a pragmarist theory of social mechanisms

7/25/2019 A Pragmarist Theory of Social Mechanisms

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A Pragmatist Theory of Social MechanismsAuthor(s): Neil GrossSource: American Sociological Review, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Jun., 2009), pp. 358-379Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27736068.

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3/23

A PRAGMATIST THEORY OF SOCIAL

MECHANISMS

359

social

control is

a

key

mechanism

mediating

between

structure

and

crime

rates.

Empirical

work

in

thisvein

is

often

distinguished

not

only

from

positivism

sensu

stricto,

but also from the

sociological

tradition f "correlational

analysis,"

which examines

associations

among

variables

but

pursues

explanation

at

a

high

level of

gen

erality

(see

Bunge

1997;

Mahoney

2001;

Steel

2004).

Both

approaches,

it

s

argued,

treat

ausal

mechanisms

as

black boxes

(Elster

1989;

Hedstr?m and

Swedberg

1998)

and

so

fail

to

provide

comprehensive

explanations.

As

more

sociologists

have

adopted

a

mech

anism-centered

focus,

theoretical

formulations

of themechanisms

concept

have

proliferated

(e.g.,

Hedstr?m

and

Swedberg

1998;

Reskin

2003;

Stinchcombe

2005;

Tilly

2001).

There

is,however,

something

paradoxical

about

many

of these formulations:

they

owe

their

attrac

tiveness

to

a

context

inwhich

sociological

the

orists,

applying

and

extending

the

ideas

of

philosophers,

have

helped

to

undermine

posi

tivism. et

they

ften

proceed

from substantive

assumptions

that

many

in the

heterogeneous

theory ommunity

do not considerviable. More

specifically,

many

prominent

theoretical

accounts

of social mechanisms

are

either

beholden

to

some

version

of rational

choice

theory

or

essentially

agnostic

about the

nature

of social

action.1

However,

a

majority

of

theorists

today

doubt

that

ction

typically

takes

the form of

a

ration

al calculation

of

means

to

ends,

and also insist

that

action-theoretical

assumptions

necessarily

factor into

every

account of social order and

change

and

should therefore

e

fully

specified.

From

a

variety

of

viewpoints,

contemporary

theorists

instead

conceptualize

social

action

as

a

creative

enactment

over

time of social

prac

tices.

Social

practices

are

ways

of

doing

and

thinking

that

are

often

tacit,

acquire

meaning

from

widely

shared

presuppositions

and under

lying

semiotic

codes,

and

are

tied

to

particular

locations

in the social

structure

and

to

the col

lectivehistoryofgroups. Collective enactment

of such

practices

produces

and

reproduces

those

structures

and

groups

(e.g.,

Archer

2000;

1

I

discuss

below

an

exception

to

this

generaliza

tion

in

Tilly's

work,

which

overlaps

in

certain

respects

with the

perspective

I

develop

here.

Bourdieu

1990;

de Certeau

1984;

Giddens

1984;

Ortner

1984;

Swidler

2001;

see

also

Chaiklin

and Lave

1996;

Pickering

1992;

Schatzki

1996,

2002;

Schatzki,

Knorr

Cetina,

and

von

Savigny

2001).

In

this

article,

I

show

how

a

sophisticated

theory

of

social

action,

broadly

in the

practice

theory

family?developed

by

the

American

pragmatist philosophers

Charles S.

Peirce,

William

James,

George

Herbert

Mead,

and John

Dewey

and elaborated

most

recently by

Joas

(1996)?can

be extended

into

a

robust

theory

of social mechanisms.

I

do

not

argue

directly

for

themerits of

a

pragmatist theory of action;

strong

arguments

to

this

effect

have been

advanced

by

others

(e.g.,

Joas

1993,

1996;

Whitford

2002).

Nor

do

I

demonstrate

that

my

approach necessarily

increases the

explanatory

power

of

every

account

of

the

operation

of

par

ticular

mechanisms,

although

I

identify

three

common

analytical

problems

with which

the

theory

could be

especially

helpful.

Rather,

I

make

a

prima

facie

case

that

a

great

many

social

mechanisms, regardless of the level of analysis

at

which

they

operate,

can

be

understood

as

resting

on a more

solid action-theoretical

foun

dation than

existing

approaches

recognize.

In

doing

so,

I

offer

a

way

to

connect

important

strandsof

sociological theory

with the research

enterprise

of "mainstream"

sociology

(see

Calhoun and

VanAntwerpen

2007) and?taking

a

different tack from the

symbolic

interaction

ists?show how the tradition fAmerican

prag

matism

can

provide

intellectual coherence

to a

discipline

looking

to

find its

way

in

a

postpos

itivist

ge.

WHAT

IS

A

SOCIAL

MECHANISM?

Confusion

abounds

as

to

what

exactly

a

mech

anism is.

A

clear definition is

an

essential

first

step

toward

a

sociological theory

of mecha

nisms. To

distill such

a

definition,

I

consider

five

varied

conceptualizations

thathave

appeared

in recent

years.2

2

For

a

more

exhaustive review of the literature

on

mechanisms,

see

Hedstr?m

(2005);

Hedstr?m

and

Swedberg

(1998);

Johnson

2002);

and

Mahoney

(2001).

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4/23

360

AMERICAN

SOCIOLOGICAL

REVIEW

Mechanisms

as

Not Necessarily

Observable

Structures

or

Processes

According

to

the

first

conceptualization?

advanced byHedstr?m and Swedberg (1998)?

a

social

mechanism

is the

structure

or

process

S

by

which

some

event

or

variable

/

leads

to

or

causes a

change

in

the

state

of variable

or

event

O.

Where

some

sociologists

would be

content

to

"blackbox"

S,

or

significant

components

of

it,

Hedstr?m and

Swedberg

insist that

true

explanation

demands

fuller

specification

of

its internal

content.

Such

specification,

in

their

view,

should

have three

features.

First,

it

should

follow the principle ofmethodological indi

vidualism,

explaining

meso-

and macro-level

social

phenomena by

reference

to

the actions

of

the

individuals

involved.

Second,

it

should

give

primacy

to

analytical

models

to

be

judged

by

their

explanatory utility

and

parsimony,

as

much

as

by

their

realism.3

Third,

the

specifi

cation of S

must

not

require

that

be

directly

observable;

many

social

mechanisms,

they

argue,

cannot

be

observed.

Although

Hedstr?m

and Swedberg point appreciatively towork

done

by

Coleman,

Granovetter,

and

others,

their

paradigm

case

of

an

adequately specified

social mechanism is

Merton's

(1968) theory

of

the

self-fulfilling

prophesy,

by

which

a

false

definition

of

a

situation

leads individuals

to

act

so

as

to

bring

that

situation

about,

as

when

belief

in

the

insolvency

of

a

bank leads

to

a run

that

causes

insolvency.

This

theory

meets

their

criteria

because

it

postulates

the

existence

of

a "general belief-formation mechanism which

states

that

the number of

individuals who

per

form

a

certain

act

signals

to

others the

likely

value

or

necessity

of the

act,

and this

signal

will

influence

other

individuals' choice of action"

(p.

21,

emphasis

in

original).

Mechanisms

as

Observable Processes

that

Do Not

Require

the

Positing

of

Motives

For Reskin

(2003),

the

specification

of

a

social

mechanism

need

not

have all

the

properties

demanded

by

Hedstr?m

and

Swedberg. Laying

out

an

agenda

for

research

on

ascriptive

inequality,

she

urges

scholars

to

stop

being

concerned with

models that

posit

motives for

unequal

allocations

and

focus instead

on

uncovering

mechanisms

by

which "ascribed

characteristics"

are

linked

"to

outcomes

of

varying

desirability" (p.

7).

For

Reskin,

as

for

Hedstr?m and

Swedberg,

mechanisms

are

what

happen

inside

the

black

box

of social causal

ity?they

are

"processes

that

convert

inputs

or

independent

variables)

into

outputs

(or

depen

dent

variables)"

(p.

7).

She

glosses

mecha

nisms-based

approaches

to

inequality

as

those

concerned with

the

question

of

how

inequali

ties arise inallocation.4 Unlike Hedstr?m and

Swedberg,

however,

Reskin

argues

that

how

questions

must

be

answerable

in

terms

of

observable

processes;

in

her

view,

this feature

commends them

over

why questions

from the

standpoint

of

realism,

for

themotives of indi

viduals

and

groups

typically

cannot

be

seen.

The

only

exception

concerns

mechanisms

pos

tulated

to

operate

at

the

intrapsychic

level;

interpersonal,

societal,

and

organizational

mechanisms must meet the observability

requirement.

Mechanisms

as

Lower-Order

Social

Processes

Stinchcombe

(1998:267),

building

on

Coleman,

offers

an

alternative

by suggesting

that

mechanisms

are

"bits of

'sometimes

true

theory'

or

'models' that

represent

a

causal

process, that have some actual or possible

empirical

support

separate

from the

larger

the

ory

in

which it

is

a

mechanism,

and

that

gen

erate

increased

precision,

power,

or

elegance

in

the

large-scale

theories."

Although

not

a

methodological

individualist,

he

argues

that

all

social mechanisms involve

processes

affect

ing

lower-order units of

analysis?processes

that in

aggregate

bring

about

the

relationship

X?>Y

for

higher-order

units

under

considera

tion.

Stinchcombe, however, insists

that

we

may

be able

to

show

that

causes

Y without

knowing

much

about

the

underlying,

lower

order

mechanisms:

only

when

such

knowledge

3

As

noted

below,

Hedstr?m

(2005)

objects

to

"instrumentalist"

versions of rational

choice

theory

that

ignore

realism

altogether.

4

Much

recent

empirical

work

on

mechanisms of

inequality

can

be

seen

as

carrying

out

Reskin's

pro

gram

(e.g.,

Rivera

2008;

Stevens

2007).



5/23

A

PRAGMATIST

THEORY OF

SOCIAL MECHANISMS

361

gives

us a

better

understanding

of the

higher

order

relationship?for

example,

of

the

con

texts

in which the

relationship

is

likely

to

obtain?will

it

be

helpful

to

have

a

grasp

of the

relevant mechanisms.

Mechanisms

as

Triggerable

Causal

Powers

"Critical realism"

provides

a

fourth

approach

to

mechanisms.

For critical

realists

like

Bhaskar

and

Collier,

the

search

for

mechanisms is

the

sine

qua

non

of

science.

In

their

view,

the iden

tification

of

mechanisms

involves

analytic

movement across three ontological domains:

from

the

empirical,

where scientists

access

expe

rience;

to

the

actual,

where

they identify

the

events

that

generate

that

experience;

to

the

real,

wherein lie the

causal

mechanisms?usually

unseen?by

virtue

of which

one

event

causes

another.

Key

to

critical

realism's

understanding

of this

process

is the claim

that

movement

from

the

empirical

to

the real

involves

movement

along

a

continuum

from

an

"open"

toward

a

"closed" system. A mechanism is "that aspect

of the

structure

f

a

thingby

virtue

of

which

it

has

a

certain

[causal]

power" (Collier

1994:62).

Mechanisms, however,

"operate

[only]

when

suitably

triggered"

(p.

62),

and

outside the lab

oratory

mechanisms

almost

always

coexist with

a

host of

other

mechanisms,

processes,

and fac

tors

that

inhibit

that

triggering

or

otherwise

interfere

ith the

causal

relationship.

"Under

non-experimental

conditions,"

in

other

words,

"we can see only what [a] mechanism in con

junction

with

other

actors

makes

it

do"

(p.

33,

emphasis

in

original)?that

is,

we can see

it

operate

only

in

an

open

system.

Experi

mentation,

by

contrast,

creates

a

closed

system

"to

isolate

one

mechanism

of

nature

from the

effects of

others,

to

see

what that

mechanism

does

on

its

own"

(p.

33).

Science

proceeds

by

generating

such

isolation and

thus involves nei

ther

a

search

for

covering

laws

nor a

simple

accumulation of findings. Rather, science

searches for

an

increasingly

comprehensive

and

deep

understanding

of

causal

mechanisms,

the

mechanisms that

underlie

mechanisms,

and

how

the

configuration

of

particular

open

systems

affects the

functioning

ofmechanisms.

Bhaskar

and

other

critical

realists

devote

par

ticular attention

to

the social

sciences,

which

they

see as

studying

systems

especially

resist

ant

tomovement in

the direction of

closure,

not

least because

of what

they postulate

to

be

the

intrinsic

capacity

of human

beings

to

work

at

transforming

social relations. This

resistance

has

methodological implications

(see

Ekstr?m

1992).

In the social

sciences,

explanation

can

only

take

the form of

breaking

events down

into

their

omponent parts,

identifying?by

the

elaboration of

analytic

models?the mecha

nisms that could have

helped

generate

them,

and

determining,

through

empirically

ground

ed reflection

on

the conditions of

historical

pos

sibility,

whether

and

how those

mechanisms,

with others

and

given contingent

circumstances,

actually broughtabout theevents (see Steinmetz

2004).

Unlike

methodological

individualists,

critical realists

are

also

emergentists

who

argue

that

higher-order

strata

of social

reality

emerge

out

of lower-order

ones,

and that

events

within

those

emergent

strata

are

caused

by

mecha

nisms

unique

to

them nd

not

reducible

to

lower

order

mechanisms.5

Mechanisms

as

Transforming

Events

A

final

framework is

outlined

by

Tilly

(2001),

who,

like

most

students

of

mechanisms,

con

trasts

mechanisms-based

accounts

with those

centering

on

the search for

covering

laws. He

also

counterposes

them

with

"propensity

accounts" that "consider

explanation

to

consist

of

reconstructing

a

given

actor's

state

at

the

threshold of

action,

with that

state

variously

stipulated

as

motivation,

consciousness, need,

organization,

or

momentum" and

to

"systems

explanations"

that "consist of

specifying

the

place

of

some

event, structure,

or

process

with

in

a

larger

...

set

of

interdependent

elements"

(p.

569).

Mechanisms-based

approaches,

by

contrast,

"select

salient features

of

[historical]

episodes

...

and

explain

them

by identifying

robustmechanisms of

relatively

general

scope"

(p.

569).

Tilly

has

a

distinct

understanding,

how

ever,

of what mechanisms

consist

of.

They

"are

events

that

alter relations

among

some

specified

set

of

elements,"

and

they

come

in three

vari

eties:

"cognitive

mechanisms

operate

through

alterations

of

individual and collective

percep

tion";

"relational

mechanisms

alter

connections

5

For

a

discussion of social

emergence,

see

Sawyer

(2005).



6/23

362

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL

REVIEW

among

people,

groups,

and

interpersonal

net

works";

and "environmental mechanisms

exert

external influences

on

the conditions

affecting

[social]

processes"

(p.

572).

In

Tilly's

view,

consequently,

social

expla

nation should involve

"pursuing]

particular

mechanisms

across

different

settings"

and

examining

the

role of those

mechanisms,

includ

ing

how

they

"concatenate"

into "social

process

es,"

in

bringing

about

puzzling

historical

episodes.

In

describing

mechanisms

as

events,

Tilly

refers

first

and

foremost

to

the different

kinds of

practices

actors

can

enact

together,

such

as

pursuing

"certification"

of their

politi

cal

identities,

as numerous would-be states did

vis-?-vis theUnited

Nations

afterWorld War

II,

or

"brokerage"

involving

actors

"establishing,

severing,

or

realigning

connections

among

social sites"

(p. 575),

which

Tilly

describes

as

a

defining

feature

of

social

life

in

the Soviet

Union.

Tilly

recognizes

thatmechanisms

thus

understood,

while

relatively

general

in

nature,

may

be instantiated

differently

n

differenthis

torical

periods.

For

example,

he

notes

thatmech

anisms of competition, involving "striving

among

several

actors

within

a

reward-allocat

ing

arena"

(p.

575),

are

key

features

of

the

con

tentious

politics waged

by

social

movement

activists,

but that

politics

of this

sort,

with

its

unique phenomenology, emerged

only

in the

nineteenth

century.

Analysts

of

mechanisms

must

thereforebe attentive

to

time and

place?

in

particular,

to

ways

in

which social mecha

nisms

may

"incorporate

institutions,

understandings, and

practices

that have accu

mulated

historically"

(p.

570).

Tilly's

(1995a:

1602)

program

for social research

thus

involves

"the

historically

embedded search

for

deep

causes

operating

in

variable

combinations,

circumstances,

and

sequences

with

consequently

variable

outcomes."

Toward

a

Definition

To extractaworking definition of social mech

anisms from these

conceptualizations,

I

consider

the

major

points

on

which

the

authors

agree

and

disagree.

First

the

points

of

explicit

and

tacit

agreement:

1. Social mechanisms

are

causal

in that

they

mediate between

cause

and

effect.

In the

sequence

X-^Y,

neither Xnor 7nor

the

causal

relationship

itself

is

a

social

mechanism. The

mechanism

is

rather the

process

or

means

by

which

X

causes

Y This

process

must

have

a

significant

social

component

if

themechanism

is

to

be

considered

a

social

one.

A volcanic

eruption

leveling

a

village

and

destroying

a

community

is

an

environmental mechanism

(not

in

Tilly's sense),

not

a

social

one,

although

it

might help

establish the conditions

under

which social

mechanisms

could

unfold.6

It

might

also be connectedwith other

social

mech

anisms that

incorporate

and mediate environ

mental

factors,

such

as

those

that

help explain

the

geographic

positioning

of the

village

or

the

nature

of its

housing

stock.

2. Social mechanisms unfold in time.Social

mechanisms

bring

about

causal

effects

through

a

temporal

sequence

of events

or

processes

occurring

in

the

social

world

at

the

micro-,

meso-,

or

macro-level

or

across

levels.

A

social

fact

or

phenomenon

that

causes

another

social

fact

or

phenomenon

instantaneously,

with

no

intervening

processes,

is

unimaginable;

such

processes

make

up

mechanisms

and

are

always

temporally

embedded. The duration of

the

sequences involved may vary greatly. The

sequence

may

be

short?a

matter

of

a

few

inter

actions and

cognitive-affective

processes?for

example,

when

an

individual

in

a

small-group

judges

another

with low

external

status

char

acteristics

more

positively

after that

person

demonstrates

commitment

to

the

group

(Ridgeway

1982).

The

duration of

a

mecha

nism

may

extend

over

years,

as

for

individuals

in

occupations

involving high

levels

of work

place autonomy who

come

to value indepen

dence

and

self-direction

(Kohn

et

al.

1990).

Or

the

mechanism

may

unfold

over

centuries,

as

in

the

sequence

of

events

by

which

the

Protestant

Reformation

instilled social

discipline

in

pop

ulations,

laying

the

microfoundations

for the

rise of

strong

nation-states

(Gorski 2003).

3.

Social mechanisms

are

general,

although

in

varying

degrees.

If

a

person

grows

up

in

a

neighborhood

with

a

high degree

of

social dis

organization,

has

no

one

exerting

informal

social

control

over

her,

and

turns to

a

life

of crime

(Wilson

1996),

a

social mechanism

can

be

said

to

be

at

play

only

if the

process

is

more or

less

6

For

example,

mechanisms

relating

to

the result

ing high

levels

of

anomie,

as

in

Erikson's

(1978)

classic

study

of Buffalo

Creek,

West

Virginia.



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A

PRAGMATIST

THEORY OF SOCIAL

MECHANISMS

363

typical

of

actors in

similar circumstances.

Every

such

person

need

not

be

subject

to

themecha

nism,

or

affected

by

it in the

same

way,

but

a

social

mechanism

is

a

causal

process

with

some

minimum level of

generality.

As

Tilly's analy

sis makes

clear,

however,

mechanisms

may

sometimes be

invoked

to

explain

particular

events

(e.g.,

historical

ones).

However much

the

events

typically

studied

by

historical

soci

ologists

involve

dramatic breaks

from

estab

lished social routines

(Sewell

1996),

they

are

explicable

in termsofmechanisms

to

the

extent

that

they

are

instances

of

a

more

general

phe

nomenon,

such

as

revolution

(Skocpol

1979),

or

result from combinations ofmore

general

mech

anisms

(see

Steinmetz

2005;

Tilly

1995a).

4. Because

a

social

mechanism

is

an

inter

mediary

process,

it is

necessarily

composed

of

elements

analyzed

at

a

lower

order

of

com

plexity

or

aggregation

than

the

phenomenon

it

helps explain.

The

nature

of

this hierarchical

relationship

will

vary

by

case,

but

Stinchcombe

speaks

for

most

writers

on

social

mechanisms

when

he

argues

that

identifying

them

means

peering intoa layerof social reality thatserves

as a

substratum

for the

phenomenon

under

investigation.

All work

on

social

mechanisms

assumes

that

mechanisms

are

the

gears

in

some

social

machinery

and

thus

stand

in

a

relation

ship

of lesser

to

greater

vis-?-vis the

causal

effect

they

ring

about

(see

Johnson

2002:230).

If

we

let

theoretical

consensus

be

our

guide,

these

points

of

agreement

should be

incorpo

rated into

any

adequate

definition

of

social

mechanisms. But such a definition should also

be

sufficiently

broad

to

accommodate

points

of

significant

epistemological

and

method

ological disagreement:

1.

Methodological

individualism

versus

social

ontologism.

Those

like

Hedstr?m

and

Swedberg,

who believe that

individual

persons

must

be

the

point

of

departure

for

social

analysis,

take

a

different

approach

to

mechanisms

than

do

critical

realists,

who

recognize

the nonreductive

reality of emergent social entities. In fact,

Hedstr?m

and

Swedberg

(1998:12)

make

a

case

only

for

a

"weak

version"

of

methodological

individualism.

In

many

instances,

they

rgue,

it

may

be

impossible

for

explanation

to trace

all

the

steps

by

which

the actions

of individuals

aggregate

to

compose

a

supra-individual

enti

ty?the

demand

of

methodological

individual

ism in

its

"strong

version."

Insofar

as

this is

so,

parsimony

not

only

allows but

requires

"taking

certain macro-level

states

as

given

and

incor

porating

them into the

explanation"

(p.

13).

Generally,

however,

Hedstr?m and

Swedberg

believe that the

analysis

ofmechanisms should

focus

on

processes

centered

on

individual-level

action. For critical

realists,

who

are

committed

to

a

social

ontologist position,

by

contrast,

it is

acceptable?the point

about

analytic

hierarchy

notwithstanding?to study

social

mechanisms

without much

concern

for the

individual-level

phenomena by

which

they

come

about

(e.g.,

Steinmetz

2005;

see

also Burris

2007).

2. Formal

versus

substantive

mechanisms.

Beyond therequirementthat ocialmechanisms

have

a

minimum level of

generality,

some

schol

ars are

concerned

with

causal

relationships

that

obtain because of the form of the

sociological

case

at

hand,

in

roughly

Simmel's

(1971)

sense

of the

term

"formal."What

matters

here

is that

an

X?> Y

relationship

comes

about

because

of

the

formal,

structural haracteristics

f the

social

relations

involved,

as

in

Burt's

(2001)

argument

that social

capital advantages

accrue

to actors

whose network ties span the "structural holes"

other

actors encounter.

The

content

of the situ

ation

in

which

actors

accrue

or

fail

to

accrue

such

an

advantage,

where

content

is either

the

actor's

subjective

understanding

of

it

or

the

ana

lyst's categorization

in

terms

of social

domain

or

manifest

or

latent

function,

matters

only

indi

rectly

to

Burt's

argument.

By

contrast,

Reskin's

call for the

study

of

mechanisms

generative

of

ascriptive inequality

aims

to

isolate

mecha

nisms operative specifically in situations of

allocation. Those who take Reskin's

view

that

the

key

mechanisms

to

study

are

substantive

rather than formal

typically

focus

on

domains

rich with

the relevant

mechanisms,

whereas

advocates of

more

formal

approaches

seek

to

identify

mechanisms

so

abstract that

they

oper

ate

across

virtually

all

domains.

The closer

to

the formal end of the

continuum

a

conceptual

ization ofmechanisms

is,

the less attentive

t ill

be to variation in theworking ofmechanisms

across

time and

space.

Nearly

all

approaches,

however,

proceed

from the

recognition

that

in

social

life

contingent

circumstances

cannot

be

completely explained

away.

3.

Analytical

versus

realist

models.

A

final

point

of contention

among

those who

offer

con

ceptualizations

of

social mechanisms

is

episte

mol?gica :

Is the

goal

to

produce

models

that



8/23

364

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL

REVIEW

allow

for

elegant

and

robust

predictions,

whether

or

not

the

postulated

mechanisms

can

be shown

to

be

present

and

operative

in

reality?

Or

should

one

seek

to

identify

echanisms

that

re

empir

ically

observable? Hernes

(1998:78),

con

tributing

to

Hedstr?m and

Swedberg's

volume

on

social

mechanisms,

takes

the former view:

"A

mechanism is

an

intellectual

construct

that

is

part

of

a

phantom

world

which

may

mimic

real lifewith abstract

actors

that

impersonate

humans and

cast

them in

conceptual

conditions

that mulate

actual

circumstances"

(emphasis

in

original).

Reskin takes

the latter iew?without

giving

up

a concern

for robustness?as

she

would reject postulated mechanisms that are

either

unobservable

or

diverge

from

processes

and

sequences

of

events

that

can

be observed.

Taken

together,

hese

considerations

suggest

the

following

definition:

A

social mechanism

is

a more or

less

general

sequence

or

set

of

social

events

or

processes

analyzed

at

a

lower order

of complexity

or

aggregation

by

which?in

cer

tain circumstances?some

cause

X

tends

to

bring

about

some

effect

in

the

realm

of

human

social relations. This sequence or set may or

may

not

be

analytically

reducible

to

the

ctions

of

individuals who

enact

it,

may

underwrite

for

mal

or

substantive causal

processes,

and

may

be

observed,

unobserved,

or

in

principle

unob

servable.

THE

PROBLEM WITH

CURRENT

FORMULATIONS

Recent scholarship, although helpful in shed

ding light

on

the

term

"social

mechanism,"

is

less

satisfactory

when

it

comes

to

offering

soci

ological

theories

of

mechanisms?that

is,

gen

eral

accounts,

not

of social

causality

as

a

philosophical

concept,

but

of causal

processes

in the

realm of

the

social.

How

should such

processes

be understood?What

are

their

build

ing

blocks? How

do

theyvary?

With

respect

to

such

questions, conceptual

work on social mechanisms tends to take one of

two

forms. Some

work seeks

to

identify

rela

tively

bstract features ofmechanisms but

stops

short of

laying

out

a

fully

developed

theory

of

them.

Stinchcombe's

and

Reskin's

contribu

tions fall into this

camp.

Although

Stinchcombe's work

clarifies

thatmechanisms

bridge

levels of

analysis,

and offers

suggestions

about the

circumstances

in

which the

specifi

cation

of

mechanisms

may

be

helpful,

it

oes

lit

tle

to

delimit the

scope

of

possible

mechanisms

and

provides

no

general

account

of their

nature.

Reskin

offers

a

categorization

of the mecha

nisms relevant

to

the maintenance of

inequali

ty,

but

provides

neither

a

reason

to thinkher

typology

exhaustive

nor

much detail

as

to

the

workings

of

themechanisms

said

to

fallwith

in each

class.

These

omissions

might

stem

from

skepticism

about the

explanatory

gain

from

general

theories.

They

might

also,

however,

stem

from

a

hesitation

on

the

part

of

scholars

to

both make

strong

assumptions

about

social

action

of the kind

that

contemporary

theorists

insiston and to

grapple

with

their

implications

for the

understanding

of causal

processes.

A

different

problem

besets another

strain

of

work.

Perhaps

because the

idea

of

opening

up

theblack box of

causality

to

develop

fully

pec

ified

models

appeals

to

sociologists

who value

a

certain

kind

of

analytical

rigor,

there

is often

an

affinity

between work

on

mechanisms

and

theorization

proceeding

from

assumptions

about

action

thought

to

be

highly rigorous?namely,

scholarship

in the

rational choice

theory

tradi

tion.

Hedstr?m's

work

provides

an

example:

formerly champion

of

rational

choice

theory

proper,

he

now

argues

that

social

mechanisms

should be understood

through

the

lens

ofwhat

he

calls "DBO

theory."

In this

theory,

social

action results when intentional

agents

have

something they

desire

(D),

have

a

belief

(B)

about

theworld

pertaining

to

that

desire,

and

confront

opportunities (O)

that

give

them

options

for

ction from

which

they

must

choose.

Where rational choice

theory posits

"an

atom

ized

actor

equipped

with unlimited

cognitive

abilities that

llow

'him'

to

consistently

choose

the

optimal

course

of action"

(Hedstr?m

2005:36),

DBO

theory

assumes

only

that

"the

cause

of

an

action is

a

constellation

of

desires,

beliefs and

opportunities

in

light

of

which the

action

appears

reasonable"

(p.

39).

Moreover,

while

at

least

some

rational choice approaches

treat

desires and beliefs

as

exogenous

to

the

explanatory

model,

DBO

theory

takes serious

ly

the notion that

"individuals'

attitudes and

beliefs

are

molded

in

interactions

with others"

(p.

43).

Such

a

molding

is

at

the

core

of

Hedstr?m's

conception

of

social mechanisms.

In his

view,

three

types

of

interactional

mech

anisms?belief-,

desire-,

and

opporrunity-medi



9/23

A

PRAGMATIST THEORY

OF

SOCIAL MECHANISMS

365

ated?are the

building

blocks

for

more

complex

social

processes.

The

problem

with

this strain of

work is that

relatively

few

in the

theory

community

agree

that

rational choice

theory

or variants such as

DBO

theory

offer

empirically

or

theoretically

adequate descriptions

of social action.

Several

objections

are

widely

shared

among

theorists

(see

Archer and

Tritter

2000;

Green

and

Shapiro

1994;

Somers

1998).

Rational choice

theory

typically

conceptualizes

rationality

s

an

innate

and

more

or

less

equally

distributed

cognitive

capacity,

whereas

sociological

theorists attend

to

ways

inwhich different

forms of

rationality

appear atdifferent istoricalmoments and come

to

be

differentially

distributed

across

social

space.

Rational choice

approaches?especially

outside

the

"bounded

rationality"

framework?

assume

that,

in

most

circumstances,

individu

als

act

rationally

or

at

least

reasonably

in the

light

of their clear

and coherent

beliefs and

desires.

Leaving

aside

the

question

of whether

most

people

act

rationally

or

reasonably

most

of

the

time,

many

sociological

theorists

would

fol

low Smelser (1998:4) inholding the "psycho

logical postulate"

of

ambiguity

to

have "wide

applicability"

in

social

life,

nd Swidler

(2001)

in

maintaining

that the

logical

coherence

of

individuals'

beliefs about

the

world

is the

excep

tion

rather

than the rule.

Furthermore,

the

tem

poral

phenomenology

of

much social action

departs

from that

implied

by

rational choice

approaches.

While these

approaches

suggest

an

individual armed with beliefs

and desires

who

steps out of theflow of action toface and eval

uate

a

choice between

competing

means,

theo

rists

note

that

such

moments

are

empirically

rare,

tend

to

come

about

in

a

socially

structured

fashion,

and

often

involve

an

inverse

temporal

ordering

inwhich

goals

emerge

and

are

clari

fied

only

after

individuals

tentatively

mbark

on

one

means or

another.

Finally,

whereas

rational

choice

approach

es?like those

emphasizing

the norm-directed

nature of action?assume that most action is

motivated,

many

sociological

theorists

argue

that

socially

learned habit

is

a

major

proximate

cause

of behavior

(Camic

1986).

While

recog

nizing

that

lines of habitual

activity might

accord with individuals'

strategic

or

expressive

interests,

theorists view

most

separate

acts

com

posing

those

lines

as

not

directly

motivated

and

see

individuals'

retrospective

accounts

of

why

they

did

something

as

post

hoc rationalizations

that,

beyond

being

restricted

to

a

prescientific

"vocabulary

of

motives"

(Mills

1940),

often

obscure thefact that

o

realmotivation

or

choice

was involved.7Because these criticisms

apply

as

much

to

DBO

theory

as

to

more

conven

tional

rational

choice

models,

no

sociologist

who

finds them

convincing

is

likely

to

think

Hedstr?m's

theory

of social

mechanisms?or

cognate

theories offered

by

Elster and

others?

promising.8

In

response

to

these

concerns;

in

reaction

to

other

developments

in

the

human sciences such

as

existentialism,

structural

Marxism,

and

anthropological

structuralism;

and

building

on

other

developments including

phenomenology,

ethnomethodology,

and work

on

"rule

follow

ing" inspiredby

the later

Wittgenstein,

theorists

in

recent

decades

have

argued

that social

prac

tices?not

discrete actions?should

be

the

focus

of

social research

at

the level

of the

individual

or

group.

Practices

are

generally

understood

as

forms

of

doing

or

ways

of

acting

and

interact

ing

that

appear

within

particular

communities

or

groups;

depend

on shared

presuppositions

and

assumptions;

often have

a

significant

cor

poreal

or

material

dimension;

and

unfold

in

individuals' lives

as a

result of

active,

creative,

and less than

fully

conscious

puttings

into

play

of those

presuppositions

and

assumptions

in

the

context

of various and

intersecting

sociobi

ographical

and interactional

exigencies.

Conceptualized

as

such,

practices

are

at

the

heart of

Bourdieu's

(1990) theory

of social

fields,

Butler's

(1990)

analysis

of the

perfor

mativity

of

gender,

Giddens's

(1984)

theory

of

structuration,

norr-Cetina's

(1999)

investiga

tions of the

"epistemic

cultures"

of science

and

modern

society,

Ortner's

(1984)

efforts

to

reground anthropological

understandings

of

7

Not

all theorists

in

the

rational

choice

tradition

are

subject

to

these

criticisms.

Macy's (1993)

"back

ward-looking

model of social control"

posits

that

actors

learn

through experience

about

the

general

conditions under

which it

makes

sense

to

participate

in

collective

action,

eliminating

the

need for infor

mation-intensive calculation

in

every

instance.

8

However,

a

growing

literature

in the

philosophy

of social science

argues

that "false models"

may

still

be

extremely

useful

in

explanation

(e.g.,

Hindriks

2008).



10/23

366

AMERICAN

SOCIOLOGICAL

REVIEW

culture,

and

Sewell's

(2005)

contributions

to

historiography,

among

many

other

contribu

tions

(for

review,

see

Schatzki

1996, 2002;

Schatzki

et

al.

2001).

Nearly

all

specific

theo

retical

programs

advanced under the rubric of

practice

theory

ave

come

in

for

criticism,

s

has

the notion

of

social

practices

itself

(Turner

1994),

but this

has

not

deterred

a

significant

amount

of

research

into the

practices

seen as

constitutive

of social

life

in

numerous

domains

and

historical

settings.

Students

of social

practices

have

by

no

means

ignored

causality.

Indeed,

as

Ortner

notes

in

a

seminal

1984

article,

the

turn

toward

practice

among

contemporary

theorists,

while

incorpo

rating

notions

of

the

active,

knowledgeable,

culturally interpretive

gent

that

can

be

found

in earlier

humanistic

approaches

such

as

sym

bolic

interactionism,

departs

from the antide

terminism

that

often

characterizes

such

approaches

by

seeing

in

patterned

iterations

of

practice

thebasis

for the

reproduction

of

social

structures,

in

particular,

structures

of

inequali

ty.

aced

with

causal

questions

such

as

"Why

is

there

not

more

intergenerational

pward

mobil

ity

in

contemporary

capitalist

societies?"

researchers

who

take

a

practice

approach

do

not

hesitate

to

point

to

practices

and their

ausal

effects,

s

in

Lareau's

(2003)

claim

that

differ

ences

in

childrearing

between

working-

and

middle-class

parents

instill

distinctive

disposi

tions

in their

offspring

that

are

differentially

rewarded

in

school and

on

the labor

market.

Yet the direct

production

and

reproduction

of

social

structuresof

inequality

by

means

of

the

iteration

f

practices

is

only

one

kind of

causal

effect

that

may

interest

ocial scientists. To

the

extent

that

it

remains

unclear

how

a

variety

of

other causal

processes

build

on

and intersect

with

social

practices?as

it

does,

given

thatfew

who

take

a

practice approach

address social

mechanisms?much

empirical

research

will

find

itself

deprived

of

sophisticated

action-the

oretical foundations.

I

argue

that

solution

to

this

problem

can

be

found

by

developing

a

theory

of

social

mecha

nisms

on

the basis

of

an

approach

to

social

action

that

has

affinities

with other strains

of

practice

theory

but is less

reductive

at

the

level

of action than

theories

like Bourdieu's.

This

approach

is the

one

taken

by

the

classical

American

pragmatists

Peirce, James,

Dewey,

and

Mead and elaborated

toward

a

sociological

theory

of action

by

Joas

(1996).

THE

PRAGMATIST THEORY OF

ACTION

The

classical

American

pragmatists

were

philosophers,

not

sociological

theorists

per

se.

Yet

as

Joas

shows,

despite

disagreement

among

them

and

significant interpretive

disputes

among

contemporary

scholars

as

to

the

mean

ing

of

pragmatism,

the classical

pragmatists

were

for the

most

part

united

in their

under

standing

of

the basic

nature

of human

activity

vis-?-vis thesocial and naturalworlds. Rejecting

theCartesian view

that

thought

nd

action,

mind

and

body,

are

ontologically

distinct,

the

prag

matists

argued

that

in

anthropological

terms,

humans

are

problem

solvers and

the

function

of

thought

s

to

guide

action

in

the service

of solv

ing

practical problems

that arise

in the

course

of life.From

this

claim,

wide

ranging

and

con

troversial

epistemological implications

followed.

More

important

in

the

present

context,

howev

er, is the corollary claim that action, as a

response

to

problem

situations,

involves

an

alternation

between

habit and

creativity.

The

main

way

humans

solve

problems,

the

prag

matists

held,

is

by enacting

habits?those

learned

through

social

experience

or

from

pre

vious

individual

efforts

t

problem

solving.

By

habits,

the

pragmatists

meant

not

rote

behavior,

but

"acquired predisposition[s]

to

ways

or

modes of

response" (Dewey

1922:42,

empha

sis inoriginal) ofwhich actors are typicallynot

conscious

in

the

moment.

Only

when

preexist

ing

habits fail

to

solve

a

problem

at

hand does

an

action-situation

rise

to

the forefront

of

con

sciousness

as

problematic.

Then,

the

pragmatists

argued,

humankind's innate

capacity

for

cre

ativity

comes

into

play

as

actors

dream

up pos

sible

solutions,

later

integrating

some

of these

into

their

stocks of

habit

for

use

on

subsequent

occasions.9

9

Space

constraints

prevent

me

from

offering

a

more

nuanced

account

of

pragmatism

or

considering

the

implications

for

sociology

of

a

pragmatist

epis

temology

or

philosophy

of science. The

one

point

1

make with

regard

to

the latter is

to

reject

the

idea that

for

pragmatists

any

action model that

"works"

to

yield

a

robust

explanation

will

suffice.

As

Joas

shows,



11/23

A

PRAGMATIST

THEORY

OF

SOCIAL

MECHANISMS

367

Blumer

(1969),

formulating

the

program

of

symbolic

interactionism,

ownplayed

this lter

nation

between

habituality

and

creativity,

but

correctly

noted that

meaning

is also central

to

a pragmatistview of action. Problem situations

present

themselves

to

actors

through

the lens

es

of the

cultural environments

n

which

they

re

immersed.

Such environments

give

meaning

to

and

help

provide

the

content

of the

goals,

ori

entations,

identities,

vocabularies of

motive,

and other

understandings

of the action

situation

that

ctors

come

to

have.

They

also

provide

the

basis

for

intersubjective

judgments

about

the

adequacy

of

problem

solutions. All

habits

are

thusenacted on the basis of culturallymediat

ed

interpretations

f the situation

one

faces

(see

Alexander

1988),

not

least

interpretations

of

the

intentions

of interaction

partners.

Why

should

sociologists

take

a

pragmatist

approach

to

action

seriously?

A

full

treatment

of

this

question

goes

beyond

the

scope

of

this

article,

but

I

can

outline

some

reasons

why

one

might

prefer

pragmatism

to

both

rational

choice

theory

and

practice

theory

approaches

such

as

Bourdieu's.

Pragmatism

is often

misunderstood

as a

form

of

utilitarianism,

but there

re

at

least five

ways

in

which it

differs from?and is

superior

to?

rational

choice

theory

(for

discussion,

see

Beckert

2002;

Joas

1996;

Whitford

2002).

First,

pragmatism

does

not

equate

problem

solving

with

the

maximization of

utility.

o be

sure,

the

situations

humans

experience

as

problems

may

involve

utility

maximization?for

example,

the

need

of

businesses

to

generate

revenue.

But the

kinds of

problems

of

concern

to

pragmatists

range

much

more

widely

and

include

all the

difficulties

humans

or

collective

actors

face

in

life,

from

theneed

to

remain

healthy

to

the

need

to

find

meaning

and

purpose

in

existence. To

reduce these

to

the desire

to

maximize

on a

preference

function is

to

ignore

the

phenome

the

epistemology

of the

classical

pragmatists

was

premised

on

their

anthropology.

My

view

of

the

tra

dition draws from

many

texts,

especially

Dewey

([1910]

1978,

[1920]

1982,

1922),

James

([1907]

1975),

and Peirce

(1992, 1998).

Beside

classic

con

tributions

to

symbolic

interactionism,

previous

efforts

at

bringing pragmatist insights

into

sociology

include

Lewis

and Smith

(1980),

Maines,

Sugrue,

and

Katovich

(1983),

Mills

(1966),

Seidman

(1996),

and

Shalin

(1986).

For

discussion,

see

Gross

(2007).

nological

diversity

involved in

the

experiencing

of

problem

situations.

Second,

to

reiterate the

point

about

meaning,

pragmatists

insist that

problem

situations

are

always

interpreted

through

cultural lenses. Even in situations of

instrumental

rationality,

actors

are

enmeshed

in

webs of

meaning

that

indicate

the

significa

tion of

the

ends

they

are

trying

to

pursue,

con

strain

the

choices

they

make

by

setting

imits

n

the

thinkability

f

means,

and sustain the social

relationships

in

which

instrumentality

ust

be

embedded. Rational choice

theory

makes

little

room

for

culture

thus

understood.

Third,

prag

matists

argue?directly

against

most

utilitari

ans?that much action ishabitual and

typically

involves

no

conscious

weighing

of

means

and

ends.

Fourth,

pragmatists

maintain that instru

mental

rationality

itself,

hen it

does

appear,

is

a

kind

of

habit,

a

way

that

some

humans

can

learn

to

respond

to

certain

situations,

and that

we

should

be

as

interested

in

the historical

processes

by

which

the

habit of

rationality?in

its

various

forms?develops

and is situational

ly deployed

as

we

should be in

its effects.

Finally, pragmatists

suggest

that

means

and

ends

are

not

always

given

prior

to

action,

as

assumed in

most

rational

choice

models,

but

are

often

emergent

from

action,

as

lines

of

activity

are

initiated

that

lead

actors

to

see

themselves

in

new

ways,

to

value different

kinds

of

goods,

and

to

become

attached

to

problem

solutions

they

could

not

have

imagined

previously

(Whitford

2002).

Thus

described, pragmatism,

in

its under

standing

of social

action,

sounds similar

to

work

in

the

practice

theory

tradition.A number of

commentators

point

to

commonalities

at

the

level

of

action

theory

between

pragmatism

and

the

thought

of

Bourdieu

(Aboulafia

1999;

Dalton

2004;

Emirbayer

and

Goldberg

2005;

Shusterman

1999).

Bourdieu

himself

noted that

"the

affinities

and

convergences

are

quite

strik

ing"

and

that

his

approach,

like

Dewey's,

"grant[s]

a

central role

to

thenotion of habit,

understood

as

an

active and

creative relation

to

the

world,

and

rejectfs]

all the

conceptual

dualisms

upon

which

nearly

all

post-Cartesian

philosophies

are

based:

subject

and

object,

inter

nal

and

external,

material

and

spiritual,

indi

vidual

and

social,

and

so

on"

(Bourdieu

and

Wacquant

1992:122).

If

pragmatism

and

prac

tice

theory,

t

least of

the

Bourdieusian

variety,



12/23

368 AMERICAN

SOCIOLOGICAL

REVIEW

are so

similar,

why

should

sociologists

prefer

the

former?

Some

might

argue

that

they

should

not.

Similar

though

the

two

approaches

may

be

in

certain

respects,

the claim could be made that

there s

one

crucial

difference.

Practice

theorists

like Bourdieu

routinely

tie their

analyses

of

practices

to

questions

of

social-structural

pro

duction and

reproduction,

which have

not

been

a

major

concern

of

scholars

working

in

a

prag

matist framework.

The

objection

here is

not

simply

that

the

work has

not

yet

been

done

to

link

pragmatist

understandings

of action

with

accounts

of

meso-

and

macro-level

phenome

na, sociology's typicalobjects of explanation.As

important,

the

lack of such

linkage

may

lead

pragmatists

to

ignore

systematic

and

conse

quential

patterns

in

the

distribution

of habitu

ality?by

social

class

position,

for

example.

To

my

mind, however,

this

argument

counts

in favor

of

pragmatism.

Because

approaches

to

prac

tice

theory

like Bourdieu's

aim

primarily

at

accounting

for

social

reproduction,

they

end

up

placing

far

too

much

emphasis

on

the

strategic

dimensions of action.Although Bourdieu does

not

see

every

individual

act

as

motivated,

he

does

view

most

lines of

activity

as

connected

to

actors' interests

in

leveraging

themselves

into

favorable

positions

inmultidimensional social

hierarchies,

and thus

as

tied

to

themaintenance

or

transformation

of those hierarchies.

As critics of

Bourdieu

have

pointed

out

(e.g.,

Alexander

1995),

however,

this

analytical

reduc

tion

is

as

problematic

in

its

own

way

as

ration

al choice theory is in its. In Bourdieu's

framework,

practices

tend

not to

be

seen as

sub

scribed

to

on

thebasis of

relatively

utonomous

identity

commitments,

or

ultimate values

dis

connected

from

broader

social-structural

posi

tionings,

or

by

virtue

of the

sheer force

of

tradition

or

institutionalization.

Yet

evidence

from domains

as

diverse

as

religion

(Smith

2003),

politics

(Stryker,

Owens,

and White

2000),

intellectual

life

(Gross

2008),

and

inti

macy (Gross 2005) suggest thatfactors of iden

tity,morality,

or

tradition

can

certainly

underlie

the

adoption

of

a

social

practice

by

a

group,

as

well

as

shape

individuals'

enactments

of it. uch

factors

must not

be

seen

as

residual

or

epiphe

nomenal

elements

but

as

coexisting

and

in

some

cases

intersecting

with

strategic

concerns over

social

positioning.

In

part

because

pragmatist

understandings

of action

were

not

designed

to

account

for social

reproduction?but

also

because the

habituality-creativity

continuum,

for

pragmatists,

is

meant to

encompass

rather

than

substitute for other forms of

action,

while

giving pride

of

place

tomatters of

identity

nd

meaning?pragmatism

is better able

to

accom

modate the

diversity

of action and

practice.

Although

nothing

in

a

pragmatist

approach

would

deny

that

some

practices

are

closely

bound

up

with

the

reproduction

of social

inequality,

the

very

thinness

of

the

model

at

the

meso-

and macro-levels

gives

it

a

flexibility

and

range

lacking

in

other

approaches.

A PRAGMATIST THEORY OF

MECHANISMS

The

key

claim

to

advance

in

constructing

a

the

ory

of social

mechanisms

on

these foundations

is this:

Pragmatists

would

view

social

mecha

nisms

as

composed

of

chains

or

aggregations

of

actors

confronting problem

situations and mobi

lizing

more or

less habitual

responses.

I

noted

above that alternation

between

habit and

cre

ativity is at the heart of pragmatism, and that

pragmatists

see

this

alternation

as

underlying?

not

substituting

for?other action forms

(Joas

1996).

These

characteristics

of the

approach,

combined

with the

focus

on

meaning, yield

unique leverage

over

the

notion

of

mechanisms.

To

see

why,

let

us

follow Hedstr?m

and

Swedberg

at

least

part

way

and describe

a

social

mechanism

as

the

structure

or

process

S

by

which

some

input

/leads

to

outcome

O.

A

prag

matist theoryofmechanisms would hold thatto

understand

S,

we

must

examine the

individual

and collective

actors

Ax_n

involved

in the 1-0

relationship.

For

each,

our

goal

should

be

to

understand

why

and

how,

when confronted

with

problem

situation

Pn

and endowed with

habits

of

cognition

and action

Hn,

along

with

other

resources,

response

Rn

becomes the

most

like

ly.

S will then

consist

of

all the relations

A

x_n

?P\-n ?H\_n -R\-n

that,

in

aggregate

or

sequen

tially,bring about the1-0 relationship.

For

example,

suppose

we are

interested

in

the

relationship

between

race

and

income

inequality

and

follow

Pager

(2003)

in consid

ering

African

American

men

and the effects

of

a

criminal record and

"negative

credentialing"

on

the

likelihood

of

gaining employment.

Many

kinds of

actors,

problem

situations,

and

habit

ual

responses

make

up

this

mechanism,

but

a



13/23

A PRAGMATIST

THEORY OF SOCIAL

MECHANISMS

369

pragmatist approach

might

concentrate

on

understanding

how,

for

employers

trying

omeet

staffing

needs

with

reliable

workers,

and in the

context

of

prevailing

racial-juridical

cultural

structures, ertainhabits of

thought

and action

are

employed

according

to

which

potential

employees

are

coded in

terms

of

trustworthiness

depending

on

their

race

and

history

with

the

jus

tice

system,

giving

rise

to

discriminatory

allo

cation decisions.

Aggregated

across

employers,

such

an

A-P-H-R

chain

is

the mechanism of

negative

credentialing

in

this

case.

I

hypothesize

that

most

social mechanisms

can

be

understood

in

this

way?as

chains

or

aggregations

of actors,

problem

situations,

and

habitual

responses?always

with the

possibili

ty, greater

in

some

circumstances

than

others,

that

a

novel

way

of

responding

to

a

problem

could

emerge

for

any

of the

actors

involved,

potentially

altering

the

workings

of themech

anism.

A

pragmatist

social

science concerned

with

mechanisms

would

aim

to

uncover

the

nature

of such

chains: the

types

intowhich

they

may

be

classified,

the

actors

involved

in

their

operation, the habits employed by such actors

and their

origins,

the

circumstances

in

which the

mechanisms

operate,

their nterconnection ith

other

mechanisms,

and their causal effects.

Note the

centrality

of

meaning

in

the

Pager

example;

themechanism is

interpretive

ll the

way

down.

For

pragmatists,

humans inhabit

worlds of

meaning. Pragmatism

is

not

a

formof

methodological

individualism;

it

does

not

require

that mechanisms

operating

at

the

meso

ormacro-levels be explained exclusively in

terms

of the actions of

the individuals

involved,

meaning-interpretive

or

otherwise.

It

does

insist,

however,

that

the

potential

contribution of indi

vidual action

to

the

operation

ofmechanisms be

taken into

account.

This

requires

that

we

grasp

how the

relevant

individuals understand the sit

uations before them

and

act

on

those under

standings, helping

thereby

to enact

the

mechanism.

In this respect, pragmatism comes close to the

weak

version

of

methodological

individualism

championed by

Hedstr?m

and

Swedberg.

Hedstr?m

(2005),

in

particular,

makes

belief

central

to

his

account

of social

action,

mobiliz

ing

Weber's

stress

on

subjective meaning

to

argue

that

ctors'

beliefs

about

the

social

world

are as

important

as

their

desires

and

opportu

nities

in

explaining

their

acti

a pragmarist theory of social mechanisms

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