a study on management of the self-installation temporary ... · each household receives permanent...
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Proceedings of International Symposium on City Planning 2013
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A Study on Management of the Self-Installation Temporary Stronghold
after Natural Disaster in Indonesia
- A Case Study of POSKO Management Support by Jalin Merapi -
Tomoki Motozuka*and Kiyoko Kanki*
Natural disasters are events that have a huge impact on people and environment. Disaster prevention is important that not only to develop strong and robust infrastructure but also to make flexible response society. In the past few years, a lot of natural disasters occurred in Indonesia. In such emergency situations, Indonesian people set up "POSKO", the temporary strongholds. POSKO is so frequently set up for any kinds of temporary function and often activated in post disaster relief or at emergency time. In spite of such flexibility POSKO supported the people indeed. Here we think we should study POSKO with the ways of management and utilization. This paper aims to clarify how the support of POSKO management had been made in cases of 2006 Java Earthquake and 2010 Merapi Eruption by the interview investigation. The result of analysis is as follows: 1) POSKOs were voluntarily established as temporary place in a short time and managed by the local community, 2) The characteristics of POSKO were able to cope with a difficult situation There was a difference of the experience for disaster response in Java earthquake of the local government. Even if a problem occurred, POSKO includes a mechanism that does not collapse. POSKO has a capability to respond rapidly when the local was hit by natural disasters. In JM there were many sources used, gathering the information of things that really needed by victims and supporters, and using the power of many volunteers, then it was possible to match the information. It is considered that the importance of information during the disaster and its management skill were connected in JM response.
Keywords: Self-Installation, Temporary Stronghold, Management, Information, Wide Area Evacuation, Indonesia
* Kyoto University E-Mail: [email protected]
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1. Background Large-scale natural disasters have become more frequent in recent years. Natural disasters are events that have a huge impact on people and environment. Therefore, it is unpredictable consequences after natural disasters. For this reason, Disaster prevention is important that not only to develop strong and robust infrastructure but also to make flexible response society. At the same time, the social problems of the day tend to be more and more complicated. In addition to the local government, businesses and citizens, new actors such as NGOs and NPOs have appeared, focusing attention on the solving of problems by taking a bottom-up approach and through collaboration between the various parties. 1.1 Post-disaster response in Indonesia In the past few years, a lot of natural disasters from earthquake, flood, volcanic eruption and more occurred in Indonesia. In such emergency situations, Indonesian people set up "POSKO", the temporary strongholds (Photo-1). POSKO is Indonesian abbreviation for two words: "POS " and "Komando.” POSKO means Command Post the original. The original use of the term is for military operation in Indonesia 1). Now the POSKO is so frequently set up for any kinds of temporary function and often activated in post disaster relief or at emergency time. Just put up the signboard, it has been recognized POSKO by Indonesian people and functioned. Furthermore POSKO is closed anytime when the event is recognized to be over by the set-uppers. In spite of such flexibility POSKO supported the people indeed. Here we think we should study POSKO with the ways of management and utilization.1.2 Two major natural disasters hit the Yogyakarta City Central Java earthquake and Merapi eruption 2010 have caused significant damage in the south and north of the Yogyakarta urban area during a short period (Figure-1). Despite the fact that damage also occurred in urban areas, many POSKO were established in each area after the disaster to deploy rapid support activities. In addition, in Java Island, there are community organizations called RT/RW(1)
in which voluntary mutual aid culture of ‘Gotong-Royong’ (2) exists. Also, after the 2004 Sumatera coast earthquake, activities by civil-based volunteer group became popular. In responding emergency situations, the community organizations
Photo-1. POSKO 2)
Figure-1. The stricken area of volcanic eruption and earthquake 3)
Proceedings of International Symposium on City Planning 2013
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are utilized as the main mutual aid networks. Even though people experience damages, they will support others who have bigger damages. 1.3 Objectives There are limits as to what prevention and prediction efforts could achieve. Therefore we focus on POSKO with the ways of management and utilization in an emergency. 2006 Java Earthquake is a typical earthquake disaster in Indonesia. Most of the damages were caused in the rural area. After the disaster victims were possible to remain in the affected areas. By contrast, Merapi Volcano eruption disaster in 2010, damages caused very large area by the eruption; therefore victims evacuated to the wide area separately. Thereby a number of POSKOs were established and managed in each area by independently; hence it was difficult to manage the POSKOs. This paper aims to clarify how the support of POSKO management had been made in the typical cases of 2006 Java Earthquake and 2010 Merapi Eruption in a more difficult situation by the interview investigation. 1.4 Methodology After the natural disaster the environment is changing dramatically, so it is necessary to review the POSKO management in light of the circumstances at the time. There are further points that need to clarify. 1) Location of POSKO, 2) Set-upper and management system, 3) Information and supply. Moreover we should notice the type of disaster. Central Java earthquake and Merapi eruption 2010 occurred same area. Therefore we determined that it is possible to clarify how the set-uppers have managed POSKO to different disaster responses. In this paper, in order to clarify differences of disaster responses by POSKOs between earthquake and volcanic eruption disaster we preceded document retrieval and the interview investigations on the set-uppers for clarifying the actual response of management of the POSKO.
2.Coping with disaster by the victims of 2006 Java Earthquake On 27 May 2006, a big earthquake with a magnitude of 6.3 on the moment magnitude scale, struck the
凡例
City Center
Main Road
Damaged Area
CandenVillage
Yogyakarta
Indian Ocean
Opak River
Progo River
0 10km
× Epicenter
◎Jakarta
○ YogyakartaJAVA
０ １００km
Pulokadang
NgibikanGadungan
Pasar
Wonolopo
Kiringan
Banyudono
Suren
Kulon Suren
Wetan Gaten
Beran
Plembutan
Canden
KralasCanden
Village
Common
Jayan
Gadungan
Kepuh
0 500m
●Village Office
Figure-2. The location of Canden village and epicenter 2)
Table-1. Damage resulting from Java earthquake inCanden village 2)
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south-southwest of the Indonesian city of Yogyakarta. The damage caused was catastrophic, with 5,782 deaths, 36,299 persons injured, 135,000 homes damaged and an estimated 1.5 million left homeless. Most of the damages were caused by the collapse of low-rise houses in the rural area. After the disaster victims were possible to remain in the affected areas. The purpose of this chapter is to reveal how the victims in a village coped with the disaster immediately after the earthquake, especially focusing on POSKO, a hub of the coping activities. Field survey was done in Canden, a village in the area with the severest damage from Central Java Earthquake, 2006(Figure-2, Table-1) (3).2.1 The location of POSKO The Figure-3 shows that the location of POSKOs. In Canden village, there were 64 POSKOs. There were two kinds of POSKO,POSKO Utama and POSKO RT. POSKO Utama was the POSKO, which oversee the local POSKO. POSKO RT was the POSKO, which managed by RT. Since many public facilities were damaged from the earthquake, POSKO was located in the followings: 1) Buildings with no damage 2) Places with security and area large enough to locate POSKO 3) Places with good location for giving effective support to the local area 4) Main roadside area, an easier place to receive support from outside of the area. POSKO had 6 kinds of purposes; shelter (Sh), healthecare (H), communal kitchen (K), supplies (Su),
U R R R RD
RTRT RT RT↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
↓
R R R R
RTRT RT RT↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
D ↓
U R
RTRT↓↓
R
RTRT↓↓
D ↓
R
RTRT↓↓
R
RTRT↓↓
D ↓
Legend□：POSKO, U: POSKO Utama, R: POSKO RT ○：Manager, D： Dukuh, RT: RT Chief,→：Management, ：Settlement
Set up POSKO Utama
No PO
SKO Utama
RT Managed Own POSKO RT Several RTs Managed One POSKO RT
Gadungan Kepuh, Wonolopo,
Kiringan,Ngibikan
Suren Wetan, Gaten
Gadungan Pasar, Jayan,
Canden, Pulokadang, Beran
Banyudono, Suren Kulon
Plembutan, Kralas
◉
◉
◉
◉
◉
◉
◉
◉
◉
◉
Pulokadang
NgibikanGadungan
Pasar
Wonolopo
Kiringan
Banyudono
Suren
Kulon
Suren
Wetan Gaten
Beran
Plembutan
Canden
Kralas
Jayan
Gadungan
Kepuh
0 500m
Legend
◉ POSKO Utama
● POSKO RT
Residence Area
Farmland
Main Road
Hamlet Boundary
■ Village Office
■
OpakRiver
Figure-3. The location of POSKO 2)
Figure-4. The management system of POSKO 2)
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information (I) and meeting(M) (Figure-5). 2.2 Management System of POSKO Management of POSKO was conducted by Dukuh (leader who is responsible of hamlet management since before the disaster occurred) and supported by RT chiefs. The management in a hamlet where POSKO RT exists was mainly performed by 1-3 of RT chiefs who run POSKO RT and Dukuh who supervised POSKO Utama and POSKO RT. In the hamlet without POSKO Utama, each POSKO received relief supplies directly from the POSKO Utama in Canden Village (Figure-4). Dukuh and RT chiefs were circuiting about the hamlet to collect information. POSKO was basically managed in hamlet unit, POSKO Utama and POSKO RT also performed information exchange inside the hamlet, but exchange beyond the hamlet had not been done much. 2.3 Establishment and closedown of the POSKO Most POSKO was established within three days from the earthquake. Time of closure ranges depending on the function of POSKO: The ones with shelter, communal kitchen, or healthcare close three months after the quake (by the time each household receives temporary house) and the ones which receive information and supplies close six months after the quake (by the time each household receives permanent house) (Table-2). 2.4 Case study in Ngibikan RT5 There were 65 houses in Ngibikan RT5. The chief of RT5 coordinated the restoration of the village by the help of Eko Prawoto, a famous local architect. Came together and, with help from readers of a local newspaper, began the reconstruction of the village using as much material salvaged from the ruins of the old structures as possible. 65 houses were completed in 90 days4).
2 DaysLater
On the Day
Next Day
3 DaysLater
3 DaysLater
Next Day
2 DaysLater
Tent(LSM,PLN)
Tent(P)
Tent(LSM)
Tent(GOV,P)
Tent(P)
Tent(P)
Tent(LSM)
3 Days Later
Next Day
7 Days Later
2 Days Later
Next Day
3 Days Later
2 Days Later
Gadungan Pasar ４ １ ２ 473 237
Jayan ６ １ ２ 534 267
Wonolopo ４ １ ４ 500 125
Kiringan ５ １ ５ 839 168
Ngibikan ６ １ ７ 1009 144
Banyudono ６ ０ ３ 771 129
Suren Kulon ４ ０ ２ 605 303
Population/POSKO
RTUt
Number of POSKO
RT
Population
Legend ） ：Start Housing Reconstruction Assistance (POKMAS), ：Emergency → Normal＊１ About Main POSKO＊２ LSM: Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (NGO), PLN: Electricity Company , TNI: Indonesia Army, GOV: Indonesia Goverment＊３ Sh: Shelter, H: Health Center, K: Kitchen, Su: Supply, I: Information , M: Meeting
ShHKSuIMShHKSuIMShHKSuIMShHKSuIMShHKSuIMShHKSuIMShHKSuIMShHKSuIM
１２３４５６７８９10 11 12
Period (month)
First
Supply
EstablishPeriod of use *5
Day Place*1
Use*3
Structure*2
Tent(LSM)
5 Days Later
7 Days Later
Gadungan Kepuh ４ １ ４ 629 157 Private
House
Market
Road
Road
PrivateGarden
Mosque
PrivateGarden
Road
Population/POSKO
RTUt
Number of POSKO
RT
Population Period (month)
First
Supply
EstablishPeriod of use *5
Day Place*1
Use*3
Structure*2
ShHKSuIMShHKSuIMShHKSuIMShHKSuIMShHKSuIMShHKSuIMShHKSuIMShHKSuIM
No Data
１２３４５６７８９10 11 12
Tent(TNI)
Tent(P)
Tent(TNI)
Tent(LSM)
BambooTent(P)
Tent(PLN)
Tent(LSM)
Tent(GOV)
2 DaysLater
2 DaysLater
Next Day
2 DaysLater
3 DaysLater
2 DaysLater
On the Day
On the Day
2 Days Later
2 Days Later
On the Day
Next Day
5 Days Later
5 Days Later
5 Days Later
10 Days Later
Suren Wetan ５ ０ ５ 773 155
Gatem ４ ０ ４ 487 122
Beran ６ １ ５ 696 139
Plembutan ５ ０ ２ 839 420
Canden ６ １ ３ 1346 449
Kralas ６ ０ ３ 880 293
Pulokadang ５ １ ３ 1026 342
Desa Canden ー １ ー 11407 ー
PrivateGarden
Road
Private House
Opening
PrivateGarden
PrivateGarden
Market
Opening
Table-2. The management period of POSKO 2)
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In RT5, POSKO RT was built in the front yard of private houses or places close to the road where cars can pass by (Figure-5). A was not only built using tent but also bricks, woods and bamboos. The facility for common kitchen was established next to the well opposite the tent. When a resident received a big volume of aid supplies, the supplies were not only distributed inside the RT but also transferred to POSKO Utama in Ngibikan Hamlet for distribution to other RTs in the hamlet. 2.5 Findings 1) POSKO has been established in a very short time with consideration on hamlet environment and location, even the situation was confusing right after the disaster. There were 6 kinds of purposes. It was found that tent was mainly used and then reduced step by step. 2) Based on RT, which formed the hamlet, management was performed by the representatives of the area. Supports were mainly performed in hamlet level; the flow could be “village hamlet RT” and also “RT hamlet RT”. It was shown that POSKOs in the same hamlet were connected. 3) POSKOs, voluntarily established as temporary place in a short time, prevent supports gap and unite the area so that it was possible for living together. It is considered that collaborative works had led to local reconstruction.
3. Local organization managed POSKOs during the Mount Merapi eruption in 2010 According to Merapi Volcano eruption disaster in 2010, damages caused by the eruption had become bigger; therefore a number of POSKOs were established and managed in each area. The increasing number of POSKOs had caused difficulties in grasping valid information of each POSKO; hence it was difficult to manage POSKOs. In other hand, an NGO called Jalin Merapi had made information support by utilizing Internet services and community radio. The purpose of this chapter is to aggregate information on damages and supports, and then based on Jalin Merapi’s activity on supporting POSKO management, Then to clarify how such network had been formed and how the support of POSKO management had been made. The interview investigations were done in 1st to 20th in December 2011 to the member of Jalin Merapi.3.1 The Mount Merapi eruption 2010 and measures Mount Merapi (2.965 m), located between Yogyakarta and Central Java Province, is among the most active volcano on earth. On October 26th 2010, Merapi began erupting. The eruption
Legend
RT Border
Building (Before EQ)
Building (After EQ)
Rice Field
RT5
RT6
RT3
Mosque
Watchman shedPOSKO RT
Tent
POSKO
Utama
Common Kitchen
Light damaged
houses
RT4
0 50m
House
(Collapse)
House
(Collapse)
House
(Collapse)
POSKO
・Watchman shed
Road
0m 5m
Well Common
Kitchen
・Tent
Shelter, Diagnosis
Supply
Information
Meeting
Pic.B Common Kitchen
2006.6.18
Pic. A POSKO RT
2006.5.28
Pic. A
Pic. B
Bathing place
Figure-5. POSKO RT in Ngibikan RT5 2)
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was the largest at the volcano in 100 years. Ash emissions reached an altitude of 40,000 ft, and 370,000 people were evacuated from a 20 km radius danger zone. More than 350 people have been killed as a result of the eruption and many more have been injured. A lahar, volcanic mudflows, caused by Mount Merapi added even more damage to the volcano's vacinity (Figure-6). Many people were forced to live as POSKOs.3.2 Establishment and closedown of POSKO Crisis management in Indonesia is based on a hierarchical organization (Regulation of President of the Republic of Indonesia No.8 2008). Governments and local governments are mainly responsible for dealing with disasters and considering the roles played by stakeholders. The refugees are concentrated in two stadiums: Maguwoharjo and Mandala Krida, also in the Youth Center Yogyakarta (Official POSKO) (Figure-7). However official POSKO was full and could not accommodate. Then local organizations, such as neighborhood associations, religious gourps and community’s around schools, were performing set up many Non-official POSKOs.There were 20 POSKOs (include 2 official POSKOs) on 2nd November. In such a situation, local organizations were performing roles in maintaining discipline at POSKO, and in securing and distributing aid. POSKOs were located in public office, school, religious, settlement and commercial buildings. Set uppers cope with the situation and repeated establishment and closedown Non-official POSKOs (Figure-10 above bar chart). The number of POSKOs rose
Yogyakarta CIty
15km
20km
25km
凡例
： Sports Commercial ： Public office ： School ： Religious ： Settlement ： Other ★： Official ▽： Visited ： Main Road
< 100 101< 10001001< 2500
2501< 5000
5001<
Refugee
0 5km
↑Mountaintop
Location of the POSKO
★
★
Youth Center(Refugee:2500)
Maguwoharjo Stadium(Refugee：21900)
Top20km 20km40km 40km60kmAsh Falls
Indian Ocean ▼
PyrodasticFlow
Urban Area Urban Area
Lintas MerapiLegend
：Residential Area
3000m
2000m
1000m
Ash Falls
Lahar
Damaged by the
Pyroclastic Flow
Damaged by the Lahar
Damaged by the Ash Falls
A AʼFigure-6. The damage caused by Merapi eruption and residential area 3)
Figure-7. Distribution map of POSKO in Sleman 2010.11.08 3)
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from 20 to 90 in 3days. Information shared by mass media had only covered sensational places. It was difficult to gain information what actually needed by the victims and supporters. Thus many supports and volunteers were concentrated in urban areas and caused gap between POSKOs. In vast disaster-affected areas, the condition changed every day; therefore it was difficult to grasp the movement of the victims. The difference of provincial government’s response and lack of coordination, non-official POSKO could not receive support from government (Figure-8). There was a difference of the experience for disaster response in Java earthquake of the local government. However, official POSKO was already full and could not accommodate. So coordination between governments in responding the area out of provincial border was difficult. In the other hand, NGOs were possible to response any area crossing the provincial border (5).3.3 The support of POSKO management by Jalin Merapi In Merapi, there were at least 3 community radios, i.e. Radio Lintas Merapi, Radio K, and MMC. 2001, these 3 radios have established a network with some NGOs (Forabi, WALHI, COMBINE, Community Radio Network Yogyakarta and Central Java Community Radio Network) to make an information system called “Jalin Merapi (JM)”. The purpose of JM is to provide information concerning Merapi, especially early warning system. JM kept participating in educate the people about the volcano and early warning to anticipate disaster. In 2009 JM carried out workshop of "Disaster Management Audio Material" in collaboration with AMARC-Working Group Japan, JICA Hyogo. With experience of coordination in handling the 2006 eruption, when the volcano erupted again on 26th October 2010, JM immediately took action. After eruption JM had an additional 2 community radio nodes, Lahara FM and Gema Merapi FM to monitor the lahar. JM use SMS Gateway, radio communications, telephone, Twitter, Facebook and post information for 24 hours.2006, JM set up the website with SMS Gateway, Yahoo! Messenger and live audio streaming. They regularly updated the information on the
Informal POSKO
Official POSKO
Yogyakarta / Central Java Province GovermentMagelan, Sleman etc.. Local Goverment
Mass CommunicationsTV, Radio, Newspaper
SupporterSupport Group
IndividualGroup
Business
NGO
GrobalNGO
LocalNGO
LegendSupport, Information for the Situation, Infromation for the Support,Object
POSKO : Helplessness, Know the Situation, Know the Needs
Get some support, Get support which they need,* A size of POSKO shows the scale of the POSKO** A direction of the arrow shows a direction of the Information *** A size of the arrow shows the amount of the support
Figure-8. Problems on disaster information 3)
① ② ③ ④
⑤
⑥
⑦ ⑧
①: Volunteer Form, ②: Donation Form③: Donation and Support, ④: POSKO Map⑤: Indonesia/English , ⑥: SMS ⑦: Twitter⑧: Facebook, ⑨: Radio streaming, ⑩: Information
⑨⑩
⑩
⑥
2007
2010.11.15
Figure-9. JM website 2007 and 20103)
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website (Figure-9). In 2010 when Merapi is active again, Jalin Merapi added some contents on the website. Twitter and Facebook (2010.10.25). After first eruption, Jalin Merapi add the volunteer form on the website (2010.10.27) 5). The end of November JM started to use CCTV and HT to monitor the lahar (Figure-10 below). Moreover JM set up 11 POSKO JM on the circumference of the location of Merapi.
Immediately after the disaster, volunteers started to gather. They are supported by 1700 (total) of volunteers who always record all refugees’needs in many POSKO (Figure-10 below). There were many student volunteers. If the volunteers got injury, they can receive treatment in a partner hospital free of charge. Volunteers were distributed to the 11 of POSKO JM. There was a volunteer leader in each POSKO JM who decided everything. The leader reported their
Figure-10. The support of POSKO management by Jalin Merapi 3)
20
40
60
80
100
POSKO
(Place)
Website Jalin M
erapi
Open 4 PO
SKO JM
Start to get donation from supporter
Start to Cooperate with ID
EA
Add 6 POSKO JM
Add 2 POSKOJM
Add Lahara FM
2011.3 POSKO JM Close
2011.3 Add Gema Merapi
11 / 1136 / 36191 / 448346 / 860500 / 1200
1100 / 3000
15 Km 20 Km10 Km Banks of a river 500 m Reducation
18310
5328865363
53669
94615
118112
133996157527 157784
149023
154441 154055133799
126041
75891
71635
67907
56533
44465
44409
41460
40466
Eruption
The total number of evacuees
The total number of evacuees(Sleman)
Evacuees
(people)
The total number of POSKO (Sleman)
Scale
: No date
: 5001<
: 2501< 5000
: 1001< 2500
: 101< 1000
: < 100
Change
：Continue
：New
Legend EvacueesPeak number of evacuees
Advice to evacuate Level .4 Level.3
Evacuate Area
No date No date
SMSMerapi InformationtwitterFacebookVolunteer formDonation formDonation and usePOSKO MapsRadioHT,CCTV
Legend
● ：Set up
：Term to use
：Obscurity term
JM and
POSKO JM
Volunteers
（work ／ registration）
Ⅰ(4 POSKO JM )
Ⅱ(10 POSKO JM )
Ⅲ(12 POSKO JM)
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activities to JM every day. The accuracy of information is always checked by media center based at COMBINE office (Figure-11). In media center, there has been a team who manages all information obtained from SMS, Facebook, Twitter and telephone to be verified and re-disseminated in the format of twitter texts. JM built a system with the basic package of support network by one POSKO JM (Figure-12). Form a network by dividing the area region, POSKO JM installed if needed. It had become a flexible response to the spread of damage (FIgure-11 below). At that time, the characteristics of POSKO, a possible installation in necessary, take advantage.
3.4 Findings 1) JM was developed as an early warning system organization by the cooperation of three community radios in the area of Mount Merapi: Lintas Merapi radio in the area of Mount Merapi: Lintas Merapi radio in Klaten, MMC FM in Boyolali, and K FM in Magelang and some non-government organizations. JM has been continuing activities since 2006 Merapi Eruption. JM has provided Merapi information to villagers at Merapi slope. 2) In 2010, JM established a system to gather volunteers before it had serious damage. Then JM formed a partnership with 20 staffs and 2,000 volunteers and set up their own POSKO (POSKO JM) between JM headquarters to each local POSKOs, to combine support and information 3) The information was obtained across region, is shared through the community radio and their own web site (http://merapi.combine.or.id/). Therefore, new support network is constructed by providing the information through this web site. 4) JM built a system with the basic package of support network by one POSKO JM. The support network of this package was able to response damage from spreading. It has become a flexible response to the spread of damage.
4. Conclusion This paper aims to clarify how the support of POSKO management had been made in the
typical cases of 2006 Java Earthquake and 2010 Merapi Eruption in a more difficult situation by the interview investigation. The findings are as follows:
SupporterSupport Group
IndividualGroup
BusinessNGOGlobal NGO
Local NGO
Jalin Merapi
Logistic
Leader
POSKO JM JM Induk
* A direction of the arrow shows a direction of the Information ** A size of the arrow shows the amount of the support
LegendSupport Information for the Support
POSKO Object Volunteer
Staff
POSKO JM
Leader
AreaA Place of POSKO JM
Figure-12. A basic package of network 3)
Figure-11. Location of POSKO JM and community radio station 3)
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1) POSKOs were voluntarily established as temporary place in a short time and managed by the local community In the case of Java earthquake, POSKO has been established in a very short time with consideration on hamlet environment and location, even the situation was confusing right after the disaster. Based on RT, which formed the hamlet, management was performed by the representatives of local community. Supports were mainly performed in hamlet level. 2) The characteristics of POSKO were able to cope with a difficult situation There was a difference of the experience for disaster response in Java earthquake of the local government. Even if a problem occurred, POSKO includes a mechanism that does not collapse. POSKO has a capability to respond rapidly when the local was hit by natural disasters. Merapi Volcano eruption disaster in 2010, damages caused very large area by the eruption; therefore victims evacuated to the wide area separately. Under such difficult situations, local community could not get enough support. However, JM was shared the information which they received directly from the local through the community radio and their own web site. In JM there were many sources used, gathering the information of things that really needed by victims and supporters, and using the power of many volunteers, then it was possible to match the information. It is considered that the importance of information during the disaster and its management skill were connected in JM response. Therefore, the new support network is constructed by providing the information. For resilient society, the characteristics of POSKO are necessary. Natural disasters are events that have a huge impact on people and environment. There are limitations as to what prevention and prediction efforts could achieve, we should study about the ability to respond promptly at the stricken area in Indonesia. Further studies are necessary in order to figure out the other appropriate ways on information tools for another cases that had huge damage or less support.
Acknowledgment We would like to thank Eko Prawoto, Mr. Maryono, Elanto Wijoyono and the member of JM. We have had the support and encouragement of students in Univ. of GadjahMada. This work has been supported by the House Building Research Institute (1308).
Note (1) RT/RW; Neighborhood association in Indonesia. RT means Rukun Tetangga (neighborhood harmonious) and RW means Rukun Warga (citizen harmonious). Each RW is divided into RTs. There are usually between 7-15 RTs each RW. Each RT consists of 18-20 households. (2) Gotong-Royong; Goton-Royong refers to asking for mutual service or mutual aid, and labor or monetary support to construct, repair the facilities needed for the autonomy of the community. (3) 1st survey was done 2010.1.13-2.7, 2nd survey was done 2011.2.26-3.19. Interviewee; key persons of Chanden village (village chief), set-uppers in each hamlet (15), reader of local group in Ngibikan RT5 (4) (4) Interviewee; Jalin Merapi (COMBINE (NGO), Lintas Merapi FM (Community Radio), IDEA (NGO), Volunteer Group), Public Agency (National Disaster Management Agency of Indonesia (BNBP), Sleman Regency)(5) From an interview with a leader of IDEA
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Reference:1) Ikaputra., Emergency and Shelter Post Earthquake: The Role of Social Capital in Javanese Community,
7th International Conference on Urban Earthquake Engineering & 5th International Conference on Earthquake Engineering, 2010, p.1599-1608, English
2) Tomoki Motozuka, Kiyoko Kanki., A Study on Actual Usage of Temporary Stronghold in Devastated Site Recovery : Case Study of POSKO in Canden Village, Central Java Earthquake Affected Area, Indonesia, Papers on city planning / City Planning Institute of Japan, 2011, 46(3), p.907-912, Japanese
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