a stalemate ukraine can win

7/21/2019 A Stalemate Ukraine Can Win

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A Stalemate Ukraine Can WinUkraines military will never be strong enough to beat Russia outright. But it doesnt

have to be.

MARCH 4, 2015BY ALEXANDER J. MOTYL

The crowing began before the battle of Debaltseve had even concluded. During the cease-fire negotiations

in Minsk, Vladimir Putin reportedly boastedthat 500 Ukrainian soldiers would be killed and 2,000 taken

prisoner. After the Ukrainians had withdrawn, he tauntedthem by saying that they had been defeated by

yesterdays tractor drivers. Perhaps inevitably, Western media reports picked up on the irresistible

alliteration and began referring to theDebaltseve debacle.

In contrast, Ukrainian government officials claimed that the withdrawal had been planned and orderly.

Some Ukrainian soldiers and analysts disagreed; others substantiated Kievs claims. One policymaker

even suggestedthat Debaltseve was a win, calling it a colossal signal of Russias impending failure. The

truth lay inbetween. Kiev had in fact planned and, to a large degree, effected an orderly withdrawal. The

Ukrainians had fought hard and well, apparently inflicting high casualties on the Russians and their

proxies. Reliable Ukrainian sources estimatethat, in the month before the Ukrainian army withdrew,

Ukraine had up to 260 dead or missing soldiers, while Russia lost 868, for a kill ratio of about 1 to 3. In

short, for the Ukrainians, Debaltseve was anything but a rout.

But neither was it a victory. Indeed, the Debaltseve battle exposed serious weaknesses in the Ukrainian

army, highlighting the need for immediate reform. Much attention has focused on the fact that weapons

and supplies are insufficient and frequently obsolete. Arguably more serious is poor top-level leadership,

inadequate inter- and intra-agency coordination, and a lack of strategic and tactical planning. Serhiy

Pashynsky, head of the parliamentary committee on national security and defense, is unsparingin his
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cr t c sm. e n stry o e ense, t e genera sta , an t e m tary- n ustr a sector c aracter ze y

an absolutely primitive bureaucracy, lack of responsibility, and non-professionalism do not

communicate effectively with each other and are unable to coordinate their actions, he said.

The consequences of these shortcomings are clear. Debaltseve was the third time in half a year that large

numbers of Ukrainian soldiers were encircled by Russian forces. The first was the disastrous battle of

Ilovaisk, in August, where Kiev lost up to 1,000 men and much heavy equipment. The second was the four-

month battle for Donetsks airport, where Ukraines so-called cyborgs held on to their bit of a terminal

until their opponents blew up the remnants of the structure and the Ukrainians with it in January. In

all three instances, the Ukrainian general staff was determined to hang on to territory even after it had

become obvious that the positions were indefensible. The top-notch Ukrainian military analyst Yuri

Butusov puts the blamesquarely on the head of the general staff, Gen. Viktor Muzhenko, whom he accuses

of gross incompetence and an inability to break with an outdated Soviet military doctrine that emphasizes

heavy artillery, wars of position, and the impermissibility of tactical retreats.

Since Muzhenko is President Petro Poroshenkos protg, criticism of the former translates into criticism

of the latter. Equally harsh critics of Poroshenko and the general staff are found among the commanders

of Ukraines volunteer battalions, which frequently occupy front-line positions and bear the brunt of the

fighting. Accusingthe high command of ignorance of facts on the ground, these leaders have recently

agreed to coordinate their activities, implying that they may do so independently of Kiev. The threat these

battalions pose to the stability of the Ukrainian government has been grossly overstated, and their

commanders are anything but warlords. But Kievs failure to integrate them fully into the formal armed

forces means that their potential to act as loose cannons will always remain a danger, especially if the

government adopts policies they reject.

Transforming Ukraines army into a modern fighting force will not be easy. Every Ukrainian government

has neglected the military since 1991, when Ukraine inherited some 780,000 troops from the Soviet Union.

The decay was especially rapid under Viktor Yanukovychs rule from 2010 through 2013, as he assiduously

diverted resources to the Internal Ministry, which offered his regime protection.
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, . ,

between the army of today and the ragtag force that called itself an army when Russian President Putin

seized Crimea without firing a shot a year ago. Ukraine plans to double the size of its army to 250,000

soldiers; the 2015 budget foreseesa significant rise in military expenditures, to 5 percent of GDP. (Compare

that with the less than 2 percent spent by most NATO members.) Thanks to a massive volunteer effort and

some Western assistance, the armys physical infrastructure, basic equipment, food provisions, and

medical supplies have improved. Ukraines defense industry, which was the worlds fourth-largest arms

exporter in 2012, has been manufacturing and repairingthe requisite heavy (mostly Soviet-era) equipment

and is slated to ramp up production in 2015. And Ukraines soldiers have demonstrated that they are

capable of holding their own against a more modern Russian adversary.

But much more needs to be done for Ukraine to defend itself against further Russian aggression. As

Butusov and other analysts argue, the general staff and the lower levels of the command structure must be

revamped, replacing old Soviet-era cadres with officers who have experienced real battle in the last year.

The Ministry of Defense and Ukroboronprom, the state agency responsible for military production, must

be streamlined. An up-to-date grand strategy identifying Ukraines friends and enemies and laying out

how Ukraines security can best be pursued under current conditions has to be developed. The

implications of such a plan for tactics, force structure, and weapons procurement must also be spun out.

Finally, the armed forces themselves, currently consisting of some 130,000 conscripts and 35,000 battle-

ready troops, have to be restructured. A smaller, leaner, and meaner army consisting of mobile units with

the ability to deliver targeted firepower is just what Ukraine needs to meet its only real strategic threat,

that emanating from Russia. All these changes will take time and money.

Still, even if the general staff is fixed, competent commanders are appointed, coordination is improved,

the army is reformed, and the requisite armaments are increased, Ukraines armed forces will be no match

for Russias in a head-on collision which, for what its worth, even Putin sayswould be an apocalyptic

scenario that is virtually impossible. Although Russias armed forces, as military analyst Pavel

Felgenhauer notes, could not win a war against a modern opponent such as the United States or NATO,

they are, and will remain, much stronger than Ukraines, if only because of the size difference. But victory

means different thin s for Ukraine and Russia.
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The unspoken assumption of much Western commentary on the Russo-Ukrainian war is that Ukraine

needs to have the capacity to beat Russia, but in fact Ukraines military doesnt have to be stronger than

Russias for Ukraine to win. It just has to be strong enough to keep Russia from winning that is, from

embarking on a massive land war or compelling Ukraine by means of a costly war of attrition to reintegrate

the Donbass enclave. Neither of those options is easy for Russia. Attempted conquest of Ukraine would be

a bloody, risky, and expensive proposition that would unleash partisan resistance, lead to a prolonged

occupation, and could start World War III. In addition, though the Minsk II agreement envisions Ukraines

paying for the Donbass enclaves reconstruction, Kiev is highly unlikely ever to accept financial

responsibility as long as the anti-Ukrainian separatists run the region and continue violating cease-fires.

The challenge before Ukraine is to acquire as quickly as possible the force structure and armaments it

needs to sustain a potentially long war of attrition. Changing the force structure is intrinsically difficult

and time-consuming; acquiring the appropriate weaponry is not, being primarily a function of money and

political connections. Russia has a huge advantageover Ukraine in terms of aircraft and tanks: 1,571

combat aircraft and 392 helicopters to Ukraines 231 and 139, as well as 2,750 tanks, plus an additional

18,000 in storage, to Ukraines 1,150, plus 1,435 in storage. Given this disparity, its unsurprising that Kiev

is prioritizing the acquisition of surface-to-air and anti-tank missiles, real-time intelligence, and advanced

radar systems.

Russias conundrum is arguably greater than Ukraines, because Russia already has ownership of the

disputed territories. Continuation of the status quo will only reinforce the eastern Ukrainian enclaves

status as an impoverished, unstable, and desperate Russian protectorate; increasingly free Kiev to pursue

reform in the rest of the country; and tax the Russian economy, which has already gone into a tailspin as a

result of Western sanctions and falling oil prices. Putins strategic miscalculations starting a war

without knowing how to finish it has to be the greatest of them have maneuvered him and Russia into a

dead end with no easy escape. The recent increase in terrorist bombings of civilian targets in Odessa and

Kharkiv may be a last-ditch effort by Putins proxies to maintain the heat on Ukraine despite the emerging

stalemate and frozen conflict.
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Ukrainian policymakers have no illusions that Western weapons would change the balance of power in

eastern Ukraine. But they expect that a stronger Ukrainian military would compel Putin to think twice

about further escalations, especially a massive one. As Kiev sees it, Putin initiated the war by invading

Crimea as punishment for the Maidan revolution (a view corroboratedby a recently leaked, and

apparently authentic, high-level Russian document). And he has escalated since then, despite the fact that

the West never courted Ukraine (indeed, it had suffered from Ukraine fatigue since 2007) and has done

nothing to undermine his control of Crimea and the eastern Donbass. His consistently aggressive behavior

suggests that escalation is a function not of aggressive Western actions, but of equally consistent Western

inaction.

Seen in this light, the stalemate in the Donbass is the result of Ukraine being strong enough to stop Putin.

Accordingly, it was Ukraines strong-enough performance at Debaltseve and not Western pleading

that brought Putin to the table at Minsk II. Continued stalemate or even a lasting cease-fire is

therefore dependent on Ukraines remaining strong enough for the foreseeable future. Since Russia will

escalate in the face of weakness, maintaining the stalemate means enhancing Ukraines military

capabilities just enough to keep Russia at bay. Then, and only then, as Kiev sees it, would peace be

possible.

Photo credit: VOLODYMYR SHUVAYEV/AFP/Getty Images
http://blog.pism.pl/blog/?p=1&id_blog=15&lang_id=13&id_post=507

a stalemate ukraine can win

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