a time of unprecedented instability

8/12/2019 A Time of Unprecedented Instability

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A Time of Unprecedented Instabilityonversation with Zbigniew Brzezinski on today's worldwide turmoil, overstating Iran's near-t

lear threat, and why a return to global order may rest on the relationship between the United

tes and China.

AVID R OTHK OP F

Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter throughout hterm of office, has remained one of the most prominent strategic thinkers in the Unite

tes throughout the ensuing three and a half decades. Recently, while talking with FP Gr

O and Editor David Rothkopf, he expressed a concern that we might be living in a period

precedented instability worldwide. When Rothkopf asked him to elaborate on the idea,

posed that they discuss the subject. An edited transcript of that conversationfollows.

pite his concerns about worldwide instability, Brzezinski offers a clear vision for what h

eves are the essentials for stabilizing the current unrest, a vision that begins with the

derstanding that first,the United States and China must both embrace one another as th

n centers of power in the modern world.

ezinski is bracingly direct in addressing the challenges faced by the United States with

dership role, the problems faced by the Europeans and those caused by Vladimir Putin,

deteriorating situation in the Middle East. His is a vision in which the United States mu

h lead more actively while at the same time set limits as to where and when it will interv

s offering an alternative to current U.S. foreign policy that builds on some of the core th

vanced by President Barack Obama concerning the reframing and rethinking of the

plication of American power. At 86, the former Columbia professor and prolific author o

rity and a breadth of experience that few others in Washington can equal and that expla

y so many in power, including those in the White House, regularly turn to him for advic

ezinski's most recent book is Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/21/a_time_of_unprecedented_instability_a_conversation_with_zbigniew_brzezinskihttp://www.amazon.com/Strategic-Vision-America-Crisis-Global/dp/0465061818http://foreignpolicy.com/voices/rothkopfhttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/21/a_time_of_unprecedented_instability_a_conversation_with_zbigniew_brzezinski


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vid Rothkopf:You told me that you felt that we're living in a time of enormous instability

rldwide, to the point that it was unprecedented in your recent memory. Can you elabor

at you meant?

gniew Brzezinski:I would even say that this is historically unprecedented, in the sense

ultaneously huge swaths of global territory are dominated by populist unrest, anger, an

ective loss of state control. One of my feelings about the United States is not that we're

lining and are faced with imminent crisis of survival, but that we are losing control of o

ity at the highest levels of dealing with challenges that, increasingly, many of us recogn

fundamental to our well-being. And yet we cannot muster the forces or generate the

dership to deal with them. So that makes us, the preeminent power, increasingly devoid

ategic will and a sense of direction.

for Europe, we saw in the wake of what happened in Ukraine that we cannot expect Euro

ert itself internationally (or even to join us effectively) when challenged for the first tim

ce 1939 with a unilateral effort at territorial expansion by a state in the region. Asia is pet

the prospects of a rising China, but also by increasing nationalist conflicts with its neigh

ip, of course, the Middle East, which is in turmoil, and Africa, which is beginning to

erience it. So I think we're seeing the kind of world in which there is enormous turmoil

gmentation and uncertainty -- not a single central threat to everybody, but a lot of diver

eats to almost everybody.

:Let's talk about the causes of all this. Why is it happening now? What makes this periodferent? In the Middle East, there has been discussion about this being the end of the era

es-Picot -- foreign powers are unwilling or unable to extend spheres of influence, and lo

wers are unable to stop grassroots forces within their borders. Is this kind of thing -- the

line in international mechanisms to stabilize the world, a retreat by the United States,

willingness by the current administrationto assume a bigger role outside its region for C

d European confusion and weakness, combined with newly empowered forces of unrest


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ground level -- responsible for this new era of instability?

I see some parallels between what's happening in the Middle East and what happened i

ope during the Thirty Years' War several centuries ago, namely the rising of religious

ntification as the principal motive for political action, and with terribly destructive

nsequences. That's one aspect.

ondly, right now, looking more narrowly at the Middle East, what countries in the Midd

t right now are really self-sufficient in terms of their identity and sense of unity and pow

ion-states? Turkey, Iran, Israel, Egypt. That's about it. And the rest -- very numerous an

y restless -- lack these attributes. They are unstable or more easily destabilized. And we

adding to it in a post-U.S. Afghanistan. And who knows what will then be happening in

istan?

:And post-Iraq Iraq.

Well, I should have mentioned that, of course. In that context, from my perspective, wh

should be doing is, first, trying to work more effectively with those countries that are reous players, which means some accommodation with Iran, which is an authentic state

iable and is going to be there. Also, of course, Turkey. And of course Israel, in part for

sons of commonality in terms of civilizational ties, but also, in that context, by the Unit

tes providing greater clarity as to what we think is a necessary precondition for success

ael. And that means a really overt, open adoption of a perspective that most Israelis wou

ept, except for the extreme right wing, which dominates its politics -- namely, somedamental accommodation of Palestinians' aspirations.

:An independent Palestinian state.

Yes, the goal should be two states working in collaboration with each other.


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:And presumably, also added into that is some acceptance of some imperfect states tha

bilizing -- like Egypt, where ...

But Egypt is an authentic historical state, and that's unique. The reason the French and

tish solutions for stabilizing the region failed, really, was because it was based entirely o

ce. It was a colonial arrangement with the pretense of national boundaries and national

ntity for people who didn't identify themselves in such a European kind of traditional

ion-state terms. And when Britain and France, so to speak, failed, we stepped in, playing

und with these arrangements, and it has turned out very badly.

e difference between the Bush I war against Iraq and the Bush II war against Iraq is that i

t one, we appealed to the sentiments and interests of the different groupings in the regio

d had them with us. In the second one, we did it on our own, on the basis of false premis

h extremely brutality and lack of political skill.

:In the first instance, there was also a recognition that there were stabilizing factors in t

ion and that we didn't want to risk disturbing those stabilizing factors. So, for example,

intaining Saddam in the place precluded some other issues and counterbalanced thenians.

Yes, and he hated al Qaeda, for example. He was a vigorous opponent of it.

:So now you're saying that we're starting to reap the whirlwind associated with the inva

raq. And in pulling out of Afghanistan, we are almost certain to find opening the door toiban a destabilizing force there. And if we push too hard on democracy in Egypt, we ma

d ourselves supporting destabilizing forces there as we did when some in the administra

med to embrace [Mohamed] Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood too quickly and too

aciously. We went into Libya without a long-term plan, unleashing destabilizing forces

failed to take decisive action in Syria, and as a consequence of that and the situation in

destabilization in Syria has spread. Risks are everywhere and the world's major stabiliz


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wers -- the United States, the EU, and the Chinese -- have an appetite for constructive

ervention in very few of these situations. Do you see us entering a period where we plac

w premium on supporting stability, even if it's not optimal from a political perspective or

mocratic perspective? An approach for which there's plenty of precedent in American fo

icy.

Well, I think we're doing that in part already, for example in Egypt. If one looks at the

ices -- and my strong preferences are dictated primarily by democratic imperatives -- w

viously we should be for the Muslim Brotherhood. Instead, I think with some reluctance

settling for supporting the Army in the hope that the Army will consolidate the state an

ntually evolve somewhat like Turkey. It's probably a better bet. But in the larger sense, w

uld say is this: I think the whole region now, in terms of the sectarian impulses and sect

olerance, is not a place in which America ought to try to be preeminent. I think we ough

sue a policy in which we recognize the fact that the problems there are likely to persist a

alate and spread more widely. The two countries that will be most affected by these

elopments over time are China and Russia -- because of their regional interests,

nerabilities to terrorism, and strategic interests in global energy markets. And therefore

uld be in their interest to work with us also, and we should be willing to play with them

assume sole responsibility for managing a region that we can neither control nor

mprehend.

:One more thing on the Middle East before we sort of switch gears, because you talk ab

accommodation with Iran, and clearly this has been something that's been on Presiden

ama's mind since he was even campaigning. And seeing the United States pushed byumstances in Iraq to at least act in some kind of tacit parallel effort with regard to ISIS,

mic State, and seeing the nuclear talks going on, many in the region are anticipating a t

d they are worried because so many of the problems we've had with them over the cour

last 30 years has had to do with their destabilizing role through Hezbollah, their state

port of terror, their support for Assad, Hamas, and so forth. Can we trust them as a part


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Basically, I see Iran as an authentic nation-state. And that authentic identity gives it

esion, which most of the Middle East lacks. In that sense, it's a more solidly defined sta

n, let's say, Egypt, which is similar and -- but doesn't have yet authentic, real cohesion.

blem with the Iranian regime of course is, one, its unsettling effects on the Sunnis,

ticularly Saudi Arabia, and, secondly, its potential threat to Israel.

e question is, how do you best solve that? I certainly don't accept the notion that the bes

ution is all options are on the table, which is the politest way of saying we're going to go

r if we don't solve the nuclear problem quickly. The fact of the matter is Israel has an eff

clear monopoly in the region, and it will have that for a long time. And one thing that the

nians are certain not to do is to undertake some suicidal mission the moment they have

mb. So the notion that's been publicized in America that there could be a crazy Iranian r

have the bomb in nine months is, to me, meaningless. What do you do with a single nuc

apon that you have for the first time, that you haven't tested, that you haven't previousl

aponized, that you cannot be sure that you can deliver effectively, and with which you

not protect yourself from retaliation because you don't have any more? And the Israeli

ve a very strong military, and they have about, what -- estimates are 150 to 200 bombs. T

ough to kill every Iranian. So I think that issue is phony.

:What about our traditional allies in the region, like the Saudis, the Emirates, the --Bahr

dan certainly, who are all very nervous with this potential of any kind of accommodatio

h Iran. Do you see it as important to maintain a balance and to cultivate those moderate

es as well in the region?

Well, that depends a great deal on what they do themselves as they acquire more capab

modern warfare and as, perhaps, they are increasingly driven by the morality of nation

even more so sectarian, motives. I, for example, am baffled by the whole history of the

ent tragedy in Syria. It's unclear to me what exactly the Saudis and the Qataris thought t

e accomplishing by launching a sectarian war in Syria, and I am even more baffled by w

thought we were going to accomplish by endorsing it as we did in such a hesitant, unde


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y.

:In many of these places, you've got a strong state and then you have the clergy, but th

other infrastructure in the country to represent in some organized way other views. An

Egypt, when [Hosni] Mubarak fell, the only other choice was the Brotherhood. There is a

d to build up institutions that provide a moderate alternative, which has not been really

dressed.

And ultimately, that has to come from within. And since the second Iraqi war, we [the

ted States] became basically disqualified as the eventual promoters and protectors of an

nstructive outcome. So in my view, it would be better to strike some sort of tacit

derstanding with the Chinese and the Russians regarding what in the region we will view

unacceptable threat, and what in the region we're going to let be.

:So, you're suggesting we have to find some kind of major-power collaborative mechan

t don't really exist right now. But the Chinese don't seem ready to embrace such a role,

Russians have hardly been constructive.

Well, the Russians have damaged themselves enormously by their invasion of Crimea a

ir actions in Ukraine and that makes their ability to undertake any such role more diffic

o, they are -- and we have to face this, and they have to face this -- much weaker. It's rea

d the Chinese. And the Chinese are more prudent, but sometimes insensitive of the

irations and self-interests of their weak, small neighbors. And those countries of course

re than anything else, want our umbrella to protect them. I think we have to be calmlydent and not become the automaticpoint of contactwhenever any one of the smaller

ntries gets into a tiff with China and feels all it has to do is phone us and get our

mmitment.

:The Europeans have effectively taken themselves off the playing field by moving towar

ucture within the EU where they can't actually formulate or execute a foreign policy. Ar


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of the picture, or is a different kind of partnership possible?

Well, they are not out of the picture, but I don't think they sufficiently understood the

ngth of narrow, self-focused, European nationalisms, in which states and national iden

and have been the preeminent glues that hold things together. And I think the notion o

ted Europe was very understandable in the immediate wake of World War II. But then

onary European statesmen faded away.

Where are the fathers of Europe that really believe in the

European identity? And the EU then turned out to be, in

end, essentially a distributed arrangement in Brussels

involving money and quid pro quos, but very little sense

common purpose.

:You know, if you switch over to Asia, Southeast Asians say part of the problem is that t

ited States is not there to counterbalance the Chinese. China has a plan, they're going

ntry to country, they're offering to build railroads and ports, and, you know, they're so

ating interdependence -- and the United States doesn't have much to offer. We pivoted,

med, briefly, as those efforts have spluttered away in the absence of the leadership prov

people like Hillary Clinton, Tom Donilon, and Kurt Campbell during the first term.

anwhile, you do have this other interesting phenomenon occurring simultaneously, wh

Japanese reconsidering their defensive military posture while also recognizing that, giv

rise of China, they need to embrace India. So you have this Abe-Modi bromance brewin

Exactly, yes. And that could in some ways become a major impediment to excessivenese expansionism. I say excessive because some of it is understandable. But if it's

tivated by some sense of regional hegemony as one of the building blocks of a globally

eminent posture, then it's of course something we cannot exactly ignore.

ink our policy ought to be such that the Chinese themselves recognize the obstacles an

ts of insensitive expansionism because of the impact it produces on the countries you

here are the fathers

Europe that really

elieve in the

uropean identity?


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ntioned and notably, by way of example, India and Japan. I don't think we should be ou

nt in managing all these issues. Let the Japanese take the lead if they want to play a mor

ve regional role -- I wouldn't mind at all to see Japan more internationally involved, glo

olved. But if they want to be essentially engaged in some sort of a conflict with the Chin

ich relatively obscure little islands assume symbolic significance, then it's not in our int

be supporting that.

:It's not. And yet there is an expectation that we will.

Because of the treaty. But I think the treaty has to be understood by the parties as invo

fundamental interests of both countries. And that is to say we have a fundamental inte

Japan being a successful democracy with military capabilities that can enhance global

bility. We don't have an interest in Japan being a successful country economically with

itary capabilities for the pursuit of very specific nationalistic objectives.

:I feel like your analogy with the Thirty Years' War was interesting because that was clea

iod of major protracted chaos that's evocative of today and that, of course, that ended i

aty of Westphalia -- the birth of the modern system of nation-sates.

d as you talk about the Middle East and you talk a little bit about Asia, one of the things

u're saying is that the solution isn't a superpower imposing its will. It's actually major-po

ndominium of some sort in each place, where the United States and the Russians and th

nese and -- or maybe the United States and the Indians and the Japanese -- find some

ance and set a set of priorities that say, we'll leave it to the regional dispute-resolutionchanisms unless it passes this threshold, at which point we'll, you know, we will act in

cert, either together or within an international forum. Is that -- is there in that an evolvi

del for dealing with this particular period for volatility that you are advocating?

Maybe. It would be a combination, really, of some practical regional arrangements, but

fail-safe mechanism for it being ultimately the ability of the United States and the Peop


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public of China to work together, because the Russians really are a side aspect to it, of so

portance particularly to the issue we talked about earlier, namely the Middle East and th

Muslim awakening and the sectarianism.

:So like it or not, we're moving into a world of a G-2 plus.

Unstated. Yes.

:Right. Well, but the Chinese are very resistant to that idea.

That's right. I have a little bit of experience on that, because on the occasion of the 25th

h anniversary of the normalization of relations, I was in China for a big event, and I gaveech in it in which I said, basically, we are now moving into a G-2 world. And the Chinese

dience got electrified, and there was a lot of excitement about it and so forth. And then w

w weeks it was made clear by official circles not to applaud this point of view, because t

American plot to entangle the Chinese into largely American -- and excessively so --

blems.

: Well, you know, it gets into another area of instability you mentioned -- which is Africa

ere you've got violent extremism, you've got chronic instability, and you've got conflict

udan and Somalia and Central African Republic and Nigeria and Mali and so on. And, o

rse, this is a region in which the Europeans have some historical interest.

To put it mildly.

:Yes. And they've been modestly involved.

And modestly successful.

:Right. And the Chinese and the United States have growing interest there -- more the


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nese than the United States at the moment. You know, is the answer to Africa to let thes

blems fester? Or do you need this kind of condominium, or the G-2 plus to be operative

ce like that as well?

Yes. And the Chinese do seem to have long-term interests in Africa. And my hope is tha

mately or in certain cases, Europe can be seen, hopefully, an extension of us, provided

get, for example, the trade arrangements with the Europeans -- tie that with NATO, get

raine to become part of Europe, which then in turn is likely to suck Russia towards Euro

ause the shadow of China will increasingly loom over Russia. And that all can eventuall

rk to our collective benefit.

in America is another area where America has real problems, and we are learning to be

erant. We have learned to live with Cuba. We have learned to live with Nicaragua. We hav

rned to live with Venezuela. And there may be others who will become anti-American. B

learning to live with all that and avoid conflict. And China is increasingly down there, b

y aren't competing ideologically with us. And we should be tolerant of that. By the same

en, we can do the same for them in Asia. That is to say, you sort out your problems nea

don't go to excess. That is to say, tolerate some measure of autonomy.

:Some Monroe Doctrine light?

Yes. And it's symmetrically sustainable.

:It's interesting, though, because, you know, I mean, in Latin America we have almost nicies to speak of. Occasionally a leader will make a trip. We don't really do that much. Bu

e of the big political crises here at the moment is the border crisis, and if you look at whe

people are coming from, it's countries like Honduras, which is racked by drug wars and

highest murder rates in the world. And these are crises that are nearby that we haven't

olved with that are now spilling into our cities and into our states, which suggests perha

ght to be a little bit more engaged than we have been. Some of that tolerance you spoke o


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s a bit like neglect to some of our neighbors.

That's true. And we have to deal with it, to a greater extent, based on our sense of natio

erest. Consider the human aspects, of course, but don't let those regimes exploit that in

ical fashion by shoving into our society the problems that they are unwilling to deal wit

t because of their antiquated social structures, social inequality, lack of social justice, a

th. And the same thing may well be the case in -- let's say in the relations between China

me of its immediate neighbors that have long felt threatened by China's presence, but th

e to accommodate to the reality that China is going to be there forever.

:Again you return to the centrality of the U.S.-China relationship as the most important

bilizing force in this emerging environment.

And the absence of an ideological collision between us and the Chinese is what

erentiates both of us together from our conflict with the Soviet Union or the earlier coll

h Hitler and Germany. In both cases, there was intense antagonism, in part because of

nventional geopolitical reasons, but in part also because of profoundly conflictive ideolo

irations.

:Part of another contributing factor in this instability has, I think, to do with the fact tha

st of the multilateral mechanisms that we have long ago reached retirement age. You kn

st of them were created in wake of World War II. They've served us for a long time. Most

m were developed to deal with those realities. And whether it's the U.N. Security Counc

U.N. overall, or it's the lack of an enforcement mechanism with the NPT, or it's the absmechanisms to deal with climate or to deal with things like cyber, it seems that the

ltilateral superstructure of the world could use a little bit of an upgrade.

And on the case of cyber, the problem is that it's a threatening issue for the most advan

ntries in the world. And that specifically means us and the Chinese in this area. And

refore I'm not sure it's subject to any generalized solution. It may require a head-on


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ponse to it by both of us, either collectively or in some fashion even antagonistically.

example of what I mean here: We recently exposed Chinese cyberattacks on us. We nam

people involved, and we published their pictures; we issued indictments against them,

orth. I wonder whether that is as effective as if we had instead used their methods and

ocked the hell out of their buildings and institutions engaged in it, at the same time tellin

Chinese leadership, very politely, we didn't like what they were doing to us, so we did

ctly the same thing to them. Please don't continue this, because this can escalate, and w

ow what we can next do. I think that would be far more credible then generating more pu

ipathy for the Chinese, thereby making it more difficult to negotiate issues.

:But also, we made empty gestures. When you go and say you're going to indict people

u're not going to indict and who are never going to come here and will never be prosecut

any penalty -- it's meaningless.

Exactly. But I am worried that we're moving to a situation in which they can do terrible

ngs to us -- the latest reports again indicate that there is more going on than we know ---

n we are sending protests. Instead of protesting, it would be much better, since we're no

ing anybody, to do a little more of the same, plus a little more, more than they have don

hem, so they realize this is pointing in dangerous directions.

:Well, with regard to the broader issue, though -- for example, as we have discussed in t

t, the U.N. Security Council isn't representative. You know, the U.N. lacks enforcement

chanisms; the NPT lacks enforcement mechanisms. We don't have effective internationmate mechanisms. What multilateral measures might help us get our arms around this p

nstability?

Well, I would say, first of all, before we try to get new multilateral institutions, we have

ke certain that a bilateral relationship can be the point of departure for dealing with that

blem, because if the bilateral relationship -- by which I mean our relationship with Chin


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stable and is not guided by a genuine recognition by both sides of our respective intere

rking together, then no multilateral institution created in that context is going to work.

we have to deepen the scope of that relationship with the Chinese (without it being

claimed, because the rest of the world would object to it), in effectcreating a kind of

derstanding of what the relationship between Rome and Byzantium once was. Rome an

antium had many similarities, were extensions of the same empire, but they had separa

titutions of power. And we have to face the fact that probably for the rest of our lifetimes

ess things go to hell, which would be even worse -- the United States and China are fate

aborate if the world is to have a system that is effective. And on both sides there is real

position to that -- institutional, traditional, philosophical, and to some extent just human

d we have different motives. For example, in China I think the military, and especially th

vy, has very strong feelings about us [here in the United States], and here in our own soc

tain business interests feel threatened by Chinese imports, plus there is a kind of latent

ive opposition to the Chinese.

We are a super-democracy, and they are essentially a se

serving dictatorship. And we overlook the fact that our s

democracy is not so perfect these days and we face so m

many, liabilities that we might better concentrate on the

little bit more.

:We just had this kind of tour of the horizon, which is what we said we were going to do

ked about a lot of different sorts of events, and in each one of the cases we find that kindentive -- you know, all roads don't lead to Rome but they lead to Beijing and Washingto

me way or another.

Syria there was a role for China, and with Iran sanctions there was a role for China. The f

tabilizing the region and the future demand for oil there is a link to China. The ability to

ply sanctions to Russia in the wake of Ukraine is adversely impacted by the degree to wh

e are a super-

emocracy, and theye essentially a self-

rving dictatorship.


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Chinese and the other BRICS don't want to go along with our plans. So they've got a car

y in that hand. Clearly in all of the Asian things there is a central Chinese role; even in

istan and South Asia there is a historical role. And economically in Africa and in Latin

erica, they have a very big role.

ain, the only other party in the world -- the only other entity comparable to the role of th

ited States and the Chinese -- is the Europeans, who have embraced the kind of federali

ms of foreign policy that has essentially left them on the sidelines.

The problem is, you're discussing a concept -- the kind of directed, coherent foreign po

t states have historically employed -- which in the case of America and China has subst

aning. Americans and Chinese identify with a nation-state that is theirs and that

mulatively exercises enormous power. Who are the Europeans? You go to Paris or you go

tugal, you go to Poland, and you ask, who are you people? They'll tell you, we're Portug

re Spanish, we're Polish. Who are the people that are really European? The people in

ssels, in the EU bureaucracy. Europe has not been able to move to the level of patriotic

ntification with the concept.

:They tried to legislate something or achieve it by fiat -- and in the case of the United St

example, it took a hundred years and the bloodiest war that had ever happened in the w

That's right. That's a good point.

:-- to get to that kind of cohesive viewpoint.

And we don't wish the Europeans some sort of civil war out of which somebody will em

reme because of the variety of nations in Europe.

anwhile we have to be very careful in how we try to cultivate the relationship with the


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nese in a cooperative fashion without ultimately setting in motion sensitive reactions to

se of identity. Being the standard-bearers of a country that's existed for 5,000, 6,000 ye

y probably have a more relaxed attitude about who they are and about us being differen

being quasi-partners than we have about them. So we can easily become overinvolved

otionally in their internal problems. They don't get involved emotionally in our internal

blems.

:And they're also much more comfortable with the long view and slow burn --

Precisely.

:-- and we're much more now-now about everything.

Also, the Chinese were never as stupid as the Russians, who came to us and said repea

e'll bury you." Not exactly an enticing invitation to a cooperative relationship.

:Well, then let me ask you one last question. We've talked about constructively sort of s

he mechanisms by which one could stabilize, but it's the hundredth anniversary of the

he First World War, and you can't help but look at the situation particularly in the Midd

t right now and see some distant echoes of the Balkans in the period mainly before the

rld War, and Central Europe more broadly.

ou can imagine ISIS going, for example, into Jordan and changing the whole complexio

s thing instantly because the United States and Israel feel compelled to respond, then yo

see this escalating. But you can also see this intersecting with a third intifada. You cou

ntersecting with what's going on in Crimea and Ukraine in that part of the world. There's

sibility of a kind of wildfire here, of some sort of trigger. Does that worry you in this?

Yes, but only up to a point. That is to say, yes, there are some similarities with 1914, but

4 the major powers had a rather narrow vision of the world in general, were preoccupied

ir most immediate concerns, and they figured that they could resolve them by the use o


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ce, which then escalated into what came to be called a world war.

on't think any of the equivalent powers today have that orientation. We don't want to be

ply drawn into the Middle Eastern crisis. The Russians would prefer us to be drawn mo

ply into it, but then not themselves. The Chinese are playing the game of watching from

e. And that provides, I think, some distance and some degree of insurance that this is n

ng to explode and do anything equivalent to 1914.

at doesn't, however, mean that we should be passive. It does mean that we should be pr

he use of our force and try to work with what we can.

d this is why I -- at the beginning of this conversation -- very deliberately mentioned the

sting nation-states in the Middle East that have some historical geopolitical viability: Tun, Israel; Egypt potentially, although probably not very actively; and then, in the

nscendental level, with China as a kind of co-equal stakeholder - a vague stakeholder, w

stakes never being precisely defined, in some residual global stability; with the Russian

e past their current complication with the Europeans, a potential ally; with India and Ja

potential second-level players; and with both we and the Chinese accepting our special

eminence, theirs on the Asian mainland, ours in the Western Hemisphere and Europe, o in a special relationship with Japan. And that's the best we can do, and I think we can

rate on that basis in the course of this century. It's going to be tough. It's going to be

ngerous and destructive, but I don't think we're sliding to a world war. I think we're slidi

era of great confusion and prevailing chaos.

:But it could take a while to get to broad recognition and acceptance of a model you jus

ked about.

Well, it's not the question of whether acceptance is going to be there. That reality is the

d we have no choice.


18/18

:No, but you may have a period where people don't act. Looking at the situation in Iraq

e scenario that seems quite plausible to me is that [Bashar al-] Assad gets a hold of a chu

ia and we decide not to push him out because we see him as a useful counterbalance to

en, [Nouri al-] Maliki looks at us trying to push him out; the Iranians are willing to tolera

m -- he doesn't want to be a puppet of the Iranians, but it's a better offer -- and so the Iran

d Maliki sort of stabilize the Shiite portion of Iraq. And so you get this kind of no man's l

ompassing part of Syria and part of Iraq that falls under the de facto control of the Islam

te. And so in the middle of this region we've not only rewritten the map. But in the midd

you then have a radical Islamic state.

And if you keep an open mind, we may also be in a situation in which Israel and Iran

ually develop a stake in each having nuclear weapons, which is the way things were hea

en the Shah was in power. I mean, who was helping the Shah's nuclear program and who

ping the Israeli nuclear program? They were both helping each other through the Frenc

ey didn't envisage it as a zero-sum game the way [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu

ay. I can envisage a nuclear-armed Israel and a nuclear-armed Iran being a source of

bility in the region.

:Certainly that doesn't seem to be on the horizon given where Israel is right now.

It is certainly caught up in a destructive cycle at the moment. That's why I feel that it's

igation to speak truth to our friends. And as I have said, if you establish Palestine as a

uine independent co-partner with Israel, Israel and Palestine have the potential to beco

Singapore of the Middle East. They have all the brainpower, all the initiative, and could

revolutionary changes in the region. So that could be a subpart of resolving the curren

moil. But unlike in the past it is not the dominant story, no longer central. It is just one

ong many rapidly changing crises that we need to address or face the consequences of

ving stood by and done too little.

n McNamee/Getty Images

a time of unprecedented instability

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