Japan Atomic Energy Agency（JAEA）Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN)

Mitsuo KOIZUMI

A Proposal of Nuclear Materials Detectionand Inspection Systems in Heavily Shielded

Suspicious Objects by Non-destructive Manner

Collaboration of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)National Institute for Quantum and Radiological Science and Technology (QST)Joint Research Center (JRC)

Supported byMinistry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Japan (MEXT)

Magic Maggiore Technical Reachback Workshop 15 min. (March 28-30, 2017, JRC Ispra, Italy)

1. Introduction2. Secure Detection of Heavily Shielded

Suspicious Object3. Interior Inspection of NMs Part taken out

from the Heavily Shielded Objects4. Summary

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Contents

1. Introduction

2

NM : Nuclear Material

3

Nuclear Materials under/out of Regulatory Control

NM Situation

Under Regulatory Control

NMs in nuclear facilities（under control of competent authority)In IAEA member states, NMs are under IAEA safeguards

Out of Regulatory Control

Smuggled NMs（out of control of competent authority）Under nuclear security policy of each state

4

NMs Terrors

Type Purposes / NMs

RDDRadiological Dispersal Device

Purposes：Killing people, causing disruptionNMs, RIs ：High radiation toxicity isotopes

(α-emitters etc.)

Nuclear Bomb

Purposes：Mass destruction

NMs: Special nuclear materials (235U, 239Pu)

OtherHigh Radiation Emission Objects

Purpose：Insensible high radiation exposure

NMs：NMs in criticality(High neutron emission) (JCO type criticality assemblies)

RIs: High gamma-ray radiation

We need to know the purposes of detected objects for safe handling.

apparent identification to NM

NMs out of Regulatory Control

NMs taken outfrom containers

Interior Inspection Systems

Dismantlement Systems

Handling of Detected Objects

Adequate Places（Airports, Harbors etc.)

5

Airports, Harbors,Other places

Secure Detection Systems of NMs

Detection

NF Laboratories

Nuclear Forensics Analytical Systems

Nuclear Forensic

A Scheme of Strengthening Nuclear Security for NMs out of Regulatory Control

Heavy Shield (Metal)

Neutron Shield+Neutron Absorber

（NM＋Mixtures）

Heavy Shield (Metal) Shield of gamma-rays from NM / gamma-rays from neutron absorption by surrounding material

Neutron Shield Moderation of neutrons emitted from NM (inside) / neutrons interrogated from outside

Neutron Absorber Absorption of thermal neutrons

(Just a pure black area by X-ray scanning)

6

An Example of Heavily Shielded Objects (HSO) containing NM

Present X-ray Scanning Systems for Cargo Containers in Nuclear Security

X-ray Scanning Purposes

BackscatterX-ray imaging

Clear imaging for light elementsFor detection ofcar and truck bombs / explosives, plastic weapons, and other organic threats / illegal drugs, etc.

Transmission X-ray imaging

Imaging for heavy elementsFor detection ofheavy metal items for hiding illegal materials in cargo / heavy weapons etc.

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Imaging with moving

Transmission X-ray Imaging

Present X-ray Cargo Container Scanning System

8

Real Time Backscatter X-ray Imaging

ROI （Region of Interest)

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Not sufficient for secure detection of NM in heavy metal items (heavily-shielded NM)

A Combined Use ofX-ray Scanning Systems

+ Passive Radiation Detectors

2. Secure Detection of Heavily Shielded Suspicious Object

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HSO Heavily Shielded Object

MGB Monochromatic Gamma-ray Beam

MGS Monochromatic Gamma-ray Source

ERL Energy Recovery Linac

LCS Laser Compton Scattering

NRF Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence

NDA(D) Non-destructive Assay (Detection)

ROI Region of Interest

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A Proposal of Secure Detection System of NMs in HSO

A combined system

X-ray Scanning System + An NRF-based NDD System using Intense MGB

X-ray Scanning System An NRF-based NDD System using Intense MGB

For detection of suspicious objects (ROI) in cargo containers

Pin-point scanning of ROI for detection of NMs (NRF gamma-ray signals of NMs)

MGB: Monochromatic Gamma-ray BeamNRF: Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence NDD: Non-destructive Detection

Next Generation ERL（350 MeV）

Laser Enhancement Cavity

350 MeV electrons

3 loops

A Future ERL-LCS Monochromatic Gamma-ray Source

Electron Beam=350 MeV, 10 mALCS Gamma-ray （2-3 MeV）ØFlux ~ 1x1013 ph/sØΔE/E ~ 0.1%

~ 25 m

High PowerLaser Oscillator

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Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence

R. Hajima et al., J. Nuclear Science and Technology (2008)

Laser Compton Scattering

Electrons Laser

gamma-rays

A Explanation of NRF-based NDA of NM using MGB

13

MGB

Detector

Hidden NM（239Pu）

Shielding Material

NRFEmission Gamma-rays

Monochromatic ( & tunable) gamma-ray beam

(Selective NRF Activation of Nuclide)

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Interrogation Gamma-rays

NRF Emission Gamma-rays

Transmission Gamma-rays

NRF Emission Gamma-rays

Bring information of NMs in HSO-Rough characterization of NMs by interrogations ofseveral gamma-rays with specific energies of NMisotopes

Transmission Gamma-rays

Bring information of detailed interior structure of HSO-CT imaging with intense monochromatic high-energy gamma-rays

Interrogation Gamma-rays：High Intensity MGB

Interior Inspections of HSO by Interrogation of MGB

(HSO)

Heavy Shield (Metal)

（NM＋Mixtures）

Neutron Shield+Neutron Absorber

Rough Characterization of NMs inside of HSO by Interrogation of MGB

NRF emission gamma-rays from the isotope of interest (i)

Interrogation gamma-rayswith tuned energy of isotope of interest (i)

(HSO)

Heavy Shield (Metal)

（NM＋Mixtures）

Neutron Shield+Neutron Absorber

By changing energy of interrogation gamma-rays tuned to theresonance energy of certain isotope of U/Pu, we are able tocount NRF emission gamma-rays from the all isotope of U/Pu.With having counts of NRF emission gamma-rays of all isotopesof U/Pu, we can have information of U/Pu isotopic compositionof NM inside the HSO. (Rough characterization of NMs)

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H. Toyokawa, NIMA 545, 469(2005).

Inner Structure of Thick Metal Container

CT Imaging with Intense Monochromatic High-Energy Gamma-rays

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Detailed information of inner structure of the object⇒ Essential for safe dismantlement

Interrogation Gamma-rays of high energy; well

penetrate into material

Transmission Gamma-rays

Gamma-ray Detector

(HSO)

For secure (pin-point) detection of NM hidden behind heavy-shield in freight cargo containers

An NRF-based NDD System using Intense MGB

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Next Generation ERL(350 MeV)

Laser EnhancementCavity

Cargo Container

Gamma-ray Detectors

High Power Laser Oscillator

Nuclear Material in Heavy Shield

Moving

40Ft ContainerMax. Weight：30.5 tons

12.2 m

2.4 m

2.6 m

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X-ray Scanning System （Present）

NRF-based NDD System using Intense MGB

A tunnel for freight container trailers

~15 m

~15 m

~20 m

~35 m

①②

To Interior Inspection

③

① When X-ray scanning system does not find any ROI in the freight container, then the trailer skips over the NRF–based NDD system.② When X-ray scanning system finds ROI in the freight container, the trailer is moved to NRF-based NDD system.③ When signals of NMs are detected, the trailer is moved to interior inspection of detected objects

A Picture of Actual Application of the Proposed System for Secure Detection of NMs (A Combined System of X-ray Scanning with NRF-based NDD)

3. Interior Inspection of NMs Part taken outfrom the HSO

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DDA Differential Die-away Analysis

DGS Delayed Gamma-ray Spectroscopy

NRTA Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis

PGA Prompt Gamma-ray Analysis

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Inspection Procedures after Detection of Heavily Shielded NMs

Process Inspection / Dismantlement

Interior inspection of HSO

Dismantlement of HSO(taking NMs part out)

Interior inspection ofNMs Part

Further Dismantlementfor taking NMs out

Inspection before opening / dismantlement of the objects- Detailed interior structure- Rough characterization of NMs

Safe (remotely operated) dismantlement of HSO at adequate place for taking NMs part out

Inspection of NMs part for further dismantlement- Mixed material（explosives etc.)- Characterization of NMs

Further safe (remotely operated) dismantlement for taking NMs Out for nuclear forensics

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NMs + Mixtures

Interrogation Neutrons

A D-T Pulsed Neutron Source

NeutronsGamma-rays

Transmission Neutrons

Induced Fission Neutrons

Neutron Capture Prompt Gamma-rays

Delayed Gamma-rays （from Fission Products of Induced Fissions）

DDA

DGA

NRTA

PGA

Rough Explanation of Interior Inspectionof NMs Part by Active Neutron NDA

（Active neutron NDA techniques (DDA, DGS, NRTA , PGA））

NDA Techniques Rough Explanation

DDADifferential Die-awayAnalysis

For counting / analysis of induced fissionneutrons (to quantify fissile mass) from NMs usingdifference of die-away time of active pulsedneutrons and induced fission neutrons

DGSDelayed Gamma-raySpectroscopy

For counting / analysis of specific high energydelayed gamma-rays after induced fissionscaused by interrogation of pulsed neutrons (toobtain ratios of fissile isotopes)

NRTANeutron ResonanceTransmission Analysis

For counting / analysis of transmitted neutronsthrough the NMs part using TOF (time of flight)method for quantification of each isotope of NMs

PGAPrompt Gamma-rayAnalysis

For detection of specific prompt gamma-raysgenerated by (n, γ) reactions of isotopes（For an example； 14N (n, γ) 15N ;detection of 14Nin explosives）

Rough Explanation of Active Neutron NDA （DDA, DGS, NRTA, PGA）

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23

Proposal of an Active NDA Systemfor Interior Inspection of NMs Part

（PGA, DDA, DGS, NRTA）

5. Summary

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25

Summary

Proposed Sytems Roles

NRF-based NDD Systemusing high energy andhigh intensity MGB

Secure detection of NMs in HSO

Inspection of inner (explosion)structure of the HSO

Rough characterization of NMs(nuclear bomb or not) in the HSO

Active Neutron NDAsystem using a D-TNeutron Source

Investigation of mixtures (explosives,toxic materials) in NMs parts /characterization of NMs

- The existence of NM in a suspicious object (in a shield) have to be securely detected.

- Before opening the suspicious object, safety should be confirmed.

Thank you for your attention.

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AcknowledgementThis work has been supported by a subsidy for strengthening nuclear security of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT), Japan.

Electron Gun

Energy Recovery Linac(Super-Conducting Cavity)

(9-cell x 2 cavity)

ExperimentRooms

Laser Enhancement

Cavity

Basic Technology Demonstration(Electron Beam = 20 MeV, 0.058 mA)

ØLCS X-ray (~ 6.9 keV) Flux ~ 1x109ph/s/mAØΔE/E ~0.5%

LCS Gamma -rays

Injector

Generation of High Intensity LCS Monochromatic X-rays : Demonstrated With the LCS Demo. System in March 2015 at KEK Tsukuba (Japan)

20 MeV electron

s High PowerLaser Oscillator

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LCS Demo. System

ERL-LCS Demo. System for Future ERL-LCS MGS

Characteristic points Advantages for inspection / detection

monochromaticgamma-rays

Interrogation of gamma-rays within pin-point energyregion- Avoiding unnecessary excitation or absorption- Useful for reduction of BGs and obtaining higher accuracy

energy tunablegamma-rays

Interrogation of gamma-rays with tunable energies fornuclides in targets- Selection of nuclide by gamma-ray energy in targets- Makes selective measurements possible

high intensitygamma-rays

Interrogation with high intensity- Higher probabilities of reactions to be interrogated- Makes very fast measurements with higher accuracy

(even for measurements of low concentration elements)

gooddirectivitygamma-rays

Interrogation within very limited direction- Avoiding attenuation of interrogation X-/gamma rays-Gives measurements freedom for target distance from thesource

gamma-rayswith deeppenetrability(*)

Interrogation with deep penetration-Deep penetration into heavy material reaching to the

target isotopes

Characteristic Points of ERL-based LCS MGS

* For MeV class gamma-rays 28

Selective nuclide

detection

Pin-point detection