflation aided and abetted by the ambiguity of 'of' in 'concept of existence.' Gibson writes as if existence is just a concept as we showed above. But if it is, then it is hard to see how it could be anything other than the concept, instantiation. This, however, would return us to the eliminativist option. The reader is invited to re-read section 2 above.

It is instructive to note that Gibson's six requirements, ifre-written in terms of instantiation, are eminently plausible, and I would accept every one of them. Here they are: (1) Either something is an instance of a concept or it is not. (2) There are no degrees of instantiation. (3) There are no kinds of instantiation. (4) Instantiation is not a relative concept. (5) Instantiation is not a property: predicating instantiation of a concept adds nothing to its content. (6) We cannot classify instances of concepts into existent and nonexistent: every instance of a concept exists, or on the eliminativist option, no instance of a concept can be appropriately characterized as either existent or nonexistent.

Our verdict, then, is this. Gibson both distinguishes and yet fails to distinguish instantiation, which can only be a second-level concept or property from existence, which, on the face of it, is an intrinsic determination of individuals. This amounts to a confusion of the semantic/conceptual with the real. As a result of this waffling, he finds it evident that there cannot be kinds of existence. But all he is entitled to say is that there cannot be kinds of instantiation. He therefore overlooks the possibility of there being kinds of existence.

Let us now try directly to illustrate and support the possibility of there being kinds of existence. Consider a mundane example. The concept chair

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applies to chairs, which are not concepts, but denizens of the real. You cannot sit on a concept or break one over someone's head. The content of the concept chair remains the same despite the fact that it subsumes wheelchairs, electric chairs, kitchen chairs, easy chairs, etc. Correspondingly, the sense of 'chair' is the same in 'wheelchair,' 'electric chair,' etc. But this sameness of conceptual content/sense 'in the logical order' is compatible with diversity of function 'in the real order.' Thus an easy chair is designed with relaxation in mind, unlike an electric chair where the object is quite different.

As a second example, consider that 'smoke' has the same sense in 'smoke a pipe' and 'smoke a cigarette,' although the ways of smoking are different. One smokes a pipe by tasting smoke without inhaling it, whereas with cigarettes, especially those whose active ingredient is cannabis sativa, the point is to inhale. By contrast, 'smoke a pipe' and 'smoke a ham' feature different senses of 'smoke' just as 'department chair,' 'endowed chair' and 'folding chair' feature three different senses of 'chair.'

These examples (except the last two) show that sameness in conceptual content/sense 'at the level of representation' is compatible with real differences 'in the world.' Now of course I am not implying that wheelchairs, electric chairs, etc. exhibit different modes of existence. But if sameness of conceptual content/sense is compatible with real differences in the world, then we may entertain the possibility that sameness of content/sense is compatible with difference in mode of existence.

Consider now the sentences 'Socrates exists,' and 'The Paradigm exists.' The sense of 'exists' is the same in both. This sense can be described by saying that 'Socrates' and 'the Paradigm' each denote something. We could just as well say that the concept Socrates and the concept the Paradigm each are instantiated. But this is compatible with saying that Socrates and the Paradigm exist in different ways.

The main point is that sense is a semantic category which must be scrupulously distinguished from way of existing, which is ontological. Our interest is not semantic, but ontological. Nor is our quest a search for the meaning of Being (Sinn von Sein) since this Heideggerian project is predicated on a disastrous confusion of the semantic/conceptual and ontological dimensions. Perhaps the most exasperating feature of Heidegger's thinking is his use of 'Being' to refer both to that which makes beings be, and to that the understanding of which makes possible our understanding of, and encounter with, beings.18 In Heideggerian terms, the present project is concerned solely with that which makes beings be.

A third example of how univocity of sense is compatible with difference in existential mode is as follows. Suppose Socrates is a substance and his tan is an accident inhering in him. Both Socrates and his tan exist, and in the very


same sense of 'exist.' What sense is this? It is the sense captured by saying that both 'Socrates' and 'Socrates' tan' refer to something; or if you will the sense captured by saying that both the concept Socrates and the concept Socrates' tan are instantiated. But this univocity of sense is compatible with saying that Socrates and his tan exist in different ways: the existence of an accident is (identically) its inberence in a substance, whereas the existence of a substance, whatever it is, is precisely not its inberence in a substance. Accidents exist in another; substances in themselves. On the other hand, Socrates and his tan, though both healthy, are not healthy in the same sense. Socrates is healthy strictly speaking, while his tan is not healthy at all: it is at best an indicator of health. Here is that failure of univocity called analogy.

The foregoing substance/accident example seems to me to show quite clearly the coherence of the idea that there are modes of existence. An accident exists in a different way than a substance in which it inberes. The existence of an accident A consists in, is nothing other than, its inberence in a substance S. If A and S were to exist in the same way, then what could the necessary relation of the two be grounded in? Since A cannot exist without S, A's existence necessitates the existence of S. This is clearly not causal necessitation. But neither is it (narrowly) logical necessitation: it is not a (narrowly) logical contradiction to say that A exists but S does not. Given that A's necessary connection to S has neither a causal nor a (narrowly) logical ground, I say that it has an ontological ground: it is grounded in the mode of being or mode of existence of accidents. Accidents are necessarily dependent on substances in their very being. That is the way they exist, dependently. Thus there are three 'moments' (as a German would say) to distinguish: the content or whatness of an accident, its occurrence (existence as instantiation), and its way of existing.

Gibson, of course, cannot allow this. So he is driven to an extreme and to my mind incoherent view. What he proposes, in effect, is that we deny the existence of both S and A. "Taking the case of things [substances] and their properties [accidents], this [view] is simply to deny the existence of both of these alleged items and to say that what exists is [sic] propertied things and propertied things only.,,19 Now a propertied thing is just a state of affairs. So states of affairs alone exist; their constituents do not exist. Gibson is well aware of the problem with this. Given that we distinguish among the constituents of states of affairs, "How can we do this without assuming their existence?,,2o His answer is that the distinction is a "distinction of reason" where "a distinction of reason does after all require the existence f something, but not necessarily of anything apart from us who make the distinction.,,21

This implies that there is no real distinction between a and F-ness in the state of affairs, a's being F. But this leads to disaster. States of affairs are introduced in the first place to serve as truth-makers for contingently true truth-

22 CHAPTER ONE

bearers (sentences, propositions,judgments ... ). But to do thisjob, a truth-maker must be a structured entity the structure of which is language- and mindindependent. If it is our distinguishing that first imports structure into states of affairs, then it is clear that states of affairs cannot serve as ontological grounds of the truth of our utterances and judgments. An ontological ground of truth must be mind- and language-transcendent. But if our mental activity is what first imparts structure to a state of affairs, then it is our mental activity which creates that which constrains the truth of our thoughts and utterances - which is absurd.

Gibsons' denial of the existence of the constituents of states of affairs undermines the very idea of a state of affairs, and with it realism about truth. Paradoxically, by denying the existence of things and properties, the constituents of states of affairs, he ends up denying the existence of states of affairs themselves. Since he is driven to this absurdity by his adherence to the principle that there cannot be kinds of existence, the latter principle would appear to be eminently rejectable.

To sum up this critique of Gibson, we may say that, from the point of view of this book, Gibson's mistake is to make a radical and unjustified distinction between existence and questions about existence, on the one hand, and what exists and questions about what exists on the other. The former set of questions are then misconstrued as conceptual and semantic and thus not ontological, while the latter set are mistaken for the only ontological questions. Thus existence drops out as an ontological topic. Existence gets reduced to a concept. This is just Heidegger's confusion of the semantic/conceptual and ontological dimensions all over again.

Gibson is of course right that questions of meaning and questions offact must be distinguished. Thus we must distinguish between senses of 'being' and kinds of beings. But he fails to consider, and fails to refute, the possibility of an ontological inquiry into Being itself.

4. CONTINGENCY AND NECESSITY AS MODES OF EXISTENCE

Implicit in the very sense of a paradigm theory of existence is the idea that the Paradigm and what depend on it exist in radically different ways. Given this difference in ways of existing, there is no one way of existing neutral as between contingency and necessity. Thus one cannot think of the existence of individuals, existence insofar as it determines individuals intrinsically as existents, in modally neutral terms. This requires a bit more support.

The Leibnizian imagery of possible worlds is a nice expository aid. Thus we may say that x is a necessary being if and only if x exists in all possible worlds, while x is a contingent being if and only if x exists in some but not all


possible worlds. But if we poke at these biconditionals a bit, we see how dubious they are if taken with full ontological seriousness. First of all, what is a possible world? The most reasonable answer is that a possible world is a possibly true maximal proposition, one that entails every proposition with which it is consistent. Call such a maximal proposition a world-proposition. For x to exist in a possible world, then, is for x to exist according to a world-proposition. Thus to say that God necessarily exists is to say that God exists according to every world-proposition. And to say that Socrates contingently exists is to say that Socrates exists according to some but not all world-propositions. But surely the necessary existence of God cannot consist in the fact that all world propositions say that He exists or represent Him as existing! For that would be viciously circular: all the world-propositions say that He exists because He exists necessarily, and not vice versa. Consider the actual world, which is not to be confused with the universe of concreta. The actual world is the true maximal proposition. One of its entailments, let us suppose, is the proposition that God exists. What makes this true is the existence of God. What makes it necessarily true is the necessary existence of God. It would be absurd to say that the truth of this proposition makes God exist, or that its necessary truth makes God necessarily exist. We are with Aristotle on this one. "For it is not because we truly hold you to be white that you are white; but it is because you are white that we who hold this hold the truth." (Metaphysics 1051b8)

The point is that necessary (contingent) existence cannot be identified with existence in all (some) possible worlds. We must not confuse an expository device with the sober ontological truth. The paradigm's necessary existence consists in its identity with existence and with its existence. Socrates' contingent existence consists in his non-identity with existence and with his existence. It follows that there is no modally neutral way of existing. There is no one way of existing common to both the Paradigm and Socrates such that the difference in modal status is assignable merely to how many worlds either exists in. The difference in modal status has a deeper root, namely, in two different ways of existing.

This is consistent with the view that instantiation is modally neutral. If the concept God is instantiated, then this concept is necessarily instantiated; if the concept Socrates is instantiated, then this concept is contingently instantiated. The property of being instantiated is exactly the same property in the two cases, in the way in which the 'property' of existing is not the same 'property' applied to God and to Socrates. Thus the property of being instantiated is modally neutral. There is no need to say, and indeed it is incoherent to say, that there are two modes or kinds or ways of instantiation, necessary-instantiation and contingent-instantiation.

24 CHAPTER ONE

5. THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED ANSWER TO THE NATURE AND GROUND QUESTIONS

We have seen that an existentially neutral theory of existence cannot possibly be correct: the existence of an individual cannot be explicated in nonexistential terms. So there is a legitimate sense in which existence is basic and irreducible. It does not follow, however, that there cannot be an account of the existence of contingent individuals. But to understand the actual existing of a contingent individual, appeal must be made to an actual existent, one whose mode of existence differs from the mode of existence of contingent individuals. Circularity is thereby avoided. Existence must be anchored in an existent, which is to say that the theory of existence must be a theory of an existent. This existent is the Paradigm.

Since this is an idea that is likely to inspire vigorous protest, perhaps we can 'soften up' the reader with an analogy, assuming we do not 'harden' him in his opposition. Consider the question of truth. Truth is in one sense basic and irreducible: what it is for a proposition to be true cannot be explicated in nonalethic terms. Attempts to explicate it in other terms, e.g., such epistemic terms as rational acceptability, or rational acceptability at the ideal limit of inquiry, etc., meet with trouble. This is not surprising. Since any decent account of truth must itself be true, how can truth fail to be in some sense basic and irreducible? Nevertheless, there is a felt need for an account of truth and falsity in the case of contingent truth-bearers, which, for present purposes, we may assume to be Fregean propositions, i.e., the senses of context-insensitive declarative sentences. (It will not matter for the following argumentation whether truth-bearers are judgments or beliefs or sentences in the indicative mood or something along the same lines.) If a truth-bearer is true, it cannot just be true; something must make it true. How can these desiderata be reconciled without falling into circularity? How can we achieve a noncircular account of truth that somehow respects its irreducibility?

If we think about this, we soon realize that there is a way both to accommodate the irreducibility of truth and the need to give a noncircular account of it. The way to do this is very natural and quite familiar: it is to explain the truth of a proposition in terms of the obtaining of a concrete fact in the world. Thus the contingent truth of the proposition expressed by 'I am sitting now' is explained in terms of a relation this proposition bears - the relation of correspondence - to a concrete fact, the fact of my being seated now. It is clear that to explain the truth of a proposition in terms of the obtaining of a fact is not circular, since truth and obtaining are different. But the explanation respects the irreducibility of truth in that it makes no attempt to decompose propositional truth into more basic sub-alethic components, whether these be


doxastic, epistemic, or whatever. For what the theory says is that the truth of a proposition consists in a relation to something having a proposition-like structure which possesses a truth-like 'valence,' namely, obtaining. Thus a truth-making fact is not just a particular plus a property; it is a particular as instantiating a property: not a + F-ness, but a's being F. This being is that to which the truth of the proposition corresponds. The mereological sum a + Fness, or the set {a, F-ness} or the ordered pair <a, F-ness> cannot any of them function as truth-makers. They can no more serve as truth-makers than a and Fness by themselves can serve as truth-makers. For they lack the analog of propositional truth which is called obtaining. The sum, the set, and the pair are all sub-alethic, as are their constituents a and F-ness. Nothing sub-alethic can function as a truth-maker. But nothing propositionally alethic ('alethic' for short) can serve as an ultimate truth-maker either. Thus no atomic proposition can be made true by another true proposition. Since an ultimate truth-maker cannot be either sub-alethic or alethic, it must be super-alethic. Facts are superalethic in that their obtaining transmits truth to propositions at the same time that this obtaining is more ontologically basic than propositional truth. To put it another way, a fact, as a truth-maker, cannot lack truth the wayan individual, property, set, sum or pair lacks truth; but neither can a fact be true in the way a proposition is true. Otherwise, it could not serve as an ontological ground of propositional truth. Therefore, facts are super-alethic.

The point, then, is that propositional truth, as truth, is irreducible, but as propositional is in need of explanation. A noncircular explanation is possible by relating a proposition to a truth-making fact external to it which obtains. There is no reduction of truth to something sub-alethic, because obtaining is super-alethic. There is no circularity, because obtaining is different from propositional truth.

The analogy with the paradigm theory of existence should be clear. There are several points of analogy. (1) Just as the truth-maker account of propositional truth attempts to provide an account of the truth of contingent propositions which is both nonreductive and noncircular, the paradigm theory of existence attempts to provide an account of the actual existing of contingent concrete individuals which is both nonreductive and noncircular. (2) Both theories must invoke an external entity, a truth-making concrete fact external to the proposition on the one hand, the Paradigm external to contingent individuals on the other. (3) In both cases, the external entity is such that there is no real distinction between it and its existence. Thus there is no real distinction between a concrete fact and its existence or obtaining. Whereas a contingent proposition is what it is whether or not it is true, a fact is nothing at all unless it obtains. There are contingent propositions that are not true; there are no facts that do not obtain. Similarly with the paradigm: there is no real distinction

26 CHAPTER ONE

between it and its existence. Whereas a contingent individual is what it is whether or not it exists, and is thus possibly nonexistent, the paradigm is impossibly nonexistent. Contingent individuals are not such that their possibility entails their actuality; the Paradigm is such that its possibility entails its actuality.

But the main point of analogy for present purposes is as follows. (4) To explain what it is for a contingent proposition to be true, an entity must be invoked which is true, but not true in the way a proposition is true. We cannot say that a truth-making fact is false, nor can we say that it is neither true nor false in the way a simple individual by itself, or a property by itself, are neither true nor false. Thus it is the obtaining of a fact that ontologically grounds the truth of a proposition, and this obtaining, since it is neither sub-alethic nor alethic, must be super-alethic. To underscore the connection between truth and obtaining, one could say that truth-making facts are ontically true. Similarly, to explain what it is for a contingent individual to exist, an entity must be invoked which exists, but not in the way a contingent individual exists.

(5) Just as the theory of propositional truth must be grounded in entities that are ontically true, the theory of the existing of contingent individuals must be grounded in an entity that paradigmatic ally exists. This implies that neither theory can be a property-theory: truth cannot be a property of propositions any more than existence can be a property of individuals. Why not?

Although 'true' and 'false' are predicable of propositions, truth and falsity cannot be construed as monadic (nonrelational) properties of propositions. This is clear if we consider that every proposition entails its own truth. Thus 'Socrates is wise' entails "'Socrates is wise" is true' and 'Socrates is foolish' entails "'Socrates is foolish" is true.' So, if truth were a monadic property of propositions, if propositions were true in virtue of instantiating this property, then every proposition would be true, which is absurd. Therefore, truth and falsity cannot be monadic properties of propositions. No doubt every contingent proposition is true 'at itself' or true 'from its own point of view' or 'purports to be true.' But not every such proposition is true simpliciter, true absolutely, true in actual fact. The point is that the truth or falsity of a contingent proposition is no part of its content or sense, its Sinn in Frege' s Sinn. This is analogous to the fact that the existence or nonexistence of a contingent individual is no part of its essence, nature, whatness, description.

Given that the truth of a true contingent proposition cannot be a (monadic) property of it, a contingent proposition's being true must involve a relation to something external to the proposition. This led Frege to his farfetched theory of the True and the False as the referents (Bedeutungen) of indicative sentences. Setting this aside, we may say with a greater show of plausibility that facts in the world are the truth-makers of contingently true


propositions. What makes a true contingent proposition true cannot be its instantiation of the putative property of truth; what makes it true is a relation to an individual external to it. (Facts are individuals by our definition in that they have properties and relations but are not themselves properties or relations.)

We now arrive at the central claim of this section, namely, that the nature question (What is it for a contingent individual to exist?) cannot be answered independently of what will be called 'the ground question,' (Why does any contingent individual exist?). We just saw how, in order to explicate the nature of truth in a manner both nonreductive and noncircular, we had to posit an ontological ground of a contingent proposition's being true. Thus an adequate explanation of what it is for a contingent proposition to be true has the resources for an explanation of why a proposition is true. We claim that the same holds with respect to existence. An adequate answer to the question regarding the actual existing of a contingent individual, an answer which is noneliminativist, nonreductive, and noncircular, must have the resources for an explanation of why contingent individuals exist. One possible answer to it, of course, is that contingent individuals exist without cause, reason, or any other sort of ground. Call this 'the negative answer to the ground question.' A positive answer would be one that specifies a ground of the existence of contingent individuals. We cannot rule out the negative answer ab initio. But neither can we assume that it is correct. The present point is simply that, given the existence of contingent individuals, if an adequate account of what it is for a contingent individual to exist is possible, an account that is noneliminativist, nonreductive, and noncircular, then such an account must provide a positive answer to the ground question. To say that an adequate account must be noneliminativist is to say that it cannot deny that there is such a thing as the existence of individuals.

In any case, we cannot evade the question as to how the nature and ground questions interrelate. This section urges the need for a unified answer to the nature and ground questions. To understand what a unified answer would be, let us review some answers that are not unified. Consider first the case of the Quinean theist who holds that contingent individuals exist because God creates and sustains them, but that the existence of these contingent beings does not consist in their being created and sustained. Being a Quinean about existence, our theist holds that the existence of x consists in x's being identical to something or other. (Note the difference between saying that x exists if and only if x is identical to some one thing, and saying that x exists if and only if x is identical to something or other. The difference is that between monism and pluralism.) Here, the answer to the nature question does not imply an answer to the ground question, and vice versa. The same holds for the Quinean atheist.

28 CHAPTER ONE

A unified answer, therefore, is one in which the answer to the nature question implies an answer to the ground question, and vice versa. A bad unified answer would be the following idealistic theory reminiscent ofBrentano: For x to exist is for x to be affirmed by a judger. This tells us what it is for an individual to exist, and by the same stroke, implies an answer to the question why x exists: it exists because some judger affirms it.

Why is there any need for a unified answer to the nature and ground questions? The answer was given in nuce in section 1. There we saw that an adequate theory of the existence of individuals must satisfy two constraints: it must be noncircular, but it must also treat of genuine, pound-the-table existence, that which makes the difference between being and nonbeing, that which constitutes a thing as ontologically present. The second constraint implies that reference to actual existence must come in on the right-hand side of the biconditional formulating the theory. An adequate theory must therefore fit schema (5): Necessarily, x exists (in mode 1) if and only ifthere is a y (which exists in mode 2) such y stands in R to x.

Now given that a exists in the mode of contingency - it exists, but there is no necessity that it exist - (5) implies that there is a y that exists in the mode of necessity, and that y stands in some relation R to x. y is obviously the paradigm existent P. But what is R? It is clear that R cannot be an external relation. An external relation is one the holding of which between two things is a matter of indifference to the two things both as regards their existence and as regards their intrinsic properties. On top of is an example of an external relation. Thus the cup, which is on top of the bookshelf, can cease to be on top of the bookshelf both without undergoing any intrinsic change, i.e., any change in an intrinsic property, and without ceasing to exist. If R were an external relation, then P would have nothing to do with the existence of a. a could exist even if P did not exist. But this is impossible if a's existence consists in its relation to P.

From the nonexternality of R we may infer that a's existence is bound up with its relation to P, whence it follows that P is the ground of a's existence. Thus we see that an adequate answer to the nature question, which requires that a necessary existent figure in the account of what it is for a to exist, also requires that this necessary existent be part and parcel of an explanation of why a exists. Thus an adequate answer to the nature question -- assuming that this question an be answered -- implies an answer to the ground question.


6. THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNIFIED POSITIVE ANSWER TO THE TWO QUESTIONS

This book proposes a unified positive answer to the nature and ground questions. A positive answer to the ground question is one that specifies a ground of the existence of contingent individuals. A unified positive answer to the two questions is one that answers the ground question in a positive manner by way of answering the nature question. Thus our project is to answer the question as to what it is for an individual to exist, and in so doing answer the question as to why contingent individuals exist. How is such a thing possible? How is it possible for a specification of what it is for an individual to exist to amount to an explanation of why it exists?

Recall schema (S): Necessarily, x exists (in mode 1) if and only if there is a y (which exists in mode 2) such that y stands in R to x. We arrive at our paradigm theory by filling in this schema. This yields (PT): Necessarily, for any contingent x, x exists if and only if (i) there is a necessary y such that y is a paradigm existent, and (ii) y, as the unifier of x's ontological constituents, directly produces the unity/existence of x.

Since the paradigm existent is a necessary being, no question can arise as to why it exists. Thus a vicious infinite regress does not arise. The theory of existence is anchored in a 'self-explanatory' existent, one for which the question of why it exists cannot arise. (That the paradigm does exist is of course something to be argued for, in Chapter 7.) The metaphysical necessity of the paradigm existent is grounded in its ontological simplicity: the paradigm is identical to existence and to its existence. Existence itself exists as the paradigm existent. It cannot fail to exist because it is its nature to exist. If existence did not itself exist, then nothing would exist, and this for the simple reason that what exists exists by 'having' existence, however one explicates this 'having.' And if existence did not necessarily exist, then nothing contingent would have an explanation of its existence. Philosophers like Butchvarov, who deny that existence exists, must reduce it to a concept that we impose on objects, which leads to intolerable consequences detailed in Chapter 8.

One might object that (PT) is circular because its explicans contains an existential quantifier. The objection is that 'there is,' which occurs on the righthand side of (PT), is an existential quantifier, and that therefore existence appears in the explicans, thereby rendering (PT) circular. This objection fails to appreciate that, on the paradigm theory, there is no modally neutral way of existing: if something exists, it either exists-necessarily or exists-contingently. There is nothing circular about (PT).

(PT) tells us what it is for a contingent individual to exist, and in so doing explains why there are any contingent individuals. The existence of a contingent individual consists in its being produced by the paradigm existent.

30 CHAPTER ONE

If so, we have by the same stroke an account of why contingent individuals exist. We have a unified positive answer to the nature and ground questions.

7. A SPECTRUM OF THEORIES

We now round out this introductory chapter by attempting to map the conceptual space of all possible theories of existence. Of course, our concern is with a small number of theory-types, not an infinity of theory-tokens. The purpose of this exercise in conceptual cartography is to allow us to situate our paradigm theory of existence among its competitors. So let us imagine a spectrum of theories of existence. On the left end of the spectrum we find 'no difference' theories; in the middle there are 'moderate difference' theories; and on the right end we encounter 'extreme difference' theories. These theories are attempts to deal with the tension between difference and togetherness, between the datum that existence is different from existing individuals and the datum that existence nevertheless is together with, or belongs to, existing individuals. There are three main types of theory because there are three main ways of relieving the tension between difference and togetherness: deny the difference; deny the togetherness; reconcile the two.

A. 'No difference' (ND) theories of existence deny that there is any real difference at all between an individual and existence, and thus between an individual and its having existence. A real difference is one that subsists apart from us and our mental and linguistic activities. Note that two items can differ in reality even if they are not physically separable. Thus the weight and the mass of an object are really different even though nothing can have a weight without having a mass. ND theories, therefore, deny that the prima facie threefold distinction among an individual, its existence, and existence, is anything more than prima facie. The ND-theorist holds that in sober ontological truth there is no such distinction. The basic idea is expressed by Donald C. Williams when he writes that "a thing's existence is it.. .. ,,22 Thus for any x, the existence

. of x is just x, which implies both that there is no difference between x and existence, and no difference between x and x's having existence. The 'no difference' approach can be described as issuing in extreme ontological identity: since existence is in no way different from individuals, existence is identical to individuals. Existence, we may say, divides without remainder into individuals. There is no such thing as existence itself as something different from individuals. There is nothing in reality that all individuals have in common in virtue of which they are all existing individuals. Radical ontological pluralism rules. 'Individual' here is short for 'contingent concrete individual.' Thus the ND theory has it that for every contingent concrete x, the existence of x = x.

Existence is in every case the existence of something or other, and would be a mere abstraction otherwise. That is, existence cannot 'occur' in reality except as something that exists, whether paradigmatic ally or non-


paradigmatically. It is important to see that this does not amount to an endorsement of the 'no difference' theory. For it is consistent to maintain both that (i) existence can occur only as something that exists, and that (ii) it is not the case that for every x, the existence of x = x. How is this consistent? Suppose that existence itself exists, and that contingent individuals exist in virtue of standing in some 'relation' to existence itself. Then (i) will be true: it will be true that in every case in which existence 'occurs' it occurs as something that exists. But (ii) will also be true: it will not be the case that for every x, the existence of x = x. Indeed, for every contingent x, the existence of x will precisely not be identical to x inasmuch as the existence of x will involve a 'relation' to existence itself. The upshot, then, is that it is consistent to reject the 'no difference' theory while holding that existence itself can occur in reality only as something that exists.

B. 'Moderate difference' (MD) theories of existence admit that there is a difference between an indi vidual and existence, and thus between an indi vidual and its having existence. One sort of MD theory is the naive property theory according to which (i) existence is a property of individuals, and (ii) an individual exists by instantiating the property of existence.

Another sort of MD theory is the relational theory of existence according to which an item exists if and only if it stands in an appropriate relation to other items. In Hector-Neri Castaneda's Guise Theory, for example, the relation in question is consubstantiation.23 A guise exists if and only if it is consubstantiated with sufficiently many other guises to form a complete system of guises. On this theory, the vehicles of existence are guises, a species of Meinongian nonexistent object; existence itself is the equivalence relation dubbed consubstantiation; and a guise's having existence is its being consubstantiated with other guises. Thus our tripartite prima facie distinction is upheld by Castaneda's theory. His theory thus counts as an MD theory.

A very interesting class of MD theories are those which fit the schema according to which (i) existence is a property, but (ii) it is not a property of individuals, but of something else, call it Z. Thus on this theory-schema, the existence of an individual x does not consist in x' s having a property, but in Z's having a property. For example, there is a theory that is suggested by a certain reading of Frege and Russell, a theory according to which Z is a property. On this theory, which we do not claim is the actual historical position of either Frege or Russell, the existence of an F is the being instantiated of the property F-ness. Thus the existence of an individual cat is not a cat's instantiation of existence, or of any other property, but the being instantiated of the property of being a cat. Existence is thus a second-level property, a property of properties, namely, the property of being instantiated. But nothing can be a cat without being a particular cat, nameable in principle. If the cat's name is 'Felix,' then the theory would imply that the existence of Felix -- that very cat as opposed to some cat or other -- consists in a certain property's being instantiated. This

32 CHAPfERONE

property cannot be multiply exemplifiable, for the simple reason that each individual's existence is its own existence. So the property whose instantiation is the existence of Felix must be such that, if it is instantiated, it is instantiated by exactly one individual in the actual world, and by the very same individual in any other possible world in which it is instantiated. This property - call it Felicity - picks out Felix uniquely in that if anything has it, Felix has it, and nothing distinct from him could have it. Thus the theory implies that the existence of Felix consists in Felicity's being instantiated. The general form of this theory is: a's existence consists in some other thing Z's having a property. This is of course rather perplexing: How can one thing's existence consist in some other thing's having a property? But critique comes later; here our concern is merely taxonomy of possible theories.

Theories of the general form just given we may call 'higher-level property theories.' The existence of a consists in some distinct item Z' shaving of a property. We have just seen how Z could be a property. But Z could also be a world or domain. Thus several thinkers have proposed the idea that the existence of Socrates, say, consists in the world's having a property, namely, the property of containing Socrates. Thus the existence of x consists not in x's having a property, but in Z's having a property, where Z contains x. Borrowing a phrase from Fred Sommers, we shall call theories of this SUbtype, 'mondial attribute' theories.

There are thus two sorts of higher-level property theory. There is the theory that existence is a property of properties, namely, the property of being instantiated; and there is the theory that existence is a property of worlds or domains, namely, the property of having a member.

A more robust 'moderate difference' theory takes the world to be an individual in its own right as opposed to a domain or collection as on mondial attribute theories. It is intuitively obvious that if the world is a collection, then its existence as a collection is logically parasitic upon the existence of the members of the world as collection. A collection exists because (logically speaking) its members exist and not vice versa. What we may call a monistic theory reverses this relation. The basic idea here is that there is exactly one self-existent substance, and that the existence of a concrete contingent individual consists in this substances' having an accident. On this theory, the existence of Socrates consists in his being a modification, or accident, of the one substance. What then is existence on this monistic scheme? Existence is the one necessarily existent substance. Existence is thus not a property of Socrates, or a property of a property of Socrates, or a property of domain that contains him; existence is the one substance of which he is an accident. Existence is not a property of Socrates, Socrates is a 'property' of existence.

We have now arrived at the idea of a paradigm theory of existence. A paradigm theory is a moderate difference theory. Thus it upholds the distinction among an individual, its existing, and existence. But it rejects the idea that


existence is a property, whether of individuals or of properties, or of worlds or domains. On a paradigm theory, existence itself, existence in its difference from existing concrete contingent individuals, is neither a property, nor a relation, nor a concept, nor a quantifier, nor anything merely logical or linguistic. A paradigm theory is therefore toto caelo different from a deflationary view like that of Quine, according to which "Existence is what existential quantification expresses.,,24 What then is existence? On a paradigm theory, existence itself exists as a paradigm existent. Thus the one substance of which all else is an accident is a paradigm existent in that it exists in a standard-setting way. It exists fundamentally, whereas all else exists derivatively. It alone exists a se, whereas all else exists ab alio. Of the paradigm it is true that nulla res indiget ad existendum - it needs no other thing in order to exist - but this cannot be said of that which depends on the paradigm for its existence. For they need the paradigm in order to exist. The paradigm is paradigmatic in that it is selfexistent. All else, however, is existentially derivative, and thus existentially substandard.

A paradigm theory, however, need not be a monistic theory, and the paradigm theory to be developed in this book is not a monistic theory. It does not claim that there is exactly one substance of which all else is an accident. It does not maintain that the existing of a contingent individual is its inhering in a substance; rather, it tries to accommodate the apparent fact that contingent individuals have their own existence over against the paradigm existent and over against each other. We want somehow to find the via media between radical ontological pluralism - which is what the 'no difference' approach commits us to - and radical ontological monism.

C. On the far right of the theoretical spectrum, we encounter 'extreme difference' (ED) theories of existence. On these theories, the difference between an individual and existence is taken to be so wide that it is denied that there is any such thing as a's having of existence. Thus our tripartite distinction is reduced to a bipartite one between a and existence. There is a on the one hand, and existence on the other, and never the twain shall meet. Theories of this type are eliminativist as opposed to identitarian. An example from the philosophy of mind will help clarify this distinction. To say that a token mental state is identical to some token brain state is to espouse an identity theory. Such a theory presupposes the existence of mental states. Its purpose is not to deny their existence, but to identify them with something better understood, namely, physical states. The theory implies that there are mental states, but that what they are are brain states. Indeed, it cannot identify them with physical states unless physical states are there to be so identified. The eliminativist, however, takes the more radical line that there are no mental states, and that talk of them is as empty as talk of phlogiston.

A similar distinction arises in the philosophy of existence. To ask what the existence of an individual consists in is to presuppose that there is 'such a

34 CHAPTER ONE

thing' as the existence of an individual. Thus someone who said that the existence of Socrates is the being instantiated of Socrateity (the property of being identical to Socrates) would be giving an identity theory, and thus presupposing that the existence of Socrates is a reality, a reality that is susceptible of explication in terms of the instantiation of an exotic haecceity property. Such an identity theorist would be presupposing that in some sense existence belongs to individuals and so can be legitimately attributed to them. This is true in general for anyone who tries to fill the blank in 'x exists if and only if __ .' In this schema, 'exists' functions as a first-level predicate. But a more radical view is that existence never belongs to individuals and is in no way attributable to them: existence is always a property of properties (or cognate items) only. On this more radical view, the above schema would be dismissed as meaningless, as meaningless as 'x is numerous if and only if _.'

It is exceedingly important to be cognizant of this ambiguity as between identitarian and eliminativist readings of an existential dictum. Consider the 'no difference' theory according to which the existence of a is just a. One might take this in identitarian fashion as implying that there is the existence of a, but what that is is just a. Or one might take it in eliminativist fashion as the outright denial of the existence of a. The different readings have different consequences. But there is no point in anticipating here what will be discussed in detail later.

We now have our spectrum of theories before us. On the extreme left, 'no difference' theories construed in identitarian fashion; on the extreme right, eliminativist theories; in the middle, 'moderate difference' theories. The datum that gives rise to this classification is the tension between the difference of existence and existing individuals, on the one hand, and the togetherness of existence and existing individuals, on the other.

We now proceed to refute the competitor theories, in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 then work out the details. It will turn out that something like God is in the details.

NOTES

1 W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 94

2 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967), p. 35: "Ontologie ist nur als Phaenomenologie moeglich." For my critique of Heidegger see the following articles. "Heidegger and the Problem of Being," International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XXX, no. 2 (June 1990), pp. 245-254; Critical Review of Heidegger's Basic Problems of Phenomenology, International Studies in Philosophy, vol. XVIII, no. 1 (1986), pp. 80-81; "Heidegger's Reduction of Being to Truth," The New Scholasticism, vol. UX, no. 2 (Spring 1985), pp. 156-176; "Kant, Heidegger and the Problem of the Thing In Itself," International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 1 (March 1983), pp. 35-43; "The Problem of Being in the Early Heidegger, The Thomist, vol. 45, no. 3 (July 1981), pp. 388-406.


3 Cf. Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 183,207,212,230,316.

4 Panayot Butchvarov, Skepticism about the External World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 122 ff.

5 Butchvarov, op. cit., p. 134.

6 At A 11-12 of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains that 'transcendental' as he uses the term pertains not to objects, "but to our a priori concepts of objects."

7 Butchvarov, op. cit., p. 125.

8 Hector-Neri Castaneda, 'Thinking and the Structure of the World," Critica IV (1972), p. 55.

9 Quentin Gibson, The Existence Principle (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998).

10 Ibid., p. 1.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., pp. 5-8.

13 Ibid., p. 1.

14 Ibid., p. 6.

15 Ibid., p. 7.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 This ambiguity is explained in my articles cited above.

19 Ibid., p. 146.

20 Ibid., p. 150.

21 Ibid., p. 151.

22 Donald C. Williams, "Dispensing with Existence," The Journal of Philosophy vol. LIX (1962), p.761.

23 Cf. Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983).

24 W. V. Quine, op. cit., p. 97.

Chapter Two

Is Existence a First-Level Property?

We begin our critical discussions with an examination of what might be called the naive property theory of existence. This theory consists of two related claims: (i) existence is a property; and (ii) the existing of an individual consists in its instantiating of the property, existence. The first claim implies that existence is a first-level property, a property of individuals, without excluding the possibility that it is also a property of non-individuals, e.g., properties. The second claim specifies how an existing individual exists or has existence: it has it by instantiating it. As we use 'property' and 'instantiation,' they are interdefinable: every property is an instantiable entity and every instantiable entity is a property. P is a property if and only if P is possibly such that it is instantiated by something, where 'possibly' is to be taken to express metaphysical or 'broadly logical' possibility. This definition rules out such impossible properties as being both round and square, and does so reasonably: it is difficult to understand how something that nothing could instantiate could count as a property. It rules in uninstantiated properties, again reasonably: whether or not all properties must be instantiated in order to exist is a difficult question not to be settled by a mere definition.

Property-instances are definable in terms of inherence: Q is a propertyinstance if and only if Q actually inheres in something. Now if this is what we mean by 'property,' and 'property-instance,' then a strong case can be made that existence can be neither a property nor a property-instance of individuals. If so, the existing of an individual can neither be identified with its instantiating of existence, nor with the inherence in it of existence. This chapter aims to make this case.

Some will think that this is a dead issue, one that was definitively settled some time ago by Frege and Russell, if not two centuries ago by Kant. Did not Kant's critique of the ontological argument establish, once and for all, that existence is not a first-level property? Recently, however, numerous philosophers have been urging, in an apparent break with Kantian-Fregean orthodoxy, that existence is after all a property of individuals. Alvin Plantinga, for example, maintains that 'Socrates exists' can be used to express "a singular proposition predicating of Socrates the property of existence."J According to David Kaplan, Russell's "claim that it is meaningless to predicate existence of [the referent of] a logically proper name is plainly a mistake.,,2 And Nathan Salmon assures us "that there is a special property -- the property of existing -that an individual has only by virtue of the fact that it exists."3 According to Salmon, philosophers who deny this -- he mentions Kant, Frege and Russell by

37

38 CHAPTER TWO

name -- are "completely mistaken.,,4 We shall see that this last epithet is more justly applied to the view of Salmon and Co. Thus the issue whether existence is a property of individuals is far from dead. We should, however, be alert to the possibility that what Frege et al. were denying when they denied that existence is a first-level property is distinct from what Salmon et at. are affirming when they affirm that it is.

The plan of this chapter is to present various arguments for the thesis that existence cannot be a property, and thus for the thesis that the existing of an individual cannot consist in its instantiating of existence. Along the way it will be shown that existence can be neither a property-instance nor a trope, which is roughly a property-instance capable of independent existence. But why present several arguments for a thesis, if one will do the job? The answer to this is that in philosophy it is never wholly clear whether a given argument is successful. Thus it is appropriate to consider a variety of arguments for the same conclusion. It is hoped that the various arguments will illuminate one another and their common subject -matter and thattheir cumulative persuasive force will be greater than that of any single argument.

1. THERE ARE NO NONEXISTENT OBJECTS

The following arguments against the naive property theory of existence rest on the reasonable assumption that there are no nonexistent objects, that every object exists. For if there are nonexistent objects, as philosophers in the tradition of Alexius Meinong maintain, then one may plausibly hold that it is possession of the first -level property of existence that distinguishes existing things (Britain, the highest mountain) from nonexisting things (Atlantis, the golden mountain).5

Thus a bit of preliminary argument is required to shore up what we are calling a reasonable assumption. That is the task of this section.

A philosopher who maintains that there are objects that do not exist is of course not maintaining the contradiction that there exist objects that do not exist. What then is he maintaining? There are two possibilities. Either the view is that nonexistent items have no being whatsoever, or the view is that they have a mode of being weaker than existence. Both views have been held and both involve difficulties.

For Meinong, such items as the golden mountain are ausserseiend, literally, "outside of being.,,6 Meinong speaks of the Aussersein of the "pure object." What he means is that the pure object neither exists (in the manner of causally active/passive things like electrons and mountains) nor subsists (in the manner of such causally inert items as propositions and numbers). The pure object has no being at all, whence it follows that Aussersein is not a third mode of being alongside of existence and subsistence. It is a commonly made mistake to attribute to Meinong the view of the early Russell that the golden mountain and the like have being or subsistence.?

IS EXISTENCE A FIRST-LEVEL PROPERTY? 39

Nevertheless, the "pure object," the golden mountain, for example, is not a mere object of thought; for it is whether or not anyone thinks about it or refers to it. The realm of Aussersein, then, is a realm of mind-independent items. They are all out there waiting to be investigated in the Theory of Objects, and it is only the famous "prejudice in favor of the actual" that dissuades us from prosecuting the investigation.

But how can something be both mind-independent and beingless? As Meinong says, nonexistent items are given to thought; they are not excogitated. We don't think them up, we somehow apprehend them. They mayor may not acquire what he calls the "pseudo-existence" of being actually thought about by some mind. The problem is not how one can hold before one's mind a pure essence in abstraction from existence, for nonexistent items are not engendered by abstraction. The problem is how a pure essence can both mind-independently be and yet be beingless. How can the golden mountain, the round square, Pegasus, Cerberus and other possibilia and impossibilia be independent of anyone's thinking and yet be beingless?

Now it seems to me that this is a flat-out contradiction. For if I say that the golden mountain is but lacks being, then what I am saying is that it both is and is not. Weare forced to make a choice. If we say that the golden mountain is mind-independent, then we must say that it has some sort of being. But if we deny that it has any sort of being, then we must deny that it is mind-independent. Meinong himself seems to realize that he cannot have it both ways. Consider a passage from the late work On Emotional Presentation (1917) in which he inclines toward the view that Aussersein is a third mode of being:

As is well known, there 'are' many objects that do not exist, and many which do not even subsist. But because they 'are' anyway, though they cannot be said to be in a sense which warrants applying the traditional word 'being' to them, I believed, and still believe, that I am justified in attributing to them something being-like (seinsartiges) by predicating 'extra-being,' or Aussersein,ofthem.8

The same contradiction may be approached by a different route. Meinong, and such latter-day Meinongians as Richard Roudey want to say that

a. There are nonexistent items that have no being at all. and

b. All nonexistent items are actual items. But (a) and (b) are inconsistent. To see this we must see why (b) is true. All agree that the golden mountain is merely possible whereas the round square is impossible. But 'merely possible' and 'impossible' do not characterize these objects in themselves, but in their relation to existence. One is merely possibly existent, the other is impossibly existent. The golden mountain itself is an actual, albeit incomplete, item that is actually golden and actually a mountain. Roderick Chisholm puts it this way:

40 CHAPTER TWO

... to say of an object that it is only a possible object is not to say of it that it is only possibly an object. For possible objects, as well as impossible objects, are objects.9

And according to Richard Routley, " ... all of Meinong' s objects are in the objectdomain of the actual world, and true unmodalised statements can be made about all of them."IO Since actuality is a mode of being, (a) and (b) are logically inconsistent. It is a contradiction to say that nonexistent items are actual and yet have no being.

If we appreciate the point made by Chisholm, we will see that an argument of Karel Lambert's for the conclusion that the round square is beingless is fallacious. He infers this conclusion from the premise that "the round square is an object" via the justification: "the round square is impossible, and ... no subsistent can be impossible."ll The argument, then, is this:

The round square is impossible. No subsistent is impossible.

Therefore The round square is not a subsistent.

Therefore The round square is beingless.

The argument is invalid since it equivocates on 'impossible.' If the first premise is to be true, 'impossible' must mean 'not possibly existent' or 'not realizable.' But if the second premise is to be true, 'impossible' must mean 'not possible in itself.' The confusion here is very seductive, as witness Lambert's seduction.

Let us now consider the other possibility , according to which nonexistent items have being, where this is distinguished from existence. The Meinongian seems forced to say that nonexistent items have being in some sense by the above considerations. Accordingly, nonexistent items are actual but incomplete and actual but nonexistent. The golden mountain (GM), for example, is an actual item -- although only possibly existent -- but incomplete: its Sosein consists of exactly two properties, being golden and being a mountain. Thus it is indeterminate with respect to such properties as being a physical thing, occupying space, having a location, etc., even though being a mountain entails these properties. (P entails Q if and only if it is impossible for P to be exemplified without Q being exemplified.) But how can this be if the GM is an actual item? How can it be a mountain without having some height, and without having a definite height? How can incomplete items be actual? And what prevents the golden mountain from having more than exactly two properties?

Consider a related question. What prevents the incomplete perceptual object, the purple mountain in the distance, from having more properties than those I now see it to have? The natural answer is that the incompleteness or finitude of the perceptual object is brought about by the finitude of the knowing subject, or perhaps the finitude essential to perceptual consciousness as such.

IS EXISTENCE A FIRST -LEVEL PROPERTY? 41

Accordingly, it is not that there are incomplete and mind-independent actual items; it is rather that there are incomplete perceptual takings of complete mindindependent actual things. Thus the finitude of the intentional object of my present perceiving would be due to the finitude of consciousness, and not due to some intrinsic finitude in mind-independent items. On this way oflooking at the matter, what the Meinongian does is to reify or 'entify' what are merely intentional objects, thus projecting them into the realm of Aussersein.

But even more fundamentally, how can nonexistents - whether they are ascribed being or not -- actually have properties? The golden mountain is supposed to be golden actually, and not merely possibly. And of course the theory is that the golden mountain is not merely imagined to be actually golden, but really is actually golden. Moreover, the claim is that 'golden' in 'This (existing) bar of bullion is golden' and 'The golden mountain is golden' is univocal in sense. Let us examine these claims.

Suppose we start with the relatively unsung nonentity, the flammable wooden mountain (FWM). Its Sosein is the set {being flammable, being wooden, being a mountain}. If something is flammable, it can readily be set on fire. So the FWM can be set on fire. But surely this is absurd. No nonexistent object can be set on fire, for that would involve its standing in a causal relation with an existent source of fire, and it cannot so stand if it does not exist. X cannot act upon Y or be acted upon by Y unless both X and Y exist. So the flammable wooden mountain is not actually flammable. It is merely possibly flammable: if it were to exist, it could be set on fire. Or perhaps we should say that it is imagined or thought or said to be (by a storyteller) flammable, which does not entail that it is actually flammable. One might concoct a piece of fiction in which a pyromaniacal mountaineer commits arson against the FWM. Or take the nubile mermaid. Distracting connotations aside, 'nubile' means 'marriageable.' But one cannot marry a nonexisting object. So the nubile mermaid is not nubile. Further examples are easily generated using other dispositional properties. And there are a lot of them. Being green, for example, in the Scientific Image at least, is the property of reflecting light of such-andsuch a wavelength. This implies that the one-eyed green cat is not green.

Is the golden mountain actually golden? The natural interpretation of 'golden' is 'made of gold.' (Someone who desires a golden mountain desires a mountain of gold, and not a hunk of rock painted gold or bathed in golden sunlight.) But surely the golden mountain is not made of gold. Gold is an existing material stuff, but no nonexistent object is constituted of any existing material stuff. So the made-of-gold mountain is not made-of-gold. But then the golden mountain, which Meinongians tout as an example of a possible object, turns out to be impossible. Is the GM perhaps made of nonexistent gold? This too is impossible since two items cannot actually be related by the is made of relation unless both exist. Compare the phlogiston cloud. Phlogiston is a nonexistent material stuff. But we still cannot say that the phlogiston cloud is

42 CHAPTER TWO

made of phlogiston; the most we can say is that it is imagined, or conceived, or said (by a storyteller) to be made of phlogiston.

Finally, there is the following argument. If anything can count as an established result in philosophy, it is the conclusion of Descartes' famous cogito ergo sum argument. Thus to the query, 'How do I know that I exist?' the Cartesian answer is that the very act of doubting that one exists proves that one indubitably exists. Now this may not amount to a proof that a substantial self, a res cogitans, exists; and this for the reason that one may doubt that acts of thinking emanate from a metaphysical ego. But the cog ito certainly does prove that something exists, even if this is only an act of thinking or a momentary bundle of acts of thinking. Thus I know with certainty that my present doubting is not a nonexistent object. But if Meinong were right, then my present doubting could easily be a nonexistent object, indeed, a nonexistent object that actually has the property of being indubitable. For on Meinongian principles, I could, for all I can claim to know, be a fictional character, one who cannot doubt his own existence. In that case, the inability to doubt one's own existence would not prove that one actually exists. This intolerable result certainly looks like a reductio ad absurdum of the Meinongian theory. If anything is clear, it is that I know, in the strictest sense of the word, that I am not a fictional character. Forced to choose between Descartes and Meinong, we ought to go with Descartes. 12

This is not the place for a full-scale critique of Meinongian ontologies. But what I have said suffices to cast considerable doubt on the very idea of a nonexistent object, and with it the idea that existence is a first-level property that sorts the existent objects from the nonexistent ones. That every object exists, on the other hand, is naturally assumed and needs no special defense. The onus probandi surely rests on the Meinongians and not on their opponents. We therefore advance to the question whether existence can be a first-level property even if there are no nonexistent objects.

2. ARGUMENT ONE: VICIOUS CIRCULARITY OF THE PROPERTY VIEW

I begin with a synopsis of the argument, and then proceed to expand upon it. Properties are instantiable entities. Existence is not instantiable without vicious circularity. Ergo, existence is not a property.

Now for the expansion. (PI) If existence is a property of individuals, then individuals exist in virtue of instantiating existence. But (P2) the existence of an individual is an ontologically prior condition of its instantiating any properties at all. So (C) it cannot be in virtue of instantiating the putative property of existence that any individual exists. To think otherwise is to move in a vicious circle of embarrassingly short diameter: one would then be saying that a exists in virtue of a's instantiating existence, even though a can do no such


thing unless it already (logically, not temporally) exists. I suppose there are philosophers who would simply deny, or feign

incomprehension of, my initial premise, (PI). They will stumble over 'in virtue of.' This phrase carries a meaning which is neither narrowly logical nor causal, but is nonetheless indispensable for metaphysics. Compare:

i. If existence is a property of individuals, then individuals exist if and only if they instantiate existence. (narrowly logical; 'if and only if read as a material biconditional) ii. If existence is a property of individuals, then individuals exist because they instantiate existence. ('because' read causally) iii. If existence is a property of individuals, then individuals exist in virtue of instantiating existence. (ontological or metaphysical)

My argument will be accepted only by someone who sees that (iii) says something different from (i) and (ii). What it says is that their instantiating existence is what makes individuals exist. This use of 'makes' is of course no clearer than 'in virtue of.' The tough-minded who want to consign 'in virtue of' to the dreaded index verborum prohibitorum will presumably want to pay the same compliment to 'makes.' But I find it to be both intuitively clear and indispensable for metaphysics. That it cannot be explicated in narrowly logical or causal terms is no argument against it.

Compare talk of truth-makers. If a contingent sentence, belief, statement is true, then it is natural to hold that there must be something in the world that 'makes' it true, something 'in virtue of which' it is true. No doubt 'I am sitting' is true if and only if I am sitting; but more than that, it is true in virtue of the fact of my sitting. The truth of the sentence is explained by the obtaining of the fact, but the latter is not explained by the former. This asymmetry shows that we are in the presence of something other than a biconditional relationship between propositions or sentences. Contingent truths need an ontological ground. This grounding or making is of course not an empirical causing; but neither is it a logical relation such as entailment. If the truth-maker (a fact, say) were said to entail the proposition, then the truth-maker would itself be a proposition, and no grounding of the truth of the proposition in something pre- or extra-propositional would be achieved. A truth-maker must be proposition-like, but it cannot be a proposition. So in truth-making we meet a relation that is neither narrowly logical nor causal. My point, then, is that truth-making is intelligible, and my use of 'in virtue of ' in (iii) is no less so. Is this non-causal grounding perfectly pellucid? No, but neither is ordinary causation. If it were, there would not be competing theories of causation.

Let me give a second illustration of the intelligibility of metaphysical uses of 'in virtue of and 'makes.' Suppose that necessarily, for any x, God commands x if and only if x is morally obligatory. One may intelligibly ask whether it is God's commanding it that 'makes' an action morally obligatory, or whether it is the action's moral obligatoriness that 'makes' God command it.

44 CHAPTER TWO

Which explains which? It is clear that this question does not reduce to one that is narrowly logical or causal. What we are looking for is a metaphysical (ontological) explanation that is in some sense 'mid-way' between a narrowly logical and a causal explanation.

The intelligibility of metaphysical uses of 'makes' can also be brought out as follows. Consider the biconditional, 'An individual exists if and only if it satisfies the predicate "exist(s)".' This is false, since there are times when individuals exist, but no language and thus no predicates exist. But if it were true, one could still ask whether it is the existing of an individual that makes it satisfy the predicate in question, or whether it is the satisfying of the predicate that makes it exist. Now it is self-evident that this question is intelligible, and that the use of 'makes' involved in its formulation is equally so. It is also selfevident what the answer must be. It is the existing of an individual that explains its satisfaction of any predicate it satisfies, and not vice versa. Planets and galactic systems exist in sublime indifference to language and finite mind. One would have to be pretty far gone into a 'Goodmaniacal' nominalism to think that we create worlds by tossing out bits of language.

Thus we may reformulate (PI) as follows. If existence is a property of individuals, then it is their instantiating of existence that makes them exist, and not their existence that makes them instantiate existence. This is clearly intelligible; but is it true? Due to the asymmetry of 'makes,' only one of the options can hold, not both. And because the question is intelligible, it cannot be that neither option holds. Now if it is the existing of a that makes a instantiate (the putative property of) existence, then this property is completely otiose, a metaphysical fifth wheel that explains nothing. It is the existing of a that needs accounting; if the putative property of existence plays no role in this account, it is explanatorily idle. From this one can see that (PI) as lately reformulated is true.

Turning now to (P2), what it says is that the existing of an individual is an ontologically prior condition of its instantiating any properties at all. Some philosophers will balk at the phrase, 'ontologically prior condition.' They will feign incomprehension of it, or declare outright that it is nonsense. But just as there are relations such as the one expressed by 'makes true' that are neither narrowly logical nor causal, there are conditions that are neithernarrowly logical nor causal. The existence of a truth-making fact in the world is an ontologically prior condition of the truth of a corresponding proposition. The fact of my being seated is ontologically prior to the truth of the proposition expressed by 'I am seated.' The fact is not a narrowly logical condition of the truth of the proposition, because the fact is not a proposition and only propositions stand in logical relations. The fact is not a causal condition of the truth of the proposition, because concrete facts and abstract propositions do not stand in causal relations. The fact is not only an ontological condition, but also an ontologically prior condition, of the truth of the corresponding proposition in


that the proposition is true because the fact obtains, but not vice versa, where 'because' obviously has a non-causal sense. Truth-making is asymmetrical.

As a second example of the intelligibility of 'ontologically prior condition,' consider the relation of an individual to one of its accidental properties. (For definitions of 'accidental' and 'essential' see section 5 below.) Surely my existence is a necessary and ontologically prior condition of my being sunburned. It is obvious that my existence is neither a narrowly logical nor a causal condition of my being sunburned: my existence, not being a proposition, does not entail my being sunburned, and my existence does not cause my being sunburned. So my existence is an ontological condition of my being sunburned. But it is also an ontologie ally prior condition of my being sunburned in that I can exist without being sunburned, but I cannot be sunburned without existing. The existence of an individual is therefore an ontologically prior condition of its possession of any accidental property.

At the risk of belaboring what to some readers will be obvious, I want to give a third example of the intelligibility and indeed the indispensability for metaphysics and philosophy generally of the phrase, 'ontologically prior condition.' I do this not only for the purposes of this chapter, but for the purposes of later chapters as well. Indeed, one could go so far as to say that anyone who balks at the intelligibility of 'ontologically prior condition' has no idea of what metaphysics is about. So turn to the philosophy of mind and the recently much discussed thesis that the mental supervenes on the physical, a thesis that is supposed to make possible a nonreductive physicalism which avoids the problems besetting type-type identity theory. In his latest book, Jaegwon Kim defines 'supervenience' as follows:

Mental properties supervene on physical properties, in that necessarily, for any mental property M, if anything has M at time t, there exists a physical base (or subvenient) property P such that it has P at t, and necessarily anything that has P at a time has M at that time. \3

Kim goes on to correctly point out that supervenience as just defined expresses a weaker notion than that of dependence. What the physicalist wants to say is that mental property instantiations depend on, or are determined by, physical property instantiations. He cannot express this idea, however, using the concept of supervenience alone. For whereas dependence/determination is asymmetric, supervenience is not. If mental properties depend on, or are determined by, physical properties, this implies that physical properties do not depend on, are not determined by, mental properties. "What does the determining must be taken to be, in some sense, onto logically prior [emphasis added] to, or more basic than, what gets determined by it."14 Supervenience, however, expresses a mere pattern of co-variation between the mental and physical properties, " ... and such covariances can occur in the absence of a metaphysical dependence [emphasis

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added] or determination relation.,,15 What this little excursus into the philosophy of mind shows is that not

only are such phrases as 'ontologically prior' and 'metaphysical dependence' intelligible, but that they are also absolutely indispensable for the proper formulation of nonreductive physicalism.

We may take it as established by these three examples that the phrase 'ontologically prior condition' is fully intelligible. (P2) is therefore meaningful. But is it true? Is it true that the existing of an individual is an ontologically prior condition of its instantiating any and all of its properties? Consider an essential property such as being human. Is my existence an ontologically prior condition of my being human? Surely it is, even allowing the fact that I cannot exist without being human.

It is clear that I am distinct from the property of being human, whether we take the property to be a universal or a particular (trope). But if I am distinct from the property, then I must be somehow related to it, and cannot be related to it unless I exist. Thus if I am a substrate related to the property by instantiation, then I must exist to stand in the instantiation relation. It follows that my existence is an onto logically prior condition of my instantiating the property of being human, or indeed of any property essential or accidental. The fact that I cannot exist without my essential properties has no tendency to show that my existence is not ontologically prior to my instantiation of my essential properties.

I have now supported both (PI) and (P2). From these (C) follows: it cannot be in virtue of instantiating the putative property of existence that any individual exists. Instantiating the putative property of existence cannot be what makes me exist, or constitutes me as existent.

Four remarks are in order. First, if someone insists that there is a property of existence, but that this property - call it pseudo-existence - is not that in virtue of whose instantiation any individual exists, then I have no argument with him except to say that he has changed the subject. The real issue is whether genuine existence, the existence in virtue of which existing individuals exist, is a property. And the answer to that is definitely in the negative. Am I thereby unwarrantedly assuming that there is something in virtue of which existing individuals exist, something that 'makes' them exist? Am I open to the objection that there is nothing in virtue of which existing individuals exist, that they just exist without anything that constitutes them as existent? Well, if there is nothing in virtue of which a exists, then this is tantamount to saying that there is no answer to the question, What is it for an individual to exist? But given that individuals exist, but might not have existed, this question seems legitimate. Hence I am assuming, warrantedly, that there is something in virtue of which existing individuals exist. But this is not to assume that contingent individuals have a cause of their existence. It is not to assume that there is a positive answer to the question, Why do contingent individuals exist? It is merely to assume that there is a positive answer to the question, What


is it for a contingent individual to exist? Second, I have been assuming that properties are not constituents of the

things that have them. Thus I have been assuming a nonconstituent ontology. If properties are constituents of the things that have them, then a different argument must be given to show that the existence of an individual cannot be a constituent of it. This will occupy us below.

Third, I have been assuming that properties are complete or 'saturated' (gesaettigt) entities in Frege' s sense, and that therefore a tertium quid, a relation of instantiation, is needed to connect a property to an individual that, as we say, 'has' it. What transpires on the assumption that properties are incomplete or 'unsaturated' or 'gappy' and connect with individuals without the services of a tertium quid? The main argument remains unaffected. For even if a relation of instantiation is not required to connect a property to an individual, the individual must exist in order to saturate the property. Thus the circularity objection applies mutatis mutandis here as well.

Fourth, some will claim that the circularity argument given above proves too much: if it were sound, then self-identity, being an individual, et al. could not be first-level properties. But I say the argument has exactly the right degree of 'probative reach': self-identity, being an individual, and the like are not firstlevel properties. Hector-Neri Castaneda has seen this as regards the property of being an individual:

Instantiation, which is an external connection between a property and what instances it, presupposes that a full-fledged entity fit to be the subject is already constituted. If such a subject cannot be an individual aside from instantiating the property of being an individual, this would make the account of individuation in terms of instantiation of this property circular and useless.16

As regards self-identity, it is "circular and useless" to say that Socrates is self-identical in virtue of exemplifying self-identity for the simple reason that his being self-identical is an ontologically prior condition of his exemplifying any property. The circularity here is just as vicious as the circularity of saying that Socrates is Socrates (i.e., Socrates is self-identical) in virtue of his satisfying the predicate 'self-identical.' In this case it is spectacularly clear that our man's self-identity cannot have anything to do with his satisfying any predicate token or type. For there is just nothing linguistic about a thing's self-identity as little as there is something linguistic about its existence. Similarly, there is nothing abstract about it either. The self-identity of a wholly concrete thing cannot consist in a relation to an abstract thing, for neither term of a relation can enter into the relation unless each is antecedently self-identical.

This is not to deny that one can focus one's mental glance upon a thing as self-identical thereby abstracting from all the other features of the thing. Such abstractive consideration yields an abstraction (not to be confused with an abstract object). Clearly, abstractions, unlike abstract objects, do not exist in

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themselves; they exist only relative to an act of abstractive consideration. Lacking real (mind-independent) existence, they possess only cognitional (minddependent) existence.

What about ordinary essential properties? Does our circularity argument show that humanity, e.g., cannot be a property of Socrates? Once nonexistent objects are rejected, it is obvious that existence is not only a necessary condition of property-possession, but an ontologically prior condition of propertypossession. But being-human is not an ontologically prior condition of an indi vidual's being human. Socrates cannot instantiate any property unless he is an existent, self-identical individual. But there is no reason to think that Socrates must be antecedently human in order to instantiate the property of humanity. Socrates must antecedently exist to instantiate the property of existence; but it is not the case that he must be antecedently human to instantiate the property of being human. Otherwise put, there is no problem with saying that it is his instantiating of humanity that makes Socrates human in the way that there is a problem with saying that it is his instanti~ting of existence that makes Socrates exist.

3. ARGUMENT TWO: EXTERNALIINTERNAL

Our second argument exploits the fact that, on a nonconstituent ontology, instantiation is a relation that, in the primary case, connects a concrete individual to an abstract property. If instantiation were a nexus within an individual, as on a constituent ontology, then perhaps it might be construed as a nonrelational tie, assuming that 'nonrelational tie' is not a contradictio in adjecto. But this is hard to make sense of on a nonconstituent ontology. Now if instantiation is a relation, it must be either an external or an internal relation. An individual, however, can be neither externally nor internally related to its existence, whence it follows that an individual cannot instantiate existence, and thus that existence cannot be a first-level property.

If existence is a property of individuals, then individuals exist in virtue of instantiating existence. Now instantiation is either an external or an internal relation. An internal relation is one that holds between or among its relata just in virtue of their intrinsic properties. Thus if a is red and b is red, then a and b stand in the internal relation of being the same color as each other. This implies that two internally related items cannot cease to stand in an internal relation in which they do stand unless one or both of them change( s) in respect of an intrinsic property. But if two individuals are externally related, then they can cease to stand in an external relation in which they do stand without changing in respect of any intrinsic property. Thus if a and b go from being ten feet from one another to being twenty feet from one another, this can happen without inducing any intrinsic change in the two things.

So if instantiation is an external relation, and existence is a first-level


property, then a can cease to instantiate existence without changing in any intrinsic respect. But the existence of a is surely intrinsic to a: it is not a relational feature of a. So if instantiation is an external relation, then a can cease to instantiate existence without changing in respect of its existence. And that is patently absurd. So if existence is instantiated by a, instantiation cannot be an external relation.

If, on the other hand, instantiation is an internal relation, then it is a relation that holds between a and the property of existence just in virtue of their intrinsic properties. In the case of a, this must be a's existence. But then it cannot be the case that a exists in virtue of instantiating the property of existence. It would the other way around: in virtue of existing, a would instantiate existence. More precisely, in virtue of the existence of a and of existence, the former would instantiate the latter. But then it is clear that the existence of a cannot consist in a's instantiation of existence.

4. ARGUMENT THREE: PROPERTY-INSTANCES AND TROPES

Properties are definable in terms of instantiation, property-instances in terms of inherence. A property-instance inheres in a subject of inherence and cannot exist otherwise. Socrates' wisdom, to coin an example, exists in Socrates, only in Socrates, and not possibly in anything distinct from Socrates. So if existence were a property-instance, existence would inhere in individuals, and they would exist in virtue of being the subjects of this inherence of existence in them. But this too is viciously circular. A subject of inherence is ontologically prior to its property-instances; so if existence were a property-instance, an individual would be onto logically prior to its existence. Since that is clearly absurd, it follows that existence is no more a property-instance than it is a property.

Closely related to property-instances are tropes. A trope is just like a property-instance, except that a trope needs no subject in which to exist. Suppose an ordinary individual such as Socrates is a bundle of tropes. Could he exist in virtue of having in his bundle an existence trope? That is quite absurd. If anything, his existence is the togetherness of all his tropes, and cannot be identified with one of them. The argument for this will be postponed to section 7 below. For now we return to arguing against the view that existence is a universal property of individuals.

5. ARGUMENT FOUR: ESSENTIAL/ACCIDENTAL

We begin our fourth argument with two definitions. (Dl) P is an accidental property of x =df x instantiates P, but x is possibly such that it exists but does not instantiate P. (D2) P is an essential property of x =df x instantiates P, but x is not possibly such that it exists but does not instantiate P. These definitions are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive: No property of a given individual

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is both accidental and essential; no property of a given individual is neither accidental nor essential. What we will try to argue, however, is that if existence is a property, then it is neither essential nor accidental to the individuals that instantiate it, whence it follows that existence is not a property of individuals.

1. If existence is a property of individuals, then either it is an accidental, or it is an essential, property of individuals. 2. Existence cannot be an accidental property of individuals. 3. Existence cannot be an essential property of individuals.

Therefore 4. Existence cannot be a property of individuals.

This argument is clearly valid in point of logical form, so the question of its soundness depends on the truth of its premises. The truth of (1) is evident from (D1) and (D2). The truth of (2) may be seen as follows.

Let a be an arbitrary contingent individual, where a contingent individual is one that is possibly existent and possibly nonexistent. If existence is an accidental property of a, then by (D 1) a is possibly such that it exists but does not instantiate existence. But given that to exist is just to instantiate existence, this amounts to saying that a is possibly such that it both instantiates existence and does not instantiate existence, which is absurd. So (2) is true.

But -- mirabile dictu -- (3) is also true. We give two arguments, the second of which is deployed in the following section.

It is obvious that some individuals cease to exist. It is also obvious from (D2) that no individual can lose its essential properties, where a loses P just in case there are times t and t' (t earlier than t') such that (i) a exists at both t and t', and (ii) a instantiates Pat t but a does not instantiate P at t'. So if existence is an essential property of a, and a ceases to exist, then a's ceasing to exist is not a's loss of the property of existence. An essential property cannot be lost. Since a's ceasing to exist cannot be a's loss of the essential property of existence, the ceasing to exist of a can only be construed as the ceasing to exist of a itself, the ceasing to exist of that which instantiates the putative property of existence. But then it should be clear that the existence of a cannot consist in a's instantiation of existence construed as an essential property.

To make the point more graphic, consider what God must do to annihilate a. Obviously, an omnipotent being cannot do just anything; it cannot actualize a logically impossible state of affairs. So God cannot cause an individual to lose one of its essential properties. (Glance back at the definition of 'a loses P' two paragraphs supra.) Therefore, to annihilate a, God must destroy a itself. He must withdraw existence from a itself. In doing this, he of course causes a to cease to instantiate all its properties essential and accidental. This makes it clear that a does not lose existence in virtue of a's ceasing to instantiate the essential property, existence, but vice versa: It is in virtue of a's loss of existence that a ceases to instantiate the essential property, existence. But then it is clear that the genuine existence of a cannot consist in a's


instantiation of the essential property, existence. Similarly, God cannot cause a to gain an essential property, where a

gains property P just in case there are times t and t* (t < t*) such that (i) a exists at both t and t* and (ii) a does not instantiate P at t but does instantiate P at t*. Hence God cannot create a by causing a to gain the essential property, existence. To create a, God must create a itself. He must give existence to a itself. In doing this he of course causes a to instantiate properties essential and accidental. This makes it clear that a does not gain existence in virtue of a's beginning to instantiate the essential property, existence, but vice versa: It is in virtue of a's gain of existence that a begins to instantiate the essential property, existence. But then it is clear that the genuine existence of a cannot consist in a's instantiation of the essential property, existence.

It is obvious that none of this argumentation requires the existence of God. Remove God from the picture and think of a coming into existence without cause and a passing away without cause. The same points can be made, mutatis mutandis.

The upshot is clear: since the existence of an individual can be neither an accidental nor an essential property of it, it cannot be a property of it.

6. ARGUMENT FIVE: EXISTENCE TOO BASIC TO BE A PROPERTY

I promised a second argument why existence cannot be an essential first-level property. Here it is. If existence is an essential property of a, this means either that necessarily a instantiates existence (instantiates existence in every possible world), or that necessarily a instantiates existence if a exists (instantiates existence in every possible world in which a exists). The first disjunct is false implying as it does that a is a necessary being, contrary to our assumption that a is contingent. But in the second disjunct, how are we to take 'exists' in 'instantiates existence if a exists'? Two possibilities: either 'exists' means 'instantiates existence' or it means something else. On the first alternative, the result is

5. Necessarily, a instantiates existence if a instantiates existence. On the second alternative, the result is

6. Necessarily, a instantiates existence if a exists. The difference between the two propositions is that (5) is a logical truth whereas (6) is not. The logical form of (5) is: Necessarily, p if p. The logical form of (6) is: Necessarily, p if q.

Now which of these two propositions captures the sense of 'existence is an essential property of a'? Clearly, the non-tautological (6), since the sentence in question expresses a non-tautological proposition. It is surely not a tautology that existence is an essential property of a. 'Existence is an essential property of a' is not true in virtue of its logical form alone. If it were, its negation would be a narrowly logical contradiction. But those who deny that existence is an

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essential property of a are not thereby embracing a narrowly logical contradiction.

This implies that the sense expressed by 'exists' in (6) is distinct from the sense expressed by 'instantiates existence.' Call this the fundamental sense of 'exists' and cognates.

It is fundamental in that its understanding is presupposed for the understanding of (Dl) and (D2) in the preceding section. To understand what it means to say that an essential property is one a thing must possess in order to exist, one must have an antecedent grip on the fundamental sense of 'exists.' Without this antecedent grip one would not understand the claim that existence is an essential property. Existence is an essential property because a thing cannot exist without instantiating existence. This is a genuine explanation. But 'existence is an essential property because a thing cannot instantiate existence without instantiating existence' explains nothing. After all, every property (including accidental properties) is such that a thing cannot instantiate it without instantiating it.

The upshot is that existence in the fundamental sense cannot be a property of individuals, whether accidental or essential. This is not to deny (but neither is it to affirm) that there is a property of individuals in the vicinity, a property we may call pseudo-existence. But it is to deny that the latter is the genuine article. Pseudo-existence (the first-level property of existence, or existence construed as a first-level property) is to be scrupulously distinguished from existence. Existence -- genuine, pound-the-table existence -- is just too ontologically basic to be a property of individuals. 'Existence' used without qualification refers of course to the genuine article.

Furthermore, if, per impossibile, existence were a property of contingent individuals, it would surely have to be an accidental property of them, for the simply reason that every existing contingent individual might not have existed. But we have shown above that existence cannot be an accidental property of contingent individuals. Modus Tollens therefore assures us that existence cannot be a property of contingent individuals. On the other hand, philosophers who hold that existence is an essential property of everything are either mistaken or have changed the subject to pseudo-existence. And if they have changed the subject, then they are not affirming what Frege and Russell were denying when they denied that existence is a property of individuals.

In sum, a thing must exist it is to pseudo-exist. A thing must be there if it is to have properties, including existence construed as a property. Surely the being-there of a cannot be yet another of the universal properties it exemplifies. Either the existence of a is just a, or (as will be argued in the following chapter) there is a difference between the existence of a and a, but not a difference articulable in terms of the difference between any property of a and a. In short, existence, as a necessary condition of an individual's having properties, is too ontologically basic to be a property of individuals.


7. ARGUMENT SIX: THE HOLISM OF EXISTENCE

The foregoing arguments assume a nonconstituent ontology according to which properties are not ontological constituents of the things that have them. What happens if we think: of properties as ontological constituents of the things that have them? Can we still show that existence cannot be a property? Indeed we can.

The intuition behind the 'holism of existence' can be expressed as follows. The existence of a thing is not one of its properties, but, in Kantian terms, the being-posited of the whole thing, the thing together with all its properties. If I want to know whether God exists, what I want to know is not whether God has a certain property; what I want to know is whether there is any such thing as God, whether God is posited in reality outside the mind with the full complement of properties that define him. In other words, what I want to know is whether the divine attributes are assembled together in one being, or are co-realized, or co-exemplified. The point was made by Pierre Gassendi in an objection to Descartes' Meditations:

... that which exists and has various perfections, does not have its existence as a particular perfection and as one of the number of its perfections, but as that by means of which the thing itself equally with its perfections is in existence, and without which neither can it be said to possess perfections, nor can perfections be said to be possessed by it. l1

Gassendi is surely right: the existence of a is that in virtue of which a together with all its properties (perfections) exists. It follows that the existence of a cannot be a property of a. A fortiori, it follows that the existence of a cannot be a property of a if properties are constituents of the individuals that have them.

Let me now try to set forth the argument in a more rigorous form. Suppose the ontological constituents of a are F, G, H, and E, where 'E' stands for existence and the other letters denote ordinary properties. These properties may be viewed as either universals, which are repeatable, or as tropes, which are not. The individual a is clearly not identical to the set {F, G, H, E} for the simple reason that this set can exist even if a does not exist. If the properties exist, then the set 'automatically' exists; but the properties could exist without being co-occurrent. For example, if F, G, and H are tropes, then each would exist if there are three trope-bundles B 1, B2, and B3 such that F belongs to B 1, G belongs to B2, and H belongs to B3. But it does not follow that there is some one bundle containing all three tropes. Therefore, a mere set of tropes cannot be identified with a concrete individual.

If, on the other hand, properties are universals, then either they can exist uninstantiated or they cannot. If universals can exist uninstantiated, then it is self-evident that there are all the sets of universals that there might have been,

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and thus sets of universals the members of which are not constituents of any concrete individual. If universals cannot exist uninstantiated, then the following is possible. F exists in virtue of being instantiated by a, G exists in virtue of being instantiated by b, and H exists in virtue of being instantiated by c. It obviously does not follow that there is some one individual that instantiates all three universals.

Evidently, there is something more to a than its constituents. This 'something more' is the unity or togetherness of these constituents. Without this unity there is no concrete individual but a mere collection of properties. Thus at a bare minimum, a = U{F, G, H, E}, where 'U' denotes the unifier of a's constituents. One way to think: of U is as an operator that operates upon a set of properties to form a concrete individual. Clearly, U cannot be a property, for then it would be just one more member of the set of properties, and the question would arise once more as to the unity of the members of that set. Thus if you say that a = {F, G, H, E, U}, you have achieved nothing. For what ties U to the rest of its classmates? A further constituent U*? But then a vicious infinite regress threatens. It is also clear that U is not a nonconstituent (NC) property instantiated by {F, G, H, E}. The arguments above that showed that the existence of an individual cannot consist in its instantiation of a NC property also show, mutatis mutandis, that the concrete individuality of a concrete individual cannot consist in its instantiation of any NC property.

Possibilism was rejected in section 1 above where we rejected Meinongian nonexistent individuals. If there are no nonexistent individuals, then (assuming as we are that individuals have ontological constituents) the existence of a is just the unity of a's constituents. Thus the actualist formula, existing a = U {F, G, H, E}. From this we can see that the property of existence is completely superfluous, a metaphysical fifth wheel that does no work. In other words, genuine existence, the existence that makes the difference between the existence and the nonexistence of an individual, cannot be a property. The latter formula therefore reduces to: existing a = U{F, G, H}.

The upshot is that the existence of an individual cannot be a property of it if properties are ontological constituents of individuals. The existence of an individual pertains to the whole set of the individual's properties, and therefore cannot be one property in that set. Note that the argument goes through whether we think: of properties as universals or as particulars (tropes). Now matter how you slice it, the existence of a thing cannot be one of its properties, hence cannot be one of its properties.

Some may try to accommodate what I am calling the holism of existence by saying that existence is not an ordinary first-level property, but the first-level property of having properties (which is not to be confused with the FregoRussellian view that existence is a second-level property, a property of properties).18 But the property of having properties is an essential property of everything, and we have seen in section 5 above that existence cannot be an


essential property. So existence cannot be identified with the first-level property of having properties. Of course, this is not to deny that, necessarily, x exists if and only if x has properties. Necessarily true biconditionals, however, do not sanction reductions or identifications.

Some are incapable of seeing that existence cannot be a first-level property because they confuse the product of a certain act of abstraction with existence. One may consider Socrates qua man, qua animal, qua living thing, qua material object, and finally qua existent. To consider a thing qua existent is to consider it in abstraction from all of its determinations except the determination, 'an existent.' But this supremely abstract determination is not to be confused with existence. For either the existence of a is just a or it is somehow distinct from a. If the former, then the point is obvious that the supremely abstract determination 'an existent' cannot be identified with the concretum a, since there is nothing abstract about the concretum a. If the latter, if the existence of a is distinct from a, then it is still the case, as already noted, that the existence of a thing is not one of its features but pertains to the whole of it. The supremely abstract determination, however, is but one of a thing's determinations. Thus it does not pertain to the whole of the thing. It is what I called earlier pseudo-existence, existence construed as a property of individuals. I need not deny that there is such a property; the point is not to confuse it with the genuine article.

8. EXISTENCE, ACTUALITY, AND CONTINGENCY

By my lights, any philosopher who fails to appreciate the cumulative force of the foregoing arguments and persists in the view that existence is a property of everything is either simply wrong or has changed the subject from existence to pseudo-existence. Charity bids us focus on the latter alternative. That there has been a changing of the subject from genuine existence to pseudo-existence becomes clear when we consider how such philosophers treat the actuality and the contingency of concrete individuals. In what follows I have Plantinga-type views in mind. 19 I shall argue that views of this type divorce existence from actuality and from contingency. This twin divorce is the basis of the charge of a shift from existence to pseudo-existence.

On the Leibniz-inspired views currently fashionable, a contingent being is defined as one that exists in some but not all possible worlds, while a necessary being is defined as one that exists in all possible worlds. So although Socrates has existence essentially (instantiates existence in every possible world in which he exists), he is nonetheless contingent since there are worlds in which he does not exist. Whether an individual is contingent/necessary thus depends on whether it exists in some/all possible worlds. But what are these worlds, and what is it to exist in one?

David Lewis and friends aside, possible worlds on the most plausible

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conception are necessarily existent abstract objects: propositions, abstract states of affairs, sets, properties.20 (Thus the actual world is not to be confused with the concrete universe.) We may think of them as (Fregean) propositions. Of course, not every logically consistent proposition is a possible world, only the maximal ones are, where a proposition is maximal just in case it entails every proposition with which it is logically consistent. Possible worlds so construed are obviously (non-mental) representations: the actual world is a proposition representing the concrete universe -- the total way things are -- and the merely possible worlds are propositions representing total ways things might have been.21 It follows that the actuality of the actual world is its truth, and that all merely possible worlds are false, although of course possibly true. If worlds are identified with maximal abstract states of affairs, then actuality will not be truth but something very much like it, obtaining. If there is a difference between truth and obtaining, we may ignore it for our purposes.

If actuality is truth, then concrete individuals like Socrates can no more be actual than they can be true: 'actual' would then have no meaningful use as a predicate of individuals. But since such individuals can meaningfully be said to exist on the view under consideration, the upshot is that actuality and existence are distinct properties. But this is counterintuitive, and is prima facie evidence that the subject has been changed from genuine existence to pseudoexistence. To say of a thing that it exists is to imply that it is actual and neither merely possible nor impossible. The question whether God exists is just the question whether God is actual. It is not the trivial question whether God exists in every possible world in which He exists. Of course, everything exists in every possible world in which it exists. What is actual exists, and what exists is actual. This is not only standard usage, but also the received opinion of philosophers. To say that God exists but that he is neither actual nor unactual is scarcely intelligible. (And if God is not actual, how can he be a necessary being? A necessary being is standardly defined as one whose possibility entails its actuality.) So either both predicates are first-level, or neither of them are. The divorce of actuality from existence is clear proof that the topic has shifted from genuine existence to pseudo-existence.

Furthermore, the contingency of an individual is not the contingent truth of some proposition about the individual, but is the contingency of the very existence of that individual, as I shall now proceed to argue.

If worlds are propositions, and actuality truth, then all it can mean to say that Socrates exists in some but not all possible worlds is that Socrates exists according to some but not all worlds. For x to exist in a world W is just for x to be represented as existing by W. Therefore,

1. Necessarily, x exists contingently if and only if x exists according to some but not all possible worlds.

But (I), though true, does not sanction the identification of contingent existence (PI) with existence according to some but not all worlds (P2).22 They cannot be


identical, since it makes sense to ask whether Socrates, e.g., has PI because he has P2, or has P2 because he has PI. Does Socrates exist contingently because some but not all maximal propositions depict him as existing? Is that what the contingency of his existence consists in? Or do they depict him as existing because he contingently exists? It seems obvious to me that our man has P2 because he has PI, and not vice versa. It is only because he exists contingently that he can be represented as existing by some but not all worlds. PI and P2 are thus distinct, and Socrates' having PI metaphysically grounds (accounts for) his having P2, and not the other way around.23

The non-identity of PI and P2 may be further argued as follows. On the theory under examination, Socrates' contingency is just the fact that some worldpropositions 'say' he exists, and some 'say' he does not exist. Now if WI represents him as existing, WI must have as a conjunct (or entailment) the contingent proposition Socrates exists. Call this proposition S. What makes S true? Clearly, the fact that Socrates exists. And what makes S contingently true? Surely, the fact that Socrates contingently exists. It is the contingency of Socrates' existence that makes S contingently true, and not the other way around.

9. EXISTENCE AND THE 'EXISTENTIAL' QUANTIFIER

Perhaps the main reason for thinking that existence is a property of individuals is that 'exists' can be treated as a first-level predicate using the elementary resources of standard predicate logic with identity. Thus

D3. x exists =df (::Iy)(x = y) where '::I' stands for the particular quantifier.24 (Calling it 'existential' is tendentious and question-begging, and is so whether or not we countenance nonexistent objects.)

In plain English, what (D3) says is that 'exists' is definable in terms of 'is identical with something.' Now if 'exists' is a first-level predicate, one will be tempted to infer that existence is a first -level property, the property of being identical with something. So is it not obvious that Frege and Russell were wrong?

This is a perfect example of how logical acuity can walk hand in hand with metaphysical obtuseness.

A moment's reflection suffices for one to see that (D3) is circular if it is not false. For either (D3) says that a thing exists just in case it is identical with something that exists, or (D3) says that a thing exists just in case it is identical with something which mayor may not exist. On the first alternati ve the circularity of the definition is obvious. On the second alternative, the definition is false.

Let us consider the second alternative first. If to exist = to be identical with something, and 'something' ranges over all objects whether existent or nonexistent, then, from the principle that everything is self-identical, the

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existence of anything whatsoever, whether God or Herr Krug's pen, can be deduced:

a. (x)(x = x). (Principle of Identity) Therefore

b. God = God (From (a) by Universal Instantiation) Therefore

c. (::Jx)(x = God) (From (b) by Existential Generalization) Therefore

d. God exists. (From (c) by translation into ordinary idiom) Believe it or not, this sort of logical legerdemain has actually been endorsed recently.25 But it is easy to see where the mistake lies. From (b) the most that can be inferred is 'For some x, x = God,' but not 'There exists an x such x = God.' The move from (b) to (c) trades on a confusion between the particular with the existential quantifier. It trades on a confusion of 'something' with 'something that exists.'

This leaves the other alternative according to which to exist is to be identical with something that exists -- which is blatantly circular. One might respond that circularity is no objection since the precise point at issue is not whether' exists' can be defined noncircularly, but whether' exists' is a legitimate first-level predicate. True, this is the question. But to be precise, the question is whether 'exists' is a legitimate first-level predicate in a way that implies that existence is a property of individuals. The fact that 'exists' as defined by (D3) is a first-level predicate does not show that existence is a property of individuals. Let me explain.

There is no doubt that there is such an open sentence as the defiliiens of (D3). Now if a predicate is just an open sentence, then there can be no doubt that the definiens of (D3) is a first-level predicate. Suppose we stipulate that this predicate shall be known as the predicate of schmexistence. We can then say that 'schmexists' = 'exists' as defined by D3. And let us use 'exists' (without qualification) in the ordinary way to express what we ordinarily mean when we say of an individual that it exists. We now arrive at a substantive question: Do 'schmexists' and 'exists' have the same sense? Or do they have different senses?

What we shall argue is that they have different senses, which is equivalent to arguing that (D3) does not capture the sense of 'exists.' Thus (D3) gives us no reason to think that existence is a property of individuals. It shows at most that schmexistence is a property of individuals. Those who cherish this property may embrace it. The point is merely not to confuse existence with schmexistence. Once this confusion has been duly exposed, it will be clear that the proponents of (D3) are not meeting Frege and friends on their own ground, but are committing an ignoratio elenchi against them.

Given the circularity of (D3), the property of schmexistence = the property of being identical with something that exists, identity-with-someexistent-or-other. (The 'or other' rider is essential, since no one will say that


existence is identity-with-some-particular-existent.) It follows that the property of non-schmexistence is the property of being diverse from everything that exists, diversity-from-every-existent. Assuming that existence = schmexistence, the following reductio ad absurdum may be mounted:

a. Possibly, I do not exist. Therefore

b. Possibly, I am diverse-from-every-existent. c. I am identical with some existent, call it 'a.'

Therefore d. Possibly, I am diverse from a.

Therefore e. Possibly, I am diverse from myself.

Since the reasoning is valid, but the conclusion is self-contradictory, one or more of the premises must be false. (a) and (c) are above reproach, so the stinker has to be the assumption that existence = schmexistence. What the argument shows is that this assumption is false. A thing's existence cannot be its identity with something that exists. And this for the simple reason that a thing's possible nonexistence cannot be identical to its possible diversity from itself.

One might object to this argument by saying that (d) does not follow from (b) and (c): although there is a possible world W in which I am distinct from everything, this is compatible with saying that there is no possible world in which I am distinct from myself. The reason being that I am not a member of W. But is this a coherent objection? The objector must grant that it is true in W that I am distinct from everything since this fact is part of what makes W the world it is. But if it is true in W that I am distinct from everything, then I must exist in W. If I do not exist in W, how could anything be true of me there? How can an individual have properties in a world in which it does not exist?

This assumes the truth of what has come to be known as serious actualism. This is the doctrine that, necessarily, no individual has a property in a possible world in which it does not exist. And so in a possible world in which I do not exist, I cannot have the property of being diverse from everything in that world. To have the property of being diverse from everything in that world, I have to be in that world, and thus I have to be diverse from myself, which is absurd.

Is serious actualism true? Michael Bergmann has recently shown that serious actualism is an entailment of actualism, the anti-Meinongian thesis that, necessarily, everything that there is exists, that there are no nonexistent objects. We will not repeat, but simply endorse, his argument.26 As for actualism, arguments in support of it were given in section 1 above.

Therefore, given the truth of both actualism and serious actualism, existence cannot be the property of identity-with-something. The fact that 'exists' as defined by (D3) is a first-level predicate does not show that existence is a property of individuals.

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There is also this consideration. The golden mountain is a merely possible object. But what is possible is possibly actual: the golden mountain (GM) is actualizable. (The principle that the possible is possibly actual-- which ought to be self-evident -- is explained and defended in Chapter 8.) Suppose someone were to set out to actualize the GM, to bring it into existence. Given the theory that to exist = to be identical with some existent, what could it be to actualize the GM? Since the GM is diverse from everything that actually exists -- and presumably this is a necessary fact -- to actualize the GM could not be to make it identical with one of the things that actually exists. A team of maniacal engineers, with a enough time, could transform Mt. Blanc into the golden mountain, which would involve destroying Mt. Blanc, but not even an omnipotent being could make Mt. Blanc identical to the golden mountain, or to anything else. To actualize the GM, then, cannot be to bring about its identity with something that actually exists. But neither can it be to bring about its identity with something that merely possibly exists -- it already is so identical. The upshot is that if existence is identity with something, then actualization is impossible. But this cries out for an application of Modus Tollens: actualization is possible, so existence is not identity with something that exists. If actualization is impossible, then merely possible objects and states of affairs are not possibly actual. But then we do not understand what it could mean for them to be possible. The possible is what might have been actull;l, or what can in the fullness of time become actual. 'You should have been more careful' entails 'You could have been more careful' which in turn entails 'You had the power to actualize the state of being sufficiently careful.' But this is nonsense if what is possible is not possibly actual.

To make this point more graphic, consider it in a Leibnizian theological setting. The divine intellect excogitates an infinite array of possible worlds and then chooses to actualize one of them, call it A. Presumably, God actualizes A by creating all the contingent beings that make up A. Among them is Socrates. Before his creation, Socrates is a merely possible, hence nonexistent, individual. For God to create Socrates is not for God to make Socrates identical with something that exists, for (i) nothing contingent exists yet, and (ii) if anything contingent did exist, it would have its own nature and so could not assume Socrates' nature. God creates Socrates by adding existence to his essence. Once Socrates exists, he is of course identical with something, namely, himself. But his identity with something is ontologically subsequent to his existence, hence the two are distinct albeit necessarily coextensive. The point is that if existence were identity with something, creation would be impossible; but the latter is at least possible, ergo, etc.

The point can also be couched in atheistic terms. Suppose the universe sprang into existence out of nothing without cause some 15 billion years ago. Clearly, this coming into existence is not a coming into identity with something that exists. Nothing can become identical with something that exists. It is an


actualization of a possibility, indeed the actualization of a possible world, the world in which the universe begins to exist without cause in a Big Bang. In this case, unlike the Leibnizian one, there is no actualizer: the actualization simply occurs without cause or reason. The point is that actualization of possibilities, whether caused or uncaused, is inconceivable if existence is identity with something that exists.

That (D3) fails to capture the sense of 'exists' may also be seen from the fact that the definiens in (D3) could just as well have been used to define 'concrete,' thus:

D4. x is concrete =Df C:Jy)(x = y). For if any individual is concrete, then it is identical with some individual, and if any individual is identical with some individual, then it is concrete. This assumes that the variables x and y are individual variables, and that all and only individuals are concrete. But these assumptions are innocuous. Similarly, we have

D5. x is an individual =Df (~y)(x = y). But surely the sense of 'exists' is not identical with the sense of

'concrete,' or with the sense of 'individual.' Concrete and individual are categorial determinations; existence is not. For one thing, 'Socrates might not have existed' is true; but 'Socrates might not have been concrete' and 'Socrates might not have been an individual' are either necessarily false or meaningless. Secondly, 'Socrates no longer exists' is true; but 'Socrates no longer is concrete' and 'Socrates no longer is an individual' are either necessarily false or meaningless. Obviously, when a thing passes out of existence, it does not pass out of its category and become a member of some other category.

Since 'exists,' 'concrete,' and 'individual' differ from one another in sense, but each is extensionally equivalent to the definiens of (D3), it follows that (D3) fails to capture what is specific to 'exists.'

There is yet another problem with (D3) worth mentioning. The point of the definition, at least for Salmon, is to show, contra Frege, Russell, Carnap et al that 'exists' is a legitimate first-level predicate.27 But when these philosophers denied that existence is expressed by a predicate, they were affirming that it is expressed by a quantifier, the 'existential' quantifier. Thus these philosophers contrasted predicates with quantifiers much in the way logicians of an older generation contrasted categorematic with syncategorematic expressions. In denying that 'exists' is a predicate, they were denying that it is a non-logical content-bearing predicate like 'drunk,' 'fat' and 'omnipotent' and more like such syncategorematic or synsemantic terms as 'is'( taken as copula), 'and,' 'all,' 'none,' and 'some.'

So when a philosopher like Salmon uses (D3) to show that these gentlemen were wrong, he commits a bare-faced ignoratio elenchi against them. For he is not contrasting predicates and quantifiers, but inflating 'predicate' to cover 'real' (in roughly Kant's sense) predicates and 'formal' predicates. This

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is obvious from the fact that the definiens of D3 contains logical machinery: identity and the 'existential' quantifier. By playing fast and loose with 'predicate' Salmon appears to be contradicting Frege and Co., but in fact he is not.

In sum, the proponent of (D3) has not established that 'exists' is a predicate in the sense in which Frege and Co. denied that it is, and so he has not established that existence is a property in the sense in which they denied it was a property. Salmon succeeds only in introducing a red herring, schmexistence.

10. THE ETIOLOGY OF EXISTENCE-BLINDNESS ANALYTIC EXISTENTIALS?

To refute a philosophical theory it does not suffice to show that it is mistaken; one must trace the mistake back to its roots. Or to vary the metaphor, one must treat not only the symptoms, but also the underlying disease. Now the disease underlying the view that existence is a property of individuals is the conceit that existence is a supremely general what-determination. Someone under the spell of this illusion is existence-blind. Let me explain.

Intuitively, there is a distinction of no small metaphysical import between what a thing is and whether it is. This is the crucial distinction between essence and existence. Nevertheless, there is a mistaken tendency to think of existence as a what-determination, as included in each thing's essence. Perhaps one reasons as follows. Everything exists, and so all things have existence in common. Because existence is common, it is part of each thing's essence.

Surely this is a mistake, not only for the reasons already given, but for the additional reason that, pace Salmon, no existential proposition is analytic.

Kant famously held that every existential proposition is synthetic, hence none are analytic. 28 We hold that Kant was right about this. But one might counter that Kant's claim is false in light of the following analytic existentials:

Existents exist. Fictitious objects do not exist. Members of extinct species existed once but no longer exist. Hallucinatory objects do not exist. Historical persons have at some time existed. Merely possible individuals do not exist Necessary beings cannot fail to exist.29

One might even go so far as to claim that all existential propositions are analytic. There are then three possible views: All existential propositions are synthetic; some are synthetic and some are analytic; all are analytic. We know what Kant's view was. What is Salmon's?

Let us start with Salmon's claim that "There is not a single plausible reason why the predicate 'exists', or the property or concept of existence, should be precluded from the definition of something or from the formation of some


inclusive concept, such as the concept of an existent fantasy island or that of an existent lion. ,,30 Thus according to Salmon we can introduce ad libitum such definitions as the following:

Exilion =df lion that exists. Exiunicorn =df unicorn that exists.

Clearly, 'Exilions exist,' 'Exiunicorns exist,' and the like are analytically true, and their negations are analytically false. Does this not show that some existential sentences are analytic?

Notice, however, that 9. 'Unicorns exist' is false 10. 'Exiunicorns exist' is true 11. 'Unicorn' and 'Exiunicorn' have the same extension, namely, the null set

Therefore 12. 'Exist' in (9) and (10) differ in sense.

If 'exist' in 'Unicorns exist' had the same sense as 'exist' in 'Exiunicorns exist,' then either both sentences would be true or both would be false; the truth of the matter, however, is that the first is false whereas the second is true. Charitably interpreted, then, Salmon's view cannot be that all existentials are analytic, but that some are analytic and some are synthetic. But to be precise, we should not say or imply that existentials divide into two species, the analytic and the synthetic, since 'exist' and cognates mean different things in the two cases. We should say, in essential agreement with Kant, that all genuine existentials are synthetic, but that there is, in addition, a class of quasi-existentials the members of which are analytic. Compare the quasi-existential, "Exilions exist" with the genuine existential, 'Lions exist.' It would be a mistake to think that 'exist' expresses the same sense in both sentences. We can easily grant Salmon that in the former it expresses identity-with-something-or-other. This is our old friend pseudo-existence. But what' exists' in the latter expresses is genuine (pound the table, stamp the foot) existence. To mark the difference we should say 'Exilions schmexist,' or better 'Schmexilions schmexist.' I think anyone with healthy faculties and sound intuitions will recognize the difference, although I do not doubt that many logicians have developed a professional blindness to it. As Santayana puts it, existence is "logically inane" and "odious to the logician."31

From a Fregean point of view, one might explain the difference by saying that quasi-existence is a mark (Merkmall of every concept whereas genuine existence is a property (Eigenschaft) of some (but not all) concepts. Thus quasi-existence would be a mark of brother just as much as sibling would be. Surely every F is an exi-F, so every brother is an exibrother, which is to say that brother includes within its conceptual content the mark, quasi-existence or identity-with-something. But genuine existence is not a mark, but a property (or eigen-property, if you will) of brother, the property of being such that something "falls under it" in Frege's jargon. This is particularly evident in the case of the

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concept unicorn. Genuine existence cannot be a mark of this concept, otherwise "Unicorns do not exist" would be analytically false. Genuine existence is rather an eigen-property of unicorn.

From a Kantian point of view, the difference would be explained a bit differently. To avail myself of an innocuous anachronism, Kant agrees with Frege's negative claim that, in Frege's argot, existence is not a Merkmal of any concept. Kant expresses this by saying that existence is not a "real predicate." But Kant does not hold Frege's positive thesis that existence is instantiation, holding instead that, very roughly, to exist is to be posited by the mind on the basis of sensory givenness.

No matter how we explain the difference, there is a difference between pseudo and genuine existence, and Salmon succeeds in defining only the former. Thus he in no way opposes Frege or Russell or Kant; he has merely changed the subject. Thus we see again that Salmon's definition of 'exists' is either false, or circular, or irrelevant. Indeed, at one point Salmon seems to admit that his definition of 'exists' in terms of 'is identical with something' is irrelevant to the genuine article. Invoking Kripke' s 'schmidentity' form of argument, he says that even if 'exists' does not express the property of identity-with-something, 'schmexists' does, and that there is no bar to the inclusion of schmexistence in any concept whatever?2 This is of course easily granted; indeed, schmexistence is nothing other than what I have been calling pseudo-existence. What Salmon does not appear to see, however, is that this concession is fatal to his project.

NOTES

1 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 146.

2 David Kaplan, "Afterthoughts" in Themes from Kaplan, eds. Almog, Perry, and Wettstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 611.

3 Nathan Salmon, "Existence," Philosophical Perspectives 1, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing, 1987), p. 63.

4 Ibid .• p. 62.

5 Cf. E. M. Zemach, "Existence and Nonexistents," Erkenntnis 39 (1993), p. 1.

6 Meinong provides a concise summary of his Theory of Objects in his "Ueber Gegenstandstheorie" in Meinong Gesamtausgabe (Graz: Akademischer Druck und Verlagsanstalt), pp. 483-535.

7 Cf. Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1903), p. 449.

8 Alexius Meinong, On Emotional Presentation, trans. Marie-Luise Schubert Kalsi (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), p. 19.

9 Roderick Chisholm, Brentano and Meinong Studies (Humanities Press, 1982), p. 55.


\0 Richard Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1980), pp. 494-495.

11 Karel Lambert, Meinong and the Principle of Independence (Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.147.

12 Cf. Arthur Witherall, "Meinongian Metaphysics and Subjectivity," Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. XXIII (1998), pp. 37-38. See also Terence Parsons, Nonexistent Objects (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 217-219.

13 Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 9.

14 Ibid., p. 11.

15 Ibid., p. 11.

16 Hector-Neri Castaneda, "Individuation and Non-Identity: A New Look," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 2 (April 1975), p. 137.

17 The Philosophical Works of Descartes, vol. II, trans. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 186.

18 See J. K. Swindler, Weaving: An Analysis of the Constitution of Objects (Rowan & Littlefield, 1991), pp. 44-45 for an instance of this confusion.

19 Cf. Alvin Plantinga, op. cit.

20 Cf. Peter van Inwagen, "Two Concepts of Possible Worlds," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XI (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 185-213.

21 It might be objected that merely possible worlds and merely possible non-maximal propositions do not represent possibilities, but are (identically) possibilities. One reason why this cannot be right is as follows. The possibility of Humphrey's being elected president is a de re possibility involving Humphrey himself, all 180 lbs. of him. But the (objective) proposition Humphrey is elected president cannot contain Humphrey. At most, it contains an abstract constituent that represents Humphrey. So the possibility of Humphrey's being elected president cannot be identified with any (objective) proposition. On a grander scale, merely possible worlds, at least some of them, represent total ways the concrete universe might have been; they represent de re possibilities involving the concrete universe. I say 'at least some of them,' since the possible world according to which no concretum exists clearly does not involve the concrete universe or any part thereof.

22 In general, logical equivalences do not sanction identifications. Necessarily, for any x, x has a shape if and only if x has a size; but shape and size are distinct properties. Necessarily, for any x, x is triangular if and only if x is trilateral; but triangularity and trilaterality are distinct properties. It is worth noting that in these two examples, the properties differ not only intensionally but also causally. It was not the size but the shape of Brutus' weapon that fitted it for puncturing Caesar's chest. And, borrowing an example from N. Wolterstorff, it is presumably because of the triangularity, but not the trilaterality, of a metal triangle that I have three bloody points on my hand.

23 One reader insisted that 'Socrates has contingent existence' means 'Socrates exists in some but not all worlds.' This seems clearly false. For one thing, the first sentence could be true even if there are no possible worlds. The existence of possibilities does not guarantee (without argument) that there are possible worlds, Le., maximal possibilities. Every possibility might be non-maximal. Or even if there are worlds, it might be that some possibles are possible without being included in

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worlds. Perhaps some possibles come in "world-sized packages" but others do not. Second, most will agree that possibility is prior to possible worlds. Proof: worlds are maximally consistent objects. But logical consistency is a modal notion: p, q are consistent if and only ifthey (logically) can both be true. So possible worlds presuppose primitive modality. For these two reasons, the sentences in question cannot be identical in meaning.

24 Cf. N. Salmon, op. cit., p. 62 ff.

25 Jose A. Benardete, Metaphysics: The Logical Approach (Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 22-23.

26 Michael Bergmann, "A New Argument from Actualism to Serious Actualism," Nous, vol. 30, no. 3 (1996), pp. 356-359.

27 Cf. N. Salmon, op. cit. p. 62 ff.

28 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A 598; B 626.

29 Some of these examples are borrowed from Jerome Shaffer, "Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument" Mind 71 (1962), p. 318. This important article anticipates N. Salmon's claims about the legitimacy of existential definitions, but is not cited by him.

30 N. Salmon, op. cit., p. 65.

31 George Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955), p.48.

32 N. Salmon, op. cit. p. 66.

Chapter Three

The 'No Difference' Theory

Some will agree with the result of the last chapter that the existence of a concrete individual cannot be one of its properties, but take this to show that, in R. Grossmann's words,

There is no individual A separate from its existence. We cannot oppose A to its existence .... an entity and (its) existence are in a sense one and the same.!

The Grossmann quotation suggests a view according to which 'existence' can only denote existing things, rather than something distinct from them in virtue of which they exist.2 We might call this the 'no difference' theory of existence: There is no difference between an individual and existence or between an individual and its existence. Existence on the 'no difference' view divides without remainder into existents; existence just is existing individuals. For each x, the existence of x = x. This radically pluralistic view is superficially very plausible. For if existence is neither a property of indi viduals, nor (as the next chapter argues) a property of properties, what is left but to agree with Grossmann that the existence of x is just x? Furthermore, if, as we have insisted in Chapter 2, the existence of a thing pertains to the whole of it, as it would not if it were a property of it, what better way to accommodate this insight than by identifying the existence of a thing with the thing? And what better way to accommodate the insight that existence is too onto logically basic to be a property?

Nevertheless, this chapter will argue that this is a mistake, and that there is a real difference between existence and that-which-exists, a difference that obtains independently of our linguistic and conceptual activities. Our task, then, is to defend what might be called, somewhat portentously, the Existential Difference. This is simply the real difference between an existing thing and existence, a difference that is real in that it obtains independently of us and our systems of linguistic and conceptual representation. This chapter argues merely that there is such a difference; the precise nature of this difference, and of its terms (that which differs in the difference), is left for later determination. One thing, however, is clear about the nature of the Existential Difference from the last chapter: it is not the difference between a property and the individuals that instantiate it, nor the difference between a concept and the things it subsumes, nor the difference between property-instances and the individuals in which they inhere.

There are, however, two aspects of existence that must be distinguished. According to the one, existence is common to existents; according to the other,

67

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each thing has its own existence. This implies that there are two sorts of existential difference. The first, call it the frU1jor difference, is that between existence as common to existents and existents. The second, call it the minor difference, is that between the existence unique to a particular existent and that particular existent. To anticipate a later conclusion, the major existential difference is the difference between the paradigm existent and that which is ontologically dependent upon it. The Paradigm is common to existents in the manner of a common ground or metaphysical cause, and not in the manner of a concept or property. The minor existential difference is the difference within a given individual a between a and the existence of a.

The task of this chapter is to argue for the minor difference, the extralinguistic and extramental difference between the existence of a and a, where a is any arbitrary concrete individual. This is a necessary step on the way towards establishing the major difference. It will become clear that the minor difference is equivalent to the distinction in a thing between existence and essence; for there is no difference between a considered in distinction from its existence and the essence of a. 'Essence' is here employed in a wide sense to denote the conjunction of those properties that make up what a thing is, and not in the narrow sense according to which a thing's essential (as opposed to accidental) properties are those it cannot fail to possess. Thus in the wide sense of 'essence' being sunburned now is part of my essence, even though I might not have been sunburned now. Thus narrowly essential and accidental properties (whether monadic or relational) are part of my wide essence.

The plan of attack in this chapter is as follows. First, the difference between eliminati vism and identitarianism is explained. Second, the identitarian reading of the 'no difference' theory is examined and refuted. Third, we examine Franz Brentano's theory of existence, perhaps the most interesting of the 'no difference' theories of existence, a theory that is most plausibly interpreted as an eliminativist theory. Brentano is an important transitional figure in the history of philosophy. Although he was steeped in Aristotle and the scholastics, his deflationary linguistic approach to metaphysical questions anticipates 20th century analytic treatments. Indeed, Gustav Bergmann calls him "the first linguistic philosopher.,,3 A good example of Brentano's deflationism is his theory of existence, which in some ways anticipates the influential theories of Frege and Russell which will be discussed in the next chapter. Fourth, we refute D. C. Williams' eliminativist version of the 'no difference' theory. Finally, we argue that the falsity of eliminativism entails the falsity of nonconstituent ontology.

1. ELIMINATIVISM VERSUS IDENTITARIANISM

The question of this chapter is whether or not there is any difference in reality between an individual and its existence. But there are two ways there might be

THE 'NO DIFFERENCE' THEORY 69

no difference. An eliminativist might say that there is no difference between an individual and its existence because there just is no such 'thing' as the existence of an individual. If there is no such 'thing' as the existence of an individual, then of course there cannot be any difference between the existence of a and a. An identitarian, on the other hand, might say that there is no difference between a and its existence, not because there is no existence of a, but because the existence of a, which is real, is nevertheless identical to a. For the eliminativist, there is no difference because one of the terms of the difference does not exist. For the identitarian, there is no difference because both terms, which exist, are identical. Our first task, therefore, is to explain the division of theories of existence into two main groups, eliminativist theories and identitarian theories. Since this is a distinction not confined to the theory of existence, we will begin by characterizing it in general terms.

An eliminativist about X, motivated by the puzzles to which X gives rise, denies that 'there is any such thing' as X. An identitarian about X, motivated by the same puzzles, aims to identify X with something theoretically more tractable, and less likely to engender perplexity. Clearly, to identify X with Y is to presuppose that X is there to be identified with Y. The distinction, then, is roughly this. Faced with a recalcitrant datum, the eliminativist, radical that she is, has no scruples about simply denying the datum and replacing it with something more congenial. The eliminati vist is thus a replacement theorist. The identitarian, however, has a conservative nature: he aims to analyze or explicate the datum in question without denying it, distorting it, or changing the subject.

Hume's regularity theory of causation is an example of an eliminativist theory.4 On our ordinary conception of causation, causes produce or bring into existence their effects. But Hume was famously unable to find any production in the causal sequences he examined. So he threw out causation-as-production and replaced it with something that comported better with his empiricist strictures. He thus proposed a theory in terms of spatiotemporal contiguity, temporal precedence and constant conjunction. Taken as an analysis of our ordinary concept of cause, as an unpacking of what we ordinarily mean when we engage in causal talk, Hume's theory is hopeless. When we say, with the vulgar, that an F-event caused a G-event, we mean that the former produced, and in producing necessitated, the G-event. We do not mean that it just happens to be the case that, hitherto, every F-event has been contiguously followed by a Gevent. Thus Hume's theory is more charitably interpreted as a replacement of our ordinary concept.

The philosophy of mind provides a second example of the eliminativistlidentitarian contrast. An eliminativist about mental states simply denies their existence. He doesn't identify pain, to coin an example, with delta A fiber stimulation (or whatever) as does the identitarian; he holds pain to be a bogus category of 'folk psychology' that in the fullness of time we will learn to do without. (It is to be hoped the manifest absurdity of eliminativism in the

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philosophy of mind does not prejudice the reader against the eliminativismlidentitarian distinction as such.)

The contrast surfaces again, more plausibly this time, in the theory of existence, where the X in question is the putative existence of individuals. Observing a tree, I may say, 'This tree exists, and it exists whether or not I am perceiving it.' This is merely a claim, of course, and no such perceptual claim is self-validating. It may be that the object of my perception does not exist. But if the claim is to make sense, which it apparently does, then it must make sense to say of an individual, e.g., a tree, that it exists, where 'exists' means exists whether or not I or anyone am perceiving it. Now the eliminativist denies this: he denies that it makes sense to attribute existence to individuals themselves. He denies that 'exists' and cognates can ever be meaningfully employed as firstlevel predicates.

Bertrand Russell took an eliminativist line when he compared existence with being numerous. From 'Human beings are numerous' and 'Socrates is a human being,' one cannot infer 'Socrates is numerous.'5 To think otherwise is to commit the Fallacy of Division: being numerous is attributable to classes and such-like, but obviously not to individuals. Russell thought that existence was in the same logical boat: existence is attributable to classes and propositional functions but not to individuals. Russell here followed in the footsteps of Gottlob Frege who held that existence is a property of those functions he calls concepts, but never a property of objects.6 Meaningful attributions of existence are claims to the effect that a concept is instantiated, i.e., has something falling under it; since no individual can be instantiated, it follows straightaway that existence cannot be meaningfully attributed to individuals.

It is important to see that neither Frege nor Russell can be charitably interpreted as an identitarian, as saying something like, 'For an individual to exist is for some concept to be instantiated,' or 'For an individual to exist is for some propositional function to be sometimes true. ,7 One reason for this is their plain denial that 'exists' is an admissible first-level predicate. If so, no schema of the form 'x exists if an only if _' is admissible. A second reason is that these proposals are grossly circular. If a concept cannot be instantiated unless it is instantiated by something that exists, then it is hopelessly circular to identify the existence of the thing in question with its instantiation of any concept. Similarly, if a propositional function 'Fx' is true only ifthere is a substituend 'a' for' x' which on substitution yields the true sentence' a is F,' and if this sentence can be true only if 'a' denotes an existing individual, then it is shamelessly circular to identify the existence of an individual with a propositional function's being sometimes true. Frege and Russell, then, are most charitably viewed as eliminativists.

For the eliminativist, then, there is no such thing as the existence of individuals. This is not to deny individuals; it is to deny the existence of individuals. So in reality there are not two items, Quine and Quine's existence,


and consequently no 'problem' of how Quine is related to his existence. Beyond mind and language, there is just Quine, who is neither distinct from his existence, nor identical to his existence. Compare: there is no question of how Quine is related to his numerousness; he is neither identical to it nor distinct from it since he is just not the sort of item that can be meaningfully said to be either numerous or not numerous. An eliminativist who is a 'no difference' theorist will therefore say that there is no difference between the existence of a and a because there is no such 'thing' as the existence of a to differ from a.

Thus the eliminativist. The identitarian, on the other hand, claims that in reality (i.e., apart from us and our linguistic and conceptual operations) there is Quine, and Quine's existence, and thus meaningful questions about how Quine is related to his existence, and what his existence consists in. One theory, the identitarian 'no difference' theory, is that Quine is one and the same with his existence. Other theories will try to show that Quine is really distinct from his existence. For the identitarian, then, individuals themselves exist. Existence in some sense belongs to them intrinsically, is attributable to them, even if it is not a property in any ordinary sense. (Note that an identitarian is not someone who identifies the existence of an individual with that individual, since this is only one way of being an identitarian; an identitarian is someone who, presupposing that existence belongs to individuals themselves, attempts to analyze, explicate, or identify this existence with something. Thus someone who holds that 'x exists if and only if x occupies a spatiotemporal position' or 'x exists if and only if x is causally active/passive,' etc.8 also counts as an identitarian.)

2. REFUTATION OF THE IDENTITARIAN READING OF THE THEORY

The 'no difference' theory in its identitarian version says that there is no difference between the existence of a and a, not because there is no existence of a, but because the existence of a, which is real, is identical to a. But if there is the existence of a, and it is identical to a, it follows that there is no distinction in a between existence and essence. 'Essence' is here to be taken in its broad sense as encompassing all of what a thing is. Essence in this broad sense is just the opposite of existence. The essence of a is just a itself when a is viewed in abstraction from its existence. And so given that a exists, it follows that a exists by its very nature, hence necessarily exists, i.e., cannot not exist. To put it another way, if in a essence and existence are identical, then a's essence entails a's existence. But that is to say that a is a necessary being. Traditionally, there was only one being of whom this could be said, namely, God. But the 'no difference' theory in its identitarian version implies that every individual is a necessary being, which is absurd.

Clearly, the only reasonable view to take with respect to contingent individuals, given that there is the existence of a, is that the existence of a is distinct from a. Within contingent beings there is a real (extramental,

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extralinguistic) distinction between their essence and their existence, equivalently, a distinction between a contingent individual and its existence. Talk of a real distinction is not to be taken to imply that the existence of an individual is itself a res, a thing, or a constituent of the individual. Some Thomists may have held this view, but it is not a view we share. It is certainly clear that the existence of a is not separable from a, any more than a is separable from its existence. We are also denying that a thing's existence is a constituent of it. For as we have already argued at length in Chapter 2, section 7, a thing's existence pertains to the whole of it. To say that a distinction is real is to say that it obtains independently of our conceptual and linguistic acts and abilities.

The 'no difference' theory in its identitarian version stands refuted. The reader may complain that this is a meager result, because no one has ever held this theory. Whether or not this is true, it is useful to have the position starkly stated so that the 'no difference' theorist will be forced to declare himself unequivocally as an eliminativist.

3. BRENTANO AS AN ELIMINATIVIST

Brentano, as we read him, is an eliminativist about the existence of individuals and to this extent anticipates the views of Frege and Russell about what existence is not. (Of course, Frege and Russell diverge from Brentano in their views about what existence is.) One of Brentano's motives for being an eliminativist is precisely to avoid the ancient scholastic dispute over whether an individual and its existence are the same or different. If Brentano is right about existence, then "The fierce disputes in which the Medieval schools engaged concerning essentia and esse ... ,,9 were based on a false assumption, namely, that existence (esse) belongs to things themselves apart from minds and that therefore the existence of a thing is either identical with it or different from it. Brentano:

The question [concerning essentia and esse] always turns on whether the existence of a being is the same or a different reality than the being itself. Scotus, Ockham, Suarez rightly deny that it is a different reality ... But as a consequence they fall into the error of thinking that the existence of a thing belongs to the essence of the thing itself, and they regard it as the thing's most general concept. Here the Thomists' opposition was correct...How, they cried, could the existence of a thing be its most general concept? -- This is impossible! -- Then its existence would follow from its definition, and consequently the existence of a creature would be just as self-evident and antecedently necessary as the existence of the Creator Himself. lO

For Brentano, both the Thomists and their opponents were wrong. It is neither the case that the essence and existence of a are identical, nor that they are different. For there is no such thing as the existence of a to be either identified with a or differentiated from it. Existence does not pertain to things themselves.


Of course, Brentano does not merely deny that existence belongs to individuals themselves, he goes on to replace the existence of a tree, for example, with ajudger's acceptance (Anerkennung) of a tree, or else ajudger's acceptance of the presentation of a tree, and the nonexistence of a unicorn with a judger's rejection (Verwerfung) of a unicorn or else a judger's rejection of the presentation of a unicornY It is important to interpret this as a replacement, and not an identification or analysis or explication. If Brentano had said that the existence of a tree is (identically) some judger's acceptance of a tree, then he would have ended up in a lunatic form of idealism according to which trees cannot exist unless human beings exist. Thus charity forbids us from interpreting him in this way. We must read him as an eliminativist, as one who denies that the existence/nonexistence contrast is applicable to individuals themselves. He is not saying that there is the existence of a, and that the existence of a is to be identified with a judger's acceptance of a. He is denying that there is the existence of a, and replacing the existence of a with a judger's acceptance of a. Compare Frege: he cannot be reasonably interpreted as identifying the existence of an individual with the instantiation of some concept; he must be interpreted as replacing the existence of individuals with the instantiation of concepts.

Thus charity demands that we give Brentano an eliminativist reading. But there is a wrinkle here that needs to be explored. It is surely absurd to say that the existence of a tree is identically some judger's acceptance (affirmation, recognition) of a tree. It is part of the very sense of 'exists' (assuming that it is a first-level predicate) that if an individual exists, it exists whether or not any judger affirms it, indeed whether or not any judger exists. But what of the view that the existence of a tree is its correct acceptability by someone? Passages in Brentano and his students strongly suggest this view. 12 For example, Anton Marty holds that the existent is that which can be rightly recognized or affirmed. 13 If the correct acceptability line is free of idealistic taint, then perhaps we will not be forced to interpret Brentano as an eliminativist.

But the view that the existence of x is identically its correct acceptability by someone also implies an untenable idealism. For although what is acceptable need not be actually accepted, the acceptable (in any robust sense) requires the existence of beings capable of accepting. Surely the acceptability or affirmability of a tree is not an intrinsic, but a relational, property of it: a property the tree's possession of which implies a relation to a judger, a being capable of accepting and rejecting. Hence the ability to be accepted is not an intrinsic capacity of the tree, but resides instead in the ability of a judger to accept. Thus to say that the existence of a tree consists in its correct acceptability is to imply that beings are on hand capable of accepting and rejecting. If so, the idealism remains: trees and the like could not exist except in worlds in which judgers exist. To avoid the idealism, one would have to say that an individual's correct acceptability, and thus its existence, requires only that it be possible that there be a being capable of accepting it. But this is surely

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far too anemic. The existence of a tree cannot be identified with the mere possibility that there be a being capable of accepting it. For in possible worlds without trees, there is surely the possibility that there be beings capable of accepting trees. If the existence of a tree were identified with the mere possibility that there be a being capable of accepting it, then trees would exist in every possible world in which this possibility exists. But this possibility exists in every world - by the characteristic S5 axiom of modal propositional logic, to wit, 'Possibly P -> Necessarily possibly p' - so the proposal under consideration implies that trees are necessary beings! This avoids idealism all right, but only at the expense of something just as bad if not worse.

Since the identitarian reading issues in an unacceptable idealism, whether existence is acceptance or correct acceptability, we conclude that the eliminativist reading of Brentano's doctrine is the only one consistent with charity. Thus when Brentano says, as in effect he does, that x exists if and only if whoever accepts or affirms x judges correctly, and x does not exist if and only if whoever rejects or denies x judges correctly, 14 we must not interpret this in an identitarian spirit. Note first that the truth of these biconditionals does not compel us to reach for an identitarian reading; we are not forced to read them as saying that (i) there is the intrinsic existence/nonexistence of x and that (ii) it consists in (Le., is identifiable with) x's correct acceptability/rejectability by someone. Generally speaking, the truth, even the necessary truth, of 'Fx if and only if Gx' does not logically require the identification of F-ness with G-ness. (To see this, substitute 'triangular' for 'F' and 'trilateral' for 'G.')

Note also that if the Brentano biconditionals are taken as requiring the identification of existence with correct acceptability, then they would be manifestly circular. For if I affirm x correctly, and individuals exist intrinsically, then the correctness of the affirmation would be grounded in the actual existence of the individual affirmed; what would make my judgment correct would be the actual existence of the individual affirmed. The judgment would be correct because x exists; it would not be the case that x exists because my judgment is correct. But if the judgment is correct because x exists, then, on pain of vicious circularity, the existence of x cannot consist in its correct acceptability. Thus the Brentano biconditionals do not support the identification of existence with correct acceptability.

The Brentano biconditionals must therefore be taken in an eliminativist spirit. 15 So taken, they have to be taken in the way we take 'God is the ultimate anthropomorphic projection' (Feuerbach). This seems to invite an identitarian reading on which (i) there is an entity named 'God' and (ii) this entity is identically the ultimate anthropomorphic projection. But of course, this is an impossible reading because self-contradictory: if God exists, he cannot be a projection, and if God is a projection, then he does not exist. We must take the Feuerbachian dictum in an eliminativist spirit as implying that there is no such thing as God. Curiously, the Feuerbachian denies the existence of God using a


sentence in which neither 'exist' nor 'not' occurs! Similarly, we must take 'X exists if and only if whoever accepts or

affirms x judges correctly' as implying that there is no such thing as the existence of x, as this is normally understood, namely, as the existence intrinsically had by individuals themselves independently of judgers. What the biconditional does, then, is to re-define the phrase 'existence of x' so as to mean the same as 'correct acceptability of x,' in the same way 'God is the ultimate anthropomorphic projection' re-defines the meaning of 'God.' The Brentano conditional amounts to a linguistic proposal that henceforth 'existence of x' shall mean just what 'correct acceptability of x' means, that the latter shall replace the former.

Brentano, then, is most charitably interpreted as an eliminativist, a replacement theorist. He replaces the existence/nonexistence of indi viduals with the judgmental acceptance/rejection of individuals, just as Hume (on one plausible interpretation, anyway) replaces causation-as-production with contiguous regular event succession. We should thus expect Brentano to reject as bogus the concept of existence. For if there is 'no such thing' as the existence of individuals apart from judgers, then there is 'no such thing' as existence apart from judgers, since existence cannot occur except as the existence of existents .16

By denying that there are existing individuals apart from judgers, Brentano is committed to denying that there is existence apart from judgers. One should therefore be puzzled by Brentano's assertion that the concept of existence is a concept we arrive at by reflection on the nature of judgment. 17 This is puzzling due to its identitarian flavor. Brentano seems to be implying that the concept of existence is legitimate after all, but just needs unpacking in terms of the concept of judgmental acceptance, or else in terms of the concept of correct acceptability. But if existence/nonexistence is explicated in terms of ajudger's acceptance/rejection of an individual, then the existence of this mountain before me is (identically) my (or someone's) acceptance of it. This however returns us to an obnoxious form of idealism. A serious eliminativist who understands what he is about cannot hang onto the concept of existence. For again, existence is the existence of individuals (subjective genitive), the existence belonging to them intrinsically, the existence that determines them as existent. So if there is 'no such thing' as the existence of individuals, then there is no such thing as existence. Hence one cannot say that existence is a concept that arises from reflection on the nature of judgment. What arises from reflection on the nature of judgment is not existence, but at most a replacement for, or a conceptual successor of, existence, namely, the concept of judgmental acceptance. A serious eliminativist about existence cannot, without obfuscation, use 'existence' to refer to judgmental acceptance,just as a serious eliminativist about causationas-production cannot, without obfuscation, use 'causation-as-production' to refer to contiguous regular event-succession. Intellectual hygiene forbids it.

A grammatical way to see the point is by comparing the phrases

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'existence of a' and 'acceptance of a.' The first is a subjective genitive construction, a possessive: the existence of a is a's existence, the existence that belongs to a. The second is an objective genitive: a is the object of acceptance (by a judger), not its subject.18 This grammatical point suffices to show that the sentence 'The existence of a = the acceptance (by ajudger) of a' either implies an unacceptable idealism, or involves an obfuscatory re-interpretation of 'the existence of a' as an objective genitive. But then we are no longer talking about plain old existence which is obviously enough the existence of individuals (subjective genitive).

What this suggests is that Brentano was not clear about the full implications of his view, and waffles between eliminativism and a form of identitarianism in which the existence of an individual is identified with a judger's acceptance of it. Each, taken straight, is absurd (as we shall further support below); but by confusing them, the hybrid position seemed to Brentano to be plausible and indeed correct. Or at least that is our exegetical hypothesis. But before going further, we need to examine Brentano' s main argument for his eliminativism.

4. BRENTANO'S ARGUMENT

Having sketched Brentano's position, we must now try to understand how he arrived at it. The first step is to consider his argument for the negative claim that there is no such thing as the existence of an individual. This negative claim is equivalent to the thesis that 'exists' is a syncategorematic or synsemantic or comeaning (mitbedeutend) expression, i.e., one that has no independent meaning, and that therefore neither denotes an individual nor expresses a property. A syncategorematic expression is one to which nothing in reality corresponds. Brentano gives 'of and 'but' as examples of syncategorematic expressions,19 to which one could add 'or,' 'not,' and numerous others. They cannot stand alone, semantically speaking. They are clearly not names, and it seems farfetched to think that they express properties. 'Socrates' and 'wise,' on the other hand, are examples of categorematic (autocategorematic) expressions. Everyone will agree that' Socrates' denotes Socrates, whether directly or via the name's sense. It is less clear that 'wise' has its own unique denotatum (the property of being wise), but it is clear that it has a non-logical content that bars it from being considered syncategorematic or synsemantic. Whatever the ultimate merit of the categorematic/syncategorematic distinction, it is a presupposition of Brentano 's argument, and one that I will not be questioning.20

Brentano's deflationary argument is that (i) the copulative 'is' is synsemantic; (ii) 'exists' can be eliminated in favor of the copulative 'is'; therefore (iii) the former is as synsemantic as the latter. Given that the copulative 'is' is synsemantic, i.e., does not denote anything or express a property, the same must also be true of 'exists,' in which case there is nothing


in things themselves that is their existence. Existence is thus in no sense a property, feature, attribute, determination of individuals. Existence in no sense belongs to individuals, not even in the limit sense of being identical to them, of dividing into them without remainder. (If you say that, for any x, the existence of x = x, then you presuppose that existence belongs to individuals.) If so, there can be no legitimate problem of explicating what it is for an individual to exist, or of explaining how an individual or its essence is 'related' to its existence. A vast amount of Medieval controversy will have turned out to have rested on a mistake. Consign it then to the flames!

Brentano's argument for his negative thesis may be rendered as follows: a. The copula is a syncategorematic or synsemantic expression. b. Existential sentences and copulative (predicative) sentences are intertranslatable.

Therefore c. 'Exists' is a synsemantic expression. In support of the second premise, Brentano offers the following schedule

of intertranslation:

Some man is sick. A sick man exists. There is a sick man.

No stone is living. A living stone does not exist. There is no living stone.

All men are mortal. An immortal man does not exist. There is no immortal man.

Some man is not learned. An unlearned man exists. There is an unlearned man.

Brentano concludes from this translation scheme that " ... the 'is' or 'is not' of the existential proposition is merely equivalent to the copula, so they are not predicates and have no meaning at all in and of themselves. ,,21

It seems clear that this analysis can be readily extended to singular sentences. Thus 'Socrates is sick' is equivalent to 'Sick Socrates exists,' and 'Brentano was never a Catholic priest' is equivalent to 'The Catholic priest Brentano never existed.' In any case, the logical equivalence of predications and existentials is not a thesis we will be questioning.

What we will be questioning is what Brentano infers from this equivalence. What are we to make of his deliciously seductive argument for the synsemanticity of 'exist(s)' and cognates? I submit that it trades on a confusion of the pure (existentially neutral) copula with the 'is' as it ordinarily functions in such sentences as 'The Charles River is polluted.' For premise (a) to be true,

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the copulae in question must be pure. But for premise (b) to be true, the copulae in question must be 'existentially loaded.' Thus the argument succumbs to a fallacy of equivocation.

To put it another way, Brentano faces a dilemma. Copulative sentences either feature a pure (existentially neutral) copula, which does not express existence, or they feature an existentially loaded copula, which does express existence, albeit while also discharging its copulative duties. If the former, the copulations cannot be rendered as existentials. If the latter, the copulative sentences can be rendered as existentials, but then this rendering has no tendency to show that 'exists' is synsemantic. For copulative sentences featuring existentially loaded copulae do not feature synsemantic copulae. A pure copula may well be synsemantic - let us grant this for the sake of the argument - but an existentially loaded copula is not.

The first question to ask is whether the 'is' in a sentence like 'The Charles is polluted' is a pure copula. Imagine the sentence asserted by someone upon emerging from an unpleasant swim in the river in question. Does the 'is' in this sentence express merely the connection between logical subject and logical predicate without expressing the existence of the logical subject? Or does it also express, or presuppose, the existence of the logical subject, i.e., the existence of that to which the grammatical subject of the sentence refers? Although it is obvious that the 'is' of existence is distinct from the 'is' of predication, this is consistent with one and the same concrete occurrence of 'is' exercising both a copulative and an existential function. The distinction between the 'is' of predication and the 'is' of existence is not like the distinction between the inclusive 'or' (vel) and the exclusive 'or' (aut). One and the same concrete occurrence of 'or' cannot be both inclusive and exclusive; but, I am claiming, one and the same occurrence of 'is' can express both existence and predication. One and the same concrete occurrence of 'is' cannot express both identity and predication, but it can express both existence and predication.

That our sentence, used in the circumstances we are imagining, does not feature a pure copula can be seen from the fact that it is analyzable as follows: 'The Charles is (exists) & the Charles [is] polluted,' where the brackets around 'is' signify that it is a pure copula. (With a nod toward Hussed, we might say that the pure copula 'brackets existence.') This analysis makes explicit the dual function of 'is' in our sentence. It functions both copulatively and existentially. When I say, emerging from its turbid waters, that the Charles is polluted, I am saying that it exists in a certain state, that of being polluted. I could just as well say that the Charles exists 'pollutedly' - turning an adjective into an adverb.22

Emerging from its troubled waters, I am certainly not abstracting from its existence when I complain, 'The Charles is polluted.'

The correctness of this analysis is obvious from the proposition that an individual cannot have a property unless it exists - a proposition to which Brentano is no doubt committed given his opposition to Meinong's doctrine of


nonexistent objects according to which there are objects that actually23 have properties despite their nonexistence. Now if the Charles cannot be polluted unless it exists, then one who understands this point and says, in normal circumstances, that it is polluted implies by his use of 'is' that it exists. We say 'in normal circumstances,' since we allow that one might for special purposes abstract from (i.e., leave out of consideration) the existence of the Charles in order to focus on its having of properties. So abstracting, one might say, 'The Charles [is] polluted.'

The point, then, is that 'The Charles is polluted,' uttered in the imagined circumstances, features an existentially loaded copula. This is simply a datum that any theory must be able to accommodate on pain of failing to satisfy elementary criteria of adequacy. Thus we cannot be fairly accused of begging the question against Brentano. We are not simply assuming what he is out to deny, namely, that existence belongs to individuals; we are invoking a datum which, when properly understood, has the consequence that existence belongs to individuals.

What is more, it is precisely the fact that the 'is' in 'The Charles is polluted' has a double function, i.e., is existentially loaded, that allows the sentence to be rendered as 'The polluted Charles exists.' What happens in the translation from 'The Charles is polluted' to 'The polluted Charles exists' is that the copulative function of 'is' is expressed by the juxtaposition of 'polluted' and 'Charles' (with the adjective preceding the noun), while the existential function of 'is' is expressed by 'exists.' It is crucial to note that both sentences exhibit both functions. It is just that in the first sentence the copulative function is to the fore, while in the second, the existential function is to the fore. Since both (types of) sentences exhibit both functions, it is a mistake to think that the copulative function can be reduced to the existential, or vice versa. No reduction is possible in either direction. Brentano's error, then, is to think that the intertranslatability or logical equivalence of predicative and existential sentences shows that the existential function can be reduced to the copulative. Intertranslatability no more shows this than it shows that the copulative function can be reduced to the existential.24

Indeed, Brentano's argument is no better than the following obviously unsound argument:

e. 'Exists' is an autocategorematic expression. b. Existential and copulative sentences are intertranslatable.

Therefore f. The copula is an autocategorematic expression.

Clearly, the truth of the premises is consistent with the falsity of the conclusion. The same holds for Brentano's argument.

Thus Brentano appears to face a dilemma. If copulations and existentials are to be intertranslatable, the 'is' in a copulative sentence cannot express merely the connection between subject and predicate; it must also

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express, or else presuppose, the existence of the subject. Hence it cannot be a mere copula, and thus cannot be synsemantic. If, on the other hand, the 'is' in a copulati ve sentence is a mere copula, and is thus synsemantic, then copulative sentences cannot be expressed as existentials.

Brentano's argument accordingly trades on a fatal confusion. It is plausible to maintain that the copula qua copula, or the 'is' in its purely copulative function, is synsemantic. But Brentano has no right to assume that the 'is' in such sentences as 'Socrates is wise,' 'Some man is sick,' etc. is a mere copula. The truth of the matter is that the 'is' in these sentences has both a copulative and an existential function in that it expresses both the connection of subject and predicate and the existence (not necessarily present existence) of the subject.

5. BRENTANO'S ELIMINATIVISM ELIMINATED

Having refuted, or at least neutralized, Brentano's main argument for his eliminativism, we will now try to show directly that eliminativism is incoherent. At the end of section 3, we referred to a certain waffling on Brentano's part as between eliminativism and a form of identitarianism according to which the existence of a is identified with a judger's acceptance of a. The latter implies an unacceptable idealism, as does the more sophisticated view that existence is correct acceptability. But the former, strict eliminativism, seems not to be susceptible of coherent formulation.

What exactly is the (Brentanian) eliminativist claiming? Apparently, the claim is that individuals themselves, individuals apart from us and our mental operations, neither exist nor do not exist, and that the phrase 'the existence/nonexistence of a,' if it is to be retained at all, is to be given the meaning 'the correct acceptability/rejectability' of a. Well then, supposing we acquiesce in this obfuscatory stipulation, does the eliminativist affirm that there are individuals that neither exist nor do not exist apart fromjudgers? That would be self-contradictory. For if there are (= exist) individuals apart from minds, then it cannot be the case that they neither exist nor do not exist. But on the other hand, if there are no individuals apart fromjudgers, what is it that judgers accept or reject? So there must be individuals apart from judgers. Obviously, it is they who set the standard for correct judgment. If so, how can they not exist? How can existence not belong to them? If they neither exist nor do not exist, then how can a judgment that a particular individual exists be correct? For if my affirmation of the tree before me is correct, this is so because the tree exists.

The absurdity of eliminativism consists in its attempt to affirm individuals apart from judgers while denying the existence of individuals (subjective genitive) apart from judgers. It hides this absurdity from itself by continuing to use the expression 'existence of individuals' but in an obfuscatory


way that transfonns this expression, which is naturally read as a subjective genitive or possessive, into an objective genitive. For if the existence of individuals is the correct acceptability of individuals, and 'existence of individuals' is taken as a subjective genitive, then the consequence is an untenable idealism. If, on the other hand, 'the existence of individuals' is read as an objective genitive, then idealism is avoided, but we are saddled with a wholly unnatural revision of the meaning of the phrase in question, and a brute stipulation that we are under no obligation to accept.

The truth of the matter is that one cannot correctly affinn an individual without affirming the existence of the individual (subjective genitive), and that it is the logically antecedent existence of the individual that makes any correct affinnation of it correct.

6. THE ELIMINA TNISM OF DONALD C. WILLIAMS ELIMINATED

D. C. Williams proposes that we dispense with existence in favor of the "ontologically prior" notion of Something.25 (Given his purpose of dispensing with existence and being, one wonders how Williams can help himself to the phrase "ontologically prior" - but let that pass.) 'Horses exist,' for example, says no more than 'Something is a horse' or 'Some individual is a horse.' The availability of words like 'thing' and 'individual' allows us to avoid saying 'Some existent is a horse.' Thus we can dispense with existents and hence with their existence.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Three cases. Either 'individual' denotes both existing and nonexisting individuals, or it denotes existing individuals only, or the existence/nonexistence contrast does not pertain to individuals. In the first case, the equivalence of 'Fs exist' with 'Something is an F' fails. In the second case, it is clear that existents and existence have not been dispensed with. Williams' only hope lies with the third case, according to which it is something like a category mistake to think of individuals as existing. His only hope lies with eliminativism about singular existence. But is it not just self-evident that existence can be attributed to individuals? The Cartesian cog ito ergo sum is about as clear as it gets in philosophy: 1 think, therefore 1 exist. Perhaps Descartes was wrong about the referent of 'I,' but however that referent be characterized, it is surely an individual. If the referent is not a thinking substance, it is at least a momentary act of thinking. We will see in the next chapter that sentences like 'I exist' are not plausibly construed as making instantiation claims about concepts or properties. The truth of 'I exist' requires that existence belong to individuals. This is not to be confused with the claim that existence is a property of individuals. The truth-maker of 'I exist' is an existing individual; but this is not to say that the truth-maker is a concrete fact consisting of an individual's instantiation of existence. How existence can belong to an individual without being a property of it is the topic of Chapter 6

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infra. Furthermore, Williams himself is committed to the intelligibility of first

level existence. For he is committed to the thesis that every individual exists, that there are no nonexistent individuals. If there are both existent and nonexistent individuals, as Meinong thought, then of course existence must play an indispensable classificatory role. So to dispense with existence, one must dispense with nonexistent objects. Williams puts his anti-Meinongian point this way: "there are no beings but existents ... ,,26 Note how he must make use of 'existents' or some cognate thereof to convey his point. He must say something equivalent to 'everything exists.' Clearly, if everything exists, then existence belongs to everything! Williams blithely helps himself to the notion that existence belongs to everything, and thus to individuals, in the very act of trying to dispense with the existence that belongs to individuals. It is clear that he cannot make his anti-Meinongian point by saying that everything is everything, or that everything is self-identical.

Eliminativism thus resists coherent formulation. The intent is clear enough: the eliminativist wants to drive a wedge between existence and individuals and assign existence to a realm distinct from that of worldly individuals, the realm of judgment (Brentano) or perhaps Frege' s third realm of ideal or abstract objects. Thus Brentano wants to say that existence qualifies presentations, or perhaps individuals just insofar as they are presented, but not individuals in themselves, while Frege wants to say that existence qualifies concepts (properties), but not individuals. But if individuals, considered in themselves, neither exist nor do not exist, then they are indistinguishable from Meinongian objectsjenseits von Sein undNichtsein. How then could 'Fs exist' be replaced by 'Something is an F ' as per Williams' eliminativist proposal? This replacement works only if every individual exists. Eliminativism is incoherent because it involves commitment to two contradictory propositions: (a) every individual exists, and (b) no individual exists. Without (a), there is no replacement such as Williams envisages. Without (b), there is no dispensing with existence. But the two together make a contradiction.

Williams gives two arguments for his eliminativist doctrine, neither of which is compelling.

The Argument from Unobservability. The first argument, Humean in inspiration, is that there is no such thing as existence, because existence is not observable. We will show, however, that the sense in which it is true that existence is not observable does not support the idea that existence is null and void.

We begin by recalling David Hume' s claim that "The idea of existence ... is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent." (Treatise, II, vi) Staring at a door knob, Williams professes to see only the knob, not the existence of the knob. Now it must be granted that there is no impression of existence, the way there is an impression of brownness, hardness, etc. But it


must also be granted that there is no impression of the knob's being brown. Staring at the knob, I have an impression of it and of brownness, but no impression of the knob's being brown. I have no impression of any connection between the particular knob and the particular brownness such as could empirically justify (in a manner to satisfy Humean scruples) my assertion that the knob is brown. I no more have a sensory impression of this instantiation connection than I do of a necessary connection between cause and effect. To have a sensory impression of the knob's being brown is tantamount to having a sensory impression of the knob's existence, since the knob obviously cannot be brown unless it exists. Nothing can have a property without existing. Therefore, one who denies that the existence of a physical object is observable must also deny that its actual having of properties is observable.

Thus the Humean doctrine implies that no fact is observable; it implies that one cannot know on the basis of sense-perception that a tree is blooming, that birds are singing, that the wind is blowing. Now this is an extreme doctrine, and one reasonably rejected. It is reasonable to maintain that one knows by sense-perception that the knob is brown, and thus that the knob exists, or at least that one often knows by sense-perception facts like this. The judgment expressed by 'This knob is brown' is made true by the fact of the knob's being brown, a fact one knows by seeing the knob to be brown. Even if one cannot explain how one knows, by perceiving it, that a physical thing instantiates a property and thus exists, it is very reasonable to say that one knows, by perceiving it, that a physical thing instantiates a property and thus exists. An epistemological difficulty as regards the how, is no good reason to deny the that.

It is crucial to note that someone who maintains that (some) facts are observable can easily concede to Hume and Williams that there is no impression 'of existence, that existence is not an observable property. We of course deny that existence is a property, and so a fortiori deny that it is an observable property. The existence ofthe knob is not the latter's instantiating of existence; the existence of the knob is, roughly, the knob's instantiating properties. (This roughness will be smoothed out in Chapter 6.) Thus the existence of the knob is a concrete (truth-making) fact or state of affairs, but not a fact of the knob's instantiating existence. (Nothing can instantiate existence, because existence is not a property).

This implies, contra Hume and Williams, that there is a difference between the knob and the existence of the knob. The latter is a fact, the former is not. We need facts, because we need truth-makers as Chapter 6 explains in detail. The truth-maker of 'This knob is brown' cannot be the knob (unless we construe the knob itself as a fact); it must the fact of the knob's being brown. But if 'This knob is brown' is true, then 'This knob exists' is also true, and the truth-maker of the latter again cannot be the knob, but must the fact of the knob's existing.

Williams' mistake is to think that existence, if it is anything at all, must

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be an observable property. But existence is certainly not a property, hence not an observable property. Thus our inability to empirically detect existence in the way we can detect brownness, hardness, etc., has no tendency to show that existence is not observable. One observes existence by observing things' having properties, not by observing a particular property that things have. If one can see that the tree is in bloom, hear that the birds are singing, etc., one can observe existence, not existence itself, of course, but the existence of particular existents. For to see that the tree is in bloom, is to see that the tree exists. And to see that the tree exists, is to see the existing of an existent.

Of course, the existence of a tree does not show up as a separate mark or feature of it. Thus it is not discriminable in the way brownness is discriminable from hardness. This is no surprise given what we said about the holism of existence in the preceding chapter. Perhaps we could say that the existence of a tree is perceived 'indistinctly': by perceiving the tree we perceive its existence. This will not satisfy the skeptic, however, who will wonder how we can claim to know that the perceptual object exists when there is nothing internal to the perceptual situation that could guarantee this. He will point out that the content of the perception will be the same whether or not the object exists.

To this we may reply that if it is not possible to perceive the existence of a physical thing, then it is not possible to perceive that any physical thing actually has any property, which implies that knowledge of the external world is not possible. But surely some knowledge of the external world is actual, and hence possible, even if we have no satisfying explanation of how it is possible. Therefore, it is possible sometimes to perceive the existence of physical things. Now this possibility is all that is required to refute Williams. For if it is possible sometimes to perceive the existence of physical things, then there must be existence.

But even apart from outer sense perception, there is the Cartesian certainty I have of my own mental states. I cannot feel pain without knowing that I am in pain, and if I know that I am in pain, then I actually am in pain. But to know that I have a mental property is to know that I exist. For nothing can have a property without existing. Thus in my own case, I have direct knowledge of my own existence via direct knowledge of my instantiating of mental properties. I am directly acquainted with existence in my own case, and in this sense can be said to 'observe' my existence.

To push this further would require an excursus into the epistemology of our knowledge of existence, which would be as fascinating as it would be out of place given the scope of this book. (We do say something about skepticism in Chapter 8, section 5.7.) But for present purposes all we need to do is show that Williams' argument from unobservability is uncompelling. And surely it is. The sense in which it is true that existence is unobservable, namely, that there is no distinct sensory impression of existence, does not support the claim that there


is no such thing as existence. In the case of outer objects, it is plausible, though not quite certain, that we sometimes veridically perceive their existence. We veridically perceive the existence of a physical object whenever we veridically perceive it to actually have properties. In our own cases, it is certain that we sometimes veridically perceive our own existence. This happens whenever we perceive ourselves to be in what Chisholm calls a "self-presenting state" such as that of feeling depressed.27

The Argument from the Distinction between Essence and Existence. According to Williams' second argument, "The reason that Existence must be empty, diaphanous, blank, neutral, and, in sum, nil, resides in its definitory contrast with Essence .... There is no nature left for Existence ... ."28 Williams' second argument may be reconstructed as follows. (1) If existence itself exists, as we maintain, then existence must have a nature. But, (2) existence cannot have a nature because it is the opposite of every nature. Therefore, (3) existence does not exist. No doubt (1) is true. But why does Williams think that (2) is true? Well, it is obvious to him and to us that if one distinguishes existence and essence in Socrates, then the existence-factor, since it is the opposite of the essence-factor, cannot itself be or have an essence. We could put this by saying that, for any x, if x admits a real distinction between essence and existence, then the existence of x cannot be a nature or essence. But it does not follow from this self-evident principle that existence itself, existence in its difference from each existing individual, cannot have a nature. For existence itself (the paradigm existent) does not admit of a real distinction between essence and existence. So what is to stop us from holding that existence itself has a nature?

What Williams is doing is confusing the existence of x, which, in the case of every contingent being, is opposed to the essence of x, with existence itself. If a case can be made that existence itself exists as the paradigm existent, then existence will have a nature. It will have this nature by being (identical to) it. Thus the sense in which (2) is true does not by a long shot support the contention that there is no such thing as existence itself.

Turning the tables on Williams. On his view, an ordinary individual is a sum of tropes, or particularized properties. But there is no such thing as the existence of an individual; otherwise it would not be true that "it is impossible to distinguish in any object ... between it and its existence. ,,29 Yet, not every possible sum of tropes makes up an actual individual: an actual individual is a sum of co-occurrent or concurrent or compresent tropes. Concurrence, to use Williams' term, is just co-occupancy of a 'plime,' a place-time.3D Talk of concurrence, however, appears to bring existence back into the picture. An existing ordinary individual, an apple say, is one whose constituent tropes (a particular redness, a particular sweetness, ... ) are concurrent. This implies that 'exists' must be an admissible first-level predicate for Williams. For his system implies the following definition of 'exists': x exists if and only if x' s constituent tropes are concurrent. It also implies that there is a real distinction between a

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concrete individual and its existence, namely, the distinction between the sum of constituent tropes and their concurrence. Existence may not be a "constituent of the world,,,3! in the manner of a trope or class of tropes, but it is as indispensable as concurrence. If existence is nothing at all, then concurrence is nothing at all.

Williams' position thus appears to be self-contradictory. On the one hand, we have just quoted him as telling us that "it is impossible to distinguish in any object...between it and its existence." On the other hand, there is the distinction between a sum of tropes and their concurrence, a distinction necessitated by the fact that concurrence is a contingent relation: a given sum of tropes might well not have been concurrent. Evidently, the distinction between a sum of tropes and their concurrence is just the trope-theoretic translation of the distinction between an ordinary object and its existence.

Furthermore, if existence is nothing because unobservable, then concurrence is also nothing because unobservable. Contrapositively, if concurrence is not nothing because observable, then existence is also not nothing because observable. Presumably, Williams believes that the co-occurrence of tropes at a place-time is observable, otherwise he would have banned it from his empirical philosophy. If so, Williams should have concluded that existence is also observable. He should have held that one observes the existence of an individual by observing the concurrence of its constituent tropes.

Williams is surely right that the existence of an individual is not a special trope, a hypertrope. This is the trope theorist's way of saying that existence is a not a property. But it does not follow from this that existence is nothing at all. After all, the existence of an ordinary individual is the concurrence of its constituent tropes, and concurrence is not nothing. If concurrence were nothing, then there would be no difference between a sum of tropes that constitutes an actual individual and a sum of tropes that does not. Again, we find Williams laboring under the false assumption that existence is nothing unless it is a property. Existence can be real without being a property, and in Williams' system it is real as the concurrence of tropes.

So concurrence must be something real, even if Williams does not want to call it a constituent of the world. What then is it? It is not a monadic trope or hypertrope, so one will be forgiven for thinking that it must be some sort of relation or relational trope. It can be shown, however, that it can be neither.

Suppose logically and nomic ally independent monadic tropes Tl and T2 are concurrent. They co-occur, but not as a matter of logical necessity or of nomic necessity. Each bears to the other the external relation of being in the same 'plime.' The relation is external, because there is nothing in the nature of n, and nothing in the nature of T2, and nothing in the nature of any physical law, to require that they be concurrent. Now it is difficult to see how this external relation of concurrence could be a relational trope, as Williams' system would seem to require. If the concurrence of Tl and T2 is identical to a


relational trope of concurrence, call it CT, then we have three distinct items, TI, T2, and CT, which form a unity of concurrence. Let ° = the ordinary object of which they are constituent tropes. Clearly, ° is numerically distinct from CT, since CT is a proper constituent of 0. Relational tropes, however, unlike monadic ones, are dependent objects: a relational trope cannot exist unless at least two monadic tropes exist. Thus the particular co-occurrence of T I and T2 is a dependent object: it cannot exist unless TI and T2 exist. Furthermore, its very nature as a concurrence trope requires the existence ofTI and T2 and their concurrence: CT is the concurrence of T1 and T2 and could not be the concurrence of any other tropes. Now since the existence and nature of CT depends on the existence of TI and T2, and their concurrence, how can CT be a proper constituent of O? Necessarily, CT exists if and only if (i) Tl and T2 exist, and (ii) Tl and T2 are concurrent. This implies that CT is not a proper constituent of O,but is identical to 0.

So if concurrence is something real, and concurrence is a relational trope, a contradiction emerges: CT is and is not a proper constituent of 0. On these assumptions, CT must be a proper constituent of 0, since it is one of the tropes making up 0, a trope distinct from TI and T2. Given these same assumptions, however, CT cannot be a proper constituent of 0, for the reason that there is nothing in reality to distinguish CT from 0. For CT cannot exist unless TI and T2 exist and are concurrent.

This contradiction shows that one of the assumptions is false. It cannot be the assumption that concurrence is something real, for this is needed to distinguish a mere sum of tropes from a sum of tropes that constitute an actual ordinary individual. So we must reject the assumption that concurrence is a relational trope. Concurrence cannot be a trope.

The only other possibility available to an empiricist is that concurrence be an external universal relation. This suggestion, however, succumbs to Bradley's regress. If a universal relation CR contingently connects TI and T2, what connects CR to Tl and to T2? If CR explains the difference between the mere sum, TI + T2, and 0, what explains the difference between the mere sum, TI + T2 + CR, and O? This problem arises since CR, unlike CT, can exist whether or not TI and T2 exist. Since Bradley's regress will be thoroughly treated in Chapter 7, we need not say any more about it here. In any case, a trope theorist like Williams cannot invoke irreducible universal relations.

To sum up. Williams' position is a tissue of confusions and contradictions. First of all, contra Williams, it is self-evident that existence belongs to individuals as the Cartesian cogito attests. Second, Williams must presuppose that existence belongs to individuals in order to maintain his antiMeinongian line and the logical equivalence of 'Fs exist' and 'Something is F.' Third, he confuses the question whether there is such a thing as the existence of individuals with the question whether existence is a property, and the question whether existence is observable with the question whether existence is an

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observable property, thus failing to refute the idea that existence is observable in the precise sense that would be maintained by someone who takes first-level existence seriously. Fourth, he confuses the question whether the existence of an individual has a nature (the answer to which is obviously in the negative) with the question whether existence itself, existence in its difference from existing individuals, has a nature (the answer to which is not obviously in the negative). Fifth, in contradiction to his claim that the existence of individual is null and void, he introduces, and must introduce, concurrence, which is indistinguishable from the existence of ordinary individuals within a tropetheoretic framework. Finally, although he is forced to admit existence as something real in the form of concurrence, this admission engenders a contradiction within his system: concurrence cannot be a relational trope, but that is all it could be within his system.

7. NONCONSTITUENT ONTOLOGY AND ELIMINATIVISM

Let us now note a surprising consequence: a nonconstituent (NC) ontologist, one who denies that individuals have ontological constituents, must subscribe to the 'no difference' theory in its eliminativist version. In other words, NContology entails that there is no difference between an individual and its existence, and this for the reason that there is no such thing as the existence of an individual.

We begin the argument by noting that for an NC-ontologist individuals are ontologically unstructured -- they are blobs rather than layer-cakes in Armstrong's terms. It follows that the NC-ontologist can neither distinguish the existence of a and a, nor identify the existence of a and a. Equivalently, the NContologist can neither distinguish nor identify the existence of a and the essence of a. For if an individual is ontologically unstructured, it cannot have essence/existence composition. Nor can an unstructured individual be a bundle of tropes, or be a substratum in which property-instances inhere. Since, on NContology, the existence of an individual can be neither a constituent of the individual, nor the unity of its constituents, or anything else that presupposes that individuals have constituents, NC-ontology implies that there can be no such thing as the existence of an individual. So the NC-ontologist must be an eliminativist about singular existence. But eliminativism, we have argued, is incoherent. So NC-ontology is incoherent. Here then we have an argument against NC-ontology.

One might think that this argument is refuted by the fact that an NContologist like Plantinga holds that existence is an essential property of everything. How then can it be said that such an ontologist must subscribe to the eliminativist reading of 'The existence of a is a'? If existence is a property of a, then existence is different from a. This would-be objection confuses the existence-of a (objective genitive) with the existence of-a (subjective genitive).


No doubt the former is distinct from a; the question is whether the latter is. What we have just seen, however, is that if individuals are ontologically unstructured, the existence of-a cannot be distinguished from a, nor can it be identified with a, and this for the reason that, on NC-ontology, there cannot be any such thing as the existence of-a.

8. THE MINOR EXISTENTIAL DIFFERENCE VINDICATED

To sum up the main argument against the 'no difference' theory. Either a is ontologically unstructured or it is not. If the former, then 'the existence of-a is a' must be given an eliminativist reading which we have seen to be incoherent. If the latter, if a is ontologically structured, i.e., has ontological constituents, then the dictum must be given an identitarian reading, which implies the egregious falsehood that every individual is a necessary being. These readings exhaust the possibilities. Therefore the dictum is false.

It follows that its negation is true: the existence of-a is distinct from a. 'The existence of-a is distinct from a' is to be understood as the claim that there is a distinction within a between the existence of-a and a, which is to say, a distinction between the existence and the essence of a. For the essence of a (in the broad sense in which this chapter uses 'essence') is just a considered in distinction from its existence. With this we arrive at what we wanted to prove in this chapter, namely, that the difference between existence and that-whichexists is a real (extramental, extralinguistic) distinction internal to things themselves.

But it is not as if individuals are composed of one part essence and one part existence. For, as we have seen last chapter, the existence of a cannot be a constituent or ontological part of a. The existence/essence distinction internal to concrete individuals is a wholly unique affair that cannot be understood analytically. Analysis operates under the aegis of the simple/complex and part/whole distinctions. Analytic understanding proceeds by resolving its subject-matter into parts, and ultimately into simple (not further analyzable) parts. Analytic understanding may provide insight into the make-up or constitution of a thing by laying out its constituents, by providing an "assay" in Gustav Bergmann's terms; but it cannot provide insight into the unity of its constituents. It will turn out that the existence of a thing, like its unity, cannot be understood analytically in terms of the simple/complex and part/whole models. We will need to find a different model for the relatedness of existence and essence in concrete individuals. But there is no point in anticipating what will later be argued in detail.

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NOTES

1 Reinhardt Grossmann, The Categorial Structure of the World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 403. Grossmann reiterates the point in The Existence of the World: An Introduction to Ontology (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 99: "A thing and its existence are 'one and the same', while a thing and one of its properties are clearly two quite different things, standing opposite to each [other], connected by the thread of exemplification."

2 I should make it clear that I am not concerned in this chapter with the particulars of Grossmann's positive theory of existence, but with the general type of view suggested by the Grossmann quotation, the view, namely, that there is no such thing as existence in distinction from existing things, that existence just is existing things.

3 Gustav Bergmann, Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), p. 234.

4 At least as standardly interpreted. Cf. J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe (Oxford, 1980), p. 59. Mackie rightly asserts that Hume's theory "aim[s] at reform rather than analysis of our ordinary concepts."

5 Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" in Logic and Knowledge, ed. R. C. Marsh (New York: Capricorn Books, 1971), p. 232 ff.

6 Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 65.

7 Talk of a propositional function being 'sometimes true' is Russell's. See Bertrand Russell, op. cit. p. 232.

8 Of course, I am not suggesting that these are good theories.

9 Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), p. 229

10 Ibid., p. 229

11 Ibid., p. 208.

12 Cf. Franz Brentano, The True and the Evident, trans. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 109 et passim.

13 "Seiend und existierend heisst, wie wir schon wiederholt betonten: was mit Recht anerkannt werden kann." Anton Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie (Hildesheim: Georg alms Verlag, 1976), p. 214. First published in 1908.

14 Cf. Brentano, The True and the Evident, loco cit.

15 If they are taken in neither an identitarian nor in an eliminativist way, they would not amount to a theory of existence. IfI want to know what existence is, it is not enough to be told that a thing exists if and only if it is correctly acceptable by someone. For I can still ask: But what is it for an individual to exist? If I want to know what it is to be trilateral, it doesn't help to be told that, necessarily, a thing is trilateral if and only if it is triangular.

16 If existence itself exists, then it is itself an existent. If existence is different from existents, then it can only exist or occur in existents.

17 Brentano, Psychology, op. cit., p. 210.


18 The difference between subjective and objective genitives is nicely illustrated by the Old Testament text, "The fear ofthe Lord is the beginning of wisdom." Exercise for the reader: explain which is which, and why.

19 Ibid., p. 294.

20 For a thorough discussion of the distinction by a philosopher within the Brentano school, see Anton Marty, op. cit. pp. 205-276.

21 Brentano, Psychology, op. cit., pp. 213-214.

22 In sentences like 'The Charles exists pollutedly' and (more idiomatically) 'The Charles exists contingently,' 'exists' is obviously functioning not only to express existence, but also as a sort of copula. We could say that such uses of 'exists' are 'copulationally loaded.'

23 Actually, not merely possibly. The golden mountain for Meinong is actually golden, even though it neither exists, subsists, or has any mode of being whatsoever. See our critique of Meinong in Chapter 2, section 1.

24 A mistake Fred Sommers makes. See Chapter 5.

25 Donald C. Williams, "Dispensing with Existence," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LIX, no. 23 (1962), p. 763.

26 Ibid., p. 761.

27 Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object (La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Co., 1976), p. 25 ff.

28 Ibid., p. 763.

29 Donald C. Williams, "Universals and Existents," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 64 no. 1 (March 1986), p. 13.

30 Ibid., p. 4.

31 Ibid., p. 13.

Chapter Four

Is Existence a Property of Properties?

Chapter 2 established that existence is not a property of individuals. This chapter engages the question whether existence is a property of properties of indi viduals, the property of being instantiated. We will be examining two main versions of this instantiation account of existence, the identitarian and the eliminativist. That there are two versions of the instantiation account is reflected in the ambiguity of 'Existence is a property of properties' and 'Existence is instantiation.' Do these dicta presuppose, or do they deny, singular existence? Do they encapsulate an analysis of what it is for an individual to exist, or do they remove existence from individuals entirely?

On the identitarian version of the instantiation account, there is such a thing as singular existence, but the singular existence of an individual is identified with the instantiation of some property. Since singular existence is the existence of specific individuals, we can put this by saying that on the identitarian version, existence is attributable to specific individuals, but what the existence of a specific individual consists in is the being instantiated of some property.! This is a property of properties theory of existence, as opposed to a property theory of existence, because the claim is not that x exists in that x instantiates the property, existence, but that x exists in that some property of x has the second-order property of being instantiated. In the mouth of the identitarian, then, 'Existence is instantiation' means that the existence of specific individuals is the being instantiated of properties of these individuals. What sorts of properties? This is one of the questions we will have to address.

On the eliminativist version, however, there is no such thing as singular existence: the existence/nonexistence contrast is 'kicked upstairs' to the level of concepts or properties where it becomes the instantiationluninstantiation contrast. The eliminativist thus removes existence from individuals, and replaces the existence of individuals with instantiation. This implies that individuals neither exist nor do not exist, it being self-evident that no individual can be instantiated. In the mouth of the eliminativist, then, 'Existence is instantiation' amounts to a rejection of the ordinary concept of existence according to which existence in its basic and proper sense is the existence of specific individuals.

To illustrate the difference between the two versions, recall the ontological argument in Descartes' Meditation V and consider how an instantiation theorist would evaluate it. The argument is that since God, the ens peifectissimum, possesses all perfections, and existence is a perfection, it follows that God exists. One standard response to this argument is to question the premise that existence is a perfection by questioning whether existence is a

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property of individuals. But if one denies that existence is a property of individuals, one faces the task of saying what existence is. For the identitarian instantiation theorist, the existence of God does not consist in His having a property, but in some property's being instantiated. This property is the divine nature, which we might think of as the conjunction of the divine attributes. Thus for the identitarian, God exists all right, but His existence is identically the instantiation of the divine nature. As such, existence is no part of the divine nature - existence is not one of the conjuncts in the conjunctive property which is the divine nature - and so God's existence cannot be inferred from His nature, and the ontological argument fails.

For the eliminativist instantiation theorist, however, the ontological argument fails for a different and far more radical reason. The conclusion of the argument, 'God exists,' attributes existence to an individual, God. This is so whether, guided by the surface grammar of 'God exists,' we think of God's existence as God's instantiation of the property, existence, or whether we think of God's existence as the identitarian instantiation theorist does, as the being instantiated of the divine nature. But if eliminativism is true, this is nonsense: existence is no more attributable to individuals than numerousness is attributable to individuals. If existence is the property of being instantiated, then it is clear that no individual can exist, and this for the simple reason that no individual can be instantiated. On the eliminativist approach, then, the problem with the ontological argument is not that one of its premises is false, but that its conclusion is meaningless. This is Frege's way with the ontological argument, as we shall see later on.

So the difference between the identitarian and the eliminativist instantiation theorist is that, confronted with a singular existential like 'God exists,' the identitarian takes this sentence to be meaningful but in need of analysis because its surface grammar hides its deep logical form, whereas the eliminati vist denies that there is anything meaningful to analyze. Both of course agree that existence cannot be an irreducible property of individuals; but while the identitarian thinks that nonetheless existence can be attributed to individuals, the eliminativist denies this.

It is essential to carefully distinguish these two versions of the instantiation account of existence since it is one of my contentions that the plausibility of the instantiation account derives from their confusion. Each taken by itself is absurd on the face of it. Confusing them, however, masks the absurdity of each. Why is each absurd? The identitarian version implies that the existence of Socrates is some other item's having a property. Thus on one variation, Socrates' existence is the being-instantiated of some such exotic haecceity-property as Socrateity. But how can one thing's existence be identically some other thing's having a property, especially when the first thing is concrete and the second abstract? Surely this is counterintuitive. How can the existence of a massive physical thing hurtling through space like the planet

IS EXISTENCE A PROPERTY OF PROPERTIES? 95

Uranus be identified with the being instantiated of a property, especially given that this property is a nonphysical, abstract entity wholly isolated from the causal order? The eliminativist version, on the other hand, implies the draconian thesis that there is no such 'thing' as the existence of individuals: there is just the instantiation of properties. But how can a theory of X deny that there is any such thing as X? How can one satisfy one's desire to understand something by announcing that there is nothing to understand? How can one treat a subject by changing the subject? If this is not absurd on the face of it, the arguments to follow should bring the absurdity into the open. For now, however, my point is that by confusing these two versions of the instantiation account one might think that one is securing the benefits of both with the liabilities of neither.

Thus one might think that one is giving a theory of the existence of individuals, as the identitarian version purports to do, while avoiding its chief drawback, its vicious circularity, something the identitarian version cannot do. Or one might think that one is avoiding circularity, which avoidance the eliminativist version does achieve, while giving a theory of singular existence, something the eliminativist version cannot accomplish. But once the two versions, which are the only versions, are scrupulously distinguished, all waffling and evasion becomes impossible. Our examination, then, will show that both versions of the instantiation account of existence are wholly untenable. In showing this, we will show that the instantiation account is wholly untenable. We will thereby restore existence to its rightful place in the individuals of the real world.

1. PRELIMINARIES

There is an obvious distinction among terms, which are linguistic, concepts, which are mental, and properties, which are abstract. Thus the instantiation account of existence may be developed nominalistically, conceptualistically or realistically. It will emerge that the most plausible version of the theory is the realist version according to which existence is a property of properties. But these are nonconstituent (NC) properties, and the property with which existence is identified is NC-instantiation. NC-properties, unlike C-properties, do not enter as constituents into the individuals that have them. NC-instantiation is not a connection internal to an individual, but connects a concrete individual to a (first-level) property external to it, a property that resides in the realm of abstracta.

Why the restriction to NC-properties? If individuals have ontological constituents, properties among them, then the existence of an individual will be some sort of unity or togetherness of these constituents. The reader should refer back to Chapter 2, section 7, for an elaboration of this theme. Now if the existence of an individual is the unity of its constituents, then the existence of an individual cannot be identified with the instantiation of some property P

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internal to the individual. For if P is instantiated, and instantiation is taken as a relation that connects a property and a particular, then P will be instantiated not by the whole individual, but by a proper part of it, one of its constituents. The only plausible candidate is the bare or thin particular internal to the ordinary individual in question. But it is the existence of the whole individual (the thick particular) that needs to be explicated, not the existence of the thin particular. The existence of the whole individual is identifiable with the being instantiated of some property P only if it is the whole individual that instantiates P. But this condition is not satisfied on a constituent ontology. Thus the instantiation account of existence makes sense only if we think of properties as external to the individuals that have them. Hence the restriction to NCproperties.

We will say that a term that applies to something is satisfied; a concept that subsumes something is instantiated; and that a property possessed by something is exemplified. Nevertheless, 'instantiation' will also be used in a broad sense to cover all three.

2. THREE GRADES OF STRENGTH OF THE INSTANTIATION THEORY

We have just seen that the instantiation theory of existence can be developed nominalistically, conceptualistically and realistically. To further complicate the picture, the instantiation theory of existence may be developed in three different grades of strength within each of these versions, ordered here from weaker to stronger. This makes for 3 x 3 = 9 combinations; fortunately, only some are 'salient.' Some of the salient theories are so defective that practically nobody will hold them; a quick examination of them, however, will aid us in isolating and clearly defining the theories that are held.

Grade 1: The existence of Fs is logically equivalent to the satisfaction of 'F' (or the instantiation of F, or the exemplification of F-ness). Call this the 'equivalence variation.' Two propositions are said to be logically equivalent just in case there is no (logically) possible world in which one but not the other is true.

Grade 2: The existence of Fs is identical to the satisfaction of 'F' (or the instantiation of F etc.) Call this the 'identity variation.'

Grade 3: The existence ofFs is not available for identification with any other state of affairs. It is simply an illusion. What is real is the satisfaction of 'F' (or the instantiation of F, etc.) Call this the 'eliminativist variation.'

3. EXISTENCE, SATISFACTION, AND INSTANTIATION

According to the first theory to be considered, the nominalist version of the instantiation account, existence is satisfaction, and thus a property ofterms: for


Fs to exist is for 'F' to be satisfied. The theory begins with the biconditional l. Necessarily, Fs exist if and only if 'F' is satisfied

and takes this as sanctioning the reduction 2. The existence of Fs = the satisfaction of 'F.'

Unfortunately, this theory cannot even begin to get offthe ground since (1) -- the equivalence variation on the nominalist version of the instantiation account -- is false. There are possible worlds in which there are cats, but no language-users, hence no linguistic tokens. In such a world, cats exist, but 'cat' tokens do not. Now if 'cat' tokens do not exist, they cannot be satisfied. So (1) is false.

The falsity of (1) is also evident from the fact that there are times in the actual world at which, say, dinosaurs exist but no linguistic tokens exist. If the equivalence variation fails, then of course so do the identity and eliminativist variations on the nominalist version of the instantiation account.

A third consideration. (l) presupposes that linguistic tokens exist. What then does the existence of these tokens consist in? The satisfaction of other tokens? I leave it as an exercise to the reader to think through the vicious infinite regress that ensues.

Is the situation improved if we substitute concepts for terms? Not at all. Since concepts are mind-dependent, and the minds with which we are familiar are all contingent, the above objections are mutatis mutandis applicable to the view that the existence of Fs is just the instantiation of the concept F. This knocks out the equivalence, identity and eliminativist variations on the conceptualist version of the instantiation account of existence.

4. EXISTENCE AND EXEMPLIFICATION: IDENTITARIANISM

To avoid the above objections we need a vehicle that exists (i) mind- and language-independently and (ii) necessarily. Enter properties, which we are taking to be necessarily existent abstract entities. The theory begins with the biconditional

3. Necessarily, Fs exist if and only if F-ness is exemplified and takes this as sanctioning the reduction

4. The singular existence of Fs = the being-exemplified of F-ness. Now (3) is clearly true given our assumption that there are no nonexistent objects, i.e., objects that exemplify properties without existing. Necessarily, if cats exist, then catness is exemplified. And necessarily, if catness is exemplified then cats exist. So far, so good. But what (4) implies is that the singular existence of cats, the existence of each individual cat, is identical to the beingexemplified of the property of being a cat. Thus the existence of Mungojerrie = the being-exemplified of catness, the existence of Rumpelteazer = the beingexemplified of catness, and so on for every other cat. This is the identity variation on the realistic version of the instantiation account of existence.

Some will see right away that this theory is obviously absurd and will

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wonder why I am bothering to refute it. To these penetrating intellects I make three remarks. First, in philosophy it is not obvious what is obvious. Second, we should be charitable towards the dimmer lights among us until such time as they can become lamps unto themselves. Third, the identity variation, though absurd, needs to be discussed and refuted in order to throw the eliminativist variation into stark relief, so that neither will be confused with the other.

The identity theory is open to attack on two flanks. On the one flank, there is the general question whether singular existence can be identified with exemplification. On the other flank, there is the question whether the right sorts of properties are available to make the identification work. We first discuss the general question.

The identity variation may attempt to arrive at (4) by inferring it from (3). The inference from (3) to (4), however, is invalid. To invalidate an inference pattern, only one counterexample is needed. Here it is:

Necessarily, x has a shape if and only if x has a size is true, but

The property of having a shape = the property of having a size is conspicuously false. Logical equivalences do not get the length of identities.

So the move from (3) to (4) is a non sequitur. But this need not stop the exemplification theorist, for he might grant the invalidity but nevertheless insist that (4) is true. (There are also various positive arguments for (4) which we will examine in due course.) So we need to attack (4) head on.

An Objection from Each Individual's Own Existence. (4) implies that the singular existence of cats, the existence of each individual cat, is identical to the being-exemplified of the property of being a cat. Thus the existence of Mungojerrie = the being-exemplified of catness, the existence of Rumpelteazer = the being-exemplified of catness, and so on for every other cat. This implies, via the Transitivity ofIdentity, that the existence of Mungojerrie = the existence of Rumpelteazer. But this is absurd, because each individual has its own existence. If Mungojerrie ceases to exist, all the other cats in the universe do not also cease to exist. It follows that, if the existence of an individual is the being exemplified of some property, this property cannot be a universal (multiply exemplifiable, 'repeatable') property.

A Circularity Objection. If a first-level property P is exemplified, it is exemplified by some individual, call it a. P is either multiply exemplifiable or it is a haecceity property. Clearly, if P is multiply exemplifiable,2 the beingexemplified of P does not entail the existence of a; all it entails is the existence of some unspecified individual or other. So the theory cannot be that the existence of a consists in the being-exemplified of P, but that the existence of a consists in the exemplification of P by a. Reference to a in the analysans is unavoidable if P is multiply exemplifiable. Now either (i) a exists or (ii) a does not exist or (iii) a neither exists nor does not exist. Since there are no nonexistent items (see Chapter 2), case (ii) may be dismissed. Case (iii) is the


eliminativist option to be discussed below. This leaves case (i). If a exists, then the existence of a is a precondition of P' s being exemplified by a rather than by some other individual, in which case the existence of a is not identical with, but is presupposed by, a's exemplification ofP.

We may think of it this way. What makes the being-exemplified ofP the existence of a rather than the existence of some other individual? If you say it is the exemplification of P by a, you move in a circle of embarrassingly short diameter. The natural response is to introduce haecceity properties. Suppose there are properties like identity-with-Socrates. (We shall see below that this supposition is incoherent, but just suppose for the nonce.) If identity-withSocrates is exemplified, then in every possible world in which it is exemplified, the honors are done by the same individual. What makes the exemplification of Socrateity the existence of Socrates? Answer: nothing else could possibly exemplify said property. Interestingly, this response is itself circular. Let me explain.

For a to stand in the exemplification relation to P, no matter whether P is multiply exemplifiable or a haecceity property, both relata must exist ontologically prior to and as a condition of the possibility of their standing in the relation. (Early on in Chapter 2 we explained 'ontologically prior.') For NC-exemplification is an external tie in this sense: it is not an ontological nexus within an individual, but a link between a wholly abstract property, causally inert because abstract, and a concrete individual in the causal order. Clearly, the existence of a relatum of such a relation cannot consist in, be identical with, its standing in the relation. For its existence is presupposed by its standing in the relation. So even if, per impossibile, there are such metaphysical monstrosities as identity-with-Socrates, it is still impossible to identify the existence of our man with the exemplification of this haecceity. The most you get is a necessary equivalence: Necessarily, Socrateity is exemplified if and only if Socrates exists. No reduction is in sight, since the philosopher must exist as a precondition of his standing in the exemplification relation.

The Haecceity Objection. Let us now shift the attack to the other flank. Whether or not the exemplification account in its identity variation is circular, its viability requires that there be the right sort of properties, properties whose exemplification is identifiable with the existence of specific individuals. I now argue that those properties are not available. Thus this haecceity objection amounts to an objection to haecceities.

The identity theorist cannot hold that the existence of a = a's exemplification of just any old property; it must be a property P that satisfies three conditions: (i) P is essential to a; (ii) P is such that nothing distinct from a has it in the actual world; (iii) P is such that nothing distinct from a has it in any (metaphysically) possible world. Let us consider why these conditions are each necessary.

Ad (i). Either P is essential to a or P is accidental to a. IfP is accidental

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to a, then, given the definition of 'accidental property,' a can exist even without exemplifying P. But then it is self-evident that the existence of a cannot be identified with the being exemplified of P. Therefore, P must be essential to a.

Ad (ii). If the existence of Socrates = the exemplification of humanity, it would follow that the nonexistence of Socrates = the nonexemplification of humanity, which is absurd: Socrates need not exist for humanity to be exemplified, which is a good thing for the rest of us. But on pain of circularity, it cannot be said that the existence of Socrates is the exemplification of humanity by Socrates, as we saw a subsection ago. So the identity theorist must identify the existence of Socrates with a property he alone has.3 This reflects the fact that each thing has its own existence.

Ad (iii). But it is not enough that this be a property he alone has in the actual world, e.g., the property of being the teacher of Plato. For someone else might have had that property; but it is surely false that someone distinct from Socrates might have been Socrates. So if there is a property whose exemplification is the existence of Socrates, this property must be a property he and he alone has in every possible world in which he exists. Let us call such a property an haecceity or (in English) a thisness. If properties are abstract, and thisnesses are properties, then they too are abstract: they are not constituents of the things of which they are the thisnesses, but reside in an abstract realm apart. On one approach, a thisness is thought of as the sense of a proper name.4 It would then be especially clear that the thisness of Socrates could not be an ontological constituent of him. The sense of a name that designates a thing is obviously not an ontological constituent of the thing designated. But what sort of thisness property could be the sense of say 'Socrates'?

There are two options. The property in question could either be a qualitative thisness or a nonqualitative thisness. I begin with the latter. What I will attempt to show, first, is that there are no nonqualitative thisnesses (if these are taken to be NC-properties), and second, that even if there are, the nonqualitative thisness of a contingent being is itself contingent; indeed, it is contingent upon the thing of which it is the thisness. If so, it is not suited to be the property whose exemplification is the existence of the thing in question.

Nonqualitative Thisnesses. A nonqualitative thisness (NQT) is nonqualitative because it cannot be analyzed in terms of qualitative properties. A qualitative property is one which does not involve or make reference to specific individuals. Thus being blue and being married to someone are qualitative, whereas being married to Heideggeris nonqualitative. Identity-withSocrates, then, is an example of a nonqualitative thisness. We may also refer to this property as 'Socrateity.'

Are there such properties? There are reasons to be sceptical. First of all, we cannot assume that for every predicate, e.g., 'is identical

with Socrates,' there is a corresponding property. Indeed, this assumption leads to a contradiction. Consider the predicate, 'is non-self-exemplifying.' If this


predicate expresses a property P, being non-self-exemplifying, we may ask: Is P self-exemplifying or not? Clearly, if P is self-exemplifying, then P is non-selfexemplifying; but if P is non-self-exemplifying, then P is self-exemplifying. So P is self-exemplifying if and only if it is not self-exemplifying, which is a contradiction. This is a rigorous proof that not every predicate expresses a property. Hence from the mere fact that there is the predicate, 'is identical with Socrates,' it does not follow that there is a corresponding property. But of course, for all that has been shown thus far, it could still be the case that there is a corresponding property.

That there cannot be nonqualitative thisnesses seems evident from several considerations. First of all, NQTs violate the chorismos, the separation, of the abstract and concrete realms. NQTs are NC-properties. An NC-property is an abstract intensional entity, a meaning or sense. (A property can be a sense even if there is no actual expression of which it is the sense.) But surely Socrates is not a sense. So how does identity-with-Socrates involve Socrates? This haecceity property somehow receives its identity and its content from Socrates. How? The NQT in question cannot include (entail) Socrates the way being a philosopher includes (entails) being rational. For Socrates is not a property. But if the NQT includes a property that represents Socrates, for example, the property of being the wisest Greek philosopher, then the NQT becomes a qualitative thisness. To be nonqualitative, identity-with-Socrates must somehow involve the actual concrete Socrates mit Haut und Haar. How is this possible without violating the chorismos? How can the intensional content of a property be determined by an individual? Surely the abstract property cannot have Socrates, warts and all, as a constituent. But if it does not have him as a constituent, then presumably it is about him by representing him. If so, it represents him via some qUalities. At most, then, identity-with-Socrates is a qualitative thisness. The idea of a nonqualitative thisness property seems utterly unintelligible.

It might be countered that this is no more unintelligible than that Socrates' singleton - the set consisting of Socrates and him alone - has Socrates as a member. How can an abstract object have a concrete object as a member? There is no need to decide on the exact degree of intelligibility that attaches to the idea that abstract sets can have concrete elements. But it is arguable that far less intelligibility resides in the notion of NQTs. One difference between the two cases is that {Socrates}, unlike identity-with-Socrates, cannot exist unless Socrates exists. The former is parasitic on the latter. This is due to the extensionality of sets according to which two sets are the same just in case they have the same members, and are distinct otherwise. But identity-with-Socrates and identity-with-Plato are distinct properties even in possible worlds in which neither philosopher exists. Thus identity-with-Socrates possesses its distinctive content whether or not Socrates exists. {Socrates}, however, has no distinctive content whatsoever in worlds in which Socrates does not exist; or perhaps we

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should say that in those worlds it is identical to the null set. {Socrates} taken in abstraction from Socrates is either the null set or just sethood in general.

The unintelligibility of haecceity properties seems to derive from the attempt to transform the very particularity of a thing into an abstract property. 'Particularity' could be used to denote the categorial form common to all particulars, or it could be used to designate the factor in a thing that 'makes' it precisely that thing and no other. Let us use 'particularity' in the second sense. And suppose it is nonqualitative. How could the nonqualitative particularity of a rock, say, be an abstract object? Abstracta do not come into being or pass out of being. But rocks do. And presumably the same goes for the rock's nonqualitative particularity. For it is this particular rock that came into being and this particular rock that will eventually pass out of being. It is absurd to suppose that the NQ-particularity of this rock existed before the rock existed. For before the rock existed, there was nothing to give the particularity of this rock any particularizing content. It is equally absurd to suppose that the NQparticularity of this rock exists in possible worlds in which the rock does not exist. But these are exactly the absurdities that afflict the haecceity-properties of Plantinga and friends.

But even if there are nonqualitative thisnesses, how could they be necessary beings as they must be to do the job demanded of them? Socrateity must exist in possible worlds in which Socrates does not exist if Socrates' nonexistence in those worlds is the non-exemplification ofSocrateity. Buthow could Socrateity exist in a world in which Socrates does not exist? How could identity-with-Socrates exist in a world in which Socrates does not exist? In such a world there would be nothing to terminate the identity relation. And how can there be such a property as identity-with-Pegasus in the actual world, given that Pegasus does not exist in the actual world? If Socrates and Pegasus are contingent, identity-with-Socrates and identity-with-Pegasus are equally contingent. 5

Other considerations will exploit the fact that abstracta, unlike rocks, are unlocated. If Socrates' NQT is an NC-property, it is unlocated; but Socrates is located and moves about in space. How then can an haecceity-property be a thisness of Socrates? The thisness of a material thing is bound up with its spatiotemporal position, or with the matter that occupies the position.

Furthermore, the NQ-particularity of a thing is the thing taken in abstraction from all its properties and relations. But if abstraction is made from all properties, including the property of being a particular, then the NQparticularity of the thing cannot itself be a property. It is better thought of as that which has the thing's properties, or perhaps as the spatiotemporallocus of the thing's properties. The NQ-particularity of a thing is the determinable element in it, as opposed to its determinations. Thus there is some plausibility to the suggestion of Aquinas that 'designated matter' (materia signata) is the principium individuationis, or better, the principle of differentiation.


This coheres well with the fact that the NQ-particularity of a thing is unconceptualizable. Hegel was well aware of this, though he drew the wrong inference from it. He argues in effect that since only universals are linguistically expressible, and NQ-particularity is not a universal, NQ-particularity is inexpressible. Thus if I use the indexical 'this' to refer to an object before me, I fail to say (sagen) what I mean (meinen). What I mean is e.g., this particular piece of paper; but all I succeed in saying or expressing are universals. The this that is expressible is a universal common to all thises; but the this that I mean is not a universal. Where Hegel goes wrong is in thinking that this inexpressible thisness is something "untrue" that can be ignored.6 The mistake is to think that what is ineffable or irrational is unreal.

Now if the nonqualitative thisness of a thing is an NC-property, a sense, I should be able to grasp or conceive it. Senses are made for the mind, made to be grasped. But what could it mean to grasp a nonqualitative thisness? What could it mean to grasp or conceive identity-with-Socrates? The very idea of a NQT which is also a property is an absurdity.

There is not the same problem with wisdom, since in this case there is something common to Socrates and Buddha which, as common, cannot be identified with either of them. The phenomenon that motivates the introduction of properties is the fact that such predicates as "is wise" apply at the same time to more than one item. Couple this with the reasonable assumption that there must be something in the things in virtue of which the predicate correctly applies to them, and we arrive at the idea of a property, a feature of reality that is somehow repeatable or multiply exemplifiable. Having arrived in this way at properties, we may apply logical operations to them and construct compound properties like being the fastest runner, which are not repeatable (in a given possible world). But the compound presupposes its components, and the latter (if they are not themselves compound) are multiply exemplifiable.

Qualitative Thisnesses. Nonqualitative thisnesses, then, are creatures of darkness. A qualitative thisness (QT) might be thought of as a disjunction of conjunctions. In every possible world W in which Socrates exists, take the conjunction C(W) of all his qualitative properties in W. Then take the disjunction of these C(W)s: C(Wl) v C(W2) v ... v (C(Wn). The result is a qualitative thisness. Could the existence of a particular consist in the exemplification of a QT?

First of all, QTs allow no evasion of the various circularity objections. These objections remain in force no matter what kind of property is on offer. Second, if thisness is qualitative, and if the existence of a consists in the exemplification of a's QT, then it is metaphysically impossible that a have an indiscernible twin a': clearly, the existence of a and the existence of a' (these being numerically distinct) cannot consist in the exemplification of one and the same QT. SO this approach brings with it a commitment to the Identity of Indiscernibles. There are, however, powerful arguments against the latter

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principle.7

The Aristotelian Theory. There is aprimajacie difference between the 'is' of existence and the 'is' of predication. But if the identitarian instantiation theory is true, the fonner reduces to the latter. For if you say that the existence of Socrates is the exemplification by him of some property F-ness, then what you are saying is that 'Socrates is (exists), reduces to 'Socrates is F.' Now we have just seen the circularity of this view. But there is another problem with it.

Consider the superficially plausible Aristotelian view that to be is always to be some kind of thing or other.8 Thus for Socrates to exist is for Socrates to be a man; for a patch of ice still to exist is for it still to be frozen water. But these analyses are unacceptable. If for Socrates to exist is for him to be a man, then for Socrates no longer to exist is for him no longer to be a man. As Robin Attfield has pointed out, " ... the name Socrates is only understandable aright if understood as the name of some man. Therefore the analysis involves the claim that a man is no longer a man. ,,9 I would add the modal observation that, on the Aristotelian theory, the fact that Socrates might never have existed is just the fact that he might never have been human. But this is palpably absurd: it implies that a certain man might never have been a man.

5. EXISTENCE AND EXEMPLIFICATION: ELIMINATIVISM

The identity theorist admits singular existence, but attempts to identify it with the being-exemplified of the right sort of property. The identity theory stands refuted. The only hope left for the exemplification theorist is the eliminativist gambit: he sacrifices the very idea of singular existence by holding that individuals neither exist nor do not exist. In this way he avoids even the suspicion of circularity: he cannot be surreptitiously presupposing singular existence if he rejects the very idea as incoherent. The idea, then, is that the existence/nonexistence contrast is at home on the level of abstracta and cannot be situated at the level of individuals on pain of a sort of category mistake. 10 But in being 'kicked upstairs' singular existence is eliminated to be replaced by exemplification. Singular existence is an illusion. It is worth noting en passant that 'singular existence' is pleonasm in the service of clarity: existence in the strict sense just is singular existence. General existence is not a kind or mode of existence but another animal entirely: exemplification. 'General' in 'general existence' is thus an alienans adjective, one that 'alienates' or shifts the sense of the tenn it modifies.

The discerning reader will have noted that we have actually already refuted the eliminativist variation by showing that there are no nonqualitative thisnesses. One can see this as follows. The eliminativist aims to replace existence with exemplification. But existence is always the existence of something, the existence of philosophers, say, or the existence of Socrates. Now philosophers cannot exist unless particular philosophers exist. Let Socrates be


one of them. So the eliminativist needs to replace the existence of Socrates with the exemplification of some property. The only property that will do is Socrateity. So if there is no such property as Socrateity, as we have argued, then the eliminativist line is as dead as the identitarian one. This being said, it is nonetheless important to consider other arguments against eliminativism since our aim is a thorough and many-sided refutation.

The eliminativist variation comes in two degrees of strength. Call them the extreme view and the mitigated view. On the former, there is no sense whatsoever in which any individual exists. Existence is no more attributable to individuals that numerousness is attributable to individuals. On the latter, there is an exiguous sense in which an individual can be said to exist, namely, to exist is to be self-identical. The extreme and mitigated views are distinct in that although both deny the contrast of existence and nonexistence on the level of individuals -- which distinguishes them from the identity variation -- the mitigated view allows existence as a property of individuals, the property of selfidentity, which does not admit of contrast: no individual is even possibly selfdiverse. Some may want to classify the 'existence is self-identity' view as an identitarian rather than an eliminativist view. But let us not quibble. The avoidance of sin is more conducive to salvation than its correct taxonomy.

Is the Extreme View Intelligible? The main difficulty with the extreme eliminativist view is that if it were true, certain statements that are clearly intelligible would be unintelligible. Consider the identitarian claim that

1. Socrates exists =df Socrateity is exemplified. The left-hand side of this definition features 'exists' as a meaningful first-level predicate, but it cannot be such if the eliminativist theory is correct. For the elimination consists in the claim that 'exist(s)' can only mean what 'is exemplified' means. It can only have a second-level use, never a first-level use. (Compare 'is numerous' which never admits of an intelligible first-level use.) But if 'exists' can only mean what 'is exemplified' means, then the former cannot be used in conjunction with a singular term like' Socrates.' So if extreme eliminativism is true, (1) is unintelligible. But, obviously, (1) is intelligible. When we were refuting the identity variation we knew exactly what we were refuting, and if the reader was not convinced by our arguments, he knew exactly which thesis it was that he thinks we haven't refuted. Therefore, by Modus Tollens, extreme eliminativism is false.

The eliminativist can evade this conclusion only by the draconian measure of denying that (1) is intelligible. But then what does his theory amount to? Either it is a mere stipulation to the effect that 'exists' will not be allowed as a first-level predicate in some sanitized language, or it is a non-stipulative claim. Now if the eliminativist' s central contention is a mere stipulation, we may safely ignore it. Metaphysical problems cannot be solved by stipulation, least of all the problem of the nature of existence. Alternatively, we are within our rights in accusing the eliminativist of changing the subject. What interests us is

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singular existence, the existence of individuals. If he stipulates that 'exists(s)' means 'is exemplified,' he has changed the subject. He has simply legislated singular existence 'out of existence.'

To appreciate this, one must realize that my criticism of extreme eliminativism does not presuppose that the surface grammar of a sentence such as 'Socrates exists' is a reliable guide to its deep logical form. After all, in Chapter 2, I reject the view that existence is a property of individuals. To the extent that the surface grammar of 'Socrates exists' suggests that existence is property of Socrates, I reject surface grammar as a reliable guide to logical form. To insist that existence belongs to individuals is not to imply that existence is a property of individuals. (Recall that properties are defined as instantiable entities.) For there are ways existence could belong to individuals without being a property of them. One obvious way would be for the existence of x to be identified with x. This is the identitarian version of the 'no difference theory' discussed and refuted in Chapter 3. If the existence of Socrates is just Socrates, then obviously existence belongs to Socrates without being a property of him. It is a mistake to think that the only way existence could belong to individuals - in the way in which it would not belong to them if eliminativism were trueis by existence being a property of individuals. Of course, one could use 'property' is a broad and loose way so as to imply that anything that belongs to an individual is a property of it. But I am using 'property' in a precise way.

This implies that 'exists' can be a legitimate and meaningful first-level predicate even if existence is not first-level property. And surely 'exists' is a legitimate and meaningful first-level predicate. If it were not, we would not be able to understand (1) above, which we clearly do understand, whether we take it to be true or false. Note also that the claim that 'exists' is a meaningful firstlevel predicate is equivalent to the claim that there is singular existence. For singular existence is just the existence that belongs to individuals, whatever this 'belonging' turns out to be. This is a problem to be engaged in Chapter 6. We don't yet know what singular existence is. All we know is what it is not. The singular existence of x is not a property of x, nor x, nor a property of a property of x.

First-level Existence and Ordinary Language. One cannot just stipulate that there is no singular existence, equivalently, that 'exists' is not a legitimate first-level predicate. There is nothing to legislate here; our duty is to conform our intellects to the real. So if the extreme eliminativist's claim is nonstipulative, what claim is it?

a. It cannot be the claim that 'exists' cannot occur as a first-level predicate in ordinary, as opposed to philosophically tainted, English. Suppose we are hiking and you recount a dream about a rattlesnake. Then suddenly we come upon one sunning itself in the middle of the trail. I say: 'The snake you dreamt about is very interesting but this one exists.' Here is a perfectly ordinary and perfectly clear first-level use of 'exists.' Pace Russell, it is nothing like the


claim that the snake is numerous. b. The extreme eliminativist's claim cannot be that what sentences of

the form 'a exists' express can be expressed salva significatione without firstlevel uses of 'exists.' For then the eliminativist variation collapses into the identity variation. To attempt to give an analysis of 'a exists' is to presuppose that it has a meaning; the eliminativist line, however is precisely that it lacks meaning in the way 'Socrates is numerous' used literally lacks meaning. No one is so benighted as to attempt an analysis of 'Socrates is numerous.'

The upshot is that it is not clear what the extreme claim could be if it is not a mere stipulation. And if it is a mere stipulation, it has no claim on our attention.

Problems with the Mitigated View: Existence and Self-Identity. It is one thing to say that there is no singular existence; it is another to say that singular existence = self-identity. Whereas the identity theorist sought to identify singular existence with a property's being exemplified, the mitigated eliminativist seeks to identify singular existence with self-identity. But 'selfidentity' is ambiguous: 'Socrates is self-identical' can mean either that he has the property of Socrates-identity, which he alone has, or that he has the property of general self-identity, which he shares with absolutely everything. The view under discussion identifies existence with general self-identity.

Now if there are no nonexistent items, is it not self-evident that to exist is to be self-identical? For if everything exists, presumably this is necessarily the case. So necessarily, x exists if and only if x = x. But this scarcely shows that existence = self-identity. That they are distinct is shown by the following reductio ad absurdum argument:

2. To exist = to be self-identical [assumption for reductio] 3. Necessarily, for any x, x = x [logical truth] 4. Necessarily, I = I [from (3) by V.I.] 5. Necessarily, I exist [from (2), (4)] 6. Possibly, I do not exist [premise] 7. (5) & (6) [from (5), (6)]

Therefore 8. To exist is not to be self-identical. [(2)-(7) RAA] The contradiction at line (7) shows that either (2) or (3) or (6) must be

rejected. Since (3) is above reproach, the decision comes down to (2) or (6). Clearly, I am not a necessary being. So (2) is false. For a somewhat fuller treatment, and a reply to an objection, see Chapter 2, section 9.

To compress the argument into three sentences: 'I might not have existed' is true; 'I might not have been self-identical' is either false or unintelligible; so existence cannot be self-identity. Reject this argument, and you must accept that every individual is a necessary being. But who can believe that?

The argument presupposes that there is a sense in which individuals

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exist: singular existence = self-identity. To deny this, however, would be to revert to extreme eliminativism, which has already been dispatched.

6. FREGE'S THEORY OF EXISTENCE

The instantiation theory of existence in all three versions (nominalist, conceptualist and realist) has been refuted in both identity and eliminativist variations. But the task of refutation is not complete until we rebut the positive arguments that have led distinguished thinkers to espouse the theory. The most distinguished is no doubt Gottlob Frege, the greatest logician since Aristotle. Unfortunately, however, logical prowess does not confer metaphysical insight and may even contribute to existence blindness.

What is Frege's view of existence? In The Foundations of Arithmetic, he writes:

... existence is analogous to number. Affinnation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number nought. Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down.!!

What Frege appears to be saying is that a sentence like 'Tame tigers exist' (to borrow G.E. Moore's example) is to be analyzed in terms of 'The number of tame tigers is not zero.' Equivalently, 'The concept tame tiger has something falling under it,' or 'The concept tame tiger is instantiated.' Accordingly, existence is a property of concepts, not of individuals, the property of being instantiated. If so, it will not be merely false, but meaningless to say of an individual that it exists. Hence the fundamental problem with the ontological argument is that its conclusion, 'God exists,' is meaningless, hence neither true nor false.

Frege provides an argument for this thesis that existence is exclusively a property of concepts in his "Dialogue with Puenjer on Existence.,,12 On my reconstruction, Frege's argument for the conclusion that existence cannot be significantly attributed to individuals is as follows:

But

1. If' ... exists' were a first-level predicate, then affirmative existentials would be trivially true.

2. Some affirmative existentials are not trivially true, e.g., 'Humans exist.' Therefore

3. ' ... exists' is not a first-level predicate. Therefore

4. 'Humans exist' is not about individual humans but about the concept human. It says that the concept has something falling under it. 5. ' ... exist(s)' and cognates are used univocally in general and singular


existentials. (Assumption) Therefore

6. First-level predications of existence are meaningless. Thus 'Leo Sachse exists,' to take Frege's example, is a meaningless

form of words, since Leo Sachse is an individual, not a concept. As such, he cannot be instantiated, or have anything "falling under him" as Frege would say. Thus it would seem to be Frege' s view that such affirmative singular existentials as 'Leo Sachse exists' are in the final analysis positively meaningless and not just trivially true. Existence is just not the sort of thing that can be a property of individuals. Russell later makes the Fregean point by comparing existence with being numerous: Socrates can no more exist than he can be numerous. This supports my interpretation of Frege and Russell as eliminativists rather than identity theorists.

The most striking thing about Frege' s argument is the unbelievability of its conclusion. Surely it is a mistake to think that sentences like 'I exist' are meaningless. If one had to choose between the magnificent Cogito argument of Descartes, which culminates in 'I exist,' and Frege' s argument, it is clear which would have to be rejected. There are few things in philosophy as luminous to the intellect as the Cogito; there are few dicta as dark as Frege's. No doubt the utterance of a sentence like 'I exist' would in most contexts be pointless or unmotivated. But that is entirely different from the question whether the sentence is meaningful in the sense of possessing a truth-value. There is just no comparison between 'I exist' and 'I am numerous' with all due respect to Lord Russell.

So there must be something wrong with Frege's argument, and one obvious locus of error is premise (5): ' ... exist(s)' and cognates is used univocally in general and singular existentials. This Univocity Assumption is implausible as I shall now argue. Let us begin by clarifying the distinction between general and singular existentials.

A general existential is a sentence of the form 'Fs exist' or 'There are Fs' or their negations, where 'F' is a predicate constant. A singular existential is a sentence of the form 'a exists' or its negation, where 'a' is an individual constant. Thus 'Philosophers exist' is a general existential, 'Socrates exists' a singular existential. Now it is plausible to say that 'Philosophers exist' is not about individual philosophers; it is about the concept philosopher or the property of being a philosopher, or the class of philosophers, or the propositional function 'x is a philosopher' or something along the same lines, and what it says is that the concept applies to something, or the property is exemplified, or the class has a member, or the function is satisfied. Similarly, 'Unicorns do not exist' is not about unicorns -- after all there are no such things -- it is about the property of being a unicorn and says of it that it is uninstantiated. Thus it is very plausible to take the Frege-Russell line that general existentials affirm or deny exemplification of concepts, properties and the like. It is very plausible, in other

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words, to say that general existence is just exemplification, equivalently, that the force of ' ... exist' is captured by 'Something is a ... .' But what about singular existence, the existence appropriate to individuals? Surely we cannot say that the irreducibly singular existence of a is identical to the being exemplified of some property of a; for that would be to deny that there is any such thing as the irreducibly singular existence of a. It would be to affirm that singular existence is reducible to a species of general existence. The incoherence of this was demonstrated ad nauseam above.

Thus one might be tempted to conclude, with Frege, that there is no such thing as irreducibly singular existence, that sentences of the form 'a exists' are meaningless (sinnlos) , that existence cannot be meaningfully predicated of individuals. 13 But this argument requires the Vnivocity Assumption mentioned above. Without this assumption, to which Frege explicitly commits himself,14 one cannot validly move from the claim that' ... exist' in 'Philosophers exist,' e.g., is not a first-level predicate to the claim that' ... exists' in 'Brunton exists' is not a first-level predicate. But why accept the assumption? It seems rather more plausible to hold that' ... exist(s)' is equivocal as between general and singular existentials. What it expresses in general existentials is exemplification, equivalently, the logical quantity someness; what it expresses in singular existentials is singular existence.

To see more clearly what is at stake, consider these arguments:

Philosophers exist Philosophers are numerous Socrates is a philosopher Socrates is a philosopher Thus, Socrates exists Thus, Socrates is numerous.

The argument on the right is obviously defective, committing as it does the Fallacy of Division. In Fregean terms, it makes the mistake of treating' .. .is numerous' as a first-level predicate. Now if Frege and Russell are right, the same sort of mistake is made by the argument on the left. 15 But the charge sticks only on the Vnivocity Assumption.

If we reject (VA), it might appear that the argument on the left falls victim to a Fallacy of Equivocation. J. L. Mackie raises this objection to the equivocity thesis, but it is invalid.16 For the equivocation on ' ... exist(s)' is not an ordinary equivocation; it is unlike the equivocation on 'bank' as between 'river bank' and 'money bank.' For there is a systematic connection between general and singular existence: Necessarily, if a property is instantiated, then it is instantiated by some individual that exists.17 Since this is a necessary truth, we may invoke it as a premise in any argument we wish. Thus the argument on the left becomes:

The property of being a philosopher is instantiated. If a property is instantiated, it is instantiated by an existent Therefore, being a philosopher is instantiated by an existent

IS EXISTENCE A PROPERTY OF PROPERTIES?

Socrates instantiates being a philosopher. Therefore, Socrates exists.

In this argument there is no Fallacy of Equivocation.

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The upshot is that we may accept the Frege-Russell analysis of general existentials while rejecting, without inconsistency, the draconian thesis that the result of attaching' ... exists' to a proper name is a meaningless string of words. Thus we reject the Fregean identification of existence tout court with general existence (exemplification).

We should note, however, that some philosophers have denied, wrongly in our opinion, that Frege subscribes to this identification. According to Peter Geach,

Frege was clear as to this distinction [between general and singular existence], though he rightly had no special interest, as a mathematical logician, in assertions of present actuality [singular existence]. It is [a] great misfortune that Russell has dogmatically reiterated that the 'there is' sense of the 'substantive' verb 'to be' is the only one that logic can recognize as legitimate; for the other meaning -- present actuality -- is of enormous importance in philosophy, and only harm can be done by a Procrustean treatment which either squeezes assertions of present actuality into the 'there is' form of [read: 'or'] lops them off as nonsensical.18

Not only does Geach cite no passage to support his claim, his claim is refuted by the following quotation from Frege: "We can say that the meanings of the word 'exist' in the sentences 'Leo Sachse exists' and 'Some men exist' display no more difference than do the meanings of 'is a German' in the sentences 'Leo Sachse is a German' and 'Some men are Germans' ."19 For Frege there appears to be only one sort of existence and that is general existence. On this score his position is indistinguishable from Russell's. Nevertheless, Geach is absolutely right to protest Russell's Procrustean treatment of singular existentials and to insist on the distinction between general and singular existence. One may wonder, however, whether singular existence ought to be identified with present actuality, inasmuch as the singular existence of the dead is clearly not present actuality. But this is a large issue that lies beyond the scope of this study.

There is another consideration that suggests that Geach cannot be right about Frege. Although Frege was not explicitly concerned with the critique of the metaphysics of existence, his attitude with respect to existence is deflationary: it reduces to someness. The quest for Being of the metaphysicians is afata morgana. "When philosophers speak of 'absolute being', that is really an apotheosis of the copula. ,,20 And so if the metaphysics of existence is to be supplanted by the logic of' ... exist(s),' existence must reduce to someness; there cannot be room for first-level attributions of existence.

Milton K. Munitz and Dennis E. Bradford are two other philosophers who maintain that Frege recognizes a kind of first-level existence, called

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"actuality" (Wirklichkeit). Munitz21 just asserts this on the basis of his reading of Geach, citing no passage from Frege. Bradford22 cites the following passage:

We must here keep well apart two wholly different cases that are easily confused, because we speak of existence in both cases. In one case the question of whether a proper name designates, names, something; in the other, whether a concept takes objects under itself. If we use the words 'there is a --' we have the latter case.23

Although this passage does seem to suggest that Frege recognizes both singular and general existence, it can also be interpreted as saying that singular existence is just a special case of general existence, the case where the concept in question is the sense of a proper name. Accordingly, the existence of Socrates, rather than being a property of him, is just the instantiation of the sense of 'Socrates,' or the designation of something by this name. Or one could take what Frege is saying metalinguistically as the view that 'a exists' is to be analyzed as '"a''' designates something.'

The real clincher, however, is that if there is a kind of existence, actuality, that pertains to individuals, then the Ontological Argument for the existence of God would not "break down" as Frege says it does. The following version of the argument would be impervious to Frege's criticism: God possesses all perfections; actuality is a perfection; therefore, God is actual.24 If Frege's theory were merely a theory of general existence, he could not have considered it to have any bearing on the ontological argument.

7. UNTANGLING PLATO'S BEARD

The argument set forth in the preceding section is Frege's version of an argument dubbed by Quine "Plato's Beard."25 I questioned the Univocity Assumption ofFrege's argument. I now want to examine the argument's central premise, (1) below. Plato's Beard is a stock argument that has found favor with many distinguished philosophers including Russell, A. J. Ayer,26 and recently C. J. F. Williams.27 Brian Davies offers this formulation: "On the assumption that ' ... exists' is a genuine property [sic] of individuals, affirmative existential statements (e.g., 'Brian Davies exists') would seem to be necessarily true, and negative existential ones (e.g., 'Brian Davies does not exist') would seem to be necessarily false. ,,28 But surely the existence of Davies, e.g., is contingent, whence it is concluded that existence is not a property of individuals.

The argument, then, is this: 1. If' ... exists' were a first-level predicate, then affirmative singular existentials would be necessarily true, and negative singular existentials would be necessarily false. 2. Some affirmative singular existentials are contingently true, and some negative singular existentials are contingently false.


Therefore 3. ' ... exists' is not a first-level predicate.

Therefore 4. Existence is not a first-level property. The inferences in this argument are valid, and (2) is obviously true. So

the soundness of the argument depends on the truth of (1). No doubt (1) has some initial plausibility. But I will show that it rests on the ancient modal fallacy of confusing the necessity of the consequent (necessitas consequentiis) with the necessity of the consequence (necessitas consequentiae).

(1) presents us with a paradox of reference. Given that there is no reference to the nonexistent, if I say of an existing thing that it exists, it seems I have said nothing, or at least nothing that can fail to be true; and if I say of an existing thing that it does not exist, then it seems I have said something that cannot fail to be false.

Although there is something to this, it is not clear that it represents a genuine paradox. A genuine paradox must issue in a logical inconsistency. (Thus Russell's Paradox is a genuine paradox, i.e., an antinomy.29) But there is no inconsistency in holding both that the existence of Davies is a contingent state of affairs and that, necessarily, every use of 'Brian Davies' designates an existent. Nor is there any inconsistency in holding both that the nonexistence of Davies is a possible state of affairs and that no sentence containing 'Brian Davies' could be used to express this state of affairs if it were actual.

Sentences of the form 'a exists' (where 'a' is a nonvacuous individual constant) have the peculiarity that they cannot be used to express a falsehood. Sentences of this form can thus be said, in a loose sense, to be necessarily true. But all this means, speaking strictly, is that, necessarily, if a sentence S of this form is used, then the proposition expressed by S is true. This, however, does not by a long shot entail that the proposition expressed by S is necessarily true.

Thus the Beard argument would seem to be entangled in a modal fallacy. Although it is true that, necessarily, every use of a nonvacuous name designates an existent; it does not follow that every use of a nonvacuous name designates a necessary existent.

Similarly, although it is true that, necessarily, every use of a sentence of the form 'a exists' expresses a true proposition; it does not follow that every use of a sentence of the form 'a' exists' expresses a necessarily true proposition. The necessity of the consequence does not entail the necessity of the consequent. The modal fallacy committed here is in essence no different from, and just as egregious as, the one committed by the fatalist who argues from 'Necessarily, whatever happens happens' to 'Whatever happens necessarily happens.' The same trap snares the Platonist (Platonizer?) who argues from 'Necessarily, whatever is known is true' to 'Whatever is known is necessarily true.'

To put it another way, it is pragmatically impossible for me to use

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'Socrates exists' or 'I exist' to express a false proposItIOn; hence it is pragmatically necessary that whenever I use such a sentence I express a true proposition. But surely the pragmatics of language use has no bearing on the modal status of propositions. The possibility of my nonexistence is not affected by the pragmatic impossibility of my using 'I do not exist' to express a true proposition.

Thus the Beard argument should be rejected. It fails to establish that existence is not a property of individuals, and so fails to lend support to the view that existence is a property of concepts or properties. Of course, it is not our view that existence is a property of individuals; our view is that existence belongs to individuals without being a property of them. Since properties by definition are exemplifiable entities, this is equivalent to saying that existence belongs to individuals without being exemplified by them. Existence is not related to existing things by exemplification. How existence can belong to individuals without being a property of them is the topic of Chapter 6. But for now the point is that Plato's Beard, by failing to establish that existence is not a property of individuals, provides no support for the Fregean view that existence is a property of concepts or properties, and thus for the view that existence does not belong to individuals. The shaving of the Beard therefore goes a good distance toward the vindication of the legitimacy of the metaphysics of (singular) existence.

8. NONEXISTENCE AND NEGATNE EXISTENTIALS

But what about nonexistence? Surely it cannot belong to individuals. And if nonexistence cannot belong to individuals, must we not conclude that existence cannot belong to individuals either? Consider the true singular negative existential, 'Pegasus does not exist.' Being true, this sentence cannot be about an existent winged horse, and since we are assuming that there are no nonexistent objects, it cannot be about a Meinongian object either. So it is plausible to say that this sentence is about a certain property (the property of being a winged horse of such and such a description) and that it predicates of this property, not nonexistence, but noninstantiation. Perhaps we can identify this property with the Fregean sense of 'Pegasus.' (The property itself must exist if it is to have the property of not being instantiated, and further inquiries into what the existence of the property consists in can be blocked by postulating that it is a necessary being.)

Now the crucial question is this: if nonexistence cannot be a property of individuals, does it follow that existence cannot be a property of individuals? Fred Sommers is one who writes as if this follows straightaway.3o But by my lights it does not follow due to an important asymmetry between existence and nonexistence. If an individual exists, then no doubt it instantiates properties, satisfies descriptions and saturates concepts. But its existence cannot consist in,


be identical with, its doing any of these things. However, if a putative individual does not exist, then its nonexistence can easily consist in a property's being uninstantiated. For a nonexistent individual is not a genuine individual, contra Meinong, but the mere absence of something of a more or less complete description. As such, there is no individual Pegasus to lack existence or to have nonexistence. Sommers speaks of "specified existence and specified nonexistence.,,31 But we need to distinguish specified general nonexistence, e.g. the nonexistence of winged horses, from specified singular nonexistence, e.g., the nonexistence of Pegasus, a particular winged horse. Specified general nonexistence may be identified with the second-level property of being uninstantiated. Accordingly, there is nothing more to the nonexistence of winged horses than the circumstance that the property of being a winged horse has the property of being uninstantiated. As for specified singular nonexistence, I suggest there is no such thing. For if there is no such individual as Pegasus, then there is no such thing as the nonexistence of Pegasus. The genitive construction here is clearly a genitivus subjectivus which connotes nonexistence as belonging to or possessed by Pegasus. But if there is no Pegasus, how can anything belong to it? Nonexistence cannot be specified or individuated by Pegasus if there is no such individual. All there is is the being uninstantiated of a certain purely qualitative property, a property that does not imply or involve the existence or the genuine individuality of Pegasus.

For a property to fail of instantiation there need not be any specific individual that fails to instantiate it. If first-level P is instantiated, then there is some individual that instantiates P. But if P is not instantiated, it does not follow that there is some individual that does not instantiate P; what follows is that it is not the case that there is some individual that instantiates P. Nonexistence is therefore always general nonexistence as opposed to singular nonexistence. But existence is primarily singular existence, the existence of individuals. Thus the asymmetry of existence and nonexistence. There is singular existence (the existence of individuals) and general existence (the being-instantiated of concepts) which latter presupposes singular existence: a first-level concept cannot be instantiated unless there exists an individual that instantiates it. But there is no such thing as singular nonexistence, e.g. the nonexistence of Cerberus. There is only general nonexistence, which is a second-level property.

Two main points in summation. First, Plato's Beard has no tendency to show that existence cannot belong to individuals, and so must be 'kicked upstairs' and construed as a property of properties or as a property of worlds (the topic of the following chapter). At the most, the Beard shows that nonexistence must be 'kicked upstairs' and construed as a property of properties. Second, there is no reason to think that if nonexistence is not first-level, then existence cannot be first-level. The truth seems to be that existence belongs to individuals while nonexistence is simply the failure of properties to be instantiated. But to

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say that existence belongs to individuals is not to say that existence is a property of individuals.

9. IDENTITARIANIELIMINATNIST AMBIGUITY IN QUINE

This chapter began by distinguishing between identitarian and eliminativist versions of the instantiation theory of existence. It was suggested that the confusion of the two versions is at the root of the plausibility of the instantiation account. The main liability of the identitarian version is its circularity, a defect not to be found in the eliminativist version. The main liability of the eliminativist version, on the other hand, is its counterintuitive denial of singular existence, a defect absent from the identitarian version. A conflation of the two versions, however, contributes to the illusion that one may garner the benefits of both with the liabilities of neither. What I now want to argue is that Quine's theory of existence exemplifies this conflation of identitarianism and eliminativism. It will thereby emerge how Quine's theory differs from Frege' s eliminativism.

To appreciate what I am about to say, the reader must bear in mind the distinction between singular existence, the existence pertaining to individuals, whether named, unnamed or unnameable, and singular existentials, which are sentences (or cognate items) of the form 'a exists.' This is the same as the distinction between first-level existence (existence as belonging to individuals, whatever this belonging ultimately amounts to) and first-level uses of 'exists.' Given this distinction, it is a non sequitur to infer the eliminability of first-level existence from the eliminability of first-level uses of 'exists.' We shall see how Quine, while dispensing with first-level uses of 'exists,' nevertheless presupposes first-level existence.

I should also issue a caveat to ward off an accusation of exegetical violence. My interest in Quine's theory of existence is straightforwardly ontological: I want to know whether it contributes to an understanding of what it is for an individual to exist. Quine's interest, however, is oblique. His focus is "not on existence, but on imputations of existence: on what a theory says exists.'032 His concern is with ontological commitment, with the question of which entities and sorts of entity a given theory or discourse is committed to, and how this is to be decided. His criterion of ontological commitment is encapsulated in the slogan, "To be is to be the value of a [bound] variable."33 The basic idea is that a theory expressed in canonical notation is committed to the entities that must figure as the values of its bound variables for the theory to be true.

Despite this difference in interest, as between existence per se and a theory's imputations of existence, it is worthwhile to inquire whether Quine'S theory of existence says anything to our question, or whether it is perhaps simply irrelevant to our question.


We begin with Quine's dictum, "Existence is what existential quantification expresses. ,,34 The very next sentence makes it clear that 'existence' refers to general existence. "There are things of kind F if and only if (::Jx)(Fx)." Putting the two sentences together, we may infer that existence is a kind's being instantiated. Quine maintains that existence in this general sense cannot be explicated in simpler terms. But singular existence can be explicated in terms of general existence.

We found an explication of singular existence, 'a exists,' as '(:Jx)(x = a)'; but explication in tum of the existential quantifier itself, 'there is,' 'there are,' explication of general existence, is a forlorn cause.35

Note three things about this passage: (i) Quine endorses the general existence/singular existence distinction in so many words; (ii) Quine appears to confuse singular existence with singular existentials; (iii) general existence is logically primitive, while singular existence is definable in terms of it. Indeed, Quine speaks as if general existence is existence in the strict sense. Point (iii) makes it clear that Quine is an instantiation theorist and thus stands in the tradition of Frege and Russell. But is he an identitarian or an eliminativist? Point (i) suggests that he is an identitarian, while point (ii) in conjunction with his explication of 'a exists' in terms of '(::Jx)(x = a)' suggests that he is an eliminativist, at least with respect to singular existentials if not with respect to singular existence.

We now proceed to examine Quine's explication of 'a exists' in terms of '(::Jx)(x = a). ,36 As remarked, point (i) suggests that Quine is an identitarian, one who admits singular existence; so let us first see what the explication amounts to on an identitarian reading. My strategy is, first, to argue that Quine's explication cannot reasonably support an identitarian interpretation, and second, to argue that it is also not susceptible of an eliminativist interpretation. I conclude that it is the waffling between them that gives Quine's theory of existence its plausibility.

The Identitarian Construal. Note for starters that a formula like '(::Jx)(x = a)' is to be evaluated relative to a universe of discourse containing only existing objects and no Meinongian objects. That this is Quine's intention is clear from his animadversions against 'Wyman' (who more or less stands in for Meinong) in "On What There Is," and from his constant references to the particular quantifier as an existential quantifier. Given this, it is surely a trivial truth that a exists if and only if there is an x identical to a. For if there is an x identical to a, this cannot be the case unless a exists. Mter all, it is a and nothing else that is the value of the bound variable in '(::Jx)(x = a).' Thus Quine's explication gives us no new insight into what the existence of an individual consists in. We can put this by saying that the explication is circular: the existence of a is explicated in terms of a's identity with something that

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exists. But since this thing that exists is a, this boils down to an explication of the existence of a in terms ofthe existence of a. No explication ofthe existence of a in other or more fundamental terms has been provided. Both explicandum and explicans require that existence be first-level. So rather than being an analysis of singular existentials that dispenses with first-level existence, or reduces it to something else, Quine's proposal presupposes first-level existence.

There is this difference, however. In the singular sentence' a exists' the burden of objective reference is borne by the singular term 'a.' But in the existentially general formula '(:Jx)(x = a)' the burden is supposed to be shifted to the bound variable which refers without naming. It is Quine's well-known doctrine that bound variables, represented in English by 'something,' 'nothing,' and 'everything,' "refer to entities generally with a kind of studied ambiguity peculiar to themselves.'>37 Thus in 'Something is (identical to) a,' which is just an ordinary language transcription of '(:Jx)(x = a),' it is 'something' that does the referring and not 'a.' Now the idea that objective reference is routed through quantified variables as opposed to names is not exactly clear; but to pursue this line of critique would take us too far afield. But even if this idea be granted, it is not easy to see why 'a' in '(3x)(x = a)' should play no referential role.

One might argue that 'a,' though no longer in the limelight, is still shouldering the referential burden. For the x in question is identical to a. 'a' must come into the explicans to insure that it is a that gets referred to and not something else. The explicans thus only appears to be a general statement; in reality it is as singular as the explicandum. Whether we say that a exists or say instead that a is such that something is identical to it, the content of our assertion is about a and so is singular. Likewise in the case 'a does not exist' explicated as '-(:Jx)(x = a).' Whether we say that a does not exist or say instead that a is such that nothing is identical to it, the content of our assertion is about a and so is singular.

Allow me to expatiate on this last point a bit. Negative singular existentials like 'Pegasus does not exist' pose well-known problems as we saw in the section preceding. But rendering 'Pegasus does not exist' as '-(3x)(x = Pegasus)' leads to no improvement whatsoever. For what the quantified formula says is that Pegasus is diverse from each thing that exists. But surely any puzzle to which 'Pegasus does not exist' gives rise will also be engendered by 'Pegasus is diverse from each thing that exists.' For if Pegasus is diverse from each thing that exists, must not Pegasus exist in order to be thus diverse?

Summing up the identitarian reading, we can say that it leads to circularity and offers no solution to the problem of negative singular existentials.

The Eliminativist Construal. A defender of Quine might say that the identitarian reading is wrongly foisted upon Quine, and gets the details wrong: the logical form of '(:Jx)(x = a)' is general, not singular despite the occurrence of 'a' in it, and parsing 'a does not exist' as '-(3x)(x = a)' does afford a solution to the problem of negative singular existentials. What's more, there is no


circularity. But to appreciate this, the Quine defender continues, one must realize that Quine's explication of 'a exists' in terms of '(3x)(x = a)' is a contextual definition in which 'a exists' taken as a whole is replaced by a sentence in which neither 'a' (as an independent semantic unit) nor 'exists' occurs. Since neither of these terms occurs in the explicans, there is no circularity; nevertheless, the entire meaning of the explicandum is captured.

This eliminativist construal of Quine's explication works only on two conditions. The first is that 'a' be replaceable by '= a' and this in tum by a general term. The second is that the context '(3x)( ... x ... )' be construable as a second-level predicate. Suppose we take these points in order.

A. If '(3x)(x = a)' is to be a truly general statement, despite the presence in it of singular term 'a,' then it must be parsed in such a way that 'a' no longer occurs in it as an independent semantic unit. Otherwise, it could be read as 'a is identical to something' which is obviously singular. The way to do this is by, first, thinking of 'a' as indissolubly linked to '=,' and thus not capable of standing on its own, and second, by replacing '= a' with a general term, a predicate constant, call it 'A' which is true solely of the individual a. Quine makes this move.38 It is a recurrent theme of his that names are eliminable through contextual definition. In Word and Object he makes the point by saying that "purely referential occurrences of singular terms other than variables can be got down to the type '= a' ."39 This shows that "'= a' taken as a whole is in effect a predicate or general term .... "40 The upshot is that the explicans of 'a exists' becomes '(::Jx)(Ax)' which is undisputably general. 'Socrates exists' would then be explicated as 'There is an x such that x socratizes' or 'Something socratizes.' 'Pegasus does not exist' would be rendered as 'Nothing pegasizes.' And so on. Clearly, 'Nothing pegasizes' is not paradoxical in the way of 'Pegasus does not exist.'

The replacement of empty names like 'Pegasus' with general terms seems unproblematic. But it is difficult to see how a name like 'Socrates,' which designates a genuine individual, could be replaced by a general term. To be able to understand' Something socratizes,' one must be able to understand the predicate 'socratizes.' But surely no one can understand this predicate without understanding it as an abbreviation of 'is identical with Socrates.' What the eliminativist construal demands, however, is that 'socratizes' be understood as an indivisible semantic unity, and thus not as built up out of an understanding of 'Socrates' and 'is identical with' taken separately. This demand cannot be satisfied. The problem in a nutshell is that there is no general description that captures the haecceity or thisness of Socrates. He may be the sole teacher of Plato in the actual world, but there are other possible worlds in which he does not satisfy this description. Since this is a theme familiar in recent philosophy of language, I will not belabor it any further.

B. Suppose I am wrong about this and that '(::Jx)(x = a)' unproblematically gives way to '(::Jx )(Ax),' which is undisputably general. Still,

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a second step is needed for the viability of the eliminativist construal. It is not enough to eliminate 'a', we must also so interpret '(3x)( ... x ... )' that it does not imply that existence is attributable to individuals. Otherwise, there would be no elimination of singular existence. The way to do this is to construe the latter expression as second-level predicate, one that cannot be meaningfully attached to a name for an individual. Thus one could read it as the predicate 'is satisfied,' which, when attached to the first-level predicate 'A' results in the sentence 'A is satisfied.' But this is precisely what Quine does not do. He interprets '(3x)( ... x ... )' objectually (as opposed to substitutionally) to mean: there is (exists) an x such that.. .. ' So what '(3x)(Ax)' says is that there exists an x such that x is A. Since the value of the bound variable in this case is a, what the quantified expression says, in effect, is that a exists. The existence of a is the fact that makes it true that (3x)(x = a). Thus Quine is committed to the view that there is first-level existence, that existence belongs to individuals. Quine is by no means an eliminativist with respect to singular existence. At the very most he eliminates singular existentials. It is only by confusing singular existence with singular existentials that one could think he has eliminated the former. Recall that we found evidence of such confusion in the passage quoted above.

Quine's Major Dicta Inconsistent. Another way of seeing this is by exploring the tension between Quine's two most famous ontological dicta, "Existence is what existential quantification expresses," and "To be is to be the value of a [bound] variable." These pull in opposite directions. The first, taken neat, implies that existence is a property of properties (or cognate items, Fregean Begriffe, Russellian propositional functions, etc.) and never a property of individuals. The second, taken neat, implies that individuals are or exist. These are doctrines that don't mix; or else their mixture evolves inconsistency. How so?

We know from "On What There Is" that for Quine, to be = to exist. Against Wyman and other whipping boys, Quine denies any distinction here. There are no modes or kinds of being. Whatever exists exists in the same way. Now a -- a itself and not the name 'a' -- is the value of the bound variable in '(3x)(Ax).' Values of a variable are not to be confused with their substituends. It therefore follows from the second dictum that a exists. It follows in other words that existence is legitimately attributable to a. The argument can put as follows.

a. If x is the value of a bound variable, then x is or exists. b. a is the value of the bound variable in '(3x)(Ax).'

Therefore c. a is or exists given that '(3x)(Ax)' is true. 'Exists' must therefore be an admissible first-level predicate. This in

tum implies that Quine's explication of 'a exists' in terms of '(3x)(x = a)' must be given an identitarian interpretation. It must be read as presupposing that there is singular existence and that affirmative singular existentials are meaningful as


they stand. By 'meaningful as they stand,' I mean that they do not need analysis to lay bare their true logical form: their logical form coincides with their grammatical form. Grammatically, 'a exists' appears to attribute existence to a. If, as has just been shown, affirmative singular existentials are meaningful as they stand, then this appearance coincides with reality.

But this conflicts with the first dictum, "Existence is what existential quantification expresses," which is most naturally taken to mean that 'exist(s)' is a second-level and never a first-level predicate. It is most naturally taken to mean that existence is just general existence, and that there is no singular existence. This tension amounts to a waffling between an identitarian and an eliminativist reading of Quine's explication of 'a exists.' Quine's objectual understanding of the quantifiers implies that individuals exist; his commitment to the idea that existence is expressed by the existential quantifier, however, implies that individuals do not exist.

It is important to note that Quine has, and can have, no principled objection to first-level uses of 'exists' as do Frege and Russell. He nowhere says or implies that it is meaningless to attach 'exists' to a logically proper name. Indeed, he implies the opposite. In "On What There Is" we read: "we commit ourselves to an ontology containing Pegasus when we say Pegasus is. But we do not commit ourselves to an ontology containing Pegasus ... when we say that Pegasus .. .is not.,,41 Note the asymmetry: 'a exists,' whether true or false, is ontologically committing, but 'a does not exist,' whether true or false, is not ontologically committing. A name by itself is not ontologically committing, and this for the simple reason that some of the terms that count grammatically as names, like 'Pegasus,' are empty. But a name concatenated with 'exists' is ontologically committing. Now if an utterance of 'a exists' commits us to an ontology containing a, then, if 'a exists' is true, it follows that a exists, and we are surely entitled to express this by saying, 'a exists.' Quine can therefore have no objection to 'exists' as a legitimate first-level predicate.

Another reason why he can have no such objection is that his explication of 'a exists' in terms of '(:=Jx)(x = a)' objectually interpreted presupposes the meaningfulness of 'a exists' as it stands, i.e., as attributing existence to a. Objectually interpreted, what the quantified formula says is that there exists an x such that x = a, which of course boils down to the claim that a exists. Compare the situation where the quantified formula is interpreted substitutionally. Substitutionally interpreted, '(:=Jx)(x = a)' is true if and only if there is a term which, when substituted for 'x,' yields a true sentence. Thus interpreted, the quantified formula is ontologically noncommittal and thus cannot serves as the explicans of 'a exists.'

Note also that, a few lines before giving his explication, Quine tells us that" 'a' is used to name an object [in a theory] if and only if the statement' a exists' is true for the theory. He goes on: "This is less satisfactory only [my emphasis] insofar as the meaning of 'exists' may have seemed less settled than

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quantifiers and identity.,,42 Clearly, the quantified formula merely regiments 'a exists' which is meaningful as it stands. The point is that, at the most, Quine shows how one can for certain purposes dispense with singular existentials, but not that one must dispense with them. Affirmative singular existentials need not be dispensed with; they can be allowed to stand. 'Pegasus exists,' even though it is false, causes no trouble. Nor does 'Socrates exists.' (I am now following Quine in using 'exists' tenselessly.) Quine nowhere argues that if 'exists' were an admissible first-level predicate, then true affirmative singular existentials would be tautologically true. It is only negative singular existentials that must be dispensed with. The same goes for names. At the very most, Quine shows how to eliminate them; it is apparently not his view that they must be eliminated.

The Fregean C.J.F. Williams sees quite clearly the difference between Quine and Frege. According to Quine's famous dictum, "To be is to be the value of a variable." Let our example be 'There is someone who alone wrote Waverley.' From Russell we learned how to put this in canonical notation: '(:3x)(x wrote Waverley & (y) (y wrote Waverley -> y = x)).' Now the unique value of the individual variable 'x' is the object Scott. Thus we can say that Scott is the value of a variable. Since Scott is an object in Frege's sense, ' .. .is the value of a variable' is a first-level predicate. It follows that ' .. .is' is a firstlevel predicate if "To be is to be the value of a variable." Quine's famous dictum therefore implies that 'is' and 'exists' - between which there is no distinction for Quine - are admissible first-level predicates. But the whole point of Frege's theory is to deny that ' .. .is' or ' ... exists' are admissible first-level predicates Quine's view is therefore quite distinct from Frege' S.43 Frege's view is unambiguously eliminativist; Quine's is not: he waffles between eliminativism and identitarianism.

to. CONCLUSION

The exemplification account of existence stands refuted in both identitarian and eliminativist versions. Existence is not a property of properties. But neither is it a property of individuals (Chapter 2). So what is existence? The question grows in urgency. Could it be a property of worlds?

NOTES

1 A specific individual is not one that is specified by anyone or named by anyone, but simply a particular individual. A specific individual may not have a name, or indeed may be unnameable.

2 Note that the property of being the wisest Greek philosopher is multiply exemplifiable in the sense that in different possible worlds different individuals exemplify it.

3 As we saw, this still does not alleviate the circularity problem.


4 Cf. A. Plantinga, "The Boethian Compromise," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 2 (April 1978), pp. 129-138.

5 Cf. Robert M. Adams, "Actualism and Thisness," Synthese 49 (1981), pp. 3-41.

6 G. W. F. Hegel, Phaenomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952), pp. 79-89.

7 Cf. Robert M. Adams, "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXVI, no. 1 (January 1979), pp. 5-26.

8 Cf. G. E. L. Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology," in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. Renford Bambrough (London, 1965). See also Alan Code, "The Philosophical Significance of the Middle Books of Aristotle's Metaphysics," University of Dayton Review, vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1988-1989), pp. 81-91.

9 Robin Attfield, "How Things Exist: A Difficulty," Analysis, vol. 33, no. 4 (March 1973), p. 142.

10 Recall Russell's comparison of existence with the property of being numerous.

11 Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 65.

12 Gottlob Frege, "Dialogue with Puenjer on Existence," Posthumous Writings, trans. Peter Long and Roger White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 53-67.

13 Gottlob Frege, "On Concept and Object" Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, trans. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), p. 50.

14 "We can say that the meanings of the word 'exist' in the sentences 'Leo Sachse exists' and 'Some men exist' display no more difference than do the meanings of 'is a German' in the sentences 'Leo Sachse is a German' and 'Some men are Germans'." Gottlob Frege, "Dialogue with Puenjeron Existence" in Posthumous Writings, trans. Peter Long and Roger White (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 66.

15 According to Russell, "If you say that 'Men exist, and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates exists', that is exactly the same sort of fallacy as it would be if you said 'Men are numerous, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is numerous', because existence is a predicate of a propositional function, or derivatively of a class." "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" in Logic and Knowledge (New York: Capricorn Books, 1971), p. 233. Russell repeats the point in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1971), p. 164. He goes on to say (p. 165) that "a exists" is a "mere noise or shape, devoid of significance" and that " ... by bearing in mind this simple fallacy we can solve many ancient philosophical puzzles concerning the meaning of existence." Russell applies this to the Ontological Argument in A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1945), p. 787: "I think it may be said quite decisively that, as a result of analysis of the concept 'existence,' modem logic has proved this argument [the Ontological Argument] invalid. This is not a matter of temperament or of social system; it is a purely technical matter."

16 J. L. Mackie, "The Riddle of Existence" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume L (1976), p. 257.

17 It might be wondered whether what I am calling an equivocation might also, and perhaps better, be thought of as an analogy, specifically, an analogy of attribution rather than an analogy of proper proportionality. Accordingly, individuals exist properly speaking whereas concepts, properties and the like exist to the extent that they apply to, or are instantiated by, individual existents. This,

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however, has the unwelcome consequence that there are no uninstantiated properties, a consequence that does not accrue if we take the equivocity approach. For present purposes we need not decide between analogy and equivocity; we need only reject univocity.

18 Peter Geach, "Aquinas" in Three Philosophers (Basil Blackwell & Mott Ltd., 1961), pp. 90-91.

19 Gottlob Frege, "Dialogue with Puenjer on Existence" in Posthumous Writings, trans. Peter Long and Roger White (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 66.

20 Posthumous Writings, op. cit., p. 64.

21 Milton K. Munitz, Existence and Logic (New York University Press, 1974), pp. 87-88.

22 Dennis E. Bradford, The Concept of Existence: A Study of Nonexistent Particulars (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), p. 83.

23 Gottlob Frege, Translationsfrom the Philosophical Writings ofGottlob Frege, op. cit., p. 104.

24 This is not to say that there are not other criticisms to which this argument succumbs.

25 Cf. W. V. Quine, "On What There Is" in From a Logical Point of View (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 2.

26 " ••• existence is not an attribute. For, when we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists: so that if existence were itself an attribute, it would follow that all positive existential propositions were tautologies, and all negative existential propositions self-contradictory; and this is not the case." A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Books, 1952), p. 43.

27 C. J. F. Williams, What is Existence? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 37 ff.

28 Brian Davies, "Does God Create Existence?" International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XXX, no. 2 (June 1990), p. 152.

29 Some sets are self-membered (e.g., the set of all things not in my pocket); some sets are nonself-membered (e.g., the set of all philosophers). Now consider R, the set of all non-self-membered sets. Is R self-membered or not? Clearly, R is self-membered if and only if R is non-selfmembered, which is a contradiction.

30 Fred SommersD'Existence and Correspondence-to-Fact," in Formal Ontology, eds. Roberto Poli and Peter Simons (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), p. 132.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p. 93.

33 "On What There Is," op. cit., p. 15.

34 W. V. Quine, "Existence and Quantification," Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 97.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., p. 94.


38 W. V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 25.


39 W. V. Quine, Word and Object, 8th ed. (Cambridge: M.LT. Press, 1973), p. 178.

40 Ibid.


42 Ontological Relativity, op. cit., p. 94.

43 Cf. C.J.F. Williams, op. cit, pp. 164,216.

Chapter Five

Mondial Attribute Theories

Descartes' version of the ontological argument assumed that existence is a perfection, and thus a property, of individuals. 1 Frege denied that existence is ever a property of individuals, holding instead that it is a property of concepts or properties, the property of having an instance.2 These property theories were refuted in chapters 2 and 4, respectively. But there is a third possibility that cannot remain unexamined. Frederic Sommers, maintaining that existence can be neither a property of individuals nor a property of properties, proposes that it is a property of a world or a Domain under Consideration (DC).3 The basic idea is that for x to exist is for a DC to have the property of containing x. Roughly similar theories have also been defended by Milton Munitz and Bruce Aune. According to Munitz, "To say'S exists' means'S is part of the world. ",4 For Aune, "a exists =df a belongs to the space-time-causal system that is our world."s In the 1930's, Nicolai Hartmann developed a theory that clearly anticipates the mondial attribute theory. A sketch of it will be provided at the end of this chapter.

The bulk of this chapter examines the mondial attribute theory of existence in its strongest and most recent version, that of Sommers. My aim is not to criticize Sommers per se, but to examine a type of theory of existence, a type of theory that is rendered very attractive once it is seen that existence can be neither a property of individuals nor of properties. But this aim is best achieved if we scrutinize a well-developed version of it. My main critical point will be that a mondial attribute theory cannot be made to work so long as the world is taken to be a collection or a mere Domain under Consideration. For the theory to work, the world must be construed much more robustly as an individual in its own right with dubious monistic consequences in which one will presumably not be eager to acquiesce.

I.S0MMERS ON EXISTENCE: EXPOSmON

Sommers' theory of existence is closely tied to his realist theory of truth according to which true statements, judgments, and propositions correspond to truth-making facts or states of affairs.6 Thus his theory of existence goes together with a theory of facts. We share with Sommers a commitment to realism, and hence to the need for truth-making facts.? But whereas classical truth realism holds that such truth-making states of affairs are in the world, Sommers maintains that they are states of the world. Let us see how he arrives at this.

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Sommers plausibly argues that there is a difference between an individual such as Quine and a state of affairs such as Quine's existence, and a corresponding difference between perceiving Quine and perceiving Quine's existence.8 These distinctions give rise to an ontological question about existential states of affairs, and an epistemological question about how we can come to know or have evidentiary beliefs about existential states of affairs. Sommers' theory may be viewed as an attempt to answer these two questions.9

We will begin by addressing the ontological worry. Quine is in the world. But what about Quine's existence? Assuming,

naturally enough, that Quine's existence is a state of affairs, is this state of affairs in the world? This is problematic, for if the state of affairs in question were in the world, then existence would be a property of Quine on a par with such ordinary properties as being intelligent, being human, etc. That existence is such a property Sommers rightly denies, invoking the authority of Kant. 10 One reason for this denial is that if existence were a property of individuals, then the ontological argument for the existence of God would be valid, which it is not: " ... to look in the world for the fact of his [Quine's] presence is to take a bite from Anselm's apple by thinking of Quine's existence as just another property of Quine."u Another standard reason Sommers approvingly cites is that existence's status as a first-level property poses the problem of nonexistence known as Plato's Beard. 12 What does not exist cannot have a property ascribed to it; thus the nonexistence of unicorns cannot consist in their instantiation of a property of nonexistence. If so, the existence of horses cannot consist in their instantiation of a property of existence. 13

Existence, then, is not a first-level property. Sommers concludes from this, not that there are no such truth-making facts as Quine's existence, but that they are not in the world. Existential states of affairs, states of affairs pertaining to the presence14 or absence of something in the world, "are not states in the world, they are states of the world."15 The existence of Quine is the world's being" {Quine }ish." In general, "The existence of (a) K is a property or state of the domain (its {K}ishness.)"16 To say that a domain is "{K}ish" is just to say that it contains a K individual. In another article, Sommers states his view as follows: " ... specified existence and nonexistence (for example, the existence of lions, the nonexistence of griffins) are mondial attributes, attributes that belong to the world in virtue of what is in it as opposed to what is not.,,17 Thus the existence oflions is the world's being {lion}ish, which is the truth-maker of 'Lions exist,' and the nonexistence of griffins is the world's being un{griffin}ish, which is the truth-maker of 'Griffins do not exist.'

In sum: Quine is distinct from Quine's existence; the latter is a state of affairs; if it were a state of affairs in the world, then existence would be a property of Quine; existence is not a property of Quine; therefore, Quine's existence is a state of the world.

It is important to note that Sommers' theory provides truth-makers for

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all truth-bearers, or at least for all truth-bearers that need truth-makers, since every statement, judgment, or proposition, whether general or singular, can be expressed as an existential statement,judgment, or proposition. Sommers credits Quine with this insight, but 1 should think that the credit oUght to go to Brentano who advanced this thesis in 1874 in his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. 18 But the point is plausible whatever its provenance. For example, and this is my exfoliation of the central point, to say that some cats are mangy is to say that mangy cats exist. To say that no cats are mangy is to say that mangy cats do not exist. To say that all cats are mangy is to say that non-mangy cats do not exist. To say that some cats are not mangy is to say that non-mangy cats exist. To say that Mungojerrie is mangy is to say that mangy Mungojerrie exists. To say that Mungojerrie is not mangy is to say that mangy Mungojerrie does not exist. Sommers is silent on modal judgments, but presumably one could extend the analysis to them as well. Accordingly, to say that Mungojerrie might not have been mangy (Possibly, Mungojerrie is not mangy) is to say that mangy Mungojerrie might not have existed (Possibly, mangy Mungojerrie does not exist.) And so on.

Sommers takes these equivalences to imply that every state of affairs is an existential state of affairs, and thus that no state of affairs is in the world. (I will question the cogency of this reasoning below.) Recall the argument: (i) if existential states of affairs were in the world, then existence would be a firstlevel property. But (ii) existence is not a first-level property. Therefore, by Modus Tollens, (iii) existential states of affairs are not in the world. Therefore, (iv) states of affairs, which we need to satisfy the realist demand for truthmakers, are states of the world. The tacit premise in the inference from (iii) to (iv) may be that, since facts cannot be outside the world, if they are not in the world, then they must be properties of the world. This is plausible, although 1 will later suggest that it is false. 1 will also raise questions about how a fact can be assimilated to a property, a state of affairs to a state.

The upshot is that Sommers holds that although there is nothing in the world corresponding to 'Mangy cats exist' or 'Some cats are mangy,' it does not follow that there is nothing corresponding to these (asserted) sentences. What corresponds to them is the extralinguistic truth-making fact of the world's being {mangy cat}ish. In this way truth-realism is upheld but without intramundane truth-makers.

1 said that Sommers' theory is motivated by an ontological question about existential states of affairs, which goes hand in hand with a question about the explication of such phrases as 'the existence of lions' and 'the nonexistence of griffins,' and an epistemological question about how we can be said to know or have evidentiary beliefs about existential states of affairs. The ontological question arises because although we seem to need existential states of affairs -if we are going to be realists - they cannot be located in the world. The

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epistemological question arises because it is unclear how we could have any sensory evidence for intramundane existential states of affairs. I will set forth the epistemological problem in my own way and then present Sommers' ingenious solution to it.

To see a cat and to see that a cat exists are clearly two different things. Yet presumably both uses of 'see' are to be taken literally: it is not as if the first refers to a visio oculis while the latter refers to a visio intellectualis. Although it is natural to conflate seeing a cat with seeing the existence of a cat, as when we say things like, 'I know that my cat exists because I see him,' seeing a cat is arguably no evidence for the existence of a cat. Even if the cat I see exists, there is nothing perceivable in the cat that could guarantee or provide any sort of evidence for the cat's existence. Existence is not a sensible or observable property, and not just because our sense organs are too crude to detect it. And if existence is not a first-level property at all, then aJortiori it is not a sensible first-level property. So it seems that one cannot perceive the existence of any sensible individual. I see the cat, feel its furriness,19 hear its purring, etc., but I have no sensory access to its existence. How then do I know that it exists? Yet it seems obvious that I do know that it exists, and that I know this in a sensory way. (We ought not acquiesce in skepticism without a serious fight.) How is sense-based knowledge of existence at all possible?

But the perplexity goes deeper than this. Even if, per impossibile, existence were a sensible property like being furry, I could not know on the basis of sense-perception alone that my cat has this property, i.e., that my cat is existent, any more than I can know via the senses alone that my cat is furry. If something appears to be furry, or is given as furry, it does not follow that it is furry; if something appears as existent, it does not follow that it is existent. Much rides on what the meaning of 'is' is, as Bill Clinton was quick to point out when it suited him, and 'x is F' clearly means that x is F whether or not there is anyone around to verify it. To know that x has a property is logically equivalent to knowing that x exists given (my knowledge of) the plausible anti-Meinongian principle that an individual cannot have properties without existing and cannot exist without having properties. But it seems I cannot know either side of this biconditional via the senses.

And yet, despite all this, I want to be able to say that I know (or at least have evidence for my belief) that my cat exists, and actually has the properties I see him as having, on the basis of sensory evidence. For if I cannot know or believe this on the basis of sensory evidence, how else could I know or believe it? (To say that the existence of a sense particular is not something that one can know or not know, that there is no fact of the matter about whether a sense particular exists, perhaps because the concept of existence is one we impose on objects, a transcendental concept that does not reflect anything real in the world, is a view we want to avoid ifpossible.20) Now the cat's existence, unlike the cat,


is taken by Sommers, and plausibly taken, to be a state of affairs: but how can I sense a state of affairs? I sense the cat and I sense furriness. But I do not sense its furriness;21 equivalently, I do not sense the connection of cat and furriness, or something in addition to the cat and furriness (the state of affairs). The state of affairs is more than the sum of its constituents, being their togetherness. But this togetherness appears to elude empirical detection.

The puzzle may be set forth as a aporetic triad: 1. One can observe the existence of cats. 2. The existence of cats is a fact. 3. One cannot observe facts.

The triad is logically inconsistent, since the conjunction of (1) and (2) logically implies the negation of (3), and yet each of its members seems true. (1) That there are cats in my house, I see (smell, hear, etc.) every day. I don't just observe the cats; I observe their presence. (2) The existence of cats is an objective truth-making fact. (3) But how can one observe a fact? The cats appear, but neither existence, nor their existence, appears.

Enter Sommers' theory. On my reconstruction, Sommers dissolves the aporia by denying (3), and he does this by viewing facts not as members of domains, but as properties thereof. Suppose a cat is in a box. Let the box be the Domain under Consideration (DC). Then what Sommers will say is that the existence of the cat is a property of the box. "The objects in a physical DC are perceived; the DC itself is 'apperceived."m I have sensory access to the properties of the cat by perceiving the cat; I have sensory access to the properties of the box (the physical DC) by apperceiving the box. But one of these properties of the box is the existence of the cat. So by apperceiving the box, I have sensory access to the existence of the cat. For the existence of the cat is just a state ofthe box, the {cat}ishness of the box.

There is no denying the intuitive appeal of this theory. Since existence is not a property of the cat, I cannot acquire sensory knowledge of the existence of the cat (which presumably I have) by confining my attention to the cat. I need to take a wider view and make a 'mondial ascent' (my term). Attending to the box, I see that it contains a cat. Thus it is plausible (at first blush anyway) to say that the existence of the cat is a property of the box.

This is an ingenious theory as can be seen from the fact that it can explain our knowledge of nonexistence. Looking for Pierre in the cafe, I may become aware of his absence. This is arguably a sensory awareness. I see that Pierre is absent. My man is 'conspicuous by his absence.' Since I cannot be sensing Pierre, what am I sensing? On Sommers' theory I am sensing (apperceiving) the cafe or perhaps my visual field as un{Pierre }ish. The nonexistence of Pierre is thus a property or state of the cafe, a state to which I have sensory access in virtue of my sensory access to the cafe.

Sommers' theory, then, is a serious contender. It explains what facts

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are, namely states of a domain, and how they can be known. To appreciate the appeal of Sommers' theory, one needs to appreciate how dubious the main 201h

century theory is, namely the Frege-Russell or 'Fressellian' theory according to which (roughly, and ignoring the differences between our two luminaries) existence is a property of properties, the property of being instantiated. Consider the existence of my hand. It would be nice to have a theory that accounts for the following Moorean data: I see my hand; by seeing my hand, I see that my hand exists. But the 'Fressellian' theory is hopeless in this regard. No doubt my hand instantiates various properties and concepts and satisfies sundry descriptions. But the existence of my hand cannot consist in, i.e., be identical to, the fact that any property or concept is instantiated, or any description is satisfied. Things exist at times and at possible worlds in which no descriptions and no concepts exist, and even if concepts and properties are necessary beings, it is still difficult to see how the existence of a concrete object could consist in the instantiation of an abstract object. To put it somewhat vaguely, but in a manner neutral as between Sommers' theory and the theory I will be proposing, the existence of a concrete object pertains to the objective world, and not to the concepts by means of which we gain access to the world. Nor, when I see that my hand exists, am I seeing that a property or cognate item is instantiated. Properties and concepts are not the sorts of items that can be seen.

Sommers' theory is beginning to look very attractive. If existence is neither a first-level property, nor a second-level property, and if, as seems obvious, there is a real distinction between an individual and its existence, then what else could the existence of an individual consist in but its being a member of the world? Equivalently, what else could existence be but a property of the world?

2. SOMMERS ON EXISTENCE: CRITIQUE

Sommers' theory of existence and facts raises three main questions corresponding to its three main theses. First, is every fact an existential fact, and thus a fact about what the world does and does not contain? Second, can existential facts be construed as properties of domains? Third, what exactly is a domain, and must a domain exist for its members to exist?

Whether Every Fact is an Existential Fact. Let me begin by conceding that every predicative statement Gudgment, etc.) is logically equivalent to an existential statement Gudgment, etc.).23 But it scarcely follows from this logical equivalence that predicative statements can be reduced to existential ones in such a way as entirely to eliminate the copulative element from the logical form or deep structure of the predicative statement. (From the fact that one can easily eliminate the word 'is,' it does not follow that one can eliminate the copulative element.) Indeed, I shall show that the copulative element is ineliminable, and


that therefore the truth-makers of predicative statements must also involve a copulative element. This will make it impossible for such truth-makers to be states or properties of a world, or the world. Truth-making cannot be a matter of what individuals the world does and does not contain.

Suppose Al is fat. 24 To say that AI is fat is to say that fat AI exists. 'AI is fat' and 'Fat Al exists' are logically equivalent in that there is no logically possible world in which one is true and the other false. (This equivalence of course presupposes that 'fat AI' is not a proper name, i.e., a rigid designator, but a description; for if 'fat AI' were a proper name, then there are possible worlds in which fat AI is not fat. There is nothing of a logical or metaphysical nature to stop a man who rejoices under the name 'fat AI' to go on a diet and become skinny.) Any truth-maker of the one sentence, therefore, will be a truth-maker ofthe other. But notice that the equivalence holds because the 'is' in 'AI is fat' has a dual function: it expresses not only the connection of subject and predicate, but also the existence of the subject. I shall say that the 'is' in this sentence has both copulative and existential import. That it has copulative import is obvious; that it has existential import is clear from the fact that 'AI is fat' metaphysically entails 'Fat Al exists.'25 Now since the 'is' in 'AI is fat' has both copulative and existential import, whereas the 'exists' in 'Fat Al exists' can only have existential import, it follows that there must be some further syntactic element in 'Fat Al exists' that expresses the connection of Al and fatness. Otherwise the two sentences would not be logically equivalent. (Recall what I said about 'fat AI' not being a name.) This syntactic element can only be the juxtaposition of 'fat' and 'Al' with the adjective preceding the noun. In a perspicuous notation, this juxtaposition will have its own symbol. So I propose we write either 'AI [is] fat & Al exists,' or '(AI [is] fat)exists),where '[is]' denotes a purely copulati ve use of 'is,' a use which, with a nod towards Husserl, 'brackets existence.' But on either notation, it becomes clear that predicative statements cannot be reduced to existential statements in such a way as wholly to eliminate the copulative element. For 'Fat Al exists' involves a hidden copulative tie. The sentence is short for 'AI, who [is] fat, exists.' If there were no such copulative tie, 'Fat AI exists' would be indistinguishable from 'A fat thing exists and AI exists.' But we know from Logic 101 that '(::Jx)(Fx) & (::Jx)(x = a)' does not logically entail '(::Jx)(Fx & x = a).' Note how the position of the parentheses in the last formula expresses the copulation of a and F-ness: one can have copulation without the copula 'is' or cognates.

Thus there is fallacy one must avoid, a fallacy to which Sommers, and Brentano before him, apparently succumbed. Although it is true that predications can be expressed as existentials, it is false that such a rewrite eliminates the copulative element from the existential sentences. For it merely hides it. The translation from 'AI is fat' to 'Fat AI exists' hides the copulation while laying bare the existential commitment, whereas the translation in the

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other direction hides the existential commitment while laying bare the copulation. But what is hidden does not cease to exist. Clearly, both sentences have both copulative and existential elements. Indeed, all predicative sentences have both elements, even those that lack existential import in the narrow sense. If 'All Italians are mafiosi' is parsed as 'If x is an Italian, then x is a mafioso,' then the analysandum sentence is said to lack existential import (in the narrow sense): it is not being assumed that there are any Italians. But the analysandum is surely equivalent to 'Non-mafia Italians do not exist,' which, by making a claim of nonexistence, has existential import in the broad sense.

If all predicative sentences have both copulative and existential elements, then every truth-maker of a predicative sentence must have both elements. The truth-maker of 'Fat Al exists,' then, must have a copulative element corresponding to the 'is' in 'AI is fat.' Recall that 'Fat Al exists' is elliptical for' AI, who is fat, exists.' But the world's containing fat Al -- which is the truth-maker Sommers' theory prescribes -- does not have a copulative element corresponding to the 'is' in 'AI is fat.' Sommers' world, unlike Wittgenstein's, is a totality of things, not of facts.26 Fat Al is not a fact but a thing (individual). As such, he has no copulative element, and so cannot make true 'AI is fat.' What is needed to do this job is the state of affairs, AI's being fat. This state of affairs, however, cannot be in the world on Sommers' theory. But when it is transformed into a state of the world, the copulative element gets lost. The world's containing fat AI, i.e., the world's being {fat AI}ish, cannot therefore be the truth-maker of 'Fat Al exists.'

The crucial point is that if the world contains something fat and the world contains AI, it does not follow that the world contains fat AI. For the world to contain fat AI, it must contain not only Al and (an instance of) fatness, but also the fact of AI's instantiating fatness. But there are no facts in Sommers' world; all facts are existential properties of the world, properties having to do with the presence or absence of individuals in the world. There is, however, no individual in the world that can account for the 'copulation' of Al and fatness. Bear in mind that I am assuming, with Sommers, that we need truth-makers, and that truth-makers are facts. Neither the individual fat AI, nor the world's containing fat AI, therefore, can be the truth-maker of 'AI is fat.'

What I have just shown is that, even though it is true that every predicati ve sentence can be expressed as an existential sentence, it is false that every truth-making fact is a purely existential fact, and thus false that every fact is a mondial attribute. AI's being fat is not purely existential, even if AI's existence is purely existential. To further nail down the point, consider 'Some cats are mangy.' This is logically equivalent to 'Mangy cats exist.' But a mangy cat is a cat that is mangy: 'mangy' does a robust characterizing job in 'mangy cat' that 'pussy' does not do in 'pussycat' and that 'mammalian' does not do in 'mammalian cat.' The existence of mangy cats thus involves an irreducible


copulative element. It is possible that a world containing both cats and mangy critters not contain mangy cats in the way in which it is not possible that a world containing both cats and mammals not contain mammalian cats. It is some kind of necessary truth that cats are mammals, but no kind of necessary truth that cats are mangy. So if individuals have some of their properties contingently, then the copulative element is surely ineliminable. It is a fallacy to think that, just because predications can be expressed as existentials, existentials lack a copulative element and that their truth-makers lack a copulative element.

Whether Existential Facts are Properties of the World. I now move on to my second question: Are even purely existential states of affairs states of the world? The existence of AI, unlike the existence offat AI, seems to be a purely existential state of affairs or fact: it appears to involve no copulation or synthesis of individual and property. (The existence of AI cannot involve the copulation or synthesis of Al and existence since existence is not a first-level property.) So it seems plausible to say that the existence of Al is just the world's containing AI, i.e., the world's being {AI}ish. But doubts arise when we consider that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, nothing can exist without having properties. So even though 'AI exists' mentions no property that Al has, it is clear that there must be properties that he has -- mentioned or not. Let 'fat' stand for any property that AI has contingently. Thus if the truth-maker of 'AI exists' is the world's containing AI, then the truth-maker of 'AI exists' is the world's containing fat AI. With this we are right back to the problem set forth in the preceding subsection. The problem was that, since fat AI is Al who is fat, the existence of fat AI implies the existence of the fact of AI' s being fat; but this fact is a 'homeless object': it cannot be in the world, and when transformed into a property of the world, the copulative tie disappears. In the preceding subsection, I argued that not every fact is purely existential; but what we have just seen is that not even existential facts (e.g., the one corresponding to 'AI exists') are purely existential. Hence I think we must conclude that no fact is purely existential and thus that no fact is a mondial attribute.

But even apart from the foregoing difficulties, when we try to understand what exactly it could mean for a fact, whether purely existential or not, to be a property of the world, we are baffled by a further difficulty. I'll call this 'the revenge of copulation.'

It is plausible to say that a fact is an existential property of a domain if the domain is non-maximal. But what if the domain is maximal? Suppose Guido is in the cafe. The existence of Guido, which (we are assuming) is a fact, is plausibly identified with a property of the cafe, namely, the property of being {Guido }ish. 27 A particular fact thereby gets reduced to a particular (instantiated) property. A particular fact, Guido's existence, which one might naturally think is in a domain (the cafe), gets transformed into a property of the domain. So far,

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so good. But the cafe's being {Guido }ish is itself a fact. For the property of being {Guido }ish is an instantiated property: it would be a category mistake to identify a fact with an uninstantiated property, and on a charitable interpretation of Sommers' theory, one cannot impute such a mistake to him. Now the instantiation of the property of being {Guido }ish by the cafe is just the fact of the cafe's being {Guido} ish. So what we have done is traded an intra-domain fact (the existence of Guido) for a higher-order fact (the cafe's being {Guido }ish) the subject-constituent of which is a domain. We have jettisoned the lower-order fact, but only by taking on board a higher-order fact.

Now this higher-order fact cannot remain unreduced lest we be left with an innerworldly fact on our hands, which is to say, a fact with an unreduced copulative element. Presumably the higher-order fact will reduce - given that the cafe is in the North End - to a property of the North End, namely, the property of being {Guido-in-the-cafe }ish. Butthe North End's being {Guido-inthe-cafe }ish is in its tum a fact, and thus a property of a more inclusive domain, Boston. And so it will go until we arrive at the maximally inclusive domain, the totality of everything that actually and presently exists. Call this domain 'MAX.' Now since our man cannot be in the cafe unless he is in MAX, we need not monkey with the smaller domains; we can say straightaway that the existence of Guido is a property of MAX, the property of being {Guido }ish. Indeed, we must say this since Guido cannot be in the cafe without being in MAX: we must make the 'mondial ascent.' But surely MAX's being {Guido} ish is itself a fact. Here, however, the 'mondial ascent' must end. There is no wider domain of which this state of affairs can be a state. This implies that although some facts can be reduced to existential properties of domains, not all facts can be so reduced. So some facts - call them 'worldfacts' - are not existential properties. Thus there are two kinds of facts, ordinary facts, which are existential properties of a domain, properties pertaining to the "presence in it or absence from it of certain constituents,,28 and world-facts which are not existential properties of domains. World-facts, then, cannot be explicated in terms of the presence or absence of constituents in domains. This implies that such world-facts as MAX's being {Guido }ish are irreducibly copulative. For there is no SUPERMAX such that MAX's being {Guido }ish can be explicated as a property of SUPERMAX, namely, the property of being {Guido-in-MAX}ish, i.e., the property of containing Guido-in-MAX.

In this way we arrive at 'the revenge of copulation.' Maltreated, marginalized and 'mondialized,' the copulative element in facts returns with a vengeance at the apex of the mondial ascent. Since world-facts are irreducibly copUlative, world-facts cannot be properties of the world, and so they must be in the world. Hence MAX's being {Guido}ish is in MAX. Where else could it be? And since everything that actually and presently exists is in MAX, for every x in MAX, there is the fact of MAX's being {x}ish. All of these facts are


in MAX. But now we are back to the original problem that was supposed to be

solved by thinking of facts as existential properties of domains. The original problem has a special form and a general form. The special form of the problem is that an existential fact like Quine's existence cannot be in the world unless existence is a first-level property, which it clearly is not. The general form is that it is difficult to see how any fact can be in the world. I'll have more to say about this later, but for now, the general problem is that it is difficult to reconcile the truth that a fact is more than its constituents, being their unity, with the truth that a fact is nothing over and above its constituents. Sommers' solution to the general problem is that all facts are existential properties of domains, and thus that no fact is in any domain: facts are properties of domains. But the 'revenge of copulation' shows that Sommers' solution is merely apparent. World-facts, as irreducibly copulative, cannot be properties of the world, and so must be in the world. Thus we are stuck with the problem of how a fact like the world's being {Quine} ish can be in the world.

What is a Domain? To evaluate the claim that existence is a property of domains, we need to know exactly what a domain is. Sommers' definitions, although clear on the surface, leave thorny questions unanswered. "By a domain we mean the (nonempty) totality of things that is under consideration when a given assertive claim has been made. The actual world is the domain of 'there are no elves.,,29 But not every domain is actua1.30 Thus there is a fictional domain relative to which 'there are elves' is true. What then distinguishes the actual world from domains that are not actual? Are there both existing and nonexisting domains? If yes, what is for a domain to exist? Is a domain a collection or is it an individual in its own right? These are some of the questions that arise. To discuss them properly, we need to make some distinctions. My strategy will be to distinguish different sorts of domain, and then to ask which sort of domain is such that membership in it could be what the existence of an individual consists in.

A domain is either a collection or a non-collection, and a non-collection is either an individual in its own right or a dependent individual. The set of all my books is an example of a collection, and so is the set of natural numbers, while my visual field and my bookcase are non-collections, with the bookcase being an individual in its own right, and the visual field a dependent individual: it depends on the subject whose visual field it is. Although a set is distinct from each of its members (if any), and from its membership - call this the extension of the set - a set is not something over and above its members. It is not 'an addition to being' but 'an ontological free lunch.'31 If the members exist, the set 'automatically' exists. Indeed, the set exists because the members exist, and not vice versa. Membership may have its privileges, but there is no club the joining of which will confer existence on you. First (logically speaking) you have to

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exist, and only then (logically speaking) can you join a club or apply for setmembership. The same goes for mereological sums. Thus as I shall use 'collection,' a collection is parasitic upon its members: it exists because they exist and not vice versa. This strikes me as self-evident and non-negotiable.

A domain that is a collection I shall call a 'collective domain.' All other domains I shall call 'non-collective.' A visual field, which I am distinguishing from the collection of objects in the visual field, is an example of a noncollective domain in that it is in some sense or other prior to what appears within it. It is as it were the 'horizon' within which visual objects appear, and so cannot be built up out of them in any sense analogous to the way a set is built up out of its members. It would be absurd to hold that a visual field is a set of visual data or a merelogical sum of visual data. (For one thing, sets and sums have their members essentially, but visual fields and sensory fields generally gain and lose data. As I hike over hill and hollow, ever new sights come into and pass out of my visual field.) But on the other hand, a visual field is not an individual that exists in its own right, but is anchored in, ontologically dependent on, a visual subject. It would be absurd to hold that my visual field could exist if I were not to exist. A domain that is an individual in its own right I shall call an individual domain. A bookcase, for example, is an individual in its own right. And so was the box my cat was in a moment ago. On the one hand, a box is not a set or sum of smaller parts;32 on the other hand, as a substance (=df a thing ontologically capable of independent existence), it is not onto logically dependent on anything, which is not to say that it is not causally dependent on anything.

Three Lemmata. I now prove three lemmata from which I will infer my main critical conclusion.

Lemma 1. No individual is such that its existence could consist in a collective domain's - a collection's -- containing it. Equivalently, no individual is such that its existence could be an attribute of any collection. Proof Suppose for reductio that (i) Mungo exists in virtue of his being a member of the collection of cats. It follows, by the asymmetry of 'in virtue of,' that (ii) the collection of cats does not exist (wholly or in part) in virtue of the existence of Mungo. But we have just seen that (iii) a collection exists in virtue of the existence of its members. Since Mungo is a member of the collection of cats, it follows that (iv) the collection of cats does exist (wholly or in part) in virtue of the existence of Mungo. But (iv) contradicts (ii); hence, (i) is false. Since 'Mungo' stands in for any individual, and 'collection of cats' stands in for any collection, we may conclude that Lemma 1 holds in full generality.

It follows from Lemma 1 that existence cannot be a mondial attribute if a world or the world is a collection. It seems hopelessly circular to say that the members of a collection exist in virtue of being in the collection, when the collection itself exists in virtue of the existence of its members. There are


actually two levels of circularity here. First, if a collection is logically posterior to its members, which seems obvious, then its existence is parasitic upon their existence, in which case their existence cannot be properties of it. But even if the existence of a collection were not parasitic upon the existence of its members, an individual must exist as logical precondition of its being in any existent collection - in which case its existence cannot consist in its being in a collection. If an individual doesn't exist, how can it be in an existent collection?

It seems as obvious as anything that a theory of existence must avoid circularity. I think this is a point Sommers would, or at least should grant, on the basis of his own critique of Frege and Russell. He finds that their theories, according to which existence is either a property of concepts (Frege) or of propositional functions (Russell), "offend against the robust sense of reality" that Russell sought to inculcate. "The existence of galaxies beyond the Milky Way must in some sense be a property of the external world; to speak of it in the Frege/Russell manner fails to do justice to the existence of such galaxies as a feature of the universe.'m What the Frege-Russell theory fails to provide is a concrete truth-maker for sentences like 'There are galaxies beyond the Milky Way.' "But ifthe existence of galaxies beyond the Milky Way is construed in the modem manner, we have the near circularity that 'there are galaxies beyond the Milky Way' is made true by the fact that the function 'x is a galaxy beyond the Milky Way' is satisfied .. ."34 Pace Sommers, the Frego-Russellian view is not just nearly circular, it is blatantly circular. For if the function is satisfied, it is satisfied by an existing object; but then what has been accomplished? If the object must exist in order to satisfy the function, then one cannot, on pain of vicious circularity, tum around and say or imply that the existence of the object consists in its satisfaction of the function.

Note that the problem with the Fregean theory is not that it is false. For assuming that concepts (which are functions for Frege) are mind-independent Platonic entities, then it is surely necessarily true that Fs exist if and only if the function expressed by 'x is an F' is satisfied. The problem with the Fregean theory is that it is (viciously) circular, where circularity is not a 'sin' against truth, but a 'sin' against explanatory adequacy . We are out to explain what it is for an individual to exist, not to lay down a condition that all and only existents satisfy. The relevant notion of philosophical (non-causal) explanation is hard to formulate, but it is intuitively understood by anyone who, like Sommers, invokes truth-makers to explain why truths are true.

But what Sommers seems not to appreciate is that something like this circularity objection can be brought against his own theory. For if the world is a collection, and a collection exists in virtue of the existence of its members, then one moves in circle of painfully short diameter if one says that the existence of the members is their being in the collection. But even if the existence of a collection were not dependent on the existence of its members, the members

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must still exist in order to be in the collection. For an existing collection could not actually have a member if that member is nonexistent. (If there is a collection of the fauna of Greek mythology, that collection is as nonexistent as its members.)

Part of the problem here is that Sommers seems to slide from 'universe of discourse' to 'universe,' from 'domain under consideration' and 'world' in the logical sense of 'domain of a claim' to 'external world' and 'real world.' It is one thing to say that (a) the existence of a galaxy is a property of a universe of discourse; quite another to say that (b) the existence of a galaxy is a property of the physical universe. The (a)-claim invites the circularity objection, but it is not so clear that the (b)-claim does. The (b)-claim, however, seems not consistent with Sommers' overall doctrine.

The physical universe is a spatio-temporal system of causally interacting concrete individuals, and is itself plausibly viewed as a concrete individual in its own right that came into existence some 15 billion years ago, is expanding at such-and-such a rate, etc. But a universe of discourse whose members are precisely the individuals in the physical universe is not a spatio-temporal system of causally interacting individuals, itself concrete, with a temporal duration of 15 billion years, a rate of expansion, etc. The universe is expanding, but it sounds like a category mistake to say that a universe of discourse is expanding. It is something fixed, and we fix it to include whatever we want for the logical purposes at hand. A universe of discourse is not a physical concrete individual in its own right with physical properties, but a mere collection of things relevant for the evaluation of claims that we make. Before claim-makers with their discourse existed, presumably there were no universes of discourse; but there was a physical universe.

Thus there is a clear difference between the (a)-claim and the (b)-claim. Which of these does Sommers intend? He clearly is making the (b)-claim in the second to last quoted passage where he says, contra Frege and Russell, that the existence of galaxies beyond the Milky Way is a property of the external world, a feature of the (physical) universe. But he is not entitled to make the (b)-claim given the rest of what he says. For the denial that existence is a property of individuals implies a denial that existence is a property of the physical universe, given that the physical universe is a physical individual in its own right. Existence is not a property of the physical universe, but of the domain consisting of the physical universe. In general, an individual cannot be its own domain, any more than an individual can be its own set. Quine is distinct from the set consisting of Quine: sets have members, individuals do not. Likewise, Quine is distinct from the domain consisting of Quine: existence is predicable of domains, but not of individuals. And what holds for Quine holds for the physical universe.

Furthermore, the existence of the physical universe is a fact, but it is not

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a fact whose subject-constituent could be the physical universe. For again, this would imply that existence is a first-level property. Hence the existence of the physical universe must on Sommers' theory be a property of a domain containing the physical universe. If this domain is the actual world, then we must conclude that the actual world is to be scrupulously distinguished from the physical universe. In any case, the actual world must be distinguished from the physical universe since the actual world contains all sorts of things that cannot be located in the physical universe such as propositions and all nonactual domains.35

The circularity objection, then, remains in force. But there is perhaps a way to defend Sommers' theory against the circularity objection which arises when a world or domain is taken to be a collection. The objection assumes that Sommers' theory is an identitarian rather than an eliminativist theory. An identitarian theory of existence inquires into what it is for an individual to exist, on the assumption that there is a sense in which individuals do in fact exist, a sense that needs and is susceptible of explication. Such a theory attempts to identify the existence of an individual with something else, something 'more respectable' or better understood, or less likely to give rise to such puzzles as Plato's Beard. (Compare the identity theory in the philosophy of mind: mental states, which are taken to exist all right, are identified with physical states which are presumably theoretically more tractable and less likely to engender puzzleS?6) An eliminativist theory of existence, on the other hand, makes the much more radical move of denying that there is 'any such thing' as the existence of individuals. (Compare the eliminativist in the philosophy of mind, for whom mental states have the status of witches and goblins.) An eliminati vist theory aims to replace the existence of individuals with something else. The theories of Frege and Russell are both clearly eliminativist. If existence is a property of concepts only, the property of having an instance, as on Frege's theory, then it is clear that existence cannot in any sense belong to individuals. It is simply senseless on Frege's theory to say of an individual that it is instantiated. And if existence is a property of propositional functions, the property of being 'sometimes true,' as on Russell's theory, then again it is senseless to say of an individual that it exists. This is why Russell compares existence with being numerous. Humans are numerous and humans exist. But for Russell it is as senseless to say of Socrates that he exists as to say of him that he is numerous. 'Numerous' and 'exist' can only be sensibly predicated of classes?7

So if Sommers' theory is an eliminativist theory, then perhaps he can escape the circularity objection?8 His theory cannot be accused of presupposing the existence of members of domains, thereby moving in a circle, if the point of the theory is to deny that there is 'any such thing' as the existence of individuals. So interpreted, Sommers' theory will say that the existence of

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Quine is replaceable by a property of the world, the property of containing Quine, but that Quine himself neither exists nor does not exist. Thus Quine need not in any way exist to be included in the world. Note that if 'exists' can only be meaningfully employed as a predicate of domains, then Quine cannot be said meaningfully to exist: Quine is not a domain. (A singleton domain consisting of Quine alone would still be distinct from Quine. If there were no distinction between Quine and the domain consisting of Quine, then the existence of Quine would be a property of Quine, the property of being {Quine }ish, and that would constitute a big bite out of Anselm's apple.)

The trouble with an eliminativist reading of Sommers' theory is that it removes the very datum from which the theory takes it point of departure. For Sommers, it is a datum that there is a crucial epistemological difference between perceiving a rabbit, say, and perceiving the existence of a rabbit, and thus a crucial ontological difference between a rabbit and the existence of a rabbit.39

Pre-analytically, the existence of a rabbit is obviously in some sense the existence of a rabbit: if this were not true, there would be nothing for the eliminativist to eliminate or for the identitarian to explicate. There would be nothing for a theory of existence to be about. Thus Sommers rightly takes it for granted that individuals exist, and so his problem becomes: "If existence is not an attribute of the things that exist, of what is it an attribute?,,4o This question, via the phrase 'things that exist,' clearly presupposes that individuals exist. His theory is therefore not eliminativist, but identitarian: presupposing that individuals exist, he is out to tell us what the existence of individuals consists in, given that it cannot consist in their instantiation of a property of existence. His answer is that the existence of Fs and the nonexistence of Gs are mondial attributes, "attributes that belong to the world in virtue of what is in it as opposed to what is not.,,41

The upshot, however, is that the circularity objection remains in force. To understand how the existence ofFido and the nonexistence of Cerberus could be properties of the world, we have to understand what it would be for the world to contain Fido but not contain Cerberus. And to understand that we have to understand what it would be for Fido to exist and Cerberus not to exist. Hence there is an ineliminable sense in which individuals exist/do not exist.

Thus both Sommers and the 'Fressellians' appear to be impaled on the horns of a dilemma which consists in having to choose between eliminativism and circularity. Given that existence cannot be a property of an individual, both Sommers and Frege/Russell assume that it must be a property of something else, a domain in the case of Sommers, a concept/propositional function in the case of Frege and Russell. But obviously this higher-level property cannot be the existence appropriate to individuals, which is what we wanted to understand in the first place. Thus neither having a member nor being instantiated are properties predicable of individuals. So we must either go the eliminativist route


and simply deny that existence belongs to individuals, thereby eliminating the very datum that we started out trying to understand, or we must go the identitarian route and fall into circularity.

Thus, in my judgment, Sommers makes no real advance beyond Frege and Russell. He clearly sees what is wrong with the 'Fressellian' theory, but his own theory falls victim to the same difficulties.

There is a modal twist that also merits exploration. Not only does a collection depend for its existence on the existence of its members, it also depends on them for its very identity: collections have their members essentially. So if the collection of presently existing cats contains mangy Mungo, then this very collection - call it C - could not have been the very collection it is, and thus could not have existed, had it not contained the distinguished feline in question. Thus C not only depends for its existence on the existence of some members or other, but on the existence of the very members it does in fact have. But surely Mungo might not have been mangy, which is to say, given the expressibility of predications as existentials, that mangy Mungo might not have existed. Now how are we to understand this on Sommers' theory? He tells us how we should understand specified existence and specified nonexistence, but what about specified possible nonexistence (e.g., the possible nonexistence of cats, of mangy Mungo, etc.) and specified possible existence (e.g., the possible existence of cats who philosophize)? It is clear that the possible nonexistence of mangy Mungo cannot consist in the possibility of C' s not containing him for the simple reason that C necessarily contains him. And of course the same goes for any collection containing him, no matter how big or small.

It is not clear that this modal point can be worked up into an objection to Sommers' theory as opposed to a request for clarification. For it is not clear that a sentence like 'Possibly, mangy Mungo does not exist' requires a truthmaker. Sommers might argue as follows. 'Mangy Mungo does not exist' is not true, but merely possibly true; not being true it needs no truth-maker. On the other hand, 'Possibly, mangy Mungo does not exist,' although true is necessarily true (by the characteristic S5 axiom of modal propositional logic according to which Possibly P -> Necessarily possibly p), and what is necessarily true likewise needs no truth-maker.

Nevertheless, the modal point that if x is a member of collection C, then necessarily x is a member of C does underscore the vicious circularity of the thesis that the existence of mangy Mungo consists in his membership in C. There would be vicious circularity even if, per impossibile, collectionmembership were not essential; but given that it is essential, the circularity is all the nastier.

My interim conclusion is that if worlds (domains) are collections, then the circularity objection that Sommers rightly directs against the Frege-Russell theory is chargeable against his own account, mutatis mutandis. But I should

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say a bit more about why circularity is a Bad Thing. This is because a theory of existence cannot be satisfied with mere

extensional correctness. It is true, indeed necessarily true, that for any x, x exists if and only if there is a collection having x as a member.42 This biconditional is extensionally correct in that it specifies a condition that all and only existing indi viduals satisfy. (There are any number of such extensionally correct biconditionals, e.g., 'x exists iff x is self-identical,' 'x exists iff x has properties,' etc.) But it delivers no insight into what it is for an individual to exist. Note that the biconditional is true in possible worlds in which no contingent individuals exist, in possible worlds in which contingent individuals exist as a matter of brute fact, and in possible worlds in which contingent individuals exist because of di vine creati ve agency. This neutrality among these radically different classes of possible worlds shows that the biconditional fails as a theory of existence.

Lemma 2. No individual is such that its existence could consist in any indi vidual domain's containing it if the domain is a dependent individual. Proof My visual field is a dependent individual in that its existence ontologically depends on my existence, and not vice versa. Suppose an elk appears in my visual field. Sommers writes: "I see what I take to be an elk and I experience the visual field as characterized by the presence of an elk.,,43 The existence of the elk is thus the {elk} ishness of my visual field. But there are three problems with this.

First, the elk might have existed -- and did exist a while ago -- without being in my visual field. Therefore, the existence of the elk cannot be identified with its being in my visual field. The existence of the elk cannot be a property of the visual field. This objection holds even if we think of visual fields as individuals in their own right, or even as collections. In general, if x is only accidentally in a domain D, then it is self-evident that the existence of x cannot consist in x's being in D, and this for the simple reason that an individual's existence is essential to it: there is no possible world in which a thing exists without existing. If the existence of a thing were accidental to it, then a thing could exist without existing, which is of course impossible.

But in the passage quoted, Sommers spoke, not of the 'existence,' but of the 'presence' of an elk. Now 'presence' is ambiguous. It could mean either presence-to, a phenomenological concept, or existence, an ontological concept, not to mention temporal presentness. It seems clear that the elk's presence to me or to anyone is accidental to it. But its existence is not accidental to it. So one gets the impression that Sommers may be equivocating on 'presence' as between its phenomenological and ontological senses. If one were to confuse existence with presence-to, one might think that the existence of an elk could consist in a visual field's being {elk} ish.

The second problem is that visual fields are dependent individuals. If the existence of the elk is its being in my visual field, and my visual field


depends for its existence on me, then the existence of the elk depends on me, which is absurd.

A third problem is that Sommers' theory does not solve a problem that it advertises itself as being able to solve. Sommers says that "One wants an account of facts that makes sense of their observability, allowing for the perception ofthe fact that there is a rabbit."44 To perceive the fact that there is a rabbit is to perceive the existence of a rabbit. But the existence of a rabbit is not a property of the rabbit, and even if it were, it would not be an observable property of the rabbit like its color. Thus on Sommers' theory the existence of the rabbit is construed as a property of something else, its environment. If the existence of the rabbit is to be perceivable, then this environment has to be of a size that I can perceptually or apperceptually 'take in.' So suppose the existence of arab bit is my backyard's being {rabbit}ish. (This cannot be right given what was said a couple of paragraphs back about the existence of a thing being essential to it, but let's not beat a dead rabbit.) The problem now is that, although I perceive the rabbit and apperceive my backyard, do I perceive (or apperceive) the rabbit's being in the backyard? I literally see the rabbit, and I literally see the backyard, but do I literally see that the rabbit is in the backyard, or that the backyard actually has a rabbit in it? There is no problem if our concern is with the phenomenological presence of the rabbit, its presence-to me, for that is consistent with there actually being no rabbit out there. There is no question that the rabbit is given as a feature of the backyard, and that the backyard is co-given as {rabbit}ish. But how make the move from the 'as' to the 'is'? If the backyard is {rabbit}ish, then it is {rabbit}ish whether or not anyone perceives it to be such. That's just what the meaning of 'is' is. Clinton take note. But the backyard's being {rabbit} ish, as opposed to merely appearing {rabbit}ish, is not something I perceive.

For consider: the content of my perception/apperception, namely the backyard's being {rabbit} ish, is what it is whether or not the backyard actually is {rabbit }ish. But then it is clear that I am not perceiving afact. For every fact obtains. There are no merely possible facts, i.e., no facts in the mode of mere possibility. It is not as if some facts obtain while others do not obtain. Facts are extralinguistic and extramental truth-makers; as such, they cannot themselves require truth-makers. They are nothing like Fregean propositions which can be either true or false. So if I perceive a fact at all, I perceive an existing fact, and my perceiving it assures me of its existence. But this is just to say that I cannot perceive the fact of the backyard's being {rabbit}ish. For what I perceive is what it is whether or not there actually is a rabbit in the backyard. What I perceive is not a fact since it is itself in need of a truth-maker.

I conclude that Sommers has not succeeded in showing how facts are perceivable. Construing facts as properties of domains does nothing to solve this problem. If the existence of a rabbit is my backyard's being {rabbit} ish, this

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simply trades one problem for another, the problem of how we know existence for the problem of how we know being, where 'being' signifies the connection expressed by the copula 'is.' The dialectic went like this: since existence cannot be a property of the rabbit, the rabbit's existence cannot be a fact in a world; so the rabbit's existence is a property of a world (domain), the backyard's being {rabbit}ish. But we cannot perceive the backyard's being {rabbit}ish, and making a further 'mondial ascent' won't help either. The backyard's being {rabbit} ish is presumably some wider domain's (e.g., the mountainside's) being {rabbit-in-the-backyard}ish. But then the same problem arises once again. If we ascend to the widest individual domain, the physical universe, we not only have the same problem all over again, but we also reach something too big to be perceived or apperceived.

Lemma 3. No individual is such that its existence could consist in any non-maximal individual domain's containing it even if the domain is an individual in its own right. Proof Suppose Pierre is in the cafe. Apart from the problem that it is not essential to him that he be in the cafe, there is further problem, namely, that his existence cannot consist in his being in the cafe unless the cafe itself exists. For if the cafe does not exist then he can't be in it. And if it does not exist, then it cannot have any properties, including the property of being {Pierre }ish. But if the cafe exists, then its existence presumably consists in its being a member of some wider domain. For if you say that the cafe just exists, then you may as well say that Pierre just exists. If Pierre's existence demands an explanation, then so does the cafe's. Now this wider domain cannot be a collection (by Lemma 1), nor can it be a dependent individual (by Lemma 2). So this wider domain must be an individual in its own right. Either the wider domain is non-maximal or it is maximal. If it is non-maximal, if e.g. the existence of the cafe is said to consist in its being in Paris, then the process repeats itself, until, passing through France, Europe, the earth, the solar system, ... we arrive at a maximal individual in its own right.

From the three lemmata just proven we may infer that existence could be a mondial attribute only if le monde, the world, is a maximal independent individual which exists from itself and not from another, and which thus necessarily exists. Only if the world is causa sui can we block the need to make a further, but impossible, 'mondial ascent.' But now we are drifting towards Spinozism, and I don't believe Sommers wants to go there. To be forced there would constitute a reductio ad absurdum of the theory.

Do Any Domains Exist? Some of the foregoing objections to Sommers' theory require the assumption that domains containing actual items exist. According to one (but not the other) of the circularity arguments, for example, the existence of a collection is parasitic on the existence of its members, in which case the existence of the members cannot consist in their being members of the collection. To assume that domains containing actual items exist seems


natural enough. How could I apperceive the cafe in which Pierre is conspicuous by his absence if it didn't exist? Or if the domain is the objects in the cafe, how could that domain not exist when the objects in it do? But Sommers denies that domains exist. Mythological and past domains, for starters, do not exist. 'There is a flying horse but no flying kangaroo' says that the domain of mythological objects contains a flying horse but not a flying kangaroo.45 The existence of dinosaurs is a property of a past world.46 This seems reasonable: if the members of a domain do not exist, then the domain won't exist either.

Sommers also says that "Any totality is existentially characterized by the presence of certain things and by the absence of certain things.,,47 Note the quantifier 'any.' This implies that the domain of mythological objects is existentially characterized by the presence in it of a flying horse and the absence from it of a flying kangaroo. We can only conclude that the words 'existence,' 'presence,' and 'absence' are not being used by Sommers in their usual ontological senses. He is using them quite obviously in an existentially-neutral way. For if a nonexistent unicorn is present in a nonexistent domain, then clearly 'presence' has nothing to with existence, and the existence of a unicorn explicated as a property of such a nonexistent domain has nothing to do with (pound the table) existence. Existence, like truth, is absolute. Existence in a mythological domain is, in plain English, nonexistence.

Given all this, it would seem eminently reasonable to think that for an actual item to exist it must be a member of an existing domain. For if the existence of Quine consists in his being a member of a domain, then surely that domain needs to exist if Quine is to exist. The actual world needs to exist if its members are to exist. This is self-evident. Otherwise, there would be nothing to distinguish the actual world from merely possible worlds, fictional worlds, impossible worlds, past and future worlds (if we take pastness and futurity to entail lack of actuality). To put it another way, if being a member of a domain is consistent with an individual's being a nonexistent object, then being a member of a domain does not suffice for a thing to exist (stamp the foot) in the robust ordinary sense we want to understand. We have to go another step and say that the domain in question is an existing domain, and that its existence gets transmitted down to its members.

But, mirabile dictu, Sommers denies that the actual world itself exists, and he has an excellent reason for the denial. Holding as he does that the existence of elks and the nonexistence of elves are properties or states of the world, he asks: "What of the world itself? Should we speak of it as existing?" He concludes that "We need not think of the world as existing.,,48 For if our present and actual world exists, then presumably its existence would be a property of a super-domain, a domain of (possible) worlds. But then all the worlds in this super-domain would exist. For each world in the super-domain is a member of the super-domain: for each world W, the super-domain is

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{W} ish. Since each world is a member of the super-domain, being a member of the super-domain confers no ontological privilege on any world. Thus Sommer's theory implies that if one world exists, then all worlds exist. To allow even one world to exist would thus be to embrace a 'mondial egalitarianism' (my moniker) reminiscent of David Lewis' extreme modal realism, according to which all possible worlds are on an ontological par. Sommers shrinks back from this "drastic step,,,49 and rightly so. He therefore denies that the actual or real world, 'our world,' exists. "What exists is present in (exists in) the world, but while the world is real, it does not exist, nor do its properties."so The actual world is real, but it doesn't exist.

But what could this mean? 'Exists,' 'actual,' and 'real' are typically used interchangeably. So if the actual world is real but not existent, how does reality differ from existence? Sommers contrasts the "real or actual world" with "fictional, mock or nonactual domains." The latter are "expressive systems that exist as intensional human products within the world, in much the way propositions do."sl So the distinction between the real and the unreal is the distinction between that which is not and that which is an intensional human product. Thus Sommers' view seems to be that the real world does not exist, because it is not a member of some wider domain; but it is nonetheless real, because it is not an intensional human product.

This leaves us with two modes of being on our hands, existence and reality, together with the suspicion that reality is or ought to be the genuine topic here, rather than existence construed as Sommers construes it. Thus a terminological 'switcheroo' has taken place. We started off wanting to know what existence is, the genuine article, the existence of all this concrete stuff around us, which is there whether we like it or not. But we are given a theory that implies that to exist is just to be a member of a domain, a theory that has the consequence that no domain itself exists. Since this is obviously unsatisfactory, amounting as it does to an existentially-neutral theory of existence, we are then told that, although the actual world does not exist, it is real. But then reality is what we wanted to understand all along, though we began by calling it 'existence' !

To see this, consider an ordinary individual like Quine. Quine, unlike the world, is both existent and real: existent, because he is in the world and real, because he is not an intensional human product. Moreover, an entity's reality would appear to be more fundamental than its existence. A non-intensional entity cannot exist (be in the world) unless it is real, but a non-intensional entity can be real without existing: the world is real but does not exist. Thus reality is the true topic. What then is reality in positive terms? Is it a property of Quine? Obviously not, and for the same reasons that existence is not a property of him. Nor could it be a property of properties, and for the same reasons that existence is not a property of properties. Is reality a mondial attribute? No again, for then


the world could not be real, for the same reason that the world cannot exist. We are now at a complete dead-end. The mondial attribute theory of

existence has as a consequence that no world or domain can exist. But if no domain exists, then nothing in any domain exists in the ordinary pre-analytic sense of 'exists' which is what we set out to explicate and whose 'pre-thematic' understanding is a pre-condition of the whole investigation. The reduction of existence to mere domain-membership, which amounts to an existentially neutral theory of existence, leaves us with reality about which we know nothing except what it is not: not a first-level property, not a second-level property, not a mondial property.

Let us conclude our critical discussion with a balance sheet. Sommers is right on the following points. (i) Existence cannot be a first-level property; an individual cannot exist in virtue of instantiating existence. (ii) Existence is not a second-level property: it is not a property of properties, concepts, propositional functions, descriptions, or any sort of logical, linguistic or conceptual item. There is a clear sense in which the existence of galaxies beyond the Milky Way is a 'feature of the world,' and not a feature of the logical or conceptual or linguistic apparatus by means of which we gain epistemic and doxastic access to the world. (iii) The existence of an individual is distinct from that individual, and thus to perceive the existence of an individual is distinct from perceiving an individual. (iv) Predications are expressible as existentials. (v) We need truthmakers. (vi) Truth-makers are facts or states of affairs. (vii) There is a problem concerning how a fact can be in the world.

Although Sommers is right on each of the foregoing points, he is wrong about the following. (i) All facts are purely existential. Sommers needs to establish this in order to establish that facts are properties of the world. But although we saw that predicative sentences are expressible as existentials, it is a fallacy to infer that existentials involve no copulative element, and thus a fallacy to think that the truth-makers of existentials involve no copulative element. (ii) The existence of an individual is a fact. Although the existence of Quine is distinct from Quine, it does not follow that the existence of Quine is fact. For there is an alternative, namely, that Quine is a fact, and the existence of Quine is the unity of his ontological constituents. More on this below. (iii) Existence is a mondial attribute. Although the existence of an electron, a planet, a galaxy are 'features of the world' in a sense in which they would not be features of the world if the 'Fressellian' doctrine were true, they are not mondial attributes in Sommers' sense.

3. DIAGNOSIS OF HOW SOMMERS GOES WRONG

Part of the problem with Sommers' theory is that he asks the wrong, indeed an incoherent, question. "If existence is not a property of a thing that exists, what

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is it a property of?,,52 This question is incoherent because it presupposes that there is a sense of 'property' according to which existence is a property of a thing that exists. For the phrase 'a thing that exists' implies that things do exist. But if things exist, then, given that a thing is not simply identical to its existence, there is a broad sense of 'property' on which existence is a property, namely, in the sense that existence belongs to things (individuals) in a way in which it would not belong to them if the Frege-Russell theory were true. As will be argued in Chapter 6, existence can belong to an individual without being a property of it in the narrow sense, i.e., without being instantiated by the individual. In any case, Sommers' own question implies that there is this broad sense of 'property' according to which existence belongs to individuals. Thus Sommers' own question implies that (i) existence belongs to things that exist, but also that (ii) existence does not belong to things that exist. Therein lies the incoherence of the question.

I would be an uncharitable quibbler if there were a way to reformulate Sommers' question so as to eliminate the incoherence. But this cannot be done: the problem is not a sloppy formulation, but the question itself. Suppose we ask: 'Given that individuals do not in any sense exist, what is their existence a property of?' Clearly, this only exacerbates the incoherence. Better would be to ask: 'If existence is not a property in the narrow sense of the things that have existence, what is existence a property of?' But this question has an obvious answer: existence is a property of individuals, but it is a property in the broad sense.

Since Sommers' own question implies that there is a broad sense of 'property' according to which existence belongs to individuals, what his theory ought to do is to work out the details of how existence can belong to an individual in the broad sense of 'property' without being a property of it in the narrow sense of 'property.' I submit that this is the right question that one should ask once one has seen that (i) existence is not a first-level property (in the narrow sense), i.e., a property that is instantiated by individuals; that (ii) existence is not a second-level property; and that (iii) the existence of x is really distinct from x. The right question, then, is: How can existence belong to an individual without being a property that the individual instantiates?

But instead of asking this question, Sommers asks a question that literally makes no sense, and in so doing falls into the same trap into which Frege and Russell fell. Seeing that the existence had by individuals cannot be a property (narrow sense) of individuals, he jumps to the conclusion that it must be a property of something else.53 As he puts it in one place, " ... though we are properly prohibited from attributing existence and nonexistence to the things that are said to exist or not exist, this does not mean that we may not attribute their existence or nonexistence to something else.54 But obviously, if existence is a property of something else, then it cannot be their existence, the existence


pertaining to individuals. To 'kick existence upstairs' is to alter it beyond recognition. Thus if existence is made out to be a property of concepts, then it is the property of being instantiated, which cannot be a property of individuals: no individual is a property, so no individual can be instantiated. And if existence is construed as a property of domains, then it is the property of having a member, which likewise cannot be a property of individuals: if Socrates could have a member, then he would be a domain, which he obviously is not. (If Socrates were his own domain, and existence is a property of domains, then existence would be a first-level property after all.) Both the Frege-Russell theory and the mondial attribute theory must end up either eliminating the existence of individuals, or else presupposing it. But an eliminativist theory is no theory at all: it denies the very datum that the theory is supposed to explicate. After all, it is a datum that individuals exist, whatever philosophical puzzles this may conjure up. I take it to be a non-negotiable methodological principle that one cannot solve philosophical problems by simply denying the data that give rise to them. The various Gordian knots need to be untied, not cut. On the other hand, a theory that presupposes individual existence moves in a circle and thus fails to explicate what it is for an individual to exist. To avoid the eliminativismlcircularity dilemma we must jettison the idea that the existence of an individual can be explicated as a property of something else.

The right question, then, is not: What is existence a property of if it is not a property of existing individuals? The right question is this: How can existence, which obviously belongs to individuals, belong to them without being a property of them in the narrow sense of 'property'? This is the question that we shall try to answer in the following chapter.

4. HARTMANN ON ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE

Something along the lines of a mondial attribute theory of existence is suggested by Nicolai Hartmann in his untranslated (and therefore?) unjustifiably neglected Zur Grundlegung der_ Ontologie (1934).55 To round out this chapter, we briefly consider Hartmann's theory.

Hartmann maintains that the relation between essence (Sosein) and existence (Dasein) is a relative one, rather like the relation between form and matter. One cannot distinguish absolutely in a thing between form and matter, materia prima aside, since the matter of an object can have its own form, and the form of an object can enter into the matter of a higher-order object. Similarly, one cannot according to Hartmann distinguish absolutely in a thing between essence and existence. This is because the existence of one thing can be an essence of another, and vice versa. For example, the existence (the Dasein, being-there) of a tree in a forest is an essence (a Sosein, a being-so) of the forest. 56 If this sounds strange, think of it in these terms: the existence of the

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tree is a feature or property of the forest, a feature without which the forest would be qualitatively different, though presumably numerically the same. Similarly, the existence of a branch of the tree is an essence (feature, property) of the tree; the existence of a leaf is an essence of the branch, and so on. An essence (Sosein) in this usage is simply a 'what-determination,' a quiddity in the widest sense, and not an essential property in the narrow sense in which it is opposed to an accidental property. Presumably, the existence of a particular branch is not an essential property in the narrow sense of the tree of which it is the branch: the tree would have existed had that branch been lopped off. Furthermore, an essence is obviously not a complete essence. To say that the branch is an essence of the tree to which it is attached is not to say that the branch is the whole essence of the tree. Hartmann's theory, then, is not implausible, and one can easily see its similarity to Sommers' theory. Both Hartmann and Sommers are saying that the existence of an individual is a property of something that contains, encompasses, or includes it, whether this be a collection or an individual in its own right.

Proceeding in the other direction, the existence of the forest is an essence of the countryside; the existence of the countryside is an essence of the earth; the existence of the earth is an essence of the solar system; and so on until we arrive at the maximally inclusive whole, the universe.57 Hartmann points out that there is no need to run through the series; we can say immediately of anything, Socrates say, that its existence is an essence (feature, property) of the world.58 Hartmann's theory, then, appears to be a clear anticipation of Sommers', and may also be classed as a mondial attribute theory. Both are denying that the existence of x is a property of x, and both are maintaining that for x to exist is for something else, the world, to have a property, the property of containing x.

Now what about the world itself? What does its existence consist in? As Hartmann realizes, the Dasein of the world cannot be a Sosein of anything: there is nothing more inclusive of which it could be the Sosein. 59 (An infinite regress of worlds upon worlds would clearly be vicious.) So even if the existence of each thing in the world could be reduced to a property of something else, and ultimately, to a property of the world, the existence of the world itself cannot be similarly reduced. It cannot be said that the existence of the world is parasitic upon the existence of its members, for this would bring us back to the view that the world is a collection rather than an individual in its own right. That view we found good reason to reject. For one thing, it showed itself to be circular: to identify the existence of x with the world-collection's containing x is to presuppose the existence of x in a sense that cannot be analyzed in terms of world-membership. The world-collection cannot have the property of containing Socrates unless Socrates exists. It would be absurd to say that both (i) Socrates' existence consists in his membership in a collection, and (ii) the existence of that


very collection logically requires the existence of Socrates. But on Hartmann's scheme, or what I am taking to be such, this objection can be met. For on this scheme, the existence of Socrates and everything else in the world is shifted onto the world itself, which exists absolutely, i.e., in itself. That is, no thing in the world has its own existence; the world alone has its own existence, and that existence is the common existence of each thing in the world.

But then what does the existence of the world consist in? If the existence of the world does not logically require the existence of its members, then it is logically capable of independent existence, and counts as a substance. And if the existence of things in the world consists in their being features of the world, then they are logically incapable of independent existence, and therefore count as accidents of the world as substance. Each thing in the world is but a feature or property of the world. We appear close to the view that each thing is a mode of Spinoza's Deus sive Natura. Accordingly, for x to exist is for the Absolute Existent to be modified x-Iy. For Socrates to exist is for the Absolute Existent to be modified socratically. Not that it was Hartmann's intention to end up in Spinozistic precincts; but thought through, this appears to be what his theory issues in. It also appears to be what Sommers' and any mondial attribute theory issues in, if we think it through. And I think we can safely take this to be a reductio ad absurdum of the theory. Concrete individuals are not properties or features, but individuals which exist in their own right, i.e., exist as substances, even if they exist as dependent substances.

To appreciate this, return to the idea that Quine's existence is the world's being {Quine }ish. What sort of property is {Quine }ishness? It is either relational or monadic depending on whether we take the world to be a collection or an individual in its own right. If it is relational, it is the property of having Quine as a member which decomposes into the individual Quine and the relation, member of But then Quine is presupposed as existing, and his existence cannot be a mere feature of the world. If, on the other hand, {Quine} ishness is monadic, then presumably it is a conjunction of all of Quine's nonrelational properties (or else a monstrous disjunctive property each disjunct of which is a conjunction of all Quine's nonrelational properties in a given possible world in which he exists). On this monadic approach, Quine does not have properties; Quine is a complex property had by the world. I won't argue against this extreme monism; I will merely note that it conflicts with the strong intuition that individuals are property-bearers.

NOTES

1 See Meditation Five wherein Descartes argues that, since God possesses all perfections, and existence is a perfection, the nonexistence of God is as self-contradictory as a mountain without a valley.

154

2 "Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down." Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 65.

3 Frederic Sommers, "Naturalism and Realism," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. XIX ed. French et al. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 29 ff. Hereafter cited asNR.

4 Milton K. Munitz, Existence and Logic (New York: New York University Press, 1974), p. 166.

5 Bruce Aune, Metaphysics: The Elements (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p.35.

6 I will follow Sommers' terminological wont and use 'fact' and 'state of affairs' interchangeably. Since they are being employed to denote truth-makers (concrete extralinguistic entities that ontologically ground the truth of true contingent (asserted) sentences, judgments, and propositions), it is clear that they are not to be confused with Fregean propositions or with abstract ('Chisholmian' or 'Plantingian') states of affairs which might either obtain or not obtain. Obtaining abstract states of affairs are presumably themselves in need of concrete ontological grounds of their obtaining. It follows that every truth-making fact or state of affairs exists; a merely possible such fact is no fact at all. The possibility of there being a truth-making fact F is not a possibility involving F itself; it is a possibility involving certain fact-appropriate constituents, namely, the possibility that they be united to form a fact.

7 We assume in this chapter what we will argue in the next (Chapter 6, sec. 4), namely, that truthmakers must be facts or states of affairs, that no other category of entity, such as tropes, will do.

g NR p. 23 ff.

9 Sommers' theory is also motivated by his logical doctrine, which cannot be discussed in this book. See his "The World, the Facts, and Primary Logic," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 34, no. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 169-182. Cited hereafter as WFL.

10 Cf. NR, p. 28. In the papers I will be citing, Sommers does not argue in any depth for this view. Although it is clear from Chapter 2 that I agree with him that existence cannot be a property of individuals, I do not wish to endorse his arguments as they stand. In particular, I reject the argument known in the trade as 'Plato's Beard' for reasons I supply in Chapter 4.

II NR, p. 30.

12 Fred Sommers, "Existence and Correspondence-to-Fact," in Formal Ontology, eds. Roberto Poli and Peter Simons (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), pp. 131-132. Cited hereafter as EC. See our discussion of Plato's Beard in Chapter 4.

13 The attentive reader will notice that this sentence, though plausible, does not follow from the preceding one. I am merely reporting, not endorsing, 'Plato' Beard.' See note 10 above.

14 Sommers uses 'presence' and 'existence' interchangeably. It will emerge later that this usage invites confusion on account of the ambiguity of 'presence' as between presence-to-a-subject (a phenomenological concept) and existence (an ontological concept), not to mention presentness (a temporal concept).

15 NR,p.31.

16NR, p. 30


17 Fred Sommers, "Putnam's Born-Again Realism," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. XCIV, no. 9 (September 1997), p. 471. Cited hereafter as PBR.

18 Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. Rancurello et al. (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), p. 213: " .. .it can be shown with utmost clarity that every categorical proposition can be translated without any change of meaning into an existential proposition, and in that event the 'is' or 'is not' of the existential proposition takes the place of the copula." See our Chapter 3 discussion and critique of Brentano.

19 To be precise, I should have written 'feel furriness,' not 'feel its furriness.' The reason for this is in the next paragraph.

20 Cf. PanayotButchvarov, Skepticism about the External World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), chs 5 and 6. Butchvarov argues that existence is just such a transcendental concept. We criticize this view in Chapter 8.

21 Even if I sense a particularized furriness, a furriness trope, it is still a further question whether that particularized quality belongs to the cat.

22NR, p. 30.

23 This of course implies that Alexius Meinong was wrong to think that an item can actually and mind-independently have a property without existing. Thus for Meinong the golden mountain is golden, where 'is' conveys actual and mind-independent property-possession but without expressing existence, or indeed any mode of being. Meinong spoke in this connection of das Aussersein des reinen Gegenstandes, the extra-being of the pure object. It is thus an egregious error, no less egregious for being oft-made, to think that for Meinong such items as the golden mountain possess subsistence or some other mode of being.

24 The politically correct are invited to substitute 'gravitationally challenged' for 'fat.'

25 Proposition p metaphysically entails proposition q if and only if there is no metaphysically possible world in which p is true and q is false. I take it to be a law of metaphysics that, pace Meinong, nothing can have a property without existing.

26 Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1.1: "Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge."

27 I am now ignoring a very serious difficulty that I will pursue irifra. Given that Guido might not have been in the cafe, how can his existence (which is surely essential to him) be identified with a property of the cafe?

28 EC, p. 138.

29 WFL, p. 174.

30 EC, p. 157.

31 I borrow these charming phrases from David Armstrong.

32 If the bookcase is 'early undergraduate,' i.e., made of cinder blocks and boards without any glue or connectors, the stuff still has to be arranged in a certain way, and to be sure, in a gravitational field which provides the 'glue.' A cellulose molecule is not just a set of atoms; there are interatomic bondings, etc. all the way down.

33 NR, p. 28. Emphasis added.

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34 NR, p. 29.

35 Cf. EC, p. 157.

36 For example, if mental states are (identically) physical states, then there is no special problem about the causal interaction of the mental and the physical.

37 Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," in Robert C. Marsh, ed. Logic and Knowledge (G.P.Putnam's Sons: New York, 1956), p. 233.

38 In private correspondence, Sommers made some remarks that suggest that he is an eliminativist. He accused me of operating with an unanalyzed concept of existence, and of not taking seriously enough his claim that existence is always relative to a domain. I responded by pointing out that he himself invokes a pre-analytic understanding of 'exists' in his critique of Frege and Russell, and that if he is merely opposing his stipulation (,exists' is a predicate of domains only) to their stipulation ('exists' is a predicate of properties only), then there is no basis for a rational choice between the theories. Furthermore, if 'exists' is a predicate of domains only, then Sommers' theory on an eliminativist construal cannot even be formulated. 'Quine exists if and only if the world is {Quine }ish' presupposes that 'exists' is a predicate of individuals.

39 NR, p. 35 et passim.

40 PBR, p. 471.

41 Ibid.

42 Trivially, for each individual, there is its singleton, the set consisting of it and it alone.

43 NR, p. 30.

44 NR, p. 26.

45 NR, p. 29.

46 NR, p. 29.

47 NR, p. 29.

48 EC, p. 157.

49 Ibid.

50 PBR, p. 467.

51 EC, p. 157.

52 NR, p. 28. Cf. PBR, p. 471 where Sommers writes, "If existence is not an attribute of the things that exist, of what is it an attribute?" Further, EC, p. 137.

53 Cf. NR, 29.

54 WFL, p. 174. My italicization of 'their.'

55 Nicolai Hartmann, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965).

56 Ibid., p. 123.

57 Ibid., p. 128.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.


Chapter Six

The Ontology of the Contingent Existent

So far we have been treading the via negativa, and it seems to have led us to an impasse. An impressive array of arguments has been marshaled in support of the following aporetic tetrad:

a. Existence is not a property or property-instance of individuals. b. Existence is not identical to individuals. c. Existence is not a property of properties or cognate items. d. Existence is not a property of worlds or domains.

The limbs of this tetrad were defended in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively. If they are all true, then they must be mutually consistent. But it is not clear how they can be mutually consistent. Limbs (c) and (d) imply that existence belongs to individuals. But if the only way existence can belong to a is by being a property or property-instance of a, then we are at an impasse. To move forward we must reject this assumption and show how existence can belong to a concrete individual without being a property or property-instance of it.

Recall that properties, by definition, are exemplifiable or instantiable entities. The fundamental question therefore amounts to this: How can existence belong to individuals without being exemplified or instantiated by them? Or, if you prefer, the question is: How can existence be related to an existing individual, but not in the way properties like wisdom are related to individuals like Socrates? Or again, how can a thing have existence without instantiating existence and without being such that existence inheres in it in the manner of a property-instance?

The central task of this chapter is to answer this question; a logically coeval task is to answer the question as to what the existence of an individual is. Thus there are two tightly connected questions: First, how does existence belong to existents? Second, what is the nature of the existence that belongs to existents? The present approach involves two basic ideas. The first, which is by no means original, is that contingent concrete indi viduals are (concrete) states of affairs. As such, they have (i) ontological constituents (ii) arranged in a proposition-like way. The second basic idea, which may have some claim to originality, is that the existence of a concrete individual is the contingent unity of the individual's constituents, the unity in virtue of which they constitute a concrete state of affairs.

This chapter divides into two parts. The first explains the main ideas of the theory, while the second adds refinements, and answers some objections.

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160 CHAPTER SIX

1. A SOLUTION VIA A CONSTITUENT THEORY OF INDNIDUALS

We have been given no good reason to reject the naive view that existence belongs to concrete individuals and is attributable to them by the use of such sentences as 'I exist,' 'This exists,' 'Socrates exists.' Surely the existence of a cannot be a property of some other thing, whether this be a property or a concept or a description or a domain. We saw that such higher-order theories either issue in circularity or lead to the elimination of the very datum with which we started, namely, that individuals exist. On the other hand, existence cannot belong to individuals in the manner of a property or property-instance. And of course the existence of a cannot belong to a by being identified with a, as on the 'no difference' theory for the reasons given in Chapter 3. So how does existence belong to an individual?

An answer is forthcoming if we think of ordinary individuals as concrete states of affairs or facts. A fact is a contingent unity of constituents. The fact of a's being F is plausibly taken to have three constituents, a, F-ness, and the asymmetrical tie of instantiation (whether this is a relation or something 'nonrelational' we leave undecided for the moment). But since the constituents can exist without the fact existing, the fact is more than its constituents; it is their unity. This being so, a fact exists just in case its constituents are united. Thus it is natural to say that the contingent existence of a fact is just the contingent unity of its constituents. Note that we do not say that the contingent existence of a fact (in the simple monadic case) is just a particular's contingent instantiation of a property. This for two reasons. First, we cannot assume that the presence in a fact of a tertium quid, a tie of instantiation, will succeed in unifying the primary constituents, a and F-ness in our example. That is, we cannot assume that the unifier of a fact's constituents is a tie of instantiation (whether or not conceived as a relation). Second, there is the question of whether the unity of a fact's primary constituents can perhaps be established without any tertium quid at all, with the help only of a 'saturated' individual and an 'unsaturated' property. For these reasons, which will be treated in detail in the following chapter, we do not speak of the existence of a fact as a particular's instantiation of a property. We identify existence with fact-unity. But we do not ground either existence or fact-unity in the tie of instantiation.

Now if an ordinary! individual is a fact, it follows that the contingent existence of an ordinary individual is just the contingent unity of its constituents. In short, existence is unity. This is to be taken as a reductive identification of existence with a particular type of unity, fact-unity, and not as an elimination or replacement of existence. There is the existence of a, but what the existence of a consists in is the unity of a's constituents, the unity whereby these constituents form a fact. We thereby receive an informative answer to our question, What is it for an individual to exist? For an individual to exist is for

THE ONTOLOGY OF THE CONTINGENT EXISTENT 161

its ontological constituents to be unified. If we use 'unity' or 'unified' without qualification, we mean fact-unity, the specific unity of constituents that constitutes a fact. There are different sorts of unity, the unity of a set, of a mereological sum, of an organism, etc., but it is only fact-unity with which the existence of a concrete individual is being reductively identified. Fact-unity is the sort of unity an entity must have if it is to be capable of serving as a truthmaker of contingent sentences, beliefs, and the like.

If existence is fact-unity, what is nonexistence?2 Nonexistence is simply the absence of fact-unity. The nonexistence of Pegasus is just the fact-disunity of certain potential fact-appropriate constituents, among them the property of being winged and the property of being a horse. There are no nonexistent facts for the simple reason that a nonexistent fact would be a unity of constituents that is not a unity of constituents. Every fact exists, and every fact obtains. Concrete facts are not 'bivalent' in the manner of (Fregean) propositions. A proposition exists whether true or false, which implies that its existence is distinct from its being true. A concrete fact, however, exists only if it is 'true,' i.e., only if it obtains.

If this proposal is defensible, it provides an answer to the question as to how existence belongs to individuals. The answer is simply that existence belongs to a by being the unity or togetherness of a' s constituents. This allows us to avoid saying that existence is a property of a when a is taken in abstraction from its properties, and also to avoid saying that existence is a property of a's properties. We thereby sidestep both the naive property account and the instantiation account. But we hear an objection coming. 'Your proposal amounts to saying that existence is the property of unity. So existence is a property after all.' This objection is wide of the mark. Unity can in no way be construed as a property.

If unity were a property, unity would be instantiable. What could instantiate it? Not a fact, since the existence, and thus the unity, of a fact is an ontologically prior condition of its instantiating any property. (,Ontologically prior condition' was explained in Chapter 2, section 2.) To think of a fact's unity as deriving from a fact's instantiating of a putative property of unity is viciously circular. Not a number of potential fact-constituents (properties, thin particular, nexus ... ), since if each of these items instantiates the putative property of unity nothing is accomplished toward the uniting of these items with each other. So unity cannot be a property if properties are not constituents of the things that have them.

If, on the other hand, properties are ontological constituents of the indi viduals that have them, it is obvious that what unifies these properties, tying them together into a state of affairs, cannot be one of them. What unites properties P, Q, and R cannot be P or Q or R. Nor can it be any further property S of the thing; for any further property is just one more constituent that needs

162 CHAPTER SIX

tying to the others. If there is a tie that is a constituent, it cannot be a property. Indeed, in Chapter 7 it will become clear that the unifier of an individual's constituents cannot be any further constituent, whether property or non-property. Thus it cannot be an ordinary relation, or instantiation construed as a relation, or instantiation construed as a nonrelational tie.

The unity of an individual, then, is not one of its properties. Unity, like existence, is too basic to be a property. Constraint (a) in our opening tetrad is thereby satisfied. Item (b) in the tetrad says that the existence of an individual is distinct from it. So if existence is unity, then the unity of an individual must be distinct from it. And surely it is. The unity of an individual is the unity of its constituents, and is therefore distinct from each constituent and from their sum. The difference between a (taken in abstraction from its existence) and its existence is then the difference between a's constituents and the unity of a's constituents. Constraints (c) and (d), according to which existence belongs to individuals, are also satisfied. For the unity of an individual belongs to it if anything does. The unity of an individual clearly does not belong to any other thing. Recall that we must avoid the sort of absurdity into which identitarian Fressellians and mondial attribute theorists fall, namely, the nonsense that the existence of a is a property of something else, whether a concept, property, propositional function, domain, what have you.

To sum up, we solve the problem of how existence can belong to an individual without being a property of it by construing concrete individuals as concrete wholes of ontological 'parts.' We take these wholes to be facts, as opposed to say bundles, for reasons to be given in a moment. The existence of a concrete contingent individual then becomes the contingent unity of its ontological constituents, the specific unity whereby these constituents form a fact. The constituents in question are not spatial or temporal parts - assuming one countenances temporal parts - but ontological 'parts.' The scare quotes signify that ontological constituents are not parts in the strict sense of mereology, a point to be discussed later. The qualifier 'concrete' in 'concrete fact' is meant to make it clear that facts or states of affairs as invoked here have nothing to do with what Roderick Chisholm and others have called 'states of affairs.' For Chisholm, states of affairs are "abstract entities which exist necessarily" and "are in no way dependent for their being on the being of concrete, individual things.,,3 Our facts are truth-makers. It is clear that Chisholmian states of affairs cannot play the role of truth-makers; indeed it would seem that they are themselves in need of something like truth-makers to distinguish those that obtain from those that do not.


2. FACTS VERSUS BUNDLES

That concrete individuals have ontological constituents is a thesis to be defended later in this chapter. But assuming for the moment that individuals have constituents, why 'assay' individuals as facts rather than as bundles? On either approach we would be in a position to say that the existence of a concrete contingent individual is (reductively identifiable with) the contingent unity of its ontological constituents. The type of unity would be different in the two cases, fact-unity versus bundle-unity. But this is a minor detail, since on either approach we would be able to circumvent the four-pronged aporetic impasse codified in (a)-(d) above. So why opt for facts over bundles?

The main reason is that (i) we need concrete facts in any case to serve as truth-makers, and (ii) it cannot be the case that a concrete fact is wholly distinct from a concrete individual involved in it. Discussion of (i) can be postponed until the next two sections. For now the task is to defend (ii).

Consider the fact of a's being N, where 'N' (short for 'nature') represents the conjunction of all of a's nonrelational properties. (When referring to a concrete fact I always write 'fact of and never 'fact that' as prophylaxis against the confusion of concrete facts with abstract facts or with true (Fregean) propositions.) The issue is whether, in addition to the fact of a's being N, there is a, or whether a is identical to the fact of a's being N. Can the category of ordinary particulars be reduced to the category of concrete facts, given that there are concrete facts? There is no harm in using 'individual' and 'particular' interchangeably.

If concrete particular a is distinct from the concrete fact of a's being N, something must distinguish them. What could that be? The fact is ainstantiating-N-ness. But a also instantiates N-ness; if it did not, it would not be a concrete particular, but a 'bare particular.' Surely there are no bare particulars, if by that we mean ordinary causally efficacious particulars lacking all properties. Socrates is not a bare particular, but a particular-instantiatingproperties. Hence there is no difference between a particular 'clothed' in its properties and a concrete fact. Of course, there is a difference between concrete a and the abstract Chisholmian fact that a is F, since the latter does not have concrete a as a constituent. But Chisholmian facts are not at issue; concrete facts are. At issue are not facts about a, not to mention true propositions about a; at issue are facts that involve a 'bodily' so to speak. Concrete, propertied particulars are therefore identifiable with concrete facts.

3. THE NEED FOR TRUTH-MAKERS

If concrete individuals are to be reductively identified with facts, there must be facts. It would be nice if we had an independent argument for facts, one that does not depend on considerations as to how existence can belong to an

164 CHAPTER SIX

individual without being a property of it. Fortunately, there is such an argument. The truth-maker argument for facts (states of affairs) consists of two main steps. First, a move from contingent truths to truth-makers; second, an identification of truth-makers with concrete facts. We take the first step in this section, the second in the section to follow.

Truth has the visage of Janus: it faces the mind, but it also faces the world. It is most naturally thought of as a correspondence or 'adequation' of the mind to things: adequatio intellectus ad rem. In a world without mind, there would be no truth: one of the terms of the correspondence would be missing. To this extent, truth is an epistemic notion. But it is not merely an epistemic notion; there is room, and need, for an ontology of truth. And this remains the case even if one denies that truth is in any sense an epistemic notion by holding, for example, that truth is a property of (Fregean) propositions the existence of which is wholly mind-independent. There is need for an ontology of truth because assertively uttered indicative sentences, propositions,judgments, beliefs and the like are true in virtue of the way the world is: they require truth-makers or truthgrounds. An assertive utterance of 'I am writing' is true because I am writing, where 'because' picks out the asymmetrical relation of truth-making, which is not to be confused with causing. This strikes me as a non-negotiable point far worthier of credence than the objections that can be brought against truthmaking and truth-makers. "For it is not because we truly hold you to be white that you are white; but it is because you are white that we who hold this hold the truth.,,4 Let us see if we can make this a bit more precise.

It is usually assumed that truth-makers must be existents; but some hold that there are truths made true by nonexisting objects and states of affairs. Accordingly, 'Cerberus is Cerberus,' and 'Pegasus is swift,' are made true by nonexisting truth-makers, e.g., Cerberus and Pegasus' being swift.5 But we deny that there are truths about nonexistent objects.6 Where there are no truths, there is no need for truth-makers. Hence we make the usual assumption: truth-makers are existents. It is important to note, however, that the truth-maker principle is distinct from the thesis that each truth is about an existing objects, that there are no truths about nonexistent objects. 'Clinton lies' is about an existing object, Clinton, but it is not made true by Clinton construed as ontologically simple -otherwise 'Clinton does not lie' would also be made true by Clinton similarly construed. The truth-maker of 'Clinton lies' must be a structured entity, a concrete state of affairs on our view. One could easily hold that every affirmative atomic truth is about something that exists without holding that every affirmative atomic truth has a truth-maker.

The principle that truth-bearers require truth-makers does not commit us to saying that every truth-bearer requires a truth-maker, since it is not clear that necessary propositions (e.g., '7 + 5 =12,' 'Red is a color,' etc.) require truthmakers. (On the other hand, it is not clear that they don't -- we leave the matter undecided here.) Nor must we hold that every contingent truth-bearer requires


its own truth-maker. Different truth-bearers may share a common truth-maker. Perhaps the truth-maker of the general proposition expressed by 'Something is spheroid' is no different from the truth-maker of the singular proposition expressed by 'The earth is spheroid.' We leave this undecided as well. Note also that the same truth-bearer may be made true by different truth-makers. 'Either Bill or Hillary is lying' is made true both by the fact that Bill is lying and the fact that Hillary is lying. In sum, the truth-bearerltruth-maker relation is not one-to-one, but many-to-many.

The need for truth-makers may be summed up in preliminary fashion in the following truth-maker principle where 't' ranges over truth-bearers:

(TMP) For some t, if t is true, then there exists an entity e such that (i) e is distinct from t, and (ii) e's existence entails that t is true.

4. TRUTH-MAKERS AS CONCRETE FACTS

We have completed the first step in our argument, the move from (contingent) truths to truth-makers. (Further support for this step will emerge in the following section wherein we respond to an objection to truth-makers.) But what sort of entity is a truth-maker? And what sort of relation is truth-making? (TMP) allows that e be a true proposition. But it seems clear that propositions, even if true, cannot be (ultimate) truth-makers, since it is precisely (true contingent) propositions that are in need of truth-makers. The whole idea is to secure an ontological ground of truth, a ground outside the logico-linguistic sphere. Of course, if propositions p, q are such that p entails q, then there is a sense in which p, if true, makes q true. For if p entails q then it is impossible for p to be true and q false. Thus one may be tempted to identify truth-makers with true propositions, and truth-making with entailment. This is a temptation to be resisted.

One argument against this view invokes the Disjunction Thesis. Let '1=' abbreviate 'makes true.' The thesis says that for any truth-maker S, S 1= p v q iff S 1= p v S 1= q. Thus if John's sitting makes true 'John is sitting or John is standing,' then either John's sitting makes true 'John is sitting' or it makes true 'John is standing.' The Disjunction Thesis seems obvious. But the thesis fails if truth-makers are identified with true propositions and truth-making is entailment. For p v q entails p v q, but p v q does not entail p nor does it entail q.7 This shows that some propositions cannot be truth-makers, and thus that truth-makers cannot be identified with true propositions.

Still, if not all true propositions are truth-makers, might it not be the case that all truth-makers are true propositions, and that every case of truth-making is a case of entailment? All are agreed that truth-making is not a causal relation, even though there is a sense in which an agent who brings about a state of affairs 'makes true' the corresponding proposition. Thus by painting the gate red, there

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is a sense in which I make true the proposition expressed by 'The gate is red.' But what is really going on here is that I cause a concrete state of affairs to exist, and then it noncausally makes true the corresponding proposition. So truthmaking is not a causal relation.

Truth-making is therefore best thought of as a kind of entailment, or as analogous to entailment. But it cannot be entailment defined as a relation between propositions. For the whole point of truth-makers is to provide worldly, extra-propositional grounds for propositional truths. If we agree that truthmakers are extra-propositional, then in cases where a true proposition entails another, we will resist referring to the entailing proposition as a truth-maker.

But not just any entity in the realm of primary reference can be a truthmaker. A truth-maker, if it is to be capable of entailing a proposition, and thus making it true, must be a proposition-like entity: it must not only be structured, but structured in a proposition-like way. An ontological 'blob' cannot be a truth-maker since it lacks structure. But not just any structured entity can be a truth-maker. For the ordered pair <Socrates, wisdom> and the corresponding mereological sum are (arguably) in the realm of primary reference, and they have a sort of structure, but they lack the requisite internal unity to be truthmakers. So it seems we must posit something like concrete states of affairs which have the sort of unity that ordered n-tuples and mereological sums lack.

But perhaps we are moving too quickly. Mulligan, Simons, and Smith have suggested that moments can serve as truth-makers. They are using this term Teutonically: it has no temporal connotation. An example of a moment is the particular redness of pen A, which is numerically distinct from the particular redness of a qualitatively indistinguishable pen B. Moments are existentially dependent objects which cannot exist alone, but require the existence of objects outside themselves. Thus the particular redness of pen A cannot exist on its own, but only in A. What we called a property-instance in Chapter 2 is therefore an example of a moment. A moment is not a trope given that tropes are capable of independent existence. But moments and tropes are alike in two respects: both are particularized properties, and as such unrepeatable, and both are ontologically simple entities. Thus in the moment, a's F-ness, there is no ontological composition, which distinguishes the moment, a's F-ness from the fact, a's being F. A fact is a complex, a moment is not. One must guard against confusion here. 'Socrates' whiteness' could be taken to denote a moment (which is ontologically simple), or a fact (which is not). As prophylaxis against confusing moments and facts, we will use' a's being F' to denote a fact, and 'a's F-ness' to denote a moment.

Let us now consider whether the contingent truth 'Socrates is white' could have a moment as a truth-maker. The moment in candidacy is Socrates' whiteness. Now in the phrase, 'Socrates' whiteness,' how is 'Socrates' functioning? Is it functioning merely to pick out a particular whiteness, one that merely happens to be attached to Socrates? In that case, Socrates' whiteness


would be transferable, to Plato say. Although moments cannot exist on their own, there would be nothing in the specific nature of a moment to require that it be attached to any particular individual as opposed to some other one. This appears to comport well with the idea that moments are ontologically simple entities. Or is Socrates somehow part of the content of Socrates' whiteness such that this moment cannot exist except in Socrates and so is not transferable? That would seem to suggest that moments harbor internal complexity: a whitenessmoment would have not only a quality but also a factor that ties it necessarily to a particular concrete individual. Either way, it can be shown that moments cannot serve as truth-makers.

If moment M is the truth-maker for truth T, then the existence of M entails that T is true in this sense: there is no possible world in which both M and T exist and T is not true. Now if Socrates' whiteness is a transferable moment, then there is a possible world W in which Socrates' whiteness exists, the proposition *Socrates is white* exists, but *Socrates is white* is false. For it may be that Socrates' whiteness exists in Plato in W. In other words, the particular whiteness picked out in the actual world by a use of 'Socrates' whiteness' adorns Plato rather than Socrates in W.

We now consider the upshot if moments are nontransferable, and we ignore the problem of how a simple quality-instance can involve a necessary tie to a particular concrete individual. Truth-makers cannot do their job unless they exist. So if Socrates' whiteness is the truth-maker of *Socrates is white*, then Socrates' whiteness exists. But if moments are not only existentially dependent, but also nontransferable, then Socrates' whiteness exists only in Socrates. Hence the real truth-maker is not Socrates' whiteness, but the existence of Socrates' whiteness in Socrates. The real truth-maker, in other words, is the concrete fact of Socrates' being white, which is a concrete particular supporting a moment, rather than a moment.

This may be see from another angle. *Socrates is white* is contingently true. (If you doubt this, substitute 'dressed in white' for 'white.') This contingency must somehow be reflected in the truth-maker. But this is impossible if the truth-maker is the moment, Socrates' whiteness. For moments are onto logically simple: it is not a complex consisting of Socrates and whiteness, a complex that can 'come unglued.' To accommodate the contingency, we must say that Socrates might not have had the moment, Socrates' whiteness. But then it is clear that the real truth-maker is the concrete fact of Socrates' being white, which is a particular supporting a moment, rather than a moment. The view under examination thus collapses into the view that truth-makers are concrete facts composed of particulars and property-instances.

So whether we think of moments as transferable or nontransferable, they cannot serve as truth-makers. Truth-makers must be concrete facts or states of affairs.

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5. THE OSTRICH REALIST'S REJECTION OF TRUTH-MAKING REJECTED

We have been arguing that (i) the truth-maker principle is sound; (ii) only facts can be truth-makers; therefore, (iii) facts exist. But this argument can be run in reverse: Since there are no facts, and since only facts can be truth-makers, the truth-maker principle is unsound. This is essentially the line taken by Julian Dodd.8 Our 'fact' is short for 'concrete fact.' But Dodd uses 'fact' as interchangeable with 'true proposition.' To avoid confusion, we will employ 'state of affairs' for the duration ofthis section. A state of affairs is a concrete fact.

As I read him, Dodd's critique of the very idea of truth-making consists of two main claims. The first is that, even if there are both particulars and universals, and even if particulars instantiate universals, we are not forced to countenance states of affairs. Thus if a exists and F-ness exists, and a instantiates F-ness, it does not follow that there is in addition the state of affairs, a's being F. A similar sentiment is expressed by David Lewis: "If I were committed to universals myself, I would be an Ostrich Realist: I would think it was just true, without benefit of truth-makers, that a particular instantiates a universal.,,9 Dodd's second claim is that states of affairs are such seriously problematic entities that no theory that invokes them has any right to our attention.

As for the first claim, Dodd will presumably admit that there is a difference between the sum a + F-ness and a's instantiating F-ness. This is something to which all must agree. If a exists and F-ness exists, it does not follow that a instantiates F-ness. So there is a difference between a + F-ness and a's instantiating F-ness. But this is just a brute difference, Dodd seems to be saying, not a difference that needs to be explained by positing a third sort of entity, a state of affairs, in addition to a and F-ness. Even if the truth that a is F ontologically commits us to a and to F-ness, it does not commit us to anything in the world that connects a and F-ness. The 'is' in 'a is F' has no ontological correlate. Thus we are not committed to an instantiation relation or to a nonrelational tie of instantiation. And not being committed to any such connector, we are not committed to the state of affairs a's being F assuming that this is the product of instantiation's connecting of a and F-ness. To this one might respond that it is not instantiation that ties a to F-ness, but the state of affairs itself, and that we can dispense with instantiation (and perhaps must dispense with it in the face of Bradley's regress). But this will not satisfy Dodd either, since he refuses to admit that we need anything in the world to connect a and F-ness. In the world there is at most a and F-ness, but there is nothing in the world that corresponds to the truth that a is F. Truth does not require an ontological ground. Not only is there nothing corresponding to the copula 'is,' there is nothing corresponding to the whole sentence, 'a is F.'


But if nothing in the world connects a and F-ness when a instantiates Fness, then what is the difference between a's instantiating F-ness and a's not instantiating F-ness? What does the difference consist in? Presumably, Dodd must say that there is a difference, but that it does not consist in anything. This however simply begs the question against the truth-maker principle. For truthmakers are introduced precisely to satisfy the felt need for an explanation of the difference in question. Dodd hasn't succeeded in refuting the truth-maker principle; all he has done so far is to reject it.

Pointing this out, we of course do not succeed in refuting the Ostrich Realist; we merely highlight the deep conflict of intuitions at the root of the disagreement. The realist about truth cannot shake the sense that truth requires an ontological ground, a sense simply unshared by an Ostrich such as Dodd. With respect to Dodd's first claim, then, the upshot appears to be a standoff.

We now examine Dodd's second claim which is essentially that the positing of states of affairs cannot serve as an adequate explanation of how particulars instantiate universals. Whereas Dodd's first claim is that we have been given no compelling reason to posit states of affairs, his second claim is that nothing is explained even if we do posit them. This is a much more serious objection. If sound, it would appear to refute the truth-maker project.

Given that a instantiates F-ness, Dodd will say that this instantiation is just a brute datum. The truth-maker theorist, however, cannot rest content with this. He feels that there must be something in the world that explains this instantiation of a universal by a particular. So he posits a state of affairs in which a and F-ness are brought together. He posits a state of affairs which just is a's instantiating of F-ness. For Dodd, however, this is a bogus explanation.

Dodd's argument is not entirely clear, but it perhaps amounts to something like the following dilemma. Either (L 1) states of affairs are composed of constituents that are ontologically more basic than states of affairs, or (L2) states of affairs are ontologically primary, and their constituents are mere abstractions from them. (Ll) faces Bradley's regress and the unity problem, something we will discuss in great detail in the following chapter. Given that a and F-ness are contingently connected, what connects them? The instantiation relation? But how can adding a further constituent establish unity of constituents? Dodd's point is that if states of affairs face the unity problem - the problem of explaining how they differ from a mere set or sum of constituents -then invoking states of affairs can do nothing to explain how a particular instantiates a universal. It is essentially the same problem all over again. If it is unclear how a particular instantiates a universal, then this cannot be clarified by positing an entity, a state of affairs, concerning the constituents of which it is unclear how they form a unity. In other words, if you say that the difference between a + F-ness and a's instantiating F-ness is the difference between two items and the same two items connected within a state of affairs, this explanation succeeds only if it is clear how the two items - a and F-ness - are connected

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within the state of affairs. Since the latter is not clear, to invoke states of affairs to explain propositional truth is to give a bogus explanation.

This throws us onto the other hom of the dilemma, (L2), according to which states of affairs are ontologically basic, and their constituents are mere abstractions from them. This would appear to avoid the unity problem. If a and F-ness are mere abstractions from a primary unity, a's being F, then there is presumably no problem about what holds them together. But then how could the positing of a state of affairs so conceived explain or ground propositional truth? The truth that a is F is contingent; hence the togetherness of a and F-ness in a's being F must be contingent. This however leads us straight back to the unity problem which arises because of the contingency of the togetherness of a and F-ness. Since a and F-ness can exist without forming a unity, they cannot be mere abstractions from some ontological primary unity: they are the ontological atoms, the 'building blocks,' out of which states of affairs are constructed. States of affairs must therefore be ontologically dependent on the items that contingently form their constituents. It is not states of affairs, but their constituents, that are ontologically basic.

Although Dodd is on to a very serious problem for states of affairs theorists, a problem to be more thoroughly discussed in the next chapter, he has given us no good reason to abandon truth-making and truth-makers. We noted above that his first claim merely begs the question against the truth-maker theorist. Standing pat on our realist intuitions, we are within our epistemic rights in taking the truth-maker principle to show that there must be truthmaking states of affairs. And the fact that the 'compositional' and 'noncompositional' conceptions of states of affairs alluded to in (Ll) and (L2) above are faulty does not by a long shot prove that there is no explanatorily adequate conception of states of affairs. For there could be a third conception of states of affairs. Working out this third conception is a task for the following chapter.

6. REJECTION OF NONCONSTITUENT REALISM

The ostrich is not yet dead, so we propose to beat on him some more. If the foregoing is correct, there are truth-makers, and truth-makers are facts. Facts have properties as constituents. Assuming that properties are universals, facts have universals as constituents. If ordinary concrete individuals are facts, then such individuals have universals as constituents, and what we may call constituent realism (C-realism) is true. Realism is the doctrine that properties are language- and mind-independent universals. C-realism is the doctrine that universals are constituents of the things that have them. The purpose of this section is to lend further support to C-realism by examining some of the difficulties of NC-realism, according to which properties are universals but universals are not constituents of the things that have them.


What we are calling C-realism is what Armstrong calls 'realism' and characterizes thusly: "The Realist will say that these properties are really there in the world, as constituents of things, and will take their sameness, where two different things have the same property, to be a matter of strict identity. Two different things have the same constituent: horseness or whatever."l0 By contrast, the NC-realist admits universals "as really there in the world" (as opposed to 'in the mind') but segregates them from the particulars that exemplify them thereby denying that they enter into the latter as constituents. Armstrong speaks in this connection of a "separate-realm theory of universals [which] permits of a blob as opposed to a layer-cake view of particulars." 11 The difference is reflected in two different ways of understanding propertypossession. On a blob theory of individuals, a thing's having a property "is not the thing's having some internal feature, but rather its having a relationship, the instantiation relationship, to certain universals or Forms in another realm. ,,12 On a layer-cake theory, a thing's having a property is its having it as a constituent.

Let A be an ordinary concrete particular, an apple say, and suppose it is red. We are assuming that redness is a universal, but that it is not a constituent of A. (This homely example does not commit us to the view that apples are basic particulars, or that universals like redness are ultimate universals.) As befits a 'blob,' A has no ontological constituents at all. How then is A related to the universal, redness? A exemplifies redness. Thus

1. A is red =df A exemplifies redness. Does the right-hand side of (1) explain the left-hand side? Is 'red' true of A because A exemplifies redness? We shall argue that the NC-realist confronts a dilemma. Either (Ll) the postulation of NC-universals explains nothing and is metaphysically otiose, or (L2) A turns out to be what we will call a bare ordinary particular (not to be confused with thin particulars as a type of ontological constituent of ordinary particulars).

Lemma One. (1) implies that predications are really relational in that they involve the relation of exemplification. A's being red is A's standing in a relation to redness. But what sort of relation is exemplification? That it is a relation (rather than something more 'intimate' like a nonrelational tie) seems clear from the circumstance that exemplification connects a concrete particular with a universal in a realm apart. Is exemplification internal or non-internal? An internal relation is one that supervenes on the intrinsic properties of its relata.13 Suppose A and B are both red and ten feet from each other. Being the same color as each other is an internal relation of A and B. To say that the relation is internal implies that it could not cease to hold without some change in the intrinsic properties of the relata. If A and B cease to stand in the same color as relation, then there has to be a change in the intrinsic color properties of either A or B or both. But being ten feet from each other is non-internal: a change in the distance between A and B is compatible with no change in any of their intrinsic properties.

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Now it seems that 'exemplifies' in cases like 'A exemplifies redness' must pick out an internal relation. For the exemplification relation could not cease to connect A and redness without some change in the intrinsic properties of the relata. Clearly, if A ceased to exemplify redness, then A would change with respect to the intrinsic property of being red: it would cease to be red. It would be absurd to suppose that A could cease to exemplify redness (or not exemplify redness in some other possible world) without any change in the intrinsic properties of either relatum. So exemplification must be an internal relation, one that supervenes on the intrinsic properties of its relata.

Now which intrinsic properties of A and redness does exemplification supervene upon? In the case of A, the only possible answer is: its being red. So A's being red is the ground of its exemplifying redness. It is precisely because A is red that A stands in the exemplification relation to redness, and not vice versa. But this makes manifest the circularity of the analysis embodied in (1). A's being red was supposed to be explained by A's exemplifying redness; but we have just seen that it is the other way around: A's being red explains (or at least is part of the explanation) of A's exemplifying redness.14

This does not show that there are no NC-universals like redness; what it shows is that they are explanatorily idle: it is not in virtue of A's exemplification of NC-redness that A is red. NC-universals cannot figure in any account of what makes truth-bearers true. They are merely abstract duplicates of properties in or at particulars. Redness, for example, merely duplicates at the level of abstracta the intrinsic redness in the concrete apple. What then are these NC-universals good for, ontologically speaking? Semantically, they may serve as the referents of predicates like 'red' and abstract substantives like 'redness'; but onto logically they appear otiose. ls They are lazy, good-for-nothing, entia non grata.

Lemma Two. The argument just given involved the following steps. (a) NC-exemplification is an internal relation. (b) An internal relation is one that supervenes on the intrinsic properties of its relata. So, (c) A's exemplifying redness supervenes (in part) on A's being intrinsically red. But then it is obvious that (d) A's exemplifying redness cannot explain A's being red, whence it follows that (e) A's exemplifying redness cannot be of any use in explaining the truth of 'A is red.'

The NC-realist's best response to the argument is to deny that NCexemplification is an internal relation, one that supervenes upon, or is grounded in, the intrinsic properties of its relata. So let us see what happens when exemplification is taken to be a non-internal relation. If A exemplifies redness, and exemplification is non-internal, then there is nothing in or at or about A that grounds A's exemplifying of redness. A just exemplifies redness, and it is A's exemplifying of redness in which A's being red consists. It is not something intrinsic to A that grounds A's being related to redness, but the other way around: A's being related to redness grounds, or rather, just is A's being


intrinsically red. A's being intrinsically red just is a relational fact about A, namely, A's standing in the relation of NC-exemplification to redness. And the same holds for the rest of A's properties. It follows that A has no irreducibly intrinsic properties; all putatively intrinsic properties are analyzable in terms of relations to NC-universals, 'separate-realm' universals. But if A has no irreducibly intrinsic properties, then A would appear to be a bare ordinary particular. A bare particular is a particular that exemplifies all of its properties externally in the sense that (i) there is nothing in the nature of the particular that dictates any of the properties it has, and so (ii) it is related to each of its properties by an external relation of exemplification. A bare ordinary particular is a bare particular that is not an ontological constituent of an ordinary particular, but itself an ordinary concrete particular. It is crucial to note the difference between saying that (iii) ordinary particulars have a thin (bare) particular as constituent; and (iv) ordinary particulars are themselves thin (bare). (iii), but not (iv), is consistent with saying that ordinary particulars have properties as constituents. We will come out in favor of (iii), but we deny (iv).

Thus the NC-realist who posits universals but bars them entry into the ontological innards of ordinary particulars faces a dilemma. If exemplification is an internal relation, then NC-universals tum out to be metaphysically otiose; they merely duplicate at the level of universals the features in or at particulars. But if exemplification is non-internal, then the NC-realist is saddled with the dreaded bare ordinary particulars. But is there really a dilemma here?

In a critical exchange with R. Chisholm, P. Butchvarov taxes the NCrealist with commitment to bare (ordinary) particulars:

If we meant...that properties are not, even when exemplified, at the places and times at which the individual things which exemplify them are, that they are not in those individuals, and therefore that they cannot be perceived as individual things can be perceived, then we would end up with a theory of properties with the consequence that individual things are quite distinct, ontologically distant, from their properties, that they are bare particulars, not consisting in, or even containing, any properties, that they are related to their properties by a purely external relation of exemplification which somehow spans the abyss between the abstract world and the concrete world.16

In his response to Butchvarov, Chisholm distinguishes two senses of 'There are bare particulars.' The sentence could be taken to mean that there are individuals that don't exemplify any properties, or that properties are not in the things that exemplify them. On the first reading, the dictum is absurd; on the second, it is true. According to Chisholm, "one may distinguish a thing from its properties without having to presuppose that the thing doesn't have any properties.,,17

Chisholm, however, misses Butchvarov' s point since he ignores a third sense -- the salient sense -- of 'There are bare particulars.' In this third sense, to say that there are bare particulars is to say that there are particulars that have their properties by being externally related to them rather than having them

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intrinsically. What makes a bare particular bare is not that it has no properties, but the way it has the properties it has. IS Everyone agrees that necessarily, every particular has properties. It is also widely accepted that necessarily, every particular has some of its properties necessarily (essentially). For example, some particulars have humanity essentially. The dispute has to do with the way the properties are had. One sets up a straw man if one takes bare particulars not to have properties at all.

Chisholm's response to Butchvarov is thus inadequate, and Butchvarov's point is well-taken. If Socrates and his properties are assigned to radically disjoint ontological realms, we seem to face a dilemma. Either Socrates turns into a bare (ordinary) particular merely externally related to his properties -- Butchvarov's point -- or the properties in the realm of abstracta merely duplicate properties that are in Socrates and are therefore explanatorily idle. Call these the 'bare ordinary particular' objection and the 'duplication objection.' The first arises if we take NC-exemplification to be an external relation, the second if we take it to be an internal relation.

The point of the duplication objection was that it does no ontological good (though it may do some semantic good) to posit universals if they cannot enter into an explanation of why a predicate such as 'red' is true of A. But what exactly is wrong with bare ordinary particulars if these are understood in the third sense as particulars that lack intrinsic properties, that have all their properties via the exemplification relation?

In this connection, David Armstrong makes mention of an "Antinomy of Bare Particulars" that is part of his motivation for construing individuals as states of affairs:

.. .if the 'is' [of predication] is not the 'is' of identity, then it appears that a considered in itself is really a bare particular lacking any properties. But in that case a has not got the property F. The property F remains outside a -- just as transcendent forms remain outside the particular in Plato's theory.19

I think there are two points here. The first is that the NC-ontologist's individuals are bare in Chisholm's second sense: they do not contain their properties. The second is that if they are bare in this sense, it is difficult to see how they can be said to have properties. How can a concrete particular's having a property consist in its standing in a chasm-spanning relation to some other entity of a radically different ontological category? 'Here below' we have a concrete (causally active/passive) particular; 'up there' in a realm apart we find its properties, all of them abstract and thus causally inert. But given the obvious point that a particular's causal powers/liabilities depend on the properties it has (e.g., it is my being massive that induces in me the causal power to depress the couch, not my being intelligent, or my being a particular) one would think that the properties that confer causal powers would have to be in the potent particulars. How could an abstract property confer a causal power?


Furthermore, how could being red, or any empirically detectable property, be abstract? Empirical detection involves causal interaction. I must somehow interact with redness to detect it, but I cannot interact with an abstract object since they are causally inert by definition.

Let us now sum up the argument of this section. I have been contending in effect that the NC-realist is an Ostrich realist: universals are posited on semantic grounds to serve as the referents of abstract substanti ves like 'redness,' but they are unfit for serious ontological work. IfF-ness is an NC-universal, A's exemplification of F-ness cannot serve to explain the truth of 'A is F.' The attempt to explain A's being red in terms of A's exemplification of redness either succumbs to the duplication objection (when NC-exemplification is taken to be an internal relation) or to the bare ordinary particular objection (when NCexemplification is taken to be an external relation).

The NC-realist must therefore be an Ostrich realist. But then it is just a brute, unaccountable, fact that A is red and that A exemplifies redness. Ostrich realism just like ostrich nominalism thus violates the truth-maker principle, which we take to be nonnegotiable. Wielding the truth-maker principle, we kill two ungainly birds with one well-aimed stone.

The bare ordinary particular and duplication objections may seem to the NC-realist to beg the question against his position. The NC-realist may insist that although the ordinary particular Socrates is distinct from each of his properties as well as from the set or conjunction or any other construction of them, it does not follow that he is a propertyless substratum. But then my question to the NC-realist will be: What does your distinction between an individual and its properties amount to? If Socrates is distinct from each of his properties, and this distinction is one with a basis in extramental reality, how can Socrates fail on the NC-conception to be in himself a propertyless substratum standing in a merely external exemplification relation to his properties? Perhaps when philosophers like Chisholm and Plantinga allow, as they must, a distinction between a thing and its properties, what they are doing is taking the properties 'twice over.' They first of all take the concrete individual together with its properties and insist, rightly, that it is not propertyless. They then consider the properties by themselves in distinction from the propertied individual and insist on the distinction between individual and properties. If that is what they are doing, they are open to the duplication objection: they are positing in the realm of abstracta explanatorily idle properties that merely duplicate the properties in or at Socrates.

Another thing NC-realists such as Plantinga may be doing is simply setting up a straw man. According to Plantinga,

... even though the tree is distinct from its properties .. .it doesn't follow either that the tree could have existed without having any properties, or that each of the properties it has is such that the tree could have existed without having that property. It is distinct from its properties, but not, of course, separable

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from them.20

But nobody ever said that a tree could exist without having any properties, and nobody ever said that an individual is separable from its properties. Bergmann and Armstrong explicitly deny reasonable facsimiles of both of these claims. One may conjecture that by using the unfortunate phrase 'bare particular,' Bergmann opened himself and his com padres up to misunderstanding and strawman attacks.

Might the NC-realist turn the tables on us and demand to know what grounds the fact that thin Socrates (to be explained in a moment) C-exemplifies a certain conjunction of universals? But here we reach rock-bottom beyond which one cannot dig for deeper ontological ground. From the hybrid state of affairs of the NC-realist we can and must move to the level of a genuinely concrete state of affairs = a thick particular. But beyond this there is no 'deeper' state of affairs. We can and will in the next chapter ask about the unity of a thick particular and whether it needs a unifier. But this question cannot be answered in terms of any further state of affairs.

7. THE THIN AND THE TmCK PARTICULAR

If A is an ordinary particular, and each such particular is a concrete state of affairs of the form a's being N, then we need to make and explain a distinction between A and a. Following D. M. Armstrong wholly in nomenclature and partly in substance, we must distinguish between the thick and the thin individual.21 (I shall use 'individual' and 'particular' interchangeably.) As a first approximation, a thin individual is the ontological constituent 'in' an ordinary propertied individual which 'supports' or 'bears' or instantiates its properties, which we are taking to be universals. Unlike a universal, whose nature is to be repeatable (multiply exemplifiable), a thin individual is the unrepeatable element of particularity or thisness in an ordinary or thick individual. It is the determinable element which is determined by the properties as determinations. The thin individual is not a property, but is tied to each of the thick individual's properties by instantiation. Since it is not a property, it is not a particularized property or trope. If we think of an ordinary individual like a red spot as a this-such, the thin individual is the this-factor in the this-such. 'Unrepeatable' conveys among other things that 'particularity' does not refer to the categorial feature common to all particulars in virtue of which they are particulars. It refers instead to that particularity which is unique to each particular and differentiates it from every other particular.

Why introduce thin particulars? Properties are determinations. So it must be at least possible that there be something they determine. (This implies that the 'property' of being both round and square is not a property, a consequence we embrace with equanimity. Not every conjunction of properties


is a property, and not every predicate picks out a property.) Some properties determine properties; but it cannot be that every property determines properties. The world cannot be properties 'all the way down.' Soon enough we come to first-level properties which determine (characterize, modify, qualify) nonproperties, individuals. Suppose property P determines individual a. P determines, a is determinable. As determinable, a in itself, a in its difference from P, is undetermined. But this is just to say that a is 'thin' in respect of P, or 'bare' in respect of P. This of course assumes realism about properties: they are nothing conceptual or linguistic. If they were it would not be appropriate to speak of them as determinations.

Now a is determined by many properties. As determinable, a in itself, a in its difference from all its properties, is undetermined. This assumes that all of the suchness of a resides in its properties, which would not be the case if a were an Aristotelian primary substance the properties of which were merely its accidents. Something will be said in defense of this anti-Aristotelian assumption below in section 11 when we consider some objections to thin particulars. But given the assumption that all of the suchness of a resides in its properties, that both the essential and the accidental such-being of a is articulated in properties a instantiates, it follows that a in itself is 'thin' in respect of all its properties. Approached in this way, the concept of a thin particular is as clear as the concept of a first-level property. They stand and fall together. It is coherent to suppose that there are first-level properties if and only if it is coherent to suppose that there are particulars that instantiate these properties. But the particulars that instantiate these first-level properties, as distinct from them, are thin in respect of them.

A second, related, reason for the introduction of thin particulars is that they are a logical consequence of our assay of ordinary particulars as concrete facts. (This assay was in turn motivated by the need to explain how existence can belong to concrete individuals without (i) being a property of them, and (ii) being identical to them.) A fact in the simplest case is a particular-instantiatinga property. So an ordinary particular is a particular-instantiating-properties. The second occurrence of 'particular' in the preceding sentence obviously cannot refer to the same item as the first occurrence. The second refers to the thin particular, the first to the thick.

Third, it is phenomenologically evident that what is presented in perception is never a mere this or a mere such, but always a this-such.22 Hence an adequate ontological assay must account both for the thisness and the suchness of what is presented. If the perceived object, a red spot for example, is a concrete fact, the thisness in tandem with the suchness is in some measure accounted for: the thisness by the thin particular, the suchness by the universal redness. This may mitigate to some extent the suspicion that a thin particular is an epistemologically inaccessible substratum, a Lockean 'I know not what.' For the thin particular is posited on phenomenological in addition to dialectical

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grounds: it is given that this red spot before me is unrepeatable, that it is a this, that it is more than a cluster of universals.23 One would have to be quite an extreme rationalist to follow Hegel in the view that 'this,' 'here' and 'now' can only be used to pick out universals, and that what is not a universal can be ignored.24

A fourth reason to introduce thin particulars is to account for numerical difference. Since two red spots are two and not one, something must account for their numerical difference. The difference of the two spots is grounded in the difference of the thin particulars lying at the core of each. The dialectic here is familiar, and there is no need to go into it any further.

8. ARE THERE UNINSTANTIATED CONSTITUENT UNIVERSALS?

Our basic idea is that the existence of a thick particular is the unity of its constituents. But what about these constituents? Can the constituents of a thick particular exist without being anything's constituents? This would seem to be required if thick particulars are ontological constructions from more basic items. Our question divides into two. The first, to be treated in this section, is whether a universal which is a constituent of a thick particular could exist uninstantiated, i.e., without being a constituent of any thick particular. We answer this question in the affirmative. The second question is whether a thin particular which is a constituent of a thick particular could exist without being anything's thin particular. This question will be addressed in the following section.

Our present question, then, is whether a universal which is a constituent of a thick particular A and is therefore instantiated by the thin particular a at the core of A, could have existed without being instantiated by a and indeed without entering into any thick particular as a constituent. We need to answer this question for two reasons. One is to determine the exact nature of the distinction between thin a and any universal (including the conjunctive universal N) it instantiates. The other reason is far more pressing.

To explain how existence can belong to individuals without being a property of them, we theorized that ordinary (thick) individuals have ontological constituents and that existence is unity of constituents. But if the existence of a thick individual is the unity of its constituents, what about these constituents? Do they exist? If so, what does their existence consist in? What is it for a universal to exist? If one gives a theory of existence which explains the existence of higher-order items in terms of the existence of more basic items, leaving the existence of the latter unexplained, then it is clear that such a theory cannot amount to a theory of existence as such. Note also that if universals depend for their existence on thin particulars, as on Armstrong's view, then universals exist only in facts, as constituents of facts. A world without facts is then a world without universals. Universals turn out to be contingent upon the facts of which they are constituents. But then to explain the contingent


existence of a fact in terms of the contingent unity of its constituents gets us nowhere. For if the existence of a universal requires the ontologically prior existence of a fact, then the existence of the fact cannot be explained by invoking the existence of universals and other constituents.

Let us be sure we understand what the difficulty is and why it is a difficulty. Given that the compositional model is correct (a thesis to be supported in the next chapter), and a fact is built up out of its constituents, there is a clear sense in which the latter must be ontologically prior to the fact. If so, it is viciously circular to say that universals depend for their existence on facts. Of course, if F-ness is a universal, then F-ness cannot depend for its existence on any particular fact such as a's being F; the dependency would be a general one, a dependency on some fact or other. So a defender of immanent universals might respond as follows. Granted, the fact of a's being F is composed of a and F-ness. But both a and F-ness can exist apart from a's being F by being constituents of other facts such as a's being G and b' s being F. So a and F-ness are ontologically prior to their coming together in the state of affairs, a's being F. Universals can be more basic than the facts into which they enter without being transcendent universals. And the same holds for thin particulars: they can be more basic than the facts into which they enter without being capable of existing apart from any fact.

This sounds plausible, but doesn't stand up to scrutiny. Consider a logically possible world WI in which there is exactly one fact, a's being F. In WI, a and F-ness exist only as constituents of a's being F. How then can the fact be composed of them without vicious circularity? How can a and F-ness be more basic than the fact if they cannot exist apart from it? If they ontologically depend on it, it cannot ontologically depend on them. Call this the problem of vicious circularity. Now consider a world W2 containing two facts, a's being F and b's being F. Let us say that a constituent is strongly fact-bound if it cannot exist apart from a specified fact, and weakly fact-bound if it cannot exist apart from some fact or other. In WI, both a and F-ness are strongly fact-bound. In W2, however, the universal F-ness is weakly fact-bound, while the thin particulars a and b are strongly fact-bound. This is a bizarre result, since the ontology of facts should not vary with how many facts there are. Tum now to W3 in which we have four facts: a's being F, b' s being F, a's being G, b' s being G. In W3, the two universals and the two thin particular are all of them weakly fact-bound. So by adding two more facts to the popUlation of W2, the ontology changes once again. But surely the ontological structure of a fact cannot depend on the presumably accidental matter of how many facts there are. Call this the problem of the contingency of ontological structure on number of facts.

Now compare WI with W3. In WI we have the problem of vicious circularity: a's being F cannot be composed of a and F-ness if the latter exist only as the constituents of a's being F. W3, however, doesn't face this problem since all constituents are only weakly fact-bound. We may infer from this that

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to avoid the problem of vicious circularity, we need a world with a minimum of four atomic facts. But then these four facts logically require one another to exist. A fact can exist only if its constituents are ontological prior to it. But this is so only if its constituents occur in other facts. So those other facts are metaphysically necessary for the existence of the given fact. Thus the existence of a's being Fentails the existence of two other facts: a's being G (to insure that a exists apart from the original fact), and b' s being F (to insure that F-ness exists apart from the original fact). But notice that the existence of b's being F entails the existence of b's being G (to insure that b exists apart from b's being F). Therefore, by the transitivity of entailment, the existence of a's being F entails the existence of b's being G. Two facts with nothing in common are such that one entails the other. Call this the problem of the violation of factindependence.

Part of our solution to these three problems is the thesis that universals are transcendent: they can exist uninstantiated, and so need not occur in facts to exist. (The other part of the solution comes in the following section.) It may seem that this is ruled out if instantiated universals are constituents of concrete facts. For one will be tempted to think that a constituent universal (C-universal) must be an immanent universal. But this is a confusion aided and abetted by the ambiguity of 'immanent.' Immanence and constituency are distinct.

As we see it, the distinction between C-universals and NC-universals cuts perpendicular to the distinction between immanent universals and transcendent universals. An immanent universal is one that cannot exist uninstantiated. Such a universal exists only 'in' the things that have it assuming that 'in' signifies ontological dependence. But it does not follow that an immanent universal exists only 'in' the things that have it when 'in' signifies constituency. To think otherwise is to be taken in by the ambiguity of 'immanent' which reflects the ambiguity of 'in.' The multiple philosophical uses of 'in' are a rich source of seduction. Thus a first-Ievelimmanent universal need not be a constituent of a particular. Why couldn't an ontologically unstructured individual (a 'blob' in Armstrong's scholarly terminology25) instantiate an immanent universal? A transcendent universal, on the other hand, is one that can exist uninstantiated. Such a universal exists 'outside of' the things that have it assuming that 'outside of' signifies the denial of ontological dependence. But it does not follow that a transcendent universal exists 'outside of' the things that have it when 'outside of' signifies lack of constituency. Why couldn't an ontologically structured individual (an Armstrongian 'layer-cake') instantiate a transcendent universal by having it as a constituent? In particular, why is it not possible for a fact to have a transcendent universal as a constituent? This is simply the possibility that a fact have as a constituent an entity that might have existed without being a constituent of any fact. The picture, then, is this:


Nonconstituent Constituent Universals Universals

Transcendent Plato Present Theory Universals

Immanent Universals ? Armstrong

On our theory, then, transcendent universals can be constituents of concrete facts. Nothing prevents this once we stop confusing the 'in' of immanence with the 'in' of constituency. But we also argued that C-universals must be transcendent if we are to avoid the three problems mentioned above, the problem of vicious circularity, the problem of the contingency of ontological structure on the number of facts, and the problem of the violation of factindependence.

Is there any independent reason to think that there are transcendent universals? If natural laws are relations between universals, and there are uninstantiated laws, then it can be argued that there must be uninstantiated (transcendent) universals. But this line of argument cannot be pursued here.

The existence of un instantiated universals is of course inconsistent with the truth of naturalism, defined as the thesis that the totality of what exists is nothing more than the space-time system. But we do not accept naturalism, and hope to show by the end of this book that it cannot be true. If existence itself exists as a self-existent paradigm existent, then of course naturalism cannot be true.

9. ARE THERE FACT-INDEPENDENT TlllN PARTICULARS?

A first-level universal can exist uninstantiated, and thus (given that the instantiation of such a universal is equivalent to its being a constituent of a fact) can exist apart from any fact. The fact-independent existence of universals can thus be invoked as part of a noncircular account of what it is for a fact to exist. We can say that for a fact to exist is for a fact-independent (conjunctive) universal to be united with a thin particular. Note also that if universals can exist uninstantiated, then they exist necessarily, which implies that there is no need for an account of their existence. But what about thin particulars? Must they too be capable of fact -independent existence, existence independent of any fact, if a noncircular account of the existence of facts is to be possible?

If anything is clear, it is that thin particulars cannot exist without instantiating properties: nothing can exist without instantiating properties.26

Thus every existing thin particular is at least weakly fact-bound: no existing thin particular can exist apart from some fact or other. On the other hand, facts on our compositional view cannot be constructed from constituents unless the latter

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are ontologically prior to the facts constructed. (Armstrong's noncompositional view according to which facts or states of affairs are primary vis-a-vis their constituents with the latter being mere abstractions from facts will be refuted in the following chapter.) There must be some sense in which thin particulars are independent of facts. It follows that the being of a thin particular cannot be exhausted by its constituency, by its being an ontological part of a concrete fact. Nor can the being of a thin particular be weakly fact-bound. Recall world WI in which there is exactly one fact: both of its constituents must be onto logically prior to the fact. Since the being of a thin particular, considered in itself, cannot be existence or actuality, it is reasonable to theorize that the being of thin particulars, when these are taken apart from the properties they instantiate, is mere potentiality. This coheres nicely with our earlier talk of properties as determinations. A first-level property determines something that is not a property, something that is determinable, and as such undetermined. This is exactly what a thin particular is: it is an sich undetermined, but determinable. It is a potentiality for determination. It is something that accepts determination; to be so accepting, however, it cannot in itself possess any determinations.

Clearly, a thin particular in itself is next-to-nothing; it is not nothing but as close as one can get. If thin particulars were nothing at all, there would be nothing for first-level determinations to determine. Thus they have being, not existence, and their being is just their potentiality-for-determination, their capacity to bear properties. One advantage of this approach is that it may allow us to give a theory of partiCUlarity which avoids the counterintuitive reification of particularity as individual thin particulars.

Analogies can be tricky and misleading and surely cannot be used to prove anything in any definitive fashion. But they still may have some use. So consider the holes in a peg-board. Suppose they are all of the same shape and size. A hole is next-to-nothing, but obviously not nothing. A hole considered in itself is fillable, but unfilled. It is therefore analogous to a thin particular, which is determinable, but undetermined. Of course, a hole in a peg-board is a 'feature' of the peg-board. This is perhaps a point of dis analogy since a thin particular is not obviously a 'hole' in something. So to approximate to the thought of a thin particular we must think: of a hole in a peg-board while thinking away the peg-board. Now if we think: away the peg-board, we think: away that which keeps the holes distinct. They coalesce into a unitary and amorphous potentiality-for-determination. Whether this is problematic will be considered after completing the analogy.

Furthermore, each peg is analogous to a conjunctive property with sufficiently many conjuncts to completely determine an individual. Just as a peg is distinct from the hole it fills, properties are distinct from the thin particulars that instantiate them. But properties are not 'ontologically distant' from the particulars that instantiate them (in the way in which they would be if they were NC-universals), any more that a peg is spatially distant from a hole it fills. A


peg-in-a-hole is analogous to a concrete fact or state of affairs. The lack of need for anything to connect peg and hole is analogous to the lack of need for a regress-generating relation of instantiation. Notice how this turns Frege's saturated/unsaturated metaphor on its head. For Frege, properties (concepts) are unsaturated or 'gappy' while particulars (objects) are unsaturated. For us, properties are saturated, while (thin) particulars are unsaturated, indeed, unsaturated in excelsis. Of course, both analogies limp, and the comparison of the two analogies 'meta-limps.' To keep things in perspective, we must recall that in Frege's mature ontology, concepts are functions; objects, as arguments of functions, could be non-particulars; and there are no facts. Thus a fact is not the value of a function for a given argument. If a's being F were the value of the function Fx for the argument a, then Fx would be a constituent of its value, which is absurd.

The peg/peg-board analogy can be pushed further to illustrate the compositional model of facts. The lack of need of anything to connect a peg and a hole does not require that peg and hole be mutually inseparable aspects of, or abstractions from, a third thing, the peg-in-hole. Analogously, the lack of need for a relation of instantiation to connect a and F-ness in the fact of a's being F does not require that a and F-ness be mere abstractions from a's being F, abstractions incapable of being apart from the fact in question. Indeed, the contingent togetherness of a and F-ness requires that a and F-ness must be capable of being apart from a's being F. But the analogy suggests something stronger, namely, that the contingency of the togetherness of a and F-ness requires that a and F-ness must be capable of being apart from any fact. For the contingency of peg A's being in hole a implies not only that A might have been in some other hole, but that A might not have been in any hole. Recall our earlier arguments why C-universals must be transcendent.

Moreover, the contingent togetherness of a particular peg and a particular hole is analogous to the contingent existence of a fact. The possibility that a peg exist apart from the peg-board is analogous to the necessary existence of universals. The possibility that a hole exist unfilled (unpegged) is analogous to the necessary being (not existence) of thin particulars. The necessary being of thin particulars? This demands explanation.

If properties are determinations, and the world is not properties 'all the way down,' then it is necessary that there be thin particulars to receive determination. But the necessity that there be thin particulars in general does not entail the necessity of the being of any 'particular' thin particular. A 'particular' thin particular, one that is actually distinct from other 'particular' thin particulars, is one that exists, i.e., actually instantiates properties. Two thin particulars actually differ if and only if they actually instantiate properties and actually exist. Otherwise they merely potentially differ. It follows that thin particulars considered in themselves do not constitute a plurality of numerically distinct items. There is no plurality of numerically distinct potentialities-for-

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determination. There is just potentiality-for-determination. This potentialityfor-determination is not nothing, so it is. And it necessarily is, given that properties are necessary beings which are necessarily such that they possibly determine something. Now it cannot be possible that afirst-level universal be instantiated unless the being of potentiality-for-determination is necessary. The point can be cast in possible worlds jargon.

First-level universal U exists in all possible worlds but is instantiated in only some possible worlds. But the possibility that U be instantiated exists in all possible worlds, by the characteristic S5 axiom. Now if it is to be possible that U be instantiated in a world W, then potentiality-for-determination must be in W. It follows that potentiality-for-determination is in all possible worlds, hence necessarily is.

The picture that emerges is this. Universals necessarily exist. Potentiality-for-determination necessarily is, but does not exist. The 'materials' for state of affairs are therefore ontologically prior to states of affairs. There is a sort of ontological hierarchy. At the very bottom, 'next to nothing,' so to speak, we have potentiality-for-determination. One step up there are facts which are contingent 'mixtures' of potentiality-for-determination and universals. Above this, necessarily existent universals removed from time, change and the possibility of nonexistence. If it turns out that universals are not necessary in themselves, but necessary from another, then at the top of the hierarchy there would be a being, necessary from itself, in which universals exist. This absolutely necessary being would also be that in which potentiality-fordetermination is. At the apex of the hierarchy would stand a being which is the unity of potentiality-for-determination and universals; as such a unity, such a being would be a necessarily existent individual as opposed to a mere bundle of properties. This of course is the Paradigm. But now we are getting ahead of our story.

We must return to the question whether it is problematic to allow thin particulars, considered in themselves, to coalesce into an amorphous potentiality-for-determination. One of the traditional jobs of thin (bare) particulars is to ground numerical difference. Can we still explain numerical difference if thin particulars, considered in themselves, have yet to emerge from an amorphous potentiality-for-determination? Our approach implies that what differentiates thick particulars A and B are not thin particulars a and b, taken by themselves, or difference of properties as between A and B, but a-instantiatingproperties and b-instantiatingproperties. Thus thin particulars, considered in themselves, are necessary but not sufficient for actual numerical difference. Potentiality-for-determination plays a role but not the only role. (Talk of thin particulars in themselves is just talk of potentiality-for-determination.) Actual numerical difference is the numerical difference of actual or existing items. But thin particulars, considered in themselves, do not actually exist. Hence they do not actually differ. But thin particulars instantiating properties do exist, and can


be invoked to account for numerical difference. Thin particulars instantiating properties, however, are just thick particulars. Thus numerical difference is grounded in difference of thick particulars. This numerical difference of thick particulars, however, is not a brute difference as we shall now see more clearly.

Suppose thick particulars A and B, which are numerically distinct, share all universal properties. Then the numerical difference of the two cannot be grounded in any property-difference. Think of Max Black's indiscernible iron spheres. Nor can it be grounded in the numerical difference of two thin particulars considered in themselves for the reasons just given. But there is a third alternative: numerical difference is grounded in thin particulars together with their properties. Not in properties apart from particulars, nor in particulars apart from properties, but in the two taken together as composing facts. A fact is something in addition to its constituents: it is their unity. Each unity excludes every other unity. Each unity, as a unity, is numerically different from every other one. This implies that two unities are numerically different even if they have all the same property constituents. Recall our Chapter 6, section 1 argument that there is no universal property of being a unity in virtue of which unities are unities. If there were such a property, then it would be nonsense to say that each unity differs as a unity. To say that each unity of fact-constituents differs numerically from every other such unity as a unity is to say that the numerical difference cannot be explained in terms of any constituent of facts, but only in terms of the unities themselves.

Thus no constituent is needed to distinguish two unities: they are two in virtue of each being a unity of constituents. Hence once you have a unity of constituents, you have a unity numerically distinct from every other unity. But this is not to say that numerical difference is an unanalyzable brute difference. For it rests on the ontological factors ingredient in facts, potentiality-fordetermination and universals. When these are unified, they form a structure (a fact) which is ontologically more than their constituents. Since a fact is more than its constituents, the numerical difference is locatable in this 'more' and need not be assigned to a constituent, whether a thin particular or a universal or anything else. Thus we reject the following three theories. (i) The difference of thick particulars A and B is grounded in the brute numerical difference of thin (bare) particulars at the ontological core of each. (ii) The difference is grounded in a qualitative difference, a difference in properties. (iii) The numerical difference of A and B is simply a brute difference, one that cannot be explained.

It is clear how our theory differs from (i) and (ii). It is perhaps less clear how it differs from (iii). For are we not committed to saying that two unities, albeit onto logically additional to the respective sums of their respective constituents, just differ as a matter of brute fact and that numerical difference has no ontological ground? This would be so if there were no unifier responsible for the unity of each unity of fact-constituents. In the next chapter we argue that unity demands a unifier which is the same for all facts, a unifier

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that cannot be internal to facts in the manner of a further constituent. Assuming that there is such a unifier, then unity in each case has a ground. But the unifier, by grounding the unity of the constituents in each fact, by the same stroke grounds the numerical difference of each unity from every other one. The ground of unity is also the ground of numerical difference. Since existence is unity, we can say that the ground of an individual's existence is also the ground of its numerical difference from every other individual. That which makes individuals exist, concomitantly makes them numerically differ. This is not merely to say that two things must exist if they are to differ, but that they differ in virtue of existing. Each thing has its own existence and so differs from every other thing in virtue of its very existence. Necessarily, to exist is to exist as an individual numerically different from every other individual. The ontological ground of unity/existence is therefore the ground of numerical difference.

Thus it is a false alternative to say that either the numerical difference of A and B reduces to the numerical difference of their substrata, or the numerical difference of A and B reduces to a property-difference. Although thin particulars (potentiality-for-determination) must enter into an explanation of numerical difference, they cannot provide the whole explanation. This approach avoids the reification of thin particulars while preserving the indispensable idea that is the sound core of substratum theories, namely, that first-level determinations presuppose for their very possibility an indeterminate potentiality-for-determination.

10. SUMMARY AND TRANSITION

Our problem was to explain how existence can belong to a concrete individual (in the way in which it would not belong to a concrete individual if the Fregean theory or the mondial attribute theory were true) without existence being either a property of a concrete individual, or identical to it. This problem was forced upon us by our critical investigations in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5. We solved the problem by identifying concrete individuals with concrete facts, and by identifying the existence of a concrete individual with the contingent unity of a fact's constituents. The identification of concrete individuals with facts rather than with bundles of properties was independently motivated by the truth-maker argument for facts. Since facts are needed in any case to serve as the truthmakers of contingent truths, we found reason to identify concrete individuals with facts. But facts or states of affairs are entia non grata in Ostrich society, and so we needed to defuse the arguments of the Ostrich realists. It turned out that the positing of NC-universals, universals that do not form concrete facts with particulars is a useless ontological move, whatever semantic value it may have. We then took a deeper look at the ontological structure of facts and argued that both universals and thin particulars must be onto logically prior to the facts into which they enter.


The essentials of our solution to the problem of how existence can belong to individuals are now before us. What remains to do in this chapter is to add some refinements, and issue some rebuttals.

11. THIN PARTICULARS VERSUS ARISTOTELIAN SUBSTANCES

Approached in one way, the concept of a thin particular is as clear as the concept of a first-level property. Necessarily, a property is possibly such as to qualify something. This is non-negotiable. A 'property' that could not qualify anything is no property at all. It is also non-negotiable that the world is not properties 'all the way down.' So soon enough we come to non-property property-bearers. This reasoning, however, rests on an assumption that we must now examine: it assumes that no first-level property is identical to an individual. For on this assumption, there would be no need for propertyless substrata. Why can't a first-level property such as being human be identical to an individual such as Socrates? Why can't a this-such be ontologically simple in the sense that it cannot be split into a thisness-factor and a suchness-factor?

To begin, let us remind ourselves that the thinness of a thin particular does not reside in its being devoid of properties. Nothing is devoid of properties. A thin particular is thin in that there is nothing in the individual or specific nature of a thin particular to dictate or constrain what properties it has or can have. It must have some properties or other, but which properties it has is not entailed by its being the thin particular it is. This is simply a consequence of a thin particular's being the sheer particularity of the thing of which it is the thin particular. As potentiality-for-determination it is in itself undetermined, but determinable.

Thus there is no sense in which the properties of a thin particular are rooted in it or flow from it or manifest its nature. A thin particular is not a property that could entail other properties, nor is it a complex that could contain properties. A thin particular is a mere particular, a simple particular. Considered in and by itself, it has no individual or specific nature: it has at most the nature common to all thin particulars. It is therefore unlike an Aristotelian primary substance which is somehow identical with its essence or natureY In the Aristotelian tradition, a substance such as Socrates is not a mere particular, but a particularized nature harboring within itself certain powers and capacities such as the capacity to acquire a tan. Being tanned is thus an (accidental) property that is rooted in a capacity in Socrates' nature. By contrast, a thin particular is, to repeat, a mere particular.

The Aristotelian conception according to which Socrates is somehow identical with his essence is a conception we reject and indeed must reject if we are to assay ordinary particulars as concrete facts composed of thin particulars and properties. In any case, how could Socrates, a particular man, be identical with his essence, which is to be a man? Mter all, he shares his essence, his to

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ti en einai (quod quid erat esse) with Plato. His essence thus looks to be a universal. This is not something Aristotle can accept, however, since he seems to think that if the humanity shared by Socrates and Plato were a universal, it would be have to be a transcendent universal, one capable of existing uninstantiated, and indeed a Platonic paradigm. But then it and not Socrates would be a primary substance (prote ousia).

Aristotle's Book Zeta Chapter 6 reasoning in his Metaphysics seems to be along the following lines. If anything is a universal, it must be a Platonic universal: it must be (i) capable of existing uninstantiated, and (ii) a selfpredicable paradigm entity. Thus the Platonic Form of the Good, the Good Itself, is identical with the essence of goodness, 'what it is to be good.' For the Good, in order to be a paradigmatic entity or standard, must itself be good. It cannot be good, however, by participation in something distinct from itself on pain of a vicious infinite regress. So the Good is identical with its essence or nature. It is insofar forth onto logically simple. But since Aristotle is convinced that there are no Platonic universals, and that they would not explain anything even if they did exist, he concludes that it is things like Socrates that are primary substances. But the Stagirite continues to operate with the quite Platonic assumption that a primary substance, something that is not predicable of anything more basic, is not such as to allow a distinction between its particularity and its essence. He therefore concludes that there is no distinction in Socrates between his particularity and his essence or nature.

There are at least two problems with the argumentation in Metaphysics Zeta, 6. One is the assumption that a universal must be transcendent, i.e., capable of uninstantiated existence. Why can't a universal be immanent, i.e., capable of existing only in its instances? A second problem is the assumption that a transcendent universal must be a Platonic paradigm. But why must humanity, 'what it is to be human,' be itself human? Even apart from the argumentation, the conclusion that there is no distinction in Socrates between his particularity and his essence is hard to square with Socrates' contingent existence. Existence is obviously not an accident of Socrates: a substance can exist without any particular accident it has, and perhaps without any accident at all; but a substance cannot exist without existence. But if existence is included in Socrates' essence, then he is a necessary being. That way lies madness. So how are we to understand the contingent existence of Socrates? We don't see any answer to this in Aristotle, who may be fairly taxed with 'existenceblindness.' Our suggestion is that contingent existence is contingent unity of ontological constituents. But then particularity and essence in our man must be distinguished. The particularity becomes thin, and essence ends up on the side of the properties.

What this little excursus on Aristotle shows us is that, for a realist ontology that cleaves to an irreducible category of particulars, a non-bundle ontology, the alternative to admitting thin particulars as the ultimate substrata


or bearers of first-level properties is to admit individuals that are identical with their essences or natures. But that strikes us as more problematic than the postulation of thin particulars. Maybe God is identical with his nature, but how could Socrates be? If there are first-level determinations, and all of the suchness of a thing is captured by its determinations, then it quite naturally follows that there must be thin particulars for those determinations to determine.

12. TWO OBJECTIONS TO CONSTITUENT ONTOLOGY

Sellars' Objection. Our solution to the problem of how existence belongs to existing things depends crucially on the thesis that ordinary individuals possess an internal ontological structure. But according to Wilfrid Sellars, views of this sort are mistaken, resting he claims on a confusion of particulars and facts. Is this criticism warranted?

Sellars characterizes the view he opposes as follows: "Any dualism of universals and particulars amounts to a distinction within things between a factor responsible for the particularity of the thing and a factor responsible for its character; in brief, a this-factor and a such-factor."28 This may be taken as a reasonable approximation to our own thesis. Sellars argues that it confuses particulars with facts. If a exemplifies F-ness, then a is an instance of F-ness, but F-ness is not a component of a. F-ness is a component of the fact that a is F. This fact, however, is not itself an instance of F-ness. Hence a particular that both has F-ness as a component and instantiates F-ness is a "philosophical monstrosity ."29

This objection is an ignoratio elenchi. Bergmann, Armstrong, et al. are not claiming that there is any particular that both has F-ness as a component (or constituent) and instantiates F-ness. The thin particular instantiates properties, but does not have them as constituents; the thick particular has properties as constituents, but does not instantiate them. Sellars' objection springs from a failure to appreciate the distinction between the thin and the thick particular.

Nevertheless, it might seem that thick Socrates, e.g., both has wisdom as a constituent, and instantiates wisdom. True enough, if we use 'instantiates' loosely. But on analysis, 'Thick Socrates instantiates wisdom' is true just in case thick Socrates has wisdom as a constituent. What instantiates wisdom is thin Socrates.

If a falls under a concept C, then of course C is not a component of a. If a satisfies a predicate P, then likewise P is not a component of a. Similarly, if a is an argument of the propositional function Fx, then Fx is not a component of a. And the same goes for NC-universals. But we saw earlier that NCuniversals are explanatorily idle. If a falls under C, there must be some intrinsic feature of a in virtue of which it falls under C. If a satisfies P, then likewise. NC-universals are in the same logical boat. If a NC-exemplifies F-ness, then there must be some intrinsic feature of a in virtue of which a NC-exemplifies F-

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ness. Thus there is good reason to think of ordinary particulars as facts with properties as constituents of them. This proposal no doubt has its own difficulties and obscurities, but it is a puerile objection to claim that it simply confuses particular and facts.

Wolterstorff's Objection. Nicholas Wolterstorff has argued that the "identification of ordinary things with facts is mistaken ... ,,30 Consider a spot that is both red and round, and the fact of its being both red and round. "The fact, but not the spot, has the property of having redness as constituent essentially. From which it can be concluded that the spot and the fact are not identical.,,3! The argument is essentially this:

a. Facts have all of their constituents essentially. b. Properties are constituents. c. Ordinary particulars do not have all of their properties essentially.

Therefore d. No ordinary particular is a fact.

We grant premises (a) and (b), but why should we accept (c)? Why can't we 'throw the argument into reverse' and argue from the negation of the conclusion to the negation of (c)? Call the spot 'Sam.' Presumably, Wolterstorffthinks we must accept (c) in order to accommodate the datum that 'Sam might not have been red' and 'Sam might not have been round' are true sentences. But the Contologist may reject (c) without denying the datum. There are at least two theoretical possibilities corresponding to two ways of taking the referent of 'Sam.'

What does' Sam' designate in a sentence like' Sam might not have been red'? Either (a) it designates Sam together with all his properties (thick Sam), or (b) Sam in distinction from his properties (thin Sam).

Option One. If 'Sam' designates the concrete state of affairs consisting of Sam together with all his (nonrelational) properties, then 'Sam' designates a state of affairs each constituent of which is essential to it. The upshot is that all of Sam's properties are essential. The datum that Sam might not have been red but blue instead may then be accommodated by saying that there might have existed a spot just like Sam except that it is blue instead of red. Instead of holding that Sam is strictly identical across all the possible situations (worlds) in which he figures, we may hold a counterpart theory a la David Lewis.

Option Two. Or we may take 'Sam' to designate a thin particular in such sentences as 'Sam is red, but might have been blue.' If so, there is no problem admitting some of Sam's properties as accidental.

On either of these alternatives, we defeat Wolterstorffs argument. W olterstorff wrongly assumes that the pre-analytic datum that Sam might not have been red cannot be accommodated on the view that the properties of an ordinary particular are its constituents. But we have sketched how it can be accommodated.

Let us now tum the tables on Wolterstorff. According to him, "ordinary


things are simples ... " and thus "non-facts."32 Sam exemplifies redness and roundness, but without having them as constituents. A thing cannot have ontological constituents if it is ontologically simple. It is also clear that for Wolterstorff these are accidental properties of Sam. What then does' Sam' refer to? It cannot be Sam as exemplifying redness and roundness, for that is a fact. So 'Sam' must refer to Sam in distinction from these properties. But what is this? It cannot be a thin particular, since this term presupposes the validity of a C-ontology. 'Sam' on Wolterstorff' s account must refer to ordinary Sam, who is neither a thin nor a thick particular. But this is as enlightening as the claim that 'Sam' refers to Sam. Just what is Sam in distinction from his properties? At this juncture the bare ordinary particular and duplication objections discussed in section 6 above kick in. Thus either Sam in distinction from his properties is a bare ordinary particular externally related to them; or Sam in distinction from his properties is ordinary propertied Sam, but related (uselessly!) to further properties in the realm of abstracta that merely duplicate in this realm the properties in or at concrete Sam.

13. CONCLUSION: ADVANTAGES OF THIS APPROACH

The present approach involves two main ideas: (i) ordinary (thick) individuals are concrete states of affairs having ontological constituents; (ii) the existence of a thick individual is the contingent unity of its constituents. If we think of existence as the unity of the constituents of thick individuals, certain advantages accrue.

One advantage is that we can uphold Frege's virtually self-evident negative thesis (existence is not a mark (Merkmal) of any concept) which he shares with Kant, while rejecting his dubious positive thesis (existence is a property (Eigenschaft) of concepts or properties, never of individuals). For if existence is the unity of the constituents of thick individuals construed as concrete states of affairs, then existence is no part of what an individual is. The whatness or nature of an individual is on the side of its properties, but existence qualifies the entire complex whose constituents are a thin individual and its properties. We have already seen that existence cannot be a further constituent property. In the next chapter, we will see that it cannot be any sort of constituent. Nevertheless, we avoid the mistake of kicking existence upstairs to the level of abstracta, as we would if we made it a property of propositional functions or Fregean Begriffe: it is the concrete Socrates that exists, and his existence is not pseudo-existence, that essential property of everything, but genuine existence. (For the distinction between existence and pseudo-existence, see Chapter 2.) We can have it both ways: existence is no part of what a thing is, and existence belongs to individuals. We can have Frege's negative thesis without his positive thesis. And we must have it both ways, since both of these claims are practically self-evident or datanic. That is, they are data that any

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adequate theory must be able to accommodate, assuming that the adequacy of a theory is closely tied to its ability to 'save the appearances.' Is it not selfevident that existence is attributable to individuals and that Russell was wrong in assimilating 'Socrates exists' to 'Socrates is numerous'? And is it not selfevident that in attributing existence to a thing we are not characterizing it as we would be if we said it was human or wise?

A second advantage of our approach is that it can accommodate the intuition that existence and actuality are closely linked, if not identical. For if ordinary individuals are concrete states of affairs, then the existence of an individual will be (identically) the actuality (obtaining) of a state of affairs. We will be able to maintain the very natural equation that one finds in Kant and others: to exist = to actually exist = to be actual. A philosopher like A. Plantinga who thinks of states of affairs as all of them 'abstract entities,' however, will be forced to distinguish between existence and actuality. For if only abstract states of affairs are actual/unactual, then no concrete individual is actual. Accordingly, Socrates exists, but is neither actual nor unactual, any more than he is true or false. What is actual is the abstract state of affairs, Socrates' existence. But this implies that it is not Socrates himself who is contingently actual, but an abstract object that at best represents him. And this is counterintuitive. Our proposal allows us to say that it is Socrates himself who is metaphysically contingent, just as it allows us to say that it is Socrates himself who exists.

A third advantage of the present approach is that we will be able to resist the temptation to identify the existence of a with a. For if existence is neither a second-level nor a first-level property, one might suppose that the existence of a = a, that "We cannot oppose a to its existence.,m The arguments against this view were given in chapter 3. We now can see that our constituent ontology offers a way of avoiding it. There is a clear difference between the actuality of a state of affairs Sand S. So if individuals are concrete states of affairs, and existence is actuality, we have a way of resisting the identification of the existence of an individual with that individual.

A fourth advantage of our approach is that it allows us to accommodate the holism of existence, the fact that existence pertains to the whole of a thing. This holism refers to the fact that the existence of a thing cannot be one of its properties (or property-instances) alongside others, as argued in Chapter 2. On the present view, the whole of a thing is the thing as concrete state of affairs. Since existence is the actuality of such states of affairs, it accrues to them 'from without,' hence is not a property or any other constituent of the thick indi vidual. Equivalently, if the existence of an individual is the unity of its constituents, it is clear how it embraces all of its properties, and is therefore not one of them.

A fifth advantage of the present approach, and one of capital importance, is that it allows us to explain how propositions can be made true by individuals, and how the world in itself can possess an intrinsic intelligibility


that does not derive from our conceptual schemes. For on the view defended here, individuals, as facts, are proposition-like. They possess an intrinsic structure and intelligibility that does not depend on us.

NOTES

1 'Ordinary' contrasts with 'thin.' This will be clarified in due course.

2 Vide Chapter 4, section 8 supra.

3 See his Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1976), p. 114.

4 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), p. 197; 1051b5. I am not suggesting that Aristotle holds to an ontology of facts.

5 Cf. Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith, "Truth-Makers," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. XLIV, no. 3 (March 1984), p. 301.

6 Vide Chapter 2, section 1 supra.

7 Cf. Greg Restall, 'Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity," Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 74, no. 2 (June 1996), p. 337.

8 Julian Dodd, An Identity Theory of Truth (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), pp. 1-18.

9 David Lewis, "Critical Notice of Armstrong, D. M., A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, " Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 70, no. 2 (June 1992), p. 215.

10 D. M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p.7.

11 Armstrong, op. cit., p. 76.

12 Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

13 Cf. David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986), p. 62.

14 Cf. James Van Cleve, "Predication without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. LlV, no. 3 (September 1994), p. 580.

15 A somewhat similar complaint was lodged by Aristotle against Plato in Book Alpha, Chapter 9 of the Metaphysics. See in particular 991alO.

16 In Roderick M. Chisholm, ed. R. Bogdan (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986), p. 131.

17 Ibid., p. 202.

18 Cf. J. P. Moreland, "Issues and Options in Exemplification," American Philosophical Quarterly vol. 33, no. 2 (April 1996), p. 140.

19 Armstrong,op. cit., pp. 94-95.

20 Alvin Plantinga, "Guise Theory" in Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983), p. 44.

21 Cf. D. M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 94-96.

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22 A this-such is a concrete fact; hence concrete facts are objects of perception.

23 To be precise, it is more than a cluster of universals if a cluster of universals is itself a universal. See my article, "Bundles and Indiscemibility: A Reply to O'Leary-Hawthorne," Analysis, vol. 57, no. 1 (January 1997), pp. 91-94.

24 G. W. F. Hegel, Phaenomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952), pp. 79-89.

25 Cf. D. M. Armstrong, Universals, op. cit., p. 38 et passim.

26 More generally, nothing can exist without having properties. We do not wish to rule out the possibility of a being which has its properties, not by instantiating them, but by being identical to them. Such a being is what it has.

27 Vide Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.6, 1031b18.

28 Wilfrid Sellars, "Particulars," reprinted in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1971), p. 286.

29 Ibid., p. 287.

30 Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Bergmann's Constituent Ontology" Nous vol. IV, no. 2 (May 1970), p.116.

31 Ibid., p. 117.

32 Ibid., p. 125.

33 Reinhardt Grossmann, The Categorial Structure o/the World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 403.

Chapter Seven

The Ground of the Contingent Existent

The argument of the preceding chapter issued in the conclusion that the existence of a concrete contingent individual is the unity of its constituents, the unity whereby an individual is distinguished from a mere collection of its constituents. The question about existence has therefore led us to a question about unity. What, if anything, accounts for the unity of a concrete contingent individual? What, if anything, is the unifier of a concrete contingent individual? The unifier of an individual is the ground of its unity, and thus the ground of its existence. We employ the term 'ground' since we reserve 'cause' for physical causes. One could, however, characterize the unifier as the metaphysical cause or source of the unity and thus the existence of concrete contingent indi viduals.

The task of this chapter and the next is to answer the question about the ground of the contingent existent using only materials supplied by, or implicit in, our Chapter 6 answer to the question about the nature or structure of the contingent existent. The task, in other words, is to establish the existence of a ground of the contingent existent through sheer explication of what it is for contingent individuals to exist, given the obvious fact that such individuals do indeed exist, together with the view that they are unities of constituents.

We will try to show that there must be a ground, and that it must be distinct from, and external to, the contingent thick individuals whose existence it grounds. Given that thick individuals are facts, the thesis could be put by saying that facts metaphysically require a unifier of their constituents, but that this unifier cannot be a constituent of the fact, or the fact itself, and so must be external to the fact and its constituents. In this chapter we are concerned only to establish the existence of an external unifier. Further attributes of this unifier await discussion in the chapter to follow.

Since our external unifier will remind some of the "God of the philosophers," it is worthwhile to point out that the dialectical procedure employed in these final two chapters is quite unlike that of a cosmological argument whose central premise is some version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR).! Although broadly cosmological in spirit, our argumentation does not apply (PSR) or any causal principle to any member of the universe, or to the universe itself; what it does is to argue from the nature of the existence of the members of the universe to a transcendent ground of their existence. Crucial to this argumentation is the general ontological thesis, defended in the preceding chapter, that the existence of a contingent member of the universe is the contingent unity of its constituents. This thesis of general ontology, taken in conjunction with the obvious fact that concrete contingent individuals exist,

195

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analytically entails the existence of a ground of the unity of an individual's constituents. In a word, unity entails a unifier. The steps in this analytic entailment will of course have to be spelled out. An analytic entailment need not be an obvious entailment, and this one is admittedly, indeed obviously, not obvious. And of course from the fact that a unifier exists it does not immediately follow that it is external (not a constituent of the unified individual), universal (the same for all individuals) and transcendent (not a member of the universe). Nevertheless, by sheer explication of the structure of the contingent existent -- explication of what it is to be a contingent existent -we can arrive at an external, universal and transcendent ground of the contingent existent, a ground that accounts for thefacticity, the sheer being-there, of the contingent existent.

The over-all argument of the present chapter, which aims to establish only that there must be an external unifier, may be summarized as follows.

1. Facts exist; hence it is only their nature that is in question. 2. Reductionism is false: A fact cannot be reduced to its constituents. 3. Nonreductionism is false: A fact both irreducible to its constituents and independently real is a contradictory structure and hence necessarily nonexistent.

Therefore 4. Dependentism is true: Facts are dependent for their existence (i.e., for the unity of their constituents) on an external unifier, one distinct from the fact and its constituents. Premise (1) was supported in the preceding chapter both by the truth

maker argument as well as by considerations as to how existence can belong to thick individuals without being a property of them. Premises (2) and (3) are about to receive support. (4) follows from (1)-(3) on the assumption that there are only three possible conceptions of states of affairs, the reductionist, the nonreductionist and the dependentist. But we will recall Fred Sommers theory, discussed and rejected in Chapter 5, according to which states of affairs (facts) are states of the world. So to be precise, we should say that there are only three possible conceptions of intramundane states of affairs.

1. THREE CONCEPTIONS OF FACTS

Given that there are truth-grounding facts, a question arises as to their precise nature. A fact such as a's being F is a complex composed of its constituents, in this case a and F-ness. Call these primary constituents. But it is clear that a fact is more than its primary constituents since the existence of the constituents does not entail2 the existence of the fact. If b and F-ness each exists, the latter being a universal, it follows (with the aid of relatively uncontroversial principles3) that various supervenient entities exist, among them the mereological sum b + F-

THE GROUND OF THE CONTINGENT EXISTENT 197

ness, as well as the set {b, F-ness }; but it does not follow that b' s being F exists. If a, b, and R each exist, the latter being an external relation and a universal, it does not follow that the fact aRb exists. For a fact to exist (obtain), it is not sufficient that its primary constituents exist; it is also necessary that they be unified or connected. But how are we to understand this connectedness?

There are two extant approaches. The one, call it 'reductionist,' attempts to account for the peculiar unity of a fact's 'primary' constituents -- the a and F-ness in our simple monadic example -- by invoking a further constituent, a 'secondary' constituent, whose job is to 'tie together' the others. (Views according to which the connectedness is supplied by a primary constituent such as the ordinary relation R in the fact aRb, without the need of a special relation of exemplification, will also be classed as reductionist.) This further constituent might be a relation of exemplification, or else some sort of nonrelational tie or nexus. Whatever it is, it is a further constituent of the fact, and thus internal to it. This approach is aptly called 'reductionist' because according to it a fact is wholly analyzable and thus reduces without remainder to its primary and secondary constituents. In the previous chapter there was talk of a 'compositional model' of facts according to which facts are composed oftheir ontologically more basic constituents. Reductionism and compositionalism come to the same thing. The idea is simply that a fact reduces without remainder to the items out of which it is composed: The entire reality of a fact is exhausted by its constituents. Even if a fact does not supervene upon its primary constituents, on the reductionist theory it does supervene upon its primary and secondary constituents. This is to say that on the reductionist/compositionalist conception, although the existence of a fact's primary constituents does not entail the existence of the fact, the existence of the primary and secondary constituents does entail the existence of the fact.

The locus classicus of this approach is Bergmann's Realism.4 The reductionist view has quite a lot to recommend it as the following argument shows. It is obvious that (PI) there is more to a's being F than a and F-ness; a and F-ness can both exist without constituting a fact. But (P2) there cannot be anything more to a complex such as a fact or state of affairs than its constituents. Therefore, (C) the 'something more,' the 'togetherness' of particular and universal must be, or must be grounded in, a further constituent of the fact, a relation of instantiation or nexus of exemplification. On this reductionist approach, one accounts for the difference between a's being F and the sum a + F-ness5 (and also the difference between the state of affairs and the membership or extension of the set {a, F-ness }) by positing a further ontological ingredient in the state of affairs that ties the others together.

It is important to appreciate how strong and natural this argument is. PI is self-evident. But given the sort of analytic ontology presupposed here, P2 also seems well-nigh self-evident. If a complex is built up out of simpler elements,

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how could there be anything more to a complex than these elements? A strict adherence to the analytical ideal bids us construe every feature of a complex, and every difference between two complexes, as grounded in a constituent. But then C follows and the unifier or connector of a and F-ness is a further constituent of a's being F.

The other approach, call it 'nonreductionist,' is essentially a reaction to the difficulties that arise from thinking of the unifier of a fact's primary constituents as a further constituent. On the nonreductionist approach, a fact is not wholly analyzable and is thus an irreducible entity over and above its constituents. We may also call this approach 'noncompositionalist' if we take this to mean, not that facts lacks constituents, but that they do not exhaustively decompose into them. Armstrong opts for this approach when he writes that "States of affairs [facts] hold their constituents together in a non-mereological form of composition ... ,,6 Thus there is no need for a special unifying constituent, whether it be a relation of exemplification or a nonrelational tie. The fact itself does the unifying job. Just what this means, however, is far from clear. There will be more to say about it later.

These then are the two main approaches to the question of the unity of a fact's constituents. On the one approach, the unifier of a fact's constituents is one of its constituents; on the other, the unifier is the fact itself. But we will show that both are incoherent. To anticipate, the reductionist approach is incoherent because, for essentially Bradleyan reasons, the unity of a fact's constituents cannot be established by any primary or secondary constituent, no matter what marvelous properties it has. The nonreductionist approach is incoherent because facts, conceived as irreducible to their constituents (whether primary or secondary), are contradictory structures: it will emerge that a fact so conceived is a whole of parts that is not a whole of parts. Any attempt to evade this contradiction by maintaining that the constituents of a fact are abstractions from it, so that it and not they are ontologically primary, will be shown to destroy the very idea of a truth-making fact, which necessarily involves the idea that the unity of constituents in a fact is contingent.

Now if both extant approaches to the nature of facts are incoherent, it does not follow that there is no coherent approach and that facts should be banished from our ontology. For one thing, the truth-maker argument explained in the previous chapter gives us excellent reason to believe that facts exist; but about anything that exists it must be possible to work out a coherent theory. To see how there could be a third approach, note that both extant approaches assume that facts are self-contained entities or as we will also say, 'independent reals.' By this is meant that on both extant approaches, facts do not depend on anything external to them for their existence as facts. On the reductionist conception, the unity of a fact's constituents (and thus the existence ofthe fact) is due to an internal unifying constituent. On the nonreductionist conception,


it is the fact itself that holds its constituents together. In neither case, then, is the existence of the fact dependent on anything external to the fact. But there is a third theoretical possibility (and this is the only other possibility), namely, that facts have an external unifier, one distinct from the fact and its constituents. Supposing this to be the case, facts would depend on this external unifier for their existence and thus would not be independent reals. They would not be self-existent, but dependent on another for their existence as facts. As so dependent, facts are ab alia; so we are tempted to call this view 'abalism.' Resisting temptation, we'll call it 'dependentism' instead.

2. BRADLEY'S PROBLEM

We now begin to make our case against the reductionist approach to the nature of facts. The task of the next several sections is to defend the genuineness and the seriousness of Bradley's problem about the unity of a fact. This is necessary if we are to appreciate why the reductionist conception of facts fails and why some have taken the lesson from Bradley to be that facts must be entities in their own right, entities irreducible to their constituents that cannot be unified by any constituent.

On reductionism, a fact, being a complex, reduces to its constituents. But as noted, a fact is arguably more than its primary constituents in that it is their peculiar fact-making unity or togetherness. This is a datum any theory must explain; characteristic of reductionism is the attempt to explain it either by assigning to an ordinary constituent such as a relation a unifying role, or by postulating a special unifying constituent. This latter might be the relation of exemplification, call it 'EX.' a's being F would then have as constituents, a, Fness and EX. But if there was a problem about how the fact's two primary constituents can form a unity, there will also be a problem about how these three constituents can form a unity. There is after all a difference between a's being F and the sum, a + F-ness + EX. Although the existence of the fact entails the existence of the sum, the existence of the sum does not entail the existence of the fact. This of course is the animating core ofF. H. Bradley's famous regress argument against external relations.? Bradley held that any attempt to explain the togetherness of a fact's constituents by invoking a unifying constituent leads to an infinite regress. Bradley thought it vicious, but that is a further question. Some consider it benign, while others deny it altogether. We are going to have to delve into all of this, and very carefully, as into a dialectical minefield. But first a bit of historical perspective.

Bradley held that our inability to render intelligible to ourselves the unity of a thing, and of relational facts generally, argued that things, and relational facts generally, are mere appearances. 8 His main idea is that the "relational situation" is self-contradictory. As he puts it, "A relation both is and

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is not what may be called the entire relational situation, and hence in this respect contradicts itself.,,9 The putative contradiction can be expressed as follows. Any relational fact -- and presumably even 'monadic' facts like a's being Fare broadly relational given that exemplification is a relation or at least relation-like -- is more than its constituents since it is the constituents actually united with one another. But a relational fact cannot be more than its constituents, for what else could there be in a fact but its constituents? The fact must be more but cannot be more than its constituents. Putative contradictions like these motivate Bradley to demote our "relational experience" to the status of appearance, the status of a "necessary makeshift" - which is not to say that relations and relational facts do not exist, as he is often misinterpreted as saying. After all, he says that "relational experience" is "unavoidable" and "fully justified in its own place as a way of life and knowledge."l0 Whether our relational experience embodies contradictions and whether this argues for ontological demotion of the objects of such experience is not at all clear. So let us consider the problem more closely, with special attention to the problem of the unity of an individual.

If an exemplification relation is introduced to connect a and F-ness, then the externality of this relation seems to entail Bradley's regress. An external relation is one whose holding between two or more objects is not grounded in the intrinsic properties of those objects in the way in which the same color as relation (which is internal) is grounded in the intrinsic properties of two red balls, say. Now it is clear that EX is an external relation: in the contingent fact, a's being F, there is nothing in the nature of a to require that it exemplify F-ness, and nothing in the nature of universal F-ness to require that it be exemplified by a. And of course there is nothing in the nature of EX itself to require that it connect any two fact-appropriate constituents that it does connect. So EX being an external relation, it appears that further relations -- which cannot fail to be equally external-- must be brought in to relate EX to its relata in order to secure the unity of the fact's constituents. But then a regress ensues which is both infinite and vicious. For no matter how many further constituents are added, there will always remain a logical gap, a failure of entailment, between the sum of those constituents and the fact. For example, if triadic EX* is introduced to tie together a, EX and F-ness, the sum of these four items still does not add up to the fact. And so on for tetradic EX**, etc.

In rebuttal of Bradley, the following moves have been tried or could be tried: (i) deny that a (dyadic) relation is a third thing between its terms; (ii) deny that exemplification is a relation; (iii) replace exemplification with unsaturated properties; (iv) deny that there is an infinite regress; (v) deny that there is a vicious regress; (vi) deny that unifying constituents are universals; (vii) deny that relatedness requires relations; (viii) deny that properties are universals. All of these moves either involve a misunderstanding of the real thrust of Bradley's argument, or are objectionable for other reasons, as will now be shown.


3. IS A RELATION A TERTIUM QUID?

One response to Bradley is deny that a (dyadic) relation is a third thing between its terms. (To simplify the discussion, we confine ourselves to dyadic relations, without of course assuming that all relations are dyadic or that all relations can be reduced to dyadic ones.) If a relation is not a third thing, then exemplification, which we are now assuming to be a relation, will not give rise to the Bradley regress. This section argues, however, that this denial is mistaken, and that there is a clear sense in which a relation is a third thing between or among its terms.

Could all the constituents of a fact exist apart from the fact?ll This is something we were assuming when we made the point that a fact such as aRb is more than the sum, a + R + b. In particular, could the relation R in the fact aRb exist apart from the fact, i.e., apart from its actual relating of a and b? Many have held that Bradley misconstrues the nature of a relation (whether this be an ordinary relation or the putative relation of exemplification) by thinking that one can get it off by itself apart from what it relates in a particular case. According to Samuel Alexander, "the business of a relation is to relate .... "12

Bradley's difficulties therefore "arise from treating relations in the abstract as if they did not relate .... "13 Brand Blanshard sounds the same note:

He [Bradley] is thinking of a relation as if it were another term, as if A-R-B were three beads on a string ... But R is not the same sort of being as its terms. It is neither a thing nor a quality. It is a relation, and the business of a relation is to relate.14

Applied to the monadic case, what Messrs. Alexander and Blanshard would be saying is that exemplification (EX), though a relation, is not a third thing that itself needs to be related to what it relates. If the business of a relation is to relate, and EX is a relation, then EX relates a and F-ness directly without igniting a regress. The relation of exemplification unproblematic ally establishes fact-unity. To evaluate this oft-made AlexanderlBlanshard objection, we need to distinguish two different senses of "The business of a relation is to relate." On one reading it is false, on the other it doesn't stop the regress.

The slogan could mean that (i) the very being of a relation is its actually relating the very terms15 it does in fact relate. Thus supposing external relation R relates a and b only, the point would be that the being of R is exhausted in relating a and b. But this would imply that R could not relate any other pair of relata, that it is essential to R that it relate just those terms. This is entirely too strong a reading of the slogan. For one thing, it would imply that no relation that just happens to relate two things is a universal. Every such relation would be a particular, a relation-instance. (This theory will be examined in section 9 below.) Secondly, we surely do not want to say that a relation that relates a and

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b, could not, by its very nature as a relation, have related any other pair. That would contradict the fact that R is external to its terms.

On the weaker reading, "The business of a relation is to relate" says that (ii) there are no unexemplified relations, that a relation cannot exist without actually relating some relata. 16 Accordingly, dyadic R cannot exist unless it is exemplified by some pair or other, but its existence does not depend on its being exemplified by any particular pair. This weaker reading is very plausible, but note that it does not stop the regress. For now R is sufficiently like a third term to cause a problem. For the weaker reading allows that a relation is more than its relating of specific relata; it is a universal capable of entering into different relational facts. Suppose that, necessarily, a relation has some terms or other. Even so, it is not necessary that a relation have the very terms it has. Now if it is not necessary that a relation have the very terms a and b that it has, if it is a contingent fact that R relates a and b, then Bradley's problem legitimately arises: what is the ontological ground of the difference between aRb and the mere sum, a + R + b? What both Alexander and Blanshard fail to see is that a relation can exist without relating the specific objects it does in fact relate. Relations are not put out of business by their failure to do their business in specific cases. Bradley's challenge cannot be met simply by holding that a relation cannot exist without terms.

Suppose we look at this from a slightly different angle. Relation R presumably occurs both in the fact, aRb, and in the sum, a + R + b. In the fact, R is supposed to occur as an 'active ingredient,' as an actually relating relation that succeeds in unifying a and b. But it is clear that in the sum, R occurs merely as an 'inert ingredient.' Now Bradley can be taken to argue as follows: (a) One and the same entity R occurs both in the fact and in the sum. After all, the fact and the sum have the very same constituents. But (b) R in the sum is inert; it is not a relating relation. Therefore, (c) R in the fact is also not a relating relation. Furthermore, (d) if R in the fact is not a relating relation, then no further relation R * will succeed in doing the job that R cannot do. To think otherwise is to embark on a vicious infinite regress. But (e) a relation is a unifying constituent of a fact into which it enters, or it is nothing at all. A relation must be at least capable of actually relating and thus unifying distinct items. A relation that cannot relate anything is obviously no relation. But given (c), according to which no relation is capable of actually relating distinct items, it follows that (f) relations are contradictory. The "relational situation" is selfcontradictory and must be consigned to mere appearance.

The AlexanderlBlanshard response may be read as a rejection of premise (a). What occurs in the fact is a distinct entity from what occurs in the sum. In the fact we have a relating relation, in the sum a relation taken in abstraction from its relating, and thus wrongly reified. But this response implies that relations are not universals. For if R is a universal, then R is one and the


same entity whether it is relating a and b or not relating them. So in effect what Alexander and Blanshard are doing is denying that relations are universals.

In defending the genuineness of the Bradley problem against the AlexanderlBlanshard attack we are therefore assuming that relations are universals, repeatables, and thus that a relation such as loves is distinct from an instance of relatedness such as occurs in a fact like Monica's loving Bill. It is because relations are universals that their being is not exhausted in their relating the specific objects they do in fact relate. And it is because relations are not exhausted in relating specific objects that the unity problem arises. There will be no unity problem if sense can be made of the view that, in each relational fact, what connects a and b is a particular (unrepeatable) entity - an instance of relatedness - which exhausts itself in connecting a and b. For in that case, R in the fact and R in the sum will not be identical, the first being an actually relating relation and the second being an illicit reification of the former. Premise (a) above will then be false. So one might think to question the assumption that relations are universals. To be exact, one might think to question the assumption that relations insofar as they are what do the job of actually connecting distinct items are universals. Why can't unifying relations be particulars, relation-instances or tropes? This is a question to be examined below in section 8.

Our interim conclusion is that the Bradley problem survives the AlexanderlBlanshard attack if it be admitted that relations are universals. If relations are universals, they are sufficiently like third terms to give rise to the unity problem.

4. IS EXEMPLIFICATION A NONRELATIONAL TIE?

The question thus remains: What is the difference between the relational fact aRb and the mere sum, a + R + b? The difference, one might respond, is that in the fact aRb, R is exemplified by a and b, but exemplification is not a relation. Thus it is admitted -- contra section 3 above -- that if exemplification were a relation, there would be a regress; but it is not a relation, so there is no regress. Accordingly, one might hold with Bergmann that exemplification is a nonrelational tie or nexus where "A nexus does not need a further entity to tie it to what it ties .... "17 The nexus of exemplification ties directly; it is simply postulated to have this 'power.' But this move won't work either. It mislocates (dislocates?) the bone of contention. For let it be granted that exemplification is a nonrelational tie or nexus, call it NEX, and that this nexus, by definition, does not spawn a regress. There will remain the problem of accounting for the difference between a's being F and the sum, a + F-ness + NEX. Thus the problem is not primarily one of blocking a regress, but one of ensuring the unity of afact's constituents. If you try to do this with exemplification relations, you

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get for your trouble a vicious infinite regress. But if you try to do it with a nonrelational tie, you avoid the regress, but are left with the unity problem.

The problem remains because NEX like EX is external to its terms: there is nothing in the nature of NEX to require that it connect any two particular fact-appropriate constituents, although it may well be that NEX cannot exist without connecting some constituents or other. Since it is the externality of NEX that causes trouble, its not being a relation helps not a jot. What is needed is not a nonrelational tie, but a nonexternal tie. But if the constituents of a fact are tied nonexternally (internally) to each other, that amounts to saying that the existence of the constituents entails the existence of the fact (analogously as the existence of two red balls entails the existence of the relational fact of their being the same color as each other). This however would destroy the contingency of facts: a fact is contingent because its constituents are only contingently connected. To preserve the contingency of the connection, a tie must be external to its terms; but then we are stuck with the unity problem. It is clear that nonrelational ties avail nothing. It remains unintelligible how NEX succeeds in actually tying together the primary constituents into a fact.

It might be thought that the unity problem cannot arise on Bergmann's approach. For if NEX is not a relation (being a nonrelational tie), it is not a universal. And if it is not a universal, then it is a particular, in which case there would seem to be no difference between a's being F and a + NEX + F-ness. The mere existence of a, F-ness, and their nonrelational togetherness would ensure the existence of a's being F.18

This attempt to save Bergmann from the unity problem fails. Although NEX is not a universal strictly speaking, it has the "one-many feature.,,19 Since NEX is the same in every fact, the nonrelational togethernesses of a and F-ness, and of band G-ness, are grounded in the same entity. NEX is therefore sufficiently like a universal to generate the unity problem. Since there is nothing in the very nature of NEX to ensure that it connects any two or more things it does in fact connect, what accounts for the difference between a's being F and a + F-ness + NEX? The unity problem remains.

It is easy to misunderstand the exact sense of the unity problem. The question, What accounts for the difference between a's being F and the mereological sum a + F-ness + NEX? is not a question about the difference in general between fact-unity and sum-unity. For I could easily grant that NEX is what accounts for this difference: all and only facts contain the NEX constituent. The question is about the difference between any particular fact such as a's being F and the sum (or the extension or membership of the set) of its primary and secondary constituents.2o If NEX unifies the fact's primary constituents, then no doubt it unifies them into a fact: that is just what NEX (the nonrelational tie of exemplification) is posited to do. The question, however, is whether and how NEX actually does this unifying job. For if you add NEX to


a and F-ness, the result is not a fact, but at most the possibility of a fact: you have everything you need for a fact except the actual connecting of a, F-ness and NEX.21 It is precisely this problem that I am highlighting when I ask, What accounts for the difference between a's being F and the mereological sum a + F-ness + NEX? Thus the question does not concern the nature of fact-unity in general, but the existence of fact-unity in particular cases. It may well be that all and only facts are complexes the unifying constituent of which is NEX. But this at most specifies the nature of facts and could be true even if there were no facts. What I am calling the unity problem, however, is a problem about the existence of particular facts. For a fact cannot exist unless its constituents are actually unified. So the unity problem is precisely this: What makes it the case that a number of constituents of the right kinds -- constituents which are connectable so as to form a fact but need not be connected to exist -- are actually connected so as to form an actual or existing fact?

5. IS EXEMPLIFICATION A NONRELATIONAL NONTIE?

At this juncture one may be tempted to make a move reminiscent of Frege. Instead of denying that exemplification is a relation by holding that it is a nonrelational tie, one may deny that it is a relation by holding that it is a 'nonrelational nontie.' Although Frege had no room in his mature ontology for facts, he held that concepts or properties are essentially 'unsaturated' or gappy or incomplete.22 Exploiting this idea, suppose we replace both EX and NEX with a gap or slot in the property constituent. Let 'J' denote a gappy property. We might be then tempted to think that a and _F fit together like plug and socket without the need of any binding agent or connector. And if there is no connector, then there will of course be no need for any further connectors to connect the original connector to what it connects. But again, this Fregean maneuver does nothing to solve Bradley's problem. One need only ask: what is the difference between a's being F and the sum, a + _F? The fact entails the sum, but not vice versa. a and _F can each exist without the first saturating the second. (Thus a might exist in the fact Ga while _F exists in the fact Fb: we need not assume that there are uninstantiated properties). So something more is needed to insure the actual unity of the constituents. Granted, ifparticular and gappy property form a fact-unity, they form it directly without the assistance of any intermediary; but the precise question is how they can form such a unity if all there is to the fact is a and _F. The unity of the two constituents is not nothing, and the unity is not entailed by the mere existence of the constituents; so there is need for something to unify the constituents. As I said a couple of paragraphs back, the Bradley problem is essentially a problem about unity, not about regress-avoidance. If a vicious regress is sired by the introduction of a tertium quid to bind together the constituents, then a Fregean quashing of the

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quid will eliminate the regress; but you will not thereby solve the unity problem. Thus the Fregean shuffle mislocates the bone of contention.

Of course, I am assuming that properties, gappy or not, are universals. If they are themselves particulars, then perhaps there is no unity problem. For then it might be plausible to say that if Socrates and his (unrepeatable) whiteness exist, then Socrates' being white 'automatically' exists. We shall return to this question below. But for now, the main point of the last three sections is that the unity problem arises whether we think of exemplification as a relation, as a nonrelational tie, or as a 'nonrelational nontie,' i.e., as a gap in a property. Hence we are saddled with the problem whether or not we think of exemplification as a tertium quid 'between' a and F-ness. The problem arises from the circumstance that there is nothing in the natures of a and F-ness to require that they come together (as they would be so required if F-ness were an Aristotelian accident of a); it does not arise because of the presence of a third item 'between' a and F-ness. The postulated third item is not the source of the difficulty, but a (misguided) attempt to solve it. Hence removing it ala Frege does not remove the difficulty. This point is often overlooked.

6. DOES THE EXEMPLIFICATION RELATION SPAWN A REGRESS?

A fourth response to Bradley is to hold that exemplification is a relation, but that it does not engender an infinite regress, not even a benign one. According to Reinhardt Grossmann, the regress requires the following false assumption:

A. Whenever two entities x and yare related to each other, there exists a third entity, the relation R, that relates them.

Principle (A), coupled with the assumption that exemplification is a relation, clearly implies an infinite regress for every monadic fact of the form, Fa. Let x = a and y = EX, and suppose a stands in the exemplification relation to F-ness. Since a and EX are related to each other in the fact of a's being F, Principle (A) demands that there be a relation R that relates a to EX. A regress ensues. Some, like Grossmann, will take this regress, even if benign, to show that the assumption is false. They will insist that relations are in no need of further relations to relate them to what they relate. Grossmann maintains that what is true is not (A) but the following principle (B):

B. Whenever two entities x and y, which are not relations, are related to each other, there exists a third entity, the relation R, that relates them.

"Relations are the glue of the world. As such, they need not be glued to what they hold together.'023 If two boards are held together by glue, there is no need for further glue to cement the glue to the boards. Similarly, if two entities that are not relations are held together by a relation R, there is no need for any further relation to relate R to what it relates. It follows that exemplification can be a relation without igniting an infinite regress.


But from our point of view, this misses the point. For let it be granted that if a exemplifies F-ness, it does so without the need of any intermediary relations. What accounts for the difference between a's being F and the mere sum of a + exemplification + F-ness? In terms of the glue metaphor, it is clear that there is no need of superglue (superduperglue ... ) to cement the glue (the superglue ... ) to the boards. But the existence oftwo boards and some glue does not entail the existence of two-boards-glued-together. Something more is needed: the glue has to be applied to the boards, and they have to be brought into contact with one another. Similarly, it is not enough that a, F-ness and the exemplification relation all exist; they have to brought together so as to form a state of affairs. Bradley's point is that this bringing together cannot be accomplished by any constituent of the state of affairs in question. Surely he is right about this.

Grossmann will presumably reject our demand for an account of the difference between a fact and the sum of its constituents, and take the lesson from Bradley to be that facts are irreducible entities.24 But then the topic has shifted from the reductionist conception of facts to the nonreductionist conception to be discussed later. The present point is simply that the reductionist conception cannot be saved by holding that exemplification is a relation that does not give rise to an infinite regress. For again, the fundamental problem is to secure unity, not to avoid a regress.

7. IS THE EXEMPLIFICATION REGRESS BENIGN? ARMSTRONG

A fifth response to Bradley admits the regress but argues that it is as benign as the truth regress. If proposition p is true, then it is true that p is true, and true that it is true that p is true, ad infinitum. This truth regress (progress?) is clearly benign. For it is obvious that the ground of p's truth is not the truth that pis true, and so on, but the state of affairs that makes p true (assuming p is contingent). And this state of affairs makes every member of the infinite series true.

Armstrong's main position, as we will see later, is that there is no need for an instantiation (exemplification) relation to tie particulars and universals into states of affairs. But he has a 'fall-back' position: even if an instantiation relation is admitted, the resulting regress is as harmless as the truth regress.25 His idea is that "while the step from constituents to states of affairs is a contingent one, all the further steps in the suggested regress follow necessarily.,,26 What he means is more clearly explained in an earlier publication where he describes the regress as follows. I have interpolated numerals into his text for later reference.

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[1] The particular a instantiates property F. [2] Prima facie, however, instantiation is a universal, found wherever there are things having properties. [3] So this state of affairs, a's instantiating property F, is a token of the type instantiation ... [4] The state of affairs instantiates instantiation. [5] But here we have another token of instantiation. [6] So the state of affairs (that state of affairs instantiating instantiation) also instantiates instantiation. And so on ad infinitum. 27

I think it is clear that this regress, which is structurally similar to the truth regress, is as benign as the latter. But it is not Bradley's regress. Armstrong confuses it with Bradley's regress because he confuses the instantiation relation with instantiation relationships .28 So let's first review the crucial distinction between a relation and a relationship or relatedness. A relationship is a particular relational fact which is nothing apart from its terms, and so cannot exist without the terms it in fact has. A relationship is in every case a particular, an unrepeatable. But a relation is a universal that can exist without relating the terms that it happens to relate. Thus Tim's kicking Tom (at a particular time) is a relationship, a relational fact, that cannot exist apart from Tim and Tom; but kicks is a universal whose existence does not depend on that of Tim and Tom, though it may depend on the existence of some pair or other.

Turning now to Armstrong's text, I will show that Armstrong confuses the instantiation relation with instantiation relationships. Note first that Armstrong is treating the fact that a instantiates F-ness as a unit and claiming that it (rather than its constituents) is a token of the type instantiation. But on this assumption, [3] follows from [1] and [2] only on the further assumption that 'instantiation' in [3] is short for 'instantiation relationship.' The inference is a non sequitur if the key term is short for 'instantiation relation.' For it is obvious that the instantiation relation cannot be instantiated by a single object: it needs at least two objects. But the fact that a instantiates F-ness is a single object, a unit. Given this clarification, [4], [5] and [6] follow.

The upshot is that, as a result of confusing the instantiation relation with the instantiation relationship, Armstrong confuses his innocuous regress with Bradley's regress, which poses the real threat to the instantiation or exemplification relation. By misunderstanding Bradley's regress, he does not appreciate its true force. Bradley's problem concerns the very constitution of a state of affairs in the first place, not what happens once there is a state of affairs. Given a state of affairs, the ensuing regress is of course benign. Bradley's regress, however, is internal to would-be states of affairs. There must be something that binds together the constituents of a would-be state of affairs; but if this is a further constituent, a vicious infinite regress breaks out that prevents the formation of a state of affairs.


8. IS THE EXEMPLIFICATION REGRESS BENIGN? MCTAGGART

There is another wrinkle to this problematic that merits scrutiny. Someone might grant the preceding critique of Armstrong, and admit that the exemplification regress is internal to would-be states of affairs, but insist nonetheless that, though infinite, it is innocuous. The idea has two parts. The first is that exemplification is a relation that gives rise to an actual infinity of higher-order relations: <a, ... , EX-n ... EX-2, EX-I, EX, F-ness>, but that this is not a problem, since there is no problem with actual infinities as such. Bolzano, and Cantor especially, have made respectable the idea of actual infinities. So if the viciousness of Bradley's regress presupposes that there are no actually infinite series, then he is at odds with the founding fathers of modern transfinite set theory. Someone might think that the regress is vicious only if all infinities are merely potential for the following reason. The actual relating of any two items might be thought to be a sort of infinite logical task that cannot be completed because completing it would require completing an infinite number of sub-tasks. One would then be thinking of the infinite regress of exemplification as a step-by-step regressing which can never terminate. But if there are actual infinities, then all the sub-tasks have been completed, so where is the viciousness of the regress?

The second part of the idea is that, if there is an actual infinity of higherorder exemplification relations internal to each fact, then every such relation is connected to its relata by the one 'above' it. There is then no 'unrelated relator' or 'unrelated relation.' Thus dyadic EX is made to connect a and F-ness by triadic EX-I, EX-I by tetradic EX-2, et cetera ad infinitum. If every exemplification relation is connected to its relata by the one 'above' it, then all of the constituents of the fact are cemented together into a unity. The unity, and thus the existence, of a fact is thereby secured by relations internal to it. There is an infinite regress, but it is harmless. One might even go so far as to say that it is necessary to establish the fact's unity.

There is an analogy here with a famous argument that David Hume, in his Dialogues on Natural Religion (Part IX), gave in rebuttal of the cosmological argument for the existence of God. He argued in effect that if the universe always existed, then one may coherently suppose that each state of the universe has an internal cause in that each state is caused by a preceding one. If there is an actual infinity of past states, then every state is caused by something internal to the universe. If the universe is just the sum of its states, then there is no reason to demand an external cause of the universe such as God. Similarly, if every exemplification relation internal to a fact is connected to its relata by an exemplification relation, then the unity of the fact is secured without recourse to an external unifier.

There are passages in McTaggart that suggest the above response to

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Bradley. Thus McTaggart held that if a thing has a quality, this having is a relation between the thing and the quality. So if a is red, then a exemplifies redness. But equally, every standing in a relation engenders relational qualities. So if a exemplifies redness, a has the relational quality of being an exemplifier of redness. But then, reverting to the first consideration, a exemplifies the relational quality of being an exemplifier of redness. And so a has the relational quality of being an exemplifier of the relational quality of being an exemplifier of redness. Et cetera ad infinitum et nauseam sed non ad absurdum. What's more, every standing in a relation not only engenders relational qualities, it also engenders further relations. If a exemplifies redness, then a, exemplification, and redness are related by a triadic exemplification relation, and these four items by a tetradic exemplification relation, and so on. For McTaggart, all of these infinite series are benign, and thus "not a sign of error" which consideration, he says, " ... removes the force of Mr. Bradley's argument for rejecting the validity of the conceptions of quality and relation.,,29

Thus McTaggart's point against Bradley might be understood as follows: Since each fact bears within itself an actual infinity of relations, every constituent of the fact is related, and so the fact is a unity; and there is no problem with such an actual infinity of relations. Thus nothing is left unexplained and in this sense there is no vicious infinite regress such as Bradley alleges.

If this is McTaggart's point, it doesn't tell against Bradley. Consider again the infinite n-tuple mentioned earlier: <a, ... EX-n ... EX-2, EX-t, EX, Fness>. What is the difference between the membership of this n-tuple and the corresponding fact? After all, there are (or could be) infinite n-tuples for which there are no corresponding facts. The problem is to explain this difference, and the problem remains with us whether exemplification spawns an infinite regress or not, and whether or not there are actual infinities. The problem of explaining the difference between a fact and the membership of the corresponding set has nothing to do with the cardinality of the set. It is the same for finite and transfinite cardinalities. One cannot possibly close the gap by cranking the cardinality of a set up from some finite number to aleph-nought or 2-to-thealeph-nought. If we are thinking in terms of merely potential infinity, then we can put Bradley's point by saying that adding another constituent will not secure unity. But if we are thinking in terms of actual infinity, and all the constituents have already been added, then we can put Bradley's point by saying that that there is a difference between an actually infinite set of constituents, and those same constituents actually unified.

If in the fact aRb, R cannot unify a and b, then an actual infinity of Rs cannot make good on the deficit. Thus the actual/merely potential infinity issue is a red herring. It distracts from the real issue which is simply that there is a logical gap, a failure of entailment, between a set of constituents and those same


constituents actually unified.

9. ARE UNIFYING CONSTITUENTS UNNERSALS?

What we are trying to show is that the unifier of a fact's constituents cannot itself be a constituent. Equivalently, we are trying to show that the reductionist approach to facts is untenable. But we have been assuming that any unifying constituent would have to be a universal, a repeatable entity, as opposed to a particular, an unrepeatable entity. This assumption, which was the basis of our defense of Bradley against Alexander and Blanshard in section 3 above, must now be examined. Why could not there be a unifying constituent that is a particular? The idea is that in the fact aRb, R is a particular, a relation-instance, as opposed to a universal relation, and that this relation-instance connects a and b. This implies that if Jack loves Jill, while Jill loves Phil, the loving that connects Jack and Jill is distinct from the loving that connects Jill and Phil. There may well be a universal loves, but if there is, it is not that which functions as unifier in the two facts in question. The sense of 'loves' in 'a loves b' and 'b loves c' is pretty clearly the same, and may be taken to be a universal; but it is not this universal on the semantic plane that serves as the 'ontic glue' that cements a and b into a relational fact or state of affairs here below in the real order. The idea, then, is that facts have unifying constituents, but these are not universals, but particulars.

If this approach is defensible, it would appear to defuse the Bradley problem. Bradley's problem requires that R in the fact aRb, and R in the sum a + R + b, be exactly the same entity. Ifthey are the same, then, since R in the sum does not unify, R in the fact does not unify either. But if R is a relationinstance, then R cannot exist except as relating a and b. It follows that there cannot be one and the same R that occurs both in the fact (where R actually relates) and in the sum (where R does not actually relate). If the sum exists at all, it does not contain the actually relating relation R, but an illicit reification or hypostatization of it, or perhaps an abstraction from it. Or one could say that there simply is no such sum as a + R + b where R is a relation-instance, for the reason that R cannot exist except as relating a and b. If there is no such sum, then there cannot be the problem that Bradley envisages, namely, that something more must be added to the three constituents to weld them together into a fact. If this is right, then the lesson to be learned from Bradley is not that a fact is irreducible to its constituents, but that an actually relating relation must not be confused with a relation tom from its relational situation and wrongly reified. As D. W. Mertz puts it, "Bradley and like-minded philosophers make the mistake of identifying R-as-actually-relating with R as separated from, and not relating, any relata.,,3o

Mertz is thus denying premise (2) in the following reconstruction of

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Bradley's argument: 1. The fact aRb and the sum a + R + b are distinct. 2. R in the fact is identical to R in the sum. 3. R in the sum is not a unifying constituent.

Therefore 4. R in the fact is not a unifying constituent. 5. No further constituents, R*, R**, etc. can do what R cannot do.

But 6. A relation is a unifying constituent of a fact or it is nothing at all.

Therefore 7. Relations are self-contradictory. Mertz denies (2) because he holds that actually relating relations are in

every case relation-instances, not universals. This implies that an actually relating relation is (i) a proper constituent of a fact, i.e., a constituent that is not identical to the fact of which it is a constituent; (ii) a unifier, and (iii) a particular (unrepeatable entity). But it is difficult to see how these three characteristics are mutually consistent.

If, as point (ii) says, R is the unifying constituent in the fact aRb, and, as point (iii) says, R is a relation-instance, then R is a unifier that exhausts itself in its unifying of a and b. This follows from R's being a particular rather than a universal. In other words, Rjust is the fact-constituting togetherness of a and b; R is not something distinct from the togetherness which brings it about. It is not a universal that could have related some other pair of relata. But then how is this consistent with point (i), according to which R is a proper constituent of aRb? As a proper constituent, R is distinct from aRb, which implies that R is distinct from a and from b. But note that R, being a relation-instance, cannot exist unless a and b exist, and unless aRb exists. It is precisely this feature of R that equips it to block Bradley's regress. Since the very identity and existence of relation-instance R depends upon the existence of aRb, there is no distinction in reality between R and aRb. The only distinction is one we bring to the matter by considering R in abstraction from a and b and from the fact aRb.

To put it another way, since the very identity and existence of R depends upon the existence of aRb, R is not an independently real constituent out of which (along with a and b) aRb is constructed. The reductionistlcompositionalist approach has then been abandoned, and we are in the vicinity of a nonreductionistlnoncompositionalist approach according to which facts are ontologically primary, with their constituents being merely abstractions from them.

Points (ii) and (iii), therefore cannot be made consistent with point (i). If R is the unifier or 'ontic glue' of aRb's constituents, and if R is a particular, a relation-instance as opposed to a universal, then R cannot be an independently real proper constituent of aRb.


We arrive at essentially the same conclusion as follows. If relationinstance R unifies a and b, then R is numerically-existentially distinct from a and b. If R brings about their unity, then it cannot be their unity. But on the other hand, R, as an unrepeatable relation-instance, is individuated by a and b. Its specific being (existence) as the relatedness of a and b necessarily involves a and b. To appreciate what is meant by 'necessarily involves,' compare 'the marriage of Bill and Mary' with 'the car of Bill and Mary.' The marriage of Bill and Mary necessarily involves Bill and Mary in that there is no possible world in which this particular marriage exists, but Bill and Mary do not exist. By contrast, the car of Bill and Mary exists in possible worlds in which Bill and Mary do not exist. Clearly, the relatedness of a and b necessarily involves a and b: there is no possible world in which this particular relatedness has different relata. How then can R be numerically-existentially distinct from a and b? The only way R can be distinct from a and b is if R is identical to the fact, aRb. But then (ii) and (iii) taken together contradict (i) according to which R is a proper constituent of aRb, and thus not identical to aRb. fu a nutshell, how is R's being a proper constituent of aRb consistent with R' s being the unifier of a and b given that R cannot exist except as relating a and b?

The problem Mertz faces is to have some principled way to distinguish relation-instance R from the fact aRb in the face of the metaphysical necessity that aRb exists if and only if R exists. Presumably, R is the relatedness of a and b taken in abstraction from a and b. fudeed, Mertz says something like this: "single relation instances ... are abstractions from complexes consisting of instances and the relata they combine.'>3J But if a relation-instance is an abstraction from the complex aRb, then it is impossible to see how this relationinstance could function as the ontic link between a and b, as the unifier of a and b. A unifier cannot be an abstraction; it must be a real ingredient in a fact.

Glance back at our reconstruction of Bradley' s argument. Mertz denies premise (2). But if we are right, this is not the correct response to the reclusive genius. What we must deny is (6). More generally, what we must deny is that unifiers can be internal to facts, can be constituents of them. Even if there are irreducible relations, i.e., relations irreducible to monadic foundations, they cannot function as unifiers. Relations cannot be the glue of the world, to invert a slogan of Grossmann. This is not to deny that we need ontic glue; it is to deny that the glue can be found within facts. Reductionism fails. We must either take the Armstrong line that facts (states of affairs) themselves are unifiers, or that the unifier of a fact is something external to it. Either facts themselves do the gluing, or the GIuer lies elsewhere.

10. DOES RELATEDNESS REQUIRE UNlFIERS?

We are nearing the end of our long argument for the thesis that the unifier of a

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fact's constituents cannot be a further constituent. We just saw that a relationinstance is not equipped for the task of unification. And if unifiers are taken to be universal relations, then Mr. Bradley's regress is up and running. But all of this rests on a presupposition that must now be examined, namely, that we need unifiers in the first place. If relations are the only possible candidates for the office of unifier, then the presupposition to be examined is that the 'Moorean fact' of relatedness, the pre-analytic datum that there are relational situations in the world, requires relations. The presupposition, in brief, is that relatedness requires (universal) relations. Clearly, Bradley is wedded to this presupposition. He may be taken to argue as follows.

1. Relatedness requires relations. 2. Relations are self-contradictory.

Therefore 3. Relatedness is self-contradictory, hence mere appearance.

But Bradley's opponent Lord Russell is also committed to the presupposition that relatedness requires relations, since he in effect makes a modus tollens out of Bradley's modus ponens:

1. Relatedness requires relations. -3. Relatedness is real, hence not self-contradictory.

Therefore -2. Relations are not self-contradictory.

There is, however, a third possibility, which is to argue for the negation of the presupposition. Milton Fisk argues in effect:

-3. Relatedness is real, hence not self-contradictory. 2. Relations are self-contradictory.

Therefore -1. Relatedness does not require relations. Whereas Mertz takes Bradley's regress to show that actually relating

relations cannot be universals, but must be relation-instances, Fisk takes the regress to show that there are no irreducible relations, whether as universals, or as particulars (relation-instances). An irreducible relation is one that is genuinely 'between' or 'among' its relata and so cannot be reduced to monadic foundations in the relata. Fisk's view, which interests us here only as representing a type of approach, is essentially the following. If relatedness (a relational situation) requires for its explanation relations, then these relations must be (i) universals that (ii) actually relate their relata. But Bradley's regress shows that relations satisfying these two constraints cannot exist. Therefore, relatedness does not require relations. This implies that relatedness must be explained in terms of monadic properties of the relata.

Fisk couches his argument in terms of relations, but we will examine a generalized form of the argument:

a. Relatedness is real, not mere appearance.


b. Unifiers are relations. c. Relations are universals, not particulars (relation-instances). d. Relations are self-contradictory. (From (c) and Bradley's regress argument)

Therefore e. Unifiers are self-contradictory. (From (b) and (d» f. What is self-contradictory cannot be real or part of any genuine explanation of what is real. (Plausible assumption)

Therefore g. Relatedness does not require unifiers. (From (e) and (f»

From our point of view, the problem with this argument is premise (b). But (b) is quite a natural assumption to make, so it would not be dialectically effective for us simply to deny it. We need to point out the problems with an assay of relatedness that does not require relations.

Our question, then, is whether the 'Moorean fact,' the datum, of relatedness can be explained without invoking universal relations. Can universal relations be eliminated in favor of such particulars as propertyinstances, accidents, tropes and the like?32 Suppose Socrates is whiter than Alcibiades. One might try the analysis: Socrates has the relational accident, whiteness-in-respect-of-Alcibiades, and Alcibiades has the distinct relational accident, darkness-in-respect-of-Socrates. These relational accidents are particulars (unrepeatables). On thisfoundationist analysis, to give it a name, the original relational fact (Socrates' being whiter than Alcibiades) reduces to a conjunction of two nonrelational facts: Socrates' having whiteness-in-respectof-Alcibiades & Alcibiades , having darkness-in-respect-of-Socrates. Both facts are nonrelational both in the sense that neither has as constituent an ordinary relation, but also in the sense that neither has as constituent an exemplification relation. Thus each substance has its relational accident without exemplifying it, without in any sense being externally related to it, or even externally nonrelated to it (as in the 'nonrelational tie' and Fregean variations). Substance S and accident A are so 'related' (speaking loosely) that although S can exist without A (though presumably not without some accidents or other), A cannot exist except in S. This implies that A is neither repeatable nor transferrable.

We are going to have to ask whether a 'fact' consisting of an accidents' inhering in a substance could be a genuine truth-making fact. But for now the task is to cast some doubt on foundationism. As suggested above, a sentence like 'Socrates is shorter than Simmias,' might be analyzed as a conjunction neither conjunct of which contains a relation-expression: 'Socrates has shortness-withrespect-to-Simrnias and Simrnias has tallness-with-respect-to-Socrates.' One problem is that analyses such as these presuppose the existence of at least one relation?3 For the property Socrates has is coordinated with the property Simrnias has. Since foundations come in pairs, each foundation P is coordinated

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with a foundation Q and vice versa.. The relation of coordination remains unreduced. Hector-Neri Castaneda's version of foundationism may seem to evade this problem but it faces others. Castaneda analyzes 'Socrates is shorter than Simmias' as 'Shortness (Socrates) Tallness (Simmias), where "the juxtaposition of the matrices 'Shortness ()' and 'Tallness ()' expresses the withrespect-to connection between the two participations in the Forms making up the relation shorterness.,,34 Note that Castaneda's analysans, unlike the foregoing one, is not conjunctive; it expresses a peculiar atomic fact.

The most obvious difficulty with this analysis, as Grossmann points out,35 is that it is not clear how 'Shortness (Socrates) Tallness (Simmias)' is to be read and understood in English. It cannot be read as a conjunction; neither as 'Socrates is short and Simmias is tall' nor as 'Socrates has shortness-ascompared-to-Simmias and Simmias has tallness-as-compared-to-Socrates.' How then is the expression, which seems to have two parts, to be read? Replacing the 'and' with a comma or semi-colon of course changes nothing as regards logical form. Could it be read as: 'Socrates has shortness with respect to Simmias has tallness'? But that makes no sense. So it is not at all clear what fact Castaneda's analysans is supposed to express.

A second difficulty, also pointed out by Grossmann,36 is that, since Shortness and Tallness both occur together in the fact in question, the relation of occurring together in the same fact must go unreduced. This is just the coordination relation under a different guise.

Finally, how is the matrix, 'Shortness ( )' to be understood? Does Socrates exemplify Shortness? That would introduce the relation of exemplification. Castaneda, as a sophisticated bundle-theorist, has a way of avoiding exemplification; but to follow this out would land us deep within the bowels of his ontology with its commitment to nonexistent objects, the Identity of Indiscernibles, and other controversial theses. Suffice it to say that foundationism is reasonably rejected, and that it is therefore reasonable to hold to the BradleylRussell view that relatedness requires relations. To put it in a more general form, it is reasonable to hold that relatedness requires a unifier.

11. ARE PROPERTIES UNNERSALS?

If foundationism is true, then relatedness does not require relations. Let us now consider what this implies for monadic contingent facts like a's being F. What foundationism implies is that the relatedness of a to F-ness does not require any exemplification relation or other internal unifier, and that for this reason Bradley's problem about unity cannot arise within monadic facts any more than it can arise within properly relational facts such as aRb. But then F-ness cannot be a universal. For if F-ness is a universal contingently possessed by a, then Fness can exist whether or not a exemplifies it, just as a can exist whether or not


it exemplifies F-ness, and so the connection between a and F-ness once again becomes a problem. So what we now must consider is whether the way to avoid Bradley's problem, for monadic facts at least, is to construe properties as particulars rather than as universals. We need to consider (i) the classical conception of substance and accident, (ii) Brentano's conception of substance and accident, and (iii) the theory of tropes.

The Classical Conception of Substance and Accident. Suppose redness is not a universal but a particularized quality, or in traditional terminology, an accident. Accidents are said to inhere in substances. Thus one sort of particular -- an abstract particular -- inheres in another sort, a concrete particular. It seems obvious that inherence is a tighter, more intimate connection than exemplification, even if exemplification is taken to be a non-relational tie. Why? Well, if redness is a universal, then, even if it cannot exist unexemplified, it is nevertheless ontologically indifferent to whether it is exemplified by a or b or.... But if redness is an accident, then there is so such thing as redness as such; there is only the redness of a, the redness of b, etc., such that the redness of a cannot exist unless a exists, the redness of b cannot exist unless b exists, etc. Accidents are 'less separable' from substances than universals are from particulars. The being of an accident is exhausted by its inhering in the very substance in which it does inhere; the being of a universal, however, is not exhausted by its being exemplified by a particular that happens to exemplify it. Not only can accidents not exist without substances, they cannot exist without the very substances of which they are the accidents. Thus they are not 'transferable.' My coldness cannot migrate to you, nor is my being cold today numerically identical with my being cold yesterday. Since nothing can have two beginnings of existence, whenever I start and stop being cold a different coldness accident comes into, and passes out of, being.

Moreover, accidents are traditionally thought to be modifications or modes of substances. As Van Cleve puts it, " ... to be red is to be a certain way; it is not to be related to a certain object.,,37 The apple is not red by being related to redness; it is or exists redly. Thus inherence is not a relation in which the accident stands to the substance, and it would be a mistake to think that the accident must exist as a condition of its standing in said relation to the substance. The existence of the accident is precisely its being in (inesse) the substance of which it is the accident in the way in which the existence of a universal could never be its exemplification by (not in) a specific particular. But despite the intimacy of the bond between a substance and its accidents, there is still a difference: Socrates is not identical to his whiteness. Identity is governed by indiscernibility: if x and yare identical, then x has a property if and only if y has it. Socrates and his whiteness cannot be identical since he is, e.g., a good dialectician, but his whiteness is not a good dialectician. The question is whether this difference suffices to engender the unity problem. Can we sensibly

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ask about the difference between the fact of Socrates' being white and the mere collection consisting of Socrates and his whiteness?

It would seem not. Socrates' whiteness need not exist, but if it does exist, it cannot exist apart from Socrates and is thus existentially dependent upon him. Accidents are necessarily linked to their substances, the contingency of both notwithstanding. But a necessary link is not one that needs to be grounded in a third entity such as an exemplification nexus. Thus it seems that there can be no difference between the fact of Socrates' being white and the mere collection of the fact's constituents. There is no difference between the fact, Socrates' being white, and the sum, Socrates + his whiteness, assuming that his whiteness is exactly the same entity in both he sum and the fact. (Or, if you insist that there is a difference between fact and sum, then the accident in the sum is not numerically identical to the accident in the fact, but an illicit reification of the latter.) So if the constituents are there, then eo ipso the fact is there. Facts would then supervene upon the bare existence of their constituents, with no need for a nexus to tie them into a fact. A fact would be an "ontological free lunch" in a phrase of Armstrong. Perhaps in thought one can separate Socrates from his whiteness, but if there is no separability in reality, there is no need for a nexus to unite them.

So if the substance-accident metaphysic were tenable, Bradley's regress would be blocked, and we would have a solution (dissolution?) of the problem of the unity of a thing. Unfortunately, the classical conception of substance is one of the murkiest in the history of philosophy. So if Aristotle is the cure for Bradley, this is a case of the cure being worse than the disease. For what is a (primary) substance (prote ousia)? One of the functions of a substance is to serve as the substratum or support of a thing's properties. The substance is that in which the accidents inhere like pins in a pin cushion. This implies that a substance is a particular. But Aristotle also seems committed to the view that a substance is a universal. For he argues in Metaphysics VIl.6 that a primary substance is identical with its essence. But an essence is a universal: whatever the essence of being human turns out to be, it will be common to Socrates and Plato, something they share, hence not something identical with either. So which is it? Are primary substances particulars or universals?

The natural thing to say is that primary substances are particulars (unrepeatables). But if primary substances are particulars, how are they 'related' to their essences, which are universals? This 'relation' cannot be inherence. For (i) inherence connects one particular or unrepeatable with another, and (ii) what inheres is an accident, something that its supporting substance can exist without, whereas an essence is not something its substance can exist without. So it seems as if the 'relation' between a substance and its essence is one of exemplification. But then the Aristotelian position is wide open to the Bradleyan objections. Not so, of course, if a substance is identical with its essence. But this identity brings


problems of its own. How can an accident inhere in an essence, which is a universal? An accident is a particular whose particularity derives from its being a modification of a particular. Thus Socrates' whiteness is a particular because it is a modification of Socrates, a particular. But if Socrates is identically his essence, then our man is a universal, in which case he cannot particularize whiteness. Compare what we have to say on this head in Chapter 6, section 11.

There are of course other difficulties, but enough has been said to expose the unclarity of the classical conception of substance and accident and thus to render it useless as a means of defusing Bradley's problem.

Brentano's Conception of Substance and Accident. There are other conceptions of substance and accident, however, most notably, Franz Brentano's.38 Let us see if Brentano can stop Bradley. Brentano attempts to understand the substance-accident 'relation' in terms of the part-whole 'relation.' A proper part of a whole is distinct from the whole of which it is a part, yet the whole cannot exist without the part. The whole is ontologically dependent upon its parts, but not vice versa. Here we have a very close analog to the circumstance that an accident is ontologically dependent upon its substance, but not vice versa.

Exploiting this analogy, Brentano maintains that an accident is a whole whose sole proper part is its substance. Brentano thus appears to stand the classical conception on its head. According to that conception, accidents are 'in' substances; but Brentano has it that substances are 'in' accidents. The appearance of an inversion is dispelled, however, if we note that 'in' is being used in two senses: first, to signify ontological dependence; second, to signify mereological inclusion. So Brentano's conception is not that far from the classical one, since he too holds that accidents are 'in' (ontologically dependent upon) substances, albeit in the way wholes onto logically depend on their parts.

Nevertheless, if the substance-accident nexus is to be a part-whole nexus, it must be a very special one. For the substance must be both (i) a proper part and (ii) the sole part of the accident. The substance must be distinct from the accident, but not such that something else is required to be added to it to yield the accident. An example Brentano gives of this sort of part-whole 'relation' is that between colored and red. Colored is contained in, or a proper part of, red, but not vice versa. But there is nothing (no specific difference) one could add to colored to get red in the way one adds rational to animal to get man. Colored is thus the sole proper part of red. Similarly, a substance is the sole proper part of each of its accidents.

This construction is ingenious but unworkable. Suppose substance S has two different accidents, Al and A2. On Brentano's theory, Al is the whole whose sole proper part is S, while A2 is the whole whose sole proper part is also S. What then distinguishes Al from A2? Al and A2 are wholes. But two wholes are different only if one has a member the other doesn't have, or vice

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versa. Two wholes are not distinguishable qua wholes, since in this respect they are the same. But both of the wholes in question have the same member, S, hence are indistinguishable. The point is ontological, not epistemological. It is not just that we cannot tell them apart, but that there is nothing in or about these wholes to make them different. Brentano's theory thus appears to have the absurd consequence that distinct accidents are not distinct. The theory implies that all of Socrates' accidents (being pale, snubnosed, hot, bothered, married to Xanthippe) are the same accident. The theory gives the right answer when it comes to the difference between Socrates' paleness and Plato's warmth: it implies that these accidents are different, which of course they are. But it gives the right answer for the wrong reason: they are distinct not because (or not only because) Socrates and Plato are distinct, but also because these qualities are themselves distinct, which is to say that they are distinct quite apart from their inhering in Socrates and Plato respectively. For if paleness and warmth were distinct only in virtue of the difference between Socrates and Plato, then paleness and warmth in Socrates would not be distinct, which is absurd. The point is that the difference between accidents is qualitative and thus impossible to explain in terms of the numerical difference of the substances of which they are the accidents.

The argument, then, is this: 1. If two wholes differ numerically, then they differ in a proper part: one has a proper part the other doesn't have or vice versa. 2. An accident A of substance S is a whole whose sole proper part is S. (Brentano's Theory)

Therefore 3. If S has accidents Al and A2, then there are two numerically distinct wholes WI and W2 each of whose sole proper part is S. (From 2)

Therefore 4. If S has accidents Al and A2, then WI and W2 both differ in a part and do not differ in a part. (From 1 and 3)

Therefore 5. Given that the antecedent of (4) is true, while the consequent of (4) is a contradiction, and given that (1) is true, it follows that (2) -Brentano's Theory -- is false. One response to this argument might be to question premise (1). Why

cannot two wholes just differ, but without differing with respect to any part? We cannot see that this makes sense, but even if it did, it would lead to a difficulty for Brentano' s theory. If whole WI is a different existent from whole W2, but the two wholes do not differ in any part, then one way this could be true is if neither has a part, and both are 'empty wholes' or 'null wholes.' That would imply that the existence of these wholes would not be dependent on the existence of their members. They would exist in their own right. But then


accidents, which on Brentano's theory are wholes, would not be ontologically dependent on the existence of supporting substances - which contradicts the very notion of an accident. We get the same result if the two wholes have members, but have all the same members. If the two wholes are numerically different "distinct existences" (Hume), then each can exist without the other existing. But since they share all their members, this implies that the existence of each whole does not depend ontologically on the existence of its members. But then accidents, which Brentano says are wholes, would not be onto logically dependent on the existence of substances - which is absurd. The conclusion to be drawn is that the above argument cannot be resisted by rejecting premise (1).

This shows what happens when one tries to philosophize in a reistic straitjacket. The bind Brentano gets himself into is similar to one that catches the class nominalist. Suppose the latter says that F-ness is just the class of Fs. If there is exactly one F, and exactly one G, and they are identical, then the theory implies that F-ness = G-ness, which is absurd.

The upshot is that Brentano stops Bradley but only at the expense of destroying property-possession. Brentano makes the tie between property and particular too intimate, so intimate that he cannot account for the difference between different accidents of the same substance. No doubt Bradley's regress cannot begin to arise on Brentano' s conception; but likewise teenage pregnancy cannot arise in a world with no teenagers. The solution to the social ill is not to get rid of teenagers; the solution to Bradley's problem is not to collapse properties into their bearers.

Trope Theory. Suppose we tum to tropes for relief. The critique of Brentano has just shown us that the distinctness of such quality instances as this red and that blue -- which is both a qualitative and a numerical distinctness -cannot supervene upon the merely numerical distinctness of their bearers. The numerical distinctness of the bearers explains at most the numerical distinctness of the quality instances. This is one of the lessons we have just learned from the failures of substance theories. Can one have distinctness of quality instances without bearers, but also without universals? Enter the trope theory of D. C. Williams as developed by Keith Campbell.

Tropes are particularized properties or abstract particulars: the particular smell of this coffee, the shape of that cup, the purple of yonder mountain. 'Abstract' here does not mean non-spatio-temporal, but partial or incomplete. Tropes differ from Aristotelian accidents in that they do not require the support of a substratum. They 'float free.' They need individuation ab extra as little as they need support ab extra: they differ numerically from each other without the need of any constituent to make them differ. In that respect they are like bare particulars, except of course that they are not bare. Each is a nature. Each is at once and indissolubly a this and a such. Tropes are the "alphabet of being" (D. C. Williams), the rock bottom existents out of which all else is built

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up. Ordinary, concrete particulars are bundles or clusters of these abstract particulars. Thus Socrates is a bundle of tropes, a system of actually compresent tropes, and to say that he is pale is to say that a pale trope is compresent with the other tropes comprising him.

Enough has been said to see that our old difficulty is left standing: What is the difference between a system of actually compresent tropes and the mere collection of those same tropes? There is obviously a difference, since there are collections of tropes to which there does not correspond an actual, concrete particular. For Keith Campbell, the difference is as follows:

... the actual world consists of compresent complexes of tropes at a place. These complexes are mereological sums of their components. But in addition to that whole sum (Compresent, place-I, a, b, c), there is the set whose members are that sum's parts: {Compresent, place-I, a, b, c }.39

Campbell goes on to identify unactualized possibilities with sets of tropes to which no mereological complex corresponds.

This implies that what makes the difference between the actual and the possible is mereological unity: Mereologically unified tropes form actual objects; merely set-theoretically unified tropes form merely possible objects. But this explanation of the difference is wholly inadequate.

It is obviously inadequate if mereological composition is unrestricted; if, as David Lewis says, "any old class of things has a mereological sum. ,,40 For then, to every class of tropes at a place there will correspond an actual trope complex. Every possible such complex will be an actual one.

A second problem concerns the nature of cornpresence itself. Consider two logically, metaphysically, and nomically independent tropes, Tl and T2. They might be being hard and being shiny. A coin, for example, which is both hard and shiny, could, consistently with the laws of logic, metaphysics, and physics, be hard but not shiny. And yet T1 and T2 are compresent in the coin. What is compresence in a case like this? Four possibilities: either compresence is a relational trope, or an internal relation, or a founded external relation, or an unfounded external relation.

Now I have already established, in my Chapter 3, section 6 discussion of D. C. Williams' trope theory, that compresence or concurrence cannot be a relational trope. Could compresence be an internal relation where this is defined as a relation which has foundations in its terms, foundations which are essential to the identity of those terms? No, and for two reasons. First, what properties of Tl and T2 could serve as the foundations in them for the compresence relation? Second, if T1 and T2 were internally related, then they could not independently vary: Tl would have to be compresent with T2. This amounts to a reductio ad absurdum of the internality of compresence.


Could compresence be a founded external relation, a relation which has foundations, but whose foundations are not essential to the identity of the terms? Again no, for the reason that there are no properties of T1 and T2 that could serve as the foundations in them for the compresence relation. This leaves the fourth possibility: compresence is an unfounded external relation. But this possibility succumbs to Bradley's regress argument.

The upshot is that Campbell's trope theory leaves us with Bradley's problem. Some give tropes the support of a substratum, but this view is sufficiently similar to the substance-accident models criticized above that we are absolved from any special discussion of it. Our conclusion, then, is that treating properties as particulars, whether as Aristotelian accidents, Brentanian accidents, or tropes, provides no relief from Bradley.

12. ARE THE EXISTENCE AND ACTUALITY OF A FACT THE SAME?

There is yet another assumption the rejection of which may be thought to solve or dissolve Bradley's problem. This is the assumption that the existence and the actuality of a fact are the same, that a fact cannot exist unless it is actual. Equivalently, it is the assumption that fact-constituents cannot be unified in the fact-way without constituting an actual fact. To reject this assumption is to hold that all categorially possible facts exist, but only some are actual. This implies a distinction between existence and actuality. On this proposal, a possible fact is itself a fact, a fact in the mode of possibility, and not merely the possibility of there being a fact; a possible fact is thus a genuine unity of constituents, albeit an unactual one.

Gi ven this 'bipolar' approach according to which all facts exist, but only some are actual (obtain), could one still press the question: What is the difference between the fact of a's being F and the membership of {a, NEX, Fness}? No. For this question has a point and a clear sense only if the existence of the fact entails the existence of its constituents, but not vice versa. But the converse entailment would be valid if every possible fact exists. For then the existence of the constituents (including the nexus) would suffice for the existence of the fact. There would be no need for any further 'assembly' of these constituents. There would be no room for a distinction between the substantival and participial aspects of a tie, i.e., the distinction between the tie as a 'static' entity and as a 'dynamic' tying tie, between a tie that 'just sits there' and a tie that 'does something,' namely, ties the other constituents into a fact. Compare Russell's distinction between an "actually relating relation" and a relation that is "merely one member of an aggregate.,,41 This sort of distinction could get no grip if every possible fact is an existing (although not an actual) fact.

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To say that every possible fact exists is to say that every possible combination of categoriaUy allowable constituents is 'automatically' a fact. To illustrate, consider a world of two individuals, two nonrelational universals and one nexus: a, b, F-ness, G-ness, NEX. Out of all the possible combinations of these entities, only four triples are categorially allowable: <a, NEX, F-ness>, <b, NEX, F-ness>, <b, NEX, G-ness>, <a, NEX, G-ness>. Now consider the first triple. How does it, or its membership, differ from a's being F? If every possible fact exists, then there is no difference at all: the existence of the three constituents, one of which is a nexus, entails the existence of the fact. If the constituents are there, then eo ipso the fact is there, which is to say that the constituents cannot exist in a disconnected state. Although the representation of the constituents as a triple suggests that they can exist disconnected, the representation is misleading if all possible facts exist. And since the constituents cannot exist in a disconnected state, there can be no legitimate question as to the difference between the fact of a's being F and the mere collection of its constituents.

Equivalently, since possible unity of fact-constituents entails existent unity, the unity of every fact is a necessary unity. Of course, this is a conditional necessity: if the constituents exist, then necessarily they are unified, form a fact. Nevertheless, this is to say more than that, necessarily, if the constituents exist, then they are unified, form a fact. Given the necessity of the unity, it is clear that the question as to the difference between a fact and the mere collection of its constituents cannot arise.

The upshot is that Bradley's problem can be solved if we abandon the assumption that the existence and the actuality of a fact are the same( or necessarily equivalent); if we admit unities of fact-constituents that are not actual. But this 'solution' is unacceptable.

Our main objection to it is very simply that if facts are truth-makers, then facts must all be actual. For if merely possible facts are truth-makers, then sentences and beliefs that are false, but possibly true, will be made true by these merely possible facts - which is absurd. In other words, the following triad is inconsistent:

a. Every fact is a truth-maker. b. Every truth-maker obtains (is actual). c. Some facts do not obtain (are not actual).

The truth of (a) follows from our discussion in the previous chapter: facts were introduced via the truth-maker argument. A fact just is a truth-maker. (b) is self-evident: if a truth-bearer is true, then its truth-maker must obtain. From (a) and (b), the negation of (c) follows. Hence, every fact obtains or is actual, which is to say that the existence and the actuality of a fact coincide. It follows that Bradley's problem cannot be defused by distinguishing the existence and actuality of facts.


We could stop right here, but a further consideration may be of interest. What could the actuality of a fact be it is not the unity of its constituents? Is it a property of the fact as a whole, a property the fact exemplifies? Obviously not, for then the old difficulty would arise once again: What is the difference between the higher-order fact that a's being F is actual and the membership of {a's being F, NEX, actuality}? Bergmann, sensitive to this difficulty,42 speaks of the "pervasion" of a fact by its mode.43 The two modes are actuality and potentiality. "The combination of a fact and its mode is a Two-in-One, which itself has no mode; nor are the two existents thus combined held together by anything. ,,44

A fact and its mode are "totally inseparable.,,45 Thus there is no third item that grounds a fact's being actual if it is actual, or potential if it is potential. If there were such an item, a regress would ensue. But if a fact and its mode are totally inseparable, how can the conclusion be avoided that every actual (potential) fact is necessarily actual (potential)? The fact of a's being green, though actual, might not have been actual: a might have been red. The fact, we say, is contingent. Sense could be made of this contingency if we said that, although a exemplifies greenness, it might have exemplified redness instead. But we cannot say this if every possible fact exists. For then both a's being green and a's being red exist. What we have to say is that a's being green, taken as a unit, is actual. But given the total inseparability of fact and mode, how can we make sense ofthe contingency of a's being green? We cannot say that this fact might have been merely potential. We seem forced to say that it is necessarily actual -- which is absurd.

Of course, this is a conditional necessity. Given that the constituents exist, the fact necessarily exists, and with it, inseparably, its mode. Thus there is a way for a's being green, which is actual, to be unactual, and that is for one or more of its constituents not to exist. But the possibility of a's being red instead of green is surely not the possibility of a's nonexistence; it is the possibility that a exist with a different property. Nor is it the possibility of the nonexistence of greenness, or of individual and universal together.

13. IS THE UNITY OF A COMPLEX CONTINGENT?

There is a further assumption embedded in Bradley's problem, the assumption that the unity of the constituents of a complex is contingent. For if it were a necessary unity, there would be no need for a tie distinct from the items tied. This has led Butchvarov to claim that "If the togetherness of a cluster of qualities is contingent, then the Bradleyan infinite regress is unavoidable.,,46 A cluster of qualities is not a fact, but Butchvarov makes it clear that his point applies also to facts. The point would then be that if the togetherness of the constituents of a fact is contingent, the Bradleyan regress is unavoidable.

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Whether or not the regress is unavoidable, the contingency of the togetherness of the constituents is surely a necessary condition of the regress. This contingency cannot, however, be denied.

This is obvious given that facts are truth-makers. The truth-maker of a contingent truth must be a contingent existent. But the contingent existence of a fact is just the contingent unity of its constituents. If there were a necessary unity of constituents in a fact, then no fact could be a truth-maker of any contingent truth.

14. SUMMARY AND TRANSITION

We have been defending the genuineness and seriousness of Bradley' s problem about the unity of a fact. It cannot be solved or dissolved in any of the ten or so ways just examined. Our interim conclusion must be that the reductionist conception fails: a fact does not exhaustively decompose into sub-factual elements. A fact is a contingent unity of constituents, but the ground of this contingent unity cannot be located in any constituent, whether this be an ordinary universal relation, an ordinary relation-instance, an exemplification relation, a nonrelational tie, or anything else. We take this to be the lesson to be learned from Bradley's regress. This completes our defense of premise (2)-Reductionism is false -- in the Master Argument of this chapter to be found at its beginning.

Thus the lesson is not that there are no relations, or that relations are self-contradictory, but that relations (whether ordinary or the putative relation of exemplification) cannot be unifiers of the facts of which they are constituents. They cannot be what does the actual connecting of the constituents in a fact. This is so whether relations are universals or particulars (relation-instances). That a universal relation cannot do any actual connecting is no reason to think that relation-instances do the actual connecting. If a fact needs a unifier, this unifier cannot be anything internal to it: the unifier cannot be a constituent. To solve Bradley's problem we must reject this assumption. Accordingly, the lesson to be learned from Bradley is that the unity of a complex cannot be explained in terms of its constituents.

But the assumption that the unifier is a constituent can be rejected in three ways, only two of which have received any 'press.'

One way is by claiming that the unity of a fact is a primary datum and that distinctions among constituents within a fact are distinctions we introduce into this primary whole by our thinking. Our relational thinking, although serviceable for ordinary purposes, ultimately falsifies the primary datum. On this view, which is close to Bradley's position, one cannot understand a fact or thick particular as a complex built up out of onto logically more basic constituents, since what is ontologically primary is the whole itself. Ultimately,


this leads to monism. I mention this approach only to reject it since it conflicts with the basic thrust of a constituent ontology, namely, that ordinary things are understandable in terms of ontologically more basic constituents. Recall that a constituent ontology is needed to be able to explain how existence can belong to an individual without being a property of it.

A second way of rejecting the unifier-is-a-constituent assumption is by arguing that a complex such as a fact is an irreducible or basic entity. If facts are irreducible entities, then they presumably stand in no need of a unifier to tie their constituents together. On this conception, represented by Herbert Hochberg and others, a fact is not a 'product' of the unification of its constituents by a special unifying constituent, but an existent in addition to its constituents. Facts have no need of either an internal or an external unifier; the unifier of a fact's constituents is the fact itself.

The third way of rejecting the assumption is by holding that a fact is indeed a 'product' of the unification of its constituents, and thus an entity reducible to its constituents, but that the unifier of the fact's constituents is 'external' to the fact. By 'external' we mean distinct from the fact and its constituents, distinct from each one of them and from the lot of them, and from the fact which is their togetherness. We solve the Bradley problem by rejecting the assumption in this third way. We then go on to ask how the unifier of a fact's constituents could be external to the fact, and what the unifier is. But first we need to argue against the view that facts constitute an irreducible category of entity.

15. ARE FACTS IRREDUCIBLE ENTITIES? HOCHBERG

The unifier of a fact's constituents cannot be internal to the fact. That leaves exactly three possibilities. Either (i) the unifier is the fact or state of affairs itself, or (ii) there is no need for a unifier of a fact's constituents, or (iii) the unifier is external to the fact and its constituents. We will now begin to steer toward (iii) by arguing against (i) and (ii). If these arguments succeed, it will have been shown (given that the unifier cannot be a constituent) that the unifier must be external. Let us first consider the position of Herbert Hochberg.

Hochberg is in agreement with our rejection of the assumption according to which the unifier of a fact's constituents is itself one of the fact's constituents. "If we recognize that the [Bradleyan] problem arises only as a challenge to analyze a fact solely in terms of its constituent elements, a simple and straightforward solution is forthcoming. We need merely acknowledge that such an analysis cannot be given.,,47 "Facts do not reduce to their constituent particulars, properties, relations, and nexus.,,48

This is correct, but Hochberg's positive account is neither satisfactory nor the only possible alternative. He tells us that "a fact is something in addition

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to its constituents, since it is the constituents connected or structured or related.,,49 "Facts must, therefore, be recognized as existents in addition to constituents offacts."50 Since facts cannot be reduced to their constituents, since they cannot be exhaustively analyzed in terms of them, they are "irreducible" entitiesY He also writes that "Facts can be said to be unanalyzable complexes [emphasis added] in two senses: first, there is no special relating tie connecting their constituents; and, second, given the constituents a fact mayor may not exist.,,52

What is it for a fact to be an existent in addition to its constituents, an irreducible entity or an unanalyzable complex? Hochberg is rejecting a Bergmann-style assay of facts. On the latter, a fact is not an existent in addition to its constituents but a complex composed of its constituents, and thus reducible to them. On Bergmann's 1967 analysis, a's being Finvolves three constituents: a particular, a universal and the nexus of exemplification. The fact just is a and F-ness tied together by the exemplification nexus; it is not something in addition to these three constituents. For Bergmann, the ontologist's task is not merely the descriptive one of providing a categorial inventory of all existents, but also the explanatory one of deriving the complex from the simple. "Ontology accounts for everything in terms of simples."53 Given that simples alone exist in the philosophically basic sense, it follows that facts, being complexes of simples, do not exist in the same sense, although of course they exist in an ordinary pre-theoretical sense of the term. 54 So when Hochberg says that facts are irreducible entities, I take him to be rejecting the sort of ontological reduction proposed by Bergmann, and asserting that facts exist just as robustly as their constituents do.

But this view of Hochberg is puzzling. There appear to be three ways of construing it, none of them acceptable.

Construal One. We are told that a fact is an irreducible entity, an entity in addition to its constituents, but also that a fact is "the constituents connected or structured or related.,,55 So a fact has constituents, but is somehow distinct from them. This suggests that the fact of a's being F = a + F-ness + a unifier, where this unifier is not a further constituent. On the one hand, since a fact is more than its constituents, it is natural to think that there must be a unifier. On the other hand, this unifier cannot be a special unifying constituent, or any constituent. What then is the unifier? On one interpretation, the unifier is just the fact itself: the fact itself, and not some special constituent, is what holds the primary constituents together. But this quickly leads to trouble. For then what we have is:

a. The fact = a + F-ness + unifier. (Because the fact is more than its constituents. ) b. The unifier = the fact itself. (Because the unifier cannot be a constituent. )


Therefore, by substitution of the left-hand side of (b) into the right-hand side of (a),

But c. The fact = a + F-ness + the fact itself.

d. The unifier (= the fact itself) cannot be a constituent of the fact. (A fact cannot have itself as one of its constituents.)

Therefore e. The fact is wholly distinct from its own constituents.

But (e) is clearly absurd: since a and F-ness are constituents of a's being F, this fact cannot be wholly distinct from a and F-ness. We have just quoted Hochberg as saying that the fact is "the constituents structured or connected or related." The truth is rather that the fact and its constituents are partially identical: they are identical in respect of a and F-ness. What this reductio ad absurdum shows is that premise (b) must be rejected. If there is a unifier, a ground of unity, it cannot be the fact itself.

This is also clear from the following consideration. A fact is nothing other than the unity of its constituents. A fact cannot therefore be the ground of this unity. A ground must be something whose existence is independent of the existence of what it grounds. If there is a unifier of a fact's constituents, a ground of their unity, then this unifier cannot be the fact itself any more than it can be something internal to the fact.

Construal Two. Hochberg, however, most likely has something different in mind with his talk of facts as "irreducible entities," namely, that facts are basic entities ("unanalyzable complexes") the unity of whose constituents is a brute given. If so, there would be no need for a unifier to explain or ground a fact's unity. In that case, a fact is a unity of constituents without a unifier. It is not the fact that unifies its constituents; the latter just form a unity. There is unity but no unifier. Why must there be a ground of unity?

There must be a ground of unity, because, without a ground, there is no explanation of the difference between the sum, a + F-ness, and the fact, a's being F. This is a genuine difference given that both a and F-ness can exist apart from the fact in question. In the sum, F-ness is an 'inert ingredient,' a character that does not characterize, a determination that does not determine, a quality that does not qualify. But in the fact, F-ness is an 'active ingredient,' a characterizing character. Bradley's challenge is essentially this: How do you get from the sum to the fact? If you cannot account for this difference, you have no right to posit facts. Hochberg's response, in effect, is that there just are facts, and there is no need to 'get to them.' (Thus, charitably interpreted, he is not saying that facts themselves do the unifying job that internal unifiers could not do.) But this is a bogus solution which legislates the problem out of existence, or else solves it by fiat. It is no better than the arbitrary stipulation that there are nonrelational ties for which the Bradley problem cannot arise. If the problem

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is to explain how a and F-ness come together so as to form a truth-making fact, it is no solution to say that there just are irreducible entities in which they do come together in the manner required. If the problem is to explain how a fact is so much as possible, it is no solution to asseverate that facts are actual. No doubt, if they are actual, then they are possible. But the problem is to explain how they are possible. In the absence of a good answer to the possibility question, we have excellent reason to doubt that facts are actual.

Let us not forget that the existence of facts in general is not obvious. Even if there are particulars (individuals) and universals, with particulars instantiating universals, why must there also be a third category of entity, facts? (Recall the anti-fact animadversions of the ostrich realist from the preceding chapter.) It cannot be claimed to be a datum that there are facts. Argument is needed. There is of course the truth-maker argument for facts elaborated and defended in the last chapter. But if facts are impossible, then the truth-maker argument cannot be sound. So any challenge to the possibility of facts must be taken seriously. Bradley's regress is just such a challenge. It cannot be met simply by positing an entity for which the problem does not arise.

Let us review why there is a serious question about the very possibility of a fact. A fact, as a complex, is an ontologically dependent entity: it depends for its existence on the existence of the constituents that compose it. It cannot exist unless they do. Thus a's being F exists only if a and F-ness exist. The point is not merely that a fact cannot exist without some constituents or other, but that a fact cannot exist without the very constituents that it has. In apparent contradiction to this, however, a fact is something more than (the mereological sum of) its constituents, and thus does not depend for its existence on anything. This is because the existence of a fact is just the unity of its constituents, and this unity, on the nonreductionist approach we are now considering, does not depend on anything. Thus the unity of a's being F does not depend on a, on Fness, on the sum, a + F-ness, on any special constituent such as EX or NEX, on any sum such as a + EX + F-ness, or a + NEX + F-ness. As we have argued ad nauseam, no constituent of a fact can be its unifier. Thus no constituent of a fact can be the ground of its unity/existence. And we have just seen that the fact itself cannot be the ground of its unity/existence. Therefore, given that the unifier of a fact cannot be external to the fact, we must conclude that a fact on the nonreductionist conception does not depend for its existence on anything. In short, a fact is not an ontologically dependent entity.

Thus we are left with a contradiction: (D) a fact, qua complex, depends for its existence on the existence of its constituents; (-D) a fact, qua unity, does not depend for its existence on the existence of its constituents. Facts, conceived as the nonreductionist conceives them, thus appear to be contradictory structures, hence impossible. The seriousness of the contradiction derives from the plausibility of each of its limbs.


Suppose you deny (D). Then either you are saying that a fact does not have constituents at all, but is a simple entity, which is absurd; or you are saying that the constituents of a fact, a and F-ness in our example, are external to the fact, which is equally absurd. It cannot be that in the world there is a, F-ness, and the fact all equally existent, with the fact entirely separate from a and Fness. That would make sense only if the fact were an abstract entity, a Chisholmian, rather than a Tractarian, fact. Chisholmian facts do not reside in the causal order, but in a Platonic realm of abstracta. A Tractarian fact is a complex built up out of its parts, and is thus ontologically dependent on them. It cannot be wholly separate in its being from them. It cannot be a denizen of a Platonic realm apart.

It is equally clear that the second limb, (-D), cannot be denied. For although a fact is composed of its constituents, it is not a mere heap or aggregate or sum of them. It has a property that neither they nor their sum has, namely, the property of being a (potential) truth-maker. The existence of a fact is therefore nothing other than the unity of its constituents, the unity whereby it is equipped to play the truth-making role. This unity is the obtaining of the fact, and thus the worldly correlate of the proposition's truth. Since this unity does not derive from any constituent of the fact, or from the fact itself, the existence of a fact does not derive from any constituent of the fact, or the from the fact itself. A fact, therefore, does not depend for its existence (= its unity) on the existence of its constituents.

triad: The contradiction is most perspicuously represented as an inconsistent

a. A fact depends for its existence on its constituents. b. A fact does not depend for the unity of its constituents on its constituents. c. The existence of a fact is the unity of its constituents.

Since it is obvious that (a) and (b) are contradictory in the presence of (c), one might think to avoid the contradiction by denying (c). One might say this: the existence of a fact is not the unity of its constituents; it is the unity of its constituents PLUS the existence of its constituents. Although this idea naturally suggests itself, it is unworkable. A fact is just a unity of its constituents. If the existence of a's being F were identical to the unity of a and F-ness PLUS some additional factor X, then, given that the unity of a and F-ness just is the fact, a's being F, we would be saying this: the existence of a's being F is identical to the existence of a's being F PLUS X. The additional factor X adds nothing.

On the other hand, if one were to insist that the X factor (the existence of the constituents) does add something, then the question would arise as to how unity of constituents, on the one hand, and existence of constituents, on the other hand, could combine to form a unity. Suppose we start with the existence of a and F-ness. How do we add the unity of a and F-ness to this? We know that the

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existence of a + F-ness does not entail the existence of a's being F, and thus we know that the sum and the fact are distinct entities. On the view we are examining, however, there is no ground of this difference. Nothing makes them different: nothing internal to the fact, not the fact itself, and nothing external to the fact such as an operator that operates upon the constituents to form the fact. The fact is indeed more than the sum, but it is unaccountably more: there is therefore nothing one could add to the sum to get the fact. Thus it is nonsense on the view under examination to say that the existence of the fact is the existence of the constituents PLUS the unity of the constituents. The existence of the fact is identical to the unity of constituents, and the contradiction stands.

The challenge, then, is to show how this apparent contradiction is not a real contradiction. To do this, one must explain how the whole which is the sum, a + F-ness, is different from the whole which is the fact, a's being F. It will not do to say that the latter, unlike the former, is an 'unmereological whole' or an 'unmereological composition.' For this merely re-Iabels the difficulty, which could then be reformulated as the question, what is the difference between a mereological whole and an unmereological whole? What one has to do is to specify the ontological ground of the difference between the sum and the fact.

We have seen that this ontological ground cannot be located within the fact as a further constituent. And we have just argued that the fact itself cannot be this ontological ground. So it is not at all clear how Hochberg can avoid the contradiction. Note that his phrase, "unanalyzable complex," appears to be a contradictio in adjecto: the adjective, 'unanalyzable' contradicts the noun, 'complex.'

The view that there is just a brute difference between the sum and the fact, a difference without ground or explanation, thus issues in a contradiction. But there is another reason to reject the 'brute difference' view. For if it is admissible, then why would it not also be admissible for the ostrich realist to say that there are particulars and universals, that particulars instantiate universals, but that there is no explanation for the difference between a + F-ness, on the one hand, and a' s instantiating ofF-ness, on the other? There is clearly a difference, one that the ostrich takes to be brute, but that the fact-ontologist tries to explain. The latter claims what the ostrich denies, namely, that it cannot just be true that a instantiates F-ness; there must be a fact that makes it true. But if the factontologist must appeal to a brute given - the brute difference between sum and fact - then why not make the brute appeal sooner rather than later? What good does it do to posit a fact as a truth-maker if the difference between a fact and the sum of its constituents is a brute difference?

In sum, Hochberg on the second construal faces a dilemma. If there is need for a unifier, then, since it cannot be internal to the fact, it must be the fact itself. But this issues in absurdity, as was seen above. For it implies that a fact is wholly distinct from its constituents, which conflicts with the obvious point


that a fact, as a complex, is partially identical with its constituents. If, on the other hand, it is claimed that there is no need for a unifier, then there is nothing to distinguish a fact from its constituents, and a fact ends up being a contradictory structure for the reasons given.

Construal Three. The dilemmajust mentioned assumes that Hochberg's model for facts is compositional. But his model may be a noncompositional one according to which states of affairs or facts are ontologically basic, and their constituents are mere abstractions from them. This would avoid the unity problem that bedevils the compositional approach. If a and F-ness are mere abstractions from a primary unity, a's being F, then there is presumably no problem about what holds them together. For to say that a and F-ness are abstractions from a's being F is just to say that they cannot exist apart from a's being F. In that case, the a in the sum, a + F-ness, will not be exactly the same entity as the a in the fact, a's being F, and the F-ness in the sum will not the be the same as the F-ness in the fact. Or to look at it in another, equivalent, way, if we begin by stipulating that the constituents are the same in sum and fact, then there simply is no sum distinct from the fact: a and F-ness cannot exist apart from the fact, and so cannot exist in the disconnected state in which they exist in the sum. Either way, our 'mantra,' 'The existence of the fact entails the existence of the constituents, but the existence of the constituents does not entail the existence of the fact' will have to be abandoned. For on the view under examination, there simply is no such thing as the existence of the constituents apart from their existence in the fact.

But this noncompositional approach is inadequate. First, it implies that properties are not universals. For if F-ness cannot exist apart from a's being F, then it certainly is no universal. Hochberg, however, holds that properties are universals. Second, how could the positing of a fact so conceived explain or ground propositional truth? The truth that a is F is contingent; hence the existence of a's being F must be contingent. But the existence of a fact is just the unity or togetherness of its constituents. Hence the togetherness of a and Fness in a's being F must be contingent. But this togetherness cannot be contingent if a and F-ness are mere abstractions from a's being F. It follows that a fact fit to serve as a truth-maker for contingent truths cannot be a fact conceived along noncompositionallines.

The problem faced by Hochberg and Co. might be put as follows. One seems forced to choose between a compositional and a noncompositional model for facts. On the compositional model, the constituents of a fact are ontologically prior to it. They are the 'building blocks' out of which facts are constructed. The constituents exist whether or not the fact whose constituents they are exists. But this faces the Bradleyan problem of unity. Clearly, from what has been argued above, the unifier of a fact's constituents can neither be a further constituent, nor can it be the fact itself. On the noncompositional

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model, a fact is ontologically prior to its constituents. This avoids the Bradley problem, but makes it impossible to see how a fact so construed could function as a truth-maker. For then the contingent existence of a fact would not be the contingent unity of its ontologically prior constituents; indeed it is not clear what the existence of a fact would be. Would the existence of a fact be the existence of a simple (as opposed to complex) entity whose 'constituents' are mere abstractable aspects of it? If yes, then this faces all the objections we brought forward in Chapter 2 against the view that existence is a property of individuals.

16. ARE FACTS IRREDUCmLE ENTITIES? OLSON

A similar critique applies to Kenneth Olson's view that, "The connection [between a and F-ness, say] is not a constituent of the fact, it is the fact itself."s6 Thus facts are not "analyzable without residue into their constituents," one of which serves to bind together the others; they are instead "irreducible entities in their own right."s7 "The connection is not a constituent of the fact but that fact itself." This seems either trivial or incoherent. There is a distinction, reminiscent of the distinction drawn above between a relation and a relationship, between a connector, which is a repeatable, and a connectedness, which is not. 'Connection' is ambiguous as between the two. Thus Olson's dictum could mean either that the connector is not a constituent of the fact, but the fact itself; or it could mean that the connectedness is not a constituent of the fact, but the fact itself. Now it is trivial to say the latter, to say that the particular connectedness of a and F-ness is not a constituent ofthe fact that a is F, but the fact itself. Who would deny this? A fact cannot be a (proper) constituent of itself. What is not trivial, but incoherent, is to say that the particular connectedness of a and F-ness is what connects a and F-ness. If there is a connector, it must be distinct from the product of its operation. A fact cannot unify itself as was argued above.

17. ARE FACTS IRREDUCmLE ENTITIES? ARMSTRONG

A view similar to Hochberg's has been urged by David Armstrong. A fact is a contingent unity of constituents, but this unity, which needs explaining due to its contingency, cannot be explained in terms of a special unifying constituent. Nevertheless, if there are to be facts or states of affairs at all, something must hold particulars and universals together, and if this cannot be an item internal to a state of affairs, then one might suppose that it must be the state of affairs itself. Armstrong accordingly holds that "States of affairs hold their constituents together. .. "s8 Thus for Armstrong, "there is no relation of instantiation over and above the states of affairs themselves."s9 " ... there is no call to bind together the constituents of a state of affairs by anything beyond the state of affairs itself.


The instantiation of universals by particulars is just the state of affairs itself."60 On this view, the proper response to Bradley is to adopt a

nonreductionist approach according to which states of affairs are not analyzable without remainder into their constituents; they are irreducible albeit complex entities. A state of affairs is a complex that is onto logically additional to its constituents. It is 'an addition to being' as opposed to 'an ontological free lunch.'

I submit that this nonreductionist conception of states of affairs is incoherent. Note first that "States of affairs hold their constituents together .. ." can be taken in two ways. Construed positively, it means that states of affairs take over the job that the instantiation relation was supposed to do but could not do. A fact is then the unifier of its own constituents. Construed negatively, the dictum means that states of affairs have no need of a unifier to hold their constituents together: they are just together in a state of affairs.

The positive construal of "States of affairs hold their constituents together .. ." is surely incoherent for reasons similar to the ones brought against Hochberg on the first construal of his position. A fact is nothing other than the unity of its constituents. A fact cannot therefore be the ground of this unity. A ground must be something whose existence is independent of the existence of what it grounds. If there is a unifier of a fact's constituents, a ground of their unity, then this unifier cannot be the fact itself any more than it can be something internal to the fact. If a fact were the unifier of its constituents, it would have to be ontologically prior to itself, which is absurd.

As for the negative construal of Armstrong's dictum, what it says is that there is no need for a unifier of a fact's constituents: a fact is a unity of constituents without need of a ground of unity. This too fails for the reasons brought against Hochberg under Construal Two.

The main point is that it is difficult to see how two complexes can be distinct without there being anything internal or external to them that makes them distinct. Thus we have the sum, a + F-ness, and the fact, a's being F. These are numerically distinct complexes which differ without differing in a constituent. Every other type of complex of our acquaintance is such that there is no difference without either a difference in constituent or a difference grounded in an external entity; so why should facts be any different? Two sets, for example, cannot differ unless they differ in an element; two sums unless they differ in a member. Consider a bicycle and (the sum of) its disassembled parts. Are these two just distinct without anything that makes them distinct? Obviously not. The distinctness is due to an external entity, an assembler. How then can a fact and the corresponding sum of its constituents just differ?

One might bite the bullet here and say that this is just the way facts are. In support of this one might adduce apparent cases in which two facts differ without differing in a constituent. Where R is a non-symmetrical relation, loves

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for example, aRb and bRa seem to differ without differing in a constituent. If there are complexes that differ without differing in a constituent, perhaps the difference between a fact and its corresponding sum is but another instance of this. Indeed, in one place Armstrong argues for states of affairs from the premise that there are complexes that differ without differing in a constituent.61 Since aRb and bRa (the relation either non-symmetrical or asymmetrical) are different states of affairs that share all constituents, they differ only by being different states of affairs. "Hence we require states of affairs in our ontology.,,62

This is not a satisfactory argument for states of affairs. For one thing, it is question-begging.63 The problem as to what distinguishes aRb from bRa cannot arise except upon the antecedent assumption that they are states of affairs, and thus entities in addition to their constituents. And as Armstrong later came to realize under the influence of Reinhardt Grossmann, it is not at all clear that our two relational facts do not differ in a constituent.64 Arguably, ... R-- is different from ---R. ... Non-symmetrical and asymmetrical relations have a 'direction' so that, e.g., x's loving y is distinct from y's loving x. Thus there is something internal to the two states of affairs that distinguishes them; they do not just differ as states of affairs. In any case, how could they differ as states of affairs given that the difference has to do with the order of the constituents? The reason to hold the facts in question to be two and not one is precisely that the order of the constituents is different. Now if difference in order of constituents is the ground of numerical difference, then the ground of numerical difference cannot be that aRb and bRa are each a state of affairs and that states of affairs just differ among themselves.

With the concession to Grossmann, Armstrong loses an independent reason for accepting states of affairs as unmereological compositions. (But a bad reason is one well lost.) He is thrown back upon the truthmaker argument as the sole support for nonreductionist (nonsupervenient) states of affairs. It is therefore puzzling when he writes that "If we have to choose between the (intuitively quite attractive) 'Nominalist' principle ['a system is nominalistic .. .if no two entities are generated from exactly the same atoms.'] and the truthmaker argument that leads us toward states of affairs, then my judgment is that the truthmaker principle is by far the more attractive.,,65 Well, they are both attractive, and there is no need to choose between them. To reject the notion that facts supervene upon their constituents it is not necessary to hold that facts can differ without differing in a constituent; it is only necessary to grasp Bradley's point that a fact is more than its constituents. It is consistent to maintain both that (i) facts are more than their constituents and (ii) facts cannot differ without differing in a constituent. Indeed, I claim that both (i) and (ii) are true.

This argument may be summed up as follows. It is unintelligible to suppose that two distinct complexes just differ as a matter of brute fact. A fact


and the sum of its constituents are distinct complexes; hence there is need for a ground of their difference. The case of aRb and bRa ( R either asymmetrical or non-symmetrical) does not show that two complexes can just differ. Since the ground of difference cannot be internal, it must be external.

A Further Argument. On the nonreductionist conception, a state of affairs is a connectedness of constituents without a connector 'responsible' for this connectedness. This implies that (Sl) a's being Fand (S2) b's being Ghave no constituent in common. And yet each is a state of affairs, and so they appear to have the universal being a state of affairs in common. Now this is puzzling. If S 1 and S2 have no constituent in common, how do we explain the fact that they are both states of affairs? This is no problem for the reductionist who posits a universal instantiation relation in both; he can say that they are both states of affairs because one and the same constituent ties their respective primary constituents into states of affairs. There is a universal of being a state of affairs because there is a universal of instantiation. But the nonreductionist cannot say this. What he must say is that there is no (or need not be any) universal of being a state of affairs because there is no (or need not be any) universal of instantiation. So the nonreductionist faces the problem of explaining why we group all states of affairs together as states of affairs. Armstrong with his characteristic intellectual honesty recognizes the problem. In the case of a's being F and b' s being F he says that it is the common universal F-ness that accounts for their both being states of affairs.66 But what if there is no common universal as there cannot be when we consider all states of affairs? Armstrong's solution is this: " ... the unity of the class of all the states of affairs is given by the unity of the class of all the universals. This latter, in turn, would seem to flow from the essential nature of universals: their promiscuous repeatability. ,,67

But what could this mean? It cannot mean that what universals have in common is repeatability, and that this repeatability is also what states of affairs have in common. For it is clear that states of affairs are (thick) particulars and are thus unrepeatable. This is the famous "victory of particularity." Combine a (thin) particular and a universal and you get a (thick) particular. Nor can Armstrong mean that what all states of affairs have in common is that they include universals, which are repeatable. For this is also true of sets, sums, and conjunctions of universals.

Clearly, what all states of affairs have in common is a peculiar sort of unity of their respective constituents. Thus what is common to a's being F and b's being G -- since it cannot be either a constituent or a property (e.g., repeatability) of a constituent -- is the unity of their respective constituents. Each state of affairs is a unity of its constituents, but since being a unity is common, there must be that which is the universal ground of these particular unities. The reductionist will say that this is the universal of instantiation. In

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the next section I will float the suggestion that there is an external unifier that is responsible for the unity of each fact's constituents. But Armstrong, and nonreductionists generally, are not in a position to specify in a satisfactory manner that which is common to all states of affairs as states of affairs. Even if each state of affairs holds its constituents together, there is obviously no one state of affairs that unifies the constituents in each state of affairs.

Armstrong's Hesitation and the Regress Revisited. Immediately after presenting his theory of states of affairs according to which it is not the instantiation tie, but the state of affairs itself that holds together its constituents, Armstrong, evincing his characteristic intellectual honesty, expresses a doubt about it. "And even if this is not so, the theory is not fatally injured because the alleged regress after the introduction of the fundamental tie is no addition of being.,,68 He simply means that even if we must posit an instantiation tie, any ensuing regress will be harmless. But as was argued earlier, Armstrong fails to appreciate the real force of this regress argument because he confuses it with something like the truth regress. He repeats this confusion in his 1997 book. If proposition p is true, then it is true that p is true, and true that it is true that p is true, and so on ad infinitum. The truth regress is clearly benign. The state of affairs that makes p true also automatically makes true all further members of the series. Armstrong thinks we can deal with the instantiation regress in the same way. Suppose a instantiates F-ness, and call this state of affairs S 1. S 1 is a token of the type, instantiation relationship. So S 1 instantiates instantiation, and a regress ensues. The regress may be benign, but it is not Bradley's. Whereas Armstrong assumes that S 1 is given, Bradley's worry concerns the very existence of S 1. S 1 exists just in case its constituents are actually connected; but the difficulty is to see how a further constituent, an instantiation tie, can effect this connection. Thus Armstrong is not entitled to assume the existence of S 1. Given S 1, the ensuing regress, if there is a regress, is benign. But Bradley's problem concerns S I itself.

It also seems that Armstrong is confusing instantiation relations with instantiation relationships. a's being F is an instantiation relationship (or relatedness). If it gives rise to a regress, it is surely a benign one. But Bradley's regress concerns the instantiation relation. For the fact to exist, this relation must actually connect a and F-ness; but how can a further constituent effect this connection?

In sum, (i) it is incoherent to suppose that states of affairs hold together their constituents, and (ii) it is a mistake to confuse Bradley's regress with the instantiation relationship regress.

18. DEPENDENTISM VINDICATED

The unifier of a fact's constituents cannot be anything internal to the fact. This,


the lesson from Bradley, shows that the reductionist approach to facts fails. So a fact cannot be reduced to its constituents. But irreducible facts, i.e., facts as viewed by the nonreductionist, are subject to three distinct construals.

On the first construal, an irreducible fact is a structure that unifies its constituents. Thus there is a unifier of a fact's constituents, but this unifier is nothing internal to the fact; it is the fact itself. This approach is clearly incoherent as was argued above. For it implies that a fact is wholly distinct from its own constituents, thus contradicting the obvious truth that a fact, as composed of its constituents, is at least partially identical to them.

On the second construal, an irreducible fact is a structure that has no need of a unifier to unify its constituents: the constituents form a unity as a matter of 'brute fact.' But we have seen that facts construed in this way are contradictory structures and hence necessarily nonexistent. This was cast above in the mold of an inconsistent triad:

a. A fact depends for its existence on its constituents. b. A fact does not depend for the unity of its constituents on its constituents. c. The existence of a fact is the unity of its constituents. On the third construal, an irreducible fact is a structure the constituents

of which are mere abstractions from it. But on this approach, what was a contingent unity of constituents becomes a necessary unity. A truth-maker for contingent truths, however, must be a contingent unity of constituents.

Nonreductionism on any of these construals is false. Some will conclude from this that there cannot be any (truth-making) facts. We, however, have convinced ourselves that there must be such facts to serve as the ontological grounds of contingent truths. So we take the correct conclusion to be dependentism: facts depend for their existence on a unifier external to them. There must be an external unifier to remove the contradiction that arises when facts are taken to be ontologically independent entities. This is detailed in the next section.

19. THE ARGUMENT SUMMARIZED

Ordinary particulars are concrete (truth-making) facts, and their existence is the contingent unity of their constituents. This, in one sentence, is our solution to the problem of how existence can belong to individuals without being a property of them. Existence is not a property, but the unity of a thing's properties and other constituents. As such, it is far more fundamental than any property of a thing.

The question then arose as to whether or not facts are ontologically brute, whether or not they 'just exist.' Our conclusion is not merely that they do not just exist, but that they cannot just exist: facts are necessarily not

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ontologically brute. Facts do not just happen to have an ontological ground; they cannot fail to have one. This implies that if facts did not have an ontological ground, they would be impossible. It implies that the existence of facts is inherently contradictory in the absence of an ontological ground. If so, their ontological ground is not merely the ground of their actual existence, but also oftheir possibility. An external unifier is needed not only to explain why contingent thick particulars actually exist, but more fundamentally, why they are so much as possible. If the universe is the totality of thick concrete contingent particulars, the implication is that the membership of the universe, and thus the universe, cannot be an ontologically brute fact. Bertrand Russell, in his debate with F. C. Copleston, said " ... the universe is just there, and that's al1.,,69 But our argument shows that the members of the universe, and thus the universe, cannot be '~ust there," a brute fact; they and it must have an ontological ground of their existence.

The central argument of this chapter may also be presented as follows. Start with the existence of truth-making facts, show that they are contradictory considered in themselves, and then demonstrate how the contradiction is removed by the external unifier as the condition not only of their actuality, but also of their very possibility. Suppose we run through these steps.

The existence offacts, as Bradley saw, seems inherently contradictory. Every fact is broadly relational, even so-called monadic facts of the form, a's being F. For exemplification is either a relation or relation-like. Even a Strawsonian 'nonrelational tie' - assuming this is not a contradiction in terms -is, qua tie, relation-like. And, as we saw, this relationality at the heart of every fact gives rise to serious difficulties which cannot be easily dismissed. On the one hand,

(B) A fact is nothing more than its constituents. But on the other hand,

(-B) A fact is something more than its constituents, since it is the constituents actually united with one another.

There is pressure to accept each limb, but of course the two together make a contradiction. To appreciate the problem, one must see that both (B) and (-B) have a strong claim on our allegiance. Note that the proponent of (B) need not deny that a fact is a unity of constituents; that, after all, is a datum. What he denies is that one must invoke something in addition to a fact's constituents to explain this unity. What he will invoke is a special unifying constituent or an ordinary relation that functions as a unifying constituent. (B) implies that a fact can be analyzed without remainder into its constituents, including perhaps a nexus that accounts for the togetherness of the others. We have seen that (B), though plausible, is untenable. Ontological analysis leaves us in the lurch when it comes to understanding the unity of a complex. Since (B) is false, (-B) must be true. But how could (-B) be true if we are not allowed to invoke any unifier


external to the fact, anything distinct both from the fact's constituents and from the fact itself? I have argued that it is no solution to say, with Hochberg and Armstrong, that facts are irreducible entities, that they are entities in addition to their constituents. And I have argued against Armstrong's view that facts unify themselves, that it is the fact (or state of affairs) itself that holds together its constituents. How then can a fact be something more than its constituents? It must be something more, because the existence of the constituents (including any nexus constituent) does not entail the existence of the fact; it cannot be something more, because there is nothing more in a fact than its constituents, and because a fact just is the unity of its constituents and not something in addition to them.

So we face a contradiction, the urgency of which derives from our need for facts as truth-makers. Before showing how it can be removed, let us linger over it a bit longer, noting its equivalence to the following paradox about existence:

(C) An existing (thick) individual is nothing more than that very individual. There is no difference between an existing x and x. (-C) An existing (thick) individual is something more than that very individual. There is a crucial difference between an existing x and x.

It should be clear that this contradiction -- call it 'Hume's Tension' - is equivalent to the foregoing one. Or perhaps I should say that the (B & -B) contradiction is a special case of the latter contradiction, one that results when an existing thick individual is assayed as a fact or concrete state of affairs. An existing individual is to a merely possible individual (or the essence, quiddity, of an individual) as a fact is to its constituents.

Again, both limbs of Hume's Tension exert a strong pull. In some sense, existence 'adds nothing' to a thing. As Hume puts it, "To reflect on anything and to reflect on it as existent are nothing different from one another." (Treatise, Bk. I, Sec. VI) Existence cannot be a property of an individual, as Chapter 2 argued ad nauseam, so one will be tempted to say that the existence of x = x, or equivalently, an existing x = x. On the other hand, there must be some distinction between an existing x and x; otherwise a merely possible x would eo ipso be actual. Every essence or quiddity would automatically exist. We cannot allow that any more than we can allow that every set of categorially allowable constituents makes a fact. (Compare our critique of D. C. Williams in Chapter 3.) As Hume also says, apparently contradicting the remark from the Treatise lately quoted, "Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent" (Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Part IX). But how could (-C) be true, how could existing Socrates be anything more than Socrates? Certainly existing Socrates cannot be an entity in addition to Socrates.

To resolve the contradiction we first deny (C) and affirm (-C). That leaves the question of how existing Socrates can be something more than

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Socrates. The answer is that existing Socrates is referred to an entity D from which he derives his existence. Existing Socrates is something more than Socrates because existing Socrates is Socrates in his dependence on the entity D, the ontological ground of Socrates' existence, whereas the latter is Socrates considered by himself, apart from any ontological ground. Given the assay of (thick) individuals as (concrete) facts, the fact which is Socrates can be something more than its constituents because this fact depends on the unifier D to be a fact at all. And it is only in this way that a fact can be more than its constituents. If there were no external unifier, facts would be impossible, because self-contradictory.

An analogy may aid the reader's comprehension, provided the reader grasps that every analogy limps, that no analogy is an identity, and that to compare X and Y presupposes that X and Y are distinct. Suppose I take a fistful of ten pencils from a bin. On the one hand, (D) that fistful is nothing more than the individual pencils: there is no further item in my fist that holds the pencils together. There is no glue, no string, no wire, no rubber band, no tape, no anything. But on the other hand, (-D) the fistful of pencils is something more than the individual pencils: it is those pencils actually united into a fistful. The existence of the pencils does not entail the existence of the fistful. The former can exist without the latter, though not vice versa. Clearly, (D) and (-D) are contradictories of one another, hence they cannot both be true.

Now suppose we try to resolve the contradiction without bringing in an external unifier, a hand. We begin by denying (D). Now if (D) is false, then (-D) must be true. But then we have the problem of explaining how the fistful of pencils could be something more than the individual pencils, given that there is nothing else in the fistful such as glue that holds them together.

It would be no solution to pull a Hochberg and claim that fistfuls are entities "in addition" to their contents, that fistfuls are "irreducible" entities, that they are a distinct ontological category. What could that possibly mean? Clearly, a fistful of pencils is not an additional entity, but the result or product of a hand's closing around a number of pencils. A fistful is a derivative entity: it derives from the operation of an external unifier, a hand, upon a number of pencils.

It would also be no solution to pull an Armstrong and claim that fistfuls hold themselves together, or hold their contents together. You don't have a fistful of pencils until a hand closes around some pencils; hence it would be absurd to say that the fistful -- which is the result of a hand's closing around some pencils -- is that which holds the pencils together.

The upshot is that we cannot resolve the (D & -D) contradiction without reaching for an external unifier, namely, a hand that unifies the pencils by closing around them. In the absence of an external unifier, and given the hopelessness of the Hochberg and Armstrong moves, we are stuck with a


contradiction. But fistfuls of pencils are actual, hence possible, hence noncontradictory. Therefore, there must be an external unifier. Of course, it could be a particularly dexterous foot: the argument does not trade on the analytic truth that a fistful of something is made by a fist and thus a hand.

A critic, however, suggests a counter-analogy. A number of bricks are stacked so as to form a wall. It is contingent that the bricks form a wall: they could exist without forming a wall. And there is nothing internal to the wall, such as mortar, to hold the bricks together. What is the external unifier in this case? The critic claims there is none. But we demur: surely gravity holds the bricks together, and gravity is external to the bricks. If nothing held the bricks together, there would be a contradiction. We would be saying that the wall is more than its constituent bricks, but that this 'more' has no ontological status whatsoever. But this would be to say that the reality of the wall both is and is not exhausted by its constituent bricks.

Let us now consider a less crude analogy, a nonphysical one. One can combine in imagination elements that cannot be combined in reality. I may form the mental image of a Saguaro cactus with human legs, say as part of an imagined comic strip in which a Saguaro runs away from a cactus rustler. Suppose I do this. The complex image is a unity of elements, and it is clear that what unifies the elements is not a further element. On the one hand, (E) the complex is nothing more than its elements. But on the other hand, (-E) the complex is something more than its elements, since it is the latter actually united. The only way to resolve this contradiction -- having seen through the Hochberg and Armstrong maneuvers -- is by positing an external unifier, which in this case is the mind that does the imaginative combining.

But the best analogy is as follows. (I here trespass upon ground that I will more fully cover in the next chapter.) Suppose I judge that a is F, and suppose further that the contents of acts of judging are not Fregean propositions, but items that cannot exist apart from acts of judging. Injudging that a is F, I create mentally a complex content composed of a subjectconstituent and a predicate-constituent. This complex is a unity of constituents. On the one hand, (F) the judgmental content is nothing more than its constituents. But on the other hand, (-F) the judgmental content is something more than its constituents insofar as it is the latter actually united to form a content capable of being either true or false -- in the way in which neither the constituents taken by themselves, nor any list, set or sum of them is capable of being either true or false. But how can the judgmental content be something more than its constituents? The only way to resolve this contradiction -- again having seen through the Hochberg and Armstrong ploys -- is by positing an external unifier, an external ground of the unity of the judgmental content. In this case it is the judging consciousness that brings about the content's unity. Without recourse to such an external ground, we would be stuck with the

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contradiction. My solution to the (B & -B) contradiction is close to Bradley's, but to

gauge how close would shunt us onto an exegetical sidetrack. He takes the inherent contradictoriness of facts to show that they cannot be ultimately real, that they must be mere appearances. Thus we are referred beyond them to that of which they are the appearances, the Absolute. I take facts to be inherently contradictory when considered as self-existent, when considered apart from their ontological ground, but free of contradiction when considered in dependence on their ontological ground. On my view too we are necessarily referred beyond facts to something else, their ontological ground, if we are to avoid contradiction. So on my view facts are real, but derivatively real. Since they derive their existence from another, and necessarily so, they are impossibly selfexistent.

If this is right, the 'natural attitude' involves a metaphysical (not empirical) illusion: it involves the illusion of taking what is derivatively existent for what is self-existent. In Buddhist terms, it involves the illusion of taking what is metaphysically 'self-less,' (anatta) for something that has 'self-nature' (atta).70

The upshot, then, is that there must be a unifier of thick particulars and it must be external to them. But what exactly is this external unifier? To this question we now turn.

NOTES

1 Cf. William F. Valli cella, "On an Insufficient Argument against Sufficient Reason," Ratio, vol. 10, no. 1 (April 1997), pp. 76-81.

2 By 'entail,' I usually mean 'metaphysically entail.' A proposition p metaphysically entails a proposition q if and only if there is no metaphysically possible world in which p is true and q is false.

3 E.g., for any two items, there is their mereological sum.

4 Gustav Bergmann, Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967).

5 Like Armstrong, I assume throughout a principle of unrestricted mereological composition. In David Lewis' formulation: "Whenever there are some things, then there exists a fusion [sum] of those things." See David Lewis, Parts of Classes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 74.

6 David Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 118. One finds a similar nonreductionist approach in Herbert Hochberg, Thought, Fact, and Reference (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), p. 339: "facts cannot be reduced to their elements and, hence, are not analyzable." "Facts must, therefore, be recognized as existents in addition to constituents of facts."


7 Cf. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1893), ch. III. For more on Bradley, see my "Relations, Monism, and the Vindication of Bradley's Regress," Dialectica, 2002.

8 F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (Oxford University Press, 1893), chs. 2 and 3.

9 F. H. Bradley, Collected Essays, vol. II (Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 635.

10 Ibid.

11 Of course, the constituents of a fact cannot exist as constituents apart from some fact or other; but that is not the question. The question is whether or not the entities that happen to be the constituents of a given fact could exist apart from that very fact, i.e., without being its constituents.

12 Samuel Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1979), p. 249.

13 Ibid., p. 255.

14 Brand Blanshard, "Bradley on Relations" in The Philosophy ofF. H. Bradley, eds. Manser and Stock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 215.

15 The terms of a relation are its relata. This old terminus technicus is presumably a contraction of the Latin terminus which in one of its senses denotes an endpoint.

16 Compare ETR, p. 295 ff. and p. 302 where Bradley argues that no relation is "real apart from all terms."

17 Bergmann,op. cit., p. 9.

18 I am indebted to a Nous referee for this objection.

19 Cf. Gustav Bergmann, New Foundations of Ontology (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), p. 78.

20 I introduce the rigmarole about the extension of the set instead of speaking simply of the set to block the following cheap-shot: the difference between a fact and the set of its constituents is that one is fact and the other a set. The problem is not to explain the difference between a fact and the corresponding set of its constituents, but between a fact and its constituents. And if anyone is tempted to think of a sum as distinct from its members, then I will reformulate the problem as follows: What is the difference between a's being F and the membership of the sum, a + F-ness +NEX?

21 Note that in 'possible fact,' 'possible' is what Geach calls an alienans adjective: it shifts or alienates the sense of 'fact' in the way 'negative' in 'negative growth' shifts the sense of' growth.' Strictly speaking, a possible fact is no more a fact than negative growth is growth. For a fact is the actual unity of its primary and secondary constituents and not their mere sum. This of course implies that all facts exist or are actual; there are no merely possible facts. There are no facts in the mode of possibility. This is of course not the view Bergmann came to hold after Realism.

22 Gottlob Frege, "Function and Concept" in Geach and Black trans., Translations from the Philosophical Writings ofGottlob Frege (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), p. 24.

23 Reinhardt Grossmann, The Categorial Structure of the World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 169.

24 Ibid., p. 168.

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25 D. M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, p. 118-119.

26 Ibid.

27 D. M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, p. 108.

28 Of course, I do not mean that Armstrong is in general unaware of this distinction; what I mean is that he temporarily lapses from this awareness in the course of arguing that the Bradley regress is as benign as the truth regress.

29 J. MeT. E. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 1927), p. 89n.

30 D.W. Mertz, Moderate Realism and its Logic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 189. .

31 Ibid., p. 76.

32 I will ignore the view that a relation is a set of ordered n-tuples. This is fine as a set-theoretic representation or model, but preposterous as the sober ontological truth about relations. See note 19 above.

33 See Reinhardt Grossmann, The Categorial Structure of the World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), pp. 160-161.

34 Hector-Neri Castaneda, "Relations and the Identity of Propositions," Philosophical Studies 28 (1975), p. 241. See also his "Plato's Phaedo Theory of Relations" in M. Bunge, ed., Exact Philosophy (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1973), pp. 201-214.

35 Grossmann, op. cit., p. 161.

36 Ibid.

37 James Van Cleve, "Predication without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. LIV, no. 3 (September 1994), p. 584.

38 Cf. Roderick M. Chisholm, "Brentano's Theory of Substance and Accident" in Brentano and Meinong Studies (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1982), pp. 3-16.

39 Keith Campbell, Abstract Particulars (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 94.

40 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 211.

41 Bertrand Russell, "Some Explanations in Reply to Mr. Bradley," Mind, vol. XIX (1910), p. 374.

42 Gustav Bergmann, New Foundations of Ontology (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), p. 90.

43 Ibid., p. 93.

44 Ibid., p. 91. Bergmann's italics have been suppressed.

45 Ibid., p. 113.

46 Panayot Butchvarov, Being Qua Being: A Theory of Identity, Existence, and Predication (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 217.


47 Herbert Hochberg, Thought, Fact, and Reference: The Origins and Ontology of Logical Atomism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), p. 338.

48 Ibid., p. 340.

49 Ibid., p. 338.

50 Ibid., p. 339.

51 Ibid., p. 340.

52 Herbert Hochberg, "The Radical Hylomorphism of Bergmann's Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Ontology of Relations," The Modem Schoolman LXXVIII (May 2001), p. 279.

53 Gustav Bergmann, New Foundations of Ontology, op. cit., p. 43.

54 See Gustav Bergmann, Logic and Reality (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p.57.

55 Herbert Hochberg, Thought, Fact, and Reference, op. cit., p. 338.

56 Kenneth Russell Olson, An Essay on Facts (Center for the Study of Language and Information, 1987), p. 61.

57 Ibid., p. 60.

58 A World of States of Affairs, op. cit., p. 118.

59 Ibid., p. 118.

60 Ibid., p. 119.

61 D. M. Armstrong, "A World of States of Affairs," Philosophical Perspectives 7 (1993), pp. 430-431.

62 Ibid., p. 431.

63 As Herbert Hochberg points out in "Facts and Classes as Complexes and as Truth Makers," The Monist, vol. 77, no. 2 (1994), p. 187.

64 D. M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, p. 121 ff.

65 Ibid. p. 122.

66 Ibid., p. 127.

67 Ibid.

68 D. M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, op. cit., p. 119.

69 Bertrand Russell and F. C. Copleston, "The Existence of God -- A Debate," reprinted in Paul K. Moser, Reality in Focus (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), p. 409.

70 For discussion of the anatta doctrine, vide William F. Vallicella, "No Self? A Look at a Buddhist Argument," International Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming, December 2002.

Chapter Eight

The Paradigm Existent

We have argued that the existence of an individual is the unity of its ontological constituents, but that this unity requires an external unifier. The task of this concluding chapter is to inquire into the attributes of this external unifier, or at least such of these attributes as are relevant to our question about the nature of existence.

1. ONE OR MANY?

First of all, is the external unifier U one or many? Is there one external unifier for all facts, or do different facts have different external unifiers? Since all facts have facthood in common, the ground of facthood must be common. Now U is that which makes a given set of fact-appropriate constituents into a fact. U is therefore one, not many. All facts have the same unifier. This is of course consistent with there being a plurality of facts. Each fact is a unity of constituents, and each such unity is numerically different from every other one; but the ground of each fact's unity is common. We must distinguish the ground of unity/existence, which is the external unifier, from each particular case of unity/existence.

Someone who holds that relations are the glue of the world, that relations hold the constituents of facts together, cannot of course agree that all facts have the same unifier. Given that aRb and cSd are distinct facts, and that relations are unifiers, then these two facts have different unifiers, R in the one case, S in the other. But we have seen that the unifier of a fact's constituents cannot be one of its constituents. If R is a universal, and R unifies a and b, then there are three possibilities:

a. R relates a and b, but R is not related to a and b. b. R, in relating a and b, relates itself to a and b. c. R, in order to relate a and b, is related by another entity to a and b. (a) is Grossmann's position which was rejected for reasons given in

section 6 of the previous chapter. How could R bring about the togetherness of a and b if it is in no sense together with a and b? Analogy: how could some glue hold together two boards without itself being together with the two boards? (b) might be called the 'agent view' of relations. Whether or not anyone has ever held this view, it is a useful foil. But R cannot literally be thought of as an agent which brings about the existence of aRb by relating a and b while relating itself to a and to b. For any such relating must be contingent, which would imply that R has the power to contingently determine itself as relating a and b. R would

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have the power of contingent self-determination. But contingent selfdetermination is the essence of free will. No relation, obviously, is a free agent. No relation literally brings together its relata and in such a way that it might have done otherwise. A relation is merely the relational content of a relational fact; it is merely the respect in which two or more things are linked. Thus in the fact of AI's loving Bill, the constituent loves cannot be what actually connects Al and Bill; it is merely the content or nature of their connectedness: they are not barely related, but love-related.

Given the untenability of (a) and (b), we are driven to position (c). (C) has two versions, which might be called 'horizontal' and 'vertical.' On the 'horizontal' version, something distinct from R is brought in to tie together a, R, and b, a further 'horizontal' item of the order of R. But this of course leads to a vicious infinite regress. Thus Bradley's regress is unavoidable if a further relation R* is brought in to relate a, R, and b. But on the 'vertical' version of position (c), an external unifier does the job, one whose unifying proceeds 'vertically' rather than 'horizontally. Of course, it will have to be shown that the same regress objection cannot be brought against this external unifier. In any case, the position we are defending is the 'vertical' version of (c).

All facts, then, have the same unifier. But of course the content of the unification is different in different cases. Hence one and the same unifier U unifies the constituents of aRb and those of aSb, but the nature or content of the unification is R in the first case and S in the second. Thus no constituent of a fact can be both the unifier of its constituents and the content of this unification. This implies that no relation is a unifier; no relation is an 'actually relating relation.' All relations are inert.

For suppose R in aRb is both unifier and content of unification. Now R is either a universal or a particular. If R is a universal, then, as we have seen, Bradley's problem is insoluble: there is a logical gap between the sum, a + R + b, and the fact, aRb. If R is a particular, a relation-instance as on D. W. Mertz' view, this gap is closed. But the price for closing the gap is high as we saw in Chapter 7, section 9. For if R is a relation-instance, then R cannot exist except as relating a and b. Necessarily, R exists if and only if aRb exists. What is more, R exists because aRb exists, and not vice versa. Since R as relationinstance cannot exist except as relating a and b, it cannot be one of the building blocks out of which aRb is constructed. This implies that R cannot be the ground of aRb's existence. If it were, a vicious circle would arise. We would be saying that the ground of a fact's existence is an item whose own existence ontologically depends on the existence of the fact in question.

2. DOES THE EXTERNAL UNIFIER AVOID BRADLEY'S REGRESS?

We now must ask whether the same Bradleyan objection that can be brought against an internal unifier can also be brought against an external one. If it can,

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then nothing will have been gained by positing an external unifier. Since U cannot be a property, an exemplifiable entity, U is perhaps best

thought of as an ontological operator or as having the formal properties of one. Accordingly, U operates upon a set or perhaps an ordered n-tuple of factappropriate constituents to produce a fact. There would then be three items to distinguish, operator, operand, product: U<a, R, b> = Fl. U is the operator, the ordered n-tuple is the operand, and the fact Fl is the product of the first's operating on the second. This schema allows us to accommodate both the insight that a fact is something more than its constituents as well as the insight that facts qua facts have something in common. What they have in common is the unifying operator U which is the ground of their unity, and thus of their existence; the 'something more' is the unity or togetherness of constituents in each fact that is produced by U and is therefore distinct from U. U is common (universal) - though not in the manner of a property - while the togetherness in each fact is in each case a particular. Since the unity of constituents in Fl is produced by U, U is not strictly speaking related to Fl. In particular, U is not related to Fl by the relation of exemplification. (Items cannot be related unless they exist. So if U were related to Fl, Fl would have to exist as a precondition of its standing in this relation; but then Fl would not be a product of U's unifying activity.)

Even though U is not related to any fact, it is still in some sense related to the constituents of facts, and so the specter of Bradley's regress remains to haunt us. If an internal unifier gives rise to the problem, why shouldn't an external one do so as well? Apparently, there will still be the problem of how U connects with what it unifies given the contingency of the connection. If the difference between the fact aRb and the mere sum a + R + b demands an ontological ground distinct from these constituents, then why doesn't the difference between U<a, R, b> and U + <a, R, b> demand an ontological ground distinct from this second sum of items?

The dilemma my operator theory appears to face may be expressed as follows. If U' s being a unifying unifier (as opposed to an inert item that in tum needs unification with what it unifies) means that U necessarily unifies the sets of fact-appropriate constituents that it does unify, then the facts that result will be necessarily existent - which contradicts their being contingent. Clearly, we want to be able to say that, given the existence of a, R, and b, the existence of aRb does not follow as a matter of metaphysical necessity. If, on the other hand, it remains contingent that U unify the sets of constituents that it does in fact unify, then how can U be a unifying unifier, one for which the difference between U qua unifying the members of set S, and the mere sum, U + the members of S, cannot arise? Thus it may appear that the preceding operator rigmarole makes no advance at all over a position like that of AlexanderBlanshard.

But it does make an advance if we are willing to construe U robustly

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enough. U must satisfy three constraints: (i) the connection between U and its operand must be contingent and so cannot be grounded in the nature of U; (ii) the connection cannot be brute, and so must have a ground; (iii) the ground must lie in U itself on pain of a vicious infinite regress. Now if the connection between U and its operand cannot be grounded in the nature of U, and yet must be grounded in U, then U must have the power of contingent self-determination: it must have the power to contingently determine itself as operating upon its operand. In other words, if U is the ground of the contingent unity of a fact's constituents, then we must be able to say that U contingently grounds its grounding of the unity of the fact's constituents. U would then ground the unity of the fact's constituents without inciting a vicious infinite regress.

A model for U that satisfies the above constraints is available in our own freedom which I assume is a power of contingent self-determination. To assume this, of course, is to assume that we are libertarianly free. (We take this to be practically self-evident, required as it is for our moral responsibility.) I am libertarianly free with respect to action A just in case my performance of A is such that I could have done otherwise. Now suppose I freely unify disparate elements in the synthetic unity of one consciousness: I judge that a is F, or perhaps I merely entertain the thought that a is F. Either way, I freely connect a and F-ness. The connection instituted is contingent; both the connection between the subject and predicate representations, and the connection between me and the judgmental content. The connections are contingent since I could have refrained from combining the representations. But the connections are not brute since they have a ground in my combining activity. This satisfies the first two constraints, that the connection be contingent, and that it not be brute.

As for the third constraint, my consciousness C, as the unifier of the subject- and predicate-representations, is not an inert ontological ingredient that itself needs unification with what it unifies. It is not as if there must be a C' which unifies a, C, and F-ness, a Coo which unifies a, C, C', and F-ness and so on into a vicious infinite regress. A Bradley-type regress cannot arise precisely because C is a unifying unifier in a way in which a relation cannot be. An external relation is not exhausted in its relating of what it relates, else it would be essential to its terms and hence not external. But if it is not exhausted in its relating of what it relates, then it is distinct from them and the problem arises as to how it forms a unity with its terms. One cannot say that a relation, in relating its relata, relates itself to them in such a way that it grounds not only their togetherness, but also its togetherness with them. For no relation has the power of contingent self-determination. But this is exactly the power consciousness exercises when it unifies disparate representations: it establishes their togetherness, and in so doing, establishes its togetherness with them.

Thus the difference between U<a, R, b> and U + <a, R, b> is grounded by U itself in a way that an external relation R cannot ground the difference between aRb and a + R + b. This of course requires that we impute to U a


power of contingent self-determination, a power for which we have a model in our own self-consciousness in the synthesis of a manifold, to put it in Kantian terms. Who is to stop us from imputing this power to V? We have argued (Chapter 7) that there must be an external unifier. Given that there must be an external unifier, it must have all the attributes necessary for it to do the job assigned to it. If V did not have the power of contingent self-determination (the regress-blocking power to determine itself as connecting fact-constituents), then it would not be able to do its job. So we are free to maintain that V has the power of contingent self-determination unless there is some compelling argument why nothing could have such a power.

It is important to note that philosophers who hold that relations are universals and that they actually relate their relata without giving rise to a vicious regress must similarly impute to relations a power of contingent selfdetermination. Suppose R relates a and b, and also c and d. Given that R is a universal, R is distinct from its relating of a and b, and could have existed without relating the two. Thus there is a distinction between the fact aRb and the sum a + R + b. R in the sum, however, is an 'inert' ontological ingredient: it is merely juxtaposed to a and b without actually connecting them. But if R in the fact actually relates its relata without igniting a regress, then R in the fact is not an inert ingredient. How is this possible? How can one and the same universal R be inert in the sum but active in the fact? Only in one way: although universal R is one and the same entity in both sum and fact, R in the fact exercises its connecting power while R in the sum does not. Thus R has a certain connecting or relating power that it mayor may not exercise. When R exercises its connecting power on a and b, the fact aRb arises. Since R's relating of the two is an exercise of its own power, there is no need for any agency distinct from R to relate R to what it relates. In this way, Bradley's regress is avoided. R relates a and b, and in relating them, relates itself to them. Thus R not only grounds the togetherness of a and b; it simultaneously grounds its grounding of the togetherness of a and b.

My claim is three-fold. First, those who think that universal relations relate without Bradleyan difficulty are taking an 'agent view of relations' such as I have just sketched. Second, to hold the agent view of relations is to ascribe a magical power to them that they cannot have. Although it is onto logically nonsensical (albeit mathematically useful) to think of relations extensionally as identical to sets of ordered n-tuples, it is also nonsensical to think of relations taken intensionally or as universals as having any sort of combinative power whereby they actually connect their relata and in so doing connect themselves to their relata. No universal could be an agent with connective power. Third, although no universal could be a unifying unifier with genuine connective power, it is necessary that there be a unifying unifier to secure the unity of facts given that facts are complexes of entities whose connection with one another is contingent. This unifying unifier has the power of contingent self-

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determination.

3. THE UNIFIER NOT A CASTANEDAN ONTOLOGICAL OPERATOR

It may occur to readers familiar with Hector-Neri Castaneda's theory of ontological operators that it provides a more sober way of fleshing out the idea of an external unifying unifier than speculative approach we are taking. But although there are certain analogies between Castaneda's ontological operators and our external unifier to which we impute the power of contingent selfdetermination, the former are too anemic to do the job of unification. With his talk of ontological operators, Castaneda seems to be importing activity and the 'participial dimension' into the serene precincts of ontology; but in fact he does not. Are his operators truly operating operators?

Castaneda introduces his theory of ontological operators by way of a discussion of the problem of individuation, a problem he distinguishes from that of diversity.! The problem of individuation is concerned with what makes an individual be an individual, whereas the problem of diversity is concerned with what makes numerically diverse entities be numerically diverse. The tendency is to conflate these two problems, but Castaneda successfully argues for their separation. Now suppose you have two distinct individuals a and b. Since both are individuals, the individuator - that which 'makes' them be individuals -should be common. Could a and b be individuals in virtue of their instantiation of a common property, that of individuality? Obviously not. "Instantiation, which is an external connection between a property and what instances it, presupposes that a full-fledged entity fit to be the subject is already constituted.,,2 In other words, it would be hopelessly circular to explain the individuality of an individual in terms of a property that the individual instantiates: an individual must already (logically speaking) be an individual if it is to instantiate any properties. But if the individuator is common to all individuals, but is not a property, what is it and how is it related to individuals?

Castaneda proposes that within the category of abstract entities we must recognize the sui generis subcategory of ontological operators on properties or sets of properties. The individuator, then, is an operator. This allows us to explain the constitution of a concrete individual as follows. Begin with some properties, say, P, Q, and R. Operate upon them with the set-forming braces { ... } to form the set {P, Q, R}, which is an abstract individual. Now operate upon this set with the concretizing operator c to form the concrete individual c{P, Q, R}. To complete the picture, think of this operating not as something we do, but as something the operator does. Think of operators as having ontological standing apart from mind and language. This seems to satisfy the demands of the situation, since the operator c is common to all concrete individuals, but not common in the manner of a property. Because c 'produces' c{P, Q, R} 'out of' {P, Q, R}, c is not related to c{P, Q, R}, as it would be ifthe individuator were


a property instantiated by the individual. Why not then think of the external unifier as an ontological operator in

Castaneda's sense? It is clear that the external unifier cannot be a property internal to a fact, for then it would be just one more constituent wanting unification with the others. Nor can it be a property exemplified by a fact, for a fact must already (logically speaking) be constituted as a fact if it is to exemplify any properties. So it is natural to think of the external unifier U as something like an ontological operator. Accordingly, U operates upon a set or perhaps an ordered n-tuple of fact-appropriate constituents to produce a fact. There would then be three items to distinguish, operator, operand, product: U<a, R, h> = FI ; in the monadic case, U<a, F-ness> = F2.

A closer look, however, will show that U cannot be an ontological operator in Castaneda's sense. On Castaneda's theory, operators are "syncategorematic," "dependent" entities which "combine with their operands in a unique and unanalyzable way.,,3 They are dependent entities in the sense there is no difference such as would cause Bradleyan trouble between an operator operating upon its operand and an operator + its operand. In the concrete individual e{P, Q, R}, one cannot drive a Bradleyan wedge between operator e and operand {P, Q, R}. This is because the connection between operator and operand is noncontingent. In Castaneda's Meinongian ontology, for every set of properties, whether compos sible or not, there is a corresponding concrete (but not necessarily existent) individual: it is not as if e operates on some property sets but not on others. The concretizing operator operates on all of them, and necessarily so. One cannot therefore reasonably ask for the ontological ground of the difference between e{ P, Q, R} and the set {e, {P, Q, R}} or the difference between e{P, Q, R}and the sume + {P, Q, R}. Bradley's regress cannot arise from within the structure of a concrete individual on Castaneda's assay of same.

U, however, cannot be a syncategorematic or dependent entity in this sense for the simple reason that its combination with its operands is contingent: U operates on some but not all sets of fact-appropriate constituents, and those sets it does operate on, it might not have operated on. U therefore cannot be a dependent entity. Unlike e, it must be distinct from its operating even if it cannot exist without operating on some set of fact-appropriate constituents or other. As such, U is not an ontological operator in Castaneda's sense.

4. THE EXTERNAL UNIFIER AS MIND

Everything is either a mind, or a content in a mind, or a physical entity, or an abstract entity. Now the external unifier cannot be an abstract entity if by this we mean an entity that is causally inert. For U is a unifying unifier, a metaphysical cause, indeed an agent-cause, of the unity/existence of concrete facts. U does what relations cannot do. Being an agent, it is active as opposed

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to inert; being active, it is concrete rather than abstract. Could U be a physical entity? There are many physical entities, but U is one. So U cannot be a physical entity. This is also clear in that material particulars, like all thick particulars, are contingent unities of constituents. But no contingent unity of constituents could be the external unifier on pain of a vicious infinite regress. U cannot be dependent on something else for its unity. Besides, section 6 infra will argue that U exists of absolute metaphysical necessity. But no material particular exists of absolute metaphysical necessity. Ergo, U cannot be a material particular.

Could U be a content in or for a mind, a mere accusative of consciousness, a mere thought? This is absurd on the face of it. The ground of the unity/existence of all facts cannot be something merely excogitated. Given that U is neither abstract nor physical, what we must conclude is not that U is a mental content, but that U is either a mind, or more like a mind than anything else. This coheres nicely with what was said in the preceding section. There a power of contingent self-determination was imputed to U, a power of free agency that it would make sense to ascribe only to minds. Only a mind or spirit has the regress-blocking power to unify itself with what it unifies, thereby grounding its own grounding of fact-unity. Someone who ascribes this power to relations dabbles in magic and superstition. Since U exists (Chapter 7), and since U must have the power of contingent self-determination to do its unifying job (section 2 supra), and since only a mind can have the power of contingent self-determination, U is a mind or spirit. Having just used the term 'spirit,' we should add that a spirit is a mind conceived as irreducible to any physical entity or collection of physical entities, as irreducible to any bundle of mental contents, as irreducible to the behavior or behavioral dispositions of any organism, and as non supervenient upon anything physical. In short, a spirit is just a mind taken as what it appears to itself to be, namely a unitary thinking substance in the broad Cartesian sense.

5. THE EXTERNAL UNIFIER AS TRANSCENDENTAL MIND?

We are obviously headed in a deeply metaphysical direction. But must one go the metaphysical route in search of an external unifier to secure the unity/existence of states of affairs? Perhaps the exigencies of the situation can be satisfied more modestly by a well-executed transcendental turn. One might maintain that the concept of a state of affairs is a transcendental concept imposed on the world by transcendental consciousness, where the latter is no sort of metaphysical reality. The rudiments of such a view may be gleaned from Panayot Butchvarov's latest book. 4 Butchvarov is arguably the clearest and best expositor of what might be called a transcendental-phenomenological approach to ontology, and so a somewhat detailed Auseinandersetzung with his views will be well worth our time and effort. 5


Butchvarov agrees with us that states of affairs are neither reducible to their constituents nor irreducible entities in their own right.6 And yet, " ... they are indispensable for any (advanced) thought and especially for language about the world. ,,7 For it is essential to indicative sentences that they have a truthvalue, and as Butchvarov notes, this is most naturally understood in terms of 'correspondence' to the world. Thus Butchvarov would appear to accept a form of the truth-maker argument for states of affairs according to which contingent truths require truth-makers. But if states of affairs are neither reducible to their constituents, nor irreducible entities in their own right, then they must depend on something external to them for their constitution or construction. To this extent our position coincides with that of Butchvarov. We differ, however, on the question of what this external entity is on which states of affairs depend, and thus on the question of what precisely a state of affairs is.

For Butchvarov, the concept of a state of affairs is a transcendental concept we impose on the world. A concept is transcendental just in case it does not stand for anything in, of, or between the objects to which it applies.8

Transcendental concepts apply to worldly entities, but not in virtue of any constituents or features of these entities. This implies that a state of affairs is the result of a conceptual structuring of worldly entities. The constituents of a state of affairs are extraconceptual (subject to a qualification to be made two paragraphs infra), but the unification of these constituents is a conceptual matter. Concepts, however, depend on us as concept-users. Butchvarov speaks of imposition. We impose "propositional forms on the manifold of entities we confront, that is, by 'seeing' them as constituents of states of affairs, rather than just as a bare 'given.",9 In this sense, (transcendental) consciousness 'makes' states of affairs 'out of' worldly constituents. There are no states of affairs in the world independently of us. A state of affairs comes about through the imposition of conceptual form on a pre-given matter.

We find this view objectionable, however, because it undercuts the realism that the introduction of states of affairs is supposed to support. (We will have to consider whether our view also undercuts realism.) If one says that contingent indicative sentences are true because they correspond to states of affairs, but that these states of affairs are conceptual structures that we impose, then one appears to take back with one's left hand what one has proffered with one's right. How can one do justice to truth-maker realism if one adopts an apparently idealist view of states of affairs? How can the truth of our sentences and beliefs be grounded in something we ourselves project? The essence of realism is ontological constraint: something independent of us makes true our sentences and beliefs. But if conceptual decisions are involved in the constitution of states of affairs, then all ontological constraint goes by the boards. The problem goes deeper than this, however. For Butchvarov also counts existence among the transcendental concepts. Existence is not something in the world (a property perhaps) that the concept existence stands

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for; on the contrary, existence just is a transcendental concept. Moreover, it is a concept analyzable in terms of the transcendental concept of identity. The identity in question here is material identity as expressed by, e.g., 'Hesperus is Phosphorus,' as opposed to formal identity as expressed by, e.g., 'Hesperus is Hesperus.' Thus for an object 0 to exist is just for 0 to be indefinitely identifiable with other objects. Butcharov also makes the point in a non-modal way, and this is his preferred way of making it: "an object exists if and only if there is an indefinite number of objects each identical with it,,,10 where 'there is' quantifies over all objects whether existent or nonexistent. (It should be clear that Butchvarov' s approach requires a Meinongian commitment to objects some of which exist and some of which do not. For our objections to Meinongianism, see Chapter 2, section 1.) Existence, then, is reduced to identity, but identity is not something we encounter in the world whether a property or a relation or anything else; it is a concept we impose on the world.

This implies that it is not just truth-makers (states of affairs) whose existence depends on us; the constituents of states of affairs also depend on us for their existence. Or at least this is the case when the constituents are existents like Butchvarov as opposed to nonexistents like Pegasus. Thus the state of affairs aRb (e.g., Alston is next to Butchvarov) is doubly dependent for its existence on us. First of all, for a and b to exist, each must be identical to other objects, and this requires the imposition of the concept of identity. Second, for existing a and b to be brought together into a state of affairs, a and b must be subsumed under the transcendental concept, state of affairs. Now states of affairs and relations stand and fall together. So it comes as no surprise to hear that the concept of relation is a transcendental concept, and thus that relations do not belong to the world. I I It cannot therefore be relations that unify the world; the unity of the world derives from our application of transcendental concepts.

Whether this leads to an objectionable form of idealism of course depends, among other things, on who we, as concept-imposers, are. If conceptimposers are just members of a zoological species, then the sort of idealism that results is absurd, and Butchvarov would be the first to admit it. 12 He assures us, however, that it is not a certain sort of animal who projects such transcendental concepts as identity, existence (reality), state of affairs and relation; it is consciousness that does this, where consciousness is taken in a manner reminiscent of G. E. Moore and J-P. Sartre as a diaphanous medium whose sole function is to reveal objects. Consciousness on such an approach is a "translucent no-thing,,13 rather than a property or state of an organism, or something whose contact with the world is mediated by representations. It is the sheer revelation of the world, its "lightening" as Butchvarov says in conscious allusion to Heidegger.

As concept-imposers, and thus as world-makers, we are neither essentially brains nor essentially souls (selves, egos); what we are is a


"contentless consciousness directly confronted with objects but involving no self.,,14 This is an anti-naturalistic, but also an anti-metaphysical view of consciousness. It is aptly called a transcendental theory of consciousness. Consciousness is neither a (physical) thing in the world, nor a (meta-physical) thing out of it; it is no-thing at all. Thus Butchvarov' s position appears to avoid the sort of obnoxious idealism according to which the existence of the world depends on the existence of organisms within the world. Butchvarov's position nevertheless strikes us as unsatisfactory. Let us run through a series of interconnected difficulties.

1. Butchvarov's concept of consciousness is vague and perhaps even self-contradictory. Consciousness, though not a thing in the world or out of it, nevertheless exists. If it did not, the world with its objects and entities would not appear. Thus consciousness "is not something but neither is it nothing ... ,,15

It is not something because it has no nature or content or character of its own. Its entire being is exhausted in its revealing of what is other than it. It is not nothing, however, because it is precisely this revealing. On the face of it, this is a contradiction.

2. If consciousness exhausts itself in revealing objects, then presumably it is the nature of consciousness to do this, and a not a mere accidental feature of it. This revelatory function of consciousness does not come from its objects, which could just as well be what they are without being revealed, and so belongs to consciousness itself. But then it would seem to follow that consciousness does have a nature and an existence of its own. Consciousness exists as that which allows objects to appear, and its nature is to allow them to appear without allowing itself to appear. If so, it cannot be "no-thing."

3. Butchvarov's reason for thinking that consciousness is not something is that, when one considers (an act of) consciousness, one finds something, but something that is entirely transparent without content or character of its own.16

But from the fact that this is the way consciousness ordinarily appears to us, how can we legitimately conclude that consciousness in reality is like this? Consciousness may appear to be "no-thing," but it scarcely follows that it is such. It could be that consciousness has a nature of its own, but that this nature cannot appear to consciousness in its ordinary state. Perhaps the reality of consciousness appears only to extraordinary states of consciousness.

4. We are told that consciousness exists. But its existence cannot consist in indefinite identifiability. Being diaphanous, (an act of) consciousness is not an object that can be identified with other objects. What then is it for consciousness to exist? Its existence must be distinct from its appearing, and thus distinct from its identifiability. There would then be two modes of existence, and we would need an account of how the two modes relate.

5. Even if Sartre and Butchvarov are right that there is no ego, self, or soul in consciousness, or from which consciousness emanates, consciousness is presumably tied to organisms in the natural world in the sense that it cannot exist

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unless they exist. If consciousness is not either epiphenomenal or emergent or in some other way dependent on organisms, then it is a substance -- in contravention of its ascribed status as "no-thing." But if consciousness is necessarily tied to organisms, then the specter of an obnoxious idealism rises once again. For if 0 exists just in case there are objects with which 0 is identical, and identity is not a relation or property or any other constituent of the world, but a transcendental concept consciousness imposes on the world, then the existence of consciousness is a necessary condition of the existence of anything. Assuming that consciousness is necessarily tied to organisms in nature, an incoherent form of idealism results. The existence of the world, and thus of organisms in the world, depends on the imposition of the concept of identity by consciousness whose own existence depends necessarily on the existence of some of these organisms. A similar problem arises for Heidegger. Or perhaps we should say that Butchvarov inherits, without solving, Heidegger' s problem. For Heidegger, too, Being (Sein) has a roughly conceptual status: Being is only in Dasein's understanding of Being (Seinsverstaendnis). Being is not itself a being (ein Seiendes) or a property of beings. This is the famous 'ontological difference' of Being from beings. Dasein, however, for the early Heidegger at least, is a contingently occurring piece of nature. It follows that Being depends on Dasein to be at all, which issues in an untenable idealism. For if Being is the Being of beings (genitivus subjectivus), and Being is only so long as Dasein is, then beings are only so long as Dasein is. Surely this is an unacceptable consequence. The universe existed before Dasein existed, and there are possible worlds in which there are physical universes but no Dasein. Clearly, the very Being of the natural world cannot depend on the Being of a transient and minuscule part thereof. Heidegger may perhaps avoid this difficulty by holding that Being is not the Being of beings, not that which makes them be, but something extrinsic to them, their 'truth' or revealedness. Be this as it may, this sort of escape is not available to Butchvarov since by the existence of an object he does not mean its being revealed, but its being there as something we are forced to confront and take note of, as we are about to see.

6. As Butchvarov correctly points out, "We ascribe existence (being, reality) to what is not subject to our whim or wishful thinking, to what we must be prepared to confront on any number of occasions in any number of ways, to what places an ineliminable constraint on our perceptions and thoughts.,,!7 But can his view that existence is indefinite identifiability capture this insight? It clearly cannot when it is taken in the way Butchvarov intends it to be taken. If o exists, and thus constrains our thinking and doing, then of course 0 is indefinitely identifiable. But does 0 exist and exercise constraint because it is indefinitely identifiable? Or is it indefinitely identifiable because it exists and exercises constraint? We say the latter: the existence of an individual is ontologically prior to its indefinite identifiability. It is the mind-independent existence of things that grounds and makes possible their indefinite


identifiability. Since the latter is a mere consequence of existence it cannot be used to analyze existence.

On Butchvarov's view, the notion of ontological constraint that he himself rightly adduces as integral to the concept of existence completely evaporates. For if O's existence consists in O's identity with other objects, and 0' s identity with these other objects derives from our application of the concept of identity to them, indeed from our conceptual decision that they are identical with each other, then whatever constraint 0 exercises on our thinking and doing is a constraint we allow it to exercise. But this makes hash of the notion of "ineliminable constraint." Genuine constraint can issue only from what mindindependently exists. Something that genuinely exists forces us to take note of it; our acknowledging it is certainly not what gives it its power over us. If "being is power" as Butchvarov quotes the Eleatic Stranger as saying (Plato, Sophist, 247e-248e), this is a power over our thoughts, not a power that somehow derives from us.

It is clear that, for similar reasons, the sort of alethic constraint that we have come to expect from any decent fact or state of affairs also evaporates on Butchvarov's approach. It is the unity of a fact's constituents that makes a fact an ontological ground of truth. But if unity is imposed by us, via the imposition of the transcendental concept state of affairs, how can this unity constrain our beliefs and indicative sentences? What we freely impose (albeit seriously and not whimsically) cannot constrain us in the sense relevant here. (I can constrain my own future behavior by entering into a legally binding contract, but this is not the relevant sense of 'constraint.')

Butchvarov correctly criticizes Russell for failing to appreciate that existence fundamentally belongs to individuals, and not to propositional functions. But if we are right, Butchvarov's own theory lacks fundamentality. He avoids the mistake of reducing existence to the instantiation of a concept, or the satisfaction of a propositional function, only to make the mistake of reducing existence to a mode of appearing. He avoids a logical reduction only to make a phenomenological one. For what does it mean to say that existence is indefinite identifiability? It means that the existence of an individual is just a particular way of its appearing: it appears in such a way as to be identifiable with other objects that appear. The difference between existence/nonexistence gets reduced to a difference between two ways of appearing. But then only what appears exists. Only what is conceptualized as existent, exists. What does not appear, or is not conceptualized as existent, does not exist. This, however, flies in the face of the obvious point that when we ascribe existence to something, we imply that the thing would exist even if it were not appearing to us now, and indeed would exist even ifit were not appearing to anyone now, and moreover would exist even if there were no one to whom it could appear. The concept of existence is the concept of a 'property' that a thing has whether or not it is the object or accusative of any act of consciousness, a 'property' the having of

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which ensures that the thing could exercise genuine ontological constraint. This is implied by the intentional structure of perception. Every outer

perception intends that its object exist and instantiate properties perceiverindependently. The mountain range I see in the distance is given as existing whether or not I or anyone perceive it. It is given as something other than an object of inner perception such as an idea or representation. This is a phenomenological point about the way the object appears. The object appears as more than a mere appearance; it appears as a reality. As phenomenological, the point remains true even if the particular object in question fails to exist. Even if I am hallucinating the mountain range, the experience remains (phenomenologically considered) an outer perception that presents its object as existing whether or not I or anyone perceive it. We could put this by saying that every outer perception by its very nature embodies a claim to the transcendence of its object. Every outer perception embodies the claim that its object is not a (mere) object, but a reality. Now a claim and its validation are two different things; but if outer perception's claim to transcendence is valid in some cases, then existence cannot be reduced to, or analyzed in terms of, indefinite identifiability, where this necessarily involves our application of the transcendental concept of identity. For if outer perception's claim to the transcendence of its object -- a claim that belongs to the phenomenological essence of perception - is sometimes valid, then some objects exist in such a way as to be capable of existing even at times and in possible worlds in which consciousness and concepts do not exist. If existence is indefinite identifiability, however, no object exists in such a way as to be capable of existing at times and in possible worlds in which consciousness and concepts do not exist. Therefore, if perception's claim to transcendence is ever valid, existence is not indefinite identifiability. Contrapositively, if existence is indefinite identifiability, then outer perception's claim to transcendence is never valid. Therefore, if Butchvarov is right about existence, then outer perception is structurally illusory: the structure of outer perception is such as to necessarily mislead us about the ontological status of its objects. They are given as capable of existing apart from being perceived when such independent existence cannot be the case. This casts considerable doubt on Butchvarov's theory: we would prefer not to ascribe to outer perception such a globally misleading character.

7. One response to what has just been argued is that it leads to skepticism, whereas Butchvarov's approach allows for a neat dissolution of the skeptical problem. If the existence of an object is something it has apart from any application of concepts on our part, then how can we know that some of the objects we perceive are real or existent? The skeptical problem arises because existence is not an observable property. Even if the mountain range I am perceiving does exist apart from my perceiving it, there is no mark, feature, or index internal to this or any perception, and as such epistemically available to the perceiver, that could certify that the object of the perception exists


independently of it. I cannot 'read off' the mind-independent existence of the mountain range from my perception of it. I can easily ascertain that the thing I am observing has (or at least appears to have) various sensible properties. But no matter how keen or protracted my observation, there is no feature or property open to sense-perception that either is the existence of the tree, or from which I could infer the existence of the tree. The problem is not that existence is a sensible property hard to detect; existence is not a sensible18 property at all: it is beyond the range of any and all sense organs, their instrumental extensions (microscopes, etc.), and all possible experimentation. (Thus nothing changes if we move from spectatorship to an active operating upon the tree. Whether the tree is Heideggeriaoly vorhanden or zuhanden, its existence remains beyond the reach of the senses.)

Given that existence is not perceivable, how then can I know or have evidence for my unshakeable belief that the object vividly and ongoingly perceived really exists? How can I escape the skeptical predicament? Butchvarov proposes that we escape it by taking the view that there simply is no fact of the matter about questions of existence and nonexistence, and that such questions are settled by conceptual decisions. "Reality [existence] is not an object of knowledge or evidentially based belief, it is an object of decision, and thus the skeptic's question whether we know or even have evidence with respect to any perceptual object that it is real does not even arise, indeed cannot be sensiblyasked."19 Because reality "is something we ourselves impose on the object,,,20 there cannot be a legitimate question whether the object perceived really exists. Once we understand what the concept of existence is, namely, a transcendental concept to which nothing in the world corresponds, we see that the skeptical problem is a pseudo-problem.

This may dissolve the skeptical problem, but it also dissolves know ledge itself. It is tantamount to saying that there is no problem about how and whether I know that the perceived mountain exists, because I cannot have any knowledge that the mountain exists. That the perceived mountain exists is, on Butchvarov' s theory, something I decide, not something I know. Indeed, that any object of outer perception exists is, on this theory, not something that anyone does or could know. Accordingly, there cannot be any skeptical problem about our knowledge of the existence of an external world, because there cannot be any knowledge ofthe existence of an external world. There cannot be any, because the concept of existence is a transcendental concept whose application to objects is a matter of imposition and decision on our part. The modal force of 'cannot' in the foregoing sentences is very strong indeed deriving as it does from the very concept of existence. Thus we are inclined to say that Butchvarov eliminates skepticism, but only by eliminating knowledge: he throws out the 'baby' of knowledge with the 'bath water' of skepticism.

To this draconian theory one would be justified in responding that we do know of some perceptual objects that they exist, even if we have no good

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answer to the question as to how we know this. But a stronger response is possible. One could argue that to either solve or dissolve the skeptical problem one must first understand it, but that this understanding requires a certain distinction the validity of which presupposes that there are entities whose existence cannot be reduced to indefinite identifiability. Let me explain.

Seeing a mountain, I need not say or think, 'I see a mountain.' I may, and usually do, live in my perceptions as opposed to reflecting on them. Living in a perception, I am 'at' its object; I am not 'at' the perceiving of the object, or 'at' the object qua object. It is nevertheless always possible that, confronting a perceptual object 0, one thinks, 'I perceive 0.' Paraphrasing a well-known passage from Kant's Critique oj Pure Reason (B132), we may say that the 'I think' must be able to accompany all my acts of awareness. Reflecting on my perceiving of a mountain, I do not lose sight of the mountain, but I do become aware that the mountain, which was initially given as something existing initself, has this status of existing in-itselfJor-me. Reflection discloses that its being-in-itself is a phenomenological feature, a mode of givenness. Reflection shows that the mountain is object for me as subject. In reflection one thus becomes aware of the distinction between that which is for-one, and that which is in-itself. As soon as this distinction is grasped, however, it is realized that all such assertions based on perception as 'There is a mountain,' 'The mountain is snow-capped,' etc., are mere claims the validity of which is by no means guaranteed by anything internal to the perceptual situation. The mountain is given as being snow-capped, but since it is given as being snow-capped, its appearing to be snow-capped is a claim the veridicality of which may be doubted. In virtue of its intentionality, outer perception posits its object 'as non-object,' as existing whether or not it is an object for a subject. What reflection reveals, however, is that the transcendence of the object - its being-initself - is a phenomenological feature of it, a feature it has Jor consciousness. At this point the skeptical question arises: how do I know that the mountain I see, the mountain for-me, also exists in-itself? How do I know that it actually has in it-itselfthe properties it is perceived to have? Note that the question arises quite naturally via a natural (pre-philosophical) reflection on the perceptual situation. The skeptical problem is not an artifact of an arbitrary commitment to a philosophical theory such as a 'mental contents' or representational theory of awareness. Even if awareness is unmediated by contents or representations, one can still ask whether the object directly presented exists and has the properties it appears to have independently of its being presented.

The main point here is that the skeptical question cannot be understood unless the for-melin-itself distinction has been understood, where understanding the latter presupposes a distinction between me as subject of awareness and the mountain as object of awareness. I must be aware of myself (qua conscious self not qua body) as distinct from the mountain for the mountain to appear to me as object and as possibly (epistemically speaking) nothing more than an object for


me as subject. Without the self-awareness I express by saying or thinking 'I,' my awareness 'loses itself in the object, thereby positing it naively as existent apart from my perceiving of it. To see that this naive positing is something that occurs within consciousness, something that consciousness does, requires reflection.

To understand the very sense of the skeptical problem, whether with an eye towards solving it, dissolving it, or ignoring it, thus requires that one understand the for-melin-itself distinction, which in tum requires that one understand the concept 'I.' Without the concept'!' there would be no distinction between the appearing of an object 0 and its being or existence. For what is or exists is that which is or exists whether or not I perceive it. Appearing and being come apart only if 0 can appear without being. But 0 can appear without being only if there is something to which 0 appears. The concept of this something, however, is precisely the concept of the I or ego. A conscious being incapable of self-consciousness could not understand the skeptical problem

We take the next step in the argument when we appreciate that the concept 'I' is entirely unlike the concept of any physical object. The concept 'mountain' may fail to be instantiated; the concept'!' cannot fail to be instantiated. Whether or not yonder mountain exists, it is certain that it is appearing. But it cannot appear without appearing to something. Just as consciousness is consciousness of something (objective genitive), appearing is appearing to something, namely, consciousness. Otherwise, appearing would be a nonrelational property of what appears. But appearing is no more a nonrelational property of what appears than consciousness is a nonrelational property of its objects. Since consciousness is of or about its objects, it is not a (nonrelational) property of them; it is that to which they appear. Hence if appearing is a property of (some) objects, it is a relational property of them.

So if 0 appears, then 0 appears to something, and indeed to something that exists. This is particularly evident if the mountain does not exist. If it does not exist, it is a mere appearance; but a mere appearance is not nothing, it is insofar as it appears to something. If this something were not to exist, then the appearance would not exist qua appearance. The whole structure would fall into the void. Clearly, then, that to which an appearance appears must exist: necessarily, if x is an appearance, then x appears to something that exists. But what is this existing something?

The mountain appears to consciousness. There is, however, no such thing, pace certain neo-Kantians, as consciousness in general (Bewusstsein ueberhaupt). Actual consciousness is in every case individuated and particular. Consciousness as it actually and concretely occurs is necessarily capable of selfconsciousness. It is necessarily capable of referring to itself via the I-thought. It is capable of this self-reference because it is in every case an individual, even when it does not recognize itself as an individual, when for example it is lost in

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the perceiving of a mountain. Since the perceptual object, whether or not it exists, cannot appear without appearing to consciousness, and since consciousness is in every case an individual consciousness capable of selfconsciousness, we can say that the object appears to an ego. The object I perceive mayor may not exist, but surely I as conscious subject must exist as a necessary condition of the object's appearing, as we have just seen. My existence as a conscious subject is not an appearance, but a support of appearances. That to which appearances appear cannot itself have the status of a mere appearance. Otherwise a vicious infinite regress would arise. If 0 appears to S, but S is a mere appearance, then there must be an S' to which S appears, etc. The very understanding of the skeptical problem, therefore, presupposes that there exists at least one conscious subject whose existence is 'transphenomenal,' i.e. whose existence cannot be understood as a mode of appearance.

In this way we tum the tables on Butchvarov. His dissolution of the skeptical problem rests on the view that existence (reality) is indefinite identifiability, that the existence of object 0 is 0' s (material) identity with other objects, where this identity has its ground, not in the objects themselves, but in us, in our imposition of the transcendental concept of identity. If this were the correct theory of existence, then of course there would be no fact of the matter as to whether or not a given perceptual object 'really exists' apart from its being perceived to exist. But what we have just argued is that the mere understanding of the skeptical problem presupposes the understanding of the concept 'I,' a concept that cannot fail to be instantiated assuming (what is obvious) that some object actually appears. Thus the mere understanding of the skeptical problem presupposes the existence of at least one subject of consciousness whose existence cannot conceivably be understood as the result of anyone's application of a concept. The existence of that which applies the concept of existence cannot be the result of an application of the concept of existence. Thus we conclude that the mere understanding of the skeptical problem refutes Butchvarov's theory of existence.

8. One point we wish to concede to Butchvarov is that existence is not observable. But if so, and if "it would be ludicrous to suppose that it [existence] is somehow hidden in or behind the object that exists ... ,"21 then how avoid Butchvarov's view that existence is imposed on objects by us? We avoid it by simply denying that what he says is ludicrous is ludicrous. That I exist is certain for familiar Cartesian reasons despite the fact that existence is not an observable property. I know with certainty that I exist even though I do not outwardly or inwardly perceive my instantiation of a property of existence. My existence is in this sense hidden. Butchvarov himself, it seems, must admit that in at least one case existence is hidden: consciousness exists, but its existence does not appear.


6. THE EXTERNAL UNIFIER AS NECESSARILY EXISTENT MIND

Our critique of Butchvarov has issued in the result that minds are not transcendental, but transcendent metaphysical realities. Given, from section 4, that the external unifier must be a mind, it follows that it must be a metaphysical reality, and indeed a unitary metaphysical reality, since we know (from section 1) that the external unifier is one and not many. But we can also show that the externally unifying mind must also be a necessarily existent metaphysical reality.

The basic idea is that the existence of the unifier is unconditionally necessary since it follows from the mere possibility of facts, which possibility exists in every possible world. Thus, (1) the possibility of facts exists in every possible world; (2) the possibility of facts in a given world W entails the existence of the unifier U in W; therefore, (3) U exists in every possible world, which amounts to saying that U exists necessarily.

That there is no possible world without the possibility of facts may be demonstrated as follows.

a. Facts exist. (From the truth-maker argument) b. It is possible that facts exist. (Ab esse ad posse) c. If it is possible that facts exist, then necessarily it is possible that facts exist. (By the characteristic S5 axiom of modal propositional logic.) d. Necessarily, it is possible that facts exist. (By Modus Ponens from (b) and (c).) What this little argument shows is that the possibility of facts is

accessible from every possible world. Every world is such that, relative to it, it is possible that there be facts. This amounts to saying that the possibility of there being some facts or other is not contingent, i.e., does not vary from world to world. And note that this is established from the premise that there is at least one fact. The necessary possibility of facts is proven from the premise that there are facts and not from the mere conceivability of them.22 Thus (a) is not superfluous. It does real work. Although (d) is necessarily true, and thus needs no ground of its being true, it needs a ground of its being-known to be true, and this is supplied by contingent proposition (a) in conjunction with (c).

The upshot is that the general possibility of there being some facts or other exists in every metaphysically possible world. Having established (1), we turn to (2) according to which the possibility of facts in a world W entails the existence of the unifier in W. An argument for (2) quickly materializes once we reflect on the following principle according to which, necessarily, whatever is possible is possibly actual (PPA).

To work up to an appreciation of (PPA) suppose we begin at the opposite end. If a thing is actual it is of course possible. Actuality is not out of all relation to the possible; it is precisely the actuality of the possible. But if a thing is possible, it does not follow that it is actual: the possible 'outruns' the

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actual. The actual is a proper subset of the possible, which implies that there are possibles that are not actual. Nevertheless, the (merely) possible is not out of all relation to the actual; it is precisely that which is possibly actual, that which can be (or could be) actual, that which is actualizable. It is part of the very nature of the possible to be possibly actual: the merely possible is not necessarily such that it is actual (else it could not be merely possible), but it is necessarily such that it is possibly actual. If one were to deny (PPA), one would be saying that an item can be possible and yet not possibly actual, not such that it can be actual, not actualizable. And that appears to be a flat contradiction. If we understand possibility at all, we understand it to stand in the sort of relation to actuality encapsulated in (PPA). A modal doctrine such as David Lewis' which is unable to accommodate the truth of (PPA) is unacceptable?3

Now given (PPA), the general possibility that there exist some facts or other (as opposed to no facts at all) is possibly actual. It is actualizable. But it is actualizable only if specific facts are actualizable. Thus every world is such that there could have been some facts or other in it only because every world is such that there could have been some specific (particular) facts in it. It is just that these specific facts are different for different worlds. No one of them is such that its singular possibility exists in every world. What exists in every world is only the general possibility that there be some facts or other. But since the actualization of this general possibility cannot come about without the actualization of specific facts, the actualization of the general possibility, no less than the actualization of singular possibilities, requires the unifier. Thus the unifier is not only the ground of the existence and possibility of Socrates (assuming concrete contingent individuals or 'thick particulars' to be facts) but also of the possibility of facts in general. The external unifier is the ground of this general possibility in that it is the ground of its possibly being actual, not the ground of its existence. The existence of the possibility of contingent beings in general is necessary existence (as per the (a)-(d) argument above) and so does not need a ground.

The argument, then, is this: 1. Although facts, which are contingent beings, do not exist in every world, the general possibility P that there exists some fact or other exists in every world. (From the (a)-(d) argument above) 2. What is possible is actualizable.

Therefore 3. Pis actualizable in every world. 4. For any world W, Pis actualizable in W only if specific (particular) facts are actualizable in W.

Therefore 5. For any world W, specific facts are actualizable in W. 6. For any world W, if specific facts are actualizable in W, then the unifier exists in W as was seen in the preceding chapter.


Therefore 7. The unifier exists in every possible world, and is therefore an absolutely necessary being.

7. THE UNIFIER AS SELF-EXISTENT EXISTENCE

The unifier U exists of absolute metaphysical necessity. But what grounds this necessity? We submit that the ground of this necessity lies in the fact that there is no real distinction between U and its existence, or between U and existence. U is self-existent existence itself. U does not have existence; it is existence. Existence itself necessarily exists as the paradigm existent. Every contingent existent exists in dependence on the Paradigm. Thus,

(PT) Necessarily, for any contingent individual x, x exists if and only if (i) there is a necessary y such that y is the paradigm existent, and (ii) y, as the external unifier of x's ontological constituents, directly produces the unity/existence of x.

The reader is referred to Chapter 1 for elucidation of (PT), and, in particular, for an account of how it avoids vicious circularity.

8. WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE?

Many will judge our paradigm theory of existence to be either extravagant or incoherent. But what is the alternative? Donald C. Williams is surely right: " ... the only viable alternative to dispensing with Existence is to decide that it is God.,,24 Although we have not identified the paradigm existent with the God of any particular religious tradition, it is obvious that the Paradigm has divine attributes: it is a necessarily existent metaphysical reality, a mind, whose free productive act is the ultimate explanation of why anything contingent exists. (Since nowhere in our argumentation do we invoke the principle of sufficient reason, we are not required to explain why the free productive act occurred.)

The alternative to a paradigm theory, then, is to dispense with existence. In other words, the alternative is eliminativism about the existence of individuals. This is the only alternative worth considering, since the identitarian 'alternatives' are quite hopeless. It is spectacularly clear from Chapter 2 that existence cannot be a property of individuals. From Chapter 3, we learned that the identitarian version of the 'no difference' theory is untenable. Chapter 4 taught us the same with respect to the identitarian version of the 'property of properties' theory. And Chapter 5 delivered a similar verdict as regards the identitarian version of the mondial attribute theory. We hope the reader agrees with us that those refutations were decisive.

Thus our main competitor is the eliminativist view according to which

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there is no such thing as the existence of individuals. Surely this is a view no less extreme than ours. For it denies the very data that motivate a theory of existence in the first place. It solves the problem of what it is for an individual to exist, not by untying, but by cutting, the Gordian knot. Instead of dealing with existence, it changes the subject to something else, the acceptance of a presentation (Brentano), a concept's being instantiated (Frege), a propositional function's being sometimes true (Russell), the logical quantity some (D. C. Williams). But it conceals this 'switcheroo' by continuing to use the good old word 'existence.' A forthright eliminativist ought to eschew use of 'existence' and just admit that he has changed the subject. But changing the subject does not make the original topic go away. If the eliminativist is not interested in the original topic, then fine; but in that case we need not bother ourselves with his pronouncements. If, on the other hand, the eliminativist flatly denies that there is the original topic, then we say that the existence of individuals is more certain than the eliminativist premises which sanction its denial.

Existence is like truth in this respect. There are anti-realists who want to say that truth is warranted assertibility, ideal rational acceptability, or something similar. If they mean to identify truth with this other thing, their theory is untenable. For truth cannot be identical to warranted assertibility unless everything warrantedly assertible is true. But then the circularity is obvious. To avoid circularity, they must make an eliminativist move; they must simply deny that there is any such thing as truth as understood by realists. But that there is truth is more certain than the premises of its eliminativist denial. Similarly, that there is the existence of individuals is more certain than the premises of its eliminativist denial.

NOTES

Hector-Neri Castaneda, "Individuation and Non-Identity: A New Look," American Philosophical Quarterly vol. 12, no. 2 (April 1975), pp. 131-140

2 Ibid., p. 137.

3 Ibid., pp. 138-139.

4 Panayot Butchvarov, Skepticism about the External World (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

5 Cf. William F. Vallicella, "Existence and Indefinite Identifiability," Southwest Philosophy Review vol. 11, no. 2 (July 1995), 171-186.

5 Ibid., p. 131.

6 Ibid.

8 Ibid., p. 119.

8 Ibid., p. 132.


10 Ibid., p. 125.

11 Panayot Butchvarov, Being qua Being: A Theory of Identity, Existence, and Predication (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 244.

12 Panayot Butchvarov, Scepticism about the External World, op. cit., p. 152.

13 Ibid., p. 153.

14 Ibid.

15 Panayot Butchvarov, "Direct Realism without Materialism," Midwest Studies in Philosophy XIX (1994), p. 10.

16 Ibid.

17 Panayot Butchvarov, ''The Untruth and the Truth of Skepticism," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, vol. 67, no. 4 (January 1994), p. 43. Cf. Being qua Being, op. cit., p. 109.

18 'Sensible' is short for 'outer-sensible.'

19 Ibid., p. 48.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., p. 47.

22 Conceivability is no sure guide to real possibility.

23 Exercise for the reader: Explain why said modal doctrine is incompatible with (PP A). Hint: explore the consequences of the alleged indexicality of 'actual.'

24 Donald C. Williams, "Dispensing with Existence," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LIX (1962), p.754.

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actuality 40, 55-56, 111-112, 192, 223-225, 267

Adams, R. M. 123 Alexander, Samuel 202, 203, 211,

251 Aquinas, Thomas 102 Aristotelian substances 187, 188 Aristotle 23, 68, 104, 108, 187,

188,218 Armstrong, D. M. 13, 171, 174,

176,180,181,188, 198,207,208,213, 218,234-238,241, 242,243

Attfield, Robin 104 Aune, Bruce 127 Ayer, A. J. 112 bare particulars 163, 173, 174,221 Benardete, Jose 66 Bergmann, Gustav 68, 176, 189,

197,203,204,225, 228

Bergmann, Michael 59 Blanshard, Brand 201-203, 211,

251 Bogdan, Radu 193 Bradford, Dennis E. 111, 112 Bradley, F. H. 200-203, 206-212,

214,217,218,221, 223,224,226,230, 235,238,240,251

Bradley's regress 87, 169, 201, 202, 208, 209, 212-214,218,221, 223,226,230, 238, 250,251,252,253

Brentano, Franz 13, 28, 68, 72-80, 82, 129, 133, 219-221,270

bundles 53, 163, 186,222

INDEX

279

Butchvarov, Panayot 8, 10, 14, 29, 173, 174, 225, 256-263, 266, 267

Campbell, Keith 221-223 Castaneda, Hector-Neri xii, 14,47,

216,254,255 Chisholm, Roderick M. xii, 40, 74,

85, 162, 173-175 Code, Alan 123 Copleston, F. C. 240 concrete facts 44, 161, 163-165,

168,177,178,180, 181, 186-188,255

constituent ontology 96, 189, 192, 227

Dasein 151, 152,254 Davies, Brian 112 dependentism 196,238,239 Descartes 42,53, 81, 109, 127 Dodd, Julian 168-170 eliminativism 12, 68, 69, 76, 80-82,

88, 94, 105-108, 116,122,141,151, 269

existential neutrality 2-4, 7 existential quantifier 29, 57-58,

117, 118, 121 Findlay, J. N. xii Frege, Gottlob xi, 6, 26, 31, 37, 52,

58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 70,72,82, 108-113, 117,121,122,127, 132,139-143,150, 151,183,205,206, 270

Geach, Peter 111,112

280 INDEX

Gibson, Quentin xii, 15-19,21,22 Grossmann, Reinhardt 67, 206,

207,213,216,236 haecceities 99 Hartmann, Nicolai 127, 151-153 Hegel, G.W.F. 103, 178 Heidegger, Martin 8, 11,258,260 Hochberg, Herbert 227-229, 232-

235,240,242,243 Hodges, Horace Jeffery xii holism of existence 53, 54, 192 Hume, David 69,241 identitarianism 69, 76, 80, 97, 116,

122 instantiation 9, 12-14, 17-19, 21,

23, 26, 31, 33, 46-49, 51, 54, 58, 64,83,93-97, 104, 108,112,116,117, 128, 132, 136, 142, 160-162, 169-171, 177, 207, 208, 235,237,238,261, 266

Kant 11,37,62-64, 128, 191, 192 Kaplan, David 37 Keller, Phillip, x Kim, Jaegwon 45 Krabbenbos, Ingrid xii Lambert, Karel 40 Lewis, David 55, 168, 190 Mackie, J. L. 90, 11 0 Marty, Anton 90, 91 McTaggart, J. MeT. E. 209,210 Meinong, Alexius 38-40, 42, 91,

82,117, 155 Mertz, D. W. xii, 211, 213, 214,

250 Miller, Barry x modes of existence 7, 15, 17,

20-22,259 Moreland, J. P. 193 Mulligan, Kevin 166

Munitz, Milton 111, 127 negative existentials 114 nonconstituent ontology 47, 48, 53,

69 nonexistence 3, 4, 12, 15, 26, 59,

73-76, 79, 81, 82, 94, 100, 104, 114-116,128,129,131, 143,148,161,184, 261

nonexistent objects 12-14, 17, 38-42, 48, 57, 60, 79, 82, 98, 115, 164, 216

nonrelational tie 48, 162, 168, 171 197,198,203-206, 226

Olson, Kenneth Russell 234 ontological operator 251,254,255 ostrich nominalism 175,246 ostrich realism 175 Owen, G. E. L.123 Parsons, Terence 65 Plantinga, Alvin 37, 88, 102, 122,

175, 192 Plato's Beard 112, 114, 115, 128,

141 Plotinus 5 property-instances 38, 49, 67, 88,

192,215 Quine, W. V. xi, 6, 33, 112,

116-122, 129 relation-instances 203, 211, 212-

214,226 Restall, Greg 193 Routley, Richard 40 Russell, Bertrand xi, 6, 31, 37, 39,

53, 57, 61, 64, 70, 72, 106, 109-111, 113,117,121,122, 132, 139-143, 150, 151,192,214,216, 223, 240,261,270

Salmon, Nathan 37, 61-64 Santayana, George, ix, 63 Sellars, Wilfrid 189 Shaffer, Jerome 66 Smith, Quentin xii

INDEX

Sommers, Fred 32, 91, 115, 127-133, 134, 139-150, 196

Sosein 14,41, 151, 152 Swindler, J. K. 65 thick particulars 176, 184, 185,

241,244,256 thin particulars 176-178, 181-187 Tomberlin, James E. 35, 193 transcendental mind 256 tropes 49, 53, 54, 85-88, 155, 166,

167,203,215,217, 221- 223

truth-makers 21, 25, 26, 43, 83, 127-129, 133-135, 139, 145, 149, 162-170, 186, 226, 240,257,258

Van Cleve, James 217 Van Inwagen, Peter 65 Williams, C. J. F. 112, 122, 124 Williams, Donald C. 30, 81-87,

222,241,269,270 Witherall, Arthur 65 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 134 Wolterstorff, Nicholas 65,190,191 Zemach, E. M. 64

281


1. Jay F. Rosenberg: Linguistic Representation. 1974 ISBN 90-277-0533-X

ISBN 90-277-0526-7 2. Wilfrid Sellars: Essays in Philosophy and Its History. 1974

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Carl Ginet: Knowledge, Perception, and Memory. 1975 ISBN 90-277-0574-7

Peter H. Hare and Edward H. Madden: Causing, Perceiving and Believing. An Examination of the Philosophy of C. J. Ducasse. 1975 ISBN 90-277-0563-1

Hector-Neri Castaneda: Thinking and Doing. The Philosophical Foundations of Institutions. 1975 ISBN 90-277-0610-7

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ISBN 90-277-0805-3 9. Bruce Aune: Reason and Action. 1977

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12. Joseph C. Pitt (ed.): The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions. 1978 ISBN 90-277-0903-3

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14. Michael J. Loux: Substance and Attribute. A Study in Ontology. 1978 ISBN 90-277-0926-2

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16. Jeffrie G. Murphy: Retribution, Justice, and Therapy. Essays in the Philosophy of Law. 1979 ISBN 90-277-0998-X

17. George S. Pappas (ed.): Justification and Knowledge. New Studies in Epistemology. 1979 ISBN 90-277-1023-6

18. James W. Cornman: Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation. With a Bibliographic Essay by Walter N. Gregory. 1980 ISBN 90-277-1041-4

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40. Stuart Silvers (ed.): Rerepresentation. Essays in the Philosophy of Mental Representation. 1988 ISBN 0-7923-0045-9

41. Michael P. Levine: Hurne and the Problem of Miracles. A Solution. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0043-2

42. Melvin Dalgarno and Eric Matthews (eds.): The Philosophy of Thomas Reid. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0190-0

43. Kenneth R. Westphal: Hegel's Epistemological Realism. A Study of the Aim and Method of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0193-5

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46. J-c. Smith (ed.): Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0451-9

47. John Heil (ed.): Cause, Mind, and Reality. Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0462-4

48. Michael D. Roth and Glenn Ross (eds.): Doubting. Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0576-0

49. Rod Bertolet: What is Said. A Theory ofIndirect Speech Reports. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0792-5

50. Bruce Russell (ed.): Freedom, Rights and Pornography. A Collection of Papers by Fred R. Berger. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1034-9

51. Kevin Mulligan (ed.): Language, Truth and Ontology. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1509-X


52. Jesus Ezquerro and Jesus M. Larrazabal (eds.): Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy. Proceedings of the First International Colloquium on Cognitive Science. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1538-3

53. O.H. Green: The Emotions. A Philosophical Theory. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1549-9

54. Jeffrie G. Murphy: Retribution Reconsidered. More Essays in the Philosophy of Law. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1815-3

55. Phillip Montague: In the Interests of Others. An Essay in Moral Philosophy. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1856-0

56. Jacques-Paul Dubucs (ed.): Philosophy of Probability. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2385-8

ISBN 0-7923-2438-2 57. Gary S. Rosenkrantz: Haecceity. An Ontological Essay. 1993

58.

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Paul Weingartner (ed.): Scientific and Religious Belief 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2595-8

Michaelis Michael and John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.): Philosophy in Mind. The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-3143-5 William H. Shaw: Moore on Right and Wrong. The Normative Ethics of G.E. Moore. 1995

ISBN 0-7923-3223-7 T.A. Blackson: Inquiry, Forms, and Substances. A Study in Plato's Metaphysics and Epistem-ology. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3275-X

63. Debra Nails: Agora, Academy, and the Conduct of Philosophy. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3543-0

64. Warren Shibles: Emotion in Aesthetics. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3618-6

65. John Biro and Petr Kotatko (eds.): Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3795-6

66. Mary Gore Forrester: Persons, Animals, and Fetuses. An Essay in Practical Ethics. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3918-5

67. K. Lehrer, B.J. Lum, B.A. Slichta and N.D. Smith (eds.): Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3980-0

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J. Mendola: Human Thought. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4401-4 J. Wright: Realism and Explanatory Priority. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4484-7

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E. Morscher, o. Neumaier and P. Simons (eds.): Applied Ethics in a Troubled World. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-4965-2

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Q. Gibson: The Existence Principle. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-5188-6

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77. J. Bransen and S.E. Cuypers (eds.): Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-5204-1

78. R.D. Gallie: Thomas Reid: Ethics, Aesthetics and the Anatomy of the Self. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-5241-6

79. K. Korta, E. Sosa and X. Arrazola (eds.): Cognition, Agency and Rationality. Proceedings of the Fifth International Colloquium on Cognitive Science. 1999 ISBN 0-7923-5973-9

80. M. Paul: Success in Referential Communication. 1999 ISBN 0-7923-5974-7

81. E. Fischer: Linguistic Creativity. Exercises in 'Philosophical Therapy'. 2000

82. R. Tuomela: Cooperation. A Philosophical Study. 2000

83. P. Engel (ed.): Believing and Accepting. 2000

84. W.L. Craig: Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity. 2000

85. D.A. Habibi: John Stuart Mill and the Ethic of Human Growth. 2001

ISBN 0-7923-6124-5

ISBN 0-7923-6201-2

ISBN 0-7923-6238-1

ISBN 0-7923-6668-9

ISBN 0-7923-6854-1

86. M. Slors: The Diachronic Mind. An Essay on Personal Identity, Psychological Continuity and the Mind-Body Problem. 2001 ISBN 0-7923-6978-5

87. L.N. Oaklander (ed.): The Importance of Time. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society, 1995-2000.2001 ISBN 1-4020-0062-6

88. W.E Vallicella: A Paradigm Theory of Existence. Onto-Theology Vindicated. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0887-2

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