a weaponized space race between the ... - debate-kansas...

DEBATE-Kansas City Some ev from camps. Thanks college debate. US-China Space Coop Neg

China Space Cooperation Neg China Space Cooperation Neg...................................1

*** Coop Solvency Answers – No Coop....................2

AT: Con 1 A. Congress Fearful/Ignorant....................2

AT: Con 1 A. Congress Fearful/Ignorant....................3

AT Con 1 B. No Space Cooperation Now...................4



AT Con 2 A. US Makes China a Threat.......................7

AT Con 2 A. US Makes China a Threat.......................8

AT Con 2 B. US China Space Cooperation Key...........9

AT Con 2 C. Space Exploration Key to Survival........10

AT Con 2 C. Space Exploration Key to Survival........11

AT: Con 3 – US China Space Cooperation Solves.....12

AT: Con 3 – US China Space Cooperation Solves.....13

Space Coop Bad – Cost............................................14

Space Coop Bad – China Doesn’t Benefit................15

Space Coop Bad – China is a Bad Partner................16

Space Coop Fails – Chinese Military........................17

Space Coop Bad – China Says No............................18

Space Coop Bad – Generally Fails............................19

Space Coop Bad – Fails to Help US-China Relations 20

Space Coop Bad – Hurts US-China Relations...........21

Space Coop Bad – Hurts US Security/Leadership....22

Space Coop Bad – Lack of Compromise...................23

Space Coop Bad – Multiple Countries Backlash.......24

Space Coop Bad - NASA Rollback............................25

Space Coop Fails – No Chinese NASA......................26

Space Coop Bad – Transparency.............................27

Space Coop Bad – Time Frame................................28

Space Coop Bad – US Doesn’t Gain/Loses...............29

US-China Relations Impact Answer.........................30

Space War/Space Race Impact Answer...................31

Politics Links............................................................32

***Militarization Disadvantage*******.................33

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Militarization DA.....................................................34

Militarization DA– Uniqueness................................35

Militarization DA– Uniqueness................................36

Militarization DA– Link............................................37




Militarization DA– Anti-Satellite Scenario...............41

Militarization DA– Anti-Sat Scenario.......................42

Militarization DA– Anti-Sat Scenario.......................43

Militarization DA - Impact – China is a Threat.........44



Militarization DA – Impact – Proliferation to Enemies47

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*** Coop Solvency Answers – No Coop

AT: Con 1 A. Congress Fearful/Ignorant

Obama has shown that a President can simply go around the Wolf amendment and cooperate with China on space.

Daniel Wiser, assistant editor of National Affairs. The Washington Free Beacon. October 2, 2015. Obama Administration Evades Congress by Hosting First Space Dialogue with China http://freebeacon.com/national-security/obama-administration-evades-congress-by-hosting-first-space-dialogue-with-china/

The Obama administration is attempting to circumvent Congress by cooperating with China on space activities despite concerns about Beijing’s development of anti-satellite weapons and cyber theft of information from NASA, according to critics of the U.S. policy. On Monday, the U.S. State Department led the first “Civil Space Dialogue” in Beijing with China’s National Space Administration (CNSA). According to a State Department press release, “U.S. and Chinese officials exchanged information on respective space policies” and “conducted discussions on further collaboration related to space debris and the long-term sustainability of outer space activities,” as well as “satellite collision avoidance.” The inaugural meeting raised eyebrows among some analysts who noted the general prohibition in U.S. law against U.S.-China cooperation on space issues. Former Rep. Frank Wolf (R., Va.), a staunch critic of the Chinese government’s cyber attacks and human rights abuses, inserted language in the 2011 U.S. spending bill that barred joint space activities among NASA, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and China, a provision that remains in effect today.

Even if the US Congress is slow to the party, global cooperation over space is inevitable.

Moltz – Prof @ Naval Postgraduate School – 10 James, China, the United States, and Prospects for Asian Space Cooperation, December, Journal of Contemporary China (2011), 20(68), January, 69–87

But the increasing crowding of space itself, the need for improved control over debris, and expanded efforts to avoid collisions are providing top-down pressures on all countries—regardless of region—to cooperate more closely in ‘managing’ space. While relatively autonomous policies were possible in the early decades of space activity, recent events (such as the 2007 Chinese ASAT test and the 2009 Iridium–Cosmos collision) and the resultant increase in orbital debris have forced countries and their militaries to begin thinking more collectively about space. The recent willingness of the US Air Force to expand its international data sharing on conjunction analysis regarding space debris and satellite collisions marks a significant evolution in American thinking. China’s restraint from conducting additional kinetic ASAT tests since 2007 may be part of the same learning curve. These factors suggest that increasing cooperation and transparency may yet emerge in the coming years, since states recognize that the alternative is the possible loss of safe access to low-Earth orbital space.

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AT: Con 1 A. Congress Fearful/Ignorant Congress is not ignorant, but correct, to fear the Chinese space program because it presents a very real threat.


Top U.S. officials have increasingly raised concerns about China’s testing of space weapons and cyber hacking against NASA and other U.S. agencies and companies. Adm. Cecil Haney, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, said earlier this year that the threat in space from China “is a real one” and that “it’s been demonstrated.” Beijing tested two anti-satellite interceptor missiles in the last couple years that are designed to target low and high-earth orbit satellites, the latter of which include vital intelligence, navigation, and targeting systems. China also conducted an anti-satellite test in 2007 that destroyed a Chinese weather satellite, creating tens of thousands of bits of orbital debris that threatened the International Space Station and other U.S. and global space systems. NASA officials described it as the most hazardous generation of debris in more than a half-century of space operations. “Just seeing the nature of these types of activities show how committed they are to a counter-space campaign,” Haney said. “So we have to be ready for any campaign that extends its way into space.” Fisher said “China is now leading the militarization of space,” noting that it tested two new space launch vehicles within a week last month that could also serve as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon systems. “These are the Long March 6 tested on September 20 and the Long March 11 tested on September 25,” he said. “Both are ‘rapid response’ small satellite launchers that could be quickly modified to carry ASAT interceptors.” He added that “China is building a dual-use, military and civil space station, a dual-use space plane, and is poised to make military use of its first Moon bases in the later 2020s or early 2030s. But instead of calling out China, this Administration is undermining the intent of Congress and strengthening China’s credentials as a responsible leader in space.”

Congress is correct to fear China. They have already stolen space technology.

Erik Seedhouse, Aerospace scientist and fellow of British Interplanetary Society. 2010 The New Space Race, http://www.springerlink.com/content/978-1-4419-0880-3#section=685117&page=3&locus=69]

China has a long history of acquiring technology by nefarious means. A good example is the launch of China’s lunar satellite, Chang’e, which appears to have been adapted from the design of DFH-3, a Chinese communications relay satellite. The DFH-3 was developed in record speed thanks to a large number of Western components used. These components included elements such as the Matra Marconi-manufactured central processor, the infra-red Earth sensor built by Officine Galileo, and parts of the solar panel built by Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm. When the Chinese decided to build the lunar probe, it simply adapted the Western DFH-3 components, enabling them to proceed quickly and reliably. More recently, the FBI, in conjunction with other US counter-espionage agencies, have tagged more than 100 people and companies allegedly involved in clandestine aerospace technology transfer benefitting China’s space program. For example, physicist Shu Quan-Sheng, a naturalized US citizen, was arrested on September 24th, 2008, on charges of illegally exporting space launch technical data and services, in addition to offering bribes to Chinese officials concerning the Long March (LM)5. Shu, a president of a NASA subcontractor, provided technical assistance and foreign technology acquisition expertise to several of China’s government entities involved in the design and development of the LM-5 space launch facility, an activity that the US alleges began in 2008.4 In another recent case, US citizen, Ping Cheng, and Singaporeans, Kok Tong Lim and Jian Wei Ding, were charged with conspiracy to violate export administration regulations by attempting to illegally export high-modulus carbon fiber to China. The material, known as Toray M40 and Toray M60, is a corrosion-resistant material used for electromagnetic shielding in rockets and spacecraft.

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AT Con 1 B. No Space Cooperation Now

International space cooperation that includes China is happening right now.

Vidvuds (Vid) Beldavs. Taught space industrial development since 1977. Dec 2015. Now works for the FOTONIKA-LV photonics research center of the University of Latvia. The Space Review. Prospects for US‐China space cooperation by Vid Beldavs Monday, December 7, 2015. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2878/1

The first International Space Exploration Forum (ISEF) was organized by the State Department in January 2014, with the attendance of over 30 countries including several developing countries as well as China. It follows the dialogue begun by the European Commission and the European Space Agency (ESA) in November 2011 in Italy. ISEF was billed as the first ministerial level international conference to promote international collaboration in space exploration and to the application of space science and space technologies to address problems on Earth and to promote economic advancement. William Burns, Deputy Secretary of State at the time, stated in his keynote remarks: Now is the time to come together to make space exploration a shared global priority, to unlock the mysteries of the universe, and to accelerate human progress here on earth. I am confident that we will advance further, faster, if we work collectively. The US-China Civil Space Dialogue can be seen as part of a process of building international collaboration in which the ISEF conference is a point of focus. Japan has agreed to host the next ISEF Conference in 2016 or possibly 2017. No doubt much will depend on continued progress with the US-China Civil Space Dialogue, with the next meeting planned for 2016 in Washington, DC. The ISEF process indicates that the Obama Administration has a major commitment to space, with the US playing a leadership role in broadening collaboration beyond the established players, notably through engagement with developing countries and China. ISEF points to a major role for international collaboration to advance space exploration and to the application of space technologies to address critical problems on Earth and to accelerate economic advancement.

The US has started space cooperation with China already.

US Department of States September 28, 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/247394.htm

Pursuant to their shared goal of advancing civil space cooperation as agreed upon in the Strategic Track of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in June 2015, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of China convened their inaugural Civil Space Dialogue on September 28, 2015, in Beijing, China. The meeting was co-chaired by the Department of State for the United States and by the China National Space Administration for China. The convening of this first Civil Space Dialogue launches a new initiative to enhance cooperation between the two countries and provide better transparency on a variety of space related issues. At the inaugural meeting, U.S. and Chinese officials exchanged information on respective space policies. They conducted discussions on further collaboration related to space debris and the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. Both sides also exchanged views on issues related to satellite collision avoidance. The two sides summarized information on national plans related to space exploration and discussed the next multilateral meeting of the International Space Exploration Forum. The two sides discussed ways to cooperate further on civil Earth observation activities, space sciences, space weather, and civil Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). Both nations confirmed the importance of the Civil Space Dialogue, and reaffirmed that this Dialogue would strengthen cooperative relations between the two countries and advance the space cooperation outcomes of the Strategic Track of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Both sides agreed to hold the second meeting of the Dialogue in Washington, D.C., in 2016.

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http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/burns/remarks/2014/219501.htm

http://www.state.gov/e/oes/sat/isef2014/

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2878/1


AT Con 1 B. No Space Cooperation Now The Wolf amendment will eventually be overturned.

Foreign Policy. Com 2013 http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/17/this-congressman-kept-the-u-s-and-china-from-exploring-space-together/ This Congressman Kept the U.S. and China From Exploring Space Together. ZACH ROSENBERGDECEMBER 17, 2013 - 10:23 PM

This is but one issue stemming from Wolf, at great frustration to NASA’s employees. Wolf’s legacy in preventing cooperation with China will almost certainly be reversed eventually — the costs of such stringent legislation are simply too great to ignore. In the meantime, Wolf’s retirement will bring an end to one of the most adversarial relationships NASA has with its political overseers.

US space cooperation with China is increasing.

Yahoo News Aug 22, 2015 https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-china-space-freeze-may-thaw-historic-experiment-121123777.html?ref=gs US-China Space Freeze May Thaw with Historic New Experiment

A Chinese experiment is being readied for launch toward the International Space Station (ISS) in what could be the forerunner of a larger space-cooperation agenda between the United States and China. NanoRacks, a Houston-based company that helps commercial companies make use of the space station, has signed a historic agreement with the Beijing Institute of Technology to fly Chinese DNA research to the orbiting outpost next year. No commercial Chinese payload has ever flown to the orbiting lab before. Space-policy experts said they viewed the agreement as a significant step in shaping possible future joint work by the two spacefaring nations. [Latest News About China's Space Program]

A weaponized space race between the US and China is inevitable.

Chambers, Naval Post Graduate Thesis, 2009 [Rob Chambers, “China’s space program: a new tool for PRC ‘soft power’ in international relations?”, March 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA497039&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]

Manned spaceflight has been the great human and technological achievement of the past 50 years. By launching astronauts and taikonauts into orbit, the US and China have stirred the imagination of the world while expanding and defining human experience. In the first few decades of the 21st century, manned spaceflight will continue to generate public enthusiasm and to embody the human drama of exploration. However, the distrust and lack of cooperation between Washington and Beijing suggest human spaceflight may be overshadowed by a competition in which the two main players seek to display their technological prowess and bolster national prestige. Since both countries recognize that space can provide one country with advantages, or at least avoid disadvantages, compared to the other, such a competition would seem inevitable. For its part, the US understands that the manned space arena can no longer be regarded as their backyard – a fact that is perhaps even more relevant militarily.

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AT Con 1 B. No Space Cooperation Now The US and China have established a space hot line to avoid conflict in space.

Value Walk. Com 2015. http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/11/china-u-s-launch-space-hotline-avoid-space-war/China, U.S. To Launch Space Hotline To Avoid Space War. By Brinda Banerjee on November 27, 2015

However, security experts in China and elsewhere have clearly realized that the risk of in-space collisions and accidents is high and such an incident could easily lead to war back home on earth. Given that the relationship between China and the United States is particularly defined by the desire to outcompete one another, the possibility of a space collision is particularly worrying. And so, Beijing and Washington have decided to set up a “space hotline” to address these concerns.

The space hotline will prevent conflict in space between the US and China.


The space hotline is going to allow direct communication between Beijing and Washington; The Financial Times reports that the hotline will enable the two governments to quickly and efficiently exchange information about each other’s projects and actions in space. The hotline has been conceptualized for the express purpose of avoiding run-ins and unintentional confrontations in space. Using the hotline, officials in China and the United states hope to be able to discuss plans, tests and the likelihood of their paths meeting in space. The hotline will serve as a conduit between military authorities and space program officials.

The space hotline is similar to the red phone during the Cold War and it will prevent miscalculation and conflict.


The space hotline with China is not the first time the U.S. has chosen to pursue faster communications systems and cooperation with a rival power: in the post-Cold War era, Russia and the United States established a direct line between Moscow and Washington, known as the “red telephone”. Direct links such as these are developed to help traditional competitors avoid catastrophes because the tenuous nature of their ties may trigger off a conflict at any given moment. As problematic as space collisions are as of themselves, Beijing and Washington are particularly worried about accidents being interpreted as acts of aggression. A chance encounter may create severe misunderstandings between the two countries and could be incorrectly understood as an act of war, thus inciting actual conflict between the states. The two governments have identified potential risks that may create such a misunderstanding; for instance, experts suggest that unintentionally harming another country’s orbiting satellites would render that country’s intelligence and other systems useless: while this may not, in fact, be a desired outcome it would no doubt be received badly and may force the affected state to enforce counter-measures or retaliate in kind.

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AT Con 2 A. US Makes China a Threat China is a threat and the idea that space cooperation can build peace is an illusion.


Further cooperation with China on space issues, Fisher said, is unlikely to blunt Beijing’s ambitions. “Advocates for U.S. cooperation in space with China are motivated by the hope that by building ‘peace in space’ they can assist ‘peace on Earth,’” he said. “This was an illusion when sought with the former Soviet Union, and it is an illusion that China will abandon any of its power objectives on Earth in favor of cooperation in space.”

China will use dialogue and cooperation to gain an advantage in space.


The first U.S.-China space dialogue also raises questions about whether Beijing could use the expanded cooperation to steal U.S. space technologies, which it has been accused of doing repeatedly in recent years. The U.S. appropriations act for 2015 maintains Wolf’s restrictions against U.S.-China collaboration on space issues. It reads, “None of the funds made available by this Act may be used for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act.” While the appropriations law does not specify that the State Department is banned from engaging in such bilateral activities with China, the first joint space dialogue included NASA’s counterpart in China and several examples of collaboration on space issues. Rick Fisher, a senior fellow on Asian military affairs at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said it appears that the administration might be trying to bypass U.S. law and congressional oversight. “The Obama administration’s decision to circumvent Congress and proceed with dialogue about cooperation proves to China that it has correctly calculated that it can wait out the Americans, gain the benefits of space cooperation without making any concessions to U.S. and Western interests in avoiding war in space,” he said.

It is healthy to examine possible threats – better than repressing them.

Joanna Macy, General Systems Scholar and Deep Ecologist, 1995, Ecopsychology) There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion , popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that “to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen.” Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, “When an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate.” But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate.

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AT Con 2 A. US Makes China a Threat US policy will not change China’s space policy or its intentions.

Xianqi, professor at the Institute of Command and Technology, and Junqin, PhD candidate at the Institute of Command and Technology, 6 (Maj. Gen. Chang and Maj. Sui “Active Exploration and Peaceful Use of Outer Space” accessed: 6-30-11 http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=244) TJL

In regard to the U.S. missile defense program, China opposes an arms race in any form. This position is evident in its consistent and strong support for the non-weaponization of space. China is willing to work with other nations to prevent the deployment of weapons in space by any country or region. If the United States ultimately chooses to deploy weapons in space, it will be profoundly regrettable; however, it will have no impact on China’s space program, particularly its manned space program. Regardless of circumstance, China will continue to resolutely uphold its defense-oriented national defense policy, and continue to explore and utilize outer space for peaceful purposes.

Under Obama the US has recognized that international space cooperation is inevitable.

Fukushima – National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense, Japan – 10 Yasuhito, An Asian perspective on the new US space policy: The emphasis on international cooperation and its relevance to Asia, December

The Obama NSP clearly recognizes that international cooperation is vital in addressing these challenges. It states that not only the USA but other countries also share the responsibility and “calls on all nations to work together to adopt approaches for responsible activity in space.” Also, the section on international cooperation in the inter-sectoral guidelines specifies that the USA will pursue bilateral and multilateral TCBMs “to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space.” Now it is increasingly important for the USA to go beyond its traditional cooperation with allies and partners, and to expand cooperation with virtually all nations. Thus, the Obama administration sees international cooperation as a “key cornerstone” of its NSP not only to take advantage of growing opportunities, but also to maintain both US primacy in space, and the safety and security of space . For the USA now, international cooperation has been evolving from “nice to do” to “must do” status.

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AT Con 2 B. US China Space Cooperation Key China has no interest in cooperation – it’s inviting everyone but America to the space party.

Laxman, journalist for Asian Scientist, 6/27/11 (Srinivas, AsianScientist, “China’s Space Mission: The Long March To The Moon And Mars Home”, http://www.asianscientist.com/features/chinas-space-mission-moon-mars/, 6.30.11, SWolff)

On the 50th anniversary of the first human space flight by Yuri Gagarin, the Chinese government made an announcement which was extremely appropriate for the occasion: it will launch its own space station. This project was already on the cards, but it was formally confirmed during the 50th anniversary celebrations. Called Tiangong (天宫) or Heavenly Palace, the 60-ton space station will be constructed in orbit from a series of modules launched over the next few years. After the initial trials in docking and rendezvous, it will be manned by a three-man crew. The present International Space Station (ISS) weighs 419 tons and generally has a six-man crew or more. For quite some time, the US has been trying its best to include China in the ISS program, but the Chinese response has been lukewarm. The Chinese space station program envisages two spacecraft – Shenzhou-9 and Shenzhou-10 – being launched in 2012, which will dock with the Tiangong-1 module. The Chinese have invited scientists from all over the world to participate in the project, and speculation is rife that a Pakistani scientist could perhaps be one of the earliest guests. Apart from the scientific significance, space scientists feel that the Chinese space station project is endowed with a lot of political and geopolitical ramifications, and is being viewed as a clear challenge to US dominance in space. China’s Space Flight Program: Codenamed Project 921 The space station project is a part of China’s ambitious human space flight program, codenamed Project 921, which incorporates a number of Russian technologies.

Cooperation will not influence the direction of China’s space program and could hurt relations.

Sterner – Fellow @ the George C. Marshall Institute, held senior staff positions with the House Armed Services and Science Committee – 2009 Eric, US-China space relations: maintaining an arm’s length’, Space News, (2 March 2009), p. 19.

Others will be tempted to promote a partnership in the vain hope of influencing the direction of China's space program. The simple truth is that China's space program exists to serve the interests — both domestic and foreign — of the rul-ing party in Beijing. It is not merely an appendage of the U.S.-PRC relationship to be directed by western carrots and sticks . The Chinese people are immensely proud of their accomplishments in orbit, as well they should be. They represent technical prowess that once be- Beijing's space behavior through the promise of a close partnership any more than King Canute could order the tides to stop. Indeed, a true partnership may exacerbate the conflict of interests by strengthening China's technical capabilities and political weight in space matters. Instead of seeing new potential partners in China, space policymakers must watch the full range of developments in China closely with an eye toward improving our understanding of Beijing's capabilities and intentions.

Space cooperation with China fails because of Chinese military influence.

Cheng – Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation 2009Dean, U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs Than Benefits, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/10/US-China-Space-Cooperation-More-Costs-Than-Benefits?query=U.S.-China+Space+Cooperation:+More+Costs+Than+Benefits

Indeed, China's space program is overwhelmingly military in nature. And nowhere more so than in the manned space program, the "commanders" or "directors" of which include the head of the General Armaments Department, one of the four general departments responsible for day-to-day management of the entire People's Liberation Army (PLA). The challenges presented by the Chinese space program's strong ties to the PLA are exacerbated by the generally opaque nature of China's space program on issues ranging from who the top decision-makers are to the size of their budget. Any effort at cooperation is likely to be stymied so long as the PRC views transparency as a one-way affair.

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AT Con 2 C. Space Exploration Key to Survival Space exploration is not key to everyday survival. For people suffering on Earth it’s a waste of money that trades off with domestic programs that could improve their quality of life.

Chris Lisee Staff Writer at Stevens Institute of Technology, 2009 Freelancer at Recorder Community Newspapers, former student at Ithaca College and Harvard Divinity School, “Race Without End”, 2/2209, http://eportfolios.ithaca.edu/clisee1/essays/spacerace/)

The United States had picked itself up was now significantly ahead of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the USSR remained true to Petrov’s word, experimenting only with orbital flights and abandoning their lunar program. There is no doubting that the lunar landing gave the United States a large morale booster, but what had it actually accomplished? Even before 1969 people had begun to speculate over the benefits of the space program. After the moon landing William Leavitt, Senior Editor of Air Force Space Digest, wrote: As the post-moon-landing decade opens, the President and his advisors simply cannot ignore the large body of opinion—public and congressional, that, for reasons ranging from worries about social problems at home to plain economy, takes exception to space spending in general (Rabinowitch 106). There is an old joke about NASA’s use of funding: “The United States government wanted their astronauts to be able to write in zero-gravity, so NASA spent years and hundreds of thousands of dollars researching and developing a pen that would write in space. The Soviets took a pencil.” Though this tale is only a myth, it reveals the common notion that United States’ space program is economically wasteful. NASA faced budget problems ever since its inception, and the Administration’s feasibility was attacked even as it achieved its goals (Lyons). The race to the moon had cost $25 billion in upgrades to NASA facilities and billions more in mission spending, not to mention three human lives (Lyons). By comparison, all eight years of the Vietnam War cost the United States a little less than $14 billion per year, notwithstanding the cost of lives and morale (Moniz). Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. could not understand the rationale behind this spending, and neither, it seems, could America. NASA listened by scaling back its missions to the moon for more “scientific” ventures. In fact, Apollo missions 18, 19, and 20 were cut from the program so money could be funneled to these tasks (Lyons). Some people however, especially scientists, believed that space exploration should continue unabated. Sidney Hyman, a Fellow of the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International affairs, proclaimed that the public was confusing the Space Race with the War in Vietnem: “I would judge that once the malignance of the Vietnam conflict is removed, the perceptions of Americans will be opened more fully to the changes in outlook” (Rabinowitch 52). This proved to be untrue; Americans were disillusioned with both the space program and the war. Instead, two other arguments for continuing the space program without cutting funding proved to be more feasible. The first of these arguments was for scientific progress. Sir Bernard Lovell, a British astronomer, gave two reasons for manned lunar landings. The first was to study “the science of the moon itself.” The second was to set a base on the moon for use in researching the solar system and universe (Rabinowitch 5). Though these may seem like wonderful goals to a scientist, it is easy to see how a common person would have difficulty understanding their importance. Knowing where we came from will not solve world hunger, nor will it end war. So why put all this money into research? Senior Specialist in Space and Transportation Technology of the Library of Congress Carles Sheldon stated the United States had benefited from advances in “weather reporting, communications, and military support flight” (Rabinowitch 57). These are all indeed wonderful advances that aid us in our daily lives. Without the larger plan of spaceflight, these technologies may not have evolved, so Sheldon’s point is valid. The other argument for continuing the Space Race places Race as a battlefield for the Cold War. Supremacy over the skies would prove invaluable in the nuclear arms race. Mose L. Harvey, who was the Director for the Office of Research for the USSR and Eastern Europe of the Department of State, wrote, “It is questionable whether any nation, even one as richly endowed as the United States, can long continue as a great power if it concedes to others primacy in such a sphere as space” (Rabinowitch 77). Time has proven Harvey wrong. China, a major player in today’s economy, only succeeded in putting a man in space in 2003, making it the third nation to do so. Meanwhile, other countries such as India and Iran have proven their might economically and militarily. Supremacy in space, it seems, has little correlation with a nation’s power.

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AT Con 2 C. Space Exploration Key to Survival Space exploration is a waste of money and based on American insecurity.

Gerard DeGroot Space Author Telegraph Feb 25th 2009 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/4807506/The-space-race-is-a-pointless-waste-of-money.html

Forget giant leaps for mankind, Nasa is a machine for spending money. That fact has been driven home by the ignominious failure of the Orbiting Carbon Observatory, a $278 million package which blasted off from Vandenberg air force base on Tuesday and promptly crashed into the Pacific. The satellite, we were told, would advance the study of global warming. But Nasa isn't interested in global warming; it simply realises that wearing green is a way to get government money. While most Americans have moved on, Nasa is stuck in the 1960s. That explains the desire to go to Mars, an aspiration given the seal of presidential approval in 2004. Bush's project, priced at $400 billion, was inspired by his desire to stay ahead of the Chinese in the new space race. Just as in the 1960s, the ability to make shallow gestures in space is still assumed to be an indicator of a nation's virility. During a recent radio programme, a Nasa astronaut asked me how the American people might react if the next man on the moon were Chinese. I replied with a question: "why are Americans so insecure?" If the Chinese want that worthless rock, so be it. Obscenely expensive manned missions mean that practical, earth-based science suffers, as does the genuinely valuable satellite research so essential to the way we live today. It is no wonder that the most articulate opposition to the Apollo missions came from Nobel scientists who objected to the way their budgets were bled in order to fund an ego trip to the moon.

We must pull the plug on space exploration and focus our energy on earth.

Gerard DeGroot Space Author Telegraph Feb 25th 2009 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/4807506/The-space-race-is-a-pointless-waste-of-money.html

The time has come to pull the plug on meaningless gestures in space. An expensive mission to the moon (especially at a time of global recession) seems like lunacy when terrestrial frontiers such as disease, starvation and drought cry out for cash. Furthermore, expensive space missions add credence to fundamentalist allegations about American spiritual vacuity. So far, Obama has sent mixed signals when it comes to space. A year before the election, he announced that a hike in education funding would be paid for by cutting the Mars mission. Then, three months later, he started courting Nasa, perhaps to woo voters in Florida. By last August, he had gone full circle: expressing full support for Bush's pledge. For a man who got to the White House promising change, that sounds depressingly like 1960s logic. While it is not Obama's habit to revere old Republicans, he would do well to study what Nixon and Eisenhower had to say about space. Nixon was the first president to catch on to Nasa's trick of using past expenditure to justify future investment. As the agency argues, going to Mars will make what was spent going to the Moon a good investment. That's a clever way of endlessly spending money without ever producing anything. But the final word goes to Eisenhower, who once vetoed Apollo. He reminded Americans that "every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed".

We should build survival technology on Earth – not Space.

Lind, Policy Director of Growth at the New America Foundation, 2011 Michael, New America Foundation, “Why We Should Embrace the End of Human Spaceflight”, 4-12-11, http://www.newamerica.net/node/48345, CH

What about the argument that part of the human race needs to dwell somewhere other than on Earth, if humanity is to avoid extinction? In 500 million years the gradually warming sun may boil the oceans, and a few billion years later the sun will evolve into a red giant, incinerating or engulfing the Earth. Our descendants, if there are any, might consider relocating. In the half-billion years until then, the chances of war, plague or global warming producing the total extinction of a species as numerous, widespread and versatile as humanity are pretty low. A sufficiently large asteroid or comet impact like the one that caused the extinction of the dinosaurs could do the job. But if a massive bolide threatened the Earth, we would send unmanned spacecraft, not Robert Duvall or Bruce Willis, to steer it away

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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/4807506/The-space-race-is-a-pointless-waste-of-money.html


or destroy it. In the event some other natural catastrophe -- a supervolcano, a nearby supernova -- rendered the surface of the Earth temporarily or permanently uninhabitable, it would be cheaper and easier to build and maintain underground bunkers than to use the same technology to do the same thing at vastly greater cost on the moon or other planets or in space stations. By the same token, if humanity had the technology to "terraform" the surface of Mars, it would have the power to make the ruined surface of a dead Earth habitable again, making the colonization of Mars unnecessary.

AT: Con 3 – US China Space Cooperation Solves Three major barriers to cooperation with China make it unworth the risk.

Dean Cheng. Senior Research Fellow for Chinese political and security affairs at The Heritage Foundation. 2014 http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--space-cooperation Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate. April 9.

My comments today pertain to prospects for cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in outer space. While the United States should not avoid cooperation with any country out of fear, at the same time, it is vital that cooperation occur with full understanding and awareness of whom we are cooperating with, and that such cooperation serve American interests. In the case of the PRC, the combination of an opaque Chinese space management structure, a heavy military role in what has been observed, and an asymmetric set of capabilities and interests raise fundamental questions about the potential benefits from cooperation between the two countries i n this vital arena. To this end, it is essential to recognize a few key characteristics of China’s space program. First, that China possesses a significant space capability in its own right, and therefore is not necessarily in need of cooperation with the United States. Too often, there is an assumption that the PRC is still in the early stages of space development, and that we are doing them a favor by cooperating with them. Second, that the Chinese space program is closely tied to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), their military. Therefore, any cooperation with the PRC in terms of space must mean interacting, at some level, with the PLA. Third, that the Chinese space program has enjoyed high-level political support, is a source of national pride, and is therefore not likely to be easily swayed or influenced by the United States, or any other foreign actor. These three issues, in combination, suggest that any effort at cooperation between the United States and the PRC will confront serious obstacles, and entail significant risks .

Beijing would want substantial benefits for its cooperation.

Cheng, Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center, 2009 (Dean, The Heritage Foundation, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs Than Benefits,” 8-30-9, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/us-china-space-cooperation-more-costs-than-benefits, 6-29-11, GJV)

Moreover, Beijing is likely to extract a price in exchange for such cooperation. The Chinese leadership has placed a consistent emphasis on developing its space capabilities indigenously. Not only does this ensure that China's space capabilities are not held hostage to foreign pressure, but it also fosters domestic economic development -- thereby promoting innovation within China's scientific and technological communities -- and underscores the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Consequently, the PRC will require that any cooperation with the U.S. provides it with substantial benefits that would balance opportunity costs in these areas.

Cooperation with China is impossible – it is empirically proven.

Pollpeter, specialist on China policy, 2008 (Kevin, specialist on China policy and former member of the RAND think tank, “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE,” March 2008, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub852.pdf, Jskoog)Increasing trust in regards to space activities appears to be difficult when space operations, in particular counterspace operations, may figure prominently in Chinese efforts to strike asymmetrically at the United States in the event of an armed conflict. 100 In the past, cooperative efforts with China’s military have been difficult. The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), designed to reduce the risk of accidents and miscommunication in the air and on the sea, has been bogged down since the collision of a Chinese fighter with a U.S. reconnaissance plane due to Chinese insistence on using the venue to claim sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone. Even when the United States transferred military

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technology to China during the 1980s, the Chinese were reluctant to provide the United States with the basic motivations for certain technologies. 101 and normally only divulge information that has already come out in the Chinese press. China’s space experts also appear to function as a conduit for disinformation. One prominent Chinese space expert concludes in an English language publication that “It is obvious that assertions judging China’s manned spacecraft program as a military threat are baseless.” 102 Yet, in an internal military publication the same author argues that human spaceflight technology “can carry a large amount of effective military payload” and can be used for information support missions as well as function as a weapon or as a weapons platform. 103

AT: Con 3 – US China Space Cooperation Solves Space diplomacy has been failing.

Lee Billings is an editor at Scientific American covering space and physics 2015. August 10. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/

In response to these possible threats, the Obama administration has budgeted at least $5 billion to be spent over the next five years to enhance both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. military space program. The U.S. is also attempting to tackle the problem through diplomacy, although with minimal success; in late July at the United Nations, long-awaited discussions stalled on a European Union-drafted code of conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China and several other countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The failure has placed diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo, likely leading to years of further debate within the UN’s General Assembly.

Space cooperation between China and U.S. won’t work – too many political and security disagreements.

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009 (Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.5, http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf, accessed 7/6/11) EK

In considering the potential for cooperation, the discussions undertaken at the three workshops have served to highlight the very real obstacles to cooperation that exist between the PRC and the United States. At its most basic, cooperation between the two sides has to operate within the political realities that mark the Sino-American relationship. There are a number of outstanding issues that separate the two, from their respective political ideologies, to such issues as human rights, trade policy, and the status of Taiwan that make any improvements in relations a delicate process. An especially prominent obstacle to greater cooperation of any sort are the mutual suspicions over security issues. US-Chinese military-to-military contacts, for example, have varied greatly, reflecting the vagaries in the general tenor of Sino-American relations—and space was no exception. In October 2006, the commander of the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), Marine General James Cartwright, expressed interest in engaging the PLA on such space issues as collision avoidance and perceptions of attacks on satellites. He hoped to raise these topics in discussions with his counterpart, General Jing Zhiyuan, commander of the Chinese Second Artillery force (which is responsible for China’s nuclear forces). Indeed, Jing’s visit had been discussed as part of the same April 2006 Hu-Bush summit that had led to NASA Administrator Griffin’s visit. 8 As of the end of 2008, however, Jing had still not visited the United States, despite repeated invitations. The security issue is especially prominent in the multilateral arena, which directly affects prospects for space cooperation. Although both the US and the PRC are members of the UN Outer Space Committee (also known as the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space or COPUOS) and the Ad Hoc Committee for Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) within the UN Conference on Disarmament, little movement has occurred in either body. Significant differences of opinion on the utility of a new arms control agreement (proposed by the PRC and Russia, and opposed by the United States), coupled with complicating linkages to such issues as limits on new fissile materials, have led to few new space-related developments in these multilateral security arenas.

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Space Coop Bad – Cost Cooperation ends up costing more money.

Michael J. Listner founder of Space Law and Policy Solutions. 2014. http://spacenews.com/41256two-perspectives-on-us-china-space-cooperation/ Commentary | Two Perspectives on U.S.-China Space Cooperation

The same rationale applies to funding. Past cooperative efforts with geopolitical competitors has left the United States footing a substantial amount of the bill. Cooperative efforts with the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation have been and continue to be funded substantially by the United States with the other party to the cooperative agreement reaping most of the benefit. Projects such as the Apollo/Soyuz rendezvous mission during the Cold War and the current engagement with the international space station are examples where the United States has provided a disproportionate amount of funding. The current arrangement with the ISS in particular has seen the Russian Federation receiving substantial economic benefit from funding of modules, revenue generated from commercial activities, including space tourism, and revenue received from ferrying of NASA astronauts. It is conceivable that China would reap a similar economic benefit to the detriment of the United States in cooperative outer space activities. The likelihood is great that China would insist that any arrangement entered into be funded disproportionately by the United States. This in turn would take away from other programs, inflate the national deficit and even require more borrowing from China, which would have a cumulative effect on the national and economic security of the United States with little or no benefit.

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Space Coop Bad – China Doesn’t Benefit China is content with the status quo and is confident in its innovative abilities

Kulacki, senior analyst Global Union of Concerned Scientists, 1-19-11 (Greg, Dr. Kulacki served as an Associate Professor of Government at Green Mountain College, Director of External Studies at Pitzer College and Director of Academic Programs in China for the Council on International Educational Exchange.Dr. Kulacki earned a doctorate in Political Theory from the Department of Government and Politics and a master’s in International Relations from the University of Maryland, College Park. He also completed graduate certificates in Chinese Economic History and International Politics at Fudan University in Shanghai. “Engaging China on Space” accessed: 6-30-11 http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/2826515287/engaging-china-on-space) TJL

China no longer needs to import foreign technology and expertise. Moreover, many of the scientists and engineers in China’s space sector believe they make more rapid progress by pursuing a policy of self-reliance without the complications of joint programs. As a result, a significant number within China’s space community actively oppose increased international cooperation or is disinclined to support it. In addition, many in China’s space community resent U.S. policies, such as China’s exclusion from the International Space Station, export controls that have severely restricted China’s ability to participate in the international launch services market, and highly restrictive visa policies for Chinese space professionals. China’s space scientists and engineers are content with the status quo. Any impetus for change will need to come from outside the space sector. Unlike in the past, cooperation with the United States or other countries is no longer valued as a technical or economic necessity. Today, cooperation with other countries in space is likely to take place for political reasons. It will need to be imposed on China’s space sector by the political leadership, and this can only happen if Chinese leaders see cooperation as a high priority.

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Space Coop Bad – China is a Bad Partner China’s cooperation with EU was a loss for the EU and a win for China. Would be the same with the US.


There is precedent for this concern from China’s participation in the Galileo satellite navigation system. China’s technical partnership with the European Union on the Galileo project led to its application on China’s indigenous Beidou Phase 2 satellite navigation system. The accuracy of the Beidou signal came as a surprise to its European partners as such accuracy was unlikely to be obtained without taking shortcuts. Thus, what began as a cooperative effort between the European Union and China led to China reaping the technological benefit with the resultant national security implications. Such would be the case with a cooperative effort with the United States. Any effort would expose U.S. technology, and it stands to reason that no matter what safeguards were put in place China would acquire and benefit from that technology. Not only would the United States not benefit from a cooperative effort it would also sacrifice its technological advantage and compromise its national security.

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Space Coop Fails – Chinese Military The Chinese space program is driven by perceived military needs – treaties and cooperation won’t change that.

ASHLEY J. TELLIS. Carnegie Endowment. House Testimony, January 28, 2014 House Armed Services Subcommittees on Strategic Forces and Seapower and Projection Forces China’s growing ability to counter U.S. technologies and capabilities in space poses a real danger to America’s military superiority in the Asia-Pacific region. spacehttp://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/28/does-china-threaten-united-states-in-space

Finally, the idea that China is deeply invested in its counterspace programs because the United States has proven resistant to space arms control is also fallacious. The Chinese interest in counterspace solutions has little to do with Washington’s attitude to space arms control, although numerous Chinese commentators continue to advance this argument. Beijing’s investments in counterspace capabilities, rather, are deeply rooted in the political predicaments it faces—none of which can be remedied by any arms control solutions. To begin with, China believes that it is engaged in a major geopolitical competition with the United States, a struggle wherein war, however remote, is still possible. Such a war could arise either because of extant disagreements, for example over Taiwan, which get out of hand; or because regional crises involving American protectees, such as Japan, explode to bring Chinese and American military power into confrontation; or because intensifying Sino-American competition in the Indo-Pacific spins out of control at some point during the next few decades when a power transition appears to be underway in Asia and possibly at the core of the international system. Irrespective of what specific provocation may spark a wider conflict, Chinese defense planners are deeply consumed by the necessity of preparing for an armed confrontation with the United States, which they clearly recognize as a superior military power. Given their assessment that American superiority derives fundamentally from its ability to leverage its space systems to produce the information dominance necessary to deliver decisive warfighting advantages, Chinese strategists are by necessity drawn to the idea of attempting to neutralize American space capabilities. This lure becomes all the more tantalizing because not only is U.S. space superiority critical for the success of American military operations but its space architecture is as a rule remarkably vulnerable to offensive actions undertaken by an adversary.

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Space Coop Bad – China Says No China would say no to cooperation in space.

Tkacik, Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 2010 (John J. Tkacik Jr., The Washington Times, 8 January 2010, p. 11, “China eyes high ground; Obama talks of cooperation, not competition on space exploration”, LexisNexis, 7.1.11, SWolff)

Beijing's political and military leaders alike foresee "competition" in space with the United States. They certainly plan to seize the high ground of low-Earth orbit and then will likely move to the even higher ground of moon landings perhaps before this decade is out. Judging from the past behavior of China's state-owned aerospace firms especially in their unseemly eagerness to proliferate ballistic missile technology to rogue states, it is unlikely that Mr. Obama can count on much "cooperation" with China in space - except on China's terms.

China will only cooperate if they set the terms.


China’s space efforts should therefore be seen as political, as much as military or economic, statements, directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Insofar as the PRC has scored major achievements in space, these reflect positively on both China’s growing power and respect (internationally) and the CCP’s legitimacy (internally). Efforts at inducing Chinese cooperation in space, then, are likely to be viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both objectives. As China has progressed to the point of being the world’s second-largest economy (in gross domestic product terms), it becomes less clear as to why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on anything other than its own terms.

China is not looking to cooperate – their program is already developed.

Sabathier, senior associate with the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program, Faith, president of Sabathier Consulting for public and private aeronautics policy, 2011(Vincent G., G. Ryan Faith, “The Global Impact of the Chinese Space Program,” World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8878/the-global-impact-of-the-chinese-space-program, May 17, Accessed July 1, 2011, NS)

Although China has relied on cooperation in the past to develop its space capabilities, it is increasingly willing to go it alone, proceeding slowly and steadily in a "long march" fashion. China might cooperate on space activities to accelerate a particular program or to gain prestige and recognition along the way, but ultimately its aim is to become a global competitor in space. Over time, Chinese policymakers have studied, analyzed and understood both the successes and failures of the U.S.-Soviet space race as well as the benefits China can derive from space. One such benefit, increased national pride, is more important in China than in any other current major spacefaring power -- with the possible exceptions of India and Russia -- because it helps unify the country during periods of great stress and transformation. In addition to showing considerable signs of determination and an enormous ambition, China has the resources needed to comprehensively develop its space assets in all areas. This will eventually allow China to compete across the board, around the globe and throughout space. China will probably catch up with European commercial space assets and policies before 2020. Its navigation system, Beidou, will be operational before its European counterpart, Galileo, and the Long March 5 family of launch vehicles, slated for use starting in 2014, will outperform Ariane 5 and its foreseen successors. China will subsequently land a "taikonaut" on the moon in the middle of the next decade, at roughly the same time that China's GDP is projected to exceed that of the U.S. -- a subtle soft-power means of highlighting China's growing influence. A Chinese moon landing ought not to represent an existential threat to U.S. space leadership, given that the U.S. landed on the moon more than 40 years ago and remains far ahead in all fields.

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Space Coop Bad – Generally Fails Many barriers to cooperating with China on space.


Within this context, then, the prospects for meaningful cooperation with the PRC in the area of space would seem to be extremely limited. China’s past experience of major high-technology cooperative ventures (Sino–Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, U.S.–China cooperation in the 1980s until Tiananmen, and Sino–European space cooperation on the Galileo satellite program) is an unhappy one, at best. The failure of the joint Russian–Chinese Phobos–Grunt mission is likely seen in Beijing as further evidence that a “go-it-alone” approach is preferable. Nor is it clear that, bureaucratically, there is significant interest from key players such as the PLA or the military industrial complex in expanding cooperation.[10] Moreover, as long as China’s economy continues to expand, and the top political leadership values space efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space expenditures—making international cooperation far less urgent for the PRC than most other spacefaring states.

US-China cooperation over space weapons is unlikely to produce anything tangible.

Stimson Center. 2013. Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations Michael Krepon. co-founder of the Stimson Center. Julia Thompson. Research Associate with the Space Security programEditors. September 2013 http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/Anti-satellite_Weapons.pdf

Although the benefits to stability from such cooperation are potentially useful, accomplishments will be difficult to achieve. The United States and China view their respective activities in space as critical to national security and will be reluctant to share data. Domestic constituencies in both countries will strongly oppose military space dialogue. It is also unlikely that dialogue will result in binding legal agreements or arms control treaties – a Chinese diplomatic objective – as was the case for dialogue between Washington and Moscow. There are significant verification challenges for a legally binding agreement covering ASAT capabilities, unlike agreements on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles between Washington and Moscow. Dual use hit-to-kill capabilities are much more difficult to limit. The limitations of monitoring capabilities and the presence of dual-use capabilities would mean that parties to an agreement would not place trust in its limitations. While legally binding agreements do not appear feasible, other reasons for dialogue might well be mutually beneficial.

There is very little room for US-China space cooperation.


Although there are some similarities between the current US-China relationship in space and the US-Soviet relationship, the differences far outweigh them. What worked during the Cold War might not work between Washington and Beijing. The incongruity between current space capabilities and long-term goals between the United States and China presents a stark contrast to the parallelism of US and Soviet space programs. These disparities might be resolved over time or set aside by national leaders in search of cooperative ventures in space. Otherwise, the range of options for possible US-Chinese cooperation in space will be severely restricted.

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http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/Anti-satellite_Weapons.pdf

http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/Anti-satellite_Weapons.pdf

http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--space-cooperation


Space Coop Bad – Fails to Help US-China Relations Attempts to solve space issues do nothing to improve China-American relations.

Hagt, World Security China Program Director, 2008 (Eric, also editor of China Security, 26 February 2008, “Mirror Imaging and Worst Case Scenarios”, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/SurvivalTellis.pdf, p. 164, 7.2.11, SWolff)

Ashley Tellis weaves a compelling argument of China’s counterspace strategy and its implications for space arms control. His logic rests on two principle elements. ‘China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities … is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies … but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capability of the United States.’ This underpins Tellis’s conclusion that ‘Washington should not invest time, energy and resources in attempting to negotiate space-control arrangements ... Such regimes are destined to be stillborn because the larger strategic logic conspires against them.’ In other words, the pursuit of a space arms-control regime is futile, even harmful to US interests, because China’s strategy to challenge American space dominance is unyielding to anything the United States can do.

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Space Coop Bad – Hurts US-China Relations Cooperation will hurt US-China relations.

David, Space.Com Space Insider Columnist, 2011 (Leonard, Winner of this year’s National Space Club Press Award, Leonard David has been reporting on the space industry for more than five decades, past editor-in-chief of the National Space Society’s Ad Astra and Space World magazines and has written for SPACE.com since 1999, SPACE.com, “China’s First Space Station: A New Foothold in Earth Orbit,” May 6, http://www.space.com/11592-china-space-station-tiangong-details.html, accessed 7/7/11) KA

Military implications Cheng sees potential military implications from the imminent testing of rendezvous and docking know-how by China. "Not so much in terms of manned military missions … Rather, rendezvous and docking skills can be transferred to unmanned spacecraft, whether it is for kinetic kill operations or inspection of foreign satellites -- say, for intelligence or war-fighting purposes or other malign purposes," Cheng said. All of this underscores why repeated attempts by the U.S. to ignite cooperation in the area of manned space are unlikely to bear fruit, Cheng said, "but likely to result in catastrophe." That is, if there is a failure in the cooperation (not technical failure, but failure of political will, or failure of political steadfastness to see things through), then it will have enormous repercussions, which would be bad for the larger Sino-US relationship , Cheng added. Cheng said that the Chinese are explicitly following a policy of "indigenous innovation" -- a heavy emphasis on self-reliance. "China's space program is largely home-grown and a point of pride to the Chinese," he added. "Why should they cooperate with the U.S.? What is in it for them … especially in light of the export control regulations aimed at China?"

US-China space cooperation fails and will only make relations worse.

Seedhouse, aerospace scientist & PhD from German Space Agency's Institute of Space Medicine, 2010[Erik, aerospace scientist & PhD from German Space Agency's Institute of Space Medicine, “The New Space Race: China vs. the US” Springer and Praxis Publishing Co., http://www.scribd.com/doc/31809026/The-New-Space-Race-China-Vs, page 209-210, accessed6/31/11, HK]

Many analysis assert that china is serious about maintaining leadership in space, it should engage the Chinese in the ISS program, perhaps inviting them to dock a Shcazhou capsule at the ISS. Although the US has made several attempts in the direction of collaborating with China, the record shows mixed results. For example.in September. 2006. NASA Administrator. Dr Michael Griffin, visited his Chinese counterpart. Laiyan Sun, in China, to investigate the possibility of cooperating with the China National Space Administration (CNSA). NASA's proposal was to allow the cooperation of Chinese scientists in a mission to deliver the large Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS) to the ISS. No follow-on activities were announced following the trip, although ihe Chinese issued a proposal for ongoing dialog between NASA and the CNSA that suggested annual exchanges.1Any progress that the meeting between Laiyan and Griffin might have generated was quickly forgotten when, on January 11th. 2007. China conducted its first ASAT test. There are space experts who argue that international cooperation is essential in maintaining a space exploration program and. by collaborating with China, the US will surely save time and money in pursuing the VSE's goals. In reality, the US is already locked into partnerships with more than a dozen nations as a part of the ISS program, including most of Europe. Washington has learned from bitter experience that major international projects almost always end up costing more, taking longer, and delivering less than a national program. While many observers have extolled the benefits of US Russian cooperation during the ISS program, in reality, the venture was a disaster. First, because Russian hardware was years late in delivery, NASA's costs spiraled out of control. Second, the situation was exacerbated by the billions of dollars wasted in redesigning integration hardware. 1 hird.in exchange for just 5% of the financial contribution. Russia was granted 40% of the station's facilities, in addition to making billions of dollars in foreign sales of space hardware! Not surprisingly, from a financial perspective, the US-Russian cooperation experience is one that the Americans will not want to repeat by collaborating with the Chinese.

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http://www.scribd.com/doc/31809026/The-New-Space-Race-China-Vs


Space Coop Bad – Hurts US Security/Leadership There will be zero spillover from space cooperation, and Chinese efforts only hurt the U.S.

Pollpeter, China Program Manager at Defense Group Inc.’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis. 2008 Kevin. Previously, he was a researcher at the RAND Corporation. Mr. Pollpeter is widely published on China national security issues and focuses on the Chinese space program, RAND corporation, “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE”, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub852.pdf//sb)

Good relations in space do not drive good relations on Earth. International cooperation on space activities usually follows progress in the overall relationship and is more of an indicator of the state of a relationship than a critical component. It is more likely that China’s penchant to offer aid and investment to developing countries without conditions will increase its influence more than cooperation on space activities. Nevertheless, China’s space program does play a role in advancing China’s diplomatic agenda and China’s leadership in this area may contribute to its overall increase in diplomatic influence. China’s cooperative space activities present another avenue for countries to participate in space without the United States and increases multipolarity. The failed attempt by China to become a major player in the Galileo project is just one example of how attempts by China to promote a more multipolar world can impinge on U.S. security interest.

China cooperation over space will make the US look weak and lose credibility.

The Space Review 2009 (Taylor Dinerman, The Space Review, “Just how soft is NASA’s soft power going to be?” 11/30/09, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1519/1//sb)

If the US is seen as meekly asking the rest of the world to please support the goals and ambitions of the exploration program, it will be treated with contempt. This will not only make it exceptionally difficult to come up with acceptable international agreements, but it will almost certainly ensure that the next Congress or the next administration will seek to overturn any unfair, unequal, or humiliating deals made by the current leadership. NASA’s experience with major international exploration agreements has been mixed. The Apollo-Soyuz deal put together by Nixon and Brezhnev in 1972 and flown in 1975 was a bit of propaganda for the idea of “detente”. As Walter McDougall put it in his authoritative …the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, “it gave Soviet technicians the chance to traipse through US space facilities and flight operations firsthand.” That’s something the Chinese can do today simply by going on the Internet. The Apollo-Soyuz flight was a dead end. Twenty years later, in February 1995, the Shuttle flew its first mission to Russia’s Mir space station. This was an early step in NASA’s second great international program, the International Space Station (ISS), and in spite of everything it has been a technological success. It has taught NASA and its partners invaluable lessons in building and maintaining large structures in space. The Clinton Administration, which created the program, and the George W. Bush administration, which largely built and paid for it, made sure that it was recognized as a US-led program. Neither of these projects represents a good or accurate model for the current situation. With Apollo-Soyuz the hardware already existed, so modifying it for the “Handshake in Space” that was intended to symbolize the end of the US-Soviet confrontation was not that difficult. The ISS project was based on previous work done by NASA on Space Station Freedom and above all on the need for Clinton to show some magnanimity towards the Russians. Today Washington’s political motivation for a US-Chinese joint space project is pretty murky. The Chinese have publicly laid out a path that does not require any international cooperation. They could change their plans, but this might upset delicate internal political or industrial arrangements that we know nothing about. There has been a lot of speculation about the exact motives that drive their human exploration program, but few hard facts have emerged. On the other hand, we know that the Obama Administration and Congress are chock-a-block full of motivations, many of them contradictory or confused, but all of them expressed with passion. There are political motivations: after all, Florida, Texas, and California are all big voter-rich states. There are questions of prestige and international power. There are industrial, scientific, and technological reasons why leaders in Washington think that this is important. There is a strong desire on the part of both parties to use NASA’s accomplishments as a way to inspire kids to study science and engineering. In all of NASA’s programs, ever since the Eisenhower days, there has been an element of “soft power”. Some administrations have used it more effectively than others, but it has always been there. Yet this kind of power is only a tool, not a goal in itself. If the

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http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1519/1//sb


US presents itself as too eager for partnership agreements or too weak to explore the solar system without assistance, then the world and the American people will only see softness

Space Coop Bad – Lack of Compromise

Negotiating with China will fail because they lack of flexibility.


Another consideration is that the Chinese usually appear at the negotiating table with their own position already formulated. If they are seeking to determine their counterpart’s bottom lines, the Chinese negotiators are well aware of their own.“Before negotiations at any level begin, the central leadership will have assessed the ‘objective reality’ and determined its objectives vis-à-vis the principal ‘contradictions as well as the strategy for achieving those objectives.”30 Such assessments are likely to have been arrived at only after significant internal bargaining within the Chinese system, in order to create the necessary consensus among competing bureaucracies, stakeholders, and leadership groupings. They are therefore unlikely to be lightly modified, much less altered or abandoned.

Traditional negotiations with China will fail because cooperation must be negotiated by the Chinese Politburo.


In order to shift the Chinese, then, it is essential to be able to traverse the labyrinthine bureaucracy of China. As one observer notes, “The first stage of wisdom in negotiating with the Chinese is to grasp that one is confronted with the world’s oldest bureaucracy.” 31 Apparent gains at the negotiating table are insubstantial unless they can garner support from the actual Chinese leadership. As one Japanese diplomat has observed, “In order for a point to be accepted by the Chinese side, it is important that our presentation is formulated in such a way that it would reach the top strata of the Chinese decision-making machinery.”32 Conversely, “pragmatism is displayed amply when there is positive political will in the top leadership of China to conclude an accord….” 33 The key leaders and decision-makers, however, are not located in the state bureaucracy, but within the Chinese Communist Party, specifically, the Chinese Politburo. This is because policy decisions are the purview of the Party’s leadership, whereas policy implementation is the responsibility of the state’s bureaucracy. It is arguably for this reason that the Chinese are extremely opaque about the details of their space policy decision-making process. The process of determining policy occurs, not in the government, but in the Party. Allowing outsiders to gain an understanding of said processes would also provide them with the ability to detect and exploit potential vulnerabilities.

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Space Coop Bad – Multiple Countries Backlas h US space cooperation with China will hurt the alliance with Japan, triggering a space race.

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.13-14, http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf, accessed 7/6/11) EK

For Japan, whose “peace constitution” forbids it from using war as an instrument of state policy, the United States is an essential guarantor of its security. Any move by the US that might undermine this view raises not only the prospect of weakening US-Japanese ties, but also potentially affecting Japan’s security policies. In this regard, then, it is essential not to engage in activities that would undercut perceptions of American reliability. Such moves, it should be noted, are not limited to those in the security realm. For example, the Nixon administration undertook several initiatives in the late 1960s and early 1970s that rocked Tokyo-Washington relations, and are still remembered as the “Nixon shocks.” While some of these were in the realm of security (including Nixon’s opening to China and the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine), the others were in the trade area. These included a ten percent surcharge on all imports entering the US and suspended the convertibility of the dollar (i.e., removed the US from the gold standard). 36 Part of the “shock” was the fundamental nature of these shifts. Even more damaging, however, was the failure of the Nixon Administration to consult their Japanese counterparts, catching them wholly off-guard. It took several years for the effects of these shocks to wear off.If the United States is intent upon expanding space relations with the PRC, then it would behoove it to consult Japan, in order to minimize the prospect of a “space shock.” Failing to do so may well incur a Japanese reaction. The decision on the part of Japan to build an explicitly intelligence-focused satellite was in response to the North Korean missile test of 1999, suggesting that Tokyo is fully capable of undertaking space-oriented responses when it is concerned.37 That, in turn, would potentially arouse the ire of China. The tragic history of Sino-Japanese relations continues to cast a baleful influence upon current interactions between the two states. If there is not a “space race” currently underway between Beijing and Tokyo, it would be most unfortunate if American actions were to precipitate one.

U.S.-Sino space cooperation is perceived by India and will trigger a backlash.

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.14-15, http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf, accessed 7/6/11) EK

India constitutes yet another participant in a potential Asian space race. Fueled by a growing economy, India has steadily improved its space capabilities, launching the Chandrayaan-1 lunar probe in 2008, soon after the Japanese Kaguya and Chinese Chang’e-1 probes. Again, this is not to suggest that there is a space race underway, but it would be hard to deny that the major Asian powers are each watching the others carefully (or, more accurately, that China is being watched carefully by its neighbors). That space is a major potential arena for competition among these states is highlighted by the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation Between Japan and India, initialed by the Japanese and Indian Prime Ministers on October 22, 2008 in Tokyo. The final “mechanism of cooperation” listed in the agreement was for cooperation between the two nations’ space programs. “Cooperation will be conducted between the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in the field of disaster management.” 38 For the United States, cooperating with China on space issues, when it is not yet doing so with India, could well send mixed messages to Delhi. In particular, there is a perception in many quarters that the United States is intent upon balancing China through India. 39 US space cooperation with China might allay such concerns and signal that the US is not seeking to counter China through India. It might, however, be seen as “double-dealing” by the Indian government, which has its own concerns about China stemming to at least the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

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Space Coop Bad - NASA Rollback Congress will cut off NASA funding if the U.S. cooperates with China.

Svitak, Space News, 5/4/11 (Amy, Space News staff writer, “China Viewed as Potential U.S. Partner in Future Mars Exploration”, Space News, http://www.spacenews.com/policy/110504-china-partner-mars-exploration.html, accessed 7/1/11) EK

Wolf, who characterizes China’s government as “fundamentally evil,” said it is outrageous that the Obama administration would have close ties with Beijing’s space program, which is believed to be run primarily by the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA. “When you say you want to work in concert, it’s almost like you’re talking about Norway or England or something like that,” an irate Wolf told Holdren, repeatedly pounding a hand against the table top in front of him. “As long as I have breath in me, we will talk about this, we will deal with this issue, whether it be a Republican administration or a Democrat administration, it is fundamentally immoral.” Culberson reminded Holdren that the administration’s civil research and development funding flows through Wolf’s subcommittee, and that funding could be choked off if the White House fails to comply with the law. “Your office cannot participate, nor can NASA, in any way, in any type of policy, program, order or contract of any kind with China or any Chinese-owned company,” Culberson said. “If you or anyone in your office, or anyone at NASA participates, collaborates or coordinates in any way with China or a Chinese-owned company … you’re in violation of this statute, and frankly you’re endangering your funding. You’ve got a huge problem on your hands. Huge.”[Note – Culberson = Rep. John Culberson, R-TX, Wolf = Rep. Frank Wolf, R-VA, Holdren = John Holdren, White House Science advisor]

Congress opposes cooperation with China – so the affirmative plan puts NASA funding in jeopardy.

Robertson, Epoch Times Staff Writer, 5/15/11 (Matthew studied at the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, and the National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan. “Wolf’s Clause Imperils (Some of) Administration’s China Plans”, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/united-states/bill-keeps-nasa-technology-out-of-china-57689.html., The Epoch Times is able to provide well-sourced stories through the original reporting done by the Chinese-language edition of The Epoch Times, pg 1, accessed: 6/27/11 [added by (R) Frank Wolf –VA]) TJL

Chief of the OSTP, John Holdren, told Wolf’s subcommittee in early May that “the prohibition should not be read as prohibiting interactions that are part of the president's constitutional authority to conduct negotiations,” effectively saying that the provision would not block cooperation. Rep. John Culberson, who sits on the committee, consulted with Wolf about that. Then he fired back: “You need to remember that Congress enacts these laws and it's the chief executive's job to enforce them. ... Now if anyone in your office, or at NASA, participates or collaborates or coordinates in any way with China, you're in violation of the statute. And frankly, you're endangering your funding and NASA's funding.” Holdren was unperturbed by the threats. The day after the hearing he participated in a major bilateral summit with senior Chinese officials over U.S.-China collaboration on science. “I take this blatant disregard for the law very seriously and the committee is currently reviewing its options,” Wolf told the U.S.-China Commission.

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Space Coop Fails – No Chinese NASA China doesn’t have a true NASA equivalent – the military runs their space program.


More to the point, there is no obvious civilian counterpart to the PLA in terms of China’s space efforts. The most regularly mentioned equivalent to NASA is the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA). But the head of CNSA is typically described in Chinese writings and press coverage first as a vice minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), then as a deputy director of the State Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), before being mentioned as the head of the CNSA. This suggests that the position of the CNSA is a third-tier bureaucracy, standing below the key super-ministry for advanced technologies, and the managing authority for China’s military industries (SASTIND). By contrast, the PLA is a key part of the Chinese power structure. One of the key positions for the top Chinese leader (Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin) is the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission. That role, along with being General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is what vests Xi, Hu, and Jiang with their power—head of the Party and head of the military. In short, bureaucratically the CNSA is dwarfed by the Chinese military (which may explain the CNSA’s absence from the top echelon of Chinese manned space management).

China’s space program is run 100% different than NASA.


While this integration of civilian and military organizations and systems may be understandable, especially in light of constrained Chinese human, financial, and technological resources, it nonetheless complicates any effort at Sino-American cooperation. The opacity and uncertainty regarding the organization of China’s space efforts, beyond the role of the PLA, adds yet another layer of complication. The United States and the PRC have almost no parallels in how each has organized its overall space organizations and political infrastructure. This makes establishing counterparts for even discussing space cooperation much more difficult.

U.S.-China space cooperation won’t work – even Chinese space officials don’t know how the Chinese space bureaucracy works.

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009 (Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.10, http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf, accessed 7/6/11) EKEven Chinese officials appear uncertain at this time about exactly how the various pieces of the Chinese space bureaucracy will fit together, noting that the reorganization remains “a work in progress.” Nonetheless, the uncertainty associated with the basic organization of the Chinese space bureaucracy, including who is subordinate to whom, underscores the potential difficulties confronting more extended negotiations between the two sides, as well as more extensive cooperation.

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Space Coop Bad – Transparency

US-China Space cooperation requires completely transparency and that remains unlikely.

Economist ‘09(00130613, 10/24/2009, Vol. 392, Issue 8654 “Aiming High” http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=46&hid=10&sid=a03a83d6-ae6c-48cd-aed8-847f942a8f89%40sessionmgr10&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=44812133EBSCOhost 7/2/11 BLG)

But the prospects are dim. Many American officials are still seething at China's test of an anti-satellite missile in 2007. It blew up an ageing Chinese weather satellite, leaving thousands of pieces of debris in orbit that pose considerable danger to other space-based equipment (a small chunk came close to the ISS in September). Even if the Americans wanted to get Chinese help with the ISS project, they would have to get agreement from other ISS partners. The Russians might object to the introduction of a competitor to their space-transport service. Japan has similar ambitions, and launched its first unmanned spacecraft to the ISS in September. A NASA official says that any co-operation would require "total transparency" from the Chinese. This would include allowing the Americans to go to China's launch-control centre and get to know the nuts and bolts of its launch vehicle. There seems little chance of this. But the Americans hardly have to worry that the Chinese are about to surpass them, as they certainly did in 1957 when the Soviet Union became the first to put a satellite into orbit. Jiao Weixin of Peking University says China's space-exploration capabilities are 30 years behind America's. A billboard on a main thoroughfare in Wenchang tries to whip up space excitement with a huge picture of a launch pad at take-off. It shows flames pouring from boosters attached to what is clearly America's very own Space Shuttle

No solvency – China won’t budge on transparency.

Cheng, Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center, 2009(Dean, The Heritage Foundation, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs Than Benefits,” 8-30-9, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/us-china-space-cooperation-more-costs-than-benefits, 6-29-11, GJV)

So what would be the purpose of cooperation from the Chinese perspective? To sustain the ISS? China is hardly likely to be interested in joining the ISS just in time to turn out the lights. There is also the question of whether the other partners in the international station, such as Russia and Japan, are necessarily interested in including China, especially now that the most expensive work has already been completed. There is also the issue of transparency. While it seems logical that the principal partners for cooperation would be the Chinese and American civil space agencies, the reality is that the China National Space Agency is, in fact, nested within the Chinese military-industrial complex rather than being a stand-alone agency. Indeed, China's space program is overwhelmingly military in nature. And nowhere more so than in the manned space program, the "commanders" or "directors" of which include the head of the General Armaments Department, one of the four general departments responsible for day-to-day management of the entire People's Liberation Army (PLA). The challenges presented by the Chinese space program's strong ties to the PLA are exacerbated by the generally opaque nature of China's space program on issues ranging from who the top decision-makers are to the size of their budget. Any effort at cooperation is likely to be stymied so long as the PRC views transparency as a one-way affair.

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Space Coop Bad – Time Frame

Even if they do solve, their impacts will happen before they can access any solvency – China-U.S. cooperation will take too long.


Should the US and the PRC actively seek to cooperate, any ventures will first require extensive negotiations. As noted earlier, there has been only minimal interaction between American and Chinese space authorities. This means that there is not an extensive foundation of personal relationships or even negotiating experience on space issues between the two countries upon which to build. With neither institutional nor personal relations, the process is likely to be extremely lengthy. In particular, the absence of a legacy of interactions goes to the heart of the Chinese approach to negotiations. President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979, for example, was the culmination of nearly twenty years of meetings in Geneva and Warsaw. 20 “From the Chinese perspective, these [Ambassadorial] Talks and the events leading to the Talks established the boundaries within which the ultimate solutions were found.Like building a stone house, a solid foundation for the relationship had to be laid, if the relationship was to endure.” 21 The absence of such a foundation means that any effort to foster cooperation in space arena, which touches on sensitive issues of national capabilities as well as being potentially highly technical, will also have to reconcile very different approaches to the process of negotiation.

Sino-US relations will take a lot time to develop and would only happen if they were reciprocal.

Bolden, NASA administrator, 11/16/10 (Charles, All-hands Address at the Marshall Space Flight Center, Transcript provided by Space News, http://www.spacenews.com/images/Marshallallhands.pdf, accessed 7/6/11) EK

My opinion is they really want to be a member of the, what I call the society of space fearing nations. I went there with three principles and I repeated them over and over and over again everywhere I went, and that was if they were going to do anything with us, and we went there to listen. We didn’t go to propose or to make any deals or anything. We went to listen. But I told them that if anything was going to come from a relationship between the United States and China in space, then they would have to demonstrate to us that they could be transparent in all dealings, that they would have to demonstrate that they were willing to exercise reciprocity which means they give us something, we give them something and we go back and forth. And then the third thing is they had to be mutually beneficial to both nations. If we didn’t get anything out of it, we weren’t interested. We felt that they were the same way. “And I will tell you one thing. My final night there, I met with the big head of their human space flight program who ironically is also head of their anti-satellite program. An odd mix of responsibility. He is a Three-Star, a lieutenant general in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force or something. And he started out the conversation. He introduced the conversation and he said they’re going to be very candid. We don’t need you. We don’t need the United States, and you don’t need us. But the potential, if we choose to work together, is incredible. I thought that spoke volumes. Very, very candid. And they don’t. They don’t need us, and we don’t need them. But I happen to be one who kind of every once in a while just wonders about what things could be like if we were able to bring more countries into the partnership. It’s going to be difficult and it will take years, but we may get there sometime.”

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http://www.spacenews.com/images/Marshallallhands.pdf


Space Coop Bad – US Doesn’t Gain/Loses China has too little to offer the US to make space cooperation useful.


When states, including geopolitical competitors, cooperate, there is always an unspoken premise that aside from the stated political goal each participant will have the unstated goals of reaping short- and long-term benefits of resources belonging to the other. In terms of cooperation between China and the United States, any stated goal of cooperation would implicate technology, intellectual property, scientific methodologies and funding. Given this presupposition, does China possess an advantage in any of these areas that would benefit the national security interests of the United States in a partnership? The answer is to both questions is cumulatively no.

Cooperating with China on space is a lose-lose for the US.


China has made significant strides in its space program, and its accomplishments follow in the footsteps of the outer space activities performed by the United States. China does have the perception of momentum in its space program and uses current technology to facilitate its achievements, but it still lags behind. Cooperation with China would reap no tangible benefits in terms of technology for the United States and in fact would risk exposing outer space technology and methodologies that China could appropriate under the guise of cooperation and incorporate into its own space and military programs.

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US-China Relations Impact Answer US-China relations are flexible and strong enough to withstand disputes – strong mutual interests

The Sunday Times 2010. . “The US-China relationship is strong enough to withstand disputes like this”. 1/22/10. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6997481.ece]

As with all recent presidents Barack Obama views America’s relationship with China as one of the most important for US interests abroad, and was careful not to discuss human rights in public when he visited Beijing in November. Mrs Clinton’s criticism of China over the Google cyber attacks is at first sight surprising, given that China is the greatest holder of US debt and plays a critical role in Mr Obama’s efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Mr Obama received much criticism in the US after his three-day visit, with allegations that he ignored human rights, had been tightly controlled by Beijing and had been too supine toward President Hu. Privately officials in Obama’s Administration felt that the trip had produced results: despite disagreements over climate change that surfaced at the Copenhagen summit in December, and impending US arms sales to Taiwan that is angering Beijing, the White House believes that dialogue with China is in good shape. It think that the relationship is strong enough to withstand disputes. Beijing appeared to be trying to play down Mrs Clinton’s comments. The wellbeing of the US economy — the world’s biggest importer of Chinese goods — is critical to job creation in China, so the two have strong mutual interests. But the Obama Administration is also a big supporter of freedom of the internet because it has begun to play such a vital role in democracy movements abroad. Sites such as Facebook, Flickr and Twitter have helped protesters in Iran to spread news and images. Mrs Clinton was reflecting a desire in Washington to fight for such freedoms. John Huntsman, the new US Ambassador to Beijing, said that the two countries would continue to have disagreements but the health of the relationship would be based on the their ability not to be distracted by such disputes.

The US won’t attack China, its deterrent capabilities are too strong.

Shixiu, Senior Fellow Academy of Military Sciences of PLA, 7 (Senior fellow for the Institute for Military Thought – PLA – China US relations specialist, Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space, China Security Winter 2007 pp.8, http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_1.pdf) AC

It is not sufficient to solely use physical counterattack mechanisms for deterrence in space. Capabilities must be paired with a wise strategy that includes important political and economic elements. Utilizing the full range of deterrent factors is the only way to maximize security advantage while minimizing the possibility of conflict. War is never purely a military action – it is also a political “event”- the two are indivisible. A successful national security strategy must be comprehensive and therefore cannot underestimate political and policy considerations. In basic terms, the initiator of a war must first find a favorable political position or a justified reason to instigate conflict. China has a strong political will to defend its national security. Political will is a type of ‘soft power’, which represents an important invisible force that can deter potential adversaries from initiating hostile actions. Other ‘soft power’ elements that China possesses: a reliable defense capability suited to its comprehensive national strength and which is sufficient to answer any challenge by its adversaries; and the deeply patriotic and unquestionable determination of the Chinese to use comprehensive national strength to safeguard national security – at any cost. China will live up to its reputation as a sovereign country with a rich history that holds an important and respected place in the global community. China’s national security strategy must also be based upon a precise calculation of economic benefit.. The United States and China share economic benefits and interests: with the United States as the world’s most developed country and China as the largest developing country, the two economies are highly complimentary. The United States and China are each other’s second largest trading partners. Meanwhile, investments between the two economies have been equally impressive. Politics and economics play an important role in the determination of war. However, the reality of capabilities and physical power cannot be ignored. Thus, China’s national strategy must include the precise calculation of these factors and seek holistic deterrence.

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http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6997481.ece


Space War/Space Race Impact Answer China has neither the resources nor the political will to engage in a space weapons race.

Shixiu, senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, 2007 (Bao, “Deterrence Revisited: Space” China Security, Issue No. 5, p. 2-3, Winter, http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=185&Itemid=8, Accessed June 30, 2011, NS)Despite the need for an effective deterrent to meet security challenges that China may confront in space, it will not initiate a space weapons race with the United States or any other country. First, China does not have the ambition to enter a space weapons race. During the Cold War period, faced with a threat of nuclear war, China did not join in the nuclear weapons race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, China’s space program is pointed in the direction of peaceful development. The new political and diplomatic doctrines – a harmonious society and world – also curb China’s entrance to a space weapons race.14 Second, China does not have the ability to enter a space weapons race. Although China has ambitious plans in space, the technical gap, especially in the military area vis-à-vis the United States, is difficult if not impossible to fill. China will not and cannot expend significant budgetary resources pursuing space weapons, but will instead focus on civilian and commercial space assets.15 So, if China owns space weapons, their number and quality will be limited in their capacity to act as an effective defense mechanism and will not be a threat to other countries. China has every interest to avoid triggering a confrontation in outer space and it will never be a deliberate choice for China. Equally important, however, is that China will not shrink from defending its core national interests.

Motivations overwhelm solvency – a US-China space race is inevitable.

Martel, Associate Professor of International Security Studies at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 5/26/2009 [William, Associate Professor of International Security Studies at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, All Academic, 5/26/2009, “United States, China, and the Race for Hegemony in Space http://research.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/3/8/8/p73884_index.html?phpsessid=b2c05260f619fc3e8d5d20b08ca5fa78, There is mounting evidence that the United States and China are positioning themselves to conduct an arms space in race. This race for hegemony in space is based on competing views about the longer-term consequences of the potential collision of American and Chinese interests in space. From China's perspective, America's hegemony in space is presumptuous and represents a significant challenge to its national security concerns and international security more generally. For the United States, China's growing space power symbolizes its ambitions to challenge U.S. national security. Deeply seated mutual suspicions are evident in their strategic assessments as the contours of potential strategic competition between Washington and Beijing emerge. In essence, both sides agree that the other represents a challenge and a source of hegemony. While this potential clash of interests in Sino-U.S. ties is not yet sufficiently severe to be visible to casual observers, the United States and China are on the threshold of a space race that could radically influence international security. This paper represents an initial step to clarify the sources of competition and the challenges faced by both sides as they seek to manage this search for hegemony in the context of space.

The militarization of space is inevitable- we must protect ourselves from China.

Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, ‘10(Bruce K, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, January 1, 2010, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 22:17–24 1469-9982 online “U.S. Space Technology for Controlling China and Russia” p.24 EBSCO host 7/1/11 BLG)

For many years, Russia and China have introduced resolutions at the UN calling for negotiations on a new treaty that would ban weapons in space. Since the mid-’80s, every UN member nation has supported the ‘‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’’ (PAROS) resolution, with the exception of the United States, Israel, and Micronesia. This was true during the Clinton presidency, as well as during the reign of George W. Bush. It will be crucial for President Obama, if he truly hopes to reset relations with Moscow and Beijing,to seriously enter into negotiations for a global ban on weapons in space. But the patience of the Chinese seems to be wearing thin. On November 2, the London Telegraph reported that a high-level Chinese air force officer had urged his nation to drop its opposition to the militarization of outer space and to begin developing orbital weapons and defense systems. ‘‘As far as the revolution in military affairs is concerned, the competition between military forces is moving towards outer space. This is a historical inevitability and a development that cannot be turned back,’’ Xu Qiliang told the People’s Liberation Army Daily. ‘‘The PLA air force must establish in a timely manner the concepts of

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http://research.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/3/8/8/p73884_index.html?phpsessid=b2c05260f619fc3e8d5d20b08ca5fa78


space security, space interests and space development. We must build an outer space force that conforms with the needs of our nation’s development (and) the demands of the development of the Space Age,’’ Xu said.

Politics Links Cooperation with China would require a huge policy shift, ie political capital.

Tech Insider. Oct 19, 2015. http://www.techinsider.io/nasa-china-collaboration-illegal-2015-10 Here's why NASA won't work with China to explore space

The reason is because, in 2011, Congress passed a spending bill that expressly forbids NASA from working with China, citing a high risk of espionage. What's more, it doesn't sound like the attitudes of US lawmakers toward the People's Republic of China are changing anytime soon. A 2015 report from the University of California called "China Dream, Space Dream" concludes that: "China's efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a military, economic, and technological power may come at the expense of U.S. leadership and has serious implications for U.S. interests." It will take a big policy shift to change that sentiment and foster collaboration between NASA and the China National Space Administration (CNSA).

The greater the cooperation between the US and China, the greater political capital will be needed on both sides.


Settling on a single initiative for US-China cooperation limits possibilities, and is therefore not the best option. A better approach would be to develop a clear strategy for US-China engagement that mixes top-down and bottom-up joint initiatives. Bottom-up initiatives might include data sharing, policy dialogues on national security topics and joint space science projects. Given the difficulties associated with increasing cooperation on space-related issues, interventions and policy impulses from national leaders in Washington and Beijing would likely be required, even for modest initiatives. The more ambitious the initiative, the greater the effort that will be required by national leaders. Whether the United States and China have the political will to undertake such an effort to develop and undertake a broad strategy remains to be seen.

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***Militarization Disadvantage *******

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Militarization DA A. Space cooperation with China under the affirmative will end up being a ONE-WAY transfer of technology—the

plan surrenders to China.

Gordon Chang, lawyer and space race author, Forbes. 2009. Author of The Coming Collapse of China, “The space arms race begins”, 11/6/09, http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/05/space-arms-race-china-united-states-opinions-columnists-gordon-g-chang.html]

The United States, therefore, will be at the complete mercy of Moscow when the last shuttle is grounded--unless we are willing to hitchhike with the only other nation that will be able to put a human into space then. "I think it's possible in principle to develop the required degree of confidence in the Chinese," said John Holdren, President Obama's science advisor, in April. And he is not alone in this view. According to the just-released report of the Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, better known as the Augustine report, "China offers significant potential in a space partnership." In one sense, this statement is correct. After all, China has put a man into space three times. Moreover, the Chinese have said on numerous occasions that they are prepared to work with us . So what is the problem with doing so? First, even though the United States will soon find itself without a way to put humans into orbit, any partnership would essentially be a one-way transfer of technology from us to the Chinese. Second, the Chinese did not respond favorably to past American efforts--made during the administration of George W. Bush--to involve them in cooperative space efforts. Third, there is no such thing as a civilian space program in China. The China National Space Administration is really a military operation. Therefore, we have to ask ourselves a question: Should we transfer technology to a potential adversary so that it can improve its war-fighting capabilities? General Kevin Chilton, the chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, called for a dialogue with his Chinese counterparts the day after General Xu's space-race declaration. "Where they're heading is one of the things a lot of people would like to understand better," Chilton said. But do we really need to talk to the Chinese to figure out their intentions? In August 2006, the Chinese lasered at least one American satellite with the apparent intention of blinding it, a direct attack on the United States. In the following January, the People's Liberation Army destroyed one of its old weather satellites with a ground-launched missile, sending more than 35,000 fragments into low-earth orbit. The Chinese want to dominate space. General Xu did the United States a favor by removing any doubt about where his country stands. Whether we like it or not, there is now a brutal competition between the United States and China to control the high ground of space.

B. Cooperation will give China the high ground in space and could lead to a Pearl Harbor style attack on America from space.

David Steele, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies Australian Defence College 2007. “The Weaponization of Space: Next Arms Race?”, 2007, http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/Shedden/2008/Publctns_ShedPaper_050310_TheWeaponisationofSpaceNextArmsRace.pdf

In July 2000, an article emanating from China was published entitled ‘The US Military’s Soft Ribs and Strategic Weaknesses’ which analysed a future confl ict with the US. The article suggests that developing countries could use information and electronic warfare and create a ‘space Pearl Harbour’ thus toppling a technologically advanced adversary. The article, in part replicated by the Arms Control Association, goes on to say: ‘For countries that could never win a war with the US by using methods of tanks and planes, attacking the US space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice’.66 Similarly, it has been proposed that any threat that the US faces now and into the future, can only be (by default) asymmetric in nature, as the US has become so dominant militarily. This is not to discount nation-states. A threat can also be a state player that possesses, or is developing, military capability, and demonstrates intent to use that capability against another. China possesses a capability (albeit a prototype) that could threaten US space dominance, whilst the ambiguous Chinese tactic of ‘attacking whilst negotiating’ could be being used to mask an emerging intent. The possibility of a future confrontation between the US and China in the Taiwan Straits in the 2015-2030 timeframe is now being debated by informed commentators and is referred to as a ‘space Pearl Harbour’. Despite the predictions of continued growth in the Chinese economy and the modernisation program

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http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/05/space-arms-race-china-united-states-opinions-columnists-gordon-g-chang.html

http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/05/space-arms-race-china-united-states-opinions-columnists-gordon-g-chang.html


being undertaken by the PLA, China is still unlikely to have a military that could challenge the US in a traditional ‘force on force’ contest for several decades.

Militarization DA– Uniqueness A dangerous space race has begun, but the US has the lead.

Lee Billings is an editor at Scientific American covering space and physics 2015. August 10. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/

The world’s most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-man’s-land of Earth orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name. The emptiness of outer space might be the last place you’d expect militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isn’t so empty anymore. About 1,300 active satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern warfare, space has become the ultimate high ground, with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that could cripple the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure. And though it might begin in space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth.

The US has a big lead in the space race.

Seedhouse, aerospace scientist & PhD from German Space Agency's Institute of Space Medicine, 10(Erik, “The New Space Race: China vs. the US” Springer and Praxis Publishing Co., http://www.scribd.com/doc/31809026/The-New-Space-Race-China-Vs, accessed: 6/30/11, SL)

The US won the Cold War because it was the most militarily powerful nation on Earth. In the same manner in which the Russians challenged the US during the Cold War. Beijing has indicated that it intends to challenge Washington for control of the Last Frontier. While the Chinese destroyed one of their own satellites in 2007. the test only replicated a test conducted by the US 22 years previously, with a weapon more advanced than that used by the Chinese. For years, the Chinese blustered about the peaceful uses of space and arms control treaties, before firing a shot across the bow and revealing their true intentions. In reality. China's ASAT test barely constituted a threat to US space dominance because the US military has at least four or five systems (Figure 5.2) capable of damaging and destroying satellites without creating an orbital debris cloud. Furthermore, the US. which was technologically superior to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. is. militarily, disproportionately more capable than the Chinese. While Beijing's capacity to develop counterspace and counter-counterspace capabilities will undoubtedly increase, many of the programs it initiates will falter, others will be stillborn, and many will prove unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the US will continue to develop its superior space capabilities and solidify its position of space dominance. The pursuit by the US and China for space superiority will likely continue until China either acquires the capacity to defeat the US. the investments in Chinese counterspace yield diminishing returns, or Sino American rivalry disappears completely. Since none of these scenarios is likely in the foreseeable future, the US will not waste time and energy attempting to negotiate space-control treaties that arc. in any case, unverifiable.

Other countries are catching up but the US still has the lead in space military strength.

Statfor Nov 11, 2015 The Battle to Militarize Space Has Begun https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/battle-militarize-space-has-begun

As Washington works to secure its orbital technology, it also realizes that competitors are catching up. This is not to say that the U.S. military has been negligent in developing and expanding its capabilities. The United States leads the field in ballistic missile defense (BMD), and many of its maturing systems are designed to operate outside of the Earth's atmosphere. The United States also dominates space-tracking infrastructure: Being able to see other countries' space-based systems is beneficial from both a defensive and offensive perspective. The U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system has the ability to reach into space and to attack ICBMs in the middle of their flight trajectory. A key component of GMD is something known as an exoatmospheric kill vehicle, which separates from its boost vehicle in space and collides with an incoming

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projectile. This technology does not violate existing space treaties but is revealing of the way military planners — and the defense industries that serve them — are thinking.

Militarization DA– Uniqueness The US has the military edge in space right now.

David Axe, editor of War Is Boring and a regular contributor to the Daily Beast. Reuters August 10, 2015. http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/08/09/the-u-s-military-is-preparing-for-the-real-star-wars/

U.S. companies and government agencies have at least 500 satellites — roughly as many as the rest of the world combined. At least 100 of them are primarily military in nature. Most are for communication or surveillance. In other words, they’re oriented downward, toward Earth. But a few patrol space itself. The U.S. military’s Advanced Technology Risk Reduction spacecraft, launched into an 800-mile-high orbit in 2009, is basically a sensitive infrared camera that can detect the heat plumes from rocket launches and, presumably, maneuvering spacecraft. It then can beam detailed tracking data to human operators on the ground. The risk-reduction satellite works in conjunction with other spacecraft and Earth-based sensors to keep track of Earth’s approximately 1,000 active satellites. The telescope-like Space-Based Space Surveillance satellite, launched in 2010, “has a clear and unobstructed view,” according to an Air Force fact sheet, “of resident space objects orbiting Earth from its 390-mile-altitude orbit.” “Resident space object” is military speak for satellites. A network of around 30 ground radars and telescopes complements the orbital sensors. Together, these systems make “380,000 to 420,000 observations each day,” Space Command explains on its Website. Observing and tracking other countries’ satellites is a passive and essentially peaceful affair. But the U.S. military also possesses at least six spacecraft that can maneuver close to enemy satellites and inspect or even damage them. In 2010, the Air Force launched its first X-37B space plane. A quarter-size, robotic version of the old Space Shuttle, the X-37B boosts into low orbit — around 250 miles high — atop a rocket but lands back on Earth like an airplane. The two X-37Bs take turns spending a year or more in orbit. Officially, the Air Force describes the maneuverable mini-shuttles as being part of “an experimental test program to demonstrate technologies for a reliable, reusable, unmanned space test platform.” But they could also attack other spacecraft. The X-37Bs “could be used to rendezvous and inspect satellites, either friendly or adversarial, and potentially grab and de-orbit satellites,” the Secure World Foundation, a space advocacy group, pointed out. The group stressed that the feasibility of the X-37Bs as weapons is low because the mini-shuttles are limited to low orbits and because the United States operates at least four other maneuverable satellites that are probably far better at stalking and tearing up enemy spacecraft. These include two Microsatellite Technology Experiment satellites that the military boosted into low orbit in 2006. The MiTEx satellites are small, weighing just 500 pounds each. This makes them harder for enemy sensors to detect — giving them the advantage of surprise in wartime. The two Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program satellites are much bigger and higher up. From their stationary positions 22,000 miles above Earth, these spacecraft — in orbit since July 2014 — monitor other satellites and can, according to the Air Force, “maneuver near a resident space object of interest, enabling characterization for anomaly resolution and enhanced surveillance.” Maneuverable space planes and satellites are one way of attacking enemy spacecraft. But there’s an older, less subtle method — blasting them out of space with a rocket. In late 2006, an U.S. spy satellite malfunctioned shortly after reaching low orbit. In early February 2008, the Pentagon announced it would shoot down the dead spacecraft. Officially, Washington insisted that the anti-satellite operation was a safety measure, to prevent the defunct craft’s toxic fuel from harming someone when the satellite’s orbit decayed and it tumbled to Earth. But it appeared to more than one observer that China’s 2007 anti-satellite test motivated Washington’s own satellite shoot-down. A new Cold War was underway, this time in space. On Feb. 20, 2008, the Navy cruiser Lake Erie, equipped with a high-tech Aegis radar, launched a specially modified SM-3 antiballistic-missile interceptor. The rocket struck the malfunctioning satellite at an estimated speed of 22,000 miles an hour, destroying it. Today, the United States has dozens of Aegis-equipped warships carrying hundreds of SM-3 missiles, more than enough to quickly wipe out the approximately 50 satellites apiece that Russia and China keep in low orbit. “Aegis ships could be positioned optimally,” Grego of the Union of Concerned Scientists wrote in a 2011 paper, “ to stage a ‘sweep’ attack on a set of satellites nearly at once,” As an anti-satellite backup, the U.S. Army and the Missile Defense Agency also operate two types of ground-launched missile interceptors that have the power to reach low orbit — and the accuracy to strike spacecraft. Against this huge arsenal, Russia and China possess few counterweights. China’s 2007 anti-satellite test, and a similar trial in early 2013, proved that Beijing can hit a low satellite with a rocket. In 2010, the Chinese space agency launched a cluster of small space vehicles, including two named SJ-6F and SJ-12,

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that slammed into each other in orbit, seemingly on purpose. In July 2013, China deployed a small inspection spacecraft, designated SY-7, in low orbit.

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Militarization DA– Link The U.S. refusal to cooperate with China on space has slowed their space weapon development.

David Axe, editor of War Is Boring and a regular contributor to the Daily Beast. Reuters August 10, 2015. http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/08/09/the-u-s-military-is-preparing-for-the-real-star-wars/

But China lacks the space- and ground-based sensors to accurately steer these weapons toward their targets. Compared to the U.S. space-awareness system, with its scores of radars and telescopes, China possesses a relatively paltry system — one consequence of Beijing’s diplomatic isolation. Where the United States can count on allies to host parts of a global sensor network, China has few formal allies and can only deploy space-awareness systems inside its own borders, on ships at sea or in space. The Chinese military can watch the skies over East Asia, but is mostly blind elsewhere.

China will use space cooperation and dialogue to steal American technology and threaten national security.


Additionally, Fisher (Rick Fisher, a senior fellow on Asian military affairs) said that China could exploit the new dialogue with the United States to seize valuable space technologies. The State Department said in its release that “the two sides discussed ways to cooperate further on civil Earth observation activities, space sciences, space weather, and civil Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS).” “These space technologies are inherently ‘dual use,’ meaning that China could gain knowledge from cooperation with the U.S. that could be used to threaten Americans,” Fisher said. “The threat of China stealing U.S. space technology in the course of cooperation is very real.” China has repeatedly been accused of pilfering sensitive defense and space data from U.S. agencies in recent years.

China will use cooperation efforts to steal our American technological secrets.

Dean Cheng, research fellow in Chinese political and security affairs at the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation 2009, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs than Benefits”, 10/30/09, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/10/US-China-Space-Cooperation-More-Costs-Than-Benefits]

According to the discussions between Presidents Bush and Hu Jintao, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin's groundbreaking visit to China in 2006 (the first by a NASA administrator to the PRC) was supposed to be matched by a visit to the U.S. by the head of China's Second Artillery. Yet the PRC has never agreed to that visit, despite Hu's commitment and repeated invitations from the U.S. If reciprocity in terms of basic leadership visits cannot be obtained, it is even more problematic how either side would achieve reciprocity in other areas. There is a general disparity in technology between the U.S. and the PRC. Under such circumstances, reciprocity would likely benefit the Chinese side far more than the U.S. side. And if the U.S. holds back, it only undermines the case for cooperation. Yet well-founded reticence on the part of the U.S. to share information could also jeopardize the missions and safety of the crews. These are the high costs of cooperation with the Chinese on manned space flight. Covering funding shortfalls seems to be the only tangible motivation for the U.S., and even that prospect is not promising. If U.S. decision-makers conclude that a manned-space capacity is important to American interests, they should find a way to properly fund it -- and not rely on the one country in the world likely to emerge as a peer competitor for global influence. By contrast, reaching out to the Chinese from a position of strength and independence in the cause of a broader diplomacy and development of space is appropriate. But even then, such engagement must be strongly conditioned to demand transparency, limit expectations, and involve America's allies and partners.

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http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/10/US-China-Space-Cooperation-More-Costs-Than-Benefits


Militarization DA– Link Cooperation with China over space facilitates espionage. It threatens the US space program and space power.

Sterner – Fellow @ the George C. Marshall Institute 2009, held senior staff positions with the House Armed Services and Science Committee – 9 Eric, US-China space relations: maintaining an arm’s length’, Space News, (2 March 2009), p. 19.It is tempting to hold out space partnership as a tool to influence the broader U.S.-PRC relationship. In particular, those who view space as a means of influencing terrestrial politics will push for a partnership. By learning to live and work together in space, we can better live and work together on Earth, or so the theory goes. But, such an approach fails to grasp the nature of international politics, in which space policy is a tool of broader goals, and not the other way around. As a result, the broad U.S.-PRC relationship will affect how the two countries interact with one another in space, and not vice versa. In that context, it makes little sense to seek a space partnership with China. The bilateral relationship is simply too unsettled with too many potential flashpoints, ranging from Taiwan and human rights to labor practices and currency manipulation. Thus, a space partnership would only import all of the burdens of the broader geopolitical relationship into the space program, without necessarily benefiting the program in a meaningful way. In- stead, sophisticated, multiyear cooperative projects would be at risk when Chinese behavior on human rights, toward its neighbors, in currency manipulation, or in proliferating dangerous technologies clash with American values, ideals or interests. Similarly, Beijing may counter U.S. moves to preserve a strategic balance in Asia by imposing consequences on any bilateral space project, essentially holding American space interests hostage to broader issues. Any potential partnership with China also raises more specific concerns. Chinese espionage activities against hightech American targets are well documented. Michelle Van Cleave, the nation's first national coordinator for counterintelligence, recently noted: "The Chinese stole the design secrets to all — repeat, all — U.S. nuclear weapons, enabling them to leapfrog generations of technology development and put our nuclear arsenal, the country's last line of defense, at risk. To this day, we don't know quite when or how they did it, but we do know that Chinese intelligence operatives are still at work, systematically targeting not only America's defense secrets but our industries' valuable proprietary information." Unfortunately, NASA is a soft target compared with the nation's nuclear labs. The U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission's most recent report noted that in 2005 Chinese hackers targeted NASA and stole files on spacecraft propulsion, solar panels and fuel tanks — all useful for military systems. More recently, a contract engineer was indicted last year for stealing technologies associated with the space shuttle and Delta 4 launch vehicle on behalf of the People's Republic of China. A close partnership would only increase the potential for greater technology transfer, to the net harm of the national security interests of the United States. Finally, consider the symbolism of a partnership with China in space. Since its inception, the civil space program has served as a geopolitical metaphor. U.S. Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy intended to send geopolitical messages in creating NASA and launching us to the Moon. Similarly, President Ronald Reagan's administration conceived of the international space station as a demonstration of the unity and technical prowess of the western democracies in contrast to Soviet authoritarianism. When Russians overthrew communism and joined the family of democratic nations, they were welcomed into the program, further symbolizing their changed status. Partnership with China would send the signal that values held by the West, such as representative government, individual liberty, the rule of law and respect for human rights — which the leaders of the People's Republic of China do not share — are no longer as important to the relationship.

Closer relations with China increase Chinese technological intelligence.

Sterner, NASA, Associate Deputy Administrator, Policy and Planning and Acting Chief of Strategic Communications ‘09(Eric R, 11/23/2009, Aviation Week & Space Technology 00052175, 11/23/2009, Vol. 171, Issue 19 “Dragon in Sheep’s

Closer relations create greater opportunities for China to acquire sensitive technology. In 2007, the U.S. launched the interagency National Export Enforcement Initiative, designed to combat illegal trafficking in sensitive technologies. Within a year, charges were filed against 145 criminal defendants. Iran and China were the intended destinations for most of the known illegal exports. The Justice Dept. noted, "The illegal exports to China have involved rocket launch data, space shuttle technology, missile technology, naval warship data, [UAV] technology, thermal imaging systems, military night-vision systems and other materials." This is consistent with other Chinese activities, including a massive 2005 cyber-raid on NASA's computers that exfiltrated data about the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter's propulsion system, solar panels and fuel tanks. The U.S. should be concerned about such transfers for two reasons. First, they will aid Chinese military modernization, particularly in areas where the U.S. holds an advantage (see p. 29). The Defense Dept.'s 2009 annual report on the Chinese military concludes, "The pace and scope of China's military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by

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acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces."

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Militarization DA– Link The US needs to build its own space military capabilities - not heavily cooperate with China.

ASHLEY J. TELLIS. Carnegie Enowment . Testimony January 28, 2014 House Armed Services Subcommittees on Strategic Forces and Seapower and Projection Forces China’s growing ability to counter U.S. technologies and capabilities in space poses a real danger to America’s military superiority in the Asia-Pacific region. spacehttp://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/28/does-china-threaten-united-states-in-space

Given this fact, the United States must prepare to cope with China’s counterspace programs principally through unilateral investments in developing the appropriate antidotes. It should initiate a discussion with all spacefaring powers about the nature of emerging threats to security in space and it should certainly engage in consultation with its friends and allies, especially in Asia—including Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia, among others—about the challenges posed by China’s counterspace program. A conversation with China about space security too would be worthwhile, but it should not be assumed that such discussions, no matter how intense, will produce a convergence in perceptions. The United States should also continue to monitor the on-going discussions about the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities supported by the European Union. But even if these deliberations ultimately produce a document that the United States finds worthwhile to sign on to, it bears remembering that neither the Code nor for that matter the proposed Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) actually address the problematic threats to space security posed by China’s counterspace investments. Regrettably, therefore, the United States is condemned to manage this hazard mainly through its own resources because, given China’s political objectives and strategic constraints, even good confidence-building measures are unlikely to constrain its evolving counterspace warfare programs in any meaningful way.

China cooperation undercuts US military advantages.

Cheng, Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center, 2009(Dean, The Heritage Foundation, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs Than Benefits,” 8-30-9, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/us-china-space-cooperation-more-costs-than-benefits, 6-29-11, GJV)

Beyond the technical issues, however, there are more fundamental political concerns that must be addressed. The U.S. military depends on space as a strategic high ground. Space technology is also dual-use in nature: Almost any technology or information that is exchanged in a cooperative venture is likely to have military utility. Sharing such information with China , therefore, would undercut American tactical and technological military advantages.

Joint space activities cause a dual-use tech transfer to China, resulting in a space Pearl Harbor.

[Jeffrey Logan, previous China program manager at International Energy Agency, 2008 “China’s space program: options for US-China Cooperation”, 9/29/08, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22777.pdf]

Challenges of Cooperating with China. Some of the most important challenges of expanding cooperation in space with China include: Inadvertent technology transfer. From this perspective, increased space cooperation with China should be avoided until Chinese intentions are clearer. Joint space activities could lead to more rapid (dual-use) technology transfer to China, and in a worst-case scenario, result in a “space Pearl Harbor,” as postulated by a congressionally appointed commission led by Donald Rumsfeld in 2001.22 Moral compromise. China is widely criticized for its record on human rights and non-democratic governance. Any collaboration that improves the standing of authoritarian Chinese leaders might thus be viewed as unacceptable. Ineffectiveness. Some argue that increased collaboration will not produce tangible benefits for the United States, especially without a new bilateral political climate.

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Militarization DA– Link Cooperation would share dual-use technology – and China has a history of taking advantage of sharing.

Rhian, former NASA intern, 2011 (Jason, has degrees in public relations and journalism and completed a NASA ESMD internship, Universe Today, “Can China enter the international space family?”, 1/10/11, http://www.universetoday.com/82368/can-china-enter-the-international-space-family/, accessed 6/30/11, CW)

China is only the third nation (behind Russia and the United States) to have a successful manned space program, having launched its first successful manned space flight in 2003. This first mission only had a single person onboard, and gave the world a new word – ‘taikonaut’ (taikong is the Chinese word for space). The country’s next mission contained two of these taikonauts and took place in 2005. The third and most current manned mission that China has launched was launched in 2008 and held a crew of three. Yang Liwei became the first of China's Taikonaut when he rocketed into orbit in 2003. Photo Credit: Xinhua China has steadily, but surely, built and tested capabilities essential for a robust manned space program. Considering that China very ambitious goals for space this would seem a prudent course of action. China has stated publically that they want to launch a space station and send their taikonauts to the moon – neither of which are small feats. China currently utilizes its Shenzhou spacecraft atop the Long March 2F booster from their Jiuquan facility. However, if China wants to accomplish these goals, they will need a more powerful booster. This has been part of the reason that the U.S. has been hesitant to include China due to concerns about the use of what are known as dual-use technologies (rockets that can launch astronauts can also launch nuclear weapons). Both China's rocket and spacecraft are derived from Soviet Soyuz designs. Photo Credit: Xinhua/Wang Jianmin Some have raised concerns about the nation’s human rights track record. It should be noted however that Russia had similar issues before being included in the International Space Station program. “In the early 1990 s, some at NASA thought having Russian cosmonauts on the Space Shuttle would mean giving away trade ′secrets to the competition,” said Pat Duggins, author of the book Trailblazing Mars. “It turned out Russian crew capsules saved the International Space Station when the Shuttles were grounded after the Columbia accident in 2003. So, never say never on China, I guess.” Duggins is not the only space expert who feels that China would make a good companion when mankind once again ventures out past low-Earth-orbit. “One of the findings of the Augustine Commission was that the international framework that came out of the ISS program is one of the most important. It should be used and expanded upon for use in international beyond-LEO human space exploration,” said Dr. Leroy Chiao a veteran of four launches and a member of the second Augustine Commission. “My personal belief is that countries like China, which is only the third nation able to launch astronauts, should be included. My hope is that the politics will align soon, to allow such collaboration, using the experience that the US has gained in working with Russia to bring it about.” Not everyone is completely convinced that China will be as valuable an asset as the Russians have proven themselves to be however. “It is an interesting scenario with respect to the Chinese participation in an international effort in space. The U.S. has made some tremendous strides in terms of historical efforts to bridge the gap with the Russians and the results have been superb,” said Robert Springer a two-time space shuttle veteran. “The work that has resulted in the successful completion of the International Space Station is an outstanding testimony to what can be done when political differences are set aside in the interest of International cooperation. So, there is a good model of how to proceed, driven somewhat by economic realities as well as politics. I am not convinced that the economic and political scenario bodes well for similar results with the Chinese. It is a worthwhile goal to pursue, but I am personally not convinced that a similar outcome will be the result, at least not in the current environment.”

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Militarization DA– Anti-Satellite Scenario China is the US’s number one threat in space and they are developing anti-satellite measures.


The single biggest example of this threat to U.S. military orbital systems comes from China. A progression of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests carried out over the past few years has alarmed the Pentagon . Though there are still limitations to the effectiveness of ground-based anti-satellite weapons — namely the tracking and accuracy requirements, given the speed, size and altitude of satellites — the technology is rapidly advancing. For countries that are still developing militarily, there is a strong incentive to pursue anti-satellite technology in the hope it could neutralize or disrupt one of the greatest advantages that the United States has: its C4ISR infrastructure.

If US satellites are attacked it could lead to a US first strike.

Council on Foreign Relations. April 2014. http://www.cfr.org/space/dangerous-space-incidents/p32790

Threats to military or civilian satellites could limit the timely and accurate information available to civilian decision-makers and military commanders during crisis situations. This is compounded by how difficult it would be for officials to quickly interpret whether a satellite malfunction was caused intentionally or inadvertently by humans, a damaging space phenomenon (such as solar flares), or routine mechanical failure. Attributing who or what is responsible for such a disruption in space is usually possible, but requires equipment, analysts, and time—all of which may be in short supply during a crisis. This situation could also create a first-strike incentive for U.S. decision-makers seeking to act before its understanding of a terrestrial dispute or its space situational awareness—the ability to view, characterize, and predict the location of manmade objects in space—is interrupted or further degraded.

China’s developing anti-satellite weapons and lying about it.

Epoch Times May 12, 2015 China’s Secret Space Weapons Have the Pentagon Worried http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1354392-chinas-secret-space-weapons-have-the-pentagon-worried/

Such programs are of particular concern for the United States. A significant part of modern military power relies on satellites—from GPS and communications, to early warning systems. The Chinese regime’s development of weapons designed to disable or destroy satellites, the report states, are “inconsistent with China’s public statements about the use of space for peaceful purposes.” The most notorious of these tests was in January 2007 when the Chinese regime launched a rocket and destroyed one of its own satellites. Today, however, its space weapons have gone far beyond rockets to include directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers. Adding concern to an already suspicious program, Chinese defense academics often publish reports on the Chinese regime’s space weapons, the report states, yet “no additional anti-satellite programs have been publicly acknowledged.” Its military writings, however, “emphasize the necessity of ‘destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance … and communications satellites,'” the report states. The statements suggest, it notes, the Chinese regime may be targeting navigation and early warning satellites, for programs “designed to ‘blind and deafen the enemy.'” The Chinese regime’s thinking is that by destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors, it can “deprive an opponent of initiative on the battlefield and [make it difficult] for them to bring their precision guided weapons into full play.”

The Chinese program is targeted at disabling America military satellites.

Epoch Times May 12, 2015 China’s Secret Space Weapons Have the Pentagon Worried http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1354392-chinas-secret-space-weapons-have-the-pentagon-worried/

One of the key reasons why the Chinese regime’s anti-satellite programs have U.S. officials concerned is that the programs appear to be targeted at the United States. The Chinese regime categorizes its anti-satellite weapons with its little-disclosed “Assassin’s Mace” and “Trump Card” weapons. A report from the National Ground Intelligence Center, declassified in 2011, states “These modern Trump Card and Assassin’s Mace weapons will permit China’s low-technology forces to prevail over U.S. high-technology forces in a localized conflict …” In the case of anti-satellite weapons, they would hypothetically allow

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http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1354392-chinas-secret-space-weapons-have-the-pentagon-worried/

http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1354392-chinas-secret-space-weapons-have-the-pentagon-worried/


the Chinese regime to disable the high-tech U.S. weapons system that its military could not otherwise defeat, which would in turn even the playing field.

Militarization DA– Anti-Sat Scenario China is developing anti-satellite technology that concerns the US military.

InfoWars May 15, 2015 “CHINA’S SECRET SPACE WEAPONS TARGETING U.S. : “SOON EVERY SATELLITE WILL BE AT RISK””http://www.infowars.com/chinas-secret-space-weapons-targeting-u-s-soon-every-satellite-will-be-at-risk/

The report is particularly concerned with China’s use of directed-energy weapons, satellite jammers and other technology that can be used to take out the communications grid and weaken U.S. military positions: “Such programs are of particular concern for the United States. A significant part of modern military power relies on satellites —from GPS and communications, to early warning systems.” The Chinese regime’s development of weapons designed to disable or destroy satellites, the report states, are “inconsistent with China’s public statements about the use of space for peaceful purposes.” The most notorious of these tests was in January 2007 when the Chinese regime launched a rocket and destroyed one of its own satellites. Today, however, its space weapons have gone far beyond rockets to include directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers.There has also been concern about “small maneuvering satellites that can attack orbiting satellites” under development by China. China’s previous demonstration of its ability to destroy one of its own satellites in orbit has already been seen as a direct threat to American interests in space, which in turn control communications, navigation and weapons technology.

China is developing highly threatening anti-satellite technology.


Many of China’s recent space-related projects and actions have created an atmosphere of concern and tension in Washington. Amongst these was a May 2013 space mission: China deployed an unknown item on a ballistic trajectory ranging higher than 30,000 km. The said object’s trajectory loomed close the geosynchronous orbit where many countries position their communications and other satellites. According to the Pentagon, the mission did not result in the deployment of any space asset into the orbit, an action that defies the usual missions undertaken by “traditional space-launch vehicles, ballistic missiles or sounding rocket launches used for scientific research”. The U.S. agencies thus suspect that China may have been testing an anti-satellite weapon instead. Space security experts reveal that being able to destroy or hinder satellites belonging to rival states could give the thus-capable states a winning advantage over adversaries . Being able to target enemy satellites, restrict access and completely demolish intelligence systems would allow states to disarm their enemies’ precision weapons and defense systems back on earth. China has rubbished reports that it is developing and testing anti-satellite systems, but the U.S. remains concerned nonetheless. The Pentagon’s report states, “China’s continued development of destructive space technologies represented a threat to all peaceful space-faring nations.”

Anti-satellite measures could devastate US military technology.


However, the U.S. military is not the sole operator of space-based infrastructure. Countries with advanced space programs, such as China, Russia, Israel, Japan and some NATO alliance members, all rely on some military space-based capability. And the trend is only increasing. As much as the United States leads the field, however, it is increasingly reliant on its space-based systems — of which a significant percentage are highly vulnerable and largely indefensible. This vulnerability has not escaped the notice of the United States' biggest competitors. By finding a way to disable space-based systems, a potential antagonist could disconnect the multiple interlocking U.S. military systems, plunging it into information darkness and delivering a critical blow ahead of any physical strike — and to do so would not violate any existing space treaty.

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Militarization DA– Anti-Sat Scenario In a conflict, China would first strike at US satellites because of US vulnerability.

ASHLEY J. TELLIS. Carnegie Endowment. Testimony January 28, 2014 House Armed Services Subcommittees on Strategic Forces and Seapower and Projection Forces China’s growing ability to counter U.S. technologies and capabilities in space poses a real danger to America’s military superiority in the Asia-Pacific region. spacehttp://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/28/does-china-threaten-united-states-in-space

Even as China has expanded these investments in space, however, its commitment to developing a wide range of counterspace capabilities—targeted principally at the United States but also applicable to other spacefaring powers—has not diminished. This antinomous dynamic is driven by two realities. First, even as China seeks to use space for its own national goals, it is determined to develop and employ counterspace technologies whenever necessary to neutralize the combat advantages enjoyed by its opponents in the event of a conflict, while at the same time utilizing these burgeoning capabilities to deter any adversary attacks on its own space systems. Second, although the goals of Chinese counterspace employment vis-à-vis a superior adversary, such as the United States, may subsist in tension with China’s own professed desire for a peaceful space environment, Beijing appears to have concluded that the “delta” between its own and Washington’s dependence on space for the fulfillment of their respective national aims favors China rather than the United States. In other words, although competing counterspace actions by both nations would be hazardous to their common interests, the United States would stand to lose more than China does, given the relatively greater American dependence on space for both civilian and military purposes. Based on such an assessment, prosecuting counterspace operations in a crisis may be rational for China in any significant Sino-U.S. conflict along its periphery, even though Beijing itself stands to lose considerably as a result of the expected American riposte.

Chinese ASAT tests are the biggest threat to space security – the debris they cause could ruin space exploration and satellite technology.

Council on Foreign Relations. April 2014. http://www.cfr.org/space/dangerous-space-incidents/p32790

The main form of inadvertent peacetime interference is the testing of ASAT systems that create space debris, which already threatens U.S. space assets and assured access to the domain. China's demonstrated disregard for the consequences of ASAT tests is the greatest threat to international space security. A January 2007 direct ascent ASAT test carried out by China against its defunct Fengyun-1C weather satellite instantly increased the amount of space debris in low earth orbit (LEO) by 40 percent. Debris is especially problematic in LEO, where half of the world's 1,100 active satellites operate. Space objects—even flecks of paint—travel as fast as eighteen thousand miles per hour and can cause catastrophic damage to manned and unmanned spacecraft—creating even more debris in the process. The U.S. National Research Council estimates that portions of LEO have reached a "tipping point," with hundreds of thousands of space debris larger than one centimeter stuck in orbit that will collide with other pieces of debris or spacecraft, thus creating exponentially more debris. Significant growth in the quantity or density of space debris could render certain high-demand portions of outer space unnavigable and inutile. Currently, there are no legal or internationally accepted means for removing existing debris. China could also test co-orbital antisatellite systems in which an interceptor spacecraft destroys its target by exploding in close proximity, creating even more debris. For several years, Beijing has conducted a series of close proximity maneuvers with its satellites in LEO; the most recent occurred after a July 20, 2013, launch of three satellites on the same rocket, which have since conducted sudden maneuvers toward other Chinese satellites. Human or operating errors during these maneuvers could inadvertently result in a collision that produces harmful debris. While these maneuvers could eventually be used for civilian purposes, most U.S. officials believe these experiments are primarily intended to demonstrate latent ASAT capabilities.

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Militarization DA - Impact – China is a Threat New reports show China is secretly pursuing space weapons.


The Pentagon has issued an alarming new report to Congress that identifies several secretive and publicly unknown projects under development in China that it perceives to a be an attempt to militarize space and undermine U.S. military and strategic interests. In particular, the Pentagon report concerns the use of anti-satellite space weapons, which is has not been forthcoming to the public about: The Pentagon has declared “China possesses the most rapidly maturing space program in the world.” […] Among the key issues are the Chinese regime’s experiments with space weapons. It has tested several of these, and has consistently told the public that it was testing something else. The United States is concerned that the Chinese regime’s “continued development of destructive space technologies” is a “threat to all peaceful space-faring nations,” states the Pentagon’s 2015 annual report to Congress on the Chinese regime’s military and security developments.

China is a military threat in space.


Now, the latest Pentagon report has gone so far as to label China as a military threat – a sensitive declaration that diplomats and politicians have been all too reluctant to do. The report claims secretive Chinese pursuit of these aims have included “military writings” about the need to destroy and damage satellites in effort to “blind and deafen the enemy.” Adding concern to an already suspicious program, Chinese defense academics often publish reports on the Chinese regime’s space weapons, the report states, yet “no additional anti-satellite programs have been publicly acknowledged.” Its military writings, however, “emphasize the necessity of ‘destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance … and communications satellites,’” the report states. The statements suggest, it notes, the Chinese regime may be targeting navigation and early warning satellites, for programs “designed to ‘blind and deafen the enemy. ’”

Chinese space weapon development is a bigger threat than ISIS.


If defense posturing by the Pentagon is to be taken at face value – as they report to Congress, who authorize their funding – this high tech militancy is much more alarming than anything ISIS or small potato terrorist groups are doing on the ground. That’s because China appears to be targeting the U.S. directly: “Soon every satellite in every orbit will be able to be held at risk,” Raymond told the website Breaking Defense. […] The Chinese regime categorizes its anti-satellite weapons with its little-disclosed “Assassin’s Mace” and “Trump Card” weapons. A report from the National Ground Intelligence Center, declassified in 2011, states “These modern Trump Card and Assassin’s Mace weapons will permit China’s low-technology forces to prevail over U.S. high-technology forces in a localized conflict …”

China is developing space weapons.

Epoch Times May 12, 2015 China’s Secret Space Weapons Have the Pentagon Worried http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1354392-chinas-secret-space-weapons-have-the-pentagon-worried/The Pentagon has declared “China possesses the most rapidly maturing space program in the world.” Yet, the nature of recent developments has experts questioning what the Chinese regime’s true intentions are in space. Among the key issues are the Chinese regime’s experiments with space weapons. It has tested several of these, and has consistently told the public that it was testing something else. The United States is concerned that the Chinese regime’s “continued development of destructive space technologies” is a “threat to all peaceful space-faring nations,” states the Pentagon’s 2015 annual report to Congress on the Chinese regime’s military and security developments.

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Militarization DA - Impact – China is a Threat China is trying to gain supremacy in space.


That space is the new- perhaps even final- frontier is a widely acknowledged fact. Even as territorial expansionism and resource-driven ambitions continue to dominate international relations, the new-age marker of geopolitical supremacy is space. And China knows this. Which is why Beijing is working hard to establish China’s preeminence in space.

China is investing in space weapons.


The Pentagon submitted a report regarding the same to the Congress, expressing concern at Beijing’s interest in processing weapons systems and defense technologies meant for use in space. The report reads, “By the end of October 2014, China had launched 16 spacecraft, either domestically or via a commercial space launch provider. These spacecraft mostly expanded China’s SATCOM and ISR capabilities, while a few others tested new space technologies”. The report was released by the United States Department of Defense in May 2015. According to the Pentagon, China is not only developing space technology and assets for scientific and technological progress purposes, but also investing in “a variety of capabilities designed to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by adversaries during a crisis or conflict, including the development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers”. These developments are contradictory to China’s assurances that it will not contribute to the militarization of space.

China’s space program is a danger to the US.


In my view, the current and evolving Chinese counterspace threat to U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific theater ranks on par with the dangers posed by Chinese offensive cyber operations to the United States. The dangers emanating from China’s counterspace investments are real and growing. And the diversity of Chinese counterspace activities ensures that almost every U.S. space component—the space systems in orbit, the links that control them and channel their data, and their associated ground facilities—will face grave perils as current Chinese counterspace programs mature and their technologies are integrated into the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) warfighting arsenal. The need for compensating U.S. investments to defeat these emerging threats is, therefore, vital if the extant U.S. military superiority that is essential to protecting the United States, its allies, and its interests is to be safeguarded.

China lies when expressing concerns about US space weapons – and they will be the first to weaponized space.


The Chinese critique about the supposed U.S. weaponization of outer space is indeed specious and is intended largely to deflect attention from the fact that China’s principal counterspace capabilities are not routinely in space and will not traverse it until actually employed in wartime. It is in fact ironic that, thanks to China’s diverse counterspace investments, Beijing is more likely to be the first to actually weaponize space—that is to introduce systems that serve as weapons in space

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—despite its insistent and avowed claims that “China is not engaged in any space arms race at present, nor will it be in the future” (Senior Colonel Zhao Dexi, “Challenges to Space Interests and Our Strategic Choices,” China Military Science, March 2010, Open Source Center, CPP20100921563002, September 21, 2010).

Militarization DA - Impact – China is a Threat

Chinese space militarization will could lead to World War III

Senator Charles S. Robb, Senate committees on armed services, foreign relations and intelligence, Washington Quarterly, 1999 Winter

In a second, more likely scenario, the United States deploys the same capabilities, but other nations do not simply acquiesce. Understanding the tremendous advantages of military space operations, China deploys nuclear weapons into space that can either be detonated near U.S. satellites or delivered to the earth in just minutes. Russia fields ground-based lasers for disabling and destroying our satellites, then deploys satellites with kinetic-kill munitions for eradicating ground targets. It also reneges on the START treaties, knowing that, rather than trying to replicate America's costly defensive systems, its incremental defense dollar is better spent on offensive warheads for overwhelming American defenses. Other rogue nations,

realizing that their limited missile attack capabilities are now useless against our new defense screen, focus on commercially available cruise missiles, which they load with chemical and biological warheads and plan to deploy from commercial ships and aircraft. Still others bring to fruition the long- expected threat of a nuclear weapon in a suitcase . If history has taught us anything, it is that a future more like the second scenario will prevail. It defies reason to assume that nations would sit idle while the United States invests billions of dollars in weaponizing space, leaving them at an unprecedented disadvantage. This second scenario suggests three equally troubling consequences. The first is that Americans would, in a relative sense, lose the most from a space-based arms race. The United States is currently the preeminent world military power, and much of that power resides in our ability to use space for military applications. A large percentage of our military communications now passes through space. Our troops rely on weather satellites, our targeteers on satellite photos, and virtually all of our new generations of weapons on the Global Positioning System satellites for pin-point accuracy. By encouraging potential adversaries to deploy weapons into space that could quickly destroy many of these systems, a space-based arms race would render many of these more vulnerable to attack than they are today. Even if our potential adversaries were unable to build a competing force, they could still position deadly satellites disguised as commercial assets near or in the path of our most vital military satellites. And even if we could sustain our space advantage, the costs would be extraordinary. Why pursue this option when there is no compelling reason to do so at this time? Why make a battlefield out of an arena upon which we depend so heavily?

The second consequence would be that a space-based arms race would be essentially irreversible -- we would face the difficulty, if not impossibility, of assessing what is being put into space. Under the START regime, signatories currently cooperate in inspecting and monitoring each other's intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarines, all of which operate within a narrow band above and below sea level. Most space payloads, however, are built and launched with great secrecy and can operate at any distance from the earth, even on celestial bodies such as the moon. Most satellites would operate up to geostationary orbit, or about 22,000 miles from the earth's surface, yielding a total operational volume millions of times greater than that now occupied by missiles, bombers, and submarines. Attempting to monitor weapons in this vast volume of space would be daunting. We would no longer be counting with reasonable confidence the number of concrete silos at missile wings or submarine missile tubes at piers or bombers on airfields. In many cases we would have no idea what is out there. Military planners, conservative by nature, would assume the worst and try to meet enemy deployments in space with an equal or greater capability. Of course, for about $ 400 million per launch, we could use the space shuttle to make closer inspections, assuming that other nations would be willing to tolerate our presence near their critical space assets. Due to orbital constraints, however, the shuttle could reach only a fraction of the total number of satellites in orbit. Another option would be to expand and improve our space monitoring assets -- but only at a cost of tens of billions of dollars. Once this genie is out of the bottle, there is no way to put it back in. We could never afford to bring all these systems back to earth, and destroying them would be equally unfeasible, because the billions of pieces of space debris would jeopardize commercial satellites and manned missions. The third consequence of U.S. space weaponization would be the heightened probability of strategic conflict. Anyone familiar

with the destabilizing impact of MIRVs will understand that weapons in space will bring a new meaning to the expression "hair trigger." Lasers can engage targets in seconds. Munitions fired from satellites in low-earth orbit can reach the earth's surface in minutes . As in

the MIRV scenario, the side to strike first would be able to destroy much of its opponent's space weaponry before the opponent had a chance to respond. The temptation to strike first during a crisis would be overwhelming ; much of the decisionmaking would have to be

automated. Imagine that during a crisis one of our key military satellites stops functioning and we cannot determine why. We -- or a computer controlling our weapons for us -- must then decide whether or not to treat this as an act of war and respond accordingly. The fog of war would reach an entirely new density, with our situational awareness of the course of battle in space limited and our decision

cycles too slow to properly command engagements. Events would occur so quickly that we could not even be sure which nation had initiated a strike. We would be repeating history, but this time with far graver consequences. In the absence of explicit evidence that another nation with the economic and technical means is developing weapons for space, we should forgo our advanced prototyping and testing of space weapons. We should seek to expand the 1967 Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space to prohibit not just weapons of mass destruction in space, but all space-based weapons capable of destroying space, ground, air, or sea targets. We should also explore a verification regime that would allow inspection of space-bound payloads. During the Reagan years advocates of the Strategic Defense Initiative ran an effective television

spot featuring children being saved from nuclear attack by a shield represented by a rainbow. If we weaponize space, we will face a very different image -- the image of hundreds of weapons-laden satellites orbiting directly over our homes and our families 24 hours a day, ready to fire within seconds. If fired, they would destroy thousands of ground, air and space targets within minutes , before there is even a chance of knowing what has happened, or why. This would be a dark future, a future we should avoid at all costs.

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Militarization DA – Impact – Proliferation to Enemies China space cooperation leads to tech transfers that fuel illicit Chinese military modernization, tech sales to Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.

Eric R. Sterner is a fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute. He held senior staff positions on the House Armed Services and Science committees 2009., served in the Defense Dept. and was NASA associate deputy administrator for policy and planning., “Viewpoint: Be Wary Of China Space Ties”,http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/Vwpt112309.xml&headline=U.S.%20Wary%20Of%20Space%20Cooperation%20With%20China//sb)\

This autumn, China and the U.S. began moving toward greater cooperation in space. As China lifted a little more of the veil covering its space program, U.S. officials expressed a greater desire to work together in exploring space. Presidential science adviser John Holdren floated the idea of increased cooperation in human spaceflight last spring. The Augustine committee raised the idea again, and Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao pledged to deepen space cooperation last week (see p. 33). Unfortunately, there are ample reasons for the U.S. to keep its distance. While the U.S. explicitly decided to separate its space exploration activities from the military, China’s human spaceflight program is a subsidiary of the People’s Liberation Army. In that context, the risks of illicit technology transfer are considerable. Closer relations create greater opportunities for China to acquire sensitive technology. In 2007, the U.S. launched the interagency National Export Enforcement Initiative, designed to combat illegal trafficking in sensitive technologies. Within a year, charges were filed against 145 criminal defendants. Iran and China were the intended destinations for most of the known illegal exports. The Justice Dept. noted, “The illegal exports to China have involved rocket launch data, space shuttle technology, missile technology, naval warship data, [UAV] technology, thermal imaging systems, military night-vision systems and other materials.” This is consistent with other Chinese activities, including a massive 2005 cyber-raid on NASA’s computers that exfiltrated data about the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter’s propulsion system, solar panels and fuel tanks. The U.S. should be concerned about such transfers for two reasons. First, they will aid Chinese military modernization, particularly in areas where the U.S. holds an advantage (see p. 29). The Defense Dept.’s 2009 annual report on the Chinese military concludes, “The pace and scope of China’s military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces.” China has already lased U.S. satellites, demonstrated a direct-ascent kinetic anti-satellite weapon, and is working on advanced microsatellites and formation flying. Collectively, these present a significant threat to the space systems upon which the U.S. depends for its conventional and strategic military advantages—advantages that Chinese theorists clearly want to hold at risk. Chinese access to advanced U.S. civil and commercial space technologies and experience, whether illicit or approved, reduces the cost and increases the speed at which China can climb the military research and development learning curve. Second, China is a serial proliferator. Some technologies could make their way to countries of even greater concern, including Iran and North Korea. The deputy director of national intelligence for analysis submits an unclassified annual proliferation report to Congress, known as the “721 Report.” The most recent report states, “ Chinese companies have been associated with nuclear and missile programs in Pakistan and missile programs in Iran; Chinese entities—which include private companies, individuals and state-owned military export firms?continue to engage in [weapons of mass destruction]-related proliferation activities.” Remaining wary of China’s intentions does not mean the U.S. should opt for isolation, but it does argue against close space cooperation. Instead, the U.S. should seek to increase transparency about China’s intentions and capabilities through military channels, share scientific data about the solar system (but not the technology that collected the data), establish standards (such as limiting orbital debris creation) that serve mutual interests, and possibly coordinate some activities such as lunar or Earth science missions. Existing international frameworks enable all of this, but China has resisted accepting the responsibilities that come with membership as a great space power. Aerospace technologies are high on China’s illegal shopping list. Until China’s intentions are clearer and its behavior has verifiably and persistently changed, close cooperation entails risks that far exceed the potential benefits .

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a weaponized space race between the ... - debate-kansas...

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