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eyeball" with the enemy, and the airsupport request net was overloaded.The Navy squadrons rising from thedecks of escort carriers improvedthereafter, to the extent that theirconflicting missions would permit.Subsequent strikes featured heavierbombs (up to five hundred pounds)and improved response time. A weeklater General Cates rated his air sup-port "entirely satisfactory:' The bat-tie of Iwo Jima, however, wouldcontinue to frustrate all providers ofsupporting arms; the Japanese almostnever assembled legitimate targets inthe open.

"The Japs weren't on Iwo Jima, saidCaptain Fields of the 26th Marines,"they were in Iwo Jima.

Richard Wheeler, who survivedservice with the 28th Marines andlater wrote two engrossing booksabout the battle, pointed out thisphenomenon:

This was surely one of thestrangest battlefields in history,with one side fighting whollyabove the ground and the otheroperating almost wholly withinit. Throughout the battle,American aerial observers mar-veled at the fact that one side

of the field held thousands offigures, either milling around orin foxholes, while the other sideseemed deserted. The strangestthing of all was that the twocontestants sometimes madetroop movements simultane-ously in the same territory, onemaneuvering on the surface andthe other using tunnels beneath.

As the Marines struggled to wrestthe second airfield from the Japanese,the commanding terrain features ris-ing to the north caught their atten-tion. Some would become known bytheir elevations (although there werethree Hill 362s on the island), butothers would take the personalityand nicknames assigned by the at-tackers. Hence, the 4th Marine Di-vision would spend itself attackingHill 382, the "Amphitheater," and"Turkey Knob" (the whole bristlingcomplex became known as "TheMeatgrinder"). The 5th Divisionwould earn its spurs and lose mostof its invaluable cadre of veteranleaders attacking Nishi Ridge andHills 362-A and 362-B, then end thefighting in "The Gorge:' The 3d Di-vision would focus first on Hills Peterand 199-Oboe, just north of the Se-

cond airfield, then the heavily forti-fied Hill 362-C beyond the thirdairstrip, and finally the moonscapejungle of stone which would becomeknow as "Cushman's Pocket:'

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E.

Cushman, Jr., a future Commandant,commanded the 2d Battalion, 9thMarines at Iwo Jima. Cushman andhis men were veterans of heavy fight-ing in Guam, yet they were appalledby their first sight of the battlefield.Wrecked and burning Sherman tanksdotted the airstrips, a stream ofcasualties flowed to the rear, "themachine-gun fire was terrific:' Cush-man mounted his troops on the sur-viving tanks and roared across thefield. There they met the samereverse-slope defenses which hadplagued the 21st Marines. Securingthe adjoining two small hills — Peterand 199-Oboe — took the 3d MarineDivision three more days of intense-ly bitter fighting.

General Schmidt, considering the3d Division attack in the center to behis main effort, provided priority firesupport from Corps artillery, anddirected the other two divisions to al-locate half their own regimental firesupport to the center. None of thecommanders was happy with this.Neither the 4th Division, takingheavy casualties in The Amphitheat-er as it approached Hill 382, nor the5th Division, struggling to seize NishiRidge, wanted to dilute their organ-ic fire support. Nor was General Er-skine pleased with the results. Themain effort, he argued, should clear-ly receive the main fire. Schmidtnever did solve this problem. HisCorps artillery was too light; heneeded twice as many battalions andbigger guns — up to 8-inch howitzers,which the Marine Corps had not yetfielded. He had plenty of naval gun-fire support available and used itabundantly, but unless the targets layin ravines facing to the sea he lost theadvantage of direct, observed fire.

Schmidt's problems of fire support

"The Grenade," an acrylic painting on canvas by Col Charles H. Waterhouse.Marine Corps Combat Art Collection

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Marine Corps Air Support During Iwo Jima

For a few special moments just prior to the landing onD-day at Iwo Jima the Marines' long-cherishedvision of an integrated air-ground team seemed to

have been realized. As assault troops neared the beach intheir tracked amphibian vehicles, dozens of Marine VoughtF4U Corsairs swept low over the objective, paving the waywith rockets and machine-gun fire. "It was magnificent!"exclaimed one observer. Unfortunately, the eight Marinefighter squadrons present at Iwo that morning came fromthe fast carriers of Task Force 58, not the amphibious taskforce; three days later TF 58 left for good in pursuit of morestrategic targets. Thereafter, Navy and Army Air Force pi-lots provided yeoman service in support of the troops fight-ing ashore. Sustained close air support of amphibious forcesby Marine air was once again postponed to some futurecombat proving ground.

Other Marine aviation units contributed significantly tothe successful seizure of Iwo Jima. One of the first to seeaction was Marine Bombing Squadron (VMB) 612, basedon Saipan, whose flight crews flew North American PBJMitchell medium bombers in nightly, long-range rocket at-tacks against Japanese ships trying to resupply Iwo Jimafrom other bases in the Volcano and Bonin Islands. Thesenightly raids, combined with U.S. Navy submarine inter-dictions, significantly reduced the amount of ammunitionand fortification material (notably barbed wire) deliveredto Iwo Jima's defenders before the invasion.

The contributions of the pilots and aerial spotters fromthree Marine observation squadrons (VMOs-1, -4 and -5)are described at length in the text. Flying in to Iwo initial-ly from escort carriers, or launched precariously by the in-famous "Brodie Slingshot" from LST 776, or eventuallytaking off from the captured airstrips, these intrepid crewswere quite successful in spotting enemy artillery and mor-tar positions, and reporting them to the Supporting ArmsControl Center. When Japanese anti-aircraft gunnersmanaged to down one of the "Grasshoppers," Marines fromall points of the island mourned.

Marine transport aircraft from Marine Transport Squa-drons (VMR) 952, 253, and 353 based in the Marianas deli-vered critical combat cargo to the island during the heightof the battle. The Marines frequently relied on aerial deliv-ery before the landing force could establish a fully func-tional beachhead. On D+1O, for example, VMR-952air-dropped critically needed mortar shells, machine gunparts, and blood within Marine lines. On 3 March, Lieu-

tenant Colonel Malcolm S. Mackay, CO of VMR-952,brought in the first Marine transport to land on the island,a Curtiss Commando R5C loaded with ammunition. Allthree squadrons followed suit, bringing supplies in, tak-ing wounded men out.

On 8 March, Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron(VMTB) 242 flew in to Iwo Jima from Tinian to assumeresponsibility for day and night anti-submarine patrolsfrom the departing escort carrier force.

Colonel Vernon E. Megee, USMC, had the distinctionof commanding the first Landing Force Air Support Con-trol Unit, a milestone in the evolution of amphibious com-mand and control of supporting arms. Megee came ashoreon D + 5 with General Schmidt, but the offloading processwas still in such disarray that he could not assemble hiscommunications jeeps for another five days. This did littleto deter Megee. Using "borrowed" gear, he quickly movedinland, coordinating the efforts of the Air Liaison Parties,encouraging the Navy pilots to use bigger bombs and listen-ing to the complaints of the assault commanders. Megee'ssubsequent work in training and employing Army P-51Mustang pilots in direct support was masterful.

Before the battle's end, General Kuribayashi transmittedto Tokyo 19 "lessons learned" about the problems of defend-ing against an American amphibious assault. One of theseaxioms said: "The enemy's air control is very strong; at leastthirty aircraft are flying ceaselessly from early morning tonight above this very small island.'Marine LtCol Donald K. Yost in his F4U Corsair takes offfrom the flight deck of the Cape Gloucester (CVE 109) toprovide close air support to the fighting troops ashore. Thiswas one of a number of Marine aircraft flown at Iwo Jima.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 262047

distribution received some alleviationon 26 February when two Marineobservation planes flew in from theescort carrier Wake Island, the firstaircraft to land on Iwo's recapturedand still fire-swept main airstrip.These were Stinson OY single-engine

observation planes, nicknamed"Grasshoppers;' of Lieutenant TomRozga's Marine Observation Squa-dron (VMO) 4, and they were fol-lowed the next day by similar planesfrom Lieutenant Roy G. Miller'sVMO-5. The intrepid pilots of these

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frail craft had already had an adven-turous time in the waters off IwoJima. Several had been launchedprecariously from the experimentalBrodie catapult on LST 776, "like apeanut from a slingshot:' All 14 ofthe planes of these two observation

3.V.,. . p . -.._._ -S '-:. ... •• • I.—a ...t. —

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.4;and produced five Medals of Honor.For Captain Frank C. Caidwell, com-manding Company F, 1st Battalion,26th Marines, it was the worst sin-gle day of the battle. His companysuffered 47 casualties in taking thehill, including the first sergeant andthe last of the original platoon com-manders.

squadrons would receive heavyJapanese fire in battle, not only whileairborne but also while being serv-iced on the airstrips as well. Yet thesetwo squadrons (and elements ofVMO-1) would fly nearly 600 mis-sions in support of all three divisions.Few units contributed so much to theeventual suppression of Kuribayashi'sdeadly artillery fire. In time the merepresence of these small planes over-head would influence Japanese gun-ners to cease fire and button upagainst the inevitable counterbatteryfire to follow. Often the pilots wouldundertake pre-dawn or dusk mis-sions simply to extend this protective"umbrella" over the troops, risky fly-ing given Iwo's unlit fields and cons-tant enemy sniping from the adjacenthills.

The 4th Marine Division finallyseized Hill 382, the highest pointnorth of Suribachi, but continued totake heavy casualties movingthrough The Amphitheater againstTurkey Knob. The 5th Division over-ran Nishi Ridge, then bloodied itselfagainst Hill 362-As intricate defenses.Said Colonel Thomas A. Wornham,commanding the 27th Marines, ofthese defenses: "They had interlock-ing bands of fire the likes of whichyou never saw." General Catesredeployed the 28th Marines into thisslugfest. On 2 March a Japanese gun-

ner fired a high-velocity shell whichkilled Lieutenant Colonel ChandlerJohnson immediately, one week af-ter his glorious seizure of Suribachi'ssummit. The 28th Marines capturedHill 362-A at the cost of 200casualties.

On the same day LieutenantColonel Lowell E. English, com-manding the 2d Battalion, 21st Ma-rines, went down with a bulletthrough his knee. English was bitter.His battalion was being rotated to therear. "We had taken very heavycasualties and were pretty well dis-organized. I had less than 300 menleft out of the 1200 I came ashorewith." English then received orders toturn his men around and plug a gapin the front lines. "It was an impos-sible order. I couldn't move that dis-organized battalion a mile back northin 30 minutes." General Erskine didnot want excuses. "You tell thatdamned English he'd better be there;'he told the regimental commander.English fired back, "You tell that sonof a bitch I will be there, and I was,but my men were still half a mile be-hind me and I got a blast through theknee."

On the left flank, the 26th Marinesmounted its most successful, andbloodiest, attack of the battle, final-ly seizing Hill 362-B. The day-longstruggle cost 500 Marine casualties

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Overall, the first nine days of theV Amphibious Corps drive northhad produced a net gain of about4,000 yards at the staggering cost of7,000 American casualties. Several ofthe pitched battles—Airfield No. 2,Hill 382, Hill 362-B, for example—would of themselves warrant aseparate commemorative mono-graph. The fighting in each case wasas savage and bloody as any in Ma-rine Corps history.

This was the general situationpreviously described at the un-suspected "turning point" on 4 March(D + 13) when, despite sustainingfrightful losses, the Marines hadchewed through a substantial chunkof Kuribayashi's main defenses, forc-ing the enemy commander to shift hiscommand post to a northern cave.

"Fire in the Hole," an acrylic painting onuntempered masonite by Col CharlesH. Waterhouse, reflects the extensiveuse of TNT to blast Japanese caves.

Marine Corps Combat Art collection

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110922A Marine dashes past a fallen Japanese killed a short time earlier, all thewhile himself a target of searching enemy fire, during heavy fighting in the north.

4

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This was the afternoon the first crip-pled B-29 landed. In terms of Ameri-can morale, it could not have come ata better time. General Schmidt or-dered a general standdown on 5March to enable the exhausted as-sault forces a brief respite and the op-portunity to absorb some replace-ments.

The issue of replacement troopsduring the battle remains controver-sial even half a century later. Gener-al Schmidt, now faced with lossesapproaching the equivalent of oneentire division, again urged GeneralSmith to release the 3d Marines.While each division had been as-signed a replacement draft of sever-al thousand Marines, Schmidtwanted the cohesion and combat ex-perience of Colonel James M. Stuart'sregimental combat team. HollandSmith believed that the replacementdrafts would suffice, presuming thateach man in these hybrid units hadreceived sufficient infantry training

to enable his immediate assignmentto front-line outfits. The problem layin distributing the replacements insmall, arbitrary numbers — not asteamed units — to fill the gaping holesin the assault battalions. The newmen, expected to replace invaluableveterans of the Pacific War, were notonly new to combat, but they alsowere new to each other, an assort-ment of strangers lacking the life-saving bonds of unit integrity. "Theyget killed the day they go into bat-tle," said one division personnelofficer in frustration. Replacementlosses within the first 48 hours ofcombat were, in fact, appalling.Those who survived, who learnedthe ropes and established a bondwith the veterans, contributed signifi-cantly to the winning of the battle.The division commanders, however,decried the wastefulness of this poli-cy and urged unit replacements bythe veteran battalions of the 3d Ma-rines. As General Erskine recalled:

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I asked the question of KellyTurner and Holland Smith andthe usual answer was, "You gotenough Marines on the islandnow; there are too damn manyhere:' I said, "The solution isvery easy. Some of these peo-ple are very tired and worn out,so take them out and bring inthe 3d Marines" And they prac-tically said, "You keep quiet—we've made the decision:' Andthat was that.Most surviving senior officers

agreed that the decision not to usethe 3d Marines at Iwo Jima was ill-advised and costly. But HollandSmith never wavered: "Sufficienttroops were on Iwo Jima for the cap-ture of the island . . . . two regimentswere sufficient to cover the front as-signed to General Erskine." On 5March, D + 14, Smith ordered the 3dMarines to sail back to Guam.

Holland Smith may have knownthe overall statistics of battle losses

The 3d Battalion, 28th Marines, finds the terrain on Iwo Jimamore broken and forbidding than the black sands of the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111933beaches as they advance in a frontal attack northward againstunremitting fire from determined Japanese troops.

'Turkey Knob," the outcropping which anchored the positionsof the Japanese 2d Mixed Brigade against the advance of the

Weary troops of Company G, 2d Battalion, 24th Marines,rest in a ditch, guarded by a Sherman tank. They are wait-

Marine Corps Historical Collection4th Marine Division for many days, was sketched by CplDaniel L. Winsor, Jr., USMCR, S-2 Section, 25th Marines.

ing for the tanks to move forward to blast the numerous pill-boxes between Motoyama Airfields No. 1 and No. 2.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109666

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sustained by the landing force to thatpoint, but he may not have fully ap-preciated the tremendous attrition ofexperienced junior officers and seniorstaff noncommissioned officers tak-ing place every day. As one example,the day after the 3d Marines, manyof whose members were veterans ofBougainville and Guam, departed theamphibious objective area, Compa-ny E, 2d Battalion, 23d Marines,suffered the loss of its seventh com-pany commander since the battle be-gan. Likewise, Lieutenant ColonelCushman's experiences with the 2dBattalion, 9th Marines, seemedtypical:

The casualties were fierce. Bythe time Iwo Jima was over Ihad gone through two completesets of platoon leaders, lieu-tenants. After that we had suchthings as artillery forward ob-servers commanding companiesand sergeants leading the pla-toons, which were less thanhalf-strength. It was that bad.Lieutenant Colonel English recalled

that by the 12th day the 2d Battal-ion, 21st Marines, had "lost everycompany commander. . . . I had onecompany exec left." LieutenantColonel Donn Robertson, command-ing the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines,lost all three of his rifle companycommanders, "two killed by the same

damned shell." In many infantryunits, platoons ceased to exist;depleted companies were merged toform one half-strength outfit.

The Bitter EndThe American drive north con-

tinued after the 5 March standdown,but the going never got any easier.The nature of enemy fire changed —fewer big guns and rockets, less ob-served fire from the highlands — butnow the terrain grew uglier, deteri-orating into narrow, twisted gorgeswreathed in sulfur mists, lethal kill-ing zones. Marine casualties con-tinued to mount, but gunshot

wounds began to outnumber high-explosive shrapnel hits. The persis-tent myth among some Marine unitsthat Japanese troops were all near-sighted and hence poor marksmenended for good at Iwo Jima. In theclose-quarters fighting among thebadlands of northern Iwo Jima,Japanese riflemen dropped hundredsof advancing Marines with well-aimed shots to the head or chest."Poor marksmen?" snorted CaptainCaidwell of Company F, 1st Battal-ion, 26th Marines, "The Japs wefaced all fired 'Expert:

Supporting arms coordinationgrew more effective during the bat-tle. Colonel "Buzz" Letcher estab-lished what some have identified asthe first corps-level Supporting ArmsCoordination Center (SACC), inwhich senior representatives of ar-tillery, naval gunfire, and air supportpooled their talents and resources.While Letcher lacked the manpowerand communications equipment toserve as corps artillery officer andsimultaneously run a full-timeSACC, his efforts represented amajor advancement in this difficultart. So did Colonel Vernon Megee'sLanding Force Air Support ControlUnit, which worked in relative har-mony with the fledgling SACC. In-stances of friendly fire still occurred,

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110626A light machine gun crew of Company H, 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, hugs theground and takes advantage of whatever cover it can from an enemy gunner.

Mopping up the caves with grenades and Browning automatic rifles, Marines flushout remaining Japanese hidden in Iwo Jima's numerous and interconnecting caves.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 142472

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rI.

The Marines' Zippo Tanks

T o the Marines on the ground, the Sherman M4A3medium tank equipped with the Navy Mark Iflame thrower seemed to be the most valuable

weapon employed in the battle of Iwo Jima.The Marines had come a long way in the tactical use of

fire in the 15 months since Tarawa, when only a handfulof backpack flame throwers were available to combat theisland's hundreds of fortifications. While the landing forcestill relied on portable flame throwers, most Marines couldsee the value of marrying the technology with armored ve-hicles for use against the toughest targets. In the Marianas,the Marines modified M3A1 light tanks with the Canadi-an Ronson flame system to good effect; the problems camefrom the vulnerability of the small vehicles. At Peleliu, the1st Marine Division mounted the improvised Mark 1 sys-tem on a thin-skinned LVT.4; again, vehicle vulnerabilitylimited the system's effectiveness. The obvious solutionseemed to be to mount the flame thrower in a medium tank.

The first modification to Sherman tanks involved the in-stallation of the small E4-5 mechanized flame thrower inplace of the bow machine gun. This was only a marginalimprovement; the system's short range, modest fuel sup-ply, and awkward aiming process hardly offset the loss ofthe machine gun. Even so, each of the three tank battal-ions employed E4-5-equipped Shermans during Iwo Jima.

The best solution to marrying effective flame projectionwith mechanized mobility resulted from an unlikely inter-service task force of Seabees, Army Chemical Warfare Serv-ice technicians, and Fleet Marine Force tankers in Hawaiibefore the invasion. According to Lieutenant Colonel Wil-liam R. Collins, commanding the 5th Tank Battalion, thisinspired group of field-expedient tinkerers modified theMark 1 flame thrower to operate from within the Shermans

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turret, replacing the 75mm main gun with a look-alikelaunch tube. The modified system could thus be trainedand pointed like any conventional turret gun. Usingnapalm-thickened fuel, the "Zippo Tanks" could spew flameup to 150 yards for a duration of 55-80 seconds, both quan-tum tactical improvements.

Unfortunately, the ad hoc modification team had onlysufficient time and components to modify eight M4A3tanks with the Mark 1 flame system; four each went to the4th and 5th Tank Battalions. The 3d Tank Battalion, thenstaging in Guam, received neither the M4A3 Shermans northe field modifications in time for Iwo Jima, although anumber of their 'A2" tanks retained the E4-5 system mount-ed in the bow.

The eight modified Sherman flame tanks proved idealagainst Iwo Jima's rugged caves and concrete fortifications.The Japanese feared this weapon greatly; time and againsuicide squads of "human bullets" would assail the flametanks directly, only to be shot down by covering forces orscorched by the main weapon. Enemy fire and the roughterrain took their toll on the eight flame tanks, but main-tenance crews worked around the clock to keep them func-tional.

In the words of Captain Frank C. Caidwell, a companycommander in the 26th Marines: "In my view it was theflame tank more than any other supporting arm that wonthis battle:' Tactical demands for the flame tanks neverdiminished. Late in the battle, as the 5th Marine Divisioncornered the last Japanese defenders in "The Gorge," the 5thTank Battalion expended napalm-thickened fuel at the rateof 10,000 gallons per day. The division's final action reportstated that the flame tank was "the one weapon that causedthe Japs to leave their caves and rock crevices and run:'

A Marine flame tank, also known as a "Ronson, "scorches equipped with the Navy Mark I flame-thrower proved toa Japanese strongpoint. The eight M4A3 Shermans be the most valuable weapons systems on Iwo Jima.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 140758

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perhaps inevitably on that crowdedisland, but positive control at thehighest level did much to reduce thefrequency of such accidents. In termsof response time, multiple-sourcecoordination probably worked bet-ter at the division level and below.Most infantry battalions, for exam-ple, had nothing but praise for theAir Liaison Parties, Shore Fire Con-trol Parties, and artillery forward ob-server teams which deployed witheach maneuver unit.

While the Marines remained angryat the paucity of the overall prelimi-nary naval bombardment of IwoJima, all hands valued the continu-ous and responsive support receivedfrom D-day onward. Many of thegunfire ships stood in close —frequently less than a mileoffshore — to deliver along the flanksand front lines, and many took hitsfrom masked Japanese coast defensebatteries. There were literally no safezones in or around the island. Twoaspects of naval gunfire at Iwo Jimarate special mention. One was the ex-tent to which the ships provided il-lumination rounds over thebattlefield, especially during the ear-ly days before landing force artillerycould assume the bulk of these mis-sions. The second unique aspect wasthe degree of assistance provided by

the smallest gunships, frequentlymodified landing craft armed with4.2-inch mortars, rockets, or 20mmguns. These "small boys" proved in-valuable, especially along the north-west coast where they frequentlyworked in lock-step with the 5th Ma-rine Division as it approached TheGorge.

While the Marines comprised thebulk of the landing force at Iwo Jima,they received early and increasingsupport from elements of the U.S.Army. Two of the four DUKW com-panies employed on D-day wereArmy units. The 138th AntiaircraftArtillery Group provided 90mm AAbatteries around the newly capturedairfields. Major General James E.Chaney, USA, who would becomeIsland Commander, Iwo Jima, at thebattle's end, landed on D + 8 with ad-vance elements of the 145th Infantry.

As far as the Marines on theground were concerned, the mostwelcome Army units flew into IwoJima on 6 March (D+15). This wasthe 15th Fighter Group, the vanguardof VII Fighter Command destined toaccompany the B-29s over Tokyo.The group included the 47th FighterSquadron, a seasoned outfit of NorthAmerican P-51 Mustangs. Althoughthe Army pilots had no experiencein direct air support of ground

38

troops, Colonel Megee liked their"eager-beaver attitude" and willing-ness to learn. He also appreciated thefact that the Mustangs could deliver1,000-pound bombs. Megee quicklytrained the Army pilots in strikingdesignated targets on nearby islandsin response to a surface-based con-troller. In three days they were readyfor Iwo Jima. Megee instructed theP-51 pilots to arm their bombs with12-second delay fuzes, attack parallelto the front lines, and approach froma 45-degree angle. Sometimes thesetactics produced spectacular results,especially along the west coast,where the big bombs with delayedfuzes blew the sides of entire cliffsinto the ocean, exposing enemy cavesand tunnels to direct fire from thesea. "The Air Force boys did a lot ofgood:' said Megee. With that, the es-cort carriers departed the area andleft close air support to the 47thFighter Squadron for the duration ofthe battle.

While technically not a "support-ing arm;' the field medical supportprovided the assault Marines primar-ily by the Navy was a major contri-butor to victory in the prolongedbattle. The practice of integratingsurgeons, chaplains, and corpsmenwithin the Fleet Marine Force unitscontinued to pay valuable dividends.In many cases company corpsmenwere just as tough and combat-savvyas the Marines they accompanied. Inall cases, a wounded Marine immedi-ately knew "his" corpsman wouldmove heaven and earth to reach him,bind his wounds, and start the longprocess of evacuation. Most Marinesat Iwo Jima would echo the senti-ments of Staff Sergeant Alfred I.Thomas, a half-track platoon com-mander in the 25th Marines: 'We hadoutstanding corpsmen; they were justlike family:'

Unfortunately, the luxury of hav-ing first-rate medical assistance soclose to the front lines took a terri-ble toll. Twenty-three doctors and 827corpsmen were killed or wounded at

Marine Corps Combat Art Collection"The Target," by Col Charles H. Waterhouse.

a.1

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110902Navy corpsmen tend a Marine who was shot in the back by enemy sniper fire.

Iwo Jima, a casualty rate twice ashigh as bloody Saipan.

Rarely had combat medical sup-port been so thoughtfully preparedand provided as at Iwo Jima. Beyondthe crude aid stations, further towardthe rear, Navy and Army field hospi-tals arose. Some Marines would bewounded, receive treatment in a fieldhospital tent, recuperate in a bunker,and return to the lines — often toreceive a second or third wound. Themore seriously wounded would beevacuated off the island, either bydirect air to Guam, or via one ofseveral fully staffed hospital shipswhich operated around the clock wi-thin the amphibious objective area.Within the first month of the fight-ing on Iwo Jima, 13,737 woundedMarines and corpsmen were evacu-ated by hospital ship, another 2,449by airlift.

For a wounded Marine, thehazardous period came during thefirst few minutes after he went down.Japanese snipers had no compunc-tions about picking off litter crews,or corpsmen, or sometimes thewounded man himself as his buddiestried to slide him clear of the fire.One of the most celebrated examples

of casualty evacuation occurred af-ter a Japanese sniper shot CorporalEdwin 3. Canter, a rocket truck crewchief in the 4th Marine Division,through the abdomen. The rockettrucks always drew an angry fusil-lade of counterbattery fire from theJapanese, and Canter's friends knewthey had to get him away from thelaunch site fast. As a nearby motionpicture crew recorded the drama,four Marines hustling Canter downa muddy hillside heard the scream ofan incoming shell, dumped thewounded man unceremoniously andscattered for cover. The explosionkilled the film crew and woundedeach of the Marines, includingCanter, again. The film footage sur-vived, appeared in statesidenewsreels — and eventually becamepart of the movie "Sands of Iwo

Installed in an abandoned Japanese dugout several thousand yards behind the fight-ing, 4th Marine Division surgeons operated on those badly wounded Marines andNavy corpsmen who might not have survived a trip to the hospital ship.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111506

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Jima." Canter was evacuated to ahospital ship, thence to hospitals inGuam, Hawaii, and the States. Hiswar had ended.

Meanwhile the beachmasters andshore party personnel performedspectacular feats to keep the advanc-ing divisions fully armed andequipped. It is difficult to imagine thescope of logistical management andsheer, back-breaking work requiredto maintain such a high volume ofsupplies and equipment moving oversuch precarious beaches. A singlebeach on the west coast became func-tional on D + 11, but by that time thebulk of landing force supplies wereon shore. General unloading endedthe next day, releasing the vulnera-ble amphibious ships from their

tether to the beachhead. Thereafter,ammunition resupply became thecritical factor. On one occasion, well-aimed Japanese fire detonated the en-tire 5th Marine Division ammodump. In another tense moment, theammunition ship Columbia Victorycame under direct Japanese fire as sheapproached the western beaches tocommence unloading. Watching Ma-rines held their breath as the ship be-came bracketed by fire. The shipescaped, but the potential still exist-ed for a disaster of catastrophicproportions.

The 2d Separate Engineer Battal-ion and the 62d Naval ConstructionBattalion (Seabees) repaired and ex-tended the captured runways. Inshort order, an entire Seabee brigade

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moved ashore. Marines returning tothe beaches from the northern high-lands could hardly recognize theplace they had first seen on D-day.There were now more than 80,000Americans on the small island. Sea-bees had bulldozed a two-lane roadup to the top of Suribachi.

Communications, often malignedin earlier amphibious assaults, werenever better than at Iwo Jima. Radiosand handsets were now waterproof,more frequencies were available, anda variety of radio systems served thevarying needs of the landing force.Forward observer teams, for exam-ple, used the back-pack SCR-610,while companies and platoons fa-vored the SCR-300 "walkie-talkies,"or the even lighter SCR-536 "Spam

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110852As the fighting moved inland, the beaches of Iwo Jima be- supplies. Note the many roads leading off the beaches overcarrie very busy places with the continual incoming flow of which trucks, LVTs, and DUKWs headed to the frontlines.

Can" portables. Said LieutenantColonel James P. Berkeley, executiveofficer of the 27th Marines and aformer communications officer, "AtIwo we had near-perfect communi-cations, all any commander couldask for:' As the battle progressed, theMarines began stringing telephonelines between support units and for-ward command posts, wisely elevat-ing the wire along upright posts toavoid damage by tracked vehicles.

Japanese counterintelligence teamsexpected to have a field day splicinginto the proliferation of U.S. tele-

phone lines, but the Marines baffledthem by heavy use of Navajo codetalkers. Each division employedabout two dozen trained Navajos.The 5th Marine Division commandpost established six Navajo networksupon arrival on the island. No one,throughout the war, insofar as any-one knew, was ever able to translatethe Navajo code talkers' voice trans-missions.

African-American troops played asignificant role in the capture of IwoJima. Negro drivers served in theArmy DUKW units active through-

out the landing. Black Marines of the8th Ammunition Company and the36th Depot Company landed on D-day, served as stevedores on thosechaotic beaches, and were joined bythe 33d and 34th Depot Companieson D + 3. These Marines were incor-porated into the VAC Shore Partywhich did Herculean work sustain-ing the momentum of the Americandrive northwards. When Japanesecounterattacks penetrated to thebeach areas, these Marines droppedtheir cargo, unslung their carbines,and engaged in well-disciplined fireand maneuver, inflicting morecasualties than they sustained. TwoMarines, Privates James W. Whitlockand James Davis, received the BronzeStar. Said Colonel Leland S. Swin-dler, commanding the VAC ShoreParty, the entire body of black Ma-rines "conducted themselves withmarked coolness and courage:'

News media coverage of the IwoJima battle was extensive and large-ly unfettered. Typical of the scores ofcombat correspondents who stuckwith the landing force throughoutthe battle was Marine Technical Ser-geant Frederick K. "Dick" Dashiell,a former Associated Press writer as-signed to the 3d Marine Division.Although downright scared some-times, and filled with horror often,Dashiell stood the test, for he wrote81 front-line communiques, pound-ing out news releases on his porta-ble typewriter on the edge of hisfoxhole. Dashiell's eye for detailcaught the flavor of the prolonged as-sault. "All is bitter, frontal assault, a!-ways uphill;' he wrote. He describedhow the ceaseless wind filled the airwith fine volcanic grit, and how oftenthe Marines had to stop and clean thegrit from their weapons—and hownaked that made any Marine feel.

Most Marines were exhausted atthis point in the battle. Occasionalhot food delivered close behind thefront lines, or more frequently freshfruit and milk from the nearby ships,helped morale some. So did watch-

"Iwo Jima," proof lithograph of two Navajo code talkers, by Sgt John Fabion.Marine Corps Combat Art Collection

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4$

/

Iwo's Fire Brigades: The Rocket Detachments

A ttached to the assault di-visions of the landing forceat Iwo Jima were provision-

al rocket detachments. The infantryhad a love-hate relationship with theforward-deploying little rocket trucksand their plucky crews. The "system"was an International one-ton 4x4 truckmodified to carry three box-shapedlaunchers, each containing a dozen4.5-inch rockets. A good crew couldlaunch a "ripple" of 36 rockets withina matter of seconds, providing ablanket of high explosives on the tar-get. This the infantry loved—but eachlaunching always drew heavy returnfire from the Japanese who feared the"automatic artillery:'

The Marines formed an Experimen-tal Rocket Unit in June 1943 and firstdeployed rail-launched barrage rock-ets during the fighting in the upperSolomons. There the heavily canopiedjungles limited their effectiveness.Once mounted on trucks and deployedto the Central Pacific, however, theweapons proved much more useful,

particularly during the battle of Sai-pan. The Marines modified the smalltrucks by reinforcing the tail gate toserve as a blast shield, installing ahydraulic jack to raise and lower thelaunchers, and applying gravity quad-rants and elevation safety chains.Crude steel rods welded to the bum-per and dashboard helped the driveralign the vehicle with aiming stakes.

Treeless, hilly Iwo Jima proved anideal battleground for these so-called"Buck Rogers Men:' At Iwo, the 1stProvisional Rocket Detachment sup-ported the 4th Marine Division andthe 3d Detachment supported the 5thDivision throughout the operation (the3d Division did not have such a unitin this battle). Between them, the twodetachments fired more than 30,000rockets in support of the landing force.

The 3d Detachment landed over RedBeach on D-day, losing one vehicle tothe surf, others to the loose sand orheavy enemy fire. One vehicle reachedits firing position intact and launched

a salvo of rockets against Japanese for-tifications along the slopes of Sur-ibachi, detonating an enemy am-munition dump. The detachment sub-sequently supported the 1st Battalion,28th Marines' advance to the summit,often launching single rockets to clearsuspected enemy positions along theroute.

As the fighting moved north, theshort range, steep angle of fire, andsaturation effect of the rocket launch-ers kept them in high demand. Theywere particularly valuable in defilade-to-defilade bombardments markingthe final punctuation of pre-assaultprep fires. But their distinctive flashand telltale blast also caught the atten-tion of Japanese artillery spotters. Therocket trucks rarely remained in oneplace long enough to fire more thantwo salvos. "Speedy displacement" wasthe key to their survival. The nearbyinfantry knew better than to standaround and wave goodbye; this wasthe time to seek deep shelter from thecounterbattery fire sure to follow.

The positions from which rocket troops launched salvosof 4.5-inch rockets became very unhealthy places, indeed,

as Japanese artillery and mortars zeroed in on the cloudsof smoke and dust resulting from the firing of the rockets.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111100

42

r.j taa9

ing more and more crippled B-29ssoar in for emergency landings, oftentwo or three a day. "It felt good tosee them land," said Sergeant James"Doc" Lindsey, a squad leader inCompany G, 2d Battalion, 25th Ma-rines. "You knew they'd just comefrom Tokyo."

General Erskine came down withpneumonia during this period, butrefused to be evacuated. ColonelRobert E. Hogaboom, his chief ofstaff, quietly kept the war moving.The division continued to advance.When Erskine recovered, Hogaboomadjusted accordingly; the two werea highly effective team.

Erskine had long sought the op-portunity to conduct a battalion-sized night operation. It rankled himthat throughout the war the Ameri-cans seemed to have conceded thenight to the Japanese. When Hill362-C continued to thwart his ad-

vance, Erskine directed a pre-dawnadvance devoid of the trappings ofprep fires which always seemed toidentify the time and place of attack.The distinction of making this un-usual assault went to LieutenantColonel Harold C. "Bing" Boehm,commanding the 3d Battalion, 9thMarines. Unfortunately this battal-ion was new to this particular sectorand received the attack order too latethe previous day to reconnoiter effec-tively. The absence of advance orien-tation notwithstanding, the battalioncrossed the line of departure prompt-ly and silently at 0500 and headed forHill 362-C. The unit attained totalsurprise along its axis of advance. Be-fore the sleepy Japanese knew it, thebattalion had hurried across 500yards of broken ground, sweeping bythe outposts and roasting the occa-sional strongpoint with flamethrow-ers. Then it was Boehm's turn to be

43

surprised. Daylight revealed his bat-talion had captured the wrong hill,an intermediate objective. Hill 362-Cstill lay 250 yards distant; now hewas surrounded by a sea of wide-awake and furiously counterattack-ing Japanese infantry. Boehm didwhat seemed natural: he redeployedhis battalion and attacked towardsthe original objective. This provedvery rough going and took much ofthe day, but before dark the 3d Bat-talion, 9th Marines stood in sole pos-session of Hill 362-C, one ofKuribayashi's main defensiveanchors.

Boehm's success, followed shortlyby General Senda's costly counterat-tack against the 4th Marine Division,seemed to represent another turningpoint of the battle. On D+18 apatrol from the 3d Marine Divisionreached the northeast coast. Thesquad leader filled a canteen with saltwater and sent it back to GeneralSchmidt marked "For inspection —not consumption." Schmidt wel-comed the symbolism. The next daythe 4th Marine Division finallypinched out Turkey Knob, movingout of The Amphitheater towards theeast coast. The end seemed tantaliz-ingly close, but the intensity ofJapanese resistance hardly waned.Within the 5th Marine Division'szone in the west, the 2d Battalion,26th Marines, was reporting an ag-gregate casualty rate approaching 70percent. General Rockey warned ofa state of "extreme exhaustion andfatigue:'

The division commanders began tolook elsewhere for relief of their shot-up battalions. In the 4th Marine Di-vision, General Cates formed aprovisional battalion under Lieu-tenant Colonel Melvin L. Krulewitchwhich conducted a series of attacksagainst the many bypassed enemypositions. The term "mopping up" asapplied to Iwo Jima, whether byservice troops or subsequent Armygarrison units, should be consideredrelative. Many pockets of Japanese

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 142845From the viewpoint of Marine company commanders, having their own "artillery,"in the form of 60mm mortars, was a very satisfying matter. A 60mm mortar crewis at work, in a natural depression, lobbing round after round at enemy positions.

Amphibious Logistical Support at Iwo Jima

T he logistical effort required to sustain the seizure ofIwo Jima was enormous; complex, largely im-provised on lessons learned in earlier Marine

Corps operations in the Pacific and highly successful.Clearly, no other element of the emerging art of amphibi-ous warfare had improved so greatly by the winter of 1945.Marines may have had the heart and firepower to tacklea fortress-like Iwo Jima earlier in the war, but they wouldhave been crippled in the doing of it by limitations in am-phibious logistical support capabilities. These concepts,procedures, organizations, and special materials took yearsto develop; once in place they fully enabled such large-scaleconquests as Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

For the Iwo Jima operation, VAC had the 8th FieldDepot, commanded by Colonel Leland S. Swindler. Thedepot was designed to serve as the nucleus of the shoreparty operation; the depot commander was dual-hatted asthe Shore Party Commander of the Landing Force, in whichcapacity he was responsible for coordinating the activitiesof the division shore parties. The timing of the logistics sup-port at Iwo Jima proved to be well conceived and execut-ed. Liaison teams from the 8th Field Depot accompaniedthe 4th and 5th Divisions ashore. On Di-3, units of thefield depot came ashore, and two days after this, when VACassumed control on shore, the field depot took over and

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the unloading continued without interruption.The V Amphibious Corps at Iwo Jima used every con-

ceivable means of delivering combat cargo ashore when andwhere needed by the landing force. These means sequen-tially involved the prescribed loads and units of fire car-ried by the assault waves; "hot cargo" preloaded in on-callwaves or floating dumps; experimental use of "one-shot"preloaded amphibious trailers and Wilson drums; generalunloading; administrative unloading of what later genera-tions of amphibians would call an "assault follow-on eche-lon"; and aerial delivery of critically short items, first byparachute, then by transports landing on the captured run-ways. In the process, the Navy-Marine Corps team success-fully experimented with the use of armored bulldozers andsleds loaded with hinged Marston matting delivered in theassault waves to help clear wheeled vehicles stuck in thesoft volcanic sand. In spite of formidable early obstacles—foul weather, heavy surf, dangerous undertows, and fear-some enemy fire — the system worked. Combat cargoflowed in; casualties and salvaged equipment flowed out.

Shortages appeared from time to time, largely the resultof the Marines on shore meeting a stronger and largerdefense garrison than estimated. Hence, urgent calls sooncame for more demolitions, grenades, mortar illuminationrounds, flame-thrower recharging units, and whole blood.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109635

Transport squadrons delivered many of these critical itemsdirectly from fleet bases in the Marianas.

Field medical support at Iwo Jima was a model of ex-haustive planning and flexible application. The Marineshad always enjoyed the finest immediate medical attentionfrom their organic surgeons and corpsmen, but the back-up system ashore at Iwo Jima, from field hospitals to gravesregistration, was mind-boggling to the older veterans.Moderately wounded Marines received full hospital treat-ment and rehabilitation; many returned directly to theirunits, thus preserving at least some of the rapidly decreas-ing levels of combat experience in frontline outfits. Themore seriously wounded were treated, stabilized, andevacuated, either to offshore hospital ships or by air trans-port to Guam.

The Marines fired an unprecedented half million artilleryrounds in direct and general support of the assault units.More rounds were lost when the 5th Marine Division dumpblew up. The flow never stopped. The Shore Party usedDUKWs, LVTs, and larger craft for rapid offloading of am-munition ships dangerously exposed to Iwo Jima's enemygunners. Marine Corps ammunition and depot companieshustled the fresh munitions ashore and into the neediesthands.

Lieutenant Colonel James D. Hittle, USMC, served asD-4 of the 3d Marine Division throughout the battle of IwoJima. While shaking his head at the "crazy-quilt" logisticadaptations dictated by Iwo's geography, Hittle saw crea-tive staff management at all levels. The 3d Division, ear-marked as the reserve for the landing, found it difficult toundertake combat loading of their ships in the absence ofa scheme of maneuver on shore, but the staff made valid

assumptions based on their earlier experiences. This paidhuge dividends when the corps commander had to com-mit the 21st Marines as a separate tactical unit well in ad-vance of the division. Thanks to foresightful combatloading, the regiment landed fully equipped and support-ed, ready for immediate deployment in the fighting.

To augment the supplies coming across the beach, the3d Division staff air officer "appropriated" a transport planeand made regular runs to the division's base in Guam,bringing back fresh beef, mail, and cases of beer. The 3dDivision G-4 also sent his transport quartermaster (tdday'sembarkation officer) out to sea with an LVT-full of war sou-venirs; these were bartered with ship's crews for donationsof fresh fruit, eggs, bread —"we'd take anything." GeneralErskine distributed these treats personally to the men inthe lines.

Retired Brigadier General Hittle marveled at the densityof troops funnelled into the small island. 'At one point wehad 60,000 men occupying less than three-and-a-half squaremiles of broken terrain:' These produced startling neigh-bors: a 105mm battery firing from the middle of the shoreparty cantonment; the division command post sited 1,000yards from Japanese lines; "giant B-29s taking off and land-ing forward of the CP of an assault regiment:'

In the effort to establish a fresh-water distilling plant,Marine engineers dug a "well" near the beach. Instead ofa source of salt water the crew discovered steaming miner-al water, heated by Suribachi's supposedly dormant vol-cano. Hittle moved the 3d Division distilling site elsewhere;this spot became a hot shower facility, soon one of the mostpopular places on the island.

held out indefinitely, well-armed anddefiant to the end. Rooting them outwas never easy. Other divisions usedcannoneers, pioneers, motor trans-port units, and amtrackers as light in-fantry units, either to augmentfront-line battalions or conduct com-bat patrols throughout rear areas. Bythis time, however, the extreme reararea at Iwo had become overconfi-dent. Movies were being shown ev-ery night. Ice cream could be foundon the beach. Men swam in the surfand slept in tents. This all provideda false and deadly sense of security.

Not very far to the north, Lieu-tenant Colonel Cushman's 2d Battal-ion, 9th Marines, became engaged ina sustained battle in extremelybroken terrain east of the third air-field. The Marines eventually encir-cled the Japanese positions, but thebattle for "Cushman's Pocket" raged

on. As the battalion commanderreported the action:

The enemy position was amaze of caves, pillboxes, em-placed tanks, stone walls andtrenches . . . . We beat againstthis position for eight continu-ous days, using every support-ing weapon. The core—mainobjective of the sector—still re-mained. The battalion was ex-hausted. Almost all leaderswere gone and the battalionnumbered about 400, including350 replacements.

Cushman's 2d Battalion, 9th Ma-rines, was relieved, but other ele-ments of the 9th and 21st Marines,equally exhausted, had just asdifficult a time. Erskine truly had noreserves. He called Cushman backinto the pocket. By 16 March

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(D+25), Japanese resistance in thisthicket of jumbled rocks ended. The4th Marine Division, meanwhile,poured over the hills along the east,seizing the coast road and blastingthe last Japanese strongpoints fromthe rear. Ninety percent of Iwo Jimanow lay in American hands. RadioTokyo carried the mournful remarksof Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso,who announced the fall of Iwo Jimaas "the most unfortunate thing in thewhole war situation:'

General Smith took the opportu-nity to declare victory and conducta flag-raising ceremony. With that,the old warhorse departed. AdmiralTurner had sailed previously. Ad-miral Hill and General Schmidt final-ly had the campaign to themselves.Survivors of the 4th Division beganbackloading on board ship, their bat-tle finally over.

drunk for five days, but our fightingspirit is still running high. We are go-ing to fight bravely to the last:' Im-perial Headquarters tried to conveythe good' news to him that the Em-peror had approved his promotion tofull general. There was no responsefrom Iwo Jima. Kuribayashi's promo-tion would be posthumous. Frag-mentary Japanese accounts indicatehe took his own life during the nightof 25-26 March.

In The Gorge, the 5th Marine Di-vision kept clawing forward. The di-vision reported that the averagebattalion, which had landed with 36officers and 885 men on D-day, nowmustered 16 officers and 300 men, in-cluding the hundreds of replacementsfunneled in during the fighting. Theremnants of the 1st Battalion, 26thMarines, and the 1st Battalion, 28thMarines, squeezed the Japanese intoa final pocket, then overwhelmedthem.

The killing continued in the north.The 5th Marine Division entered TheGorge, an 800-yard pocket of incredi-bly broken country which the troopswould soon call "Death Valley." HereGeneral Kuribayashi maintained hisfinal command center in a deep cave.Fighting in this ungodly landscapeprovided a fitting end to the battle —

nine endless days of cave-by-cave as-saults with flamethrowers and demo-litions. Combat engineers used 8,500tons of explosives to detonate onehuge fortification. Progress was slowand costlier than ever. General Rock-ey's drained and depleted regimentslost one more man with every twoyards gained. To ease the pressure,General Schmidt deployed the 3dMarine Division against KitanoPoint in the 5th Division zone.

Colonel Hartnoll J. Withers direct-ed the final assault of his 21st Ma-rines against the extreme northern tipof the island. General Erskine, pneu-monia be damned, came forward tolook over his shoulder. The 21st Ma-rines could see the end, and theirmomentum proved irresistible. Inhalf a day of sharp fighting theycleared the point of the lastdefenders. Erskine signalled Schmidt:"Kitano Point is taken:'

Both divisions made serious effortsto persuade Kuribayashi to surrenderduring these final days, broadcastingappeals in Japanese, sending personalmessages praising his valor and urg-ing his cooperation. Kuribayashi re-mained a samurai to the end. Hetransmitted one final message toTokyo, saying "we have not eaten or

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It was the evening of 25 March,D + 34, and the amphibious assaulton the rocky fortress of Iwo Jima fi-nally appeared over. The island grewstrangely quiet. There were far few-er illumination shells. In the flicker-ing false light, some saw shadowyfigures, moving south, towards theairfield.

General Schmidt received the goodnews that the 5th Marine Divisionhad snuffed out the final enemy cavein The Gorge on the evening ofD+34. But even as the corps com-mander prepared his announcementdeclaring the end of organizedresistance on Iwo Jima, a very well-organized enemy force emerged fromnorthern caves and infiltrated downthe length of the island. This finalspasm of Japanese opposition stillreflected the influence ofKuribayashi's tactical discipline. The300-man force took all night to moveinto position around the island's nowvulnerable rear base area, the tentsoccupied by freshly arrived Army pi-lots of VII Fighter Command, adja-cent to Airfield No. 1. The

Marine Corps Historical CollectionAfter 24 days of the most bitter battle in the history of the Marine Corps to thatdate, on 14 March 1945, the colors were raised once again on Iwo Jima to signifythe occupation of the island, although the battle was still raging in the north. Theofficial end of the campaign would not be until 14 days later, on 26 March.

"'I.t—

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counterattacking force achieved to-tal surprise, falling on the sleeping pi-lots out of the darkness with swords,grenades, and automatic weapons.The fighting was as vicious and bloo-dy as any that occurred in Iwo Jima'smany arenas.

The surviving pilots and membersof the 5th Pioneer Battalion impro-vised a skirmish line and launcheda counterattack of their own. Seabeesand elements of the redeploying 28thMarines joined the fray. There werefew suicides among the Japanese;most died in place, grateful to strikeone final blow for the Emperor. Sun-rise revealed the awful carnage: 300dead Japanese; more than 100 slainpilots, Seabees, and pioneers; andanother 200 American wounded. Itwas a grotesque closing chapter tofive continuous weeks of savagery.

The 5th Marine Division and the21st Marines wasted no time in back-loading on board amphibious ships.The 9th Marines, last of the VACmaneuver units to land, became thelast to leave, conducting two moreweeks of ambushes and combatpatrols. The 147th Infantry inherit-

ed more of the same. In the first twomonths after the Marines left, theArmy troops killed 1,602 Japaneseand captured 867 more.

Iwo Jima's Costs,Gains, and Legacies

In its 36 days of combat on IwoJima, the V Amphibious Corps killedapproximately 22,000 Japanese sold-iers and sailors. The cost was stag-gering. The assault units of thecorps — Marines and organic Navypersonnel — sustained 24,053 casual-ties, by far the highest single-actionlosses in Marine Corps history. Ofthese, a total of 6,140 died. Roughlyone Marine or corpsman became acasualty for every three who landedon Iwo Jima.

According to a subsequent analy-sis by military historian Dr. NormanCooper, "Nearly seven hundredAmericans gave their lives for everysquare mile. For every plot of groundthe size of a football field, an aver-age of more than one American andfive Japanese were killed and fiveAmericans wounded:'

The assault infantry units bore the

brunt of these losses. Captain Wil-liam T. Ketcham's Company I, 3dBattalion, 24th Marines, landed onD-day with 133 Marines in the threerifle platoons. Only nine of thesemen remained when the remnants ofthe company reembarked on D + 35.Captain Frank C. Caldwell reportedthe loss of 221 men from CompanyF, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. At theend, a private first class served as pla-toon commander for Caldwell'smerged first and second platoons.Elsewhere in the 1st Battalion, 26thMarines, Captain Tom Fields relin-quished command of Company D onthe eighth day to replace the battal-ion executive officer. Rejoining hiscompany at the end of the battle,Fields was sickened to find only 17of the original 250 men still in theranks. Company B, 1st Battalion,28th Marines, went through ninecompany commanders in the fight-ing; 12 different Marines served asplatoon leader of the second platoon,including two buck privates. Each di-vision, each regiment, reported simi-lar conditions.

As the extent of the losses becameknown in the press, the Americanpublic reacted with shock and dis-may as they had 14 months earlierat Tarawa. This time, however, thedebate about the high cost of forci-bly seizing an enemy island raged inthe press while the battle was still be-ing fought.

The Marine Corps released onlyone official communique aboutspecific battle losses during the bat-tle, reporting casualties of nearly5,000 men on 22 February. Five dayslater, at the insistence of press baronWilliam Randolph Hearst, an earlysupporter of the MacArthur-for-President claque, the San FranciscoExaminer ran a front page editorialbewailing the Marines' tactics andlosses. "It's the same thing that hap-pened at Tarawa and Saipan," theeditorial stated, urging the elevationof General MacArthur to supremecommand in the Pacific because "HE

The fighting hardly over, grizzled, begrimed, and tired Marines solemnly displaythe spoils of war captured in a very long, difficult, and hard-fought battle.

Marine Corps Historical Collection

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I.'

I

S.'.

Ii

MEN." With that, 100 off-duty Ma-rines stormed the offices of the Ex-aminer demanding an apology.Unfortunately, the Hearst editorialreceived wide play; many families ofMarines fighting at Iwo Jima for-warded the clippings. Marinesreceived these in the mail while thefighting still continued, an unwel-come blow to morale.

President Roosevelt, long a masterof public opinion, managed to keepthe lid on the outcry by emphasiz-ing the sacrifice of the troops asepitomized by the Joe Rosenthal pho-tograph of the second Suribachi flag-raising. The photograph was alreadywidely renowned. FDR made it theofficial logo of the Seventh War BondDrive and demanded the six flag-raisers be reassigned home to en-hance popular morale. Regrettably,three of the six men had already beenkilled in subsequent fighting in thedrive north on Iwo Jima.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff lookedappraisingly at Iwo Jima's losses. Noone questioned the objective; IwoJima was an island that categorical-ly had to be seized if the strategicbombing campaign was ever going to

fore not be bypassed or "leap-frogged." There is considerable evi-dence that the Joint Chiefs consideredthe use of poison gas during the IwoJima planning phase. Neither Japan

nor the United States had signed theinternational moratorium, there wereno civilians on the island, the Ameri-cans had stockpiles of mustard gasshells in the Pacific theater. But Presi-dent Roosevelt scotched these con-siderations quickly. America, hedeclared, would never make first useof poison gas. In any case, the use ofpoison gas on an area as relativelysmall as Iwo Jima, whose prevailingwinds would quickly dissipate thegas fumes, became moot. This leftthe landing force with no option buta frontal amphibious assault againstthe most heavily fortified islandAmerica ever faced in the war.

On the other hand, seizure of IwoJima provided significant strategicbenefits. Symbolically, the Marinesraised the flag over Mount Suribachion the same day that General MacAr-thur entered Manila. The parallelcapture of the Philippines and IwoJima, followed immediately by theinvasion of Okinawa, accelerated thepace of the war, bringing it at longlast to Japan's doorstep. The three

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110599The fighting continues and continues. For weary flamethrower operators Pvt RichardKlatt, left, and PFC Wilfred Voegeli the campaign is just one cave after another.

SAVES THE LIVES OF HIS OWN be effective. The island could there-

Uncommon valor in a peaceful setting: this 4th Division Marine threatens theenemy even in death. His bayonet fixed and pointing in the direction of theenemy, he was killed by a sniper before he even got off the beach on D-day.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109624

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-S.

a

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1r.,

- C,

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campaigns convincingly demonstrat-ed to the Japanese high commandthat the Americans now had thecapability — and the will — to over-whelm even the most stoutly defend-ed islands. Kyushu and Honshuwould be next.

Iwo Jima in American handsproduced immediate and highly visi-ble benefits to the strategic bombingcampaign. Marines fighting on the is-land were reminded of this missiontime and again as crippled B-29 Su-perforts flew in from Honshu. Thecapture of Iwo Jima served to in-crease the operating range, payload,and survival rate of the big bombers.The monthly tonnage of high explo-sives dropped on Imperial Japan byB-29s based in the Marianas in-creased eleven-fold in March alone.As early as 7 April a force of 80 P-51Mustangs of VII Fighter Commandtook off from Iwo Jima to escortB-29s striking the Nakajima aircraftengine plant in Tokyo. But the ArmyAir Force valued Iwo Jima most ofall as an emergency landing field. Bywar's end, a total of 2,251 B-29s madeforced landings on the island. Thisfigure represented 24,761 flight crew-men, many of whom would haveperished at sea without the availabil-ity of Iwo Jima as a safe haven. Saidone B-29 pilot, "whenever I land onthis island I thank God for the menwho fought for it."

General Tadamichi Kuribayashiproved to be one of the most com-petent field commanders the Marinesever faced. He displayed a masterfulgrasp of the principles of simplicityand economy of force, made maxi-mum use of Iwo's forbidding terrain,employed his artillery and mortarswith great skill, and exercised com-mand with an iron will virtually tothe end. He was also a realist.Without hope of even temporarynaval or air superiority he knew hewas doomed from the start. In fiveweeks of unremitting pressure, theAmericans breached every strong-point, exterminated his forces, andseized the island.

Iwo Jima represented at once thesupreme test and the pinnacle ofAmerican amphibious capabilities inthe Pacific War. The sheer magnitudeof the task — planning the assault andsustaining of that many troopsagainst such a formidableobjective — made Operation Detach-ment an enduring model of "detailedplanning and violent execution:' Herethe element of surprise was not avail-able to the attacker. Yet the speed ofthe American landing and the tough-ness with which assaultunits with-stood the withering barragesastounded the Japanese defenders."The landing on Iwo was the epitomeof everything we'd learned over theyears about amphibious assaults:'said Colonel Wornham of the 27thMarines. Bad as the enemy fire be-came on D-day, there were no reportsof "Issue in doubt:' LieutenantColonel Galer compared Iwo Jimawith his Guadalcanal experience:"Then it was 'can we hold?' Here atIwo Jima the question was simply'When can we get it over?'"

The ship-to-shore assault at Iwo

49

was impressive enough, but the realmeasure of amphibious effectivenesscan be seen in the massive, sustainedlogistical support which somehowflowed over those treacherousbeaches. Not only did the Marineshave all the ammunition andflamethrower refills they needed,around the clock, but they also hadmany of the less obvious necessitiesand niceties which marked this bat-tle as different from its predecessors.Marines on Iwo had ample quanti-ties of whole blood, some of it do-nated barely two weeks in advance,flown in, refrigerated, and available.The Marines also had mail call, unitnewsletters, fresh water, radio batter-ies, fresh-baked bread, and prefabri-cated burial markers, thousands ofthem.

Iwo Jima featured superior inter-service cooperation. The Navy-Marine Corps team rarely functionedmore efficiently. The blue-waterNavy continued to earn the respectof the Marines, especially on D-2when the flotilla of tiny LCI gunboatsbravely attacked the coastal defense

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 142434With his buddies holding the four corners of the National Colors, the last ritesfor a fallen Marine are offered by the chaplain at a temporary gravesite in Iwo'sblack sand. Chaplains of all religious persuasions heroically ministered to all Ma-rines and Corpsmen throughout the thick of the fighting at their own risk.

\\\1\\k

Above and Beyond the Call of Duty

T wenty-seven men received the CongressionalMedal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry andintrepidity during the battle of Iwo Jima: 22 Ma-

rines, four Navy corpsmen, and one Navy landing craftcommander. Exactly half of the awards issued to Marinesand corpsmen of the V Amphibious Corps were posthu-mous. Within a larger institutional context, Iwo Jimarepresented more than one-fourth of the 80 Medals ofHonor awarded Marines during the Second World War.This was Iwo Jima's Roll of Honor:

Cpl Charles J. Berry, 1/26, 3 March 1945*PFC William R. Caddy, 3/26, 3 March*LtCol Justice M. Chambers, 3/25, 19-22 FebruarySgt Darrell S. Cole, 1/23, 19 February*Capt Robert Dunlap, 1/26, 20-21 FebruarySgt Ross F. Gray, 1/25, 21 FebruarySgt William C. Harrell, 1/28, 3 MarchLt Rufus G. Herring, USNR, LCI 449, 17 FebruaryPFC Douglas T. Jacobson, 3/23, 26 February

50

PltSgt Joseph J. Julian, 1/27, 9 March*PFC James D. LaBelle, 1/27, 8 March*2dLt John H. Leims, 1/9, 7 MarchPFC Jacklyn H. Lucas, 1/26, 20 FebruarylstLt Jack Lummus, 2/27, 8 March*Capt Joseph J. McCarthy, 2/24, 21 FebruarylstLt Harry L. Martin, 5th Pioneer Battalion, 26 March*Pvt George Phillips, 2/28, 14 March*PhM 1/c Francis J. Pierce, USN, 2/24, 15-16 MarchPFC Donald J. Ruhl, 2/28, 19-21 February*Pvt Franklin E. Sigler, 2/26, 14 MarchCpI Tony Stein, 1/28, 19 February*PhM 2/c George Wahlen, USN, 2/26, 3 MarchGySgt William C. Walsh, 3/27, 27 February*Pvt Wilson D. Watson, 2/9, 26-27 FebruaryCpl Hershel W. Williams, 1/21, 23 FebruaryPhM 3/c Jack Williams, USN, 3/28, 3 March*PhM 1/c John H. Willis, USN, 3/27, 28 February*

* Posthumous

--a—'-5-C'

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a'•t11'*

*t

the glory of the prolonged battle.Two aspects of the battle remain

controversial: the inadequate prelimi-nary bombardment and the decisionto use piecemeal replacements instead

of organized units to strengthen theassault forces. Both decisions, ren-dered in the context of several com-peting factors, were made byexperienced commanders in goodfaith. Unavoidably, Iwo Jima's big-gest cost to the V Amphibious Corpswas the loss of so many combat vete-rans in taking the island. While thebattle served to create a new genera-tion of veterans among the survivors,many proud regiments suffereddevastating losses. With these sameunits already designated as key com-ponents of the landing force againstthe Japanese home islands, such loss-es had serious potential implications.These factors may well have in-fluenced General Holland Smith's un-popular decision to withhold the 3dMarines from the battle. From theperspective of an exhausted compa-ny commander on Iwo Jima, Smith'sdecision seemed inexcusable, thenand now; from the wider perspectiveof the commanding general, Fleet

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111147At the end of a very long fight, a Marine flamethrower operator pauses to light up.

guns to protect the Navy and Marine of whom shared both the misery andfrogmen. Likewise, the Marines wel-comed the contributions of theArmy, Coast Guard, Coast and Ge-odetic Survey, Red Cross, and thehost of combat correspondents — all

LtGen Holland M. Smith, USMC, with his Fleet Marine Force,Pacific chief of staff, Col Dudley S. Brown, surveys the wreck-

age along the landing beaches. Iwo Jimc# was Gen Smith's lastbattle. After this, he returned to his headquarters on Hawaii.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110635

51

Assault Divisions' Command StructuresAs the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions conducted their

final preparations for Operation Detachment, these werethe infantry commanders who would lead the way at thebeginning of the battle:

3d Marine Division3d Marines Col James A. Stewart9th Marines Col Howard N. Kenyori

1/9 LtCol Carey A. Randall2/9 LtCoI Robert E. Cushman, Jr.3/9 LtCol Harold C. Boehm

21st Marines Col Hartnoll J. Withers1/21 LtCol Marlowe C. Williams2/21 LtCoI Lowell E. English3/21 LtCol Wendell H. Duplantis

4th Marine Division23d Marines Col Walter W. Wensinger

1/23 LtCol Ralph Haas2/23 Maj Robert H. Davidson3/23 Maj James S. Scales

24th Marines Col Walter I. Jordan1/24 Maj Paul S. Treitel

2/24 LtCol Richard Rothwell3/24 LtCol Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr.

25th Marines Col John R. Lanigan1/25 LtCol HolEs U. Mustain2/25 LtCol Lewis C. Hudson, Jr.3/25 LtCol Justice M. Chambers

5th Marine Division26th Marines Col Chester B. Graham

1/26 LtCol Daniel C. Pollock2/26 LtCol Joseph P. Sayers3/26 LtCol Tom M. Trotti

27th Marines Col Thomas A. Wornham1/27 LtCol John A. Butler2/27 Maj John W. Antonelli3/27 LtCol Donn J. Robertson

28th Marines Col Harry B. Liversedge1/28 LtCoI Jackson B. Butterfield2/28 LtCol Chandler W. Johnson3/28 LtCol Charles E. Shepard, Jr.

[Note: Of those infantry battalion commanders who landedon Iwo Jima on D-Day, only seven remained unwoundedand still retained command at the battle's end].

Marine Forces, Pacific, the decisionmakes more sense.

Whatever his shortcomings, Hol-land Smith probably knew amphibi-ous warfare better than anyone. Ofthe hundreds of after-action reportsfiled immediately following the bat-tle, his official analysis best capturedthe essence of the struggle:

There was no hope of sur-prise, either strategic or tactical.There was little possibility fortactical initiative; the entireoperation was fought on whatwere virtually the enemy's ownterms . . . . The strength, dis-position, and conduct of theenemy's defense required amajor penetration of the heartof his prepared positions in thecenter of the Motoyama Plateauand a subsequent reduction ofthe positions in the difficult ter-rain sloping to the shore on theflanks. The size and terrain ofthe island precluded any ForceBeachhead Line. It was an oper-ation of one phase and one tac-

tic. From the time theengagement was joined until themission was completed it was amatter of frontal assault main-tained with relentless pressureby a superior mass of troopsand supporting arms against aposition fortified to the maxi-mum practical extent.

We Americans of a subsequentgeneration in the profession of armsfind it difficult to imagine a sustainedamphibious assault under such con-ditions. In some respects the fightingon Iwo Jima took on the features ofMarines fighting in France in 1918,described by one as "a war girt withhorrors:' We sense the drama repeat-ed every morning at Iwo, after theprep fires lifted, when the riflemen,engineers, corpsmen, flame tankcrews, and armored bulldozer oper-ators somehow found the fortitudeto move out yet again into "DeathValley" or "The Meatgrinder:' Few ofus today can study the defenses, ana-lyze the action reports, or walk thebroken ground without experiencing

52

a sense of reverence for the men whowon that epic battle.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz said thesewords while the fighting still raged:'Among the Americans who servedon Iwo Jima, uncommon valor wasa common virtue," a sentiment nowchiseled in granite at the base of Fe-lix de Weldon's gigantic bronze sculp-ture of the Suribachi flag-raising.

Twenty-two Marines, four Navycorpsmen, and one LCI skipper wereawarded the Medal of Honor for ut-most bravery during the battle of IwoJima. Half were posthumous awards.

General Erskine placed thesesacrifices in perspective in remarksmade during the dedication of the 3dMarine Division cemetery on the em-battled island:

Victory was never in doubt.Its cost was. What was indoubt, in all our minds, waswhether there would be any ofus left to dedicate our cemeteryat the end, or whether the lastMarine would die knocking outthe last Japanese gunner.

I'

ii1J

SourcesThe official records of the V Amphibious

Corps at Iwo Jima occupy 27 boxes in theUSMC archives. Within this maze, the mostuseful information can be found in the com-ments and recommendations" sections of the Af-ter Action Reports filed by the major units. Thebest published official account of the battle iscontained in George W. Garand and Truman R.Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations, vol IV,History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations inWorld War II (Washington: Historical Division,HQMC, 1971). Three other official accounts arerecommended: LtCol Whitman S. Bartley, IwoJima: Amphibious Epic (Washington: Histori-cal Division, 1954); Capt Clifford P. More-house, The Iwo Jima Operation, and BernardC. Nalty, The U.S. Marines on Jwo Jima: TheBattle and the Flag Raising (Washington:Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1960).Chapter 10 of Jeter A. Isely and Philip A.Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1951), combines exhaustive research and keenanalysis of the assault on Iwo. Three of themany postwar published accounts are particu-larly recommended: Richard F. Newcomb, IwoJima (New York: Bantam, 1982); RichardWheeler, Iwo Jima (New York: Crowell, 1980);and Bill D. Ross, Iwo Jima: Legacy of Valor(New York: Vanguard Press, 1985).

The most comprehensive Japanese account iscontained in Part 11 ("Ogasawara IslandsDefense Operations") in Chubu Taiheyo riku-gen sakusen (2) [Army Operations in the Cen-tral Pacific vol II], part of the Senshi Sosho WarHistory Series. Of Japanese accounts in English,the best is Major Yoshitaka Hone's Explana-tion of Japanese Defense Plan and Battle of IwoJima," written in 1946 and available at the Ma-rine Corps Hhistorical Center (MCHC).

The MCHC maintains an abundance of per-sonal accounts related to Iwo Jima. Among themost valuable of these are the Iwo Jima com-ments in the Princeton Papers Collection in thePersonal Papers Section. The Marine CorpsOral History Collection contains 36 well-indexed memoirs of Iwo Jima participants. Theresearch library contains a limited edition ofDear Progeny, the autobiography of Dr.Michael F. Keleher, the battalion surgeon credit-ed with saving the life of "Jumping Joe" Cham-bers on D + 3. The Personal Papers Section alsoholds the papers of TSgt Frederick K. Dashiell,Lt John K. McLean, and Lt Eugene T. Petersen.For an increased insight, the author also con-ducted personal interviews with 41 Iwoveterans.

The author wishes to acknowledge the con-tributions of Marvin Taylor of the MarineRocket Troops Association; Helen McDonaldof the Admiral Nimitz Museum: Frederick andThomas Dashiell; LtCol Joseph McNamara,USMCR; BGen James D. Hittle, USMC (Ret);Mr. Bunichi Ohtsuka; and the entire staff of theMarine Corps Historical Center, whose collec-tive "can-do" spirit was personified by the lateRegina Strother, photograph archivist.

About the Author

C olonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret),served 29 years on active duty in the Ma-

rine Corps as an assault amphibian officer, in-cluding two tours in Vietnam. He is adistinguished graduate of the Naval War Collegeand holds degrees in history from North Caroli-na, Georgetown, and Jacksonville. He is a lifemember of both the Marine Corps HistoricalFoundation and the Naval Institute, a memberof the Society for Military History, the Military

Order of the World Wars, and the North Carolina Writers' Workshop.Colonel Alexander, an independent historian, wrote Across the Reef: The Ma-

rine Assault on Tarawa in this series. He is co-author (with Lieutenant ColonelMerrill L. Bartlett) of Sea Soldiers in the Cold War (Naval Institute Press, 1994)and the author of "Utmost Savagery: the Amphibious Seizure of Tarawa" (NavalInstitute Press, pending). He has also written numerous feature essays publishedin Marine Corps Gazette, Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval History, Leatherneck,Amphibious Warfare Review, World War Two, and Florida Historical Quarterly.

945 i9WORLD WAR II

/ A'94" WW(!I 1945

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in theWorld War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines bythe History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observanceof the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part bya grant from the Marine Corps Historical Foundation.

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DiRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMSBrigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR,WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Benis M. Frank

CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANTGeorge C. MacGillivray

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONRobert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-5040

1994

PCN 190 003131 00