A Tale of Two Committees: CERD and CEDAW and the Protection of Migrant

Workers’ Rights in the Gulf

Nick McGeehan

European University Institute, Florence

Outline

The region The problem Mafiwasta International Obligations CERD August 2009 CEDAW January 2010 Following Up

The Gulf Cooperative States

Economically, socially, culturally homogenous

0.5% of world population 20% global oil production /

reserves Strong western allies Recent history of slave

trading and use of slaves Dependence on migrant

labour

$Arabian Gulf vs. $South Asia

Bahr

ain

Kuwai

t

Oman

Qatar

Saud

i Ara

bia

Unite

d Ar

ab E

mira

tes

Bang

lade

shIn

dia

Nepal

Pakist

an

Sri L

anka

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

gni/capita (2007 figures)

Migrant Workers in the Gulf

Imposition of debt Passport Confiscation Kafala system Denial of access to justice Denial of trade union rights No active civil society Active repression of human

rights defenders No press freedom

Mafiwasta: Origins and Goals

International Obligations

ICCPR OP ICESCR OP MWC CERD* CEDAW

Bahrain

y n y n n y y

Kuwait y n y n n y y

Oman n n n n n y y

Qatar n n n n n y y

UAE n n n n n y y

Saudi A

n n n n n y y

*none have recognised the Committee’s competence to accept individual complaints under Article 14 of CERD.

CERD: August 2009

“he observed that the State party’s society appeared stratified, with an element of separation between citizens and different groups of migrant workers. In that regard, he recalled the Committee’s view, expressed in general recommendation XIX, that a condition of racial segregation could arise without any initiative or direct involvement by the public authorities...”

CEDAW: January 2010

57. The Committee requests the State party to provide, within two years, written information on the steps undertaken to implement the recommendations contained in paragraphs 27 and 37 [shelters for abused women + legal protection of foreign workers]

Thank YouThe End