a survey of cordillera indigenous political...

A SURVEY OF CORDILLERA INDIGENOUS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS*

June Prill-Brett

CSC Working Paper 05

*This is a revised version of the paper presented during the Conference on Issues on Cordillera Autonomy, 22-24 May 1987, Inn Rocio, Baguio City, Philippines.

The CSC Working Paper Series makes recent research on the Cordillera

available in order to stimulate comment and discussion.

ISSN 1656-3425

First Printing December 1987 Second Printing May 1995 Published by The Cordillera Studies Center University of the Philippines Baguio 2600 Baguio City, Philippines © Cordillera Studies Center, 2001 All rights reserved. No Part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieva1 system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Book Design & Layout: Giovannie R. Rualo Typeface: Footlight & Bookman Old Style Typeset: Microsoft Word 2002xp® Printer: Allied Printers, Inc.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the

Cordillera Studies Center.

A Survey of Cordillera Indigenous Political Institutions

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................................2 THE IBALOY ........................................................................................................................................................4

Political Leadership ............................................................................................................................................4 THE KANKANAEY..............................................................................................................................................5

The Ili .................................................................................................................................................................5 Political Leadership ............................................................................................................................................5

THE BONTOK ......................................................................................................................................................7

The Ili .................................................................................................................................................................7 Political Leadership ............................................................................................................................................8 The Bontok Pechen ............................................................................................................................................9 Alliances...........................................................................................................................................................12

THE KALINGA...................................................................................................................................................12

The Region .......................................................................................................................................................12 Political Leadership ..........................................................................................................................................12 The Bodong ......................................................................................................................................................14

THE IFUGAO......................................................................................................................................................17

Political Leadership ..........................................................................................................................................17 Biyaw Trading Partnership...............................................................................................................................18

THE ISNEG .........................................................................................................................................................18

Political Leadership ..........................................................................................................................................18 Settling disputes ...............................................................................................................................................18 Peace Pacts .......................................................................................................................................................19

THE TINGUIAN..................................................................................................................................................19

Peace Pact.........................................................................................................................................................20 Political Leadership ..........................................................................................................................................20

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS...................................................................................................................20

Political Functions Among the Cordillera Ethnic Groups................................................................................20 Concept of Territory.........................................................................................................................................21 Political Leadership ..........................................................................................................................................22 Fines .................................................................................................................................................................24 Alliances...........................................................................................................................................................24 The Institution of Intervillage Diplomacy ........................................................................................................25

CONCLUDING REMARKS ...............................................................................................................................26 RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................................................27 REFERENCES.....................................................................................................................................................28

CSC Working Paper Series no. 05

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to review ethnographic literature with focus on indigenous Cordillera political institutions. This initial inventory of available published literature is not meant to draw generalizations or recommendations for Cordillera Autonomy at this point, since the data are as yet inadequate for such recommendations. Furthermore, this initial survey is admittedly not as exhaustive as it hoped to be due to data availability constraints. Unpublished materials are not included in this review due to time constraints.* The quality of the reports surveyed is therefore necessarily uneven. In recognition of the inadequacy of data as bases for policy recommendations, a proposed research is expected to be undertaken to fill in some of the gaps in our knowledge of indigenous Cordillera political institutions, with the aim of further investigating their policy implications in the light of Cordillera Autonomy.

The better known Cordillera groups are the Ibaloy, Kankanaey, Bontok, Kalinga, Ifugao, Isneg, and Tinguian (refer to map). The Ibaloys occupy the extreme southern section, namely the Naguilian, Agno, and Ambayang River areas, and the southern Kankanaeys inhabit the Amburayan and the northern portion of the Agno River. The Bontoks inhabit the upper Chico River, while the Kalingas, occupy the lower Chico River area. The Ifugaos are settled in the Asin and Ibulao River areas, the Isnegs, in the Apayaw-Abulog and Matalag River areas, and the Tinguians inhabit the middle Abra River system.

This survey presents the Ibaloy, Kankanaey, Bontok, Kalinga, Ifugao, Isneg and Tinguian, focusing on their specific political institutions as described by writers of these ethnic groups. A description of political functions among the Cordillera groups is also discussed in this preliminary attempt to compare these political institutions.

Finally, some concluding remarks are suggested in anticipation of an up-to-date research on the indigenous political institutions operating in the Cordillera region.

* This paper was specifically prepared as a backgrounder for the conference “Issues on Cordillera

Autonomy” sponsored by the Cordillera Studies Center,U.P. College Baguio, 22-24 May 1987 at Inn Rocio, Baguio City.


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MAP OF THE CORDILLERA


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THE IBALOY

Political Leadership

Our knowledge about Ibaloy political institutions comes to us from the work of Moss (1920), Kamora (1927), Bagamaspad and Pawid (1985).

The Tongtong. The tongtong holds the status of an institution, an important decision-making body in the Ibaloy community. The tongtong council is composed of the impanama or anum'nemen (wise men) of the village. The impanama were not paid for their services to the community, but they stood to gain prestige from dispensing duties related to the council. Tongtong membership is composed of the elders who are baknang (rich, wealthy) and intelligent.

The main function of the council is to gather for the settling of disputes between persons and families. If cases involved problems between 2 villages or sitios, the tongtong of each sitio would meet to settle their differences (Kamora 1927). Most cases settled by the council concern land conflicts such as boundary disputes, inheritance cases, marriage conflicts, and similar civil cases.

Decisions made by the tongtong have traditionally had the force of law. Punishment consists of fines and appropriation of real and movable properties (land, animals, and family heirlooms). The impanama could change the law but such action takes place only upon the agreement of the majority of people during the olnong (gathering). If the tongtong of two settlements were unable to come to an agreement, it was not uncommon for the people of one settlement to engage in armed conflict with the other (Moss 1920:237).

The Baknang. Moss (1920) describes the baknang as the wealthy class that has the authority to exercise disciplinary control over the poor or abitug. "The baknang's power was almost absolute, and it extended over a number of communities, where he owned rice fields, and cattle." However, the authority of the baknang was not unlimited, for the tongtong could check the power of a baknang by the tongtong council. Without the council, any baknang could become a one-man tongtong, whose judgment (right or wrong) would become unquestionable law.

Ibaloy accounts mention the pechit ritual, a feast of merit performed by the wealthy, as to have been originally a peace pact celebrated among the Ibaloys (see Moss 1920:352). However, no specific mention or description of it is found in the literature examined except in Scott (1977:115). In the latter, there is clear indication of the forging of a pact due to trade benefits:


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Amkidit tried to promote a kind of tribal consolidation and work out a modus vivendi with the newly arrived Spaniards who seemed promising customers of the Ilocos gold trade...he established a boundary line near Acop's place and made a peace pact with chief Mashay of Amuse (Kabayan) which forbade inhabitants of the valley from coming up to the ridge without formally reporting their presence, an arrangement which also made them dependent on his people for Ilocos cloth and other necessities. This pact was solemnized by the drinking of one another's blood spiced with sili (pepper) and the sacrifice of two slaves (Scott 1977:115).

However, aside from the above event there does not seem to be any other description of peace pacts among the Ibaloys. Informants do not recall any such pact arrangements (Personal Communication with Kabayan Elders).

THE KANKANAEY

The Ili

Bello (1973:162) writes that the ili (barrio/village) is the largest political unit among the Bakun southern Kankanaeys. These settlements were originally founded by a few families which later on expanded as their children increased and was gradually infused by other migrant families. Each ili has clearly delineated boundaries that are known to every member. Each also has its own ancestral fields and rules of citizenship. These items were not elaborated on by Bello (1973). Though Bello informs us that in ancient times most of these units would also have at-atoan (councils of old men, lalakay). This institution has since disappeared and is replaced by the municipal government which has taken over most of its functions.


In the Mankayan area the elders of the community are the amam-a (dakay in other communities) or decision-makers. These old men are part of the community power elite with functions including directing, restraining and advising the heads of families on political matters as well as prescribing the holding of feasts when necessary (Bagamaspad and Pawid 1985:115). Some of the old men constituted the agom (jury) whose duty is to adjudicate differences of people within the community. These men are known to be mensapit (articulate). In settling cases, the decision of the agom is final and irrevocable, and not one of the offended party could make any appeal. The words of the amam-a have the effect of law for it is acknowledged that the primary duty of the old men is to promote fairness and justice. When the jury cannot decide a case due to lack of evidence after investigation, and when the accused denies the charges against him, ordeals are resorted to for determining guilt or innocence. The basic principle observed is that a person should prove himself innocent by undergoing an ordeal. The unfailing justice of Kabunian is implored, and it is believed that the guilty person would


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surely be found out through the performance of ordeals of oath-taking, where signs are interpreted to verify guilt or non-guilt. Once proven guilty, punishment is meted out accordingly. As soon as the jury announces the punishment, the guilty party is held responsible to carry this out. He may or may not carry out his punishment, but heavy pressure through community censure, plus the danger that deities and spirits may inflict on his life, more often that not cause the person to render whatsoever penalty or fine is required of him (Bagamaspad and Pawid 1985:115).

The Abong. Among the northern Kankanaeys the ili is also the largest political unit corresponding to what is known as sitio or barrio. The abong (dap-ay) tribunal or ward mentioned in early literature (Robertson 1914:511) is the institution which took care of community decision-making. The Kankanaey abong is similar to the Bontok ator. Robertson notes that only old men who have reached a certain age are allowed to take part in the settling of disputes among the townspeople. Cases may also be settled by the ritual examination of entrails of a chicken. It is the litigants who shoulder the cost of animals butchered during the settlement of the case. Should the case not be settled due to lack of evidence, then an ordeal, requiring the participation of suspects, is resorted to. Should the resolution of a case be unsatisfactory, a second opinion is requested from the old men of other communities. The use of oaths is also resorted to (the sun, moon, stars, earth), or other natural phenomena are called upon to witness the oath and punish the offender by some kind of terrible fate (like blindness, death by drowning, accidents, falling from cliffs, and other like accidents).

Eggan (1963:352), who did research among the Sagada Kankanaeys, writes that the shift from emphasis (or value) given the kinship circle, to that of the ward organization, has further weakened kinship obligations by establishing a competing solidarity. The ward organization presents a discrete group whose membership at any one time is clearly defined, despite the differing kinship circles of its component members. Each ward has an informal council of old men who settle problems within the ward, and in joint sessions mediate inter-ward conflicts. Village solidarity is enhanced by the joint performance of communal rituals and other activities under the leadership of the old men, or of particular priests who inherit their position through certain family lines.

There does not seem to be any practice of intervillage diplomacy or peace-making between villages in the Kankanaey literature. However, some of the northern Kankanaey (in Western Mt. Province) villages are said to have been introduced to the peace pact institution from the central Bontok area, and recently, from the Kalinga region due to recent conflict. This will be described further in the section on Kalinga and Bontok political institutions.


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THE BONTOK

A number of ethnographic works (see Keesing 1949; Bacdayan 1967; Drucker 1977; Botengan 1976; Cawed 1972) have been written on the Bontok; however, apart from the excellent survey done by Jenks (1905) during his five months field work in Bontok ili in 1902, there is a dearth of information on Bontok political institutions. For this section I have relied primarily on my own research (Prill-Brett 1975, 1987a, 1987b) for data on the ator (ward) and the pechen (peace pact institution).

The Bontoks live in compact villages with populations ranging from 600 to 3,000 persons. They are wet rice agriculturists who supplement their diet with produce from swidden farms (usually corporate-owned land).

The Ili

The largest political unit is the ili or village. It has its own territory and boundaries recognized by surrounding villages. Each Bontok community is politically and economically autonomous from any other authority. Traditionally, no superior authority controlling judicial or economic processes within the village exists outside of the judicial or economic processes within it. Intervillage relationships are channeled through intermarriages and the institution of the peace pact.

Citizenship. Citizenship is acquired by virtue of birth in the ili of one's parents (who are from the community), and second, through intermarriage and residence. Residence is formalized through affiliation with one of the ators or wards in the village. Bontoks may have dual citizenship, as seen in cases of intermarriage between persons from different ili; their children likewise may opt for dual citizenship.

The Ator. The Bontok ator (ward) system may have from 3 to 18 wards in each ili (depending on the size of the population). Each family is affiliated with one of the several wards in the village. The physical structure which wards use for social and ritual functions is an elevated, semi-circular stone platform with an open court. There is usually a hut behind this stone paved-yard where bachelors and widowed members are housed during the night. The area is taboo to women. Only male visitors may be entertained or housed in the ator.

The ward's other functions besides its overseeing socio-economic, political and ritual activities for its member families, include management of a common fund and property that may be used for the benefit of the ward members. The wards are also the guardians of peace pacts in behalf of the village and are not kinship-based. Kin-relationship is not a prerequisite for ward membership.


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Transferring membership from one ward to another entails ceremonial obligations and acceptance by the ward where one wishes to transfer to. The general tendency is for a son to affiliate with his father's ward after his marriage. However, in actual practice the issue of membership is more flexible; one has more choices.


The decision-makers for the village are the amam-a or elders. These are old men who by virtue of seniority and experience in life, automatically form the core of village decision-makers. When decision-making involves only the members of the ator, that particular ward generally settles the case through its resident elders. However, if the case involves other wards or if it affects the interests of the village, all the elders sit as a body in behalf of the village and not as representatives of their particular wards. This informal council of elders is the supra-ator (the maamongan nan umili) level of decision-making.

The elders are the leaders of the ili in cases which affect the welfare of its citizens. The elders are required to be: 1) old men who are assumed to have had rich experiences in life; 2) articulate and have had occasion to make good judgments in past deliberations of cases; 3) fair in the formulation of decisions as evidenced by past cases, and by the villagers' affirmation of this fact; and 4) holders of a good war record, although not an absolute necessity, this may give an elder an edge over the others in prestige; 5) wealthy, though this requirement is, alone, not sufficient qualification, he must have the above mentioned qualities.

When gathered as a single body, the elders compose the judicial, legislative, and executive body of the ili. Each elder, taken individually, has no power to make decisions for the ili. These old men try cases involving community members and impose fines based on precedents; they may amend custom law when they see fit, and impose fines on offenders from the villages that have no peace pacts with them. They schedule the agricultural calendar, declaring the "rest" days, "work" days, and community welfare ceremonies. They may also advise and counsel villagers who need help, though such, is a function normally taken care of by their particular ward.

The Pinakarsu. Before discussing intervillage politics it is important to introduce the other political functionaries among the Bontoks. One is the go-between called pinakarsu or inanak; this is a variant of the Kalinga and Ifugao go-between. Jenks (1905:177) mentioned the presence of this person designated the task of mediating during conflict between two warring villages.

The Bontok pinakarsu (see Prill-Brett 1975) or go-between is an adult individual who comes from village A and marries into village B. Should two villages with affiliations owing to intermarriage of members come into armed conflict, communication and social interaction cease until peace is restored. The individual described above (chinawil, dinawil) automatically becomes the candidate for pinakarsu, especially if there is only one such person who comes from the enemy


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village. During this period of conflict the pinakarsu is the only person who can move from village A to village B without being in danger since he has dual citizenship. Thus, he has diplomatic immunity. Any communication to or from either of the villages in conflict is coursed through the pinakarsu whose traditional role becomes active during the conflict period. The pinakarsu acts as the diplomat and must maintain his neutrality at all times. He is the messenger for both hostile communities. Should peace talks commence the pinakarsu becomes the official bearer of messages. However, the Bontok go-between has no power to make decisions on intervillage political matters, he merely relays messages and tries his best to help establish peace since he and his kinsmen in both villages would be those most affected by any conflict situation.

The pinakarsu's functions are: 1) to deliver messages from village A (his affinal village) to village B (his natal village); 2) to beg for the heads or skulls of victims of past hostilities to bring back to the home village. This enhances his prestige as pinakarsu; 3) to collect fines from villages that have been sued but have no existing peace pact; 4) together with the pinakarsu of the two warring villages, they try to stop a battle by physically situating themselves between the warring groups. This can only be effective if no one has been killed in the encounter or if the score has been evened; 5) to show neutrality by not taking sides during any occasion; 6) to deliver the sudsud (the formal declaration of war) to challenge the other village to meet them in the traditional battlegrounds; should peace be restored and a new peace pact be forged, 7) to help the ator peace pact guardian to preserve the pact.

The Bontok go-between is not compensated materially for his services, although honor and prestige are bestowed on him by both villages involved in the conflict. Informants emphasize that performing the duties of pinakarsu, is a duty to both the natal and affinal communities. In cases where the go-between is made to return the remains of a slain enemy, tradition requires that in addition, the pinakarsu undertakes a cleansing ceremony involving the offering of sacrificial animals. The relatives of the deceased person may give the go-between a chicken or a small pig to be used during the performance of the purification rite.

When the score is even between the conflicting villages and peace negotiations have commenced, the pinakarsu fades into the background and the ator of responsibility takes over. The respective wards of the victim of the last hostilities and his killer, become the priority parties to the making of a pact.

The Bontok Pechen

Bontok peace pacts called pechen (from ped-nan, literally "to hold tight to a grip") are ritualized contracts between two warring villages with the aim of ending warfare and establishing peaceful relationships. The following is a summary of the procedure of pact-forging up to the breaking or rupturing of a peace pact.

1) The first step in the forging of a peace pact is the sending of the warang by the village that wants to sue for peace. This is symbolized by the


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presentation of a head-axe or a spear, sent through the pinakarsu to the priority ator (the ator of the victim of the last hostilities).

2) After the sending of the warang the senglip period follows when the elders on both sides make an account of their losses and the fines which they would negotiate for. Past grievances must be settled during this occasion before the contract would be perfected. During this time the conditions of the pact is discussed and agreed upon by the representatives of the parties to the pact. The general provisions discussed during this stage in the Bontok peace pact are:

a) Within the specified territorial boundaries of safety, citizens of the villages covered by the pact are guaranteed safety, and should any harm come to them within the said boundaries it would be the responsibility of the village pact-guardians to investigate the breach of contract.

b) The villages' party to the peace contract should respect the neutrality of the other in relation to a third village which has peaceful relations with one of them but an enemy of the other. There should be no spilling of enemy blood within the territory of the opposite pact-holder, and there should be no aiding of the enemy at the expense of the opposite pact-holder. This can be illustrated in a case where village A forces a peace pact with village B, with village C as a co-peace pact-holder of A but an enemy of B. In this case, village B should not try to kill citizens of C within the territory of A, nor should A aid C against B at the expense of the latter community. They should remain neutral.

c) The fines for different offenses are discussed with special attention to the fine to be paid for faokhan. Faokhan refers to the act of killing a citizen from a community that shares a peace pact with another, without sending the sudsud to give due warning to the citizens of the enemy village.

3) Chuwar ("to give gifts"). This practice entails the invitation to a peace renewal feast by one pact guardian ward in behalf of the village. The host ward is given gifts by the invited delegation from the village it shares a peace pact with. This is the occasion for feasting and for the elders' boasting of their war exploits (falliwat). The conditions of the peace pact are reiterated during this occasion and both groups are reminded of their peace-contract and their duty to contribute to the peaceful relationship of the two villages. After the formal establishment of the pact, reciprocal invitations to the other village would be anticipated. Chernat/papu-os, which means "warming up of the pact," are examples of such invitations scheduled annually, or every 2-3 years, depending on agreements made during the senglip or chuwar. Again the conditions of the pact are enumerated, and should any


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amendments be suggested by one group, they would be taken up during such occasions. There is also an exchange of gifts between the two partners to the peace pact.

4) Eret (offenses, "to tighten"). This is a non-violent remedy for breach of contract, should conflict arise between the citizens of both villages sharing a pact. The elders from the offender's village are invited to a meeting to settle the case, which may be theft, battery, insult, wounding and other with the exception of murder. Representatives from both pact guardian wards hear the case and negotiate the fine to be paid to the offended ward. After both parties are satisfied, an eret ceremony consisting of a ritual, and settlement of the conflict, is performed to prevent the rupturing of the pact.

5) Fakas nan pechen ("rupturing of the pact"). Any act of murder automatically dissolves a peace pact. The ward guardians wash their hands off the responsibility of upholding the pact contract. Their last responsibilities are to warn their citizens that the pact is broken and they are now in a state of war, and to exact the full penalty from the individual(s) who caused the rupturing of the pact. The pact guardian ward members cannot kill the offender since it is taboo among the Bontoks to kill a fellow villager; internal killing is rarely, if ever, carried out to punish the person who caused the breaking of a pact.

Fines. Fines for offenses committed by citizens of other villages rarely, if ever, go to the offended individual or to his family. In Bontok custom law, offenses against individuals of another village are offenses against the village and not merely against the individual. If it has been proven that a carabao was stolen from the communal pasture land by a citizen of another community, the complaint is reported to the ator pact-guardian of that community. It would be the guardian ator's responsibility to handle the case and exact the fine from their citizen. The usual procedure is the replacement (or indemnification) of the lost carabao, but the fine of two carabaos would go to the offended village, specifically to the ator pact-guardian. Of the two carabaos, one is sent back to the village of the offender to be delivered to the ator co-peace pact guardian; the other carabao would be retained by the offended ator-pact guardian. These animals would then be butchered and shared by all the ward elders of the village.

Fines for breaking a peace pact are delivered to the offended village and directly to the ward guardian of the pact. It is considered taboo for the victim or his family to partake of any of the fine; to do so would be tantamount to "eating themselves." This taboo prohibiting the offended to partake of the fine also allows them to retaliate and avenge the death of their kinsman before any peace talks are conceived of. Retaliation is the duty of the ator of the victim.

Fines are uniform for all offenders, regardless of rank or status. For instance, if a contract stipulates five carabaos as fine for the rupturing of the pact, this is to be complied with, regardless of the social rank of the victim.


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Alliances

In the past, Bontok villages have been known to ally (tipan) against a common enemy village. However, these are informal alliances and are short-lived; after a village raid, such alliances are usually dissolved. However, in the peace pact there has been no known provision allowing for peace pact communities sharing a peace pact, to enter into a contract of alliance against a common enemy.

THE KALINGA

Our knowledge of Kalinga political institutions comes from a number of scholars such as Barton (1919); Dozier (1966); Bacdayan (1967); De Raedt (1969); and Takaki (1971) among others.

Barton writes (1949:137) that the Kalinga region has a political organization that is rather feeble so far as domestic affairs go but "has a hard crustacean shell with respect to foreign affairs."

The Region

The region within which the Kalinga cooperates as a social and political unit (Barton 1949; Dozier 1966; Bacdayan 1967; De Raedt 1969:91; Takaki 1971) consists of from one to eight settlements with about 20 houses in each. The northern Kalingas are traditionally dry rice farmers while the southern Kalingas are wet rice agriculturists.

Citizenship. Two factors determine citizenship: residence and blood relationship (descent). Changes in citizenship are usually under the control of the pact holders, as in the case of Lubuagan. According to Barton (ibid.:209), in the Magnao-Naneng district, matters pertaining to changes in citizenship must be added as amendments to the treaty between the regions concerned and may have to wait two or three years until the two regions meet in a lonok celebration, or in a dolnat ("warming-up") of the pact. Changes in citizenship are publicly announced in both the region of nativity and the region of naturalization. If a Lubuagan man decides to marry in Tanglag, reside there and change his citizenship, the following forms would be observed. He would take a gift befitting his station to the pact-holder of Tanglag. The pact-holder in turn would display the gift and announce the inclusion of the new citizen in the pact of Lubuagan. The same announcement would also be made in Tanglag.


Among the Buwaya of northern Kalinga, the leader (ap-apu) has jurisdiction or political influence over a cluster of settlements. He enjoys public acceptance,


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being a mombagbaga (spokesman), a rich man, and a mengol (headtaker). The size of the kin group is important to the ap-apu, since his influence is partly based on fear. His being a headhunter has usually helped in the acquisition of wealth, in as far as his threat of revenge obtained for him a large share of the indemnities for killings (even if he were only a third-degree relation of the victim). The leader also has to be articulate, since he must represent his kin group in disputes (De Raedt 1969:98). In his role as a spokesman a village leader also extends his influence to relations in other villages throughout the region. Village leaders who are collectively called pangats in other Kalinga regions, are also pact-holders, although not all pact-holders are pangats.

The pangats among the Lubuagan are powerful individuals. They are selected by a long, informal process whereby they grow in popular influence and recognition, and are subsequently elevated to the rank. Their main function is to make peace when trouble arises. Pangats are referred to as manlilintog ('right determiner' or 'peacemakers') when they settle conflict cases. The qualifications of pangat include wealth, lineage, family connections with other pangats, personality, cooperativeness, fairness, oratorical ability, a record of having settled cases of controversy between kinship groups, and above all, a reputation as a pugnacious man (Barton 1949:148).

The Go-Between (Mangiugud). The function of the mangiugud or go-betwen is simply to arrange a settlement between kinship groups involved in controversy, but in another respect, his power is vastly greater. The Kalinga go-betweens are functionaries of the territorial social unit as well as of kinship groups. They are honor-bound to punish infractions (with death or wounding) of the peace by either side while mediation is in process. They are also honor-bound not to pay weregild in such cases. That is, they carry out executions sanctioned by the whole region (Barton 1949:164). The go-between's qualifications include the following:

1) Maturity - he must have much political experience in dealing with men;

2) Influence - he must have strong financial and family support. (In earlier times, he must also have had renown as a "killer");

3) Finally, if there is only one go-between, the preference is that he should be related by blood and affinity to both sides in the dispute, or else to neither.

The go-between receives gifts (gunsud) from all those that receive substantial payments for offenses. The receiver of a large field ought to give the go-between a carabao; the receiver of a field or gusi (precious China heirloom jar) worth five carabaos ought to give him a large pig. The gifts should run to about 5-10 percent of the value of the fine received (Barton 1949:167).


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The Bodong

The Kalingas, similar to the Bontoks, have developed a political institution which allows for the resolution of intervillage or inter-region conflict in the bodong or peace pact institution. Barton (ibid:168) thinks that trading partnerships (abuyog) between men of different regions lie at the origin of the present bodong system. As reflected in a number of Barton's cases, the desire for safety in trading with other regions is an important consideration in the making of peace pacts (e.g., ibid:171-172). Bacdayan, Keesing, and Dozier, on the other hand, are of the opinion that the peace pact is of fairly recent development, and was introduced or elaborated during the first two decades of the early American administration.

In the bodong system, the office of the pact-holder is inherited in much the same way that property is. There is a tendency to favor sons, and yet daughters frequently inherit, too.

Generally, Kalinga treaties contain eight general articles which are enumerated by Barton (ibid: 185-86):

1) Statement of the boundaries of each region

These have to be defined whether the region be adjacent to or distant from each other, because they define the people for whom each pact-holder will be responsible.

2) Responsibilities of pact-holder within his region

Each pact-holder is responsible for the acts of citizens of his region and for all acts within the region that affect citizens of the other region covered by the pact.

3) Responsibility of pact-holder in "pollution" cases

Neither region will pollute the soil of the other with foreign blood (each region will respect the neutrality of the other). Neither region will permit a third region to stain the soil with the blood of the other.

4) Guarantee of hospitality to visitors

Each pact-holder guarantees visitors from the other region shelter and food.


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5) Pact-holders' responsibility in cases of illness involving co-pact citizens

In the event of illness or of accident to citizens of one region within the bounds of the other, the pact-holder within whose jurisdiction this occurs will return the persons concerned to their home region, or to an adjacent intermediate region, providing carriers or attendants as the cases may require. In the event of serious illness or deaths, the person will be returned wrapped in blankets.

6) Assistance extended to trading partners

Each pact-holder will assist traders from the other region. If requested, the pact-holder will appoint reliable agents to help decide on the appropriate commissions for the visiting trader or will undertake them himself.

7) Responsibility in theft cases

Money stolen from or lost by a citizen of one region within the other region will be replaced by a collection from the citizens of the place where the theft or loss occurred.

8) Responsibility in collecting debts

Pact-holders will facilitate the collection of debts incurred by their citizens with citizens of the other region by confiscation (taliwan) to cover such debts.

Besides the general articles of the treaty, there may be particular articles covering such points as inclusion of citizens living outside the region, determination of cases of dual citizenship, definition of the status of policemen, Philippine Constabulary soldiers, government officers, or others, under the modern national political system whose acts in most cases are declared outside the scope of the pact-holder's responsibility, if correctly performed as a part of their official duties.

Duties of the Pact-holder. The pact-holder supervises the relations of his home region and the other region with which he holds the pact. For example, if a man of his region slays or wounds a man from the other region, the pact-holder is obliged to slay or wound the offender or one of his relatives.

A pact-holder enjoys certain benefits or privileges from his position, including the following:


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1) He and his relatives are in a priority position for carrying on trade with the region for which he holds the pact.

2) He usually shares in the so-ol (fines) of fields seized and of heirlooms sold between the regions.

3) He avenges transgressions of the pact by slaying the offender or a member of his family. He receives weregilds from the slayer's kinship group and also lotok (a kind of fine) from the offended region.

4) He always shares in indemnities collected from his own people for offenses against the other region and often shares in those collected from the other region for his own people.

Steps in the Making of a Bodong. De Raedt (1969:24) gives us a summary of the steps involved in the institution of a bodong.

1) Sipat is the exchange of two objects (usually weapons like spears or head-axes) of about equal value, between two men who want to make or establish a bodong.

2) Simsim ("to taste") is a ritual held in the region of the peace pact initiators. Each of the leaders appoints the region's pact-holder or kaputong. Grievances are discussed, and announced to the public. There are gift exchanges such as the top-a and palanga, the latter being an exchange of gifts between the wives of the kaputong.

3) Lonok ("to enter") is a large celebration to which delegations from the other region are invited. Differences are once more discussed and payment of indemnities is settled. The tokom (wine in a ritual container) is drunk, and pokaw (ritual boasting) is done by both regions. The provisions of the pact (pagta) are then drawn up.

4) Dolnat/Songot ("to warm up") is much like a lonok celebration where gifts are exchanged. The difference between the lonok and dolnat is that the former procedure is carried out during the forging of the peace pact.

Map-gas ("broken off," "cut") indicates the breaking of the peace pact, and it is announced when the sipat (symbolized by the spear/head-axe) is returned with the message that it be not returned unless the offending region agrees to settle the case.

Weregilds. Barton writes that weregilds are multiple; there is not a single standard of payment either according to rank of the slain or wounded. Barton also informs us that the weregild to be given during negotiations depends more on the


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number of relatives to be bought off, since these would be the most likely persons to retaliate. Secondly, it depends on the general status of the family. For instance, a rich family will demand weregilds of somewhat larger size than a poor one, and pangats always demand more than ordinary folk. Barton further states another observation in relation to weregilds:

...the weregild is a more recent satisfaction than retaliation. The possibility of “buying off” gives wealthy families an opportunity to gain control over the people by killing, and so may likely have led to an increase of killing rather than a decrease, within the home region. It is a phenomenon of the rise of the wealthy to political control (Barton 1949:240).

In summary, the size of the weregild a kinsman receives depends on nearness of relationship, rank, and the amount of fear he inspires among individuals who would violate the pact provisions.

THE IFUGAO

Among the Ifugaos the kinship group is the most important socio-economic and political unit. Each family is responsible for its own affairs (Dumia 1979:11). The settlement pattern is generally described as composed of 20 to 30 houses in a cluster on a hill or a plain surrounded by wet rice terraces. In most settlements the inhabitants are all kinsmen (hintutulang). Knowledge of pedigrees (genealogies) is of paramount importance especially in property conflict cases. This knowledge is possessed by expert genealogists called the mumbaki (Dulawan 1967:4).


The monkalun or "go-between" is according to Barton (1919; 1965:87), a whole court, completely equipped in embryo. He is judge, prosecuting and defending council, and the court record. He is paid a fee (lubbu/liwa) for his services. However, in actual practice the monkalun has no authority except as a peace-making go-between. His power is to persuade with tact, and occasionally to appeal to human emotions.

Should the monkalun find a case not negotiable and decides to withdraw from it, he must impose a truce (pao-wa) of 14 days during which time he is allowed to punish the side that commits an aggressive act against the other. He may kill or wound a man from a kinship group that attacks a member of another while he is mediating a controversy between the two. Breaking the peace while a case is being mediated by a go-between is considered a crime or public wrong. All other offenses are against kinship groups and are torts.


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Biyaw Trading Partnership

The Ifugaos have the biyaw institution, which is the only evidence of some form of external social-political relationship to the village. This occurs when two men of distant regions enter into a highly formalized and ritualized contract which makes them biyaw trading partners, with definite obligations towards each other. Each will trade with the region of the other, but only through the other. Each would be to avenge the killing of the other, or of his trading companions if the killing occurs within certain limits agreed on. Such trading pacts are said to be short-lived (Barton 1919).

Fines. The Ifugaos have an elaborate method of fines which are paid to the family of the offended person. Barton (1919:8) informs us that among the Ifugaos, to a very great extent "might is right" in the administration of justice. For a given crime, one family, because of account of superior war track record, or superior diplomacy or rhetoric, may be able to exact much more severe penalties than another.

THE ISNEG

Isnegs live in small hamlets, preferably near their swiddens planted mainly to upland rice. According to Reynolds and Grant (1973:81) there were few regulations found in this society except those developed within the family group.


Among the Isnegs, political leadership traditionally resides with the kamenglan, the bravest of the headhunters. Aside from his headhunting record, he must be able to settle disputes, and should have some wealth. The mengel may serve as "go-between" to settle internal disputes in the village.

The rights of the mengel were largely ceremonial. In addition to being accorded respect, they were given four special privileges: to boast of their bravery and exploits in warfare at the large feasts (say-am); to carry the dog's head from the house where the say-am was held to the ritual site; to dance the tungtung (dance with bamboo poles); and to be the first person to hold a say-am in the village (Madale 1973:228-243).

Settling disputes

The traditional way to settle an injury or insult was to attempt to gain revenge or to arrange for a go-between to arbitrate the dispute. The mengel might impose a fine on the offender. The fine or indemnity (awat) was not paid to the community treasury, but directly to the injured person or his family. It might


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consist of money, chinese jars, beads, rice, animals, or other forms of wealth and goods.

While certain leadership responsibilities were performed by other members of the community, the mengel and kamenglan were responsible for headtaking expeditions and for the defense against headtakers from other communities, maintenance of peace and order, settling disputes among community members, training the youth for warfare, and maintaining a balance in the economy (ibid.: 233).

Privileges. The mengel are respected leaders and people seek them out for help in the settlement of conflicts. The mengel are not necessarily given any material benefits. In fact, the mengel might use his own property in the settlement of disputes and in giving feasts. The mengel are treated as any ordinary community member. If their relatives violate any of the local customs they are punished in the same way that an ordinary person would be punished. One's relationship to the leader does not make him a privileged person, though the family gains status with him.

Peace Pacts

Peace pacts are made by the Isneg for the purpose of trading and exchanging social obligations with families among other Isneg communities, and among the Kalingas, the Tinguians, and Bontoks. These pacts are made and held by an individual and his kinship group, and the kinship group of his or her spouse. It does not seem to entail the territorial provisions found in the Kalinga and Bontok peace pacts.

Madale (1973:243) observed that one result of the new democratic form of government is the shift in leadership from elderly men to young and middle aged persons. Suggested as one of the reasons for such a shift is education. The gradual phasing out of headhunting and the institution of formal democratic procedures required by the two Barrio Acts (1953, 1960) resulted in many changes: new methods of selecting leaders, very different qualifications for political leaders, additional responsibilities for ordinary citizens, new ways of settling disputes, the introduction of political parties, and the participation of some Ilokano and non-Isneg in matters of leadership.

THE TINGUIAN

The Tinguians inhabit most of Abra (Gaioni 1967) in towns such as Licuan, Lacub, Tubo, Tineg, and Malibcong in the northwest. Although there is a gradual shift from dry rice cultivation to wet rice, swiddening is still an important subsistence activity.


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Peace Pact

Fay Cooper Cole (1915), who did an extensive study (1908-1909) on the traditions of the Tinguian, made no mention of any institution such as the peace pact. Thus, Bacdayan (1967:56) concludes that “Cole’s lack of mention of any pacting arrangement in his thorough study of their social and political institutions earlier in the century would lead us to see them as borrowers rather than inventors of the institution.” Oral history suggests that some Tinguians have established peace pacts with Apayao towns such as Conor and Kabugao in the 1920s and 1930s, and recently with Bontok villages. Headhunting is reported to have stopped in 1913, especially after the establishment of a provincial government.


The community decision-makers are the old men called lalakay. Any conflict within the village was referred to these lalakay for settlement. However, there is scanty information on Tinguian political institutions and political processes. Thus, the necessity for research to update studies carried out among the Tinguians.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Political Functions Among the Cordillera Ethnic Groups

A review of literature on Cordillera indigenous political institutions reveals that there is a range of political structures found among the different Cordillera groups. Although a number of ethnographic works have been written on the Cordillera groups (the works of Barton on Kalinga and Ifugao custom law still being the most comprehensive), it appears that there is a dearth of information on political institutions and political processes.

The Cordillera groups may be viewed as situated within the following range of political functions:

1) Social groups where the family and kin carries out political functions within the community in their relationship with other individuals and families. Relationships outside the village are contracted in the form of trading partnerships such as the biyaw of the Ifugao.

2) Groups that developed political functionaries only of local application, such as the monkalun of the Ifugao, the mengel of the Isneg, and mangiugud go-between of the Kalinga.


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3) Where the kinship group carries out political functions in relation to internal political affairs and external political relations (such as the bodong of the Kalingas, which is held generally, but not always, by pangats).

4) Groups where the family and kin group are subordinated to the village council of old men such as the tongtong of the Ibaloy and the agom of the Kankanaey, who handle conflict cases generally within the village.

5) Groups that developed a political institution regulating the internal and external political relationships of the village by the ator or dap-ay (not kinship-based). The coordination of these wards is effected through the council of elders when the collective interest of the villagers is affected, as in cases of intervillage conflict and the agricultural cycle calendar of activities.

Let us look at the different groups presented and examine them in the light of their concepts of territory and boundaries, leadership, intra-village political relationships, external or intervillage political relationships and concepts of fines and alliances.

Concept of Territory

Among the Cordillera groups examined here, there is an absence of reference to territory and boundaries (in relation to political jurisdiction) among the Isneg, Tinguian, and Ifugao. However, there is mention of the political unit which is the settlement or hamlet, although there is no reference in the literature as to the extent to which political jurisdiction regarding territorial space is defined. Thus it would appear that the concept of territory has not yet been well developed, or else that this subject has been a neglected area of inquiry. It should also be noted that the Isnegs and Tinguians are mentioned as shifting cultivators while the Ifugaos are wet rice terracers who live in scattered hamlets, composed of families related to one another.

Among the larger settlements are the Ibaloys of Kabayan, the Kankanaeys of Bakun and Sagada. Among these groups there is mention of a clear concept of what is considered as an area of political jurisdiction of the physical space considered to belong to the community.

The Kalingas and Bontoks have further defined and reinforced their concept of territory and jurisdiction through their peace pact institution. Between these two groups, the development of compact settlements is a characteristic of Bontok villages; here, wet rice agriculture is the primary means of subsistence. The southern Kalingas also live in clustered hamlets and subsist on wet rice, while the northern Kalingas live in smaller settlements and are reported to be shifting cultivators. The Bontoks inhabit the central Cordillera, an area which is densely occupied by several Bontok communities. The situation has reached the point


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where there is no more unclaimed land to expand into outside the said boundaries. Thus, Bontok communities have defined their traditional boundaries such that each village controls and exploits its own natural resources. Some villages are known to have engaged in armed conflict (see Prill-Brett 1987b) to settle boundary disputes and water rights disputes, aside from the regular intervillage hostilities based on some earlier conflict history where the goal is to even the score and to gain prestige. These boundaries are defined by mountain ridges, mountain draws, brooks, streams, dug-out canals and other natural markers.

Furthermore, the development of a worldview or ideology in relation to “pollution of the soil,” “calling the spirits of the soil to witness an ordeal,” and so forth, reflects the importance of the concept of territory among the Bontoks. Thus, the taboo on eating or drinking in enemy soil, and the safety guaranteed an outsider/alien who eats as a guest within the territory of another, would have to be protected while within the community’s boundaries. The southern Kalinga hold the same view that a person who eats with them must be protected, especially by the person who fed him.


The decision-makers are the council of elders among the Ibaloys, Kankanaeys, Tinguians, and Bontoks. The mengel or kamenglan occupies the position of decision-maker among the Isneg, the monkalun of the Ifugao has political functions but has no authority, while the pangats are the individual powerful leaders among the Kalingas.

Ibaloy. The elders (anum’nemen or impanama) compose the tongtong council whose main function is to settle disputes between persons and families. It may also settle cases of conflict between one neighboring community with another. The tongtong councilmen are not paid for their services.

Kankanaey. The lakay or amam-a are the elders who are sanctioned by villagers to be the decision-makers of the community. These old men are part of the community power elite, with functions including directing, restraining and advising the heads of families as well as prescribing the holding of feasts when necessary. In the northern Kankanaey region the old men who are affiliated with the different wards are the political leaders. The elders (mensapit) who help to settle cases are not paid a fee but partake of the sacrificial animal which the offender is made to provide.

Bontok. The decision-makers are the amam-a or old men, their seniority and their rich experience in life automatically qualifies them to sit in the village decision-making body. At the same time, these old men are affiliated with a particular ator; in cases that involve the welfare of the villagers these elders do not represent their individual wards but collectively become the decision-making council of the ili.


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Kalinga. The pangats are the powerful individuals who belong to this rank. It is an achieved status, unlike the ascribed status of the Bontok and Kankanaey amam-a. Pangats’ qualifications include wealth, lineage, family connections with other pangats, personality, cooperativeness, fairness, oratorical ability, a record of having settled cases of controversy between kinship groups, and above all--a reputation as a “dangerous” man who is said to be feared by his own villagemates. Should the pangat also be a pact-holder, he is expected to take a share of the material goods from weregilds, and other indemnities collected from the other region for his own people. He also shares in the indemnities collected from his own people for offenses against the other region.

The go-between’s (mangiugud) function is to arrange a settlement between kinship groups involved in controversies within the territorial unit. They are selected by the pangats and are honor-bound to punish infractions of the peace by either side with death or wounding, while mediation is in process. The go-between must be a mature man of much experience in dealing with men, must be a man of influence, with strong family backing, and must, in the past, have been a renowned warrior. He receives gifts from all those that receive substantial payments, running in value from 5-10 percent of the value of the total fine received.

Ifugao. The monkalun in criminal cases, has no authority, but according to Barton, is a whole court completely equipped in embryo. The go-between is simultaneously judge, prosecuting and defending counsel, and court record. The go-between is responsible to both parties to a transaction, for the correct rendering of tenders, offers, and payments. He must be impartial to both groups. His power is his art of persuasion, tact, and his skillful playing on human emotions. He is paid a fee for his services. During the period of truce, should any of the parties to the conflict attack the other, it is the monkalun’s responsibility to wound or kill the offender. This is considered an offense against the monkalun, but the punishment is sanctioned by the public.

Isneg. The traditional leaders of the community are the kamenglan who settle disputes. The status of the kamenglan, similar to the Kalinga pangat, is achieved. He serves as the go-between in the settlement of internal disputes. The rights of the mengel, according to Madale (1973:223-4), are largely ceremonial. What makes the mengel different from the Kalinga and Ifugao political functionaries is that the former does not necessarily get paid. In fact, the mengel might use his own property in the settlement of disputes and in giving feasts. Mengels are not given any special privileges except the ceremonial prestige mentioned earlier under the section on the Isneg.

The responsibilities of the kamenglan are: to lead headtaking expeditions and defense against other headtakers from other communities, to maintain peace and order, to settle disputes among community members, to train the youth for warfare, and to maintain the balance in the economy.


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Tinguian. The lalakay are the community decision-makers who settle cases of conflict within the community. Their qualifications are similar to those of the elders in the Kankanaey, Ibaloy, and Bontok communities.

Fines

Among the Ifugaos, Kalingas, and Isnegs, fines which are imposed by the political functionaries are given directly to the offended individual or his kin group, and these are distributed to the kinsmen in accordance with their degree of kin relationship and their ability to take revenge. Among the Bontoks and northern Kankanaeys fines rarely, if ever, go to the offended person or his family. The fine called lakkaw (for offenses such as stealing, wounding, cheating, and violating religious taboos) in northern Bontok, for example, is considered “dirty” and “polluting,” and, should the offended person or his kinsmen partake of it, the belief is that he/she is opening himself to the risk of the same misfortune befalling him again. The fine goes to the village common fund; and since fines are, in most cases, in the form of livestock, the animal is butchered, cooked and partaken of by the elders who are immune from its polluting effect since they are said to be “near their graves.” Fines collected from offenders who are citizens of another village, do not go to the offended individual or to his family, since it is considered “taboo” for the latter to accept such fines. The offended person may be given a replacement for his stolen carabao, but will have nothing to do with the fine imposed for theft of his carabao. The act of stealing from an individual in one village is considered as an offense against that village, although it was an individual citizen of that place who was directly offended. The lakkaw fine imposed on individuals always goes to the village common fund. Should the offended individual partake of it, there is a belief that he will be mafutot (afflicted with an illness whose symptoms include the swelling of the lower extremities and abdomen, the blurring of vision, and finally, death).

A death caused by an individual or group is generally followed by retaliation from the kinsmen of the victim. However the development of a system of payment of weregilds has been observed among the Kalingas, Isnegs, Ibaloys, Kankanaeys and Ifugaos, which may substitute for retaliation. Among the Bontoks, should the relatives of the victim be “hotheaded,” retaliation may be quick, but once the score is even, the neutral relatives (who are related to both parties to the conflict) prevent the occurrence of any further bloodshed. The offender is expected to shoulder all the death requirements of the victim, which would cause him to dispose of his ricefields and other properties. Purification rites between the two families, including the village (which was polluted) are carried out to avoid supernaturally-caused illnesses. This is believed to afflict persons who are hostile toward each other, but might accidentally eat of each other’s food since they belong to the same village.

Alliances

The cooperation of two armed groups against a common enemy has been an observed practice among the Bontoks, northern Kankanaeys, Ifugaos and Kalingas.


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However these alliances are traditionally never of long-term duration. It is for the purpose of one activity, and the agreement is generally not binding after that purpose has been attained.

Among the Ifugaos, kinship is the primary basis for social relations and each individual or sibling group is the center of a kinship group or family. The local group or neighborhood in contrast is relatively weak, and local groups unite only against distant regions, as suggested in the review of literature.

The Institution of Intervillage Diplomacy

The Bontok pechen and Kalinga bodong peace pact systems appear to have been developed independently of each other in the context of the groups’ political, economic and ecological interrelationships. This political institution developed specifically to carry out external political functions in intervillage social interactions. The main goal is to end hostile relationships and establish peace among warring groups. The significant differences between the two peace pact systems, although procedures are very similar, are the development of the ator institution among the Bontoks, which has taken over the political functions carried out by the kin group among the Kalingas. The ator is not a kinship group, although it resembles it. It is a corporate group which acts, to some extent, as a legal fiction (see Prill-Brett 1987b) owning a common fund used for the benefit of its members and possessing its own membership incorporation rules. As a political entity it can sue and likewise be sued on behalf of its members. There are less conflicting loyalties of kinship groups since loyalty and cooperation in the ator is not based on kinship but on membership obligations (see also Eggan 1963). Thus, when an ator becomes guardian of a peace pact the qualification of wealth is not important since each ator member must contribute to the expenses incurred in any of the feasts related to the peace pact. Furthermore, the pact holder need not have a large kin group since the ator male members’ duty is topolice the pact. It is also the ward members’ duty, under the elders’ supervision and instigation to carry out what a Kalinga pact-holder’s kin group is responsible for. The ator pact guardian is responsible for the maintenance of the pact in behalf of the village. Thus, the Bontok have developed a system which decentralizes political responsibilities not only in its internal functioning but also in external relations through the guardianship of peace pacts by the several ators in one village.

Together with the development of the peace pact institution, we see the development of the concept of territory. Such a concept may have evolved in a reciprocal manner where territory was defined and incorporated in the peace contract, where zones of safety and responsibility were agreed upon by the parties to the pact. It appears, from the literature, that the Kalinga and Bontok have the most developed indigenous political concept of territory as expressed in their peace pact treaties.

The concept of autonomy is an indigenous development which plays a major role in the functioning of Cordillera communities. The indigenous concept of autonomy means that no other community imposes its own rules, laws, or will on


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any other, thus, explaining partly the presence of short-term alliances, since each village jealously guards its own sovereignty in relation to their internal community political affairs.

Cordillera autonomous communities developed their own rules to regulate internal relationships. Some groups did not find it necessary to elaborate on the kinship group which was sufficient to carry out political functions. Others such as the Ifugao have developed political functionaries to handle conflict cases among individuals and families. There are, however, Cordillera communities such as the Bontok who found the need for the regulation of external political relations as populations increased and scarce resources such as agricultural land and water began to be felt. Resource competition among these communities may have led to armed conflict (see Prill-Brett 1975; 1987b). The Kalinga saw intervillage and inter-regional trading as an important reason for the establishment of political relations to make trading safe.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A number of Cordillera groups, since the above ethnographic studies were written, have been undergoing a process of change which may have affected their political institutions in varying degrees. Moss (1920) wrote about the tongtong of the Kabayan Ibaloy as it was functioning during the early decade of this century. Cole (1915) described the Tinguian based on his 1908-9 field research. However, no systematic research has been carried out on political institutions since these works emerged. A more recent study by Madale (1973) on the Isneg, informs us that the superimposition of national government political institutions, with the new qualifications for political leadership, have weakened the indigenous political leaders’ status in the community. The mengel has given way to the barrio captain, and literacy is becoming an important qualification for political leaders. The introduction of non-Isneg political leaders has also undermined the traditional political functions. Traditional bases for qualification of political leaders have become obsolete (e.g., the need for the person to be a good headhunter). Furthermore, the kinship group which was the rallying point of the individual is slowly losing its importance in the modernization process. Bello (1972) writes that among the Bakun Kankanaey, the at-atoan lost its political functions, which is taken over by the municipal government. Some northern Kankanaey dap-ay (wards) are now exclusively used for ceremonial purposes, specifically the coordination of rice agricultural cycle activities. With the disappearance of headhunting, the introduction of the municipal government and a new political system, wage labor, and increasing participation in the cash economy, some Cordillera groups have given up their indigenous political practices and incorporated or adopted the national system (e.g., some of the Ibaloy and southern Kankanaey).

Why have some groups given up their traditional political institutions while others have persisted and have even become more elaborate? Which Cordillera groups are still practicing the indigenous forms? What changes have taken place


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regarding political structures and processes? These are some unanswered questions which will be investigated by an ongoing research which is being undertaken by the Governance and Public Policy research program of the Cordillera Studies Center, at the UP College Baguio.

RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS

This review of literature has revealed some of the gaps in the ethnographic literature on indigenous Cordillera political institutions. The data are inadequate, as reflected in the inventory of literature, to aid in the understanding of the emergence, disappearance and/or persistence of indigenous political institutions. It is essential to get historical perspective of the development and dynamics of these institutions through time, and the effects or influences of exogenous developments on the indigenous political systems.


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REFERENCES

Bacdayan, A.

1967 The Peace Pact System of the Kalinga’s in the Modern World. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms. (Xerox.)

Bagamaspad, A., and Pawid, Z.H.

1985 A People’s History of Benguet. Baguio City: Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc.

Barton, R.F.

1919 “Ifugao Law.” American Archeology and Ethnology. Vol 15, no. 1. University of California Press.

1949 The Kalingas. The University of Chicago Press.

Bello, M.

1973 Kankanay Social Organization and Culture Change. Quezon City: Community Development Research Council, University of the Philippines.

Botengan, K.

1976 Bontoc Life Ways. Capitol Publishing House. Cawed, C.

1972 The Culture of the Bontoc Igorot. Manila: MCS Enterprises, Inc. Cole, F.C.

1915 Traditions of the Tinguian. Field Museum of Natural History Anthropological Series. Vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 1-226.

De Raedt, J.

1969 “Some Notes on Buwaya Society.” Saint Louis Quarterly. 7:7-110. Dozier, P.

1966 Mountain Arbiters. Tucon: The University of Arizona Press. Drucker, C.

1977 “To Inherit the Land: Descent and Decision in Northern Luzon.” Ethnology. 16 (1):1-20.

Dulawan, L.

1967 “The Ifugaos.” In UNITAS. Vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 4-52.


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Dumia, M. 1979 The Ifugao World. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.

Eggan, F.

1963 “Cultural Drift and Social Change.” Current Anthropology. Vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 347-355.

Gaioni, D.

1967 “Effects of Social Economic and Ecological Changes on the Traditional Ritual Life of the Tinguians of Abra.” The Ilocos Review. Vol. 7-8, pp. 15-36.

Jenks, A.

1905 The Bontoc Igorot. Manila Publishing. Kamora, H.

1927 “Highlanders of Luzon.” (Typewritten.) Keesing, F.

1949 “Some Notes on Bontok Social Organization, Northern Philippines.” American Anthropologist. 51:578-601.

Madale, A.

1973 “Political Organization.” In The Isneg of the Northern Philippines, pp. 228-242. Edited by Reynolds and Grant. Dumaguete City: Siliman University Museum Library.

Moss, C.

1920 “Nabaloi Law and Ritual.” American Archeology and Ethnology. University of California Publications. Vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 207-342.

1920 Kankanay Ceremonies. University of California Publications.

Prill-Brett, J.

1975 “Bontok Warfare.” M.A. thesis, University of the Philippines. 1987a Pechen: The Bontok Peace Pact Institution. Cordillera Studies Center

Monograph 1. Baguio City: Cordillera Studies Center, UP College Baguio.

1987b “Landholding and Indigenous Corporate Groups among the Bontok of

the Mountain Province, Philippines.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of the Philippines.


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Reynolds and Grant 1973 The Isneg of the Northern Philippines: A Study of Trends of Change

and Development. Dumaguete City: Siliman University Museum Library.

Robertson, J.

1914 “The Igorots of Lepanto.” Philippine Journal of Science. Vol. 9. Scott, W.H.

1974 The Discovery of the Igorots. Quezon City: New Day Publishers. Takaki, M.

1971 Aspects of Exchange in Kalinga Society, Northern Luzon. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms. (Xerox.)

a survey of cordillera indigenous political...

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