A purposive sample of 5 projects Ghana, the Village Infrastructure Project, VIP Mauritania, The Oases Development Project, ODP-2 Senegal, Project dOrganization et Gestion Villageoise, POGV-2Mali, Fond de Development Sahelien, FODESA Cape Verde, Projecto de Lucha contra a Pobreza Rural, PLPR

Criteria for selecting the projects:the project major thrust is to develop the rural communities, through a demand driven participatory approachthe projects represent different options for the organization and management of the service delivery system, and the projects have been implemented for a sufficiently long time, or represent a second phase of an earlier project with a similar approach, to have accumulated experience that can be usefully shared.

Features of CDD used to compare design and implementation performanceScope for initiative by the Community Based Organizations, CBOsTargeting instruments appliedContribution to improving the local system of governance

Scope for CBO initiativeWho determines the menu of project interventions?What measures to ration demand? Do CBOs implement their own micro-projects?Do CBOs handle public resources in cash?Do CBOs operate the rural financial services?Do CBOs participate in project management?How complex is the procedure to approve funding of CBOs initiatives?

Who determines the menu of project interventions?VIP, POGV-2, and ODP-2 offer a limited menu: production and transport infrastructure, NRM, functional literacy; credit is envisaged only to groups engaged in productive activitiesFODESA and PLPR are very liberal, a community can ask support for any priority initiative, except if it falls in a simple negative list (determined jointly with the communities in the case of the PLPR)During implementation, eligible activities were increased in Mauritania and Ghana, to accommodate strong demand for basic social needs

Participation of the CBOs in the delivery systemThe VIP does not envisage a role for the CBOs; CBOs are users of services produced and delivered by somebody elseODP-2, POGV-2, and PLPR envisage a key role for the CBOs in the implementation phase of their priority projects (participation in design, contracting, supervision of deliveries, clearance of payments)FODESA design included the above as well, but implementation has been rather different so farIn no case do CBOs handle project cash

Providing rural financial servicesThe VIP had a credit component, which did not envisage supporting community based MFIsA matching grant mechanism was introduced after MTRBy the end of phase 1, FODESA had not managed to contract the component designed to develop the MFIsThe PLPR and the POGV did not have a MFI componentThe MFI component of the ODP in Mauritania was quite successful, despite some problem with loan delinquencies

CBOs participation in project managementThe PLPR and ODP-2 have established close partnerships between the project and the CBOsIn Cape Verde, the leaders of the CBOs are full right members of the CRP, which is the operating unit of the PLPRIn Mauritania, the ODAs (Oasis Development Associations) are the planning and executive agent of the project at community levelFODESA was also to establish partnerships with the CBOs but for a variety of reason did not manage so farThe VIP did not envisage a management role for any actor other than the local government

The FODESA experience highlights a problem with the CBOs participation in project management organizationsThe partnership of project and CBOs established by FODESA at regional level was an impractical solutionToo many CBOs potentially members of the associationFODESA project re-orientation suggested to decentralize at district level The ODP experience: project reorientation cut down the number of ODAs from 400 to 200The POGV deals with about 600 villagesThe PLPR does not have the problem: there are only a few communities in each of the islands where there is a CRP

Complexity of processes and proceduresTwo extreme cases:FODESA applied AGETYPE procedures designed for large public investment projectsThe First Phase review counted over 20 bureaucratic steps to get a micro-project implementedAs a result, the project could not negotiate the large number of small contracts required to fulfill the participatory implementation policy envisagedTo manage its administration costs, the Project sidelined its community capability building objectives and concentrated delivery contracts in the hands of few private sector contractor foreign to the receiver communityAn interesting concrete instance of project induced elite capture of benefits that has little to do with elite dominance at the community level

.more on proceduresQuite opposite the case of the PLPR:

Government introduced special instruments to transfer public funds to the CRP, the associations of the civil society that implement the PLPRThese instruments embody two key concepts:Government approves a 3-years indicative plan, and The principle of ex post control on the AWP&B of the CRPsThe result is a remarkable simplification of procedures, that enables the CBOs to participate in all the stages of their project implementation

Targeting instrumentsFour sets of instruments were introduced:

Ex ante selection of target community and related exclusion criteria Exclusion vs. non-exclusion within the communitySpecific measures to secure a role for women and the poorSelf-targeting mechanisms applied to the support of specific activities

Targeting communities Four projects target the village (or the oasis)The PLPR targets any CBO of poor people (as defined by the GoCV policy reduction policy paper)Criteria of community exclusion:VIP and PLPR have noneODP-2 excludes oases owned by absentee landlordsFODESA excludes non-vulnerable villages, based on food self-sufficiency indicatorsPGOV-2 excludes villages that have badly performed under a predecessor project

Exclusion vs. non-exclusion within a target community No project discriminates specifically against wealthy or otherwise dominant members of the society within a community eligible for project support

This greatly facilitates the mobilization of the community and avoids opposition to project intervention

Specific measures to facilitate inclusiveness i.e. how to secure a role to women and poor HHsVIP initially did not address the questionODP-2, POGV-2, FODESA require to have women member of all CBO institutions and operating bodiesPLPR relies on the consensus of the communities on the role of women and the poor, supported by the animation service of the CRPsAll projects record easy formal acceptance by the communities of a new role of women in the CBOs ODP-2 records considerable success in securing a pro-active role for women, in the ODAs and in the MFIs, enhanced by the impact of the functional literacy programme

Important self-targeting instrumentsCeilings on the amount of project funding of community initiatives (per micro-project, per HH of partner involved), automatically excludes wealthy members of the community (Cape Verde)Access to credit is more important to the poor than the cost of credit, MFIs set interest rates higher than commercial banks, which excludes borrowers that have access to formal credit, while attracting deposits from themRefusal to pay the labor required to construct irrigation infrastructure activates the traditional rule that entitles those who supply the labor the right to share the land they helped to develop (Guinea)

CDD contribution to improving local governanceThree key point:Establishing sustainable CBO within and beyond the individual community to create the conditions for effective participation and empowermentSupport of project policy by the political environment and the public administrationControlling the impact of local elite dominance

Creating sustainable CBOs The VIP experience:The VIP tried to reach the communities through the decentralized public administrationAt the level of the the District Assemblies it did not work, priorities are different, level too far away from the villageAt Area Council level, the activation of public delivery mechanisms was much more effectiveIn Ghana, Area Councils are much nearer to the village, and the gap with the District is quite wide

The Mauritania and Cape Verde experienceIn Mauritania and Cape Verde the governments enacted legislation that recognizes the public utility of private associations of the civil society engaged in poverty alleviation and/or community development, such as the ODAs and the CRPs, In both countries, the respective roles of the associations and of the decentralized public administration have not yet been clearly definedRepresentative vs. participatory democracy

On the capture of project benefits by the elites dominant in the communities There is little objective evidence collected on this issueAn insight can be gained by analyzing the emerging pattern of effective community demandThis signals that communities attach priority to investing their own resources to match project intervention:first in basic social needs (water, house improvement, functional literacy, health care), followed by income generation activities, when the minimum social needs are satisfied,and attach low priority to NRM

The projects experience suggests that:So far at leastThe CDD approach has not resulted in serious cases of capture of project benefits by the local dominant elitesOn the contrary there are clear signals of the influence of women in the decision about common preferences!

Whereas the risk may increase as community demand to support income generation activities increases,capture of project benefits by agents external to the communities (administrators, contractors) induced by inappropriate implementation procedures is a higher risk at the moment.

Impact of the projects on the local economy A completion evaluation is available only for ODA-2, which incorporates advanced CDD featuresIt suggests a very positive impact, through increased agricultural production and activation of many other income generation activities (mostly women led) The emerging pattern of demand in Mali, Cape Verde, and Senegal suggests that the impact depends of existing economic opportunities, and may well be slow to start but growing with the passing of timeThe impact of the project direct investment expenditure has been below the potential of the amount of resources used

Cost of the CDD approachHow much does the CDD approach cost?At appraisal, the estimated cost of project management was:14% of total project cost in the case of FODESA10% and 15% respectively in the case of the POGV-2 and the PLPRand 24% in the case of the ODP-2The cost of training included in the other components was:6% of total project cost in the case of FODESA16% and 12% respectively in the case of the POGV-2 and the PLPRAnd 19% in the case of the ODP-2

A clear concept of CDD emerges from the reviewCDD is a way to unleash the potential for change of the rural communitiesRural communities have institutions that can be used (and improved) to achieve IFAD corporate objectivesCDD means empowering the communities to shape their own institutional and socio-economic developmentCDD addresses contextually the institutional system within and around the communitiesCDD focuses on organizations of members of a Community (the CBOs) as the building blocks of socio-economic transformation that enhance opportunities for individual HHs CDD encourages the establishment of linkages that empower the CBOs to offset the negative impact of government and market failures

Lessons learned on the projects institutional settingThe projects faced two options to reach the communities

Through the public administration

Through civil society organizations and the private sector

Lessons learned on the first option:Need to find the right level to reach the communities:The district is far too remote (insufficient subsidiarity)Districts have no specific capacity to deal with village problems (insufficient specialization) Clear risk that, without corrective measures, district administrations replicate at their level the centralized approach that prompted administration reform in the first place

. moreSub-district units of the public administration are more effective activators of delivery mechanisms for the communities But still view the communities: only as users of servicesnot as subjects of change in their own rightThe gap between district and sub-district level of the local government is often very wideThe respective mandates are not definedNeed to balance the hierarchical relations with the higher levels of the local governmentNeed to establish separate funding channels to support district and community initiatives

Advantages of the second option:Partnerships that join together the CBOs, the civil society, and the private sector, besides the government: Provide access to a wider horizon and more sources of support than just the governmentFacilitate transparency of operations and accountability to their membersEnsure the single allegiance of CBO leaders to the membershipCan adopt community-friendly proceduresForce the CBOs to devise the instruments of their own sustainability and growthEstablish centers of pluralistic governance and promote autonomous advocacy of community interests

Lessons learned on the second option:Governments may not agree with a policy aimed at pluralistic governanceIf instead there is agreement in principle:Need to define the role, functions, and responsibilities of the partnershipsAnd their relationships with the local government with respect to the five components of service provision (regulation, planning, production, delivery and financing)

The two options:Are not mutually exclusive, and in the course of time may well complement one another

In either case, the CDD approach involves changes in the institutions and this requires effective and continuous policy dialogue

Police dialogue

is essential to:

reach understanding and agreement with government on the project CDD approach before projects startkeep projects on the right track during implementation

The right venue for policy dialogue is important

There are many other lessons learned.

Let us leave more to tomorrow session

End of Presentation

Thank You