a paradoxical convergence: french economists and the
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A paradoxical convergence: French economists and thepolicy towards cartels from the 1870s to the eve of the
Great DepressionDavid Spector
To cite this version:David Spector. A paradoxical convergence: French economists and the policy towards cartels fromthe 1870s to the eve of the Great Depression. 2020. �halshs-02967599�
WORKING PAPER N° 2020 – 63
A paradoxical convergence: French economists and the policy towards cartels from the 1870s to the eve of the Great Depression
David Spector
JEL Codes: B19, N13, N14, N43, N44. Keywords:
1
Aparadoxicalconvergence:Frencheconomistsandthepolicytowardscartelsfromthe1870stotheeveoftheGreatDepression
September2020
DavidSpector*
Abstract
Justlikeinotherindustrialcountries,cartelizationwaswidespreadinFranceafterthe
1870decade.Cartels,andthepublicpolicytowardsthem,werefrequentlyaddressedin
thepublicdebate.ThisarticledealswiththestancetakenbyFrencheconomistsonthis
subjectuntiltheGreatDepression.Althoughtheyweredividedinseveralgroupsthat
wereinsharpdisagreementonmostscientificandpolicyissues,Frencheconomists
werealmostunitedintheirlackofsupportforanti-cartelpolicy.Theliberaleconomists’
oppositionstemmedfromtheirgeneralhostilitytogovernmentintervention.Unlikein
theEnglish-speakingworld,wheremanyeconomistsotherwisecriticalofgovernment
graduallybecamesupportiveofantitrustaftermountingevidencehadrevealedthe
scopeofcertainkindsofexclusionarybehavior,theFrenchliberaleconomistsremained
constantintheiropposition.Themorereform-mindeduniversityprofessors,aswellas
thesociologists-economistsoftheDurkheimianschool,wereunenthusiasticabout
policiesmeanttosafeguardcompetitionbecausetheyviewed‘excessive’market
competitionasdestabilizingandwasteful.Finally,themostprominentexpertsin
industrialeconomics,whowereemployedbylargecompaniesorprofessional
organizations,alsoadvocatedahand-offapproach,inaccordancewiththeiremployers’
preferences.
*CentreNationaldelaRechercheScientifiqueandParisSchoolofEconomics.
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Thedevelopmentofcartelsinindustrialcountriesfromthelastquarterofthe
nineteenthcenturytotheGreatDepressionputthemattheforefrontofthepublic
debate,involvingeconomists,lawyers,politicians,businessmenandthepublicopinion.
However,theformandthecontentsofthesedebatesvariedalotacrosscountries.This
paperanalyzeseconomists’contributionstothisdebateinFranceandcontraststhem
withthoseoftheirBritishandAmericanpeers.
WhenassessingFrencheconomists’viewsoncartelsandgovernmentregulationof
competitionbetweensecondhalfofthenineteenthcenturyandtheGreatDepression,
onecannotbutbestruckbyaparadox.Ontheonehand,thefieldofeconomicswas
highlyfractured,withdifferent‘schools’ofeconomistsagreeingonnexttonothingon
mosteconomicpolicyissues-suchasfreetradeversusprotectionism,laborlaws,
taxation,theroleofthegovernmentintheeconomy-,onthemethodsandgoalsof
economicsandonitsrelationtoothersocialsciences.Ontheotherhand,eventhough
economists’statementsaboutthemeritsofcompetitioninprinciplewerefarfrom
uniform,inpracticehardlyanyeconomistadvocatedgovernmentpoliciesaimedat
prohibitingcompetition-restrictingconductbyprivatefirms.Moreover,thisskepticism
orevenoutrighthostilitytowardsanysuchpolicydidnotdiminishbetweenthelate
nineteenthcenturyandthe1920s.
ThisstandsinsharpcontrasttoboththeUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates.Inthe
UnitedStates,theenforcementoftheShermanAct,evenifinitiallytimid,gradually
exposedthesophisticatedstrategiesusedbycertainlargefirmstocementtheir
dominance.Thisnewlyavailableinformationcausedseveralprominenteconomiststo
revisittheirearlierskepticismandembraceamoreinterventionistapproachinthe
1910s.Likewise,intheUnitedKingdomwherethedominantviewhadlongbeenthat
freetradeprovidedsufficientprotectionagainstabusebydomesticcartels,mounting
evidencetothecontraryledAlfredMarshallandhisdisciplestoconsidercartelsworthy
ofclosepublicscrutiny.
InFrancejustlikeelsewhere,academiceconomistswerefarfrombeingtheonlyoreven
themainparticipantsinthesedebates,whichalsoinvolvedbusinessrepresentatives,
unionleaders,politiciansofallstripes,scholarsinotherfields(inparticularlaw,andthe
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nascentfieldofsociology),civilservantsandjudges.Studyingeconomists’rolesinthese
debatesthusrequiresonetotakeintoaccount,beyondtheirideas,thestatusof
economistswithinandoutsideofacademia,andtheirrelationshiptootherparticipants
tothesedebates,includingforeigneconomists.Thisisallthemoretruethatthroughout
theperiodweareconsidering,economicsinFrancewasnotfullyestablishedasa
separate,well-identifiedfieldofscientificinquiry–muchlessthanintheUSortheUK.
Lawprofessors,specializedjournalistsorexpertsworkingfortradeassociations–with
someoverlapbetweenthesegroups–whoparticipatedinthedebatesaboutthe
regulationofmarketcompetitionwerealsoonoccasionconsideredeconomists,were
appointedbythegovernmentaseconomicexperts,andpublishedarticlesinthesame
journalsaseconomicsprofessors.1
TheevolutionofFrenchpolicyoncartels
ThroughoutthenineteenthcenturyandupuntilWorldWarII,thelegaltreatmentof
cartelswasbasedonArticle419oftheNapoleonicPenalCodeof1810,whichprohibited
“coalitions”ofsellers“thattendnottosell,ortosellonlyatacertainprice”.This
prohibitiondatedbacktotheRevolution:theLeChapelierlaw(1791)hadabolished
guildsandstatedthat“citizensofthesametradeorprofession[…]maynot,when
assembled,[…]draftregulationsconcerningtheirallegedcommoninterests”nor“make
agreementsamongthemselvesdesignedtosetpricesfortheirindustryortheirlabor.”2,3
ThearticlesinthePenalCodereflectingthepartofthisprohibitionapplicabletolabor
wereremovedinthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcenturyasgovernmentsgradually
authorizedworkers’unions,butArticle419remainedinplace,unchangedtill1926.
Beyondthequestionofeconomiccompetition,thisprohibitionreflectedoneofthemain
politicalprinciplesunderlyingtheRevolution,namely,thereplacementoftheoldsocial
organizationbasedonspecificgroupsthathaddifferentprivilegesandobligations(such
asthethreeAncienRégimeorders,certaincitiesorneighborhoods,regional
1OnthesociologyoftheeconomicsprofessioninFranceandthechangesitunderwentsincethenineteenthcentury,inacomparativeperspective,seeFourcade(2001,2010).2ThistranslationisbyStewart(1951:165-166).3In1774,Turgot,whomLouisXVIhadappointedContrôleurgénéraldesfinancesuponhisaccessiontothethronein1774,hadenactedalawabolishingguilds.Butfacedwithstrongresistance,thekinghadreplacedTurgotwithNecker,whoreestablishedguilds,albeitinamodified,supposedlymorerationalform(seeKaplan,2001).
4
parliaments,orguilds)withonebasedonaunifiedcommunityofequalcitizens,withno
intermediategroups.Onamoredown-to-earthlevel,theprohibitionofagreements
betweensellersofthesameproductwasinitiallymeanttotarget‘hoarders’of
commodities,andprimarilygrainhoarders.Itaddressedthelong-standingfearthat
theirspeculationscouldaggravateshortagesandinsomecasescausesocialandpolitical
unrest.
Cartelsattheturnofthecentury
Overthecourseofthenineteenthcentury,theconcernoverhoardinggraduallymade
wayforpreoccupationsaboutindustrialconcentration,reflectingtherisingshareof
industryintheFrencheconomy.4Cartelagreementsbecamewidespreadafterthestart
ofthe1873depression.Mostofthemtooktheformofcommonsalesagencies,referred
toascomptoirs.Theirmainrolewastoallocatecustomers’orderstotheirmembersin
ordertostiflecompetitionandstabilizeprices.Thesecomptoirscoveredmostofthe
metallurgicalindustryfrompigiron(the‘ComptoirdeLongwy’,createdin1876)to
weldedsteeltubes(1890),axles(1892),steelbeams(1896),sheetandplatesteel
(1895),coachsprings(1896),semifinishedbarsteels(1897),ironore(1897),and
seamlesssteeltubes(1910).Likewise,cartelswereformedinthesugar,paper,coal,
petroleum,textile(cottonspinninginparticular)andchemicalindustries(see,e.g.,
Freedeman,1988andthereferencestherein).
Eventhoughthedetailsofthesecartelsvaried,theyallhadthesameendgoal:limiting
competitionbetweentheirmembersinordertomaintainhighenoughpricesbymeans
ofmechanismssuchaspricefixing,productionquotas,oracentralizedallocationof
customerorderstocartelmembers.Somecartelsdevisedsophisticatedmechanismsto
ensurethattheirfunctioningwouldnotbedisruptedbyamember’sattempttoincrease
itssales,suchasimposingpenaltiesonfirmsthatexceededtheirquotaorhavingall
cartelmembersownsharesinanymember’snewplants.5Likewise,somecartels
devisedcoordinatedresponsestothethreatofexternalcompetition,suchasjointly
acquiringnon-cartelfirmsandthenshuttingthemdown(insomecasesdestroyingtheir
4Hoardingcasesdidnotcompletelydisappear,however.Aslateastheendofthe1880s,acaseaboutcopperhoardingmadeheadlines(Freedeman,1988).5Morsel’s1976studyofthechloratescarteldescribessuchclausesindetail.
5
machines)6orengagingintemporarypredatorypricingtobankruptentrantsanddeter
furtherentry.7
Monopoliesandcartelsbetweenpublicoutrageandjudicialleniency
Justlikeinotherindustrialcountries,monopoliesandcartelsoftenarousedstrong
opposition.OneoftheearliestexamplesistheCompagniedesMinesdelaLoire,which
afterofaseriesofmergershadbecomealocalcoalmonopolyinSaint-Etienneandits
regioninthelate1840s.Thehighpricesitchargedcausedwidespreadprotestsfrom
domesticandprofessionalconsumers.Itwasalsoaccusedofkeepingminers’wagesat
artificiallylowlevels.TheseprotestswerestrongenoughtoleadEmperorNapoleonIII
toforcetheCompagniedesMinesdelaLoiretodissolveandsplitintofourdistinct
companiesin1854.Proudhon(1865:405-408)referredtothisepisodeasanillustration
ofhis“antinomyofcompetition”.
Startinginthe1890s,cartels’misdeedswereregularlydenouncedintheChamberof
deputies,mostlybyleft-wing(socialist)andcenterleft(Partiradical)representatives
whoclaimedtorelaythegeneralpublic’sangeratcartel-inducedhighprices.The
maritimefreightcartelwasdiscussedinParliamentin1895and1901;8in1899the
ministerofcommerce,addressingtheChamber,mentionedthatdisgruntledcustomers
hadpointedouttohimcartelsinthealcohol,sugarandmetalindustries;9andin1901a
longdebatetookplaceabouttwocartelsthathadcausedamajoruproarandgivenrise
tolegalproceedings–thesugarrefiningandpigironcartels.10
Atthesametimehowever,judgesbecamemorelenient.Aseriesofrulingsbetween
1894and1902setanewstandardbasedonthedistinctionbetween“good”and“bad”
cartels:goodcartels,whichonlyaimedtostabilizepricesatlevelscompatiblewiththe
6Mastin’s2011studyoftheRoubaixwoolcombingcartelthatfunctionedbetween1881and1914describessuchaggressivemeasurestargetingcompetitors.7Whereasmoststudiesofpre-1914cartelsfindthattheirmaineffectwastoreducevolumesandincreasepricesratherthantoincreaseproductiveefficiency,someeconomichistorianshavepointedtoexceptionstothischaracterization.See,e.g.,Gillet1973.Insomecases,agreementsonpricesrequiredsomeproductstandardization,whichcouldincreaseefficiency.Insomeothersacommonorganizationforexportscouldreducecommercialcosts.8Chamberofdeputies,sessionsof14June1895and18January1901.9Chamberofdeputies,sessionof23November1899.10Chamberofdeputies,sessionsof15and22March1901.
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“naturaloperationofsupplyanddemand”ratherthantosetthemat“excessive”levels,
werenowfoundnottoviolateArticle419.11Themosthighlypublicizedofthese
proceedingswerethoseonthepigironcartel,knownastheCarteldeLongwy,which
endedwithtwopermissiverulingsin1902.
Twomainfactorscontributedtothisevolution.Oneofthemwasthegeneralloosening
oftherestrictionsonthecreationofassociationsofallkinds,andinparticularworker
unions.Thislooseningstartedin1864whentheSecondEmpireenteredamoreliberal
phase,andwasfurtheredatthestartoftheThirdRepublic,withthe1881lawon
associations.Themorelenienttreatmentofcartels–usuallyreferredtoasententes
(agreements)-alsoreflectedawidelyheldviewthatunbridledcompetitionwas
undesirableasitwouldleadtoinstability,largepriceswings,periodicunemployment,
andinsomecasesachainofbankruptciesendinginconsolidationandmonopoly.
TheargumentsraisedindefenceoftheFrenchcartelsaround1900
Accordingtocartelapologists,“pacifying”andstabilizingmarketswasbeneficialtoall,
evenifitledtoslightlyhigherprices.Inparticular,cartelsweredefendedonthesame
groundsasprotectionisttariffshadbeenafewyearsearlier:theywereconsidered
necessarytothesurvivalofmanyindependentmedium-sizecompanies,inlinewitha
specificallyFrencheconomicidealthatreflectedthenationalcharacter:individualism,a
strongdemocraticspiritandadistasteforgiganticorganizations.Justliketariffs
purportedlyprotectedsmallagriculturalandindustrialproducersfromtheviolenceand
chaosofforeigncompetitiontriggeredbythepermanentthreatofoverproduction(even
though,inthewordsofJaurès,powerfulandwealthylandownerswere“hidingbehind
smallpeasants”whenlobbyingforprotection),12cartelsweremeanttoprotectsmall
andmedium-sizedfirmsfromdomesticcut-throatcompetition.13
11TheserulingsincludethoseoncartelsbetweentileproducersintheGrenoblearea,limeproducersintheSouth-West,pigironproducersintheLorraine,andbooksellers(Freedeman,1988).12Jaurèsmadethatclaiminaparliamentarydebateonagriculturaltariffsin1887.13Someprotectionists,whileinprinciplefavorabletocartels,wereconcernedthatcombinedeffectoftariffsandcartelswouldbetoomuchforthegeneralpublictoacceptandwarnedthatabusesbycartelsmighttriggerapopularmovementagainstprotectionism.SeeforinstanceJulesDomergue’sinterventioninthedebateoncartelsorganizedbytheSociétéd’économiepolitiquenationaleon21January1903(BulletinmensueldelaSociétéd’économiepolitiquenationale,1903:12-13).
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ThepartisansofententesoftenstressedhowdifferenttheywerefromGermancartels
(orrather,Kartells,astheyoftenspelledthemtohighlighttheirteutonicessence)or
Americantrusts.14OneofthemostvocalwasJulesMéline,theformerPrimeMinister
whosenamewasassociatedwiththeprotectionisttariffsofthe1890s.Asalawyer,
MélinerepresentedtheCarteldeLongwyinlegalproceedings.Beyondcourts,he
relentlesslypresentedargumentsinfavorofFrenchcartelstothegeneralpublic,inthe
BulletinoftheSociétéd’économiepolitiquenationaleofwhichhewashonorary
president,andwhichhadbeencreatedin1897tosupportprotectionism.Accordingto
him,theFrenchententeswereanemanationofFrance’s“prudentandmoderate”
character,15incontrasttoAmericantrusts,whichweredenouncedasgiganticand
oppressiveacrossthepoliticalspectrum,16andtoalesserextenttoGermancartels.
ThepartisansofFrenchcartelsaround1900rarelyclaimedthattheyfosteredeconomic
efficiency.Theyratherstressedthatthemaingoaloftheseagreementswasmodest,that
is,topreventpricesfromfallingtounreasonablylow(“debased”)levelsandtoavoid
overproduction,consideredthemainevilafflictingindustry,whileallowingeachfirmto
retainamaximaldegreeofautonomy.17AccordingtoPauldeRousiers,alifelong
apologistforcartels(seehereafter),Frenchcartelsweretobecommendedforleaving
theirmembers“independentfromanindustrialviewpoint(…)whereasan[American]
trustmaybestrengthenedbyafortunatediscovery,thankstoindustrialconcentration
thatmakesallmembersofthetrustgainfromit”(Rousiers,1901).Followingasimilar
logic,FrenchcartelswerefavorablycomparedtoGermanonesbyJulesDomergue(a
closeassociateofJulesMéline)becausetheydidnotusetheproceedsfromhigh
domesticpricestoencouragelow-priceexports:“practicedinthatway,acartelisan
absurdenterprise(…).ThecorrectmodelforfutureorganizationsisinLongwy,notin
Germany”.18
14However,forthesakeofreadability,thisarticlewillusethewordcartelunlessitaddressesthe(actualorpurported)differencesbetweenFrenchententesandcartelsinothercountries.15SeeJulesMéline’sprefacetoLaur1903.16OnthewidespreadperceptionoftheUnitedStatesasafrightening“empireoftrusts”,seechapter8ofRoger2002.17SeetheverbatimofdiscussionsoncartelsorganizedbytheSociétéd’économiepolitiquenationale(BulletinmensueldelaSociétéd’économiepolitiquenationale,1901,1902,1903).18ThissentenceisanexcerptfromDomergue’sinterventioninoneofthediscussionsoftheSociétéd’économiepolitiquenationale(BulletinmensueldelaSociétéd’économiepolitiquenationale,1901).
8
ThisisincontrastwiththepartisansofAmericantrusts,whoappealedtomorethanjust
thevirtuesofpricestabilization.Theyoftenarguedthattrusts,almostlikefull-fledged
mergers,allowedfirmstopooltheirtechnology,rationalizeproduction,andachieve
economiesofscale.Likewise,thepartisansofGermancartelspraisedtherationalization
ofeffortstopenetrateforeignmarkets.InFrance,suchargumentswererareandthe
defenceofcartelsreliedonanalmostinversecharacterization:forthemostpart,they
weredepictedaround1900asanalternativetothekindofconcentrationand
centralizeddecision-makingthatwassupposedtojustifythemtothegeneralpublicin
theUnitedStatesandinGermany.Likewise,protectivetariffswerecommendedasa
defenceagainstthe“excesses”ofAmericanorGermantrusts–thatis,theirlowexport
pricesthatthreatenedFrenchproducers.19Exceptforafewexceptions,theapologists
forcartelspaidonlylipservicetotheideathattheyfosteredeconomicefficiencyor
consumers’interests,bymakingvagueclaimsthatinthelong-run,stabilitydelivered
betteroutcomesforall.
TherenewalofthedebatesoncartelsafterWorldWarI
Thelenientcourtrulingsofthefirstfewyearsofthecenturysomewhatclarifiedthe
applicablerulesandthetopicofcartelsbecamelessprevalentinthepublicdebateuntil
WorldWarI.20However,thewarchangedthis,fortworeasons.First,asthewarcaused
thestandardsoflivingtofalland“solidarity”insacrificestobecomeacardinalvalue,
profiteeringwasperceivedasintolerable.Accordingly,severallocalcartelsthathad
affectedthepriceofbasicconsumergoods,especiallyfoodstuffs,werepursued(Paxton
1977).
Theresumptionofjudicialactivitywasalsocausedbytheperceivedneedtoreininthe
excessesthathadbeenfosteredbywartimegovernmentpolicyonindustry.Justlikein
otherbelligerentcountries,thegovernmenthadencouragedclosecooperationwithin
keyindustries,especiallythosedeemedessentialtothewareffort.Inmanyindustries,
19SeeforinstanceBulletinmensueldelaSociétéd’économiepolitiquenationale(1901:216)andMéline’sprefacetoLaur1903.20Inalltheperiodicalsstudiedduringthepreparatoryworkforthisarticle,oneobservesthatthefrequencyofarticlesoncartelspeaksbetween1897and1903,anddecreasesafterwards,beforeincreasingagaininthe1920s.
9
thelargestfirmshadformed“consortia”thatcoordinatedtheallocationofscarceraw
materialsandmanpower,productionandsales,inordertoefficientlysupplywar-
relatedproducts.Theseconsortia,whichincertainindustriesweretheformal
continuationofanearlierinformalcartel,wereinsomecasesaccusedofprofiteering
throughunjustifiablyhighprices.Themostemblematiccasewasthatofthecalcium
carbideconsortium,whosemembersweretargetedin1915byacomplaintthatwasthe
startingpointofayearlong,highlypublicizedprocedure(Paxton,1977).
Theseproceedingsbeliedthepre-warviewthatArticle419wasarelicofpre-industrial
timesthatincreasinglypermissivecourtrulingshadrenderedobsolete.Thismadea
clarificationnecessary,eventhoughtherewasnoconsensusonwhatthisclarification
shouldbe.
Thetenorofthepublicdebatewasdifferentfromthatof1900:ratherthanmarket
stabilization,industrialmodernizationwasnowtheendgoal,especiallyinviewofthe
needtokeeptheever-presentGermanthreatatbay.Therealsowasbroadagreement
thatthismodernizationwouldrequirelarge-scalecooperation,orevenmergers,
betweencompanies.Viewsdivergedhoweveronwhether,howandbywhomsuch
cooperationshouldbecontrolled.Themainworkerunion,theCGT,demandedsome
kindofworkercontroloverindustry-wideconglomerates.Leftandcenter-left
politicianslikeAlbertThomas(thewartimeMinisterofArmament)andEtienne
Clementel(thewartimeMinisterofcommerce)demandedsomegovernmentoversight
overthecreationandoperationofindustrialagreements.Incontrast,LouisLoucheur,
theformerbusinessmanwhohadsucceededAlbertThomasattheMinistryof
Armamentin1917,concurredwithbusinessleaderswhoaskedforgovernment
interventiontostopnowthatthewarwasover(Kuisel1981).
TheparliamentarydebatesonthereformoftheoldArticle419lastedfrom1922to
1926(seePaxton1977,Freedeman1988,andChatriot2008).Publicsensitivitytohigh
pricescausedbythereturnofinflationfrom1923onwardsmadeitpolitically
inexpedienttoexplicitlyremovethebanonagreementsbetweencompetitors.Instead,
accordingtothelawthatwasenactedin1926,Article419was,fromnowon,applicable
onlyto“coalitionsleadingtopricesthatwouldnotbethenaturalresultoftheoperation
10
ofsupplyanddemand”.Theseunspectacularwordswereinfactmeanttoauthorize
cartelsprovidedtheirimpactonpriceswasmoderate:theministerofcommerce
speakingintheSenateinfavorofthedraftlawonNovember19,1926explainedthatit
wouldlegalize“agreementsthatonlyaimtosustainanormalbalancebetween
productionandconsumptionandmarketstabilitywhilepreventingoverproduction
crises”(JournalOfficieldelaRépubliquefrançaise,Débatsparlementaires,1926:1654).
Eventhoughbusinessleadershadclaimedthattheprohibitionofcartelsshouldbe
relaxedinordertoallowforefficiency-enhancingcooperation,inpracticenothinginthe
1926lawreflectedsuchaconcernsincethenewconditionforcartelstobelegalwas
their“moderation”,nottheirpotentialcontributiontoproductiveefficiency–inline
withwhatthepartisansofcartelshadlobbiedforsincethe19thcentury,andwiththe
prewarlenientcaselaw.
Theoverallassessmentbylatereconomichistoriansisthatforthemostpart,themany
cartelsthatflourishedundertheauspicesofthe1926law(inindustriessuchas
metallurgy,coal,chemicals,cement,shipbuilding,wool,cotton,silk)hadlittletodowith
productiveefficiency,andthattheyrathersloweddownmodernizationbyallowingless
efficientfirmstosurviveandbydampeningincentivestocutcostsorincreasequality
(HirschandSauvy1984).21
‘Liberal’,pro-marketeconomists:pro-competition,againstgovernmentintervention
Attheendofthenineteenthcentury,economicsinFrancewasstillanemergingand
fragmentedfield,consistingofseveralgroupsthatagreedonverylittleintermsof
methodologyorpolicy(Fourcade2001,2010,andLeVan-Lemesle2004).
Westartourinquirywiththegroupthatwasdominanttilltheendofthenineteenth
century.Thelibéraux,sometimesmerelycalledleséconomistesinpublicdiscourse,
formedtheoldestandmostcohesivenetwork.Sincethemiddleofthecentury,itsmost
21SomemonographsonspecificindustriestendtoqualifyHirschandSauvy’s1984conclusionthatcartelswereonly“Malthusian”.AccordingtoOmnès1980,thecombinationofmergersandcartelsinthesteeltubesindustrycontributedtoitsmodernization.
11
illustriousmembershadoccupiedprestigiouspositionsintheGrandesécolesand,after
itsfounding(1871),attheEcoleLibredesSciencesPolitiques.Theirmainpurposewas
politicalratherthanscientific:inthejournalstheyhadfounded(inparticulartheJournal
desÉconomistesandL’ÉconomisteFrançais)aswellasinotherinfluential,more
generalistperiodicalsandintheirbooks,libérauxauthorssuchasPaulLeroy-Beaulieu,
LéonSayorYvesGuyotextolledthe“eternaltruths”discoveredbytheearlyclassical
economiststoopposebothprotectionismandanygovernmentinterventionthatcould
belabelledassocialist,fromincometaxationtominimumwagesormandatorysocial
insurance.
Manyoftheselibérauxheldpowerfulpositionsinpoliticsandbusiness–mostlyin
sectorsthatfavoredfreetrade,suchasbanking.Thecontextoftheirwritingswasan
ever-presentfearofsocialism,whichhadbeenrevivedbythe1848revolutionandthe
1871Commune;andtheveryrealdominanceofprotectionistsinpolicymaking,
especiallyafter1890.
Theirpoliticalgoalscouldleadthemtodistancethemselvesfromclassicalauthors:for
instance,theyopposedRicardo’stheoryofrentbecausetheydislikeditsrelatively
egalitarianpolicyimplicationssuchasJohnStuartMill’sideaofataxationofthe
“unearnedincrement”orHenryGeorge’slandtax.Lateron,mostliberaleconomists
rejectedmathematicaleconomics,bothbecauseoftheirlackofevenbasicmathematical
trainingandbecausetheydislikedsomeofthepolicyviewsvoicedbythemost
prominentmathematicaleconomists,fromLéonWalras’sself-proclaimedsocialismto
AlfredMarshall’spartialembraceoftheprogressivetaxpoliciesenactedinLloyd
George’sPeople’sbudgetin1910.
Sincethebeginningofthenineteenthcentury,andwithremarkablylittleevolutiontill
the1930s,Frenchliberaleconomistsdevotedmuchenergytoextollingthevirtuesof
marketcompetitionandwarningagainstthedangersofgovernmentinterference.For
instance,oneofYvesGuyot’smanyanti-socialistpamphletswasentitledTheMoralityof
Competition(Guyot1896).Attheendofthenineteenthcentury,invokingtheabstract
virtuesofcompetitionandlaissez-faireagainstsocialreformershadfordecadesbeena
tropeofconservativediscourse-includinginwritingsbybusinessmenorpoliticians
12
whoseprofessedloveofcompetitiondidnotpreventthemfromadvocating
protectionism(see,forinstance,Thiers1848:290).
Inlinewiththeirabsolutehostilitytogovernmentinterventionintheeconomy,French
liberaleconomistsadvocatedahands-offapproachtocartels.Thisstancewasidentical
tothatofmostbusinessleaders,towhomseveralofthemajorliberaleconomistshad
closeties:eventhoughsomecompaniesoccasionallycomplainedagainstacartelthat
increasedthepriceoftheinputstheyneeded,22businessleadersweremoreunitedon
thequestionofcartelsthanontradepolicyandthemajorityoftheregionalchambersof
commercelobbiedfortheabolitionofArticle419.
Saveforafewexceptions,thelibérauxdidnotseeanytensionbetweentheir
appreciationofcompetitionandtheirdistrustofgovernmentintervention,andthey
emphaticallydeniedthatgovernmentinterventioncouldberequiredtoprotectmarket
competition.AsJosephGarnier(1859)emphaticallyasked:“Whatisnaturalandfree
competition[…]withouttherighttoenteragreements?”
Ascartelsbecamewidespreadandstartedtotriggercomplaints,thisappealtothemere
principleofabsoluteeconomicfreedomwascomplementedwithstatementsonthe
innocuousnessofcartelsandthelackofanyjustificationforgovernmentorjudicial
oversight.Articleafterarticlemadethesamepoint:cartelabusescouldhappenonlyasa
resultofstateintervention,suchastariffsthatshieldeddomesticcartelsfromforeign
competitors,orlegalmonopoliesoperatedbythegovernment.
Withimpressiveregularity,theJournaldeséconomistesandL’Economistefrançaisthus
publishedarticlesontheinefficiencyandmisdeedsofthegovernment-operatedmatch
monopoly(monopoledesallumettes),withlittlechangefromthe1880stothe1920s,
whilestressingthatabsentgovernmentsupport,cartelscouldnotcauseharmbecause
theyinducedreactionsonboththesupplyside(withtheentryofnon-cartel
22Forinstance,AlgerianchambersofcommerceprotestedagainstthemaritimeshippingcartelthathinderedtheirexportstometropolitanFrance,andrailwaycompaniesprotestedagainstthecartelintherailsupplyindustry(Caron1988).
13
competitors)andthedemandside(withsubstitutiontootherproducts)thatmadethem
largelyineffective.
Theseargumentswerealwaysformulatedasgeneral,obvioustruths,withonly
superficialreferencetoempiricalobservation.Theywerealsoremarkablyconstantover
time.ConsiderforinstancePaulLeroy-Beaulieu,oneofthemostprominentlibéraux:in
1900,inanarticleinwhichheadvocatedtheabolitionofArticle419,preciselyatthe
timewhencourtswereinvestigatingseveralhigh-profilecourtcasesinvolvingclear
evidenceofcartel-inducedpriceincreases,hewrotethat“oneshouldnottaketragically
allthesetruststhatpeopletrytopaintasscary“because“inafreemarket,thelawof
substitution”isenoughtopreventabuses(Journaldeséconomistes,1900;41(1):119and
127).23Herepeatedexactlythesameargumentinthe1914editionofhiseconomics
treatise,claiming,withreferencetoafewpastcartels(zinc,coffee,oil,copper)andtohis
personalexperienceinbusinessthatcoalitionsareboundtofailandcouldnotdurably
raiseprices(Leroy-Beaulieu1914,1:660).Healsoshowedextremereluctanceto
concedearoleforthegovernmentinindustriesthatEnglish-speakingclassicalorneo-
classicaleconomistshadrecognizedasexceptionswarrantingeitherpriceregulationor
directadministrationbythegovernment–explicitlycriticizingJohnStuartMill’s
statementthatcompetitioninpostalserviceswasinefficientandevenunworkable,and
ignoringJ.B.Clark’sandAlfredMarshall’snuancedviewsofrailways.
Tosumup,fromthe1880stothe1920s,themainmessageconveyedbyFrenchliberal
economistsregardingcartelswasreassuring,andaboveallhostiletoanygovernment
regulationofcompetition–eventhoughtheirjournalsoccasionallymaderoomfor
contrarianviews.24Thishostilitywasamatterofprinciple-forinstanceananonymous
contributortoL’EconomistefrançaiscriticizedanAustriandraftlawmeanttosubmit
cartelstoadministrativeoversightbylikeningittocommunistfantasiesofabsolute
statism(L’Economistefrançais,1901:533-535).Liberaleconomistsoftendescribedthe
23ThesestatementsweremadeduringadiscussionoftheSociétéd’économiepolitiqueon5January1900.Inthesamediscussion,anotherliberaleconomist,ArthurRaffalovich,statedthatinprotectionistcountriessuchasFranceorGermany,cartelscouldhaveadverseeffects.Butthisobservationdidnotdeterhimfromopposinganti-cartellegislation(boththeFrenchArticle419andtheAmericanShermanAct).Hehadmadeasimilarpointin1889.24See,e.g.,GeorgesVillain’sappraisaloftheCarteldeLongwyatthemeetingoftheSociétéd’économiepolitiqueon5March1900(L’Economistefrançais,1900:842-843).Anotherliberaleconomistwhowroteinfavorofstricterenforcementofanti-cartellawswasEdmondVilley.
14
fulllegalizationofcartelsasanobviouslogicalnecessity,inviewofthefreedomof
associationthathadbeengrantedtoworkerunionsin1884(see,e.g.,Nouvions1918).
Even Clément Colson, who, as a mathematical economist was more exposed to the
influence of contemporaneous British and American economists and had an atypical
profilewithinthegroupofFrenchliberaleconomists,heldaconstantlylenientviewof
cartelsandwarnedagainstanypolicyaimingtocontrolorrestrictthem.25Inthe1927
editionofhisCoursd’économiepolitique,hewrotethat“specialrepressivemeasures[…]
are neither necessary nor efficient” (Colson 1927:265) and that cartels were mostly
harmless because they could not raise prices durably unless they deterred entry, and
entrydeterrencewastoocostlytobecredible.26Thiswasexactlythesamestanceasthe
one he had expressedmore than twenty years earlier (Journal des économistes, 1904,
3(1):103-113). In the 1933 edition of hisCours, hewould argue against international
cartels,butonlytotheextentthattheyfosteredgovernment interventionthattriedto
controlthem(Colson1933,7:76-79).Justlikehim,YvesGuyot(1927),whobythenwas
a kind of patriarch of the old French liberal economic school, and the author of the
abovementioned Morality of Competition, approved the demand by one of the main
businessconfederations(theUniondesindustriesminières)forafullabolitionofArticle
419,eventhoughthe1926lawhadmadeitpracticallytoothlessafewmonthsearlier.
Thisunchangingandabsolutehostilitytoanylegalrestrictionsoncartelscontrastswith
theviewsexpressedbycontemporaneousneoclassicalBritishandAmericaneconomists.
It iswell known that afterwidespread skepticism regarding the ShermanAct (1890),
Americaneconomistsgraduallywarmedtoantitrustpolicy.Severalanalysesofthemain
Americaneconomicjournalshavedocumentedthisevolution,whichcanbeillustratedby
a comparison of the 1901 and1912 editions of JohnBates Clark’sControl of Trusts.27
Whereasthe1901editiondismissedthefearsofabuseofmarketpower,arguingthatsuch
abuseswouldnecessarily triggerentry, the1912editionrecognized thata trust could
resorttocertainexclusionarytactics(inparticular,selectiveprice-cutting)todeterentry
25OnColsonandhispositionattheintersectionbetweentwoseparategroupsofFrencheconomists,themathematicallytrainedengineer-economistsandtheliberalnetworks,seeLeVan–Lemesle(2005)andPicory(1989).26Hehadmadethesamepointinthe1903editionofhisCoursd’économiepolitique,aswellasinOrganismeéconomiqueetdésordresocial([1912]1918).27The1912editionwasco-authoredwithJ.B.Clark’ssonJohnMaurice.
15
and charge excessive prices durably. The causes for this gradual shift have long been
discussed(Stigler1982,Scherer1989,Mayhew1998)butoneofthemstandsout:inthe
courseof the legalproceedings that resulted fromtheapplicationof theShermanAct,
muchhithertohiddeninformationbecamepublic,revealingthebrutal,sophisticatedand
ofteneffectiveexclusionarystrategiesusedbydominantfirmsortruststodeterentryor
evict smaller, less financially solid competitors. This body of evidence belied the
reassuringview thatpotential entrywas sufficient tokeep trusts in checkandcaused
manyeconomiststochangetheirmind.
EventhoughthecontextintheUKwasdifferent–withatotalfree-traderégime,less
industrialconcentrationandlesscartelization–theevolutionwassimilar,atleastas
regardsthe(dominant)neoclassicalschool.AlfredMarshall’sstanceontrusts,cartels
andeconomicconcentrationshiftedfromanalmosttotallackofconcernin189028toa
morenuancedviewdecadeslater.InIndustryandtrade(Marshall1919),hewarnedthat
cooperation,evenwhenjustifiedbyactualefficiencygains,wasalwayslikelytoleadto
‘militantrestrictivemonopoly’.Healsonotedthatfreetradedidnotalwayssufficeto
preventcartelabusesinallcases.JustlikeClarkataboutthesametime,hewarned
againstexclusionarypracticesthatcartelsormonopoliescouldusetodeterentry,such
asdiscriminatorypricing,especiallyintheformoflocalprice-cuttingorexclusive
dealing.Thisexplainswhy,whileexpressingasomewhatagnosticviewofthenatureof
thedesirablegovernmentscrutiny,Marshallcriticizedthesuppressionin1921ofthe
short-livedStandingCommitteeonTrusts,whichinhisviewcouldhavebeenavaluable
sourceofinformation.
Frenchliberaleconomists’unwaveringhostilitytoanypolicyrestrictingcartelactivity
cannotbeexplainedbydifferentialaccesstoinformation,sincedetailedreferencesto
theBritishandAmericandebateswereubiquitousinarticles,booksandparliamentary
debatesafterthepassageoftheShermanAct–includinginmanyoftheirownwritings.
NorcanadifferenteconomicsituationexplainFrencheconomists’lackofconcern.On
thecontrary,thecombinationofprotectionism(unlikeinBritain)andasmaller
28InSomeAspectsofCompetition,Marshall(1890:624)dismissedconcernsovertrusts’abilitytoexploitconsumersbyresortingtothegeneralclaimthathighprices“temptthoseontheinsidetobreakfaithandthoseontheoutsidetostartrivalworks”.
16
domesticmarketthanintheUnitedStateswaslikelytomagnifytheadverseeffectof
cartels.Infact,onemaybesurprisedthatFrenchliberaleconomists,havingclaimedthat
freetradewasthecuretotheillsofcartels(Marshall’smorenuancedpostwarposition
notwithstanding)andobservingthatitwasunlikelytoprevailinthenearfuture,didnot
advocatesomekindofpublicrestrictionofcartelactivityasasecond-bestpolicy.
Thiscomparisonconfirmsthatthehostilitytotherepressionofcartelsdisplayedby
mostFrenchliberaleconomistsstemmedfromtwoprinciplesthatoverrodeallthe
others:absolutedistrustofgovernmentinterventionandclosealignmentwithbusiness
interests.
The“solidarist”universityprofessors’lukewarmviewofcompetition
Thesecondmaingroupisthatoftheuniversityprofessors.Aftertheteachingof
economicshadbeenmadeacompulsorypartoflawstudiesin1877,severalpolitical
economychairswerecreatedwithinlawfaculties.Forthemostpart,theywerefilledby
professorswhodidnotsharethelibéraux’faithinthevirtuesofunregulatedmarkets.29
Theroleassignedbythegovernmenttotheholdersofthesenewchairswastopromote
viewsthatfellwithintheconsensusthatcharacterizedthefirstdecadesoftheThird
Republic,namelythedefenseofsocialandeconomicstabilityandlipserviceto
cautiouslyprogressivesocialpolicies.30Thesebroadprinciplesleftroomforvastly
differentviews,fromprotectionistactivisminconjunctionwithbusinessassociationsto
thepromotionoflabor-friendlyregulationsandprogressivetaxation.Butinspiteof
someheterogeneity,mostoftheneweconomicsprofessorssharedaprofessedrejection
ofthelaissez-fairedogmatismoftheirliberalcolleagues.Incontrast,theycouchedtheir
writingsinthediscourseofsolidarisme.Thisdoctrine,whichwasdubbedthe‘official
philosophyoftheThirdRepublic’(andwasassociatedinparticularwiththePartiradical
thatwasthebackboneofmostgovernmentsafter1900),stressedthevalueof
cooperationasopposedtocompetition,andwasinvoked(bydifferentpeople)tojustify
protectionistpolicies(reflectingthesolidarityofurbanconsumerswithfarmers),some
29OneofthefewexceptionswasEdmondVilley,whowasalsooneoftheveryfewlibérauxwhoadvocatedarepressivepolicytowardscartelsandcriticizedtheweakeningofArticle419(Villey1924).30InthewordsinLeVan–Lemesle(2004:321),economicsprofessorswereexpectedto“produceconsensus”(“produireduconsensus”).
17
socialinsurance,andthefirststepsintoprogressivetaxation,inthenameofan“implicit
socialcontract”bindingtogetherthemembersofasociety.
Accordingly,thetreatieswrittenbytheseprofessorswerecriticalofcompetitionifit
was“excessive”,“anarchic”,“cut-throat”.ConsiderforinstancePaulCauwès(1843-
1917),oneofthemostprominentprofessorsofeconomicsattheturnofthecentury.He
washeavilyinfluencedbytheGermanhistoricalschoolandhewasoneofthefounders
in1897oftheSociétéd’économiepolitiquenationale,togetherwithJulesMéline,the
politicianwhoasamemberofparliamentandthenasPrimeministerwasthedriving
forcebehindtariffincreasesofthe1890s.Asitsnamesuggests,thisassociationaimedto
countertheinfluenceoftheolder,liberalSociétéd’économiepolitique,chieflyonthe
questionoftradepolicy.
Contrarytoliberaleconomists,hedescribedcompetitionasanunstablestateboundto
endinmonopolyandthusharmfultobothconsumersandworkers.Accordingly,inhis
Coursd’économiepolitique(1893),whilecriticizingcartelsthatpracticed“monopoly
prices”,heclaimedthatmostofthetimetheyhadapositiveimpactbecausethey
reducedoverproductionandstabilizedprices(Cauwès1893,vol.2:147-149).Tenyears
later,afterseveralcartelshadcreateduproarinFrance,heagainpraisedcartels’
stabilizinginfluence.Theonlyreasonhedisagreedwithcallsforacompleterepealof
Article419ofthePenalcodewasthatin1903,recentcourtdecisionshadvoideditofits
substance(BulletindelaSociétéd’économiepolitiquenationale1903).
Cauwès’spro-cartelstanceiscoherentwithhiscloseassociationwithbusinessinterests,
especiallyvisiblethroughhisproximitytoJulesMéline,who,havingresumedhisactivity
asalawyerafterhistimeingovernment,representedtheLongwycartel.Thesame
remarkcannotbemadeaboutCharlesGide(1847-1932),whoasthefounderofthe
Revued’économiepolitiqueandtheauthorofthebest-sellingeconomicstreatisein
French(with26successiveeditionsfrom1884to1931),wasforseveraldecadesthe
mostprominentrepresentativeoftheeconomicsuniversityprofessors.Hewasleaning
politicallytotheleftandwasthemainpromoterinFranceofproducerandconsumer
cooperatives,inthenameof“cooperativesocialism”.However,hisgreaterdistancefrom
businessinterestsdidnotmakehimanadvocateofanti-cartelpolicyanymorethan
18
Cauwès.AcomparisonofthemanyeditionsofhisPrincipesd’économiepolitiqueshows
anunchangingassessmentofcompetition:whileacknowledgingitsroleasastimulant,
Gidemostlystressedthenegativeconsequencesofcompetition:itsdestabilizingeffects
onmarketsoftenendupinmonopoly,itiswasteful,anditinducesfirmstodegrade
quality.31
Asubstantialdiscussionofcartelsappearsonlyinthepost-1900editions,inaccordance
withthegrowingimportanceofthesubjectinpublicdebate.Gide’sPrincipesmention
themeritsofAmericantrustsintermsofproductiveefficiencyaswellasthelikelihood
ofabuse,bothbythemandbythelessintegratedFrenchcartels.But,truetohis
skepticismtowardscompetitionandtohispreferenceforcooperativesolutions,he
statesthatthemostpromisingsolutionliesnotinthedismantlingofcartels,butrather
inthedevelopmentofconsumercooperativesthatcouldwieldtheirbuyerpower
againstcartels,allowingsocietytobenefitfromthegreaterproductiveefficiencyand
stabilitycartelsaffordedwithoutfallingpreytotheirabusivetendencies.
Hisdiscussionofpossiblepoliciestoprotectcompetitionisconsistentlyskeptical,when
hedoesnotmerelyignorethem:the1890ShermanAntitrustActisnotmentioneduntil
morethantenyearsafteritsenactmentanditsdiscussionmostlystresseshoweasily
firmscancircumventit.The1913editiondescribestheabusesofRockefeller’sStandard
Oil,butitfailstomentionthattheShermanActallowedacourttoorderitsdismantling
in1911.Likewise,whereasearliereditionsstressedthatoneofthemanywaysfirms
couldcircumventtheShermanActwasbymergingthroughacquisitions,thelater
editionsfailtomentionthattheClaytonActwasenactedin1914toprecludethisway
out;andthe1926editiondoesnotevenmentionthecontemporaneousdebateinFrance
aboutthereformofArticle419.Allinall,thesubjectoftherepressionofcartelsseems
tohaveembarrassedthisleadingproponentofco-operativesocialism,whocould
neitherdefendcompetition,towhichhewasideologicallyaverse,norsidewithcartels
whoseabusesheacknowledged.
31Thisparagraphandthenextonesarebasedonananalysisofthe1893,1898,1913and1926editionsofhisPrincipes(respectivelythe4th,6th,14thand25theditions).
19
Thespecificcaseofthe‘Durkheimian’sociologists-economists
TheapproachtocompetitionbythefoundersofFrenchsociologydeservesaspecific
discussion,becauseoftheinfluenceofEmileDurkheimandhisdisciplesinacademia
andinthelargerpublicdebate,butalsoinpolicymaking.Severalofthem,aswellas
theirstudents(inparticularattheEcoleNormaleSupérieure)reachedpositionsof
powerduringandafterWorldWarI.Inparticular,AlbertThomas,asMinisterof
Armamentinchargeoforganizingwarproduction,hadthetwosociologists-economists
MauriceHalbwachsandFrançoisSimiandworkwithhimasadvisors.
Durkheimwashighlycriticalofeconomiccompetition.Hedoubtedthatchaotic
competitioncouldbringaboutaspontaneousorderandthatpriceadjustmentscould
swiftlyrestoreequilibriumonmarketsafterademandorasupplyshock(Durkheim
1893).Buthisoppositionwentbeyondthestrictlyeconomicquestionofhowquickly
competitioncouldbalancesupplyanddemand:Durkheim’sentireworkislargelya
critiqueofindividualism,bothasascientificmethod(heandhisdisciplesrejected
methodologicalindividualismintheirscathingreviewsofneoclassicaleconomists’
books,inalmosteveryissueofL’AnnéeSociologique)andasasocialreality.Accordingto
him,asocietymostlyruledbyeconomiccompetitionwasboundtosufferfromanomie,
thatis,alackofsocialorder,ofstructureandofmeaning.Accordingly,Durkheim
advocatedthe“urgent”creationofprofessionalassociations.Hehopedthatanewkind
ofguilds,differentfromthosethanhadexistedbeforetheRevolution,couldbringabout
“cohesion”and“regularity”inawaythatwouldpacifysociety(Durkheim1902).
TheviewsofMauriceHalbwachsandFrançoisSimiand(who,comparedtoDurkheim,
devotedamuchlargershareoftheirworktoeconomicsubjects)reflectboththis
intellectualstanceandtheirpolicyexperience.Duringthewar,theywereinchargeof
organizingcooperationbetweenprivatecompaniesrelevanttowarproduction.They
lamentedthelingeringanti-cartellegislation(Article419)thatthreatenedtorestrict
interfirmcooperation,inthesametermsasthebusinessleaderswithwhomtheseself-
identifiedsocialistshaddevelopedcloseworkingrelationships.
20
Duringandafterthewar,SimiandandHalbwachsadvocatedtherepealofArticle419.32
Eventhoughtheiradvocacyofsomekindofgovernmentoversightoverinterfirm
agreementswasnotsharedbybusinessleadersandliberaleconomists,thisdifference
appearsminorrelativetotheirmainpointofagreement,thatis,theneedtoremovethe
prohibitiononsuchagreements.Simiand’seconomicscoursetaughtin1930illustrates
thisconvergencequitestrikingly.Hisassessmentofthepriceeffectofcartelsisalmost
identicaltobusinessleaders’and(French)liberaleconomists’:accordingtohim,cartels
cannotcreatemuchharmbecauseanyattempttoraisepriceswillface“competitorsand
limits”thatwillmake“moderation”theonlyrationalcourseofaction(Simiand,
1932:572-613).Simiand’sselectivementionofAmericananalysesofcartelsandhis
misrepresentationoftheirfindingsalsotestifiestohispro-cartelbias:hequotes
JeremiahJenks’sTrustProblembutnotClark’sandMarshall’slaterandmorecritical
contributions.Inaddition,SimiandinaccuratelyclaimsthatJenksfoundtheAmerican
sugarcarteltohavehadlittleeffectonprices.33Thedismissalofthefindingthatinsome
casesthemaineffectofcartelsmaybeapriceincreaseattheexpenseofconsumersisall
themorestrikingthatJenksdidnotderivefromthisconclusionablanketcondemnation
ofinterfirmcoordination.Rather,heacknowledgedtheirpossibleefficiencymeritsand
heproposedacriteriontodistinguishefficiency-enhancingcartelsfromthosethat
merelyexploittheirclients:“theactualeffectsoftheindustrialcombinationuponprices
formcertainlyoneofthebesttestsoftheirusefulnessordisadvantagetosociety”(Jenks
1912:131-132).Thataleft-leaningeconomistsuchasSimiandpreferredtoignore
altogethertheriskofcartelabusestestifiestothestrengthofhisrejectionof
competition.
ThetrajectoryandactionofeconomichistorianHenriHauser(1866-1946)isinmany
wayssimilartothatoftheabovementionedsociologists-economists.Hewasan
academichistorianwho,likeHalbwachs,wroteonaverybroadrangeofsubjects(such
asreligiousanddiplomatichistory),includingcontemporaneousindustrialorganization
–whichexemplifiestheextenttowhicheconomicswasnotconsideredinFrancea
32Paxton(1977:280).33AccordingtoSimiand(1932:586-587),thedatapresentedbyJenksontheAmericansugarcartelthatoperatedafter1887showthatthecarteldidnotmateriallyincreasepricesoverasubstantialperiodoftime.ThisisatoddswithJenks’s(1912:144)summaryofhisanalysis:“Onthewhole,thechartseemstomakeitperfectlyevidentthatthesugarcombinationhasraisedthepriceofrefinedsugarbeyondtheratesinvogueduringtheperiodofactivecompetitionbeforetheformationoftheSugarTrustandthetwocompetitiveperiodsduringitsexistence.”
21
separate,highlytechnicalfieldofexpertise.Duringthewar,hewastheclosestadvisorto
EtienneClementel,theradical(centerleft)MinisterofCommerce,andassuchhewas
involved,likeHalbwachsandSimiandattheMinistryofArmament,inthecoordination
ofwarproduction.Justlikethem,hewassensitivetotheefficiencymeritsoflarge-scale
productionandinterfirmcooperation.However,his1918proposalsforareformof
Article419gofarbeyondthepromotionofagreementsenhancingproductiveefficiency:
underhisproposedwording,interfirmagreementswouldhavebeenillegalonlyifthey
hadrecoursetoobviouslyfraudulentmethodssuchasthedisseminationoffalse
informationortheplacementoffictitiousordersinorderto“momentarilycausethe
increaseordecreaseofprices”(Hauser1918).Eventhoughhealsosuggestedthat
interfirmagreementsshouldberegisteredasaconditionfortheirclausestobelegally
binding,onecannotbutnoticethatthisproposalamountedtoauthorizeallcartels–
includingthosethatwereonlymeanttoraisepricesorlimitoutput,withoutany
rationalizationofproduction–whichisclosetotheDurkheimians’proposals.
ThislenientviewofcartelsbytheleadingFrencheconomists-sociologistsofthe
DurkheimianschoolisincontrastwiththoseexpressedbythemostinfluentialBritish
andGermansociologists,respectivelyLeonardHobhouseandMaxWeber,whose
politicalstancewerealsocenter-left.InLiberalism,LeonardHobhouse(1911)denied
thatcompetitionwasboundtodegenerateintomonopoly,claimingthatintheBritish
case,freetradehadlimitedcartelization,thusbelyingKarlMarx’somberprediction.As
forMaxWeber,whileacknowledgingthatconcentrationcouldincreaseproductive
efficiency,hewascriticalofprice-fixingandproductionquotasbyGermancartels,which
hedeemed‘economicallyconservative’(Roth2006).
Left-leaningeconomistsversusleft-leaningopinionandmembersofparliament:ideas
versusinterests
Theskepticismoftheabovementioned“solidarist”economists,orthesociologists-
economists(whobelongedtooverlappingacademic,socialandpoliticalcircles,see
Topalov1999)regardinganti-cartellegislationisatoddswiththeanti-cartelopinions
expressedbyalargefractionofpublicopinionand,inparticular,left-wingmembersof
parliament.Asmentionedabove,thetopicofcartelabuseswasrepeatedlyaddressedin
parliamentinthelastyearsofthenineteenthcentury.In1924,whentheChambredes
22
députésdiscussedtheproposedreformofArticle419,thevotesagainstthelooseningof
itsanti-cartelprovisionscamemostlyfromitscommunistandsocialistmembers.34A
fewyearslater,theloudestvoicesagainsttheoutputrestrictionsthatcouldresultfrom
“rationalization”camefromthecommunist-dominatedtradeunionCGTU,whichwarned
that“capitalistrationalization”wouldraisepricesandcauseunemployment,andit
accusedthemoremoderateCGTofcolludingwithbusinessagainstworkerinterests(La
Viesyndicale,1927).
Thiscontrastpointstoaconflictbetweeninterestsandideas.Manycontemporary
observersconsideredcartelstobeharmfultoconsumers–inparticular,thosewho
derivedincomeonlyfromlaborandnotfromashareoffirms’profits.Thismadethe
repressionofcartelsaworker-friendlypolicyandthisexplainswhysupportforthe
repressionofcartelscamemostlyfromtheleft.Ontheotherhand,endorsingthe
repressionofcartelsimpliedanacknowledgementofthemeritsofmarketcompetition,
whichwasindirectcontradictionwiththeviewsofmostleft-leaningeconomistsaswe
haveseenabove–andmoregenerally,withtheviewsofleft-leaningintellectuals.This
principledoppositiontomarketcompetitionwasareactiontothewayFrenchliberal
economistshadsincethe1840sinvokedthevirtuesofcompetitioninordertodefend
theexistingsocialorderandtoopposeallprogressivefiscalandlaborpolicies,however
cautious–incontrasttoEnglish-speakingeconomistslikeJohnStuartMillorHenry
George,whohadsimultaneouslyextolledcompetitionandadvocatedrelatively
egalitarianfiscalpolicies.
Industryexpertsindefenceofcartelsinthenameofmodernization
Thelastimportantgroupofeconomistsweneedtomentionistheso-calledindustry
experts,whowereactiveinthedebatesaboutcartelsandindustrialpolicymore
generally.Theseauthorswereforthemostpartbusinessleaderswhowrotebooksand
articlesontheside,journalistsor“publicintellectuals”whohadbeenhiredbyindustrial
associationstoworkaslobbyists.
34SeethedetailedanalysisoftheMarch14,1924voteinPaxton(1977:29).
23
Owingtotheuncertainstatusofeconomics,whichwasnotconsideredadistinct
academicfield,frontierswereporousbetweenpositionsinbusiness,government,and
academia(inparticularintheGrandesécoles,whichhadamorepracticalorientation
thanuniversities).Themenconsideredthebestspecialistsofindustrialeconomicsin
Franceinthefirstdecadesofthetwentiethcentury,whowereconsultedbyvarious
governments,hadcareersstraddlingthesethreespheres.Theyfoundthemselvesatthe
centerofjointeffortsbycertainbusinessleaders,governmentofficials,andpoliticiansto
modernizeFrenchindustrythroughamixofmergers,interfirmcooperationand
governmentintervention(seeKuisel1981).
PauldeRousiers(1857-1934)wasconsideredthebest-informedspecialistoncartelsin
France.Apolygraphwhomadealivingasthesecretary-generaloftheshipbuilders’
associationandwhowroteonsubjectsrangingfromtheBritishworkingclass,toFrench
havens,elitesinmodernsocietiesandmodernAmericancivilization,heauthored
severalarticlesandbooksoncartels:Lesindustriesmonopolisées(Trusts)auxÉtats-Unis
(1898);LesSyndicatsindustrielsdeproducteursenFranceetàl’étranger(trust–cartells
–comptoirs–ententesinternationals)in1901,withseveralsubsequenteditions;aswell
asareportoncartelsforthecommitteepreparingthe1927InternationalEconomic
ConferenceoftheLeagueofNations,towhichhewasappointedasanexpert.Even
thoughthesewritingsspanalmostthreedecades,theyexpressanunchangingview,
namelythatthemarketstabilizationmadepossiblebyFrenchcartelswasbeneficialto
allandcouldneverleadtoabusessimilartothoseofAmericantrusts.35
AnotherbusinessmanconsideredamongthebestexpertsoncartelswasHenride
Peyerimhoff(1871-1953),whosecareeralternatedbetweenbeinganadministrative
judge,ahighofficialattheministryofagricultureandoneoftheleadersofthe
coalminesassociation,theComitécentraldeshouillèresdeFrance.Hewasalsothevice-
presidentoftheConseilnationaléconomique,agovernment-sponsoredcouncilthat
includedlaborandbusinessrepresentatives,afteritscreationin1925.36Hewas
appointedtotheFrenchdelegationatthe1927InternationalEconomicConference,
35ForamonographyonPauldeRousiers,seeSavoye(1988).36OnPeyerimhoff,seeChatriot(2005)2013.
24
wherehedefendedcartels,whichaccordingtohimshouldbefreefromgovernment
oversight,apositionhedefendedagainina1929article.
The1927conferenceledtonotangibledecisionsexceptthecreationofacommittee
taskedwiththestudyofcartels,theInternationalIndustrialCartelCommittee(CEII).
OneofitsmemberswastheindustrialistLouisMarlio(1878-1952)whoafterafew
yearsingovernment,becameabusinessleaderinthealuminiumandelectricity
industries(heendedupbeingchairmanofthealuminumcompanyPéchiney),oneofthe
leadersofRedressementfrançais,anorganizationpromotingthemodernizationand
concentrationofFrenchindustry;whileatthesametimebeingaprofessorofeconomics
attheEcolenationaledesPontsetChausséesandtheEcolelibredessciencespolitiques
(Morsel1893).Unsurprisingly,LouisMarlio’sreportontheglobalaluminiumcartel(to
whichhisfirm,Pechiney,wasaparticipant)fortheCEIIwasnotparticularlyalarming,
nomorethananarticleonthesametopicthathepublishedinLaRevuedeParis(Marlio
1930).37
ThedifferencebetweenFrenchandBritisheconomists’viewsofcartels
IntheaftermathofWorldWarI,inbothFranceandtheUK,politicalandbusinesselites
sharedasimilarconcern,thatis,thefearthatinmanysectorstheirindustrywaslagging
behindthatofGermanyandtheUnitedStates,whereincreasedconcentrationhadmade
producersmoreefficient.Inbothcountries,interfirmcooperationandmergerswere
seenaspossiblesolutionsandsupportforgovernment-supportedrationalizationwas
widespread.
However,asseenabove,economists’stancetowardscartelswasmarkedlydifferentin
bothcountries,withBritishliberaleconomistssuchasMarshallacknowledgingcartels’
possibleabusesandtheusefulnessofsomegovernmentoversightinordertoprotectthe
competitiveprocess,unlikeFrenchliberaleconomistsoreconomistsofanyotherstripe.
TheInternationalEconomicConferenceheldin1927undertheauspicesoftheLeagueof
Nations,isinstructiveinthisrespect.
37Onthealuminiumcartel,seeBertilorenzi2015.
25
Economicexperts’assessmentofglobalcartelsattheInternationalEconomicConference(1927)
Theconferencewasmeanttoexplorewaystoincreaseinternationaleconomic
cooperationandinparticularreviveinternationaltrade,inlinewiththemoregeneral
missionoftheLeagueofNations.TheFrenchpoliticianandformerindustrialistLouis
Loucheur,whowasthedrivingforcebehindtheorganizationoftheconference,had
proposedtoincludeinternationalcartelsamongthetopicstobediscussedbecausehe
consideredthatinternationalcartelswouldmakefreetradelessdestabilizingandcould
decreasetheappealofprotectionism(Barjot2013).38
Overthecourseoftheconference,agroupofcountriesledbyFranceadvocatedthe
creationofaninternationalframeworktoencourageandgivealegalstatusto
internationalcartels,apositionthattheBritishdelegationopposed(Hantos1930:153-
162;Bussière1992,1994;Hara1994;Berger,2006;Bertilorenzi2016).Amongthe
economicexpertswhowereaskedtosubmitpreliminarystudiesonthesubjects,Paulde
Rousierswroteamarkedlypro-cartelreport,unliketheBritisheconomistDavid
MacGregor,theOxfordprofessor(andformerstudentofMarshall)whowasconsidered
Britain’sforemostindustrialeconomist.MacGregor’sreport(MacGregor1927a)
acknowledgedthatinterfirmcooperationandconcentrationmightbedesirableinsome
circumstances.Buthewasadamantthatthethreatofabuseshouldbekeptincheckby
thecompetitivepressurebroughtaboutbyfreetrade,andhedisapprovedof
internationalcartelsbecausetheywouldweakenthissourceofoutsidecompetitive
pressure,justliketariffswould(seealsoMacGregor1927b).
AccordingtoabookpublishedinParisin1928,MacGregor’sskepticismcouldeasilybe
explainedbythefactthat‘he[was]anEnglishman,and,likeeveryBriton,he[had]1)an
instinctivedistrustofanythingthatgoesagainsttheEnglishindividualisttradition,and
2)arepulsiontowardsanyoverlypreciseinternationalcommitment’(Palivachi
1928:376).However,acomparisonofthestatusandcontentsofeconomicexpertisein
bothcountriesbetteraccountsthan‘nationalcharacter’forthedifferencebetweenthe
FrenchandBritishdelegation.
38LouisLoucheurhadsucceededtheabovementionedAlbertThomasattheMinistryofArmament.
26
Inbothcountries,themajorityofbusinessleadersandoflaborrepresentativeswere
favorabletocartels,eventhoughtheydifferedonwhoshouldcontrolthem–with
unionsdemandingsomeoversightbygovernmentsorworkerrepresentatives.Alfred
Mond,thechairmanofoneoftheUK’slargestcorporations,ImperialChemical
Industries,advocatedthedevelopmentofinternationalcartelsinhisworkasanexpert
fortheconference,andinoneofhispro-cartelspeechesheridiculedthereluctanceof
economistssuchasMacGregorwho“stillheldtheantiquatedideathatbusinessmensat
solemnlyroundatablewithaviewtoshovingupprices”(Mond1927).ArthurPugh,the
unionleaderwhowasoneofthemembersoftheBritishdelegation,wasalsofavorable
tocartelsiftheyweretobesubjectedtogovernmentandunionoversight.Thesestances
weresimilartothoseexpressedbybusinessandunionrepresentativesinother
delegations,includingtheFrenchone.
Themaincontrastbetweenbothcountriesregardingthe1927conferencehastodowith
thenatureoftheeconomicexpertisetheyprovided:oneoftheBritishexpertswas
MacGregor,andoneofthefivemembersoftheBritishdelegationwasArthurLayton,the
editorofTheEconomistandaformerstudentofMarshallwho,whilefavorableto
industrialrationalization,wasskepticalofcartels(seee.g.his1927articleonthe
forthcominginternationalconference).OntheFrenchside,oneoftheeconomicexperts
wastheabovementionedpro-cartelPauldeRousiers39,and,amongthemembersofthe
delegationwhowereinvolvedinthediscussionofinternationalcartels,onlythe
abovementionedPeyerimhoffcouldclaimsomeexpertiseonindustrialeconomics.40
Inotherwords,theBritishexpertswereacademicallytrained(inthedominant
Marshallianmould)andwereindependentofbusinessinterests,whereastheFrench
expertswere,aboveall,representativesoflargeindustrialfirms.Onecannotbut
establishalinkbetweenthisdifferenceandthefactthattheBritisheconomicexperts’
39TheotherFrenchexpertwasWilliamOualid,alawprofessorwhosereportcannotbedescribedasclearlypro-oranti-cartel.40TheothermembersoftheFrenchdelegationweretheheadofthelargestworkerunion,arepresentativeofanagriculturalassociation,andDanielSerruys,aliberal-leaningeconomicexpertthenworkingfortheMinistryofCommerce.Serruyswasinvolvedinthediscussionsontariffsbutnotinthoseoninternationalcartels.
27
stanceonglobalcartels,butnotthatoftheFrenchexperts’,wasatoddswiththe
demandsofbusinessrepresentatives.
Economists,competitionandrationalizationinFranceandintheUK
CharacterizingBritisheconomistsorpolicymakersinthefirstdecadesofthetwentieth
centuryasuniformlystaunchdefendersofcompetitionagainstcartelsandmonopolies
wouldbeplainlywrong.Ontheleft,startingaround1900,theFabianeconomists
departedfromJohnStuartMill’spromotionofcompetitivemarketscombinedwith
redistributivetaxation(andideathathadbeenmadeevenmorepopular,globally,by
HenryGeorge’slandtaxmovement).Theyconsideredthattrusts“heraldedthenew
SocialistAge”andtheytouted“guildsocialism”(Mercer1995).AfterWorldWarI,even
theLiberalPartydepartedfromitseconomicorthodoxy.Whenitlaunchedanindustrial
inquiryin1927,itentrustedthesectionon“theorganisationofbusiness”toKeynes,
who,inhiscontributiontotheparty’sbookentitledBritain’sIndustrialFuture(1928),
chartedafuturecharacterizedbyacorporatistmanagementofindustry,withcartels
achievingcoordinationandrationalizationundertheaegisofgovernment.
Movingfromideastopolicies,itisintheUK,notinFrance,thatgovernmentsactively
supportedwidespreadcartelization:startingattheendofthe1920s,theBritish
governmentsupervisedrationalizationandcartelizationinmanysectorsincluding
shipbuilding,coal,textile,steel,sugarandlinershipping(Mercer1995).
NosuchpolicieswereattemptedinFrancetilltheGreatdepression.Eventhen,attempts
inthatdirectionwereforthemostpartunsuccessful.Adraftlawmakingcartelization
mandatoryifamajorityoffirmsinanyindustrialsectorwantedit(the“Flandin-
Marchandeaulaw”)ultimatelyfailedinparliament(in1935),largelyasaresultof
disagreementsregardingtheextentofgovernmentoversight(Chatriot2007:13-16,see
alsoDenord2008),andalsobecauseofthegeneraldifficultyinhavinglawspassedin
bothchambersofparliamentinatimeofpoliticalinstability.
28
Conclusion
Afocusontheexperienceofthe1930sintheUKandinFrancemightsuggestthat
economists’ideasaretoovolatile,ortooirrelevanttopolicy,toreallymatter.Thealmost
totallackofsupportamongFrencheconomistsforanti-cartelpolicies,andtheir
widespreadsupportforinterfirmcooperation,didnottranslateintosystematic
government-sponsoredcartelizationinthe1930s,whereastheinverseconfiguration
prevailedintheUK.Onemightbetemptedtoconcludethateconomists’viewschanged
sothoroughlyattheendofthe1920sintheUKthattheMarshallians’previous
skepticismwassupersededbydifferentideas,ormoresimplythateconomists’
discourseonthesesubjectshadlittleinfluenceonpolicy.
However,consideringthelongerrun,suchaconclusionmustbequalified.Inthelate
1930s,aftergovernment-sponsoredcartelizationintheUKwasfoundtohaveamore
positiveimpactonprofitsthanonproductivity(BroadberryandCrafts,1992;Crafts,
2013)andKeynes’GeneralTheoryshiftedthepolicydebatetomacroeconomics,many
Britisheconomistsreturnedtoamorepositiveappraisalofcompetitivemarketsand
pro-competitionpolicies:Keyneshimself,inthefamouslastchapteroftheGeneral
Theory,butalsotheyoungergenerationofsocialisteconomistsattheNewFabian
ResearchBureauwhowentontohaveinfluenceonpolicyafterWorldWarII(Durbin,
1985).Whilethepost-WorldWarIILabourpartycannotbedescribedaspro-market,
theseeconomistshadsomeimpactonthepoliciesitfollowedwheninpower,fromthe
limitationofthescopeofnationalizationstonaturalmonopolies(pluscoalandsteel)in
the1940s(Milward1997)toananti-cartellawin1948,supportforthestrengtheningof
anti-cartelpolicyin1956(underaconservativegovernment)andamergercontrollaw
in1965,thesecondintheworldaftertheAmericanClaytonAct(Mercer1995:92-94,
140-141).Althoughidentifyingintellectualgenealogiesiscomplex,theMarshallianview
ofcompetitionprobablyplayedarole:evenifitseemedtobesidelinedbythelate
1920s,itwaslaterincorporated(andcomplementedwiththenascenttheoriesof
oligopolisticcompetition),togetherwithKeynes’ideas,intheneoclassicalsynthesis,
whichwasfirstformulatedinthelate1930sandthenformedthebasisfortheteaching
ofeconomicsintheEnglish-speakingworld.
29
Incontrast,Franceremained,formostofthepost-WorldWarIIdecadesanduntilnow,
theEuropeancountrymostconsistentlyreluctanttowardscompetitionpolicy,savefora
fewexceptionalepisodes.41ShortlyafterthecreationoftheEuropeanCommunity,the
Frenchgovernment,supportedbytheItalianone,attemptedtopreventtheanti-cartel
clausesoftheTreatyofRomefrombeingimplementedtooforcefully(thatis,bythe
EuropeanCommission,withlittleroomforinfluencebynationalgovernments),finally
failinginthefaceoftheoppositionofGermanyandBeneluxcountries(Warlouzet2006,
2008).Lateron,successiveFrenchgovernmentsinsistedthatagriculturebelargely
exemptedfromcompetitionrulesandtheyblocked(till1989)thecreationofa
Europeanmergercontrolmechanism.Francehasbeenpermanently,fordecades,
irrespectiveofwhichpartywasinpower,thecountrypushingmoststronglyinfavorof
relaxingcompetitionrulesinthenameofindustrialpolicyorpublicservices.
ThehistoryofthedebatesoncompetitionpolicyinFrancethroughoutthetwentieth
centuryfallsoutsideofthescopeofthisarticle.However,consideringthepermanenceof
theFrenchreluctance–inspiteoffar-rangingpoliticalandeconomicchangesoverthe
sevendecadessincethebeginningsofEuropeaneconomicintegration-,onecan
hypothesizethattheintellectualconfigurationunderlyingtherejectionofcompetition-
promotingpoliciesbyalmostallFrencheconomistsinthedecadesleadinguptothe
GreatDepressionhadalong-lastinginfluence.
41ThemainexceptionconcernstheoriginofEuropeancompetitionpolicy:theFrenchgovernmentwantedacompetitionprovisiontobeincludedinthetreatycreatingtheEuropeanCommunityofCoalandSteel(1951)outoffearthatGermansteelproducersmightbenefitfromanunfairadvantagethroughpreferentialaccesstocheaperGermancoal.TheseprovisionswerethebasisforthecompetitionarticlesintheTreatyofRome.
30
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